Studia Moralia – Vol. XXXIX / 2

Transcripción

Studia Moralia – Vol. XXXIX / 2

Studia
Moralia
Biannual Review
published by the Alphonsian Academy
Revista semestral
publicada por la Academia Alfonsiana
VOL. XXXIX/2
2001
EDITIONES ACADEMIAE ALPHONSIANAE
Via Merulana 31, C.P. 2458 - 00100 Roma, Italia
Studia Moralia
–
Vol. XXXIX / 2
CONTENTS / ÍNDICE
Articles / Artículos
ÁLVAREZ VERDES, L., Dinamismo creador de la libertad cristiana
MURPHY, W. F., JR., The Pauline Understanding of
Appropriated Revelation
TREMBLAY, R., Le thème de l’étoile dans les Sermons pour
l’Épiphanie de saint Léon le Grand
BILLY, D. J., Growing in the Virtues and the Gifts.
Spiritual Direction As a Practical Theological Locus
for the Convergence of Spirituality and Morality
KOWALSKI, E., La morte proibita. Il morire nella prospettiva filosofica, antropologica ed etica
REHRAUER, S. T., The Injustice of Justice and the Justice
of Injustice. Part Three: The Needs That Cry for
Injustice
GARCÍA DE VICENTE, J. C., San Antonino y Gabriel Biel:
sobre el homicidio y la autodefensa
MCKEEVER, M., One Last Right? The Politics and Ethics
of Liberalizing Euthanasia Legislation
Controversy / Controversia
DRUM, P., “AIDS Prevention and the Lesser Evil”:
Response
JOHNSTONE, B. V., AIDS Prevention: A Response To Drum
Chronicle / Crónica
GROS, D., Accademia Alfonsiana: Cronaca relativa all’anno accademico 2000-2001
Reviews / Recensiones
Books Received / Libros recibidos
Index of Volume XXXIX / Índice del Volumen XXXIX
333
371
411
433
461
483
517
553
583
586
591
619
667
673
333
StMor 39 (2001) 333-370
LORENZO ALVAREZ VERDES CSSR
DINAMISMO CREADOR
DE LA LIBERTAD CRISTIANA
El sentimiento de “libertad”, ha estado presente en la conciencia del hombre de todos los tiempos. La Biblia pone en la
base del pecado de los primeros padres el ansia de liberarse de
las restricciones impuestas a su libertad de poder comer de
cuanto quisieran (Gén 3,2-6).
El tema de la libertad lo encontramos también en los albores del pensamiento griego. Homero, pone como motivo supremo de la lucha el que los guerreros y los habitantes de la ciudad
puedan evitar el riesgo de ver a sus mujeres privadas de la luz de
la libertad, al ser arrancadas de su hogares por manos del enemigo. En la Ilíada encontramos el testimonio más antiguo del
uso del lexema ejleuvqeroı (ejleuqeriva) en su sentido original1: desarrollo de la propia personalidad en el contexto de la vida en la
propia casa y en la propia ciudad2.
1
Los autores ponen actualmente la etimología del término ejleuvqeroı en
conexión con el indo-europeo leudh-ho = pueblo. Indicaría así originariamente la relación de pertenencia a una comunidad familiar y social. Esta
vinculación originaria con el grupo doméstico y ciudadano está reflejada en
los textos griegos más antiguos.
2
Diversos textos de la Ilíada emplean el lexema ejleuvqeroı para indicar
la condición de quien, libre de esclavitudes externas, puede en su propia casa celebrar las alegrías y triunfos de la vida cotidiana, en el servicio a la familia y a la ciudad. He aquí la respuesta de Héctor a su mujer Andrómaca
cuando ésta le pide que no continúe luchando contra los aqueos que están
llevando la mejor parte en el combate: “No es tanto la preocupación por el
futuro de los troyanos, o de Hécuba o Príamo… ni de mis hermanos… sino
la preocupación por ti, cuando un aqueo vestido de bronce te arrastrará
inundada de lágrimas, arrancándote la luz (día) de la libertad (ejleuqero;n
h\mar ajpouvraı)” (Ilíada VI, 450). Con idéntica expresión, se despide Héctor de
Patroclo tras haberlo pasado a espada: “Patroclo, tú esperabas saquear nuestra ciudad, y llevarte con las naves a tu patria las mujeres troyanas tras haberles arrancado la luz de la libertad… Insensato”. (XVI, 831. Cf. 20, 193ss.).
334
LORENZO ALVAREZ VERDES
De hecho, el ansia de libertad ha estado en la base de todos
los movimientos que a lo largo de la historia han producido las
crisis políticas, sociales, económicas y culturales. Sólo cambian
los polos de referencia y las modalidades de la lucha. En nuestros días, y más en concreto en el mundo occidental, la relativa
autonomía alcanzada en el contexto de las democracias actuales, el bienestar económico, los avances tecnológicos y científicos podrían en cierto modo haber eclipsado el interés por el tema de la libertad. Y, sin embargo, no ha sido así. La sociedad
moderna y las nuevas instituciones, en las que hipotéticamente
se apoya el progreso, con las férreas leyes de la competencia y
del mercado, pasan frecuentemente una factura muy fuerte en
materia de libertad. Pocos pueden ya dudar que el avance inexorable de la globalización terminará por sofocar el derecho a la
autonomía de las personas e incluso de los pequeños grupos. Esto ha hecho que el nerviosismo se haya ido apoderando de las inteligencias, conduciéndolas a un radical pesimismo frente a todo cuanto suena a imposición o absoluto, no sólo en el ámbito
de las relaciones sociales sino incluso en la esfera del ser y del
existir.
El postmodernismo tiende precisamente a señalar - como lo
indica el propio nombre - el rechazo y superación de lo que el
modernismo había levantado como bandera segura de libertad:
la razón. La razón – se dice- no es ya tan “pura” como pretendía
Kant, por eso le viene contestado el derecho a imponer como absolutos sus imperativos. “La ficción postmoderna, escribe J. Conill, quiere prescindir de toda razón unificadora y parece resignarse al perspectivismo relativista del contextualismo”3. Esto
En estos textos, la expresión “arrebatar la luz de la libertad” (a las mujeres
que son llevadas cautivas) significa arrebatar a la mujeres troyanas la posibilidad de vivir en sus casas, en la tranquilidad que da la independencia de
todo poder esclavizador extraño. El mismo significado tiene en VI,528: Héctor invita a Paris a volver al combate, asegurándole que, tras la victoria, Zeus
les permitirá levantar sus copas (cráteras) en libertad (krhth‘ra ejleuvqeron) en
honor de los dioses: el adjetivo ejleuvqeroı expresa la condición de quien, libre
de esclavitudes externas, puede en su propia casa celebrar las alegrías y
triunfos de la vida cotidiana, en el sevicio a la familia y a la ciudad.
3
J. CONILL, “Etica y postmodernidad” en A. GALINDO G. (ed.), La pregun-
DINAMISMO CREADOR DE LA LIBERTAD CRISTIANA
335
comportaría probablemente, si no la desaparición, sí al menos la
reducción de la función de la razón a simple legitimación de la
realidad fáctica. El postmodernismo considera como más compatible con la autonomía de las conciencias el proceder éticamente, no a golpe de imperativos o de normas, sino reclamando
el “consenso” de quienes van a comprometerse a observar un determinado tipo de comportamientos. Esto viene aplicado de modo particular a la ética cívica. Por la misma razón, se pretende
eliminar cualquier tipo de dependencia heterónoma de carácter
religioso, mientras en la ética individual se proclama una libertad sin fronteras que incluye, por ejemplo, el derecho a disponer
de la propia vida, escogiendo el momento y la forma de la propia muerte4.
Esta representación de la idea de libertad, reacia a toda fundamentación metafísica, ha hecho emerger como contrapeso,
un abanico de sensibilidades altamente positivas. Entre ellas nos
interesa resaltar la sensibilidad ecológica, que pretende combinar la libertad individual y social con la libertad transhumana o
cósmica. Por eso podríamos hacer nuestras las palabras de F.
Gogarten: en la “libertad” se concentran como en ningún otro
término la fatalidad y la esperanza de la época moderna5.
La variada panorámica de propuestas de libertad indica que
se trata de un tema que en absoluto puede decirse claro y definido. Por nuestra parte, nos hemos propuesto ahondar en el
concepto desde el punto de vista bíblico, particularmente en los
escritos paulinos, tratando de identificar los elementos constitutivos de la libertad cristiana, para desde ahí poder valorar su ca-
ta por la ética. Etica religiosa en diálogo con la ética civil. Salamanca 1993,
85-100, hic 94.
4
J. CONILL, Ibidem,“Tal vez el potencial crítico de la postmodernidad se
encuentre en el afán radical de libertad individual y en la búsqueda de nuevos caminos de liberación, diferentes de los seguidos por la modernidad oficial, a la vista del fracaso social y vital. ¿Pero sus presuntas nuevas aportaciones van más allá del pragmatismo ciego, del nihilismo y del hedonismo?
¿Son esos los mejores caminos para defender actualmente con fuerza la dignidad humana?”.
5
Citado por S. VOLLENWEIDER, Freiheit als Neue Schöpfung, Eine Untersuchung zur Eleuthería bei Paulus und in seiner Umwelt, (FRLANT 147),
Göttingen 1989, 397.
336
pacidad creadora y su alcance no sólo a nivel individual sino a
nivel social y cósmico.
Precisaciones previas
Antes de iniciar nuestra reflexión nos parece oportuno hacer
algunas aclaraciones de carácter general sobre el concepto de libertad.
En primer lugar, la libertad puede entenderse sea como sentimiento innato de autoafirmación personal, sea como reflexión
filosófica sobre la realidad misma de la libertad. En el primer
sentido, la libertad es algo que acompaña al hombre de todos los
tiempos. Desde el punto de vista de la reflexión filosófica, el concepto de libertad ha ido evolucionando de acuerdo con los esquemas de pensamiento de las diversas culturas. La cultura griega ocupa, en este sentido, un puesto de primer orden.
La libertad tiene ante todo el perfil negativo de exclusión de
todo tipo de coacción externa o interna. Positivamente la libertad puede ser entendida como valor cualificante del ser o como
tendencia6. En este último caso, la libertad sería la cualidad de la
proyección del ser a la acción, incluyendo el momento de la elección, de la decisión y de la realización7. Para los griegos, se trataría de dos niveles estrechamente relacionados que se recubren
y superponen. De hecho, la elección tiene, en principio, como
contenido el bien y el mal morales que ayudan al ser a autorrealizarse. Aristóteles introduce una ulterior distinción en el campo de la tendencia: la elección propiamente dicha (proaivresiı)
que alcanza sólo a los hombres libres (poseedores del logos y de
la dianoia), y la voluntariedad (ejkouvsion) que, con toda su carga
de espontaneidad e indeterminación, sería aplicable también a
los niños, esclavos y animales8.
6
Otros autores emplean aquí los términos de libertad transcendental y
libertad categorial.
7
En la reflexión teológica clásica el problema de la relación entre la libertad de decisión y la libertad del ser encuentra su fuente probablemente
en S. AGUSTÍN: “prima ergo, libertas voluntatis erat posse non peccare; novissima erit multo maior, no posse peccare”(Corr. et grat. 12,33 [PL 44 936]).
8
ARISTÓTELES, Eth. Nicom, 1111b 6-10: “La elección (proaivresiı) es, por
337
La libertad como tendencia supone la libertad del ser como
fuente y como elemento propulsor, pero no se identifica con
ella9. La identificación llevaría a la inmobilidad, a la imposibilidad de cambio y, por tanto, a la imposibilidad de que el ser mismo pueda evolucionar perfeccionándose con la praxis de la libertad10.
El término clásico entre los griegos para indicar el concepto
de libertad es eleuthería (ejleuqeriva, ejleuvqeroı). Junto al término
eleuthería aparece frecuentemente, sobre todo en el estoicismo, el
término exousía (ejxousiva). Para Epicteto la exousía representa el
poder que uno tiene sobre el comportamiento interno, a donde no
puede llegar el poder de los otros11. En este contexto puede significar también la energía (capacidad) moral para realizar una acción12. Esto sería privilegio particular del sabio que, por ello, es el
sólo verdaderamente libre. En los LXX exousía indica el poder y la
tanto, claramente una cosa voluntaria, pero no se identifica con lo voluntario (eJkouvsion), porque lo voluntario tiene una extensión mayor: efectivamente, también y los niños animales tienen en común con el hombre la posibilidad de obrar voluntariamente, per no la de elegir…”. La razón principal de
la distinción se funda, según Aristóteles, en el hecho que la “elección” dice
referencia al logos y a la diánoia mientras que la “voluntariedad” (eJkouvsion)
puede realizarse fuera de la esfera del logos (a[loga) (Eth. Nicom., 1112a,
14ss.).
9
H. J. KRÄMER, “Die Grundlegung des Freiheitsbegriffs in der Antike”, en
J. SIMON (ed.), Freiheit. Theoretische und praktische Aspekte des Problems,
Freiburg 1977, 239-270. Hic 262. El a. dice explícitamente que “la libertad
del ser (des Selbstseins) es la forma más elevada de libertad que se puede alcanzar”. La libertad de realización sería, según el a., de signo negativo: libertad de toda coacción externa, mientras que la libertad de elección sería
positiva: libertad para hacer el bien. La libertad del ser, en cambio, contendría ambos elementos.
10
La inmutabilidad era considerada por los estoicos como un signo de
la verdadera libertad. El verdadero libre, el sabio manifiesta su inmutabilidad a través de su immersión en el eterno “ahora” de la divinidad (en la unidad del cosmos). EPICTETO, Diss. 3,6,9.
11
EPICTETO, Ench. 14,2; Diss. 3,22,94. Con este mismo significado se usa
también el verbo e[xestin (Diss. 2,16,37)
12
K. NIEDERWIMMER, Der Begriff der Freiheit im Neuen Testament, Berlin
1966, 4: “˘Exousiva bedeutet die Möglichkeit zu einem Handeln, die Voll-
338
libertad concedida por el derecho o por Dios. En el N.T. la exousía
apunta sobre todo a la libertad y potencia de Dios y de los que actúan en su nombre13.
En principio, podemos afirmar que la comprensión de la libertad (sea como cualidad del ser sea como tendencia) depende
de la comprensión que se tiene del hombre, de la naturaleza y de
Dios. De ahí las profundas diferencias no sólo en el mundo griego sino en la época moderna (racionalismo, existencialismo, estructuralismo, postmodernismo)14.
I. LAS
PREFIGURACIONES DEL
A.T.
1. La libertad de Dios, una libertad liberante
El tema de la libertad de Dios, no fue directamente abordado por los pensadores antiguos. Esto se debió a la común convicción entre ellos de que el mundo se apoya sobre una estructura perfectamente establecida, en la que la figura de Dios era
considerada como elemento constitutivo, intrínsecamente ligado a la totalidad. La verdad de Dios, como la verdad del hombre,
entraban como partes de una teoría de la totalidad. De ahí que
resultara prácticamente inimaginable que Dios pudiera intervenir libremente para cambiar el orden del mundo15. Al hombre
macht, die Erlaubnis, das Anrecht, die Freiheit. Epiktet fragt tiv moi e[xestin,
er fragt damit nach dem, worüber ich verfügen kann, er fragt nach dem Bereich der Freiheit. So kann ejxousiva einfach auch dazu dienen, um das Recht
und die Macht zur Selbstbestimmung des freien“.
13
W. FOERSTER, ejxousiva, ThWNT II, 599ss. Sobre la relación entre
ejxousiva y ejleuqeriva en Pablo remitimos al importante estudio de J. DUPONT,
Gnosis. La connaissance religieuse dans les épîtres de Saint Paul, Louvain-Paris 1949, 283ss.
14
J.M. CAMBIER, S.D.B., La liberté chrétienne, une morale d’adultes. Visage
actuel d’un christianisme vivant, Louvain-la-Neuve 1978, 27.
15
CICERÓN (Nat. deor., 3,92) atribuye a los estoicos la afirmación de que
los dioses “todo lo pueden”. Tal omnipotencia, sin embargo, sería muy limitada, pues en definitiva, ellos están tan sometidos como nosotros a la ananke y a la moira (cf. FILEMÓN CÓMIC. frag 31,5ss: eJtevron tuvrannoı tw‘n turan-
339
competía la función de penetrar con su logos en la profundidad
de logos universal, descubrir su verdad. En esta perspectiva, la
verdad (que se desvela en el dinamismo global del cosmos) es la
que crea la libertad del hombre. Las leyes del cosmos son expresión de esta libertad. Por ello, la sumisión a las mismas nunca
puede ser interpretada como esclavitud o falta de libertad. El
mundo judío, que contemplaba el mundo en clave de “creación”,
no podía evidentemente considerar la libertad de Dios neutralizada por el dinamismo de la totalidad. Esto no sería, sin embargo, inconveniente para que se concediera a la ley (torah) un automatismo vinculante semejante al que el mundo antiguo otorgaba a las leyes que rigen el cosmos.
Para quienes, de modo explícito o implícito, aceptaban esta
visión totalizante y fundamentalmente determinista del mundo,
era inimaginable un planteamiento autónomo de la libertad de
Dios, por cuanto esto significaba la ruptura del sistema global de
comprensión. Por eso no debemos extrañarnos de que tal planteamiento, al menos en forma orgánica, llegara bastante tardíamente, concretamente en la Edad Media (en los ss. XII y XIII),
por obra sobre todo de la escuela franciscana. La nueva doctrina del primado de la voluntad sobre la razón16 llevaría a colocar
la libertad absoluta de Dios por encima del orden de la creación.
La relación de Dios con la creación, afirmaban, fue al principio,
no necesaria, sino contingente; y contingente sigue siendo en su
posterior acción de ordenación y conservación. Esta liberación
nouvntwn fovboı dou‘loi basilevwn eijsivn, oJ basileu;ı qew‘n, oJ qeo;ı ajnavgkhı... touvtoiı ajnavgkh tau‘ta douleuvein ajeiv).SÉNECA (Ep. 95,49) dice de los dioses que
“no pueden por naturaleza hacer el mal… Su naturaleza, la más alta y la más
bella, al hacerles inmunes de los peligros, les ha hecho también no peligrosos”.
FILÓN hace más de una vez referencia a la libertad de Dios (Imm 48ss.;
Fug 212). A la libertad de Dios harán también referencia los Padres en su lucha contra el determinismo gnóstico (Cf. IRENEO, Haeres. 4,20,1; 2,30,9 etc).
16
La voluntad, escribía ENRIQUE DE GANTE, es la facultad más excelsa “de
todo el universo interior del alma”. Como un patrón guía al siervo, así la voluntad guía a la razón, mientras que la razón, en cierto modo, guía al patrón
“iluminándolo”, como hace el siervo que con la lámpara alumbra para que
el patrón no tropiece. Citado por F.X. PUTALLAZ, “Libertà”, en Dizionario enciclopedico del medioevo, Roma 1998, 1043-1044.
340
de la acción de Dios con relación al orden del mundo alcanza lógicamente a la voluntad humana17, como lo pondrían de relieve
los nominalistas y, más tarde – con enfoques diferentes- la reforma18, el neoestoicismo19 y el racionalismo de la ilustración. El
reverso de esta conquista de la libertad, sería la introducción de
una cosmovisión nueva que comportaba no sólo la ruptura de la
unidad del hombre con la naturaleza sino la supremacía arbitraria del hombre sobre la misma.
El tema de la libertad se presenta en la Biblia con características particulares, que hacen difícil el paralelismo con el pensamiento de las culturas de su tiempo y especialmente del mundo greco-helenista. Por esta razón, se ha podido llegar a afirmar,
por ejemplo, que en el A.T. “no se encuentra formulación conceptual alguna del fenómeno de la libertad”20, al menos en el
sentido en que se puede hablar de un concepto de libertad helenista, estoico o gnóstico”21. La misma liberación del Éxodo no
17
El nominalismo desarrollaría la tesis de la “contingencia” para defender el primado de la experimentación y de la inducción frente a la ontología y la teoría. La ilustración continuó la línea de ruptura con la visión
“determinista” del mundo, pero no en nombre de la contingencia sino de la
autonomía del sujeto, que se erige en piloto de la verdad de la realidad. Aquí
se invierten totalmente los papeles con relación al estoicismo: ahora es la libertad quien crea la verdad. Cf. S. VOLLENWEIDER, o.c., 13.
18
Los teólogos de la Reforma ponen en el centro de su reflexión la relación entre la libertad de Dios y la contingencia de su acción en la justificación. Cf. G. EBELING, Luther, Tübingen 41981, 247ss.
19
El neoestoicismo se desarrolla en los paises del norte de Europa, en
el contexto de las turbulencias de las guerras de religión (s. XVI-XVII). No
se consideran ya válidas las consideraciones prácticas de la ética racional
aristotélica, mientras se buscan métodos más eficaces para afrontar la
emergencia de la historia. Esto no se realiza ya dentro de la contemplación
de una estructura determinística del mundo, sino en el contexto de un orden de la naturaleza des-enteleologizado y contingente, frente al que se yergue la autonomía del sujeto que, con su libertad de indiferencia, puede prevenir y manipular los acontecimientos contigentes, a través de un “constructivismo racional”. En el origen de este movimiento suele ponerse a Lipsius, con su tratado De constantia (1584). Cf. J. KRAYE, “History of Western
Ethics”, en L.C. BECKER (ed.), Encyclopedia of Ethics, I, New York & London
1992, 495 ss.
20
S. VOLLENWEIDER, o.c., 123.
21
K. NIEDERWIMMER, o.c., Berlin 1966, 76.
341
habría sido entendida en analogía “directa” con la liberación de
los esclavos22. Solamente por influjo del helenismo, el judaísmo
habría entendido el paradigma de la “redención” exódica como
liberación realizada por Dios23. H.-J. Hermisson se atreve, por
ello, a aconsejar el ser cautos y no sobrevalorar la llamada “liberación” exódica. Para probar esta tesis, los autores suelen aducir
la ausencia de un término hebraico cuya carga semántica corresponda al griego ejleuvqeroı (ejleuqeriva, ejleuqerou‘n), aunque la
versión griega de los LXX haya recurrido en algunos casos a estos términos (Ex 21,2; Lev 19,20; 2 Mac 1,27).
Aquí nos parece particularmente oportuna la distinción que
hacíamos más arriba entre reflexión propiamente dicha sobre el
concepto de libertad y la experiencia de la libertad como realidad
social, experiencia particularmente válida en el pueblo de Israel,
que desde el principio se autoidentificó como pueblo “elegido” a
través de una intervención liberadora de Yahwé.
Por cuanto se refiere a la semántica de la “libertad” debemos
decir que en la Biblia aparecen numerosos términos que expresan
la idea de libertad, incluso con connotación sociológica24. Por otra
parte, hay que tener en cuenta que el sentido de un lexema viene
dado últimamente por el sistema de relaciones generado por el texto. Un autor puede, en efecto, emplear figuras o estructuras que,
sin integrar los clásicos lexemas de “libertad” desarrollen un sistema de relaciones idéntico, como sucede en el relato del Éxodo con
el binomio carácterístico salir - entrar (yas¸â-bô): Yahwé hace salir a
su pueblo de Egipto, de la “casa de la esclavitud” para hacerlo entrar en la “tierra prometida”25.
22
S. VOLLENWEIDER, ibidem :”Das erlöste Israel ist kein ‘Freigelassener’
(hafschî)”.
23
H.-J. HERMISSON, “Gottes Freiheit – Spielraum des Menschen. Alttestamentliche Aspekte eines biblisch-theologischen Thema”, ZThK 82 (1985)
141.
24
Connotación sociológica tienen sin duda los términos chôr y chfsch
(chafschî, chufschâ). La idea en general de libertad aparece además en otros
términos, como nqh, ntsch, schlch, ‘zb, ptr, schmt etc.
25
Esto no ha sido tenido en cuenta, por ejemplo, por J.F.A SAWYER, Semantics in Biblical Research. New Method of defining Hebrew Words for Salvation (Studies in Biblical theologie 24), London. El autor contempla como
342
El problema de la libertad en el A.T., no puede, pues, plantearse en términos puramente lexicales, como tampoco puede
hacerse a partir de un horizonte de comprensión preestablecido.
El horizonte de comprensión de los autores bíblicos no es estrictamente filosófico, sino de carácter histórico-salvífico.
En este contexto podemos afirmar que el israelita tenía, en
primer lugar, pleno convencimiento de la libertad de Dios, manifestada palmariamente en sus actuaciones históricas, desde la
creación del mundo. Dios es efectivamente quien toma la decisión de crear, y va haciendo salir las cosas de la nada según el orden y el esquema de contenidos que sólo Él ha establecido. Y esto lo hace sin quedar aprisionado en el dinamismo del cosmos.
Yahwé crea con su “palabra”, quedando por encima de lo creado como vigilante providencia; por eso exigirá cuentas a quienes
ha dado responsabilidad sobre lo creado (Gén 1,29). Porque
Dios es libre, impone preceptos y exige su cumplimiento, castigando su violación (Gén 2, 16ss; 3,13ss.). Con la misma libertad
creadora elige a Israel como “pueblo suyo”, liberándolo de la esclavitud de Egipto: “os adoptaré como pueblo mío y seré vuestro
Dios: entonces conoceréis que Yo soy el Señor vuestro Dios, el
que os libró de la opresión de los egipcios y os lleva a la tierra
que juré dar a Abrahán” (Ex 6,7).
Evidentemente la libertad a que Dios llama a su pueblo no
es la libertad de toda dependencia (el “hacer lo que uno quiere”
de los griegos). De hecho, de “la casa de la esclavitud” saldrán
para “prestar servicio (´abodâ) a Yahwé, observando la ley que
les había sido dada en el Sinaí26. Dios exige una respuesta incondicional y absoluta. El llamado “rîb” profético reviste todas
conjunto central de términos (central core) que expresan la salvación el siguiente: hosia‘ (yesa‘, yesu‘a, mosia‘, mosa‘ot, tesu‘a); his¸s¸il (has¸s¸ala); ‘azar
(‘ezer, ‘ezra); chilles¸; millet¸; pillet¸(pallet¸, palit¸palet¸, pelet¸a); pas¸a; paraq. De los
términos de este grupo semántico sólo hosia‘ aparecería (una vez) en el libro
del Éxodo (15,2). Con los resultados obtenidos por el autor, habría que concluir que el tema de la salvación-liberación está prácticamente ausente (!) del
libro del Éxodo.
26
G. AUZOU, confirma esta realidad al dar a su comentario al Éxodo el
título De la servitude au service (Trad. española: De la servidumbre al servicio.
Estudio del libro del Éxodo, Madrid 1969).
343
las características de un juicio divino contra el pueblo que le ha
sido infiel (Is 1,20)27.
El relato del Éxodo coloca la acción de Dios, no en el marco
de un determinismo cósmico, pues Él está sobre la naturaleza, a
la que maneja como arma al servicio de su proyecto liberador
(Ex 7,14-11,10; 14,19ss; cf. Sab 5,20-22), sino en el de una historia etiológico-mitológica.
Porque Dios no se identifica con el mundo creado, ni con las
leyes por Él promulgadas, éstas no pueden nunca ser divinizadas. Por la misma razón, a diferencia de cuanto sucede en el
pensamiento griego, a Yahwé no se le da alcance a través del logos. No obstante las diversas epifanías y la manifestación de su
nombre (Ex 3,14), Yawé queda, en su ser y en su obrar, oculto en
el misterio, que nadie puede osar conocer de forma directa (Is
40,13; cf. 1 Cor 2, 16). Por eso las cosas que Él va desvelando con
su acción en la historia son siempre “cosas nuevas” (Is 42,9;
48,6). En este sentido, la actitud lógica es la de creer, reverenciar,
esperar. Expresión negativa de esta inaccesibilidad de la libertad
de Dios es la prohibición de aprisionarlo mágicamente en los límites de la “imagen” (Ex 20,4; Dt 5,8). A esta inaccesibilidad por
vía racional no se opone, sin embargo, la proximidad real, claramente sentida28 y experimentada como libertad liberadora a
través de las intervenciones históricas de Dios, como se desprende de la fórmula frecuente “y entonces conoceréis que Yo
soy” (Ex 6.7; Núm 16,30; Ez 14,23; Jl 3,17; Zac 4,9; 6,19).
2. La libertad del hombre, una libertad liberada
Si la libertad de Dios en el A.T. es una realidad “históricamente” manifestada y comprobada, no lo es menos la libertad
del hombre. Ésta aparece, en efecto, como presupuesto de toda
la vida ética. Las exigencias y prohibiciones, los castigos y las
27
Cf. N. LOHFINK, Chofschî, ThWAT, 3, 127ss. El a. pone de relieve cómo
la teología del Éxodo, a la vez que desbarata la esclavitud humana, no se
transforma en teología de la libertad, sino más bien en “teología de la esclavitud a Dios”.
28
Esta proximidad de Dios constituirá una nota de orgullo para Israel
(Dt 4,7).
344
promesas de Yahwé suponen de parte del hombre la existencia
de una libertad de elección y de decisión (Gén 3). Lo mismo hay
que decir de la intimación de la ley y de las exhortaciones de los
profetas. La reflexión sapiencial habla explícitamente de la libertad de decisión que Dios puso en el hombre desde la creación
(Sir 15,11-20)29.
Característica fundamental de la libertad del hombre es la
de ser una libertad liberada. A nivel efectivo se presenta, pues,
como un don que, en cuanto tal, abre el existencial humano al
donante, e.d., a Dios. La tragedia de esta libertad es la de contar
con la tensión apertura - clausura, pudiendo el hombre decidirse por la clausura, que conlleva su propia destrucción. Ello es
posible en cuanto que el sujeto puede llegar a considerar como
heteronomía opresora la ley y el hecho mismo de la dependencia de Dios30. En la perspectiva escatológica se prevé, sin embargo, un nuevo sistema de relación ley-sujeto por el que la ley
no funcionará ya desde fuera, como algo heterónomo, sino desde el interior de cada hombre (Jer 31,31ss.).
La diferencia entre esta comprensión de la libertad y la del
pensamiento griego es radical. La libertad para el estoicismo,
por ejemplo, es una realidad interna al hombre, garantizada por
el correcto uso del logos, que es participación del logos que rige
el universo, e.d., de Dios31. Por eso, sólo el que hace correcto uso
29
Sir 15, 11-16: “No digas: mi pecado viene de Dios…El Señor creó al
hombre al principio y lo entregó a su albedrío. Si quieres observarás sus
mandamientos….Ante ti están el agua y el fuego; echa mano de lo que quieras”. El mismo pensamiento se encuentra en los escritos de influencia farisaica, como Sal Salom 9,4: “Nuestras obras dependen de la elección y poder
de nuestra alma, el realizar el derecho y la injusticia con las obras de nuestras manos”. Toda la doctrina de las dos vías está fundada sobre el presupuesto de la capacidad de elección del hombre, incluso en relación con los
dos espíritus (cf. TestLev 19,1; TestAss 1,3-8).
30
Es lo que el análisis estructural llama cambio de actancialidad. Dios
que en la narrativa de la acción liberadora del Éxodo aparece como mitente
principal llega a ser contemplado por Israel como actante opositor, al preferir retornar a las “cebollas” (Núm 11,5) que le ofrecía el opositor verdadero,
el Faraón.
31
No todos los estoicos aceptan este grado de monismo universal. Car-
345
del logos, puede ser verdaderamente libre, al lograr la plena actualización del fin (tevloı) y del medio (la virtud)32. Todo ello es
obra del hombre y no un don recibido.
Filón insistirá en la capacidad de autorrealización del sabio,
mediante el distanciamiento de las pasiones, que le permite la superación del pecado y el descanso imperturbable33. A este distanciamiento de sí mismo sigue el distanciamiento del cosmos para
remontarse platónicamente al mundo espiritual, de arriba. En un
esfuerzo sincretista, Filón intenta combinar la ley de Moisés con la
ley de la naturaleza que gobierna el mundo. Con ello, la torah “escrita” tendría el mismo alcance universal de la ley que gobierna el
mundo sea en el campo físico que en el ético34. Este dinamismo en
el que se encuadra la libertad se realiza en el presente, sin que el
futuro le pueda aportar nada de nuevo (mhdh;n kainovn)35.
La perspectiva bíblica, aun en el horizonte de la esperanza
escatológica, mantiene como notas fundamentales de la libertad
néades, por ej., llega a negar la total correspondencia entre el logos universal y el logos personal, restableciendo “la diferencia platónica en el proyecto
subjetivo de definir el ‘telos’ de la vida feliz y el arte de conducir a ella”. R.
BERTHOUZOZ, “Liberté grecque et théologie de la liberté selon S. Paul”, en AA.
VV. Autonomie, Dimensions éthiques de la liberté, Fribourg- Paris, 1978, 63.
32
La confluencia telos-skopos, conduce, según R. BERTHOLZOUZ (o.c., 64)
a la identificación de la vida ética con la vida de Dios, lo que sería un ideal sobrehumano, un proyecto de existencia que iría más allá de la condición humana. El fin (tevloı) no sería sólo algo final a lo que se debe apuntar (skovpoı
= eudaimonía o felicidad), sino que se identificaría con el obrar mismo virtuoso. El fin sería, pues, algo inmanente que se conquista teóricamente en
cada acto perfecto de virtud (ib. 65).
Los estoicos justifican este giro (en relación con la teoría clásica de Platón y Aristóteles) recurriendo a un cambio de metáfora: en vez de la figura
del arquero se tendría la del bailarín: en el primer caso el arquero hace todo
(telos) para obtener el objetivo (skopos: dar en el blanco = objetivo externo),
en el segundo caso, el danzante no busca una cosa externa sino que en la
danza misma encuentra su skopos.
33
FILÓN, Quod omnis prob 17.21.55.59.
34
FILÓN, Abr 4.16.27; Mos 2,45-52.
35
FILÓN, Ib 24.
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la distinción y, a la vez, la dependencia en relación con Dios36. El
drama de la libertad, que se dilucidará sólo con la eclosión del
evento salvífico de Cristo, se jugará en el plano de la interiorización-autonomía y en de la potenciación, no tanto del logos sino
del sujeto en cuanto tal, previa la liberación plena frente a las
fuerzas anti-libertad.
II. LA
REALIZACIÓN EN
CRISTO
1. La libertad como exousía en Cristo
Los evangelios expresan la presencia de la libertad en Cristo
ante todo en términos de ejxousiva, en relación particularmente
con la ley. Jesús cuestiona, no la obediencia a determinadas formas o clases de preceptos de la ley, sino el principio mismo en
que se apoya: la ley en cuanto tal introduce un principio externo
al sujeto como fundamento de la obediencia. Jesús proclama e
introduce “personalmente” otro vínculo con Dios más allá del de
la ley: el de la filiación y el amor. No es tanto el hombre quien
busca a Dios sino Dios quien busca al hombre.
Jesús es el principio de la nueva libertad que, por lo mismo,
adquiere la forma de plena autoridad (ejxousiva)37 frente a la ley y
a las tradiciones pasadas, autoridad que es reconocida por las
gentes del pueblo (Mc 1,22.27; Mt 7,29; 9,8; Lc 4,36). En las curaciones y en el perdón de los pecadores colocados fuera de la
ley, Jesús demuestra que es en referencia a Él y no a la ley cómo
llega ahora la libertad.
La exousía de Jesús es parte integrante y constitutiva del
Reino. Toda la misión de Jesús se realiza bajo el signo de la
exousía, de la que serán hechos partícipes los discípulos enviados a predicar: éstos reciben el poder (ejxousiva) de arrojar demo-
36
FILÓN Abr 4.16.
Duvnamiı y ejxousiva van intrínsecamente unidas cuando se habla de la
libertad de Dios. Pablo lo pone de relieve cuando, para explicar la libertad de
Dios en la elección de Israel frente a los pueblos paganos, la compara a la facultad (ejxousiva) del alfarero para decidir el tipo de vaso que quiere sacar de
la arcilla (Rom 9,21). Cf. K. NIEDERWIMMER, o.c., 144.
37
347
nios y de curar toda enfermedad (Mt 10,1 Mc 6,7; Lc 9,5;
10,19)38. La exousía de Jesús recibirá el marchamo definitivo
(pa sa ejxousiva, Mt 28,18) en la resurrección. A la resurrección
como momento decisivo de plenitud de la exousía de Cristo hace referencia Rom 1,4 cuando afirma que Cristo fue constituido
hijo de Dios en potencia a través del Espíritu, mediante la resurrección de entre los muertos. La misma idea se encuentra en el
himno de Fil 2,6 11 en donde se habla de la exaltación vinculada a la resurrección39.
La plenitud de poder-libertad está esencialmente vinculada
a la acción del Espíritu Santo, que se manifestará plenamente a
partir de la resurrección. Jesús lo anuncia (Jn 7,39), lo promete
(Jn 14,17) y finalmente (tras la resurrección) lo confiere: “recibid el Espíritu Santo” (Jn 20,22). Pablo no duda, por lo mismo,
en definir al Espíritu como “Espíritu de libertad” (2 Cor 3,17).
En la plenitud de la exousía destaca su alcance universal:
“en el cielo” (ejn oujranw /) y en la tierra (ejpi; th‘ı gh‘ı)”. La expresión debe entenderse en sentido sea local que de contenido: todos los seres celestes y todos los seres de la tierra, incluida la
misma naturaleza, han sido alcanzados por el dinamismo de la
libertad liberadora del Resucitado (2 Cor 5,19. Como el hombre
redimido participa en la exousía del Resucitado en el marco de
la tensión del ya y del aun no, todas las demás cosas de la natu-
38
Sobre el sentido del término ejxousiva en el evangelio de Marcos remitimos al estudio monográfico de A. DAWSON, Freedom as Liberating Power. A
socio-polical reading of the ejxousiva texts in the Gospel of Mark, Freiburg
(Schweiz)-Göttingen, 2000.
39
Para S. Pablo la liberación y la adquisición de la libertad nos llega a
través de Cristo. Aunque nunca hable explícitamente de la “libertad de Cristo”, la supone como trasfondo necesario de su comportamiento. Esto aparece claramente en el himno de Fil 2,6-11, en donde el ser de Jesús se “autoidentifica” no como un ser-para-sí (que se aferra a la divinidad) sino como un
ser para el otro, que se vacía de sí mismo para entregarse existencialmente
al proyecto del Padre, asumiendo la condición humana. Este vaciamientorenuncia de la divinidad es sólo un momento dialéctico para recuperarla
después (tras la resurrección) como plenitud para sí y para los demás. Su libertad la encuentra precisamente en este su no ser-para-sí sino para Dios.
Adán había hecho exactamente lo contrario: queriendo construir su ser-ensí, destruyó su identidad y su libertad verdadera.
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raleza caminan también en la tensión dolorosa de la esperanza
(Rom 8,22).
La exousía de Cristo está enclavada en el movimiento del
tiempo, con una actualidad en el presente esencialmente abierta hacia el futuro. En esto se diferenciará fundamentalmente la
exousía (y la ejleuqeriva) cristiana de la estoica, que centra el pasado y el futuro en el presente.
2. Libertad cristiana como participación en la exousía de Cristo
Tanto en los evangelios como en Pablo, la libertad tiene como fundamento a Cristo, que la poseía en plenitud a nivel personal y la transmitió a todos los que creen en él: partícipe de la
libertad misma de Dios en virtud de su filiación, Cristo la confiere a todos los que son hijos en el Hijo (Rom 1,4-7; cf. Jn 1,16).
La libertad de Cristo, como la libertad de Dios, no puede entenderse como propiedad añadida al ser sino como expresión del
ser divino, contemplado desde una determinada angulación humana. En realidad Dios (correlativamente Cristo) no “posee” la
libertad sino que “es” la libertad. Cuando hablamos, pues, de
“donación” de la libertad al hombre, tal donación no podrá nunca entenderse como “transferencia” de algo que pasa a ser propiedad del hombre, con lo cual éste pueda autónomamente afirmar su “aseidad”. Tal don debe entenderse más bien como “gracia” e.d., como presencia operante del mismo Dios, a través de
su Espíritu. De ahí, el realismo de la expresión paulina “hemos
sido liberados para la libertad” (Gál 5,1). La libertad aquí descrita no es la libertad en abstracto sino “la” libertad precedentemente descrita: la libertad que se funda en la libertad del Dios
que predestinó, no al hijo de Agar, sino al hijo de Sara (Gál 4,2125), del Dios que decidió enviar a su Hijo “nacido de mujer” para redimir a los que estaban bajo la ley y hacerlos hijos suyos
(Gál 4,4). Porque se trata de una libertad determinada, podrá decir más adelante (Gál 5,13) qué es lo que exactamente incluye (el
agape) y excluye (el entregarse a los instintos de la carne). La libertad cristiana es agape “en el Espíritu”. A esa libertad hemos
sido “llamados” (ejklhvqhte) por Dios. No se trata, pues, de una
conquista del hombre; por eso quedan excluidas por igual la
apropiación y la vanagloria (kauca sqai, Gál 6,13; cf. 1 Cor 4,7).
El hecho de que la libertad cristiana no deba considerarse
349
como categoría de la que el hombre pueda servirse para la propia afirmación, no representa un motivo de vanificación de la
misma sino que revela su auténtico espesor óntico. La libertad
tiene toda la densidad del indicativo cristiano, con su polaridad
negativo-positiva, la misma que se expresa con el lexema “fe”: la
fe comporta, como polo negativo, el “vaciamiento” de sí mismo,
lexicalizado por S. Pablo con numerosas figuras (morir, crucificar, destruir el hombre viejo), con el reverso positivo de “apoyarse” sólo en Dios (renaciendo como nuevas creaturas, injertándonos en Él, revistiéndonos de Él)40. Entre los númerosos códigos semánticos empleados por Pablo para describir la nueva
condición del cristiano, el código biológico (construido sobre el
binomio muerte-vida) es sin duda el que obtiene un mayor relieve.
A través de toda esta simbología se pone en evidencia, en
primer lugar, el espesor óntico de la transformación del cristiano y la esencial referencialidad a la vida-gracia de Dios en Cristo. De hecho, el sujeto agente de la transformación es siempre
Dios41. Esta transformación se realiza a través de Cristo; de ahí
la frecuencia de las expresiones sun Cristw/ y ejn Cristw/ . La expresión más densa de esta referencialidad del indicativo a Dios
y a Cristo es la de Gál 2,20: “No soy yo propiamente quien vive,
es Cristo quien vive en mí”. En este contexto, la libertad difícilmente puede plasmarse en autoafirmación del sujeto; la única
autoafirmación válida es la que parte del reconocimiento de la
presencia íntima y personal del operador principal, al que el
hombre ofrece la apertura radical y la adhesión incondicional.
Desde esta presencia de la libertad liberante de Dios a través
de Cristo se puede abordar el tema del dinamismo de la libertad
cristiana en su aspecto negativo, de continua superación de la
acción de las potencias alienantes, y en su aspecto positivo de
apertura a nuevos horizontes de realización frente a los hombres
y frente a la creación.
40
La fe connota la idea de solidez y consistencia (de la raíz ’aman; de
ahí el uso para indicar las columnas en que se apoya el edificio, 2Re 18,16).
Aplicado a las personas en sus relaciones con Dios significa la solidez-fidelidad del apoyarse en Dios.
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a) La continua victoria sobre las potencias esclavizantes
La participación en la exousía de Cristo no se agota, como
pudiera pasar en las religiones mistéricas, en el acto ritual del
bautismo con su simbolismo de muerte y vida, sino que abre las
puertas a un dinamismo que se proyecta a la plenitud escatológica futura. Por lo mismo, la liberación frente a las potencias
hostiles no es algo que se ha realizado de una vez para siempre.
Esto sucedió solamente en Cristo, que con su muerte triunfó sobre las mediaciones de la muerte (la ley y el pecado) y sobre la
muerte misma, de una vez para siempre (ejfavpax, Rom, 6,10). En
el cristiano la participación en esta victoria ha sido algo real pero no plenamente actualizado, por cuanto debe seguir viviendo
en el “cuerpo mortal” (Rom 6,12), donde siguen activos el pecado (aJmartiva) y la muerte (qavnatoı). Por eso, la victoria se presenta como tarea y empeño permanente de no dejarse vencer sino de luchar por el triunfo. Es significativa en este sentido la estructura adversativa de la parénesis paulina: “no pongáis vuestros miembros a disposición del pecado como armas de injusticia sino (ajllav) poneos a disposición de Dios, de modo que vuestros miembros sean instrumentos de justicia al servicio de Dios”
(Rom 6,13). La participación en la liberación traída por Cristo se
presenta, pues, como tarea ética en la doble vertiente de lucha
contra las fuerzas del mal y de progreso en la línea de la nueva
vida (wJsei; ejk nekrw n zw/nteı).
Se comprende, pues, que frente al poder demoníaco esclavizante de la ley, Pablo exhorte a los Gálatas: “Manteneos firmes (sthvkete) y no os dejéis atar (ejnevcesqe) de nuevo (pavlin) al yugo de la esclavitud” (Gál 5,1). Pablo acusa a los Gálatas precisamente de no
haber sabido mantenerse firmes en la victoria y de haber vuelto a
“servir a los elementos débiles y pobres de este mundo” (4,9). La
“debilidad” (ajsqenh ), atribuida a los elementos, indica su incapacidad intrínseca para realizar las funciones que les vienen asignadas
41
Prueba de ello es el uso del pasivo teológico: hemos sido concrucificados (oJ palaio;ı hJmw‘n a[nqrwpoı sunestaurwvqh, Rom 6,6), cosepultados (suntafevnteı aujtw‘/ ejn tw‘/ baptivsmati, Col 1,12; cf Rom 6,4) corresucitados (sunhgevrqhte dia; th‘ı pivstewı, Col 2,12).
351
y, en concreto, la salvación (a nivel personal y cósmico). La pobreza (ptwcav) expresa la falta de contenidos: su aparente riqueza de
dones es pura vaciedad.42
Es sintomático que Pablo coloque en el mismo nivel la “ley” y
los “elementos del mundo”, reconociendo en ambos el mismo poder demoníaco esclavizante. La repetición del verbo douleuvein en
Gál 4,2.8.9 no deja lugar a duda de que la ley produce el mismo
grado de esclavitud que los elementos del cosmos43. El cambio gramatical de la voz pasiva (dedoulwmevnoi, 4,2) a la activa (ejdouleuvsate
- douleuvein, 4,8.9), que connotan respectivamente el “estado” de esclavitud y el “acto” de servicio al patrón, no introduce, en este caso, una diferencia sustancial, ya que, como escribe Pablo, la praxis
concreta es la mejor prueba de la existencia de un estado real dependencia (“Se es esclavo de aquél a quien se presta efectivamente
servicio”, Rom 6,16).
En clave de libertad, Pablo recuerda que a quienes han logrado, a través de Cristo, entrar a formar parte de la nobleza de
42
B. CORSANI, Lettera ai Galati, Genova 1990, 274: Los stoicei‘a “definiti
‘deboli’ perché non hanno forza di salvare, e ‘poveri’ perché incapaci di dare
ai loro seguaci le ricchezze della comunione con Dio”. Es probable, como advierte el mismo autor, que la expresión ajsqenh‘ kaiv ptwcav sea una fórmula
estereotipada usada para referirse a las falsas divinidades, tanto en el contexto de la polemica judaica contra los dioses paganos (cuya existencia no
sería negada) como en al ámbito del paganismo que distinguía entre dioses
verdaderos y demonios.
43
Según G. DELLING (stoicevw, ThWNT VII, 665s.), “dada la inclusión de
stoicei‘a con novmoı, no es posible entender el vocablo en el sentido literal de
‘materias primigenias’, y menos aun como “astros”. Pablo usaría la expresión
stoicei‘a tou‘ kovsmou en un sentido nuevo, pero siguiendo una idea común en
su tiempo. La expresión stoicei‘a tou‘ kovsmou indicaría “aquello sobre lo que
se basa la existencia de este mundo y que constituye también el ser del hombre”. En nuestro caso, se trataría de aquello que constituía la existencia del
hombre antes de Cristo. De ello se dice que es mísero y débil, y hace al hombre esclavo en vez de hacerlo libre. H. HÜBNER (La legge in Paolo. Contributo
allo sviluppo della teologia paolina, Brescia 1995,70-71) pone de relieve cómo
la puesta en común de “elementos de este mundo” y “torah” quiere probar
que “el dominio de esclavitud bajo el que se encontraban judíos y paganos
era sustancialmente igual”, lo que resultaba una afirmación intolerable para
los judíos.
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la familia de Dios, no les está permitido reconstruir antiguos
castillos dominados por el odiado guardián (Gál 4,1-3). Sólo en
un sentido podría reconocerse función positiva a la ley, en cuanto ésta ha servido como “pedagogo” que conducía a la casa de la
libertad. Una vez introducidos en ésta, se da por terminada su
función de patrón; por eso el retorno a la ley significaría retornar a la “casa de la esclavitud”44.
Lo que verdaderamente hace de la ley una categoría opresora es el carácter de “patrón”. Ello le permite jugar en el mismo
equipo y al servicio del mismo programa en que actúan el pecado y la muerte (Rom 5,18). El grave peligro, del que Pablo quiere prevenir a los Gálatas en relación con la ley, no es de orden
meramente coyuntural sino un riesgo que acompaña al cristiano de todos los tiempos. La libertad cristiana es una libertad liberada, que lleva en sí las cicatrices de referencia a los polos de
opresión originales. Estos polos perduran, amenazando continuamente con restaurar los propios sistemas de esclavitud, erigiéndose como “patronos”. De ahí que frente a ellos deba la libertad cristiana demostrar todo su dinamismo creador, luchando por mantener constantemente efectiva la victoria ya conseguida.
En este contexto, resultaría banal reducir la lucha frente a la
ley a esferas particulares de su acción, como sería, por ejemplo,
la esfera de los preceptos rituales o de pretendidos horizontes
políticos (judío o romano), como pretende J. Taubes45.
b) Nuevos horizontes de realización
La cara positiva de la libertad cristiana es presentada por
Pablo en términos de filiación. Esto no es simple efecto o con-
44
La expresión “casa de la esclavitud” es en el A.T. típica para indicar el
lugar donde los israelitas habitaron como esclavos, e.d., Egipto (Ex 13,3.14;
20,2: Dt 5,6; 6,12; 7,8; 8,14; 13,5; 13,10; Jos 24,178; Jue 6,8; Jer 34,13; Miq
6,4).
45
J. TAUBES, Teologia politica di San Paolo, Milano 1997. Según el Rabino J. Taubes, Pablo habría propuesto una liberación de carácter político-negativo: no dependencia ni de la ley romana ni de la ley judaica, sino de la ley
pneumático-mesiánica.
353
secuencia de la liberación de la ley sino una realidad radicalmente nueva que funda un sistema de relaciones incompatible
con cualquier tipo de esclavitud. Al colocar en el centro de su
evangelio (Rom 1,16) la nueva vida de hijos, a la que nos abrió
las puertas el Resucitado, Pablo hubiera debido, en línea lógica,
haber dado por superados todos los esquemas basados en el bipolarismo de la esclavitud (señor-esclavo). Su dependencia, sin
embargo, del horizonte cultural griego, le llevó a combinar el
nuevo esquema de filiación (padre-hijo) con el de señor-esclavo.
La coexistencia de ambos esquemas no aparece, sin embargo,
como una fatalidad cultural irresolvible. La clave de solución está en la naturaleza y origen de la kyriotes de Cristo. Ésta nace
del hecho mismo de la “filiación” divina (Rom 6,4)46. Se trata,
pues, de un señorío específico, el señorío que brota de la integración plena en la familia de Dios. Pablo no tendrá, por ello, dificultad en presentarse, en su función apostólica, como dou loı
Cristou (Rom 1,1) y en llamar a los cristianos “siervos de Cristo”
y de Dios47.
La conexión esencial de la libertad cristiana con la filiación
recibida en Cristo nos sitúa en un horizonte de total positividad,
en el que el “caminar”, e.d., el obrar ético (Rom 6,4) arranca de
la comunicación vital Padre-hijo “en Cristo”. A través de ese cauce, el imperativo fontal se plasmará, con la mediación del nou ı,
en imperativos concretos. Ello no supondrá la fuga hacia una racionalidad (lovgoı) que pone al hombre frente a Dios, sino el ejercicio de una racionalidad renovada (ajnakaivnwsiı, Rom 6,12) en
base a la interiorización previa del nou ı de Cristo (1 Cor 2,16).
En el horizonte de la filiación, la libertad del cristiano adquiere,
pues, toda la capacidad creadora de la voluntad liberadora del
Padre.
46
Cf. N.R. PETERSEN, Rediscovering Paul. Philemon and the Sociology of
Paul’s Narrative World, Philadelphia 1985, 230ss.
47
La aplicación del término “esclavo” (dou‘loı) a todos los cristianos aparece sólo raras veces en Pablo (1 Cor 7,22). En otros casos considera a los
cristianos como “esclavos de la justicia” y de Dios (Rom 6,18; cf.- 1 Tes 1,9).
Implícitamente, sin embargo, la idea de esclavo la podemos ver presente
cuantas veces se refiere a Cristo con el término “Señor”, por cuanto se trata
de términos correlativos (como padre-hijo).
354
c) De la libertad de la ley a la ley de la libertad
La interiorización del nou ı de Cristo pone la libertad cristiana frente a una problemática de profundo espesor ético. ¿Cómo
establecer los límites de la exousía humana? ¿Hasta qué punto
la ley positiva puede integrarse en el proyecto de libertad cristiana sin caer de nuevo “en el yugo de la esclavitud”? ¿Qué nexo
existe entre la ley de Cristo y la ley positiva?
Con la audacia que le es característica, Pablo trata el problema de la libertad del cristiano desde las diferentes y a veces
contradictorias situaciones que van brotando al paso de su acción misionera, pero sin ofrecer en ningún momento una síntesis orgánica de su pensamiento, a diferencia de lo que encontramos en los diversos sistemas de su tiempo (helenismo, estoicismo, gnosticismo). El punto de partida de su pensamiento no es,
evidentemente, de orden metafísico, sino empírico: la experiencia real que, a través de su conversión, ha tenido de la potencia
salvadora de Cristo resucitado. Cristo es el enviado del Padre para salvar el mundo (Rom 1,1-7); Él (muerto y resucitado) es el
principio de referencia del proyecto de realización del hombre
nuevo y de la creación nueva (kainh; ktivsiı, 2 Cor 5,17; cf. Gál
6,15); Él, al final de los tiempos, entregará al Padre el Reino, tras
la victoria definitiva sobre las potencias de alienación (1 Cor
15,24-28). La obra redentora aparece, pues, como un arco que se
extiende desde la resurrección de Cristo hasta la resurrección final, recubriendo toda la historia del hombre y del mundo, en
donde se hace presente a través del dinamismo del Espíritu.
Este es el nuevo horizonte de comprensión para el Apóstol.
En él aparece Cristo como punto de referencia último para el
hombre y para la creación. Cualquier categoría que pretenda introducirse en el programa del “hombre nuevo” con pretensiones
de ultimidad resulta lógicamente usurpatoria y alienante. Esto
vale para las categorías externas al hombre, como la ley, y para
las internas, como la razón, las pasiones etc. Lo que está, pues,
en juego es la pretensión de referencialidad última y, con ello, la
validez o inutilidad del proyecto de Cristo. Si la ley, dice Pablo,
sigue teniendo la centralidad que los Gálatas quieren atribuirle
(reconociéndole la capacidad de dar la justificación), habría que
concluir que “Cristo ha muerto en vano” (Gál 2,21).
Para el cristiano no está, pues, en juego el problema de si de-
355
be o no debe haber leyes, si éstas se deben o no aceptar en el propio proyecto ético. Se trata del problema de su “centralidad referencial”. De hecho, S. Pablo, en la carta a los Gálatas, tras el
discurso demoledor que ha dedicado a la ley, no tiene dificultad
en retomar ese mismo término para hablar de la “ley de Cristo”,
que los cristianos deben cumplir (ajnaplhrou‘n, 6,2) y de autodefinirse en términos de identificación con esa ley (e[nnomoı Cristou‘,
1 Cor 9,21).
La ley referida a Cristo no se presenta evidentemente como categoría “a se”, es decir, como norma proposicional escrita, pues en
tal caso caería bajo la censura de la ley “escrita en piedras” y no “en
el Espíritu” (2 Cor 3,6-7). La ley debe entenderse aquí como algo
esencialmente unido a Cristo. En nuestra opinión, Pablo entiende
la “ley de Cristo” como la constelación de principios y criterios de
valor que sirvieron a Jesús de tejido axiológico de su praxis mesiánica. En la carta a los Filipenses recogerá esta misma idea cuando
los exhorta a tener la misma actitud o los mismos sentimientos de
Cristo Jesús (2,7). Pablo se pone aquí en la misma línea de pensamiento expresada en 1 Cor 2,16 cuando afirma que nosotros “poseemos el nou~ı de Cristo, es decir, su “modo de pensar”. El nou‘ı de
Cristo, interiorizado a través de la fe, se transforma en principio
normativo (novmoı) y operativo de todo el quehacer ético, produciendo aquella renovación (ajnakaivnwsiı) del nou‘ı humano que permite
llegar a un discernimiento correcto (dokimavzein) de lo que en cada
caso concreto es la voluntad de Dios (Rom 12,2)48.
48
La interpretación de la fórmula novmoı Cristou‘ no ha sido siempre
unánime. C.H. Dodd, por ejemplo, sostiene que el síntagma novmoı Cristou‘ es
equivalente a novmoı tou‘ pneuvmatoı. Para otros, los más numerosos, la expresión haría referencia al precepto del “agápê”. Así, entre otros, C.J. Ellicott,
W. Schrage; D.A. Stoike, H. Schürmann, J.F. Collange; U. Schnelle, E. P. Sanders. W.D. Davies, por su parte, se orienta por la interpretación de trasfondo
rabínico: “Pablo, el apóstol de la libertad cristiana de la esclavitud del legalismo, volvería aquí al estilo del catequista típicamente rábinico, que contemplaba al Mesías como el restaurador de la torah. En términos de “torah
del Mesías Jesús” - en línea con la esperanza rabínica- se expresa también H.
Schlier, si bien admite que se trata de una torah tal cual fue cumplida por Jesús, e.d., radicalmente renovada. Interpretaciones parecidas ofrecen M.
Hengel y P. Stuhlmacher y E.J. Schnabel. Para una información más deta-
356
La ley de Cristo así entendida no elimina o reduce el ámbito de la ejxousiva cristiana sino más bien la ilumina y la refuerza,
permitiéndole alcanzar horizontes nuevos que van más allá de lo
que permitiría cualquier sistema legalista. Su capacidad creadora viene dada en términos de “flexibilidad” que permite acercarse al hombre y a la realidad de manera siempre nueva, con comportamientos que a primera vista pudieran parecer contradictorios. La ennomía crística, en efecto, permite a Pablo observar la
normativa judía cuando lo juzga conveniente (es decir, cuando
tiene que tratar con los judíos) y abandonar tal normativa cuando la considera contraproducente (es decir, cuando tiene que
tratar con los paganos). El mismo criterio seguirá cuando tiene
que dirigirse a los “débiles” (que rechazan el uso de carne sacrificada a los ídolos), (1 Cor 9, 19-23).
En cuanto expresión de la superación de los vínculos de la
imperatividad legalista, la “flexibilidad” (acomodación) es símbolo de libertad, pero en cuanto supone “sumisión” a las exigencias “impuestas” por las circunstancias concretas de los destinatarios implica sin duda una limitación de la propia libertad49, como reconoce Pablo al afirmar: “siendo libre frente a todos, me he hecho esclavo de todos” (1 Cor 9,19). Para Pablo, sin
embargo, en este caso se trata de una “esclavitud” creadora en
cuanto está orientada a “ganar” a los hombres para Cristo (1 Cor
19,22).
Desde la ennomía crística queda, pues, resuelta la contradicción sea frente a la vocación general a la libertad sea frente a las
normas positivas existentes. La ennomía crística, al ligar al hombre con Cristo, lo desliga de cualquier otra normatividad que no
tenga a Cristo como centro. La religación con Cristo es, por tanto, el criterio hermenéutico de cualquier tipo de normativa posi-
llada remitimos a nuestro estudio “Ley de Cristo y ennomía crística” en L.
ALVAREZ VERDES, Caminar en el Espíritu, Roma 2000, 226-251, hic 234ss.
49
Por los fueros de la ejxousiva clamaban particularmente los miembros
de la comunidad de Corinto, que desde su visión marcadamente gnóstica, se
resistían a tener que dejar de comer carne sacrificada a los ídolos, por el escándalo de los llamados “débiles”. Su posición aparece concretizada en el
principio “todo está permitido” (pavnta e[xestin, 1 Cor 10,23). De ahí su queja: “¿por qué mi libertad va a ser juzgada por la conciencia de otro?”.
357
tiva, sea civil o religiosa. No se trata, por tanto, de introducir, en
nombre de la libertad, un anomismo de corte gnóstico que rechaza toda clase de leyes, sino de valorarlas desde el prisma ineludible de todo cristiano: la “ley de Cristo” (1 Cor 9,21).
Esto vale incluso para las normas proposicionalmente formuladas por el Señor. En los Evangelios encontramos preceptos dados
por el Señor que Él mismo modificaría después en su aplicación
concreta, como el de “ofrecer la otra mejilla” (Mt 5,39) al que nos
abofetea (Jn 18,22-23). Esto no significa poner a Jesús contra Jesús
o introducir contradicciones en su doctrina sino distinguir entre
las formulaciones proposicionales, ligadas necesariamente a un
contexto, y el “sentir” mismo de Jesús. Si esto vale para los preceptos de Jesús, con mayor razón, ha de valer para la normas posteriores que han ido formulándose en la historia de la Iglesia, que
nunca podrán ser desvinculadas de la persona misma de Cristo.
Al criterio hermenéutico fundamental de la religación con
Cristo, Pablo añade en forma explícita el de la dinámica creadora
del agape, que debe estar en la base de la edificación (oijkodomhv)50
del cuerpo de Cristo. Frente a la pretensión libertaria de los gnósticos, que intentaban solucionar el problema de los “débiles” mediante el recurso a la gnosis, Pablo dirá claramente que la gnosis
no hace otra cosa que “hinchar”, mientras que el agape es lo que
verdaderamente edifica (1 Cor 8,2). El agape es la expresión genuina del dinamismo de la libertad creadora: “habéis sido llamados a la libertad para que en el agape os sirváis mutuamente” (Gál
5,13). Siendo el agape expresión de la presencia del amor liberador de Dios, la ausencia del agape deja al hombre en el vacío y en
la nulidad: “si no tengo amor, no soy nada” (1 Cor 13,2). En la carta de Santiago (1,25) se hace referencia al papel de la caridad, definiéndola como la “ley perfecta de la libertad”51
50
Con la misma firmeza recurrirá al criterio de la “caridad” para juzgar de la autenticidad de los carismas (1 Cor 13,1-13).
51
Para un estudio más completo sobre el sentido de la expresión “ley
perfecta de la libertad”, ver H.D. BETZ, Paul’s conzept of freedom in the context
of hellenistic discussion about possibilities of human freedom, Center for her-
358
Junto al criterio de la caridad Pablo ofrece un instrumento
necesario: el discernimiento (dokimavzein) mediante el uso del nou‘ı
renovado (Rom 12,2). La libertad cristiana, garantizada a nivel
óntico, por la exousía propia de los hijos de Dios, debe proyectarse a la praxis mediante valoraciones y decisiones concretas.
Aquí es donde deberá hacer realidad el principio de que la “verdad hace libres” (Jn 8,31-36). Las decisiones deberán ser prece-
meneutical studies and modern culture, 26, Berkeley 1977, 11ss.; R. FABRIS,
Legge della libertà in Giacomo, en RivBibl Supl. 8, Brescia 1977; S. LAWS, A
Commentary on the Epistle of James, San Francisco 1980, 87ss.; A.SCHLATTER,
Der Brief des Jakobus, Stuttgart 31984, 153ss.; F. MUSSNER, Der Jakobusbrief,
HthK 13/1, Freiburg 41981, 108ss.; M. DIBELIUS, Der Brief des Jakobus, KEK,
15, Göttingen 61984, 41ss.; R. BULTMANN, Teología del Nuevo Testamento, Salamanca 1987; 168; 590; W. SCHRAGE, Etica del Nuevo Testamento, Salamanca
1987, 350ss.; S. VOLLENWEIDER, o.c., 184 ss.; S. SCHULTZ, Neutestamentliche Ethik, Zürich 1987, 244ss.; M. HENGEL, “Der Jakobusbrief als antipaulinische
Polemik”, en G.F. HAWTHORNE/O. BETZ (ed.): Tradition and Interpretation (FS
E.E. Ellis), Tübingen /Grand Rapids 1987, 248-278; R. SCHNACKENBURG, El
mensaje moral del Nuevo Testamento 2. Barcelona 1991, 247ss.; M. KLEIN, Ein
vollkommenes Werk, Vollkommenheit, Gesetz und Gericht als theologische Themen des Jakobusbriefes, BWANT 139, Suttgart-Berlin-Köln, 1995. La expresión “ley perfecta de la libertad” se encuentra solamente en Sant 1,25 (cf
2,12). Se debe, sin embargo, distinguir entre la expresión y el contenido. La
expresión se encuadra sin dificultad en el ambiente cultural judaico del autor. La ley era para el judío, lo mismo que para el estoico, algo perfecto, completo por razón sobre todo de su origen divino (de ahí también su denominación de “real”, cfr Sab 6,20). No creemos que el autor tuviera intención explícita de hacer una apología de la interpretación judaica (M. DIBELIUS, o.c..
41ss; 152) ni de adoptar una posición antipaulina (contra H.D. BETZ, o.c., 11;
M. HENGEL, a.c., 248ss). En cuanto al contenido, lo que le interesa resaltar al
autor es la importancia, frente al juicio de Dios, del “cumplimiento efectivo”
de la ley, sin limitarse a una simple aceptación teórica que se despreocupa de
la praxis -cosa que son capaces de hacer los mismos demonios (2,19). En 1,25
se habla del “escucha ‘olvidadizo’ de la palabra”. En esto coincide con Mt
7,21ss. y con el mismo Pablo cuando afirma que “no son justos ante Dios los
que escuchan la ley sino los que la ponen en práctica” (Rom 2, 13). Para el
autor, la confluencia observancia-plenitud incluye de modo especial la praxis
del amor (Sant 2,8), es decir, el núcleo central de la ética cristiana, que brota
de la palabra de verdad “con la que nos ha engendrado” (por el bautismo,
1,18), la “palabra sembrada” en el corazón del creyente (1,21).
359
didas de un análisis objetivo para identificar dónde está la “verdad” que, en el caso, se identifica con la voluntad (qevlhma) de
Dios. El “análisis objetivo” excluye cualquier tentación de subjetivismo y arbitrariedad. La libertad que nace de la verdad de
nuestra dignidad cristiana conduce a la verdad de una praxis en
consonancia con la misma. Aquí se abre un amplio horizonte a
la imaginación creadora iluminada por el Espíritu y por la fidelidad a la tradición, en cuanto sólo apoyándose firmemente sobre
el fundamento de la propia identidad cristiana se puede, en contacto con la realidad cambiante, proponer y crear cosas nuevas52.
d) Alcance cósmico de la libertad53
El cristianismo ha sido frecuentemente acusado de llevar
demasiada carga de platonismo y estoicismo en su comovisión y
en su relación con la naturaleza. De hecho S. Pablo, en su repliegue ético hacia la subjetividad ha introducido no pocos elementos de la cultura griega contemporánea, que le llevaron a
considerar lo somático como savrx, es decir, como espacio propio
del pecado (aJmartiva) y de los instintos (ejpiqumiva). El ideal cristiano apunta ante todo al dominio de la gracia, de la justificación y, en definitiva, a la superación de aquello que nos liga a esta tierra, para buscar las cosas de arriba (Col 3,1ss). De ahí que
Pablo se muestre preocupado por la lucha continua que deberá
sostener el cristiano para lograr vivir según el Espíritu, superando las exigencias de la carne (Gál 5,16-25). La existencia misma terrestre es considerada como un “sembrar en la miseria” (ejn
ajtimiva/) para después resucitar gloriosamente (ejn dovxh/ 1 Cor
15,43). Otras veces recurrirá a la imagen del “barro” para designar el cuerpo (2 Cor 4,7; cf. 2 Tim 2,20). Es la imagen usada por
52
En su discurso sobre el “discernimiento” Pablo no aborda el tema del
“libre albedrío”, que tanto preocupó a los pensadores estoicos y a los teólogos cristianos, especialmente a S. Agustin. Cf. M. POHLENZ, La libertà greca,
Brescia 1963, 229: “Il problema filosofico del libero arbitrio, che era al centro
dell’etica greca, non viene accolto né da Paolo né altrove nel Nuovo Testamento, neppure là ove si descrive il contrasto fra la vera volontà dell’uomo e
i desideri della carne (Rom. 7, 14 ss.)”
53
S.VOLLENWEIDER, o.c., 375ss.
360
los estoicos54 para describir el horizonte negativo de lo creado y
la necesaria liberación del mismo55.
Esta dependencia cultural de Pablo con relación al estoicismo, que le hace ver frecuentemente lo somático en perspectiva
negativa, queda, sin embargo, contrarrestada con la “objetividad” del evento salvífico que derrama nueva luz sobre el hombre
y sobre su compromiso liberador hacia el mundo. En este sentido puede resultar sintomático el texto de Rom 12,1-2. Pablo exhorta a hacer del dinamismo de la libertad cristiana un servicio
“litúrgico” (qusiva) que sea reflejo fiel (logikhv) y activo (zw‘sa) de
nuestra condición de liberados en Cristo (Rom 6)56. Al indicar
cómo concretizar este dinamismo en la historia real, Pablo recurre a la formulación adversativa: no adoptar los esquemas del
eón presente sino servirse de la mente transformada para discernir
la voluntad de Dios (v. 2). Son, pues, los “esquemas” del eón presente los que aparecen en directa contraposición con el proyecto de nueva creación en que está comprometida la libertad cristiana. Para entender el alcance de esta contraposición conviene
aclarar algunos puntos.
Ante todo, la parénesis de 12,1-2 (que sirve de pauta para las
exhortaciones de los capítulos siguientes) se presenta como consecuencia de la doctrina establecida en los capítulos precedentes
(6-8). En ellos se ha descrito la transformación óntica del cre-
54
EPICTETO, Diss., 1.1.11: “¿Qué dice Zeus, Epicteto? De haber sido posible, yo hubiera hecho ese miserable cuerpo, esa pequeña fortuna tuya, libre y sin trabas. Pero tal como son las cosas -no lo olvides- este cuerpo no es
tuyo sino que sólo es barro ingeniosamente amasado”.
55
Cf. FILÓN (De plant, 66): “Según la enseñanza del Legislador, que deben mantener los que no reconocen ningún valor a los objetos creados, los
que al contrario, rechazan todo lo que es del dominio de lo creado, en razón
de su intimidad con lo increado, que consideran como la sola riqueza de la
felicidad perfecta”. FILÓN (Quis rerum divin., 93) describe la inteligencia del
sabio en los siguientes términos: “Purificarse de cada uno de estos bienes (terrenos), retirar la fe del mundo que pasa porque no es digno de fe, y creer
solamente en Dios, que es también realmente el único digno de fe, he ahí la
obra de una inteligencia grande”.
56
El ou\n parenético de 12,1 conecta, con carácter consecutivo, con los
cc. 6-8 donde se ha expuesto la transformación óntica que se ha operado en
el Cristiano.
361
yente por el hecho de su inserción en Cristo muerto y resucitado. En el horizonte de esta transformación aparece expresamente el “cuerpo”. En el ámbito del cuerpo se realiza “el servicio” (paristavnein) real a Dios, poniendo nuestros miembros al
servicio de la justicia (6,13). La figura del “culto” en Rom 12,1
no hace sino añadir una connotación “sacra”. Quedan con ello
rotas las barreras que separan lo espiritual de lo profano57. El
Dios que con su Espíritu resucitó a Cristo de entre los muertos,
se dirá más adelante, vivificará también nuestros cuerpos mortales por el Espíritu que habita en nosotros (8,11) y que nos
mueve a un único “servicio” a Dios, con el anverso de culto formal (rezando a Dios: Abba, Padre) y el reverso del culto real (en
forma de compromiso ético). Este culto integral supone evidentemente no plegarse a los “esquemas” de las potencias58 que rigen el mundo presente.
La redención aparece, pues, como algo operante en el espacio histórico-somático del hombre, a través del cual éste es parte integrante de la creación. Con ello la nueva creación (iniciada
ya en el hombre) alcanza “la creación” global.
En Rom 8,19-25 la situación actual (ajrci; to; nu‘n) de la creación es descrita en clave de dolor y de esperanza. La mención del
dolor trae a la mente de Pablo el recuerdo del origen del mismo: el
dolor es expresión de una situación de diástasis (entre el hombre y
Dios y, con ello, entre el hombre y la creación) que ha supuesto para la creación el hundimiento en el fracaso (mataiovthı) y en la corrupción (fqorav). Esta situación, dirá Pablo, no ha sido fruto de
una natural degeneración, sino resultado de una violencia externa,
a la que la misma creación se resistía (oujc eJkou‘sa, Rom 8,20): es la
violencia introducida por el pecado de Adán. Pero, con el pecado,
llegó la promesa y con ella la esperanza de liberación. Esperanza
que ha adquirido un espesor nuevo con la superación de la diásta-
57
Cf. U. WILCKENS, La carta a los Romanos, 6-16. Vol II, Salamanca 1992,
341.
58
Los “esquemas del eón presente” son las categorías de valor propuestas por los poderes que “dominan” el mundo, que han sido “destronados” por
Cristo, pero no destruidos. “Esquemas” puede, pues, ser traducido metonímicamenete por las “potencias” que los generan.
362
sis por la irrupción de la nueva creación en Cristo. Desde este momento, el dolor cobra los perfiles de los dolores de parto, y la esperanza deja de ser un mero sentimiento para transformarse en la
impaciencia de quien está oteando en el horizonte el momento de
la eclosión final de la glorificación de los hijos de Dios. Esta impaciencia de la creación va de la mano con la impaciencia de los hombres que suspiran por la liberación definitiva de sus cuerpos (Rom
8,23)59, que es reforzada por el Espíritu Santo: Él garantiza la existencia de la nueva creación, dando testimonio de que somos “ya”
verdaderamente “hijos” de Dios (8,16) y coherederos con el Resucitado (8,17) y Él es quien sintoniza nuestro gemido con el gemido
de la naturaleza, esperando la llegada de la glorificación total. Ése
será el momento de la superación de toda forma de diástasis y de
la llegada de la armonía total60.
Las modalidades del dinamismo de la nueva creación son
expresadas a partir de los dos polos: el originario y fundante (el
evento cristológico: muerte resurrección) y el del cumplimiento
final (glorificación). El camino entre ambos polos se rige por la
tensión del ya y el aun no, bajo la guía y el impulso del Espíritu
Santo.
El horizonte cristológico y pneumatológico en que queda
encuadrada la liberación de lo creado dan a esta liberación una
radical novedad en relación con una hipotética armonía paradisíaca. No se trata de una restauración sino de una verdadera creación que, por lo mismo, trasciende el marco puramente protológico natural. La perspectiva cristiana se sitúa, por ello, en un
nivel de comprensión diferente al de los naturalistas que parten
59
Pablo emplea en ambos casos el verbo ‘gemir’. En el caso del hombre
que espera la redención del cuerpo usa la forma simple (stenavzein). En el caso de la creación usa la forma compuesta (sustenavzein) para expresar la “coralidad” del grito, un grito al unísono (sun).
60
Pablo habla en Rom 8,19-25 de un triple gemido: el de las criaturas,
el del hombre y el del Espíritu. Los gemidos del Espíritu son calificados de
“inenarrables” (stenagmoi‘ı ajlalhvtoiı = sin palabras, 8,29). El sentido (frovnhma) de los mismos coincide con el de los emitidos por el hombre y la naturaleza, de quienes el Espíritu se hace portavoz ante el Padre.
363
de la originaria sumisión de la naturaleza al hombre61. Hay aquí
una cierta coincidencia de lenguaje con el pensamiento estoico
que pone el ideal de la libertad en la armonía. Ésta se puede lograr, según los estoicos, a través de la plena identificación del logos personal con el logos del cosmos, cosa accesible solamente
al sabio. Hay, sin embargo, diferencias fundamentales: la armonía estoica es una conquista del hombre en cuanto tal, que se realiza en la historia y que se construye sobre la eliminación de
cuanto está relacionado con lo somático, como los sentimientos
y pasiones y, especialmente, el dolor y el sufrimiento, mientras
la armonía propuesta por Pablo integra todos estos elementos.
La calificación “escatológica”, esencial en la libertad cristiana en su proyección cósmica, no representa ningún tipo de reducción temporal, en el sentido de una fuga hacia el futuro que
deje al presente en su ambigüedad y esclavitud. Tampoco significa que la nueva creación haya de construirse sobre las ruinas y
aniquilamiento de la creación existente, en la línea de la resurrección de entre los muertos, o como una creación de la nada
(Rom 4,17). La “nueva creación” se realiza y actúa ya dentro del
mundo.
La escatología de la nueva creación, como nuevo ámbito de
libertad, no parte de la división (materia-espíritu, presente-futuro) sino de la integración. Ello es posible desde el horizonte específico de los modos del tiempo con que opera la nueva creación. A diferencia del estoicismo, que reduce pasado y futuro al
presente eterno, el cristianismo cuenta con la triple división del
tiempo, sobre la base del binomio continuidad-discontinuidad.
La relación pasado-presente aparece marcada fuertemenete por
la discontinuidad (expresada con diversas figuras: muerte del
hombre viejo, nuevo nacimiento etc.), pero sin destruir totalmente la continuidad. El “yo” que grita su impotencia para superar los ataques esclavizadores del pecado (aJmartiva, Rom 7,24)
es el mismo que en Rom 8, 2 canta la alegría de haber sido libe-
61
Los defensores de la sumisión de la naturaleza a la libre voluntad del
hombre suelen aducir en su favor Gén 1,28: “creced y multiplicaos, llenad la
tierra y sometedla, dominad a los peces del mar y a las aves del cielo …” (cf.
Sal 8,7: “Le diste el mando sobre las obras de tus manos. Todo lo sometiste
bajo sus pies”.
364
rado por la ley del Espíritu de vida. El hombre, alcanzado por la
nueva creación en Cristo, lleva en sí una serie de elementos que
lo ligan al pasado. El binomio antes-ahora (povte-nu‘n) introduce
un distanciamiento que funciona sobre una plataforma en la
que permanecen muchos elementos del pasado, esencialmente
ligados a su somaticidad histórica, como la savrx, el sw‘ma y, por
supuesto, las pasiones y los sentimientos, como la sensación de
disforia (ejpaiscuvnesqai) por la praxis de pseudo-libertad realizada en el pasado (Rom 6,21).
Si en la relación pasado-presente se pone de relieve ante todo la discontinuidad en la continuidad, en la relación presentefuturo se acentúa la continuidad en la discontinuidad, debido
particularmente a la presencia operante del Espíritu Santo. Ello
justifica que a veces las mismas calificaciones sean expresadas
indiferentemente en presente y en futuro. La discontinuidad se
expresa en Rom 8,21ss. en la contraposición de dos bloques de
figuras que describen respectivamente el presente y el futuro
desde el binomio esclavitud-liberación: sumisión al fracaso (mataiovthı) y a la corrupción (th‘ı fqoravı) y ocultamiento, frente a
las figuras de liberación de la esclavitud de la corrupción: la libertad de la gloria (dovxa) de los hijos de Dios y la visión.
La contraposición indicada por estas figuras debe entenderse, no tanto en clave de exclusión real cuanto de “manifestación”. No se excluye, pues, la presencia en el presente de la filiación divina del hombre y de la participación en su doxa y libertad62, e.d., la validez actual de la nueva creación. La discontinuidad de los tiempos, sin embargo, impone que el presente sea un
“ahora” de ocultamiento y de esperanza, mientras que el futuro
será un “después” de manifestación plena y de visión. El presente es ya espacio real de la nueva creación pero con la tónica de
esperanza ansiosa (ajpokaradokiva) de la revelación (ajpokavluyiı)
definitiva (Rom 8,19).
Continúan efectivas en el presente las fuerzas negativas pero no en calidad de “señores”, pues tal señorío lo han perdido,
62
No sería lógico que tras haber afirmado apodícticamente nuestra situación de libertad en el Espíritu en 8,2, la excluyese en 8,19ss.
365
como se afirma categóricamente en Rom 6,9.1463. Esta presencia efectiva de las potencias del mal hace que la doxa de los hijos de Dios se manifieste frecuentemente a través de sus contrarios: el sufrimiento y la angustia. Es el marchamo específicamente cristológico: el resucitado continúa siendo el crucificado.
La continuidad en la discontinuidad hace que la culminación escatológica se convierta en clave hermenéutica de toda la
historia de la libertad. Por ello Pablo, tras proclamar el gran
evento de la nueva creación, se siente en el deber de hacer una
relectura del pasado, comenzando por la historia del fracaso original (Rom 8,20).
Con esta clave hermenéutica debemos también leer hoy la
historia de la libertad, la pasada y sobre todo la presente que, en
principio, tratándose de nueva creación, deberá ser “creadora”,
e.d., capaz de “liberar” al máximo las potencialidades del hombre y de la naturaleza. El término “liberar” es empleado aquí en
todo su espesor polisémico de “hacer emerger, desplegar para la
libertad”, y que evoca como “contrarios” someter, explotar, rebajar o destruir.
En esta misma clave hermenéutica, el proyecto de libertad
del hombre en sus relaciones con el mundo y con los demás
hombres será valorado desde el respeto a su “trascendencia”,
fundada ante todo en su dimensión cristológica. No se trata de
un proyecto meramente histórico con el que el hombre busca la
propia autoafirmación sino del proyecto de Dios en Cristo, a
quien corresponde la gloria final.
A la luz de estos criterios hermenéuticos generales cabe preguntarse ¿cómo organizar concretamente un sistema de relaciones con el mundo que sea a la vez libre y liberador? Hay que partir del hecho evidente de la progresiva degradación de la naturaleza, debida a un inadecuado trato de parte del hombre y de la
sociedad actual. Si en el pasado, efectivamente, era la naturaleza la que propiamente amenazaba al hombre, en nuestro tiempo la revolución técnico-industrial y la consiguiente autosuficiencia del hombre han hecho que suceda exactamente lo con-
63
En Rom 6,9.14 se dice claramente que la potencia de la muerte y del
pecado no tienen ya dominio sobre el hombre (kurieuvein), y, por lo tanto, ya
no se puede decir que el hombre “está bajo” (ei\nai uJpov).
366
trario: la naturaleza corre vertiginosamente hacia su degradación total por culpa del hombre. La razón de fondo está en la
diástasis que el hombre mismo ha introducido en la comprensión de su relación con el mundo. Es la herencia actualizada de
la distinción cartesiana entre res cogitans y res extensa. La supremacía absoluta del yo pensante, con la consiguiente descalificación de la naturaleza, no puede generar sino una libertad objetivadora y materializante, que identifica su función creadora
con el dominio absoluto que aplasta el movimiento natural y
evolutivo bajo el peso de la transformación y del artificio64.
La vía de solución de la presente crisis ecológica se presenta difícil y complicada. No se trata sólo de realizaciones, aunque
éstas lleven una intención restauradora, sino de asunción de criterios de valor que garanticen un ejercicio de la libertad verdaderamente creador. Entre éstos deberán necesariamente destacar los valores de unidad, totalidad y solidaridad. La nueva creación es una realidad única, que alcanza por igual al hombre (a
todos los hombres) y a la naturaleza. Nada ni nadie puede quedar excluido de su dinámica liberadora. En cuanto “nueva” no
puede limitarse a utópicas “reconstrucciones” sino que debe
abrir nuevos caminos de vida. La convergencia cristológicopneumatológica de la nueva creación introduce en ella una “comunión” que no puede ser rota por visiones utilitaristas y miopes. A reforzar esta unidad en sentido proyectivo, viene el común sentimiento de la “esperanza” que, arrancando del reverso
negativo y doloroso de la realidad, apunta a la culminación de
vida en la glorificación final. De ahí la actitud básica de la compasión en el sentido pleno de su etimología: participación en el
mismo “pathos” de vida con su anverso de dolor y su reverso de
gloria. Por ello la naturaleza, más que como res extensa, debería
ser contemplada como res vivens y res sperans65.
La realidad de la nueva creación pone así importantes retos
64
W. BINDEMANN, Die Hoffnung der Schöpfung, Röm 8,18-27 und die Frage einer Theologie der Befreiung von Mensch und Natur, Neukirchen-Vluyn
1983, 155 (citando a Ebeling).
65
A. SCHWEITZER propone sustituir el slogan cartesiano (pienso, luego
existo) por otro que expresa la voluntad de vivir: “Yo soy vida, que quiere vivir, en medio a la vida” (cit. por W. BINDEMANN, o.c., 156).
367
a la libertad del hombre. Ante todo, el reto de una responsabilidad creadora a la que se abre el horizonte inmenso de las potencialidades de la creación que deberán ser “liberadas”. La
ciencia y la técnica, no obstante los éxitos alcanzados, apenas si
han logrado asomarse al pozo profundo de la realidad y remover la superficie de sus aguas. La comunión y el amor llevan a
un conocimiento cada vez más profundo de las personas y las
cosas a las que se ama. Es el carácter inquirente de la verdad66.
El hombre tiene, pues, ante sí la ilimitada tarea de conocer el
mundo “amándolo” como compañero precioso que Dios le ha
dado, y ayudándolo a liberar sus mejores potencialidades, consciente de que el mundo es “suyo” como él es del mundo.
CONCLUSIÓN
La libertad es parte constitutiva del hombre y, por tanto, elemento esencial de su propia realización. Para el cristiano se trata de una libertad liberada y liberante que no puede tornar a esclavitudes destructivas, ni frente a la ley ni frente a los ídolos
(dioses escondidos) del poder y la riqueza. La libertad esclavizada se autodestruye en su ser y en su proyección creadora67.
Pero en este campo se deben precisar bien los contornos de
la realidad llamada “esclavizante”. Sería absurdo identificar como elemento esclavizante todo cuanto de una manera u otra
66
X. ZUBIRI habla del carácter inquirente como nota constitutiva de la
“verdad en encuentro” (Inteligencia y razón, Madrid 1983, 261. El autor avala su tesis con la sugestiva frase de S. AGUSTÍN: “Busquemos como buscan los
que aún no han encontrado, y encontremos como encuentran los que aún
han de buscar, porque cuando el hombre ha terminado algo, no ha hecho sino comenzar” (De Trinitate, IX,1).
67
Citamos aquí una frase de STO TOMÁS (Ad 2 Cor 3, sec. 3) que juzgamos altamente pertinente: “Liber est qui est causa sui; servus autem est causa domini. Quicumque ergo agit ex ipso, libere agit; qui vero ex alio motus,
non agit libere. Ille ergo qui vitat mala, non quia mala, sed propter mandatum Domini non est liber; sed quia vitat mala, quia mala, est liber”. Cf., sin
embargo, 2 Sent. d.19, q.3, a.3 ad 3: Conscientia obligat non virtute propria,
sed virtute praecepti divini; non enim conscientia dictat aliquid faciendum
hac ratione, quia sibi videtur, sed hac ratione, quia a Deo praeceptum est”.
368
puede subjetivamente estimarse limitante de la propia libertad.
Aquí debemos hacer necesariamente referencia a la libertad que
definíamos como “cualidad del ser”. Existe una tendencia a reducir la libertad a la libertad de decisión, excluyendo de su horizonte toda referencia al fundamento, en cuanto ello significaría imponer al libre uso de la libertad un peso asfixiante que terminaría por anularla o, por lo menos, por someterla a inaceptables “manipulaciones”. Se prefiere vivir de la atomización y de
la fluidez del instante. El recurso a los referentes últimos, como
la razón o la fe, quedaría, pues, recluido en la esfera de la reflexión privada o reducido a simple aval de las decisiones fácticas.
Cabría preguntarse aquí si la liberación de todo recurso al fundamento deja al hombre al abrigo de manipulaciones o más bien
lo abandona a la marea de condicionamientos que la sociedad va
inoculando en todos los ámbitos de la vida humana, creando
“consensos” que no son más que respuestas inconscientes a ideologías e intereses perfectamente calculados.
La libertad de Dios es la libertad perfecta, fundamento de la
libertad del hombre. El tornar a la fuente no es sino actualizar
la religación real de la persona con el fundamento. Desde ahí será fácil construir un sistema “moral” de relaciones verdaderamente liberador con los demás hombres y con el mundo del que
forma parte. Se trata de una aproximación fundada en la causalidad personal, distinta de la causalidad clásica física o metafísica68. En esta causalidad personal se funda precisamente el carácter “moral” de la aproximación del hombre a la realidad.
El pensamiento cristiano, al arrancar el concepto de libertad
del cuadro monista-determinista del estoicismo, ha introducido
sin duda una ruptura en la armonía cósmica que servía de soporte a la visión positiva de las relaciones hombre-mundo. La
novedad, sin embargo, introducida por el cristianismo compensa con creces los efectos de esta ruptura, al construir un nuevo
tipo de armonía fundada en la relación personal libre del hombre con el Creador, y en la consiguiente responsabilidad ética
frente al Creador y a lo creado. Por otra parte, la inserción en el
evento cristológico-escatológico abre esta responsabilidad ética
68
X. ZUBIRI, El hombre y Dios, Madrid, 21985, 205-206.
369
a un horizonte radicalmente nuevo, el de la nueva creación, que
bajo el dinamismo de la esperanza y la fuerza del Espíritu anticipa al presente la armonía plena y definitiva.
Desde esta clave de lectura de la realidad se comprende fácilmente el espesor creativo de la libertad cristiana. La dimensión esencialmente ética del sistema de relaciones hombre-mundo excluirá por anticipado cualquier tipo de acceso a la realidad
regido por coordinadas de carácter puramente económico o de
voluntad de dominio. La historia actual, no obstante la positividad de los adelantos científicos y técnicos, no se puede ciertamente presentar como modelo de búsqueda de un proyectohombre a la altura de las exigencias actuales. Tampoco está sobresaliendo por sus propuestas sobre el futuro del cosmos. De
ello son prueba, de una parte, la radical desorientación de las
propuestas antropológico-filosóficas del llamado “hombre postmoderno” y, de otra, el imparable avance de cosmovisiones fundadas en el ansia de poder y en la búsqueda exclusiva de los propios intereses, sin la mínima perspectiva de futuro.
Es difícil hablar de libertad creadora cuando se identifican
bienestar, felicidad y libertad, llegándose incluso a “teologizar”
el progreso económico69. En nuestra opinión la única teologización válida pasa por la aceptación de la “theologia crucis” que,
reconoce los límites de lo humano y sabe integrar en su proyecto liberador el dolor y las esperanzas de los hombres. El peligro
del hombre de hoy es que la ilusión de ignorar el dolor le lleve a
ignorar o a matar la esperanza.
Via Merulana, 31
C.P. 2458
00100 Roma
Italy
69
Lorenzo ALVAREZ VERDES, CSsR
En este sentido puede resultar emblemática la inscripción que se lee
en el Dólar USA: “In God we trust”, en donde la palabra Dios equivale a “éxito económico”, dinero. Es una expresión del carácter cuasi-religioso de la
búsqueda de la efectividad y racionalidad. La libertad es entendida en clave
de autoafirmación. Una versión actualizada de la justificación por las obras.
(Cf. W. BINDEMANN, o.c., 160).
370
—————Summary / Resumen
In this article freedom is studied as a quality or value of being
which empowers the subject for ever-new capabilities at the level of
choice, decision and realization. The Christian, wrested from cosmic
determinism, is not left floundering within the oscillation of pragmatic
arbitrariness without being anchored in the Christological indicative.
This allows the subject to participate in the creative project of the liberating will of God. The eschatological dimension of the ‘new creation’,
moving forward from the present to the future of the perfect harmony
of all that is created, projects the Christian task to a system of relationships with other people and with the whole of the cosmos that is
essentially ethical. It achieves this with a positive and creative character, in radical opposition to the utilitarian and economic systems that
are dominant in our society.
La libertad es estudiada en el presente artículo como cualidad o
valor del ser, que potencia al sujeto para prestaciones siempre nuevas a
nivel de elección, decisión y realización. El cristiano, arrancado del
deteminismo cósmico, no queda flotando al vaivén de la arbitrariedad
pragmática sino firmemente anclado en el indicativo cristológico, que
le permite participar en el proyecto creador de la voluntad liberante de
Dios. La dimensión escatológica de la “nueva creación”, adelantando al
presente el futuro de armonía perfecta de todo lo creado, proyecta el
quehacer cristiano a un sistema de relaciones con los demás hombres
y con el cosmos esencialmente ético, de carácter positivo y creador, en
radical oposición a los sistemas utilitaristas y economicistas dominantes en nuestra sociedad.
—————The author is Ordinary Professor of Biblical Moral Theology at
the Alphonsian Academy.
El autor es profesor ordinario de Teología Moral Bíblica en la
Academia Alfonsiana.
—————
StMor 39 (2001) 371-409
WILLIAM F. MURPHY, JR
THE PAULINE UNDERSTANDING
OF APPROPRIATED REVELATION
AS A PRINCIPLE OF CHRISTIAN MORAL ACTION
1.0 Introduction
In this article, we will consider the Pauline understanding of
how man, created in the image of God, realizes his potential for
a distinctively theological mode of moral action “in Christ”. We
will see that he does so through a transformation that occurs as
he appropriates or internalizes the revelation that culminates in
the person and work of Jesus Christ. We will conclude with some
brief observations regarding how this important but often neglected teaching from the inspired word of God might provide a
stimulus for a more biblical recovery of virtue-based, and especially Thomistic, moral theology.
Because of its pivotal role in Paul’s most mature and systematic letter, Rom 12:1-2 is widely-recognized as being among
the most important texts for understanding the relationship between the apostle’s theology and his ethics. Moreover, since Paul
is arguably the most “systematic” of the inspired authors, this
pivotal text from Romans merits particular attention from theologians seeking to articulate the theological foundations of
moral action. The heart of this passage speaks of a transformation “by the renewal of your mind, that you may discern what is
the will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect”1. An
analogous but more developed teaching is found in the later
Pauline2 tradition as represented by Eph 4:20-24, which refers to
1
All NT translations are my own, and generally follow the RSV.
Throughout this study, references to the letters and theology of “Paul”
will indicate the 7 uncontested works of the apostle (1 Thes, Gal, Phil, 1 Cor,
2 Cor, Romans and Philemon). I will use the word “Pauline”, on the other
hand, in a more general sense to refer to these uncontested letters along with
2
372
WILLIAM F. MURPHY
being “renewed in the spirit of your minds”(4:23). As we will see
below, this important text from Ephesians builds upon that of
Rom 12:1-2 in several ways. For example, it emphasizes the
christological concentration of (i) revelation, (ii) catechesis, and
(iii) our transformation through a spiritual renewal of the mind.
Moreover, this passage appropriately specifies the christocentric
character of this transformation through a reference to putting
on “the new man” (4:24). This recurrence and further articulation, in Ephesians, of the mind-centered transformation that
provides the theological basis of Christian moral action gives a
further indication of the importance of the reality mediated to
us through Rom 12:2.
By elucidating the theological dynamic disclosed by these
pivotal texts, I suggest that the notion of the “appropriation of
revelation” can help us to articulate how what we might call “the
theological foundations of Christian moral action” are deepened
and made effective within us. This “appropriation” of revelation
can be defined as a process through which we are transformed,
under the movement of grace, in theological and moral virtue,
and precisely according to the image of God in Christ. This occurs through our yielding to, accepting, assimilating, internalizing, or “making our own” the revelation that God discloses to us
through creation, scripture, and especially through the person of
Jesus Christ, the incarnate Word of God. Although this appropriation is centered in the mind, it results in the transformation
of the whole person, which enables, and is manifest in, a new
quality of moral action. Pope John Paul II uses the word “appropriation” in a similar way at several points in his encyclicals3.
Colossians and Ephesians. Although these latter two are normally referred to
as “deutero-Pauline”, I will refer to them as “Pauline” to emphasize that their
theology, especially as it pertains to the current study, is a development of
that found in the apostle’s uncontested letters.
3
In Redemptor Hominis n. 25, as part of his explanation of the famous
text from Gaudium et spes n. 22, John Paul writes that man “must ‘appropriate’ and assimilate the whole of the reality of the Incarnation and Redemption in order to find himself”. This text is later quoted in Veritatis Splendor n. 8, where the Pope uses it to build upon his teaching that it is the encounter with the person of Jesus that prompts within man “new questions
about moral good”. It is he who “opens up … the book of the Scriptures and
THE PAULINE UNDERSTANDING OF APPROPRIATED REVELATION...
373
Moreover, because this transforming assimilation of the revelation given in Christ effects not just the mind but the whole person, its systematic articulation is especially conducive to virtueoriented approaches to moral theology4. More particularly, the
elucidation of this dynamic can help us to understand how this
gradual realization of the christocentric fulfillment of human
existence prepares us to share in the pattern of moral action as
exemplified by Christ. Thus, through this brief study5, I hope to
contribute toward a more adequate understanding of the christological and anthropological foundations of the Christian life.
2.0 The Theological Basis of Pauline Ethics
The following brief section will help to situate this theological dynamic of appropriated revelation within the context of
contemporary studies of Paul’s ethics, which emphasize the the-
… teaches the truth about moral action”. In n. 52 the Pope uses the notion
of “appropriation” with respect to the truth of the law when he writes that
“the acting subject personally assimilates the truth contained in the law. He
appropriates this truth of his being and makes it his own by his acts and the
corresponding virtues” (emphasis added).
4
Two important recent works argue that virtue-based approaches are
particularly apt for articulating the New Testament, and especially Pauline,
understanding of the Christian life. Joseph J. Kotva makes this argument in
his The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics, Moral Traditions & Moral Arguments
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1996). Similarly, in her By
the Renewing of Your Minds: The Pastoral Function of Christian Doctrine
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), Ellen T. Charry uses Rom 12:2
as the basis of her argument for the virtue-shaping function of doctrine (19).
The present paper can be understood as an articulation of a Pauline account
of how the theological realities mediated by the Scriptures shape us in
virtue.
5
Although this study is informed by a more “scientific” study of the
Pauline texts in question, its approach is more “theological” than historicalcritical in that the primary concern is with the theological realities being
disclosed by the text. This emphasis is articulated by Robert Sokolowski in
his Eucharistic Presence: A Study in the Theology of Disclosure (Washington,
D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1994), especially chapter 11,
“Disclosure in the Scriptures”.
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WILLIAM F. MURPHY
ological foundations upon which the great apostle’s exhortations
depend. Perhaps the most widely-recognized way of articulating
the relationship between Pauline theology and ethics is through
the grammatical categories of “the indicative”, which refers to
the theological basis of moral action, and “the imperative”,
which specifies moral exhortations or commands6. The widespread use of these grammatical categories reflects the lingering, but hopefully diminishing, reluctance among biblical scholars to utilize specifically theological or philosophical categories7. Thus, in the contemporary context, biblical ethicists,
moral theologians and pastors can draw upon a broad consensus that, in Paul’s understanding, distinctively christian moral
action depends upon a preceding, but ongoing, transformation
that God works in man through the saving work of Christ. Moreover, theologians are invited to draw with greater freedom upon
philosophical and theological concepts to help articulate the realities mediated by the biblical text.
6
Pauline scholars have utilized these grammatical categories since the
publication of an influential essay by Rudolph Bultmann. For a contemporary treatment that acknowledges the value of more philosophical and theological categories, see especially Michael Parsons “Being Precedes Act, Indicative and Imperative in Paul’s Writing” in Brian S. Rosner, Understanding
Paul’s Ethics: Twentieth-Century Approaches, translated by Christoph W.
Stenschke (Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, 1996), 217-247. See also James D. G.
Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans Pub., 1998), 626-631.
7
This reluctance traces ultimately to the nominalist rejection of ontological language. The results of this philosophical option have been manifest
in both the tradition of Reformation theology, and in Catholic post conciliar
biblical studies, which have been identified almost exclusively with historical-critical exegesis. Unfortunately, the object of such exegesis is normally
restricted, by methodological constraints and/or underlying philosophical
presuppositions or choices, to an analysis of the biblical text, without an adequate consideration of the theological realities mediated by the text. For a
valuable corrective from the perspective of patristic thought, see Thomas F.
Torrance, Divine Meaning: Studies in Patristic Hermeneutics (Edinburg: T&T
Clark, 1996). For a well-reasoned attempt to put Thomistic epistemological
realism in dialogue with modern philosophy of language regarding the theological truth borne by texts, see Bruce Marshall, Trinity and Truth, Cambridge Studies in Christian Doctrine (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), especially chapter 9.
375
Paul’s account of this theological basis of moral action can
be understood as the fulfillment of the Old Testament promise
regarding “a new covenant” (Jer 31:31) in which God would
write his law upon the hearts of his people (Jer 31:33)8 and “put
[his] spirit within” them (Ez 36:27). Thus, they would truly
“know the Lord” (Jer 31:34) and be able to live according to his
law.
This theological basis of moral action corresponds to what
Joseph Fitzmyer calls “the ten effects of the Christ event”9, particularly as each believer appropriates them. It further corresponds to what James Dunn has described in his important new
treatment of Pauline theology as “the beginning of salvation”10.
Dunn acknowledges that his three major topics regarding “the
beginning of salvation”, namely justification, participation in
Christ, and the gift of the Spirit, correspond in reverse order to
what the Catholic Lucien Cerfaux had previously treated as “the
present status of the Christian”11. The present study will empha-
8
See T. J. Diedun, New Covenant Morality in Paul, AnBib 89 (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1982).
9
As an alternative to what I have called the theological basis of moral action, and to the grammatical category of the “indicative”, Joseph Fitzmyer
speaks of “the ten effects of the Christ event”. These include justification, salvation, reconciliation, expiation, redemption, freedom, sanctification, transformation, new creation, and glorification. See J. A. Fitzmyer, Paul and His
Theology, a Brief Sketch (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1989), 59, 99-101.
10
See Dunn’s Theology of Paul the Apostle, chapter 5, “The Beginning of
Salvation”, 317-459. As a leading Pauline scholar working out of the Protestant tradition, Dunn’s work is of particular interest because it resituates, balances, and corrects many controversial aspects of Reformation theology. Similiarly, his adherence to the biblical text enables him to avoid distortions of
Pauline thought through the influence of nominalist philosophical presuppositions. Thus, Dunn’s reading is, in many ways, more congenial to both the
pre-Reformation tradition, and the best contemporary Catholic sensibilities,
than either traditional Reformation theology or many historical-critical
Pauline studies.
11
See Lucien Cerfaux The Christian in the Theology of St. Paul, trans. Lilian Soiron (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967) Part III, “The Present Status of the Christian”, 237-470. Although Dunn, working out of the Reformation tradition, treats justification first, and at length, he spends a good portion of this effort arguing for “the new perspective on Paul” as advocated by
scholars like E. P. Sanders. Moreover, he both acknowledges with Cerfaux
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WILLIAM F. MURPHY
size the widely neglected reality of this “participation in Christ”
as recently recovered by Pauline scholars like Dunn. In particular, I suggest that we “actualize” this participation, regarding
both our being and our action, through what can be called our
“appropriation of revelation”. To the extent that we do so, we
share in both the virtue of Christ and the quality and pattern of
his moral action.
In the following primary section of this essay (3.0), we will
consider how the theological dynamic mediated to us by the sacred text, through notions such as “the renewal of the mind” and
our ongoing transformation “in Christ”, enables a new quality of
moral action. The result of this transformation is well-expressed
by a specifically theological and christocentric application of the
scholastic principle that “being precedes act”; namely, “new existence in Christ precedes moral action in Christ”.
3.0 Transformation in Christ through the Appropriation
of Revelation
A few remarks about the broader context of Pauline theology will help us to situate the present study. The Pauline, and
broader NT, understanding of the existence of the Christian in
time and history is characterized by what Oscar Cullman has
called an “eschatological tension” between “the decisive ‘already
fulfilled’ and the ‘not yet completed’, between present and future”12. The culmination of history effected by Christ thus inthe prominence (425) of his third dimension (the Spirit), and works to correct widespread neglect of his second dimension, namely, the reality of our
“participation in Christ”. Dunn discusses the interpretation of Paul’s understanding of baptism as including all three of these dimensions (444). He emphasizes that an interpretation of Paul should include “all the elements and
aspects of the crucial beginning event of salvation” while respecting “the relative weight and emphasis Paul placed on the different elements and aspects
in different contexts (457).
12
See Oscar Cullmann, Salvation in History, (New York: Harper & Row,
1967) 202, 176, and Christ and Time: The Primitive Christian Conception of
Time and History, Rev. (London: SCM Press, 1962) 145, 154-155. For a more
recent treatment of this eschatological tension, see J. Paul Sampley’s, Walking Between the Times: Paul’s Moral Reasoning (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991).
377
volves two decisive times, between which the drama of Christian
moral action occurs. The first is the time of Christ’s life, death,
resurrection, and sending of the Spirit; the second is the time of
his return in glory. The ambiguous quality of the moral action of
Christians throughout history reflects this “eschatological tension”. Within this time of the church, Dunn describes three
“overlaps” that exist between (i) the present age and the age to
come, (ii) the old creation and the new creation, and (iii) human
existence “in Adam” corresponding to death and “in Christ” corresponding to life13. Between these times of the “already” and the
“not yet”, Dunn describes the “process” of salvation that follows its
“beginning”. This process involves the metamorphosis of the person from the “present age”, “old creation”, or “existence in Adam”
to the “age to come”, “new creation”, or “existence in Christ”.
In this primary section of the present study, I will elucidate
the Pauline understanding of the transformation that characterizes this “process of salvation” and that provides the anthropological, theological and christological basis for the moral action
of Christians14. To do this within its proper context, I will first
emphasize the christological character of Pauline anthropology
(3.1), and then the christological culmination of the Pauline understanding of revelation (3.2). These preliminaries will provide
the basis for the subsequent detailed consideration of our transformation in Christ through a spiritual “renewal of the mind”
that can be understood more specifically as an anthropological
and distinctively theological appropriation of the revelation that
culminates in Christ (3.3).
13
Dunn, Theology of Paul the Apostle, 463-465.
In this, I have benefited from Dunn’s treatment of the “process” that
follows the “beginning” of salvation. Whereas Dunn has, for the most part,
excluded Ephesians from this study because of the scholarly consensus that
it was written by a disciple of Paul, I have included it because it provides a
vital canonical witness, from the later Pauline tradition, to the deepening understanding of the theological reality at the heart of this study. More particularly, Ephesians provides further insights regarding how we are transformed in Christ through a “learning” of Christ (4:20) and a “putting on” of
Christ (4:24) that corresponds to a deep spiritual understanding of the mystery that has been revealed in him.
14
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WILLIAM F. MURPHY
3.1 The Christological Dimension of Pauline Anthropology
Pauline anthropology offers a wealth of profound insights
into human existence. At the more philosophical level, Paul’s anthropology retains the Jewish understanding of the essential
unity and relational character of man, while also drawing upon
the resources of Greek thought15. We can gain a more unified
and theological grasp of this anthropology through a consideration of the great apostle’s understanding of human identity as
manifest in the two archetypes of Adam and Christ. Consistent
with Jewish biblical16 and post-biblical17 tradition, Paul theologizes about the “dark” or “fallen” character of human existence
by reference to the figure of Adam18.
Paul’s primary concern, however, is to emphasize how our
“new” existence in Christ supersedes our “old” existence in
Adam. This priority can be seen in Rom 5:12-21, which relativizes the tragic ongoing historical effects of Adam’s transgressions through a contrast with the much greater effects wrought
by Christ. Paul emphasizes that the grace of God, as shown in
15
For a recent discussion of Paul’s anthropology, see Dunn’s Theology of
Paul the Apostle, 51-78. For our present purposes, it suffices to identify the
main sense of Paul’s primary anthropological concepts below. Soma, which
is usually translated as “body”, refers not merely to a body in the sense of a
corpse, but to a person as embodied and therefore in relation to others. Sarx,
or “flesh”, can be understood as denoting, especially, the human person in
his weakness and vulnerability to manipulation. Kardia, or “heart”, denotes
the person considered from the perspective of his innermost aspects of emotion, intellect and will. Nous, is a Greek term that overlaps with kardia and,
specifies the person as thinking and reasoning. The Greek term psyche corresponds to what we understand as the “soul”, and indicates our share in the
mystery of life. Pneuma, or “spirit”, indicates the highest dimension of man
through which he relates most directly to God.
16
Gen 1-3, Sir 17:25-18:14; 25:24, Wis 2:23-24; 10:1; 15:8, 11.
17
Jub 3:17-31, Philo, Apoc. Moses 22:4, 4 Ezra 3:7-10, 2 Baruch.
18
Rom 1:22, which reads “claiming to be wise, they became fools” is an
allusion to the result of the temptation of Gen 3:5-6 to become like God. Rom
5:12-21 presents an explicit contrast between Adam and Christ, and Rom
7:7-11 on the other hand relies upon the existential solidarity between the
common experience of fallen mankind and that of Adam in Gen 2-3.
379
the gift of righteousness and life (5:18) through Jesus Christ, will
abound “much more” (5:15, 17) than the sin and condemnation
brought on by Adam, who was only “a type of the one to come
(5:14)”. Moreover, as we can see from 1 Cor 15:21-22 and 15:4449,19 our fundamental identity is manifest most fully in our eschatological completion in Christ. The closest earthly anticipation of this fulfillment might be called our “anagogical” state20.
Thus, we can argue that the overarching emphasis of Pauline
theological anthropology is that Christ, and not Adam, is the revelatory archetype for man. Moreover, this christocentric culmination of theological anthropology has been emphasized by both
contemporary theologians such as De Lubac, Kasper, Von
Balthasar, Ratzinger, Rahner, Tremblay and Scola,21 and in the
19
1 Cor 15:21-22 reads “For as by a man came death, by a man has come
also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ
shall all be made alive”. Similarly, 1 Cor 15:48-49 reads “As was the man of
dust, so are those who are of the dust; and as is the man of heaven, so are
those who are of heaven. Just as we have borne the image of the man of dust,
we shall also bear the image of the man of heaven”.
20
For discussion of the notion of anagogy, see my “Henri de Lubac’s
Mystical Tropology”, Communio XXVII, no. 1 (2000): especially 179 n 26,
192-193.
21
De Lubac writes, for example, “in Jesus Christ we have had the perfect and definitive revelation of the human being as a personal being”. See
his “Mysticism and Mystery”, 63 in Theological Fragments. San Francisco: Ignatius, 1989. See also Walter Kasper’s Theology and Church, trans. Margaret
Kohl (New York: Crossroad, 1989), 80. Similarly, Ellero Babini writes that
Balthassar’s “particular manifestation of the unbreakable bond between
christology and anthropology is certainly one of the most important contributions he has made to Catholic theology”. See his, “Jesus Christ: Form and
Norm of Man according to Hans Urs von Balthasar”, in Hans Urs von
Balthasar: His Life and Work, ed. David L. Schindler (San Francisco: Communio Books, Ignatius Press, 1991), 230. For Karl Rahner, “anthropology is
deficient christology”. See his “On the Theology of the Incarnation”, in Theological Investigations, IV (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1966), 105120, especially 117. See also the important work of Father R. Tremblay such
as his “L’Homme qui divinise. Pour une interprétation christocentrique de
l’existence”, (Montréal-Paris: Editions Paulines/Médiaspaul, 1993) and Radicati e fondati nel Figlio. Contributi per une morale di tipo filiale, (Roma: Edizioni Dehoniane, 1997). See also Angelo Scola’s Questioni di antropologia
teologica. 2. ampliata. ed, Lezioni e dispense; 1. (Roma Milano: Pontificia
Università Lateranense; Mursia, 1997), 18, 21-22, 29-41.
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WILLIAM F. MURPHY
famous text from Gaudium et spes n. 2222. George Weigel has recently written that, for Pope John Paul II, this text is “the theological linchpin of the entire Council”23. This evaluation is supported by the Pope’s explicit statement in Fides et Ratio n. 60 that
this text (GES 22) “… serves as one of the constant referencepoints of my teaching”24.
In this context, we can recognize that man as revealed most
fully in the person of Jesus Christ discloses a deeper understanding of the fundamental OT teaching regarding our creation
in the image of God. From the initial biblical revelation of Gen
1:26-27, we were able to see man “the image of God” as intelligent, free, relational, sexually differentiated into male and female, and called to participate analogously in God’s creation and
governing of the world as a sort of vice-regent25. From the more
complete revelation given through several Pauline texts, we can
see that Jesus is the perfect image (eijkwvn) of God,26 and that we
are also created in the divine image (1 Cor 11:7) and foreordained (Eph 1:4, 5) to be conformed to Christ27. As we will see
below, our movement towards the realization of this destiny occurs within the eschatological tension described above. More-
22
This text places particular emphasis on the relationship between
Christ and man: “… it is only in the mystery of the Word made flesh that the
mystery of man truly becomes clear”. It further emphasizes Christ as revealer of both the Father and of man: “Christ the Lord, … in the very revelation
of the mystery of the Father and of his love, fully reveals man to himself and
brings to light his most high calling”.
23
George Weigel, Witness to Hope: The Biography of Pope John Paul II,
1st ed. (New York: Cliff Street Books, 1999), 169.
24
The christocentric character of John Paul II’s teaching is considered
in further detail by John Saward in his Christ is the Answer: The Christ-Centered Teaching of Pope John Paul II (New York: Alba House, 1995).
25
For a discussion of the OT teaching regarding our creation in the image of God, see Francis Martin’s “Male and Female He Created Them: A
Summary of the teaching of Genesis chapter one”. Communio 20 (1993): especially 256-259.
26
2 Cor 4:4 “… Christ, who is the image of God”, Col 1:15 He is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of all creation.
27
Recall 1 Cor 15:49 “… we shall also bear the image of the man of heaven”. See also Col 3:10 “and have put on the new nature, which is being renewed in knowledge after the image of its creator”.
381
over, it occurs in a particular manner, centered in a renewal of
the mind, which provides the theological and anthropological
foundation for moral action.
3.2 The Christological Culmination of Revelation
A brief discussion of the Pauline understanding of God’s revelation as culminating in Christ will prepare for our subsequent
consideration of how we assimilate it, especially through the
mind. For a basic understanding of the notion of revelation, we
might draw upon Dei Verbum (nn. 2-6) which presents it as the
action of God whereby he reveals himself and a knowledge of his
plan of salvation28. Paul uses a variety of words and images to
mediate the content of this divine revelation to us. In particular,
the object of his teaching and preaching can be understood as
“the Gospel” (Gal 1:6-9, 11; 2:2, 5, 14; Rom 1:1, 3, 9, 15-16), or
perhaps more specifically as “Jesus Christ and him crucified” (1
Cor 2:2; see also 1:18-25). Moreover, in Rom 16:25, he uses the
notion of “the mystery” in reference to both the “gospel” and his
“preaching of Jesus Christ”. Similarly, in 1 Cor. 2:1,29 “the mystery” refers to the content of Paul’s preaching, while in 2:7 it is
associated with the wisdom of God as manifest in “the Word of
the cross” (1:18), and in 4:1 it refers to the saving message entrusted to the apostles.
This notion of mystery has a broader and more developed
sense in the later Pauline writings. In Col 1:26-27, the mystery
refers to God’s plan of salvation as now revealed, and especially
the way that this plan pertains to the indwelling of Christ within the believer (1:26). Col 2:2 further reinforces the christologi-
28
An adequate understanding of our appropriation of revelation is facilitated by a corresponding understanding of the theology of revelation itself, such as that found in Dei Verbum, and Fides et Ratio. For a treatment of
the central aspects of such a theology of revelation, see my “Revelation in
Fides et Ratio”, forthcoming in the Josephinum Journal of Theology 8, No.I
(Winter/Spring, 2001): 74-89.
29
Although there are textual variants for this reference, the committee
preferred the witnesses for the present reading of musthrivwn. See Bruce Manning Metzger and United Bible Societies., A Textual Commentary on the Greek
New Testament (Stuttgart: German Bible Society, 1994).
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WILLIAM F. MURPHY
cal culmination of God’s revelation. It specifically equates
“knowledge of God’s mystery” with knowledge of Christ. Joseph
Ratzinger has emphasized the integrating power of this Pauline
understanding of revelation in his commentary on Dei Verbum30.
Thus, the Pauline notion of “mystery”, which Raymond Brown
has summarized as “the plan of God revealed”, corresponds particularly well to our earlier definition of revelation31. Moreover,
God’s mysterious plan to reconcile, bring together or recapitulate all things in Christ (1:9-10) is arguably the controlling theme
of the letter to the Ephesians32. Besides this general sense of the
mystery as God’s plan of salvation centered in Christ, several
specific aspects of this revealed plan of God are treated in the
letter. These include (i) the reconciliation of Jews and gentiles
within the church (2:11-22), (ii) Paul’s reception of the mystery
through a revelation (3:2-13), (iii) a prayer that his audience
might come to a similar understanding of the mystery (3:14-19),
and (iv) the nuptial mystery through which husband and wife
participate in, and signify, the relationship shared between
Christ and the church (5:21-32). Thus, the notion of “the mystery”, or even better “the mystery of Christ” provides an apt way
30
“… we have a sacramental view, which sees law and grace, word and
deed, message and sign, the person and his utterance within the one comprehensive unity of the mystery. The idea of mystery in the epistle to the
Ephesians, with all its associations, should echo here: this idea includes the
universality of salvation (“unite all things in him”, i.e. Christ; 1:10), the unity of mankind in the one Christ, the cosmic dimension of what is Christian,
the relation of revelation to history, and finally its Christological center. For
the mystery of God is ultimately nothing other than Christ himself — it is the
person (Colosians 1: 27)”. Joseph Ratzinger, “Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation. Chapter 1”, in Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II,
ed. Herbert Vorgrimmler (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), 171.
31
See Raymond Brown, “The Semitic Background of the Term “Mystery” in the New Testament”, Catholic Biblical Quarterly 20 (1958): 437-438,
and “The Semitic Background of the New Testament Mysterion”, Biblica 39
(1958): 426-48.
32
For the following insights regarding the notion of mystery in Ephesians, I have benefited from Chapter 1 of Francis Martin’s A Vision for Humanity: Marriage According to the Letter to the Ephesians (Washington, DC:
Catholic University of America Press, forthcoming).
383
of speaking about the christological culmination of revelation,
both in general, and in its various dimensions33.
3.3 Transformation in Christ through a Spiritual Renewal of
the Mind
We are now prepared to study, in detail, the important theological reality mediated to us by texts such as Romans 12:1-2.
This consideration of our human transformation in Christ will
be organized around this passage from Romans because of the
importance of the letter, and of the pivotal role of this passage
within it. Moreover, the following study of Rom 12:1-2 will look
back to draw upon texts from Paul’s earlier letters and look forward to the later Pauline tradition, especially as found in Eph
4:17-24. Our primary text reads as follows:
12:1 I exhort you therefore, brothers, by the mercies of God, to
present your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to
God, which is your spiritual/rational worship. 2 Do not be conformed to this world but be transformed by the renewal of your
mind, that you may discern what is the will of God, what is good
and acceptable and perfect34.
3.3.1 Function of the Passage within the Structure of Romans
Romans 12:1-2 is among the most important texts for understanding the relationship between Paul’s theology and ethics.
It functions as the “hinge” between the doctrinal (1:16-11:36)
and hortatory (12:1-15:13) sections of the letter35 by addressing
33
Besides these Pauline texts, a similar christocentric emphasis can be
seen especially in Jn 1:1-18, 1 Jn 1:1-3, and Heb 1:1-3.
34
Rom 12:1-2 is comprised of a single Greek sentence and thus should
be treated as a unit. Parakalw‘ ou\n uJma‘ı, ajdelfoiv, dia; tw‘n oijktirmw‘n tou‘ qeou‘
parasth‘sai ta; swvmata uJmw‘n qusivan zw‘san aJgivan eujavreston tw‘/ qew‘/, th;n
logikh;n latreivan uJmw‘n: kai; mh; suschmativzesqe tw‘/ aijw‘ni touvtw/, ajlla; metamorfou‘sqe th/‘ ajnakainwvsei tou‘ noovı eijı to; dokimavzein uJma‘ı tiv to; qevlhma
tou‘ qeou‘, to; ajgaqo;n kai; eujavreston kai; tevleion.
35
This basic structure of the letter to the Romans is widely recognized
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WILLIAM F. MURPHY
how the theological reality mediated by the “thesis statement” of
the letter, namely that “the Gospel is the power of God for salvation” (1:16), becomes effective in the moral action of Christians36. As we will see below, the answer that this passage presents involves two complementary dimensions. One is a mindcentered transformation of the person (12:2), through, what I
will argue can be understood as an appropriation of revelation.
The other is a corresponding life of sacrificial love (12:1). For
Paul, a deep spiritual understanding of the divine wisdom and
love as revealed in Christ is inseparable from, and manifest in, a
similar mode of action. Thus, the Gospel becomes effective in
our moral action as “the power of God for salvation” (1:16) precisely through this ongoing dialectic of transformative spiritual
understanding and correlative action. The implicit teaching is
that our moral action will be strengthened by this divine power
to the extent that we have undergone this transformation.
This emphasis on the functional significance of Rom 12:1-2
is reinforced by a consideration of Eph 4:17-24, which indicates
that the theological reality disclosed through Rom 12:1-2 was
both recognized as significant, and further developed, by the later Pauline tradition. Ephesians 4:17-24 is a further development
of Rom 12:1-2 in two primary ways. First, through its contrasting structure and secondly through its more christocentric articulation of our spiritual transformation. This text is structured
to present a vivid contrast between (i) the inability of unbeliev-
among Pauline scholars. See, for example J. A. Fitzmyer, Romans (The Anchor Bible 33; New York: Doubleday, 1992), x-xii and Frank J. Matera, New
Testament Ethics: The Legacies of Jesus and Paul, 1st ed. (Louisville, Ky.:
Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 192.
36
F. J. Matera emphasizes this passage as the “theme” of the moral exhortation, which “root[s] the moral imperative in the salvation-historical indicative”. New Testament Ethics, 193. Victor Furnish considers 12:1-2 as a restatement, “in an explicitly hortatory mode and context, of the theme of the
letter stated in 1:16-17”. See his Theology and Ethics in Paul (Nashville:
Abingdon, 1968), 103. Without contradicting the insights of these commentators, I would emphasize that the text goes beyond “announc[ing] the
theme” or “restating it in a moral context” to reveal something of the decisive transformation that enables a distinctive quality of Christian moral action.
385
ers to live according to the standards of moral truth and virtue
as revealed through creation (4:17-19), and (ii) the internal appropriation of the supernatural resources which enable Christians to live according to the fullness of truth revealed in Jesus
(4:20-24). Whereas 4:17-19 echoes the teaching of Rom 1:18-32
on natural morality, 4:20-24 provides a more christocentric articulation of the reality mediated through Rom 12:1-2. Thus, the
negative side of this contrast (4:17-19) indicates that the moral
truth and virtue available to anyone of sound mind are in continuity with the spiritual or mystical foundations of distinctively
Christian moral action, as described in the positive side (4:2024). This positive side of the contrast will be discussed further
below. Like our text from Romans, Eph 4:17-24 also follows the
doctrinal section of the letter (Eph 1:3-3:23) and occurs near the
beginning of the hortatory section (Eph 4:1-6:20) to provide fundamental principles upon which the subsequent exhortation depends. The affirmative side of this text (Eph 4:20-24)37 is similar
to Rom 12:2 in that it speaks of being “renewed in the spirit of
your minds”. Furthermore, as will see below, it develops this
teaching from Romans in several important ways, especially by
further articulating the christocentric character of this transformation.
3.3.2 The Theological Reality Mediated by Rom 12:1-2
We will now consider the theological reality mediated by
this important passage through a selective commentary, focusing on the decisive aspects of the text. As I indicated in the preceding section, I will argue that Rom 12:1-2, especially when understood in light of passages like 2 Cor 3:18 and Eph 4:17-24,
discloses to us how the Gospel becomes effective within us as
the power of God for salvation (Rom 1:16). In particular, I will
37
Eph 4:20-24 (RSV) “You did not so learn Christ! – assuming that you
have heard about him and were taught in him, as the truth is in Jesus. Put
off your old nature which belongs to your former manner of life and is corrupt through deceitful lusts, and be renewed in the spirit of your minds, and
put on the new nature, created after the likeness of God in true righteousness and holiness”.
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WILLIAM F. MURPHY
suggest that it teaches us that distinctively Christian moral action depends upon an ongoing dialectic between a transformative spiritual understanding of the revelation given in Christ
(12:2) and a corresponding life of sacrificial love (12:1).
3.3.2.1 Romans 12:1
“I exhort to you therefore, brothers, by the mercies of God
…(12:1)”.
This introductory phrase begins with the Greek verb,
parakalevw (I exhort), which signals the transition from the doctrinal section of the letter into the moral exhortation38. For our
present purposes, the most important thing to note is the clear
indication within this short phrase that the subsequent exhortation is grounded in Paul’s previous discussion regarding the theological reality of what God has done for us in Christ. In particular, the conjunction ou\n, which is translated above as “therefore”, clearly indicates that the subsequent exhortation builds
upon the preceding doctrinal teaching.
“…to present / offer your bodies as a living sacrifice…”
This phrase exhorts Christians to a life of self-sacrificial love
in union with Christ. The dependence of this sacrificial offering
upon the preceding teaching regarding our union with Christ in
his death and resurrection (6:3-11) is signaled by the use of the
verb parivsthmi, (to present or to offer) which occurs five times in
Chapter 6.39 The reference to “your bodies” as the object of the
offering should be understood, not in our modern sense, but in
terms of Jewish anthropology. For Paul and his Jewish contemporaries, sw‘ma (body) should not be understood as a part of the
38
For Paul, the word also evokes his apostolic authority. See Rom 15:30,
Phil 4:2, and 2 Cor 10:1.
39
See 6:13 (two times), 6:16, 6:19 (two times). Thus, commentators like
Victor Furnish, for example, emphasize “the special significance of the relationship between Chapter 6 and the appeal of 12:1-2”, See his Theology and
Ethics, 105.
387
human being, but rather as the visible, tangible, biological and
historical aspect of the unique human totality. It is “what one is”
rather than “something one has”40. Furthermore, his use of sacrificial language in the context of this unified anthropology
helps to explain the choice of sw‘ma rather than mevlh, as in
6:13,19; namely, this ongoing sacrifice involves the living bodyperson and not just his individual elements41.
For Paul, the Christian life is sacrificial in nature because it
is based upon a participation in the mystery of Christ and his
body, the church; thus, it manifests the pattern of moral action
as exemplified in Christ’s paradigmatic and revelatory act of sacrificial love. This emphasis on the sacrificial pattern of Christian
life is evident throughout Paul’s writings. For example, he exhorts the Galatians to a way of living he describes as “faith working through love (5:6)”, which involves enslaving themselves to
each other in love, and thereby fulfilling (i.e., filling full) the law
of Christ (5:13-14). This same notion of fulfilling the law
through love is found in Rom 13:8-10. Moreover, Paul teaches in
1 Cor 2:16, that Christians have, or share in, “the mind of
Christ”, which enables them to lead lives of self-sacrificial love
ordered to the edification of the church42. Paul exemplifies this
love especially in Second Corinthians, with its four lists of apostolic hardships (2 Cor 4:7-8; 6:4-10; 11:23-29; 12:10)43. This life
40
Fitzmyer, Romans, 126-127. For Frank Matera “human beings do not
merely have a body, they are sw‘ma because they are able to make themselves
the object of their own actions and to experience themselves as subjects to
whom something happens”. New Testament Ethics, 195. Gabriel Marcel
writes that “of this body I can neither say that it is I, nor that it is not I” (12).
It is, rather, “the frontier district between being and having” (82). Gabriel
Marcel, Being and Having: An Existentialist Diary, trans. K. Farrer (New
York: Harper & Row, 1965).
41
See James D. G. Dunn, “Romans 9-16”, in Word Biblical Commentary
38 (Dallas: Word, 1985), 709.
42
Allen R. Hunt, for example, emphasizes the moral, and therefore sacrificial, implications of sharing in “the mind of Christ” in his work The Inspired Body: Paul, the Corinthians, and Divine Inspiration (Macon: Mercer
University Press, 1996), 142.
43
In Pauline theology, these apostolic hardships are understood as a participation in the redemptive suffering of Jesus. Paul is able to rejoice in such
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WILLIAM F. MURPHY
of self-sacrificial love should be understood as the ultimate goal
of Paul’s moral exhortation because, in such a life, one has appropriated the mystery of Christ to such an extent that it bears
fruit in his moral action. This transformation and renewal of the
mind (12:2) should be understood as enabling both the life of
self-sacrificial love, as indicated in 12:1, and the spontaneous
manner of Christian freedom that we find in Rom 8 and Gal 5.
… holy and acceptable to God which is your rational/spiritual
worship44.
Almost all commentators agree that this phrase stands in apposition to the entire preceding phrase beginning with
“parasth‘sai”45. It thereby helps us to grasp more fully the reality
trials because, through them, the mystery of divine strength working through
human weakness is made effective. Although it is most fully developed in 2
Cor, this theological dynamic of divine strength working through human
weakness is disclosed to us in various ways throughout the first letter to the
Corinthians, especially where Paul presents himself as an example. In 1 Cor
2:1-5, Paul reminds the Corinthians how his initial preaching to them was
made effective precisely through a “demonstration of the Spirit and of power”
(2:4), in spite of his “weakness”, unadorned speech, “fear”, and “trembling”
(2:3). In 3:5-9, Paul acknowledges implicitly this theological dynamic when he
emphasizes that ministers of the Gospel, such as he and Apollos, are merely
servants (3:5) through whom God gives growth to his Church (3:6-7). In Chapter 4, Paul responds further to the Corinthians’ widespread misunderstanding
of Christian ministry, which apparently included a particular criticism of his
own apostolic service. His response emphasizes that, in contrast to the divine
power that makes the apostolic ministry bear fruit (i.e., 3:6-7), he and his fellow apostles are “weak”, “held in disrepute” (4:10), hungry, thirsty, ill-clad,
buffeted, homeless, persecuted, and slandered (4:11-13).
44
The Greek text for the key phrase reads th;n logikh;n latreivan uJmw‘n:
“[which is] your rational worship”. Dunn notes that the word logikh;n does
not occur in the LXX but is common in Greek (especially Stoic) and Hellenistic Jewish (i.e., Philo) philosophy and religion in the sense of “belonging to reason, or rational”. An interesting citation from Ap. Const. 8.9.8
“thinks of man as a rational being by virtue of the Law given him, implanted and written. Dunn, Romans, 709.
45
See Dunn, Romans, 709. The term “apposition” is commonly employed in biblical studies to indicate that one text corresponds to, or explains, another.
389
of Christian life as a sacrificial offering to God. The primary challenge in interpreting this phrase is to recover an adequate sense
of the Greek phrase th;n logikh;n latreivan, which is rendered
above as “rational”, or perhaps “spiritual” worship. More particularly, the difficulty arises from the use of the adjective logikovı,
which is a hapax legomenon, both in Paul, and within the NT. It
includes the related senses of both (i) an inner worship that involves the mind and the heart, as opposed to an exterior worship
that merely goes through the motions, and (ii) a spiritual or rational worship in the sense of that which is appropriate for human beings as rational and spiritual creatures of God46. This sacrificial offering of one’s entire self is holy and pleasing to God because we thereby give him the only appropriate gift, in light of
what he has done for us in Christ. Only such action, which gives
God the love that he justly deserves, is in full conformity with our
rational nature47. Thus, to this point, we have found that logikovı
specifies an embodied worship that is rooted in our rational and
spiritual nature, and in conformity with the just requirements of
our radical indebtedness before God.
I suggest that we can gain a better understanding of the underlying theological realities being mediated to us by this Greek
word logikovı through a consideration of the Pauline, and broader NT, usage of the related verb levgw (I speak), and especially the
noun lovgoı (word). Both the verbal and substantive forms run
the whole gamut of usage within the NT from the most everyday
to the most theologically pregnant. The more theological of
these occurrences tend to both retain and develop the OT sense
of the eternal, creative, living, and effective Word of God (i.e., Is
46
See Douglas J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, The New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans
Pub. Co., 1996), 753; Dunn, Romans, 710; Fitzmyer, Romans, 640; and Matera, New Testament Ethics, 194; are close to the second sense.
47
In contrast to the truly rational or spiritual character of a life dedicated to God as a sacrificial offering, texts like Rom 1:18-32 indicate that failure to acknowledge God results in the corruption of our rational nature. This
notion of giving God the worship that he deserves is treated by St. Thomas
as the virtue of religion (ST 2,2, q. 81-100), which is understood as a species
of the virtue of justice.
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WILLIAM F. MURPHY
55:11). For Paul, and for the NT more generally, this efficacious
Word of God reaches its fulfillment in the message of salvation
centered in Christ48. The NT revelation regarding the lovgoı
reaches a certain culmination in Johannine thought. Here we
see most explicitly that Jesus, as the second person of the Trinity, is the eternal Word who became flesh (i.e., Jn 1 and 1 Jn 1).
From this broader theological reflection upon the New Testament, we can recognize that it is this eternal Word, or lovgoı, who
reveals to us the mystery of God and his plan of salvation (Eph
1:9-10), especially through the culminating disclosure of divine
wisdom and love on the cross. Thus, we might say that the sacrificial character of our life of “rational worship” is according to
this eternal Word or logos when it follows (i) moral truth as revealed through creation, (ii) the law as revealed to Israel, (iii) the
concrete teachings of Jesus, (iv) the fullness of truth revealed in
his person, and (v) the pattern of sacrificial love that he exemplifies.
The recognition that Philo’s use of the word logikovı contains
elements of both mysticism and Stoicism helps us to further
penetrate this sacred text49. Thus, we can similarly distinguish
between “mystical” or spiritual and, what we might call, “rational” elements in Paul’s usage. We might say that the rational aspect has to do with the ability of the mind to comprehend those
dimensions of reality that are available to the “unaided” human
intellect. The more distinctively mystical or spiritual aspects of
logikovı relate to the role of the Spirit in helping our minds to
grasp the deeper dimensions of reality50. In this light, the present
48
See, for example, the article on levgw, lovgoı, etc. by G. Kittel in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament ( TDTN) IV (1967), especially 100137.
49
See G. Kittel, “logikovı”, TDNT IV (1967), 143.
50
Here, I am trying to make a distinction regarding human knowledge
while recognizing the fundamentally unified character of reality. In his “God
and the End of the Intelligence: Knowledge as Relationship”, Communio
XXVI, no. 3 (1999): 510-540, David Schindler discusses (520) the important
implications of Aquinas’ principle from De Veritate (q. 22, a.2) that “all knowers know God implicitly in whatever they know”. He argues (520ff) that this
understanding of our implicit knowledge of God follows from the biblical
doctrine of creation, and that it is of particular value in restoring the har-
391
verse is an exhortation that relies upon the fullness of revelation
mediated to us through the Christ event. This revelation is understood, not only rationally, but also spiritually or mystically,
and not only as a source of information or motivation, but also
as a share in the divine power given through the Gospel (1:16)51.
3.3.2.2 Romans 12:2a
12:2 … but be transformed…
The command to “be transformed” is the RSV rendering of
the present passive imperative of the Greek verb metamorfovomai.
The passive voice of the verb indicates that this transformation
is effected by divine rather than human power, while the imperative mood indicates the human responsibility in this ongoing
process of transformation. This present occurrence of the verb
should be interpreted in light of its occurrence in 2 Cor 3:18,
where the transformation is further specified as “into his image”52, and the Spirit is identified as agent of the transformation53. That the transformation of Rom 12:2 is also specifically
mony between faith and reason. However, he observes that “this feature of
the implicit has not been central in Catholic or at least Thomistic accounts
of knowledge in the modern period, even though Aquinas appears to assert
it as an almost axiomatic principle”.
51
Further support for this recognition of the both rational and mystical
dimensions of our “living sacrifice” can be gained by considering this text in
the light of what Paul teaches in 1 Cor 2:6-16. Here he treats of the necessity of the Spirit in order for man to comprehend the depths of God, in particular the wisdom of the cross, through which Christ offered himself as a
living sacrifice. While laying down one’s life is foolishness to an unbeliever,
a life of sacrificial love makes perfect sense to the Christian. This is true
since the Christian has contemplated the mystery of the cross (1 Cor 1:182:5), through the light of the Holy Spirit, and has experienced the reality of
his participation in Christ through a sharing in the pattern of his life, death
and resurrection.
52
In this context, the pronoun “his” is a clear reference to Christ, and
the notion of image, or eivkwvn, is an important technical term tracing back to
Genesis, as we saw in section 3.1 above.
53
While the role of the Spirit is not specified in Rom 12:2, Paul does emphasize the change effected by the Spirit in Rom 8:1-13. By the Spirit, Chris-
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WILLIAM F. MURPHY
according to the image of God in Christ is confirmed by the occurrence of the same Greek root in Rom 8:29, which teaches that
we are “predestined to be conformed (suvmmorfoı) to the image
(eivkwvn) of his Son”54. James Dunn is particularly clear on this important but widely neglected dimension of Paul’s theology. “The
work of the Spirit is to transform Christians into the divine likeness (2 Cor 3.18), which is Christ (4.4)”55. As we will see below,
the christocentric character of this transformation is further emphasized in the later Pauline tradition as represented by Colossians and Ephesians. Moreover, this transformation is ordered
towards our living or walking by the Spirit (Rom 8; Gal 5:16-25)
and it tends toward our eschatological orientation (1 Cor 15:5152; Rom 6:5, 6:8; Phil 3:10-11, 3:21). Thus, it presupposes and includes not only our adherence to moral truth but also our
growth in the moral and theological virtues.
12:2 … by the renewal of your mind …
This phrase specifies the primary spiritual dynamic that effects this christocentric “metamorphosis” or transformation of
the person, namely, a “renewal of the mind”. A
jnakaivnwsiı, or renewal, refers essentially to the ongoing renewal of thought and
being that characterizes authentic Christian life under the influence of the Spirit. In a similar way, Paul uses the verbal form of
ajnakainovw in the parallel passages of 2 Cor 4:16 and Col 3:10 to
tians are transformed from having their minds and lives “set … on the things
of the flesh” (8:5), such that they “live according to the flesh” (8:13), to having their minds (fronou‘sin) set “on things of the Spirit” (8:5), in order to “live
according to the Spirit”.
54
See also 2 Cor 5:17, Col 3:10, and Eph 4:24, via its dependence on Col
3:10. Similarly, this reality can be described as Christ “being formed” (Gal
4:19) or “living” (Gal 2:20) in the believer. Put another way, it involves
“putting on” Christ (Rom 13:14; Gal 3:27; Eph 4:24).
55
Dunn, Theology of Paul, 263. Later he writes “Paul’s most basic conception of the salvation process [is] one of the personal transformation
(metamorphosis), that is, in particular, as transformation to become like
Christ” (468). “The process is one of being transformed into the image of
Christ (2 Cor 3:18), a being conformed to the image of God’s Son” (468).
393
describe the ongoing renewal effected by the Spirit in the believer56. Moreover, our present phrase picks up on the references
to “the new life of the Spirit” (kainovthti pneuvmatoı) from Rom
7:6 and “newness of life” (kainovthti zwh‘ı) from Rom 6:4, thereby indicating the intrinsic connection between the new life in
union with Christ (Rom 6:3-11) and the renewal of the mind
(Rom 12:2).
Consistent with the unified character of Jewish anthropology, as discussed above, the mind (nou‘ı) that is renewed is not so
much a faculty of the human person as it is the human person
understood through the aspect of his intellectual capacity for
knowing, understanding, and judging. This renewed “mind” can
be further understood as the remedy for the corrupted Gentile
mind as discussed in 1:18-32 and 2:14-15. The “renewal of the
mind” addresses the problems identified in both of these earlier
passages57. Thus, the righteousness that comes through the
Gospel includes an ongoing work of the Spirit, transforming the
person through a renewal of his mind. This mind-centered
56
In 2 Cor 4:16, the outward decay which is apparent, especially in a life
of apostolic labor, is contrasted with the continual daily renewal (ajnakainovw)
of the inner person. In Col 3:10, “Paul” refers to an ongoing present renewal
(ajnakainouvmenon, pres passive participle) in knowledge.
57
A sketch of Paul’s argument in Romans will help us to see the connection between (i) this renewal, (ii) the corrupted mind (1:18-32), (iii) the
justification effected by the Gospel (i.e., 3:21-31), and (iv) the Christian “life
in the Spirit” (i.e., chap. 8). In contrast to the Gentiles who have refused to
acknowledge God (1:21), have become futile in their thinking (dialogismoi‘ı)
(1:21), and have fallen into sin (1:22-31), Christians are justified by God’s
grace (3:24) through faith, and are therefore “at peace with God” through
Christ (5:1). While the Gentiles have only a partial knowledge of God’s law
(2:14-15) through nature, and the Jews have a more complete knowledge
through revelation (2:17-20), neither is able to keep the law (3:9-20) without
“the power of God for salvation” as found in the Gospel (1:16). Although
their minds have at least a partial grasp of the truth, they can’t live in accordance with it. Furthermore, while no one is justified (3:19-20) without the
Gospel, God justifies, or makes righteous, the one who has faith in Jesus
(3:26). In 8:5-8, Paul describes those who have their mind (frovnhma) set on
the flesh and who thereby live according to the flesh, in hostility to God and
his law. The contrast to this life with a mind set on the flesh is life in the Spirit (8:9-17).
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WILLIAM F. MURPHY
transformation of the person, through the Spirit, brings about
our deepening participation in, not only “the mind of Christ” (1
Cor 2:16), but also his virtues58 and his exemplary and salvific
pattern of moral action.
To better understand this transformation by the renewal of
the mind it is helpful to look at our parallel text from Ephesians,
which speaks of a similar renewal “in the spirit of your minds”.
Most interesting for our purposes is not the relatively insignificant variation in this particular phrase, but rather its further
elaboration in two contexts. First, in the immediate context of
Ephesians 4:20-24, the more christocentric character of this renewal is presented more explicitly. Second, within the broader
context of the letter, we can see that this renewal corresponds to
a deepening spiritual understanding, or appropriation, of God’s
mysterious plan as revealed in Christ. Immediately below, I will
discuss first the immediate context of this passage; in the following section, we will consider how this renewal “in the spirit
of your minds” relates to the theme of knowledge, spiritual understanding or, the appropriation of revelation as emphasized
throughout the letter.
3.3.2.2.1 Renewal of the Mind in the Context of Ephesians
4:20-24
As we observed in the introductory paragraph of this essay,
the exhortation of Eph 4:23 to be “renewed in the spirit of your
minds” draws upon its context to extend the teaching of Rom
12:1-2 in several ways. In particular, it emphasizes the distinctively christological character (i) of revelation, (ii) of Christian
catechesis, and (iii) of the transforming renewal that corresponds to our “putting on” of “the new man” (4:24). First, concerning revelation, this text emphasizes that the fullness of truth
58
For St. Bonaventure, the virtues are precisely a participation in the
virtues of Christ, whereas for St. Thomas, this christological context is not
developed explicitly. In a forthcoming article, I will trace the implicit christological foundations for Thomistic virtue theory and argue for the further
development of this dimension of Thomistic thought, especially in the context of the new evangelization.
395
is found in the person of Jesus who is, in Himself and in his action, the completion of God’s revelation. Here, I refer to the
phrase “as the truth is in Jesus” (Eph 4:21), which emphasizes
that the content of revealed truth is found, in some way, in the
person of Jesus. Moreover, by using the personal name, it implies that this revelation is mediated within the context of an interpersonal relationship59. Second, regarding catechesis, the
tasks of teaching and learning correspond to this christocentric
revelation to such an extent that the process of learning is referred to as “learn[ing] Christ” (4:21)60. Lincoln writes that the
personal object “Christ” is significant here because Christians
believe that He is a living person whose presence is mediated by
the proclamation and teaching about Him, so that learning
Christ includes being shaped by the risen Christ as the source of
a new way of life61. Luke Timothy Johnson has dedicated an important new book to emphasizing this truth that, according to
the NT, learning the Christian faith and living as a Christian presuppose an ongoing “relationship” with the risen Christ62. This
59
The recognition of this personal character of revelation is gaining increasing attention in contemporary thought. See Franz Jozef van Beeck’s, “Divine Revelation: Intervention or Self-Communication ?”, Theological Studies
52 (1991): 199-226, and my previously cited “Revelation in Fides et Ratio”. Regarding the interpersonal character of knowledge, see also Schindler “God
and the End of the Intelligence” 528ff, where he argues that “knowledge is
first and foremost a matter of relation, the order of which is disclosed in the
creation of all things by and in the triune God revealed in Jesus Christ”.
60
To “learn Christ” is to be on the receptive side of expressions such as
“to preach Christ”, “to proclaim Christ”, “to announce Christ”, or “to teach
Christ”. Some verse references follow: “to preach Christ” (1 Cor 1:23, 15:12;
2 Cor 1:19, 4:5, 11:4; Phil 1:15), “to proclaim Christ” (Col 1:28; Phil 1:17; Acts
17:3), “to announce Christ” (Gal 1:16; Eph 3:8) or “to teach Christ” (Acts
5:42; Col 1:28). For this note, I am indebted to Francis Martin’s Biblical Theology of Marriage and Family (Class notes; Washington, DC: JPII Institute,
Fall 1996), 58.
61
See Andrew T. Lincoln, Ephesians, Word Biblical Commentary (Dallas: Word, 1990), 280.
62
See Luke Timothy Johnson, Living Jesus: Learning the Heart of the
Gospel, 1st ed. (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1999). See also my review of this book in The Thomist 63, no. 4 (1999): 672-677.
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WILLIAM F. MURPHY
interpersonal “learning” of what God has revealed in Christ is,
therefore, an aspect of what we have called the appropriation of
revelation. Thus, we might say that Christ is both the central object of the revelation we appropriate, and, in some way, the personal agent who communicates this revelation.
Our third observation addresses how this renewal of 4:23 effects the transformation from, literally, “the old man” (to;n
palaio;n a[nqrwpon) of 4:22 to “the new man” (to;n kaino;n a[nqrwpon) of 4:24. We can perhaps best understand the meaning of
this metamorphosis by considering a similar contrast in Eph 2
where the Gentiles (2:11-12), who are without Christ, are contrasted (in 2:15) to “the new man” (kaino;n a[nqrwpon), which
refers to the new humanity as united “in Christ”. In the context
of Pauline theology as discussed above (3.0), we can see that this
text refers to what Dunn calls “the process of salvation” in which
the Christian moves from his fallen state “in Adam” towards his
fulfillment “in Christ”63. Moreover, the subsequent phrase (4:24)
indicates that this new man is created literally “according to”, or
perhaps better “in the image of”, God64.
In the following section, we will consider more broadly the
important theme of deepening spiritual knowledge or understanding within the letter to the Ephesians. Such a study will
63
This teaching of Eph 2:15 regarding the “new man” builds upon Paul’s
teaching that Adam was “a type of the one who was to come” (Rom 5:14),
and that Christ “the last Adam” is “a life-giving spirit” (1 Cor 15:45). Thus,
“the new Adam” is Christ, but not as separated from his body. Rather the
new man is the Mystery of Christ and his body, the Church.
64
This text is best understood in light of the parallel passage found in
Col 3:10, upon which it probably depends. This text from Colossians includes the word eijkovna, which in the context of Pauline theology, indicates
the christological character of our origin and destiny. A consideration of
some parallel references to the old man can help us to recognize the distinct
character of our present passage. Whereas Rom 6:6 (the old man was crucified) and Col 3:9 (you have put off the old man) stress the definitive break
with the old person that has already occurred, this present text (Eph 4:24)
retains the tension between the ontological reality, or “indicative”, of new life
and the consequent moral “imperative” by exhorting the audience “to become in practice what God has already made them”. See Lincoln, Ephesians,
285-286.
397
help us to further comprehend how this renewing transformation is effected by, what might be called, a christocentric appropriation of revelation.
3.3.2.2.2 Knowledge, Renewal, and the Appropriation of
Revelation in Ephesians
The importance of this theme of cognitive growth or transformation is further indicated by its four occurrences within the
doctrinal section of Ephesians. These are found within the
prayer of praise (1:3-14), the prayer of thanksgiving and wonder
(1:15-23), “Paul’s” account of how “the mystery was made
known to [him] by revelation” (3:2-13), and his prayer that his
audience might comprehend the mystery of God’s love as revealed in Christ (3:14-19)65. Let us survey, briefly, some of the relevant aspects of these four texts to further elucidate the transforming renewal of the mind that provides the theological foundation for the moral exhortations of both Ephesians and Romans.
Broadly speaking, the object of the knowledge referred to in
Ephesians is God’s mysterious plan of salvation “to recapitulate
all things in Christ” (1:10). We can distinguish various aspects of
this mysterious plan including its eternal existence in the mind
of God66, and its working out in salvation history67. Within the
65
Eph 3:14 For this reason I bow my knees before the Father, … (3:1619) that … he may grant you to be strengthened with might through his Spirit in the inner man, and that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith;
that you, being rooted and grounded in love, may have power to comprehend
with all the saints what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and
to know the love of Christ which surpasses knowledge, that you may be filled
with all the fullness of God.
66
The eternal dimensions of the divine plan are indicated in various
ways within the prayer of praise (1:3-14). For example, we are chosen in
Christ “before the foundation of the world” (1:4); and foreordained to adoptive sonship (1:5).
67
Reflection structured along these lines corresponds roughly to the patristic distinction between (especially trinitarian) theology (theologia) and
economy (oikonomia). Although the decisive historical realization of God’s
plan has already occurred in the saving work of Christ, its completion involves the activity of the church in time. Within the letter to the Ephesians,
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WILLIAM F. MURPHY
context of this divine plan, the prayer of thanksgiving and wonder (1:15-23) includes what we might call a prayer for a renewal “in the spirit of your minds”; it thereby helps to elucidate our
primary text from the letter (Eph 4:23). In particular, the prayer
of Eph 1:17-18 requests that God “may give you a spirit (pneu‘ma)
of wisdom (sofiva) and of revelation (ajpokavluyiı) in the knowledge (ejpivgnwsiı) of him, having the eyes of your hearts enlightened (fwtivzw), that you may know (oi\da)…”68. Thus, our author
uses a variety of Greek terms to mediate the reality of this intellectual and spiritual grasp of God’s plan as revealed in Christ.
The theme of knowledge is also at the heart of “Paul’s” long
digression (3:2-13) regarding “how the mystery was made
known (gnwrivzw) to [him] by revelation (3:3)”69. This text alludes
to Paul’s transforming encounter with Jesus on the road to Damascus70. This language of “revelation” indicates the profound “insight into the mystery of Christ” (3:4) that Paul was given “by the
Spirit” (3:5). Moreover, this language of “revelation” alludes to
the previous reference to spiritual knowledge in 1:17. Besides
this revelatory and illuminative work of the Spirit, Eph 3:13 indicates an important additional aspect of how one appropriates
we can further distinguish several aspects of the historical dimension of “the
mystery”. These include the reconciliation of both Jews and gentiles within
the church (2:11-22), Paul’s reception of the mystery through a revelation
(3:2-13), and “the nuptial mystery” (5:21-33) in which husband and wife participate in the mysterious union between Christ and the Church. Furthermore, through our deepening spiritual understanding of God’s plan, we participate consciously in its historical realization. For this last aspect, I rely upon Francis Martin’s forthcoming A Vision for Humanity, esp. chapter 1.
68
The text continues “…what is the hope to which he has called you,
what are the riches of his glorious inheritance among the saints, and what is
the immeasurable greatness of his power in us who believe…”
69
This notion of knowledge by revelation is also important in Romans
16:25-27 “…according to the revelation of the mystery… now disclosed …”
16:25-26, Galatians 1:11-16 “…it came through a revelation of Jesus Christ”.
1:12, and 1 Cor. 2:10 “…God has revealed to us through the Spirit”.
70
This event is also alluded to in Gal 1:12, which reads “For I did not receive it (the Gospel) from man, nor was I taught it, but it came through a revelation of Jesus Christ” [emphasis added]. See also Gal 1:15-16. This important event is narrated by Luke in Acts 9:3-8; 22:5-11 and 26:12-17.
399
the mystery of Christ, through a reference to Paul’s suffering on
behalf of the Gospel. Although there is a clear emphasis on
knowledge, Paul’s participation in this mystery does not pertain
simply to the intellect. Rather, through the intellect, the entire
person is transformed “according to” or “after” the “likeness” (or
image) of God (4:24), and begins to participate in the pattern of
self-sacrificial love for which Christ provides the exemplar. As
we learn especially through the Gospels, this pattern involves
faithfulness to the Father’s will, “dying to self”, and “taking-up
the cross”; it results in the edification of the church through an
active participation in the divine plan of salvation. It therefore
results in our mediation of eternal life to others. Here in Eph
3:13, “Paul” refers to the imprisonment that he suffers for
Christ. Elsewhere, he indicates that the hardships which occur
in his life, and by implication in that of every Christian, are a
participation in the suffering of Jesus (Col 1:24). When these trials are understood in their theological context, accepted lovingly, and united with the offering of Christ, they are of immeasurable value in the divine plan of salvation. Thus, Paul is able to
rejoice in his apostolic hardships (2 Cor 12:10) because he recognizes, through this deep, conscious participation in the mystery, that the power of Christ works through him71.
Following this account (Eph 3:2-13) of how his spiritual understanding of the mystery of Christ had transformed not only
his mind but also his entire existence and action, “Paul” prays in
Eph 3:14-19 that a similar grace be given to his audience. In particular, he prays that by the Spirit’s work of inward renewal
(3:16) they may “comprehend” the mystery of Christ in all its dimensions. Like the earlier prayer (1:15-19), Eph 3:14-19 emphasizes knowledge,72 but it goes beyond the first in both its em-
71
2 Cor 12:8-10 reads “Three times I besought the Lord about this, that
it should leave me; but he said to me, ‘My grace is sufficient for you, for my
power is made perfect in weakness.’ I will all the more gladly boast of my
weaknesses, that the power of Christ may rest upon me. For the sake of
Christ, then, I am content with weaknesses, insults, hardships, persecutions,
and calamities; for when I am weak, then I am strong”.
72
This second prayer for knowledge (3:14-19) is similar to those found
in the earlier Pauline writings. For example, in Phil 1:9-11, Paul prays “that
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WILLIAM F. MURPHY
phasis on love (3:19), and in what Andrew Lincoln calls “the extravagant prayer for a total filling of believers by God”73. Together with the doxology which follows (3:20-21), this text serves
as the climax of the theological section of the letter (1:3-3:21).
Moreover, Eph 3:14-19 should be interpreted in light of Col 1:2728, upon which it probably depends. The text from Colossians
reads “…God chose to make known how great among the Gentiles are the riches of the glory of this mystery, which is Christ in
you, the hope of glory. Him we proclaim, warning every man and
teaching every man in all wisdom, that we may present every man
mature in Christ (emphasis added)”.
In this context we can understand Eph 3:16, which specifies
the work of the Spirit in effecting a strengthening74 in the inner
man (e[sw a[nqrwpon), as referring precisely to a transformation
in Christ. The christological form of the fortification referred to
in 3:16 is made explicit in the explanatory petition of 3:17 “that
Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith”. This text specifies that it is through faith that we undergo a transformation resulting in, what can be described as, having Christ dwell in our
hearts (See Gal 2:20). Here we have touched again upon both the
christological culmination of Pauline anthropology,75 and its realization through a particular form of spiritual knowledge.
your love may abound more and more, with knowledge and all discernment
(ejpignwvsei kai; pavsh/ aijsqhvsei)”. In Col 1:9-10 he writes “… we have not
ceased to pray for you, asking that you may be filled with the knowledge of
his will in all spiritual wisdom and understanding (th;n ejpivgnwsin tou‘ qelhvmatoı aujtou‘ ejn pavsh/ sofiva/ kai; sunevsei pneumatikh‘)… and increasing in the
knowledge (ejpignwvsei) of God”.
73
See his Ephesians, 201.
74
Rudolph Schnackenburg understands this strengthening as “the main
concern of the intercession”. See his The Epistle to the Ephesians: A Commentary, trans. Helen Heron (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 145.
75
The eastern Fathers would later develop this vital dimension of New
Testament revelation in their doctrine of theosis, which was sometimes further specified as Christification. See, for example, Panayiotis Nellas, “The
Spiritual Life in Christ, A Study of The Christocentric Anthropology of St.
Nicolas Kavasilas”, in Deification in Christ: Orthodox Perspectives on the Nature of the Human Person, Contemporary Greek theologians; no. 5 (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1987), especially 121-140.
401
With the help of this teaching from Ephesians, we now have
a deeper understanding of how our transformation in Christ occurs precisely through the renewal of the mind. This metamorphosis builds upon our anthropological identity as predestined
in Christ to be conformed according to his image. It occurs especially through what might be called an “appropriation” of the
revelation given in Christ that takes the form of an ongoing dialectic of spiritual understanding and corresponding moral action.
After the above “excursus” in the letter to the Ephesians, we
are now ready to return to the study of our text from Romans.
3.3.2.2 Romans 12:2b Spiritual Discernment
… that you may discern what is the will of God,
The goal of this transformation and renewal is that we might
enjoy a new quality of moral discernment corresponding to the
more intuitive mode of moral action that characterizes virtuous
and experienced agents. More particularly, the goal of our moral
and spiritual transformation in Christ is that we might enjoy the
mode of moral action as exemplified by Christ, and by the saints
who have been brought to a maturity in Christ through the Spirit (Rom 8:1-17; Gal 5:1, 13-14, 16, 18, 22-23). With a renewed
mind, the Christian can “discern what is the will of God”, which
provides the ultimate “norm of Christian conduct”76. In Paul’s
theology, this discernment is not that of the natural man (yuciko;ı a[nqrwpoı, 1 Cor 2:14)77. Rather, it is that of the spiritual
76
Fitzmyer, Romans, 641. The present reference to the will of God reflects common biblical language. However, in order to avoid the impression
of any opposition between the divine mind and the divine will, it is helpful
to recall that theologians such as St. Thomas Aquinas teach us that, within
the godhead, there is really no distinction between the divine intellect and
will. See ST 1a, 3 regarding the divine simplicity.
77
Paul uses the word yuciko;ı to denote humanity in its natural physical
existence. Raymond Collins observes that the word “unspiritual” would be a
reasonable translation for Paul’s use of both yuciko;ı (1 Cor 2:14-15, 15:4446) and savrkinovı (1 Cor 3:1; Rom 7:14; 2 Cor 3:3). However, rather than
lumping the two together as “unspiritual”, we can retain some of Paul’s pre-
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WILLIAM F. MURPHY
man (pneumatiko;ı) who shares in “the mind of Christ” (1 Cor
2:13-16). Thus, an adequate understanding of Christian moral
discernment must account for the ongoing and directive influence of the Spirit78.
In his commentary on Ephesians 5:10, Lincoln observes that
the verb dokimavzein (to discern) is used to describe the moral discernment of Jews, Stoics, and Christians. For the Jew, discernment is based on the law as we see in Rom 2:8. For the Stoic, discernment or testing is according to reason (Epictetus, Diss.
1:20.7; 2:23.6,8; 4.5.16; 4.6.13; 4.7.40). For Paul, while these other two factors still apply, the Spirit perfects this prudential reasoning so that it conforms to the requirements of not only truth,
but also love as indicated by texts such as Phil 1:9-1079. Thus, for
Paul, neither human reasoning based upon the created order,
nor even the OT, provide a complete and authoritative guide for
conduct. Instead, these modes of moral knowledge are sublated
within a higher order in which the renewed mind of the believer, under the ongoing influence of the Spirit, enables a more perfect mode of moral action. For Paul, the Christian should be “so
thoroughly renewed that we know from within, almost instinctively, what we are to do to please God in any given situation”80.
However, it should be emphasized that, in addition to the potentially subjective “mind of Christ”, Christians also have objec-
cision by specifying the first (yuciko;ı) as “natural” and the second (savrkinovı)
as “carnal”. See Raymond F. Collins, ed., First Corinthians, vol. 7, Sacra Pagina (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1999), 136.
78
See, for example, Dunn, Romans, 714, with reference to Cullman,
Christ and Time, 228. Other Pauline uses of dokimavzein in a similar sense of
spiritual discerning include 1 Thess 5:21 (do not quench the Spirit... but test
everything), Phil 1:9-10 (that you may test what is best/right), and Eph 5:10
(testing for what is pleasing to the Lord). The root krin|- is used in 1 Cor 2:1316 (ajnakrivnetai) regarding the spiritual man discerning spiritual things because he has the mind of Christ, in 12:10 regarding the discernment of spirits, and in 14:29 regarding the testing of prophecy. See also 1 John 4:1.
79
See Lincoln, Ephesians, 328. Phil 1:9-10 (RSV, modified) reads “And
it is my prayer that your love may abound more and more, with knowledge
(ejpivgnwsiı) and insight (ai]sqhsiı), so that you may approve (dokimavzein) what
is excellent, and may be pure and blameless for the day of Christ”.
80
Moo, Romans, 758.
403
tive standards against which to measure behavior. These standards include the “law of Christ” (Gal 6:2; 1 Cor 9:21), and Jesus’
own teaching as expanded and explicated by his appointed representatives, the apostles81.
The Pauline view of Christian life is distinguished by this intuitive, Spirit-assisted testing such that Christians can truly live
in the freedom that is appropriate for the children of God. Thus,
rather than beginning from the lowest common denominator of
unaided human rationality, Pauline theology studies Christian
moral action by considering its full realization in a truly spiritual man82. Within the context of our study, it becomes clear that
this intuitive, Spirit-assisted mode of knowledge and moral action is possible only to the extent that we have undergone, and
are undergoing, a transformation from vice to virtue according
“to the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ” (Eph
4:13).
… what is good and acceptable and perfect.
These three adjectives can be understood as specifying some
of the characteristics of the will of God83, and summing up the
transformed life of the Christian84. Thus, by the ongoing work-
81
See Moo, Romans, 757-758. Of course, as Catholics who read the
scriptures within the church, we would also recognize the successors of the
apostles. In support of this tradition of teaching, and in recognition of the
unity of truth (i.e., the truth of reason can not contradict the truth of faith),
we would also recognize the value of moral reasoning according to the natural law.
82
This is an important point in NT teaching. Paul knew himself to be a
spiritual man (pneumatiko;ı), by the grace of God, and thus he did not hesitate to present himself as an example to be imitated-especially to the Gentile
Christians who did not have the opportunity to see Jesus in the flesh. This
strategy of theologizing about theological anthropology and moral action
based upon its full realization in Christ, and in the saint, is clear in the teaching of Pope John Paul II, for whom the text of Gaudium et spes 22 serves as
a constant reference point.
83
Moo references Murray, Kasemann, Cranfield, and Schlier as supporting the position that these adjectives are in apposition to “the will of
God”. Moo, Romans, 757.
84
See Fitzmyer, Romans, 641.
404
WILLIAM F. MURPHY
ing of the Holy Spirit, the mature Christian can accurately, and
often intuitively, discern a course of action which is according to
the will of God, in that it is (i) objectively good according to
God’s ordering of creation and plan of salvation, (ii) acceptable
or pleasing to Him, and (iii) consistent with His wise and loving
plan to bring us to perfection in Christ.
3.4 Summary: Transformation in Christ through the Appropriation of Revelation
In this primary section (3.0) of our study, we have endeavored to build upon the scholarly consensus regarding the basic
structure of Pauline ethics (2.0). According to this consensus,
the moral action of Christians as indicated by Pauline “imperatives” depends upon the preceding work of God, which is often
referred to as “the indicative of salvation”. This consensus corresponds to the common structure of Pauline letters in which
doctrine precedes ethics85. Our attempt to gain a deeper understanding of the reality of Christian moral action builds upon the
recognition of a more subtle aspect of Pauline theology that indicates the transformation in Christ which strengthens us to live
the new life. Our study involved several steps. First, a recognition of the specifically christological origin and destiny of man
as revealed especially through Pauline anthropology (3.1). Second, a review of the Pauline and basic NT teaching that Jesus is
in himself, and in his saving action, the fullness of divine revelation (3.2). Third, a recognition of both the logical function
(3.3.1) and the meaning (3.3.2) of Rom 12:1-2, especially as understood within the broader teaching of the Pauline corpus.
Regarding the function of Rom 12:1-2, we saw that it provides the linking principle between doctrine, which reveals and
mediates the theological basis of the Christian life, and subsequent moral exhortations and actions. It teaches that we must
be transformed by a renewal of our minds so that what God has
85
In Paul’s letters, this structure of is most clear in the letters to the
Galatians and Romans. This clear structure of doctrine preceding moral exhortation is continued in the later Pauline letters to the Colossians and Ephesians.
405
done for us in Christ becomes effective in our moral action. Regarding the specific meaning of this metamorphosis, we have argued that we are to be transformed specifically according to, or
towards, the image of God as manifest in Christ. Furthermore,
we have argued, drawing especially on the later Pauline theology of Ephesians, that this mind-centered renewal and transformation is perhaps best understood as an appropriation or assimilation of what God has revealed to us in the person of His
Son. It involves what can be called the actualization, or deepening, of our participation in Christ, and thus our formation in
virtue and truth. Moreover, it thereby results in an analogous
continuation of the incarnation through which our moral action
participates in the ongoing saving work of Christ, as carried on
through his body the church. This participative reality of Christian moral action is manifest most clearly in the lives of the great
saints, like Paul, whose lives of sacrificial love exemplify the pattern of divine strength working through human weakness.
4.0 Applicability to the Biblical Renewal of Moral Theology
These inspired Pauline texts have mediated to us a deepening understanding of the christological, pneumatological, and
anthropological foundations of Christian moral action. Of
course, if these texts actually disclose to us a basic dynamism of
the Christian life, we would expect a similar recognition of our
cognitive transformation in Christ as a basis for the moral life to
be manifest beyond the apostolic age. Thus, the first step in determining the relevance of this Pauline notion to the contemporary renewal of moral theology is to establish some level of continuity between the Pauline, patristic, and medieval and contemporary experience of life in Christ. In a previous article, I
have argued that Henri de Lubac’s recovery of the patristic and
medieval understanding of the tropological sense of scripture offers a significant contribution in this regard. In particular, I argued that according to de Lubac, the patristic and medieval tradition bears witness to an understanding of Christian moral action that proceeds from a deepening “mystical” participation in
Christ that is achieved through an appropriation of the revela-
406
WILLIAM F. MURPHY
tion that culminates in him86. Upon this basis, I suggest that this
ongoing manifestation of the theological dynamic that I have
called the “appropriation of revelation as a principle of moral action” indicates its significance to the Christian life, and therefore
its importance to the contemporary renewal of moral theology.
This Pauline and patristic understanding of morality as sublated within a broader, christocentric, mysticism is attractive in
many respects. It excludes the possibility of a philosophical
truncation of our understandings of anthropology or moral action by emphasizing instead their christological and anagogical
fulfillment. However, neither St. Paul, nor the Church fathers
nor contemporary patristic scholars like Henri de Lubac have
offered us an account of the moral life of sufficient systematic
rigor for the contemporary context. Furthermore, the inherent
compatibility between the above perspectives and much
Catholic moral theology of the modern era is not readily apparent. Can such a biblical and christological perspective be harmonized with more systematic and philosophical accounts of
the moral life that often emphasize dimensions such as practical
reasoning based upon the rational principles of the natural law?
As a theologian with a particular interest in the contemporary recovery and development of Thomistic, virtue-based theological ethics, my primary interest concerns the compatibility of
such a biblical, christocentric and mystical perspective with this
important tradition. However, as implied above, St. Thomas’
ethics are often understood to be primarily philosophical, and
with apparently only scant reference to Christ. The complaint
often leveled against the Dominican’s ethics is reminiscent of
Augustine’s regret upon reading Cicero’s Hortensius: “Only one
thing dampened my enthusiasm for it; there was never a mention of Christ”87.
86
See my previously cited “de Lubac’s Mystical Tropology”, 171-201. In
this article, I provide a further discussion of the relevance of de Lubac’s work
to the contemporary renewal of, especially Thomistic, moral theology.
87
As quoted by Servais Pinckaers in his discussion of this frequent objection against St. Thomas. See his The Sources of Christian Ethics, trans.
Mary Thomas Noble (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press,
1995), 169. Many readers will note at this point that the christological foun-
407
I suggest that such readings of “Thomistic” ethics should be
challenged by the principle enunciated by John Paul II in the
seventh chapter of Fides et Ratio, namely that philosophy and
theology must be held accountable to the requirements placed
upon them by the biblical word of God. I suggest that one of the
clearest requirements that the New Testament places upon
moral theology is that it must provide a robust articulation of
the relevance of Jesus Christ to the moral action of his followers.
Such an account would include, for example, the christological
origin and destiny of the human person, an account of his transformation in Christ, and a discussion of the various modes of
causality exercised by the risen Lord on the believer. In this light,
I offer the present study, not just as an effort to further our understanding of Pauline ethics, but as a stimulus to moral theology, especially that done in the Thomistic tradition.
Although this is not the place for a detailed treatment, I suggest that a recovery and further development of the largely implicit christological foundations of Thomistic ethics is thus required in light of the scriptures, and especially in the context of
the new evangelization88. Although the christological foundations of Thomistic ethics are not pronounced, and are therefore
easily and frequently overlooked, they are clearly present and
need to be further exploited and developed. This christological
foundation is grounded in Thomas’ trinitarian theology of the
second divine person, and especially His procession and mission, to which the Dominican friar attributes the intelligibility of
the entire created order. The association of the intelligibility of
the created order with the procession and mission of the Eternal
Word is particularly true for man, the culmination of creation.
Upon this basis, we can therefore recognize the extensive ethical
treatise of the Secunda Pars, with its account of human inclinations and virtues, as an extended treatment of the trinitarian processions. Thus, when reading the Summa from this trinitarian
and sapiential perspective, we can recognize that what we have
dations of anthropology and ethics have been the subject of vigorous research by scholars such as B. Häring, R. Tremblay.
88
I plan to elucidate these somewhat implicit christological foundations
of Thomistic ethics in a forthcoming article.
408
WILLIAM F. MURPHY
called the appropriation of revelation pertains to, what the
fathers called, the “deification” or “christification” of man
through his transformation in knowledge and virtue, especially
according to the intelligible pattern disclosed through the procession and mission of the Word89. I suggest that such a recovery, and further articulation, of this “christological thread” within the Summa will offer an important complement to Servais
Pinckaers’ retrieval of the treatise on “the new law”, and thereby
further help to reestablish the bonds between Thomistic ethics,
Christ, and the scriptures.
In conclusion, the Pauline articulation of the anthropological and christological foundations of moral action offers a powerful biblical stimulus to moral theology in general, and to
Thomistic virtue-based moral theology in particular. In the contemporary context of the new evangelization, the church will
need, not only to proclaim Jesus Christ, but also articulate his
relevance to human identity, fulfillment, and moral action. This
implies that contemporary advocates of Thomistic moral theology will need to make explicit, and to articulate further, the
christological foundations of life in Christ.
WILLIAM F. MURPHY, JR.
227 Malloy Hall
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, IN 46556
USA
—————
Summary / Resumen
Within the study of Pauline ethics, there is a broad consensus regarding the theological foundations of moral action. This article attempts to provide a deeper understanding of this theological basis
through a consideration of some key texts in light of various aspects of
Pauline thought, especially those regarding the distinctively christolog-
89
Similarly, we might note that the christological dimension of anthropology is also present but underdeveloped in the Summa.
409
ical anthropology and theology of revelation. Through a careful study of
the content and function of especially Rom 12:1-2, the “hinge” passage
between doctrine and ethics in Paul’s most mature and systematic letter, the author argues that it is precisely this transformation that provides the basis for Christian moral action. In light of the broader
Pauline corpus, the author argues that this transformation should be
understood precisely as a transformation in Christ; with a particular
focus on the later teaching of Ephesians, he argues that this occurs especially through what can be called an appropriation of revelation. The
article concludes with some thoughts regarding how this biblical teaching might provide a stimulus for a more christocentric reading of
Thomistic moral theology.
En el estudio de ética paulina, existe un amplio acuerdo sobre los
fundamentos teológicos de la acción moral. Este artículo intenta ofrecer una comprensión más profunda acerca de esta base teológica reflexionando sobre algunos textos clave a la luz de varios aspectos de pensamiento paulino, sobre todo los que se refieren a la antropología distintamente cristológica y teológica de la revelación. A través de un estudio cuidadoso del contenido y función sobre todo de Rom 12:1-2, el
pasaje “enlace” entre la doctrina y ética en Pablo la más madura y la
carta sistemática, el autor defiende que es precisamente la transformación la que mantiene la base para la acción moral cristiana. A la luz del
más amplio cuerpo paulino, el autor defiende que esta transformación
debe entenderse exactamente como una transformación en Cristo; con
un enfoque particular en la enseñanza posterior de Efesios, sostiene
que esto sucede sobre todo a través de lo que puede llamarse una
incautación de la revelación. El artículo concluye con algunos pensamientos que indican cómo esta poderosa instrucción bíblica proporciona un estímulo para una lectura más cristocéntrica de la teología
moral tomística.
—————
The author is Visiting Assistant Professor of Theology at the
University of Notre Dame’s Center for Philosophy of Religion.
El autor es profesor assistente invitado de Teología en el Centro
de Filosofía y Religión de la Universidad de Notre Dame.
—————
411
StMor 39 (2001) 411-431
RÉAL TREMBLAY C.SS.R.
LE THÈME DE L’ÉTOILE
DANS LES SERMONS POUR L’ÉPIPHANIE
DE SAINT LÉON LE GRAND
On s’étonnera peut-être de trouver dans une revue de théologie morale une étude sur un thème qui, à première vue, semble
bien loin de cette discipline théologique. À l’examen des Sermons auxquels fait allusion le titre du présent travail, la surprise disparaîtra. Car cette thématique est l’objet d’une transposition éthique qui n’est pas, croyons-nous, sans signification pour
la dimension théo-phanique de la morale chrétienne. Du reste, J.
Leclercq a déjà entrevu quelque chose en ce sens en écrivant ce
qui suit en référence, justement, à nos Sermons: “Faire apparaître le Christ en nos moeurs et faire du bien à tous par notre
exemple, ce sera prolonger l’Épiphanie du Christ au milieu du
monde”1.
Avant d’illustrer ce point avec toutes les nuances requises
(III), il faudra nous attarder brièvement sur les autres facettes de
la théologie léonienne de l’étoile. Comme c’est le cas quand on
porte attention à un aspect d’un tableau, la contemplation de
l’ensemble est nécessaire pour ne pas risquer de modifier la
consistance et les proportions réelles du détail examiné (II). Selon l’usage en une étude de ce genre, nous débuterons notre recherche avec quelques remarques d’ordre historique et textuel
sur l’auteur et la partie de son oeuvre qui nous intéresse plus directement ici (I).
1
J. LECLERCQ, “Introduction” à LÉON LE GRAND, Sermons, tome I (Sources
Chrétiennes, 22bis), Paris, 19642, 43.
412
RÉAL TREMBLAY
I. Quelques mots sur la figure de saint Léon le Grand et
sur ses Sermons pour l’Épiphanie
Dans le premier chapitre de son livre récent sur la christologie de saint Léon le Grand, L. Casula a recueilli l’essentiel de ce
qu’il faut savoir pour connaître les traits saillants de la personnalité de Léon. Nous nous inspirons de ces pages pour les
quelques indications qui vont suivre2.
Léon est né vers la fin du IVe siècle probablement à Rome
d’une famille d’origine toscane. Après ses études classiques, il
s’incorpore au clergé de sa ville natale et il est ordonné diacre
sous le pontificat de Célestin I (422-432). Alors qu’il se trouve en
Gaule envoyé par l’Empereur Valentinien III pour y conjurer une
guerre civile rendue imminente par suite des rivalités survenues
entre deux généraux impériaux de la région, le peuple romain le
choisit par acclamation pour succéder au pape Sixte III (432440). Quarante jours après (le 29 septembre 440), il est ordonné
évêque. À la suite d’un long ministère d’une rare intensité, il s’endort dans le Seigneur le 10 novembre 461 et est enseveli dans le
portique de l’ancienne basilique de St-Pierre. Vénéré en Occident comme en Orient, il est déclaré Docteur de l’Église le 15 octobre 1754 par Benoît XIV3. Les lignes majeures de son pontificat, reflets évidents d’une personnalité dotée de talents multiples
et hors du commun, pourraient être résumées de la manière suivante:
“Dans le monde romain (Léon) fut une personnalité de
grand prestige, d’une habilité politique reconnue, d’une sensibilité ecclésiale prononcée et d’une éloquence raffinée. Il fut ferme dans la condamnation des abus, fort dans la sauvegarde des
droits de l’Église de Rome, énergique dans la réfutation des hérésies et courageux dans la défense de la Cité. Tout au long de
son ministère pastoral, il démontra avoir un grand sens de la
responsabilité ecclésiale et civile qu’il manifesta soit par des
actes de nature strictement ecclésiastique soit par des interven-
2
L. CASULA, La cristologia di san Leone Magno. Il fondamento dottrinale
e soteriologico (Dissertatio Series romana 27), Milano, 2000, 7-47.
3
Par la Constitution Apostolique Militantis Ecclesiae (12 octobre 1754).
LE THÈME DE L’ÉTOILE DANS LES SERMONS POUR L’ÉPIPHANIE
…
413
tions de valeur civile et politique”4.
Léon le Grand est l’auteur de Lettres et de Sermons. Ces derniers couvrent une bonne partie de l’année liturgique. Avant leur
édition critique par Antoine Chavasse accueillie par le Corpus
Christianorum5, la collection des Sources Chrétiennes (sigle:
SCh) avait publié le texte latin du tome 54 de la patrologie latine de Migne (1846)6 avec une première traduction française
confiée aux soins de René Dolle. Cette édition répartit les Sermons léoniens en quatre tomes selon les grandes fêtes et autres
événements majeurs de l’année liturgique. Pratiquement, les
choses se présentent comme suit: noël et épiphanie (premier tome: no 22 [1947]/no 22bis7 [1964]); carême (deuxième tome: no 49
4
L. CASULA, o.c., 10. (C’est moi qui traduis). En son Encyclique Aeterna
Dei publiée à l’occasion du 15e centenaire de la mort de Léon le Grand (le 10
novembre 1961), Jean XXIII décrit le profil plus strictement théologique de
son célèbre prédécesseur de la façon suivante: “… Au milieu du Ve siècle,
(Léon) ressort dans le ciel de la chrétienté comme une étoile brillante de première grandeur. L’exactitude de l’affirmation ne pourra être contestée, si l’on
envisage surtout le domaine doctrinal de la foi catholique dans lequel son
nom va de pair avec ceux de saint Augustin d’Hippone et de saint Cyrille
d’Alexandrie. De fait, si saint Augustin, comme on le sait, revendiqua, contre
l’hérésie de Pélage, la nécessité absolue de la grâce divine pour vivre dans la
droiture et acquérir le salut, si saint Cyrille défendit la divinité de JésusChrist et la réalité de la maternité divine de la Vierge Marie contre les opinions erronées de Nestorius, saint Léon, de son côté, ayant reçu sa doctrine
comme en héritage de ces deux flambeaux insignes de l’Église orientale et
occidentale, fut parmi ses contemporains le défenseur, de beaucoup plus vigoureux, de ces vérités capitales de la foi catholique” (traduction de la DC
49(1962), 10).
5
Sancti Leonis Magni Romani Pontificis tractatus septem et nonaginta
(CCL 138-138A), Turnhout-Paris, 1973. Dans l’édition des Sermons de Léon
publiée dans la collection Biblioteca Patristica, E. Montanari a repris l’essentiel du travail de Chavasse en en simplifiant l’appareil critico-textuel et
en s’attachant surtout à identifier et à proposer le “canon” critique qui préside à la constitution du texte (LEONE MAGNO, I Sermoni del ciclo natalizio (a
cura di E. MONTANARI, M. NALDINI, M. PRATESI) (Biblioteca Patristica 31), Fiesole, 1998).
6
Qui reprend l’édition des frères Ballerini (1755-1757) commissionnée
par Benoît XIV.
7
Il s’agit d’une réédition du no 22. Il en va de même pour les autres numéros “bis”.
414
RÉAL TREMBLAY
[1957]/no 49bis [1969]); passion-résurrection, ascension et pentecôte (troisième tome: no 74 [1961]/no 74bis [1976]); jeûne de la
pentecôte et quelques fêtes du sanctoral, etc. (quatrième tome:
no 200 [1973]).
Dans les pages qui vont suivre, nous renverrons exclusivement aux huit Sermons In solemnitate Epiphaniae Domini Nostri
Jesu Christi8. Nous utiliserons le texte latin établi par Chavasse
et la seconde traduction française de Rolle9.
II. Une vue d’ensemble sur la théologie léonienne de
l’étoile
Sans trop risquer de se tromper, on peut dire que saint Léon
considère le thème de l’étoile et les autres éléments de la narration matthéenne de la visite des Mages à Bethléem (cf. Mt 2, 112)10 qui lui sont reliés à deux niveaux différents: celui de l’histoire11 et celui de son actualisation. Bien qu’il insiste ordinairement plus sur le premier que sur le second, il n’attache pas
moins, en bon pasteur qu’il est, une grande importance au second. Il est donc tout à fait justifié d’adopter ces deux niveaux
pour structurer l’étude de notre thème.
8
Qui correspondent aux Sermons XXXI à XXXVIII de l’édition Ballerini-Migne. Pour une description d’ensemble du contenu des Sermons pour
l’Épiphanie, voir L. CASULA, o.c., 209-217. À titre d’introduction, voir E. J.
AHERN, The Epiphany Sermons of Leo the Great, dans The Irish Ecclesiastical
Record 99(1963), 24-27.
9
Publiée dans la collection SCh, n. 22bis. Signalons aussi l’existence de
la traduction Naldini de la collection Biblioteca Patristica (cf. note 5) que
nous avons consultée au besoin vu son lien avec l’édition critique de Chavasse-Montanari.
10
Pour le commentaire de la péricope matthéenne, voir: J. GNILKA, Das
Matthäusevangelium (HThKNT., I/1), Freiburg-Basel-Wien, 1988, 33-46
(avec bibliographie). Sur la méthode exégétique de Léon, consulter: A. LAURAS, Saint Léon le Grand et l’Écriture Sainte, dans Studia Patristica VI, Berlin, 1962, 127-140.
11
C’est-à-dire des événements qui font partie du récit de Matthieu ou
qui y sont impliqués.
…
415
1. Le niveau historique
Saint Léon signale d’abord l’éclat particulier de l’étoile observée par les “trois mages des pays d’Orient”. Elle était “d’un
éclat insolite”, “plus brillante, plus belle que les autres astres”12.
La beauté et le rayonnement singuliers de cette étoile firent
qu’elle “attira facilement à elle les yeux et les coeurs de ceux qui
la contemplaient” et que l’on comprit qu’un tel phénomène
“n’était pas purement gratuit”13.
Dieu qui est à l’origine de ce signe “en donn(a) l’intelligence”
à ceux qui scrutaient le ciel14. Il agit dans leur coeur par “une
inspiration divine” “pour que le mystère contenu en une telle vision ne leur échapp(ât) pas et que le spectacle insolite qui frappait leurs yeux n’eût rien d’obscur à leur esprit”15. Les mages ont
pu aussi être instruits par les anciennes prophéties de Balaam
dont le souvenir s’était perpétué et répandu: “Un astre issu de Jacob apparaîtra; un chef issu d’Israël se lèvera; il dominera sur les
nations” (Nb 24, 17)16. Ce que Dieu fit comprendre à ces “observateurs du ciel”, “il le fit chercher et une fois cherché, il se laissa trouver”17.
Ailleurs, Léon parle de la “beauté de l’étoile” qui frappa le regard charnel des mages et du “rayon plus brillant encore de la
vérité” qui instruisit leur coeur. C’est cette seconde lumière, “lumière de foi” attribuée à l’Esprit, qui leur fit comprendre avant
de se mettre en route que l’étoile leur indiquait “quelqu’un à qui
étaient dus l’honneur propre à un roi, signifié par l’or, l’adora-
12
Sermo I, 1/SCh, 211. 213; cf. Sermo III, 2/SCh, 229. 231; Sermo IV,
1/SCh, 239.
13
Sermo I, 1/SCh, 213.
14
Cf. Sermo I, 1/SCh, 213.
15
Sermo III, 2/SCh, 231.
16
Cf. Sermo IV, 1/SCh, 239.
17
Sermo I, 1/SCh, 213. Ailleurs, saint Léon range le signe de l’étoile parmi les nombreux signes qui précèdent la naissance de Jésus. La spécificité du
signe de l’étoile par rapport aux autres est qu’il marque le “commencement
de cette vocation qui fer(a) que l’évangile du Christ (sera) prêché non seulement en Judée, mais encore dans le monde entier” Sermo V, 1/SCh, 255. 257.
416
RÉAL TREMBLAY
tion propre à Dieu, signifiée par l’encens, la qualité reconnue de
mortel, signifiée par la myrrhe”18.
Munis de ces présents, les trois hommes “se (laissèrent)
conduire par la lumière d’en-haut […]; ainsi (furent)-ils amenés
par le resplendissement de la grâce jusqu’à la connaissance de la
vérité, eux qui, selon le bon sens, avaient jugé devoir chercher
dans une cité royale la naissance d’un roi qui leur avait été révélée par ce signe”19.
Avant d’approfondir encore cette question, signalons un
autre point lié à la dimension céleste de l’étoile. En s’inspirant de
deux versets (2 et 5) du Ps 18: “les cieux publièrent la gloire de
Dieu et par toute la terre retentit la voix de la vérité”, saint Léon
voit “l’éclat insolite d’un nouvel astre” jouer pour le monde entier le rôle que les anges jouèrent pour les bergers. Réalité céleste comme le sont les anges20, l’étoile orienta la marche des mages
qui venaient adorer le Sauveur. De la sorte, “de l’aurore au cou-
18
Sermo IV, 3/SCh, 243. Cette interprétation des dons est traditionnelle
(pour d’autres textes patristiques, cf. SCh, 22bis, 214. n. 2). Chez Léon, elle
s’accompagne d’une précision qui trahit sa préoccupation christologique: “À
Dieu ils offrent de l’encens, à l’homme de la myrrhe, au roi de l’or, conscients
d’honorer dans l’unité les natures divine et humaine; ce que chaque nature,
en effet, rendait propre, la puissance ne le divisait pas” Sermo I, 2/SCh, 215.
Cf. encore Sermo III, 2/SCh, 231. Dans le Sermo VI, 1, c’est l’actualisation
(voir infra) des dons qui prime: “Il tire, en effet, l’or de la cassette de son âme,
celui qui reconnaît dans le Christ le roi de toutes choses; il offre la myrrhe,
celui qui croit que le Fils unique de Dieu s’est associé une vraie nature humaine; et il vénère le Christ par une sorte d’encens, celui qui le reconnaît égal
en tout à la majesté de son Père” (SCh, 269).
19
Sermo I, 2/SCh, 213.
20
C’est peut-être de ce rapprochement que vient le remplacement de
l’étoile par un ange ou l’ajout d’un ange à l’étoile que l’on trouve souvent dans
l’iconographie religieuse touchant le récit des mages (cf. M. FÉLIX, Le livre des
Rois Mages, Paris, 2000, 86). Pour d’autres explications de ce phénomène,
voir: F. CARINI, I Re Magi. Storia e leggenda, Venezia, 2000, 46s. Signalons
dans ce contexte que l’étoile peut prendre d’autres formes, celles par exemple
du monogramme du Christ, d’un soleil, d’une fleur. Dans le superbe Triptyque
de Bladelin de ROGIER VON DER WEYDEN (Berlin, Staatliche Museen), on voit les
mages contempler l’Enfant Jésus lui-même dans une étoile qui a aussi la forme d’un soleil.
…
417
chant” (cf. Ps 49, 2), “la naissance du vrai roi brilla de tout son
éclat”21. Comme les bergers racontèrent ce qu’ils avaient vu à
leur entourage et, par là, au peuple d’Israël22, les mages racontèrent le récit de cette naissance aux nations de l’Orient et à l’empire romain qui ne pouvaient plus, dès lors, l’ignorer23.
Touchant le rapport déjà mentionné de l’étoile au lieu de la
naissance “de l’enfant qui devait régner sur tout Israël”, saint
Léon affirme encore que l’astre “aurait pu conduire les mages par
ses indications, comme elle le fit ensuite, jusqu’au berceau de l’enfant en leur faisant négliger Jérusalem”. En ces conditions, la réponse des savants d’Israël ne faisait que confirmer “cela même
que l’étoile indiquait dans le ciel”24 et montrait ainsi que le détour
des mages par Jérusalem n’était pas nécessaire. Mais alors pourquoi devaient-ils néanmoins y passer? “Pour confondre l’endurcissement des Juifs”, répond notre docteur. Et il précise:
“Il n’était pas sans importance que […] la naissance du Sauveur fût connue, non seulement par le chemin que montrait l’étoile, mais encore par l’aveu que feraient les Juifs eux-mêmes. Ainsi la
parole prophétique passait déjà aux païens pour les instruire, et les
coeurs des étrangers apprenaient à connaître le Christ, annoncé
par les anciens oracles: les Juifs infidèles, au contraire, proféraient
des lèvres la vérité, mais gardaient le mensonge en leur coeur”25.
21
Sermo II, 1/SCh, 219. Après avoir énuméré les témoignages qui, par
des signes évidents, faisaient connaître à la parenté de la Vierge Marie ou à
la famille de Joseph la naissance corporelle du Seigneur, saint Léon mentionne le signe de l’étoile. En tant qu’il “mit effectivement en marche des
mages lointains et les attira sans discontinuer jusqu’au Seigneur Jésus, ce
signe fut, sans nul doute, un sacrement de cette grâce et un commencement
de cette vocation qui feraient que l’évangile du Christ soit prêché non seulement en Judée, mais encore dans le monde entier” Sermo V, 1/SCh, 255. 257.
22
Sermo II, 3/SCh, 223. Ailleurs, saint Léon écrit en précisant: “Alors
que Bethléem elle-même n’avait pas encore tout entière appris la naissance
du Christ, (l’éclat nouveau d’une étoile plus brillante que les autres) l’apportait déjà aux peuples destinés à la foi; et ce dont aucune parole humaine ne
pouvait encore parler, le ciel en faisait connaître la bonne nouvelle” Sermo
IV, 1/SCh, 239.
23
Cf. Sermo II, 1. 3/SCh, 219. 221. 223.
24
Sermo II, 2/SCh, 221.
25
418
RÉAL TREMBLAY
Un peu plus loin dans le même Sermon et dans un contexte
polémique analogue, notre docteur revient sur le témoignage
des docteurs juifs. Il sert à éliminer chez les mages toute hésitation sur le lieu de la naissance du roi vu que l’étoile ne leur enseignait pas clairement ce lieu où elle était pourtant, comme
nous venons de le voir, capable de les conduire. “Que ce chef soit
né, écrit-il, des nations lointaines de l’Orient païen l’ont appris
par l’éclat insolite d’un nouvel astre. Et, pour qu’ils n’hésitent
pas sur le lieu où le roi a vu le jour, votre science leur a appris ce
que l’étoile ne leur enseignait pas”26.
Dans un autre Sermon, saint Léon revient sur le même thème en introduisant une nuance nouvelle. Après avoir rappelé
comment les mages furent avertis de la naissance du Sauveur
par la nouveauté et la brillance particulière de l’étoile, avertissement de plus confirmé par la prophétie de Balaam, il poursuit:
“Aussi les trois hommes, divinement stimulés par l’éclat de
l’astre insolite, suivent la voie que sa resplendissante lumière trace
devant eux, et pensent trouver dans Jérusalem, cité royale, l’enfant
dont il est le signe. Mais, cette conjecture s’étant révélée fausse, ils
apprirent des Scribes et des Docteurs des Juifs ce que l’Écriture
sainte avait prédit de la naissance du Christ”.
Notre auteur fait ici allusion à la prophétie de Michée (5, 2)
rapportée par Mt 2, 6 touchant Bethléem, lieu d’où sortira un
chef qui régira Israël. Et il conclut:
“Ainsi fortifiés par un double témoignage, ils se mirent à chercher avec une foi plus ardente ce que leur manifestaient et la lumière de l’étoile et l’autorité de la prophétie”27.
L’hésitation dont il était question plus haut devient ici réalité. Les mages se trompent sur le lieu de la naissance du Sauveur
dont le chemin qui y mène était illuminé par la splendeur de
l’astre. L’“autorité de la prophétie” vient accentuer, pour ainsi di-
26
27
Sermo IV, 2/SCh, 241.
…
419
re, la “lumière de l’étoile” et leur indiquer sans équivoque possible le lieu de la naissance du Roi.
Concluons. Au niveau des faits évangéliques proprement
dits, on peut penser que l’étoile implique pour saint Léon les éléments suivants. Elle est un astre d’une splendeur toute particulière. Elle est remarquée par trois hommes habitués à scruter le
ciel qui, à côté du peuple élu, représentent le monde païen. Frappant les yeux de leur corps par sa beauté singulière, elle est accompagnée d’une lumière encore plus vive qui illumine leur
coeur. C’est cette inspiration intérieure qui leur fait comprendre
que ce phénomène céleste n’est pas sans signification. Il est le
signe de la naissance d’un Roi (or), à la fois Dieu (encens) et
homme (myrrhe), signe sanctionné par une prophétie qui leur
avait été jadis adressée et qui traînait depuis lors dans les plis de
leur mémoire. Ainsi informés par ce signe céleste comme les
bergers le furent par les anges, ils se mettent en route, guidés par
cette étoile, pour chercher l’Enfant. S’il est vrai que l’étoile aurait pu les conduire au lieu même de la naissance de l’Enfant, elle était passible de diverses interprétations et donc d’erreurs. En
vertu justement d’une fausse estimation de leur part, on les retrouve à Jérusalem. C’est là qu’ils reçoivent des précisions supplémentaires de la part des savants juifs incrédules. Toujours
conduits par la splendeur de l’étoile, ils se remettent en route et
arrivent à Bethléem pour contempler de leurs yeux28 et adorer le
28
Sur ce point, Léon précise: “Et sans doute, en ce qui concernait la lumière de la foi, tout ce qu’ils avaient cru et compris pouvait bien leur suffire, sans qu’ils cherchent à voir des yeux du corps ce qu’ils avaient si pleinement contemplé du regard de l’âme. Mais leur zèle à remplir leur devoir jusqu’au bout les poussa à aller voir l’enfant, les rendant ainsi utiles aux peuples
à venir et aux hommes de notre siècle; de même qu’il nous a été bon à tous
que l’Apôtre Thomas s’assurât de la main des marques des plaies dans la
chair du Sauveur, après la résurrection du Seigneur, ainsi fut-ce pour notre
profit et notre utilité que les mages, en le contemplant de leurs yeux, firent
l’expérience de son état d’enfance. Les mages virent donc et adorèrent un enfant de la tribu de Juda, “de la lignée de David selon la chair, né d’une femme, fait sujet de la loi” et venu non abolir celle-ci mais l’accomplir” Sermo
IV, 3/SCh, 243. On reconnaît ici la supériorité de l’“instruction” (foi) sur la
“vision” souvent évoquée par Léon. Voir par exemple De Ascensione. Sermo
420
RÉAL TREMBLAY
Roi du ciel et de la terre29. De retour dans leur pays d’origine, ils
racontent aux nations de l’Orient ce qu’ils avaient vu comme les
bergers l’avaient fait pour le peuple d’Israël.
2. Le niveau de l’actualisation
Passons maintenant au niveau de l’actualisation en essayant
d’en recueillir les composantes principales. Deux champs d’actualisation sont repérables chez Léon. L’un, lié à la liturgie,
consiste à rendre le mystère célébré de nouveau actuel pour l’assemblée. L’autre, appelé par Rolle “l’actualité “prophétique” du
mystère”, est défini par lui en ces termes:
“L’événement “mystérique” a valeur prophétique, et ce qui
s’est accompli une fois en lui se perpétue après lui: “Ce qui avait débuté en figure s’achève en vérité.” […] C’est la typologie appliquée
au Nouveau Testament; les événements racontés, en plus de leur
valeur historique que saint Léon, malgré l’apparence du mot qu’il
emploie, n’a jamais niée, sont en même temps figure et “type” de la
vérité enseignée par Dieu dans le mystère”30.
II, 2/SCh 74, 140. Par contre, signalons l’importance accordée par saint Irénée au “voir” des mages: Adv. Haer. III, 16, 4/SCh, 211. 305 et nos commentaires dans: La manifestation et la vision de Dieu selon saint Irénée de Lyon
(MBTh., 41), Münster, 1978, 113s. 138s.
29
Prenant prétexte de l’affirmation léonienne que la fête de la manifestation du Seigneur inonde les croyants “de sa lumière” (Sermo II, 1/SCh,
219), Rolle écrit à juste titre: “Le mystère de l’Épiphanie est, pour saint Léon,
un mystère de lumière. Le Verbe de Dieu est lumière pour éclairer l’esprit des
hommes; c’est une lumière qui avertit les mages et les guide vers l’Enfant se
montrant à leurs yeux tandis que la vérité divine éclaire leurs âmes” (SCh,
218, note 2) [C’est l’auteur qui souligne].
30
Dans SCh, 22bis, p. 258-259, n.1. Voir aussi ibid. p. 266, n. 1. Les observations de Rolle sont faites en lien immédiat avec Sermo V, 2/SCh, 257.
259 et avec Sermo VI, 1/SCh, 267 dont il vaut la peine de citer un passage:
“Ce jour (de l’Épiphanie), en effet, n’est pas si complètement révolu que soit
passée avec lui la vertu alors révélée de l’action divine, et que, de l’événement, rien d’autre ne soit venu jusqu’à nous qu’un souvenir glorieux que
notre foi accueille et que notre mémoire honore; le don de Dieu, au contraire, se multiplie, et, même aujourd’hui (“quotidie”), notre temps expérimente
tout ce qui eut alors son commencement”. À peu près dans le même sens,
…
421
Dans la prédication de Léon, ces deux champs de la pensée
ne sont pas toujours clairement séparés l’un de l’autre, ni leurs
contours toujours bien définis. Le plus souvent, ils se fondent
l’un dans l’autre selon les exigences de la pastorale. Notre étude
suit ici le tissu concret du texte léonien en gardant, à l’horizon
de la pensée, ce double sens conféré au procédé d’actualisation.
Comme coup d’envoi à la présente recherche, on pourrait dire que l’étoile est l’occasion plus ou moins prochaine d’une répartition de l’humanité. Les païens sont illuminés et les Juifs
aveuglés. Cette illumination des païens se prolonge chez les
chrétiens qui se trouvent, pour ainsi dire, inclus en eux comme
en leurs “prémices”, tandis que l’attitude des docteurs juifs du
temps du Christ se retrouve chez les Juifs du temps de Léon.
Illustrons cela plus en détail.
Arrivés à Jérusalem, les mages demandent à Hérode de leur
indiquer le lieu de la naissance du Messie annoncée par l’étoile.
Hérode consulte les savants juifs, spécialistes de l’Écriture. Leur
réponse confirme “cela même que l’étoile indiquait dans le ciel”.
Pourquoi dès lors s’adresser à Hérode? “Pour confondre l’endurcissement des Juifs” répond saint Léon31. Et il poursuit:
Pratesi observe: “Secondo Leone i personaggi e i fatti dell’Epifania hanno
rispetto al presente un valore che sarebbe riduttivo definire soltanto esemplare. Essi hanno un valore tipico in quanto manifestano quello che sarebbe
avvenuto nel tempo della Chiesa, nell’hodie, manifestius et copiosius. Sono
quindi imago della veritas che si sarebbe realizzata nel cammino temporale
della Chiesa” o.c., 20. Pour compléter ces réflexions, voir: M.-B. DE SOOS, Le
mystère liturgique d’après saint Léon le Grand (LQF., 34), Münster, 1958; ID.,
Présence du mystère du salut dans la liturgie d’après Saint Léon, dans ETL
73(1959), 116-135.
31
Remarquons la belle phrase typiquement léonienne: “Nisi ad confutandam Judaeorum duritiam pertinuisset, ut non solum ductu sideris, sed
etiam ipsorum professione innotesceret nativitas Salvatoris” Sermo II,
2/SCh, 220. 222. Ailleurs l’étoile n’est pas seulement l’occasion plus ou moins
immédiate de l’endurcissement des Juifs, mais elle est elle-même le signe de
leur cécité en tant qu’elle “ne brilla pas aux yeux des Israélites”. Inversement,
elle est le signe de l’illumination des gentils en tant qu’elle “resplendit aux regards des mages” Sermo V, 1/SCh, 257 (voir plus bas, note 39). — Sur le rapport polémique de Léon avec les Juifs, consulter: A. LAURAS, Saint Léon le
Grand et les Juifs, dans Studia Patristica XVII, Berlin, 1982, 55-61.
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“Ainsi la parole prophétique passait déjà aux païens pour les
instruire, et les coeurs des étrangers apprenaient à connaître le
Christ annoncé par les anciens oracles: les Juifs infidèles, au
contraire, proféraient des lèvres la vérité, mais gardaient le mensonge en leur coeur”.
C’est là “l’illumination accordée aux païens”32 que “l’aveuglement des Juifs prouve”33. À la fin du même Sermon, Léon voit
dans les mages “les prémices” de la vocation chrétienne des fidèles auxquels il s’adresse et de la sienne. “Reconnaissons donc,
bien-aimés, dans les mages adorateurs du Christ, les prémices
de notre vocation et de notre foi, et célébrons […] les débuts de
notre bienheureuse espérance”. Et il enchaîne:
“C’est alors, en effet, que nous avons commencé à entrer en
possession de notre héritage éternel; c’est alors que se sont ouverts
à nous les secrets des Écritures qui nous parlent du Christ, et que
la vérité, refusée par les Juifs aveugles, a répandu sa lumière sur
tous les peuples”34.
À ce premier bloc de réflexions s’en rattache subtilement un
autre, et des plus suggestifs. Les peuples en attente du Roi dont
parle Gn 49, 10 font partie de la descendance promise par Dieu
à Abraham, descendance issue de la fécondité de la foi et comparée “à la multitude des étoiles, pour que le père de toutes les
nations espérât une postérité non terrestre, mais céleste”. “Pour
donner naissance à cette postérité promise, continue-t-il, des héritiers signifiés par les astres sont alertés par le lever d’un nouvel astre: ainsi celui à qui le ciel avait fourni son témoignage recevait du ciel hommage et service”35.
32
Il est intéressant de constater que les Égyptiens furent appelés au salut “par une grâce cachée (“occulta gratia”)” due à la présence de la Vérité en
personne qu’ils accueillent en dépit de leurs coeurs encore empêtrés dans
l’idolâtrie. Cela aussi contribue à faire ressortir l’épaisseur de l’aveuglement
des Juifs. Cf. Sermo II, 1/SCh, 221.
33
Sermo II, 2/SCh, 221. 223.
34
Sermo II, 4/SCh, 225. Cf. Sermo III, 3/SCh, 233.
35
…
423
Qu’est-ce à dire? On pourrait paraphraser la pensée de Léon
en ces termes: le Dieu dont le ciel avait jadis illustré la promesse faite au patriarche se voit maintenant gratifié et assisté par ce
même ciel. C’est en effet l’étoile qui éveille la curiosité des
mages, les mène auprès de l’Enfant et ainsi leur donne de devenir les commencements de la postérité spirituelle d’Abraham assimilée aux étoiles du ciel (cf. Gn 15, 5).
Un peu plus loin dans le même Sermon, notre docteur mentionne Israël qui “ne voit pas ce qu’il montre”. En lien plus étroit
avec le contexte, il dit aussi de lui qu’il est devenu l’esclave de
son cadet (cf. Gn 25, 23). “Tu te mets, précise-t-il encore, au service d’étrangers qui entrent en part de ton héritage, en leur lisant
le testament dont tu ne retiens que la lettre”36. Enfin, les chrétiens sont exhortés à célébrer dans “une joie éclairée”37 “le jour
de (leurs) prémices et celui où commença l’appel des païens”.
Car, ajoute-t-il, la miséricorde de Dieu “«nous a rendus dignes de
partager le sort des saints dans la lumière» (Col 1, 12)”, vocation
annoncée par l’Ancien Testament (cf. Is 9, 1; 55, 5; Ps 85, 9; 97,
2), entrevue dans l’allégresse par Abraham (cf. Jn 8, 56) et réalisée “dans le fait que trois mages, appelés de leur lointain pays,
furent conduits par une étoile pour connaître et adorer le Roi du
ciel et de la terre”38.
Plus proche cette fois du second sens donné au processus
léonien d’actualisation, on voit tour à tour l’étoile continuer à
briller dans le ciel “par la grâce”, les trois mages, appelés par
l’éclat de la lumière évangélique, “accourir tous les jours, en la
personne de toutes les nations, adorer la puissance du souverain
roi”39, la “cécité des Juifs”, renvoyant au fait que “l’étoile ne
brilla pas aux yeux des Israélites”, devenir actuelle au point de
36
Pour célébrer la liturgie dans la joie, il faut en comprendre le sens. C’est
là une constante de la pensée de Léon et l’explication de sa prédication: “Ut in
communi gaudio tanto religiosior sit omnium pietas, quanto magis omnibus
fuerit intellecta solemnitas” Sermo III, 1/SCh, 226; ibid. 5/SCh, 234; etc.
38
39
Sermo V, 2/SCh, 257. Signalons en passant que, dans le présent
contexte, les nations ne sont pas contenues, comme en leurs “prémices”,
dans les mages; ce sont plutôt les mages qui se retrouvent en elles.
37
424
RÉAL TREMBLAY
provoquer l’exclamation de Léon: “Reviens enfin à toi, ô Juif, reviens, laisse là ton infidélité, et retourne vers le Rédempteur qui
est aussi le tien”40.
Dans un autre Sermon, la même tendance s’affirme. L’expérience de l’illumination des mages qui arrivent du fond de
l’Orient pour connaître Dieu sans avoir été instruits par la Loi et
les prophètes41 s’accomplit “plus manifestement et plus abondamment encore dans le don de la lumière à tous ceux qui sont
appelés”. L’explicitation de cette observation suit un peu plus
bas:
“Ainsi, lorsque nous voyons tirés du fond de leurs erreurs et
appelés à la connaissance de la lumière, des hommes qui jusque là
étaient adonnés à la sagesse du monde et bien éloignés de reconnaître Jésus-Christ, c’est là, sans aucun doute, une oeuvre accomplie par la splendeur de la grâce divine; toute lumière nouvelle qui
apparaît dans des coeurs enténébrés émane des rayons de la même
étoile; ainsi les âmes que celle-ci touche de son éclat, elle les meut
miraculeusement et les guide pour les conduire à adorer Dieu”42.
Comme on le voit, l’étoile est considérée en ce passage comme une oeuvre divine d’où sourd la “splendeur de la grâce” qui
luit dans les coeurs des païens du temps de Léon pour les détourner de la “sagesse du monde” et les conduire à l’adoration de
Dieu. La nouveauté ici réside dans le fait que l’étoile des mages
continue à être active dans l’aujourd’hui de l’histoire selon une
intensité plus grande. La grâce qui éclate à partir d’elle est rendue plus manifeste et est répandue avec plus d’abondance. De la
sorte, elle accomplit son oeuvre d’illumination et de force mo-
40
Ibid./SCh, 259. Il vaut la peine de lire la suite du texte pour découvrir
toute la profondeur de la charité pastorale de Léon à l’égard des Juifs de son
temps.
41
Remarquons ici l’absence de l’étoile. On peut la supposer présente en
sourdine en vertu du restant de la pensée de Léon et de sa mention explicite
au plan de l’actualisation. Remarquons également l’absence de l’allusion à la
prophétie de Balaam à laquelle Léon attache pourtant tant d’importance
dans d’autres Sermons (voir plus haut).
42
Sermo VI, 1/SCh, 269.
…
425
trice qui mène à Dieu comme la “vérité” achève la “figure”43.
Dans le même monde de pensée, Léon affirme encore que le
coeur des croyants, “libéré et affranchi des choses visibles, suivra, comme si une étoile le conduisait, la lumière (d’en haut) reçue par l’intelligence”, cette “splendeur de la vérité” ordonnée à
dissiper les hésitations touchant l’identité de l’Enfant de Bethléem avec celui qui maintenant règne avec son Père44.
Récapitulons. L’étoile constitue les mages héritiers de la promesse, faite à Abraham, d’une postérité aussi nombreuse que les
étoiles du ciel. Les Juifs s’excluent de cette promesse par leur entêtement à ne pas voir. Les chrétiens sont représentés par les
mages comme la moisson l’est dans les “prémices” tandis que les
mages, à leur tour, le sont aujourd’hui en eux et dans les nations/individus qui continuent à fixer l’étoile de la grâce et à se
laisser conduire au Christ par sa lumière. C’est dans la logique
de cette vocation due à l’étoile que les chrétiens pourraient devenir eux-mêmes des étoiles pour le monde. Mais est-ce bien là
la pensée de notre docteur? Si oui, comment? C’est ce qu’il faut
maintenant considérer de plus près.
III. Une morale de l’épiphanie du divin
Il est déjà connu que les Sermons de saint Léon ont une forte charge éthique45. Promoteur acharné de l’union hypostatique
de Jésus le Christ qu’il a contribué à faire accepter au Concile de
Chalcédoine (451) par son fameux Tomus ad Flavianum46, notre
43
Cf. Sermo VIII, 1/SCh, 285.
Cf. Ibid., 2/SCh, 287.
45
J. Leclercq en a illustré les grandes lignes dans son introduction à
l’édition critique des Sermons (SCh, 22bis, 40-50). Voir encore: G. HUDON, La
perfection chrétienne d’après les sermons de saint Léon le Grand (LO), Paris,
1958; ID., Vie chrétienne et vie liturgique d’après saint Léon, dans Année du Seigneur 70(1965), 54-66; R. DOLLE, Les idées morales de saint Léon le Grand,
dans Mél.Sc.Rel. 15(1958), 49-84.
46
Cf. U. DOMINGUEZ-DEL VAL, S. Léon Magno y el Tomus ad Flavianum,
dans Helmántica 13(1962), 193-223; A. GRILLMEIER, Jesus der Christus im
Glauben der Kirche. Bd. 1: Von der Apostolischen Zeit zum Konzil von Chalcedon (451), Freiburg-Basel-Wien, 1979, 734-750; L. CASULA, o.c., 87-129.
44
426
RÉAL TREMBLAY
docteur était loin des temps où la morale serait séparée du dogme au point d’apparaître par rapport à lui comme un corps
étranger. Pour Léon, le dogme se prolonge dans la morale, l’anime, la modèle, la façonne, tandis que la morale s’enracine dans
le dogme, y trouve le sol duquel elle tire ses énergies, ses sucs vitaux pour pousser, se développer et produire des fruits en abondance. En termes plus proches de l’évangile, on pourrait dire que
le dogme est d’après lui le “demeurer” sur le cep et la morale, les
grappes multiples et pleines des sarments qui lui sont rattachés
(cf. Jn 15, 1ss). Dans nos Sermons, ces remarques générales se
présentent comme l’application ou les conséquences des mystères contemplés47.
Cela dit, la question est de savoir s’il est bien vrai que la
théologie léonienne de l’étoile est l’objet, comme nous l’avons affirmé plus haut, d’une transposition éthique. Si c’était le cas, on
pourrait, à la lumière de ce qui précède, entrevoir déjà ce que cela signifierait pour la physionomie de la morale: une morale de
l’apparition, de la manifestation du divinum qui séduit, attire et
conduit au vrai Dieu supplanterait une morale des performances
de l’homme en vue de sa propre gloire. Mais n’anticipons pas trop
et voyons les textes.
Le premier qui va dans cette perspective se trouve à la fin du
troisième Sermon. Après avoir cité quelques passages des prophètes touchant “l’appel des païens” au salut, Léon continue:
“Cela s’est réalisé, nous le savons, dans le fait que trois mages
appelés de leur lointain pays, furent conduits par une étoile pour
connaître et adorer le Roi du ciel et de la terre. La docilité de cette
47
“Vénérez dans leur accomplissement les mystères du salut de l’humanité et appliquez toute votre ardeur aux choses qui ont été accomplies pour
vous. Aimez la pureté de la chasteté…” (Sermo I, 3/SCh, 217). Ailleurs, il parle d’une conformité des membres à leur tête (Sermo II, 4/SCh, 227). Ailleurs
encore, il parle d’un engagement moral identifié “à courir la route qui n’est
autre que le Seigneur lui-même (Jn 14, 6)” (il y a peut-être ici une fine allusion
à la route parcourue par les mages pour rejoindre l’Enfant). Et il continue:
“Sans qu’aucun mérite plaidât en notre faveur, il nous a secourus et par sa grâce et par son exemple: par celle-là, il élevait au salut ceux qu’il appelait à la faveur de l’adoption, par celui-ci il les formait au travail” Sermo V, 3/SCh, 261.
…
427
étoile nous invite à imiter son obéissance et à nous faire ainsi, autant que nous le pouvons, les serviteurs de cette grâce qui appelle
tous les hommes au Christ48. Quiconque, en effet, vit pieusement
et chastement dans l’Église, qui songe aux choses d’en-haut, non à
celles de la terre (cf. Col 3, 2), est d’une certaine façon semblable
à cette lumière céleste; tant qu’il conserve lui-même l’éclat d’une
sainte vie, il montre à beaucoup, comme une étoile, la voie qui mène à Dieu49. Animés par ce zèle, vous devez vous appliquer, bienaimés, à vous être tous utiles les uns aux autres, afin de briller
comme des enfants de lumière (cf. Ep 5, 8; Mt 13, 13) dans le
royaume de Dieu auquel on parvient grâce à la foi droite et aux
bonnes oeuvres”50.
Comme l’étoile fut l’instrument docile dont Dieu s’est servi
pour appeler les mages/nations au salut, ainsi, exhorte saint
Léon, les chrétiens devraient-ils, dans la mesure du possible, se
mettre à la disposition de la grâce qui convoque tout homme au
Christ. Cette grâce/lumière est identifiée à la vie pieuse et chaste, tournée vers les réalités d’en-haut. La comparaison s’impose:
par sa vie morale, le chrétien est semblable à l’“étoile” qui ouvre,
pour un grand nombre, la “voie” vers le Seigneur. Pour pouvoir
resplendir dans le royaume de Dieu comme des “enfants de lumière”, il faut avoir ce souci les uns envers les autres.
Ailleurs, la perception des choses est différente bien qu’elle
vienne du même champ de la pensée:
“C’est pourquoi, tandis que le temps vous est accordé pour accomplir les commandements de Dieu, “glorifiez Dieu dans votre
corps” (1 Co 6, 20), et “brillez, bien-aimés, comme des foyers de lumière en ce monde” (Ph 2, 15). Que toujours soient allumées les
48
Un peu plus haut dans le texte, Léon avait parlé de l’actualisation de
cette vocation chez les chrétiens et avait cité à l’appui Col 1, 12-13, passage
qui parle “de partager le sort des saints dans la lumière” par opposition à un
arrachement “à l’empire des ténèbres” et d’un transfert “dans le royaume du
Fils bien-aimé”. On remarquera ici l’importance donnée au contraste lumière-filiation /ténèbres. Cf. Sermo III, 5/SCh, 235.
49
“Multis viam ad Dominum quasi stella demonstrat”.
50
428
RÉAL TREMBLAY
lampes de vos âmes et que rien de ténébreux ne demeure en vos
coeurs. Ainsi que le dit l’Apôtre, “jadis vous étiez ténèbres, mais à
présent vous êtes lumière dans le Seigneur; conduisez-vous en enfants de lumière” (Ep 5, 8); que s’accomplisse en vous ce qui a commencé sous la figure des trois mages; “qu’ainsi votre lumière brille
aux yeux des hommes, pour que, voyant vos bonnes oeuvres, ils en
rendent gloire à votre Père qui est dans les cieux” (Mt 5, 16). C’est
un grand péché que le nom du Seigneur soit blasphémé parmi les
païens à cause des mauvais chrétiens, mais c’est une oeuvre méritoire de piété qu’il soit béni dans la sainte vie de ses serviteurs”51.
L’exhortation léonienne adressée aux membres de son auditoire de profiter du temps pour vivre selon la volonté de Dieu revient à une exhortation à se conduire en “enfants de lumière”
(pureté du corps, limpidité de l’âme et transparence du coeur)
selon leur être-lumière dans le Seigneur52. Du même coup, notre
docteur souhaite que s’achève en eux ce qui a déjà eu son commencement dans les trois mages. À l’exemple de ces derniers enfin, il désire que les oeuvres lumineuses des croyants suscitent,
dans le monde païen, non pas le mépris, mais la vénération du
nom de Dieu.
Comme on peut le voir, le point de comparaison de la vie morale des chrétiens n’est plus, comme précédemment, l’étoile, mais
la personne des mages. Est-ce à dire que l’aspect rayonnant de la
morale perd de son importance? Non, si l’on songe que, d’après
le contexte, les mages sont perçus ici comme ces païens porteurs
de la lumière de l’étoile et conduits par elle à chercher et à montrer le vrai Dieu et que les croyants parachèvent, par leur agir
moral, ce que ces personnages furent et firent. Morale de la lumière donc et morale qui fait resplendir la gloire de Dieu, non celle
de l’homme. Et ceci nous conduit à notre troisième texte:
51
Sermo V, 4/SCh, 265.
Remarquons les trois textes bibliques utilisés pour l’occasion. Particulièrement significatif dans le présent contexte est Ph 2, 15 qui rapproche
tevkna qeou~ (“enfants de Dieu”) de fwsth~reı (“étoiles”: cf. J. P. LOUW-E. A. NIDA (ed.), Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament based on Semantic Domains, Vol. 1, Cape, 19893, 8) par le truchement de la morale.
52
…
429
“Désormais, lorsque le zèle à garder les commandements se
fait remarquer dans le progrès de chacun des fidèles et que s’accomplit cette parole: “Ainsi votre lumière doit-elle briller aux yeux
des hommes pour que, voyant vos bonnes oeuvres, ils en rendent
gloire à votre Père qui est dans les cieux” (Mt 5, 16), qui ne reconnaîtrait la présence de la divinité, là où l’on voit apparaître une authentique vertu? Celle-ci, en vérité, n’existe pas sans Dieu, et il ne
lui est pas donné de recevoir ce qui est propre à Dieu, si l’Esprit de
son Auteur ne vient la nourrir. C’est le Seigneur, en effet , qui a dit
à ses disciples: “Sans moi, vous ne pouvez rien faire” (Jn 15, 5); il
n’est donc pas douteux que l’homme qui fait le bien, tient de Dieu
et l’achèvement de son oeuvre et le commencement de son vouloir”53.
Il n’est plus ici directement ou indirectement question
d’étoile, ni de mages. Le lien persiste cependant avec le texte précédent par la citation de Mt 5, 16 et son commentaire “quis illic
non praesentem intelligat Deitatem, ubi veram videt apparere
virtutem”. En l’occurrence, saint Léon insiste fortement sur la
présence du divinum en cette morale. Vu la densité de l’expression, on pourrait même dire qu’elle traduit Dieu dans le monde,
voire même qu’elle y réalise son mystère. Dans ces conditions, elle ne peut venir de l’homme54. Un peu comme la splendeur extraordinaire de l’étoile avait Dieu pour cause et que les mages
comprirent le message de l’astre par une grâce intérieure, ainsi
une telle morale ne peut avoir que l’Esprit de Dieu pour auteur.
C’est du reste conforme à l’avertissement que Jésus donna aux
siens avant de mourir.
***
La théologie de l’étoile de saint Léon nous a conduit à trois
affirmations touchant l’identité de la morale chrétienne. La vie
morale est semblable à un astre particulièrement lumineux qui
53
Sermo VIII, 3/SCh, 287. 289.
Pélage est peut-être ici à l’horizon de la pensée. Cf. M. PELLEGRINO,
L’influsso di S. Agostino su S. Leone Magno nei Sermoni sul Natale e sull’Epifania, dans Ricerche patristiche (1938-1980) I, Torino, 1982, 163-194.
54
430
RÉAL TREMBLAY
attire les regards et qui conduit à Dieu ceux qui se laissent imprégner de sa lumière. Quand cette vie morale réalise la “figure”,
entendons l’identité et l’oeuvre des mages, elle est encore éclat,
splendeur, parce que les mages sont les relais de la luminosité de
l’étoile et les révélateurs de Dieu auquel elle les mène. La vie morale se fait alors théo-phanique. C’est cette identité de la vie morale chrétienne qui fera enfin dire à notre docteur qu’elle implique la présence de Dieu, mieux qu’elle met au monde son
mystère. Une si haute conception de la morale ne peut avoir,
comme c’est le cas pour l’étoile et les mages, que Dieu comme
fondement.
Il est inutile d’insister sur l’actualité de la pensée léonienne.
Dans un monde où la vie compte plus que la parole, le témoin
plus que le prédicateur; dans un monde où seul l’amour que
Dieu est (cf. 1 Jn 4, 8, 16) a encore la chance de toucher les
coeurs droits; dans un tel monde donc, une morale qui ne se
comprend et ne se vit que comme reflet, trace de celui qui est
“venu apporter le feu sur la terre” (Lc 12, 49) est la seule à avoir
des possibilités de survie, d’attraction et d’efficacité. Ce qui fut
valable pour le temps de saint Léon le Grand comme pour les
temps apostoliques l’est toujours et de plus en plus pour aujourd’hui.
Via Merulana 31
C.P. 2458
Roma
Italy
RÉAL TREMBLAY C.SS.R.
—————
Summary/Resumen
Important studies have already made Saint Leo the Great well
known as a Doctor who is very close to the life of the faithful and particularly preoccupied with the quality of their moral action. Inserting
itself within the follow-up to these studies, the present article would like
to give prominence to an aspect of Christian morality as Leo presented
it and which is still too little noticed: its theophanic dimension. What
meaning does he give to this feature of ethics and what scope does he
attribute to it? Our Doctor uses the occasion of the liturgical feast of
the Epiphany of the Lord to respond to these questions.
…
431
Son ya conocidos los trabajos importantes sobre San León Magno,
un doctor muy cercano a la vida de los fieles y preocupado especialmente por la calidad de su conducta moral. Adentrándose en la serie de
estos trabajos, este estudio destaca un aspecto muy poco acentuado de
la moral cristiana, tal como León la representa: su dimensión theofánica. ¿Qué sentido da a este rasgo de la ética y qué alcance le asigna?
Para responder a estos interrogantes, nuestro doctor se sirve de la fiesta litúrgica de la Epifanía del Señor.
—————
The author is Professor of Fundamental Moral Theology at the
Alphonsian Academy.
El autor es profesor de Teología
Academia Alfonsiana.
—————
Moral Fundamental en la
433
StMor 39 (2001) 433-459
DENNIS J. BILLY
GROWING IN THE VIRTUES AND THE GIFTS:
SPIRITUAL DIRECTION AS A PRACTICAL
THEOLOGICAL LOCUS FOR THE CONVERGENCE
OF SPIRITUALITY AND MORALITY
One way of understanding the relationship between spirituality and morality is by looking at how the two dimensions of
human existence converge in the ministry of spiritual direction.
This convergence takes place in the persons involved, the
process they undergo, and the conversion effected in them. A
critical examination of these dimensions of spiritual direction –
the anthropological, the covenantal, and the transformational –
reveals a reciprocal relationship between spiritual and moral
knowledge. There is, in other words, a spiritual side to all moral
knowledge and a corresponding moral side to all genuine spiritual knowledge.
This essay will focus on the language of “virtue” and “gift” as
an appropriate way of understanding how these important
facets of the spiritual moral life define themselves and interrelate. It will also put forth reasons for viewing the ministry of
spiritual direction as a practical theological locus for developing
further integrating insights between the two fields.
The Anthropological
Because it involves “helping someone to become oneself in
one’s faith,”1 spiritual direction must take account of all the di-
1
JEAN LAPLACE, The Direction of Conscience, trans. John C. Guiness (New
York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 26 [adapted with inclusive language]. For
other definitions of spiritual direction, see DENNIS J. BILLY, “The Relations of
Spiritual Direction,” Studia moralia 36(1998): 67 n. 1.
434
DENNIS J. BILLY
mensions of human existence. Not to do so would be a sure sign
that the person’s genuine needs were not being met and that the
process of spiritual direction itself had at some point gone awry.
A brief look at the history of theology shows that a variety of
anthropologies have influenced the formulation of Christian
doctrine (e.g., Platonic, Aristotelian, humanist).2 The same can
be said for the varying attitudes of how Christianity relates to
human culture (e.g., “against it,” “of it,” “above it,” “in paradox
with it,” “a transformer of it”).3 Any one of these anthropologies
and cultural models may be predominant in a particular historical epoch. At any given time, however, it is also possible for several of them to be operative in and to exert various degrees of
control over the same general cultural milieu – and even over the
same person.
It is important for spiritual directors and their directees to
examine their attitudes toward this great variety of anthropological and cultural factors. Along with the operative image(s) of
God in a person’s life, they go a long way in determining the direction and shape a person’s growth in the spiritual life will ultimately take. They provide, moreover, a concrete context within
which both director and directee can understand the various
patterns of interrelation among God, humanity, and the world
that provide the basic contours of all mature theological reflection on the spiritual moral life.4
The relational triangle mentioned above highlights the close
connection between theology, anthropology, and culture. Questions regarding any one of these areas will undoubtedly raise
concerns about the others. One’s image of God, in other words,
is partially determined by one’s own self-understanding and conception of the world one inhabits. Because the specific purpose
2
See BENEDICT M. ASHLEY, Theologies of the Body: Humanist and Christian (Braintree, MA: The Pope John XXIII Medical-Moral Research and Education Center, 1985), 103-32, 148-87, 204-39.
3
See H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, Christ and Culture (New York: Harper and
Row, 1951), 39-44.
4
See N. MAX WILDIER, The Theologian and His Universe: Theology and
Cosmology from the Middle Ages to the Present (New York: The Seabury Press,
1982), 1.
GROWING IN THE VIRTUES AND THE GIFTS
435
of spiritual direction is to help a person grow in intimacy with
God, it is essential that he or she be encouraged to sift through
the operative images of the divine in his or her life and strike
down any that promote dysfunctional ways of relating.
Because such images are not formed in isolation (as if in a
vacuum) but in the wider context of one’s familial and societal
relationships, it is important for a person to take account of the
culture in which he or she lives. By doing so, he or she will be
better able to understand the dynamics of his or her own way of
relating and, as a result, be in a better position to do something
about those areas that are particularly lacking. The wise and discerning help of a spiritual director can be invaluable in helping
a person come to recognize the spiritual dimensions of his or
her everyday relationships. By helping the directee to ponder the
presence of the divine in the human and the human in the divine, he or she highlights the concrete ramifications that faith in
Christ has for the circumstances of daily life.
As Emmanuel, “God with us,” Jesus is present to the directee
on every level of his or her anthropological makeup and promises to lead each person along the way to sound relational wholeness. This incarnational correspondence between the human
and divine in each person involves certain similarities and differences with the human-divine correspondence in Christ. In the
former, the grounds of relationship focus on a moral and spiritual communion of persons, while the connection in the latter is
rooted in a unique and incommunicable hypostasis of union in
a single divine person.5
It is important for both the director and directee to keep this
analogical point of reference in mind when examining the contours of the directee’s spiritual life. Otherwise, an unwarranted
merging or collapse of one into the other will obfuscate the legitimate distinction between Christology and anthropology.6
5
For the analogical significance of the incarnation, see Dizionario di
mistica, eds. L. Borriello, E. Caruana, M. R. Del Genio, N. Suffi (Vatican
City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1998), s.v. “Incarnazionismo,” by A. AMATO.
6
See, for example, the discussion of “christology with an anthropological emphasis” in WALTER KASPER, Jesus the Christ, trans. V. Green (London/New York: Burns and Oates/ Paulist Press, 1976), 48-52.
436
DENNIS J. BILLY
Such a caution, however, in no way obscures the very real and
legitimate way that Christ embraces the directee through the
Spirit on every level of his or her anthropological makeup: the
inorganic, the biological, the unconscious, the emotional, the
imaginative, the conceptual, the spiritual, the bi-relational, the
familial, and the societal – to name but a few.7
The analogical nature of the incarnational hermeneutic involved in spiritual direction should give director and directee
alike a deep reverence for the interdisciplinary nature of the direction process itself. It should also foster a strong appreciation
of how the mystery of the Word-made-flesh brings unity to the
dysfunctional relational triangle of God, humanity, and world effected by the deeply rooted diffidence of the human heart which
Christians have traditionally explained through their doctrine of
original sin.8 In the context of spiritual direction, this incarnational hermeneutic is the vehicle by which the covenantal relationship between the directee and the divine is uncovered, pondered, and gradually deepened.
The Covenantal
Spiritual direction focuses on the covenantal relationship
between the directee and God. It does so through a process of
honest reflection and prayerful trust that goes on between the
spiritual director and directee. While not the central concern of
the spiritual direction process, this last relationship itself has
strong covenantal overtones and benefits the directee to the extent that it enables him or her to plumb the depths of his or her
experience of the divine.9
7
See also the seven anthropological constants developed in EDWARD
SCHILLEBEECKX, Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 734-43.
8
For models of original sin, see GABRIEL DALY, “Theological Models in
the Doctrine of Original Sin,” The Heythrop Journal 13(1972): 121-42. For the
theological spirituality of the fall, see DENNIS J. BILLY, Evangelical Kernels: A
Theological Spirituality of the Religious Life (Staten Island, NY: Alba House,
1993), 65-76.
9
For the spiritual direction relationship, see BILLY, “The Relations of
437
This experience is intimately related to the ongoing narrative of the directee’s life. By focusing on the degree of one’s intimacy with God, spiritual direction provides the directee with the
opportunity to see how such intimacy is reflected in his or her
other relationships, especially with the director. This transposing of the divine relations onto the human sphere brings an element of spiritual (almost sacramental) concreteness to the directee’s experience that, when seriously and judiciously reflected upon, provides him or her with even deeper insights into
one’s understanding of and participation in the divine. It also
provides the basis for the directee’s understanding of and participation in the experience of communion with the variously incorporated members of Christ’s body.10
The process used to examine the directee’s covenantal relationship with God and, through Christ, with the Church, involves a threefold movement of narrative sharing, reflective consideration, and transnarrative correspondence. That is to say
that the directee is given: (1) the opportunity to relate concrete
experiences of his or her life of prayer (e.g., occasions, kinds, experiences, and difficulties involved); (2) a chance to step back
from the narrative of his or her spiritual moral life and to ponder its meaning in the wider context of the directee’s vocational
and life discernment; and (3) the freedom to look for points of
correspondence between the narrative of his or her spiritual
moral life and that of the Christian tradition, particularly the
Gospel narrative of Jesus life, death, and resurrection.11
Spiritual Direction,” 81-85; MADELINE BURMINGHAM, “The Spiritual Direction
Relationship,” Human Development 2(1981): 563-65; BARRY and CONNOLLY,
The Practice of Spiritual Direction, 31-45; JAMES GAU, “Relationships in Spiritual Direction,” in , Kevin G. Culligan, ed., Spiritual Direction: Contemporary
Readings (Locust Valley, NY: Living Flame Press, 1983), 89-97..
10
BILLY, “The Relations of Spiritual Direction,” 85-88. For the transposition of the divine relations onto the human sphere, see JOHN R. SHEETS,
“Spiritual Direction in the Church,” Review for Religious 46(1987): 505-22;
GERALD E. KEEFE, “Letter to a Person Beginning Spiritual Direction,” Review
for Religious 33(1974): 542-45.
11
Related to this threefold movement are the various elements of theological reflection. See ANTHONY F. KRISAK, “Theological Reflection: Unfolding
the Mystery,” in Handbook of Spirituality for Ministers, ed. Robert J. Wicks
438
DENNIS J. BILLY
During this process, the director’s role is to facilitate as
much as possible a thorough and mature self-reflection on the
directee’s life of prayer. Such a role means helping the directee
to name whatever fears may be keeping him or her from growing in intimacy with the divine. It also means enabling the directee to articulate whatever experiences of the divine are lying
on the periphery of his or her consciousness and encouraging
him or her to adopt new strategies for spiritual growth that will
deepen his or her communion with God and others. To facilitate
this process, it is important for the director to receive careful supervision in the subtleties of the director-directee relationship.
To this end, regularly scheduled supervisory sessions can help
guarantee both the quality of the direction being given and received. They can also serve to keep the direction within the
bounds of clearly thought-out ethical guidelines.12
Like human actions, human relationships are “moral” to the
extent that they involve deliberated will.13 The covenantal relationship involved in spiritual direction fits this description very
well. The category that reflects this important spiritual moral
phenomenon best is friendship and its three dynamic marks of
benevolence, reciprocity, and mutual indwelling.14 Friendship
with God is the goal of the moral life and the ultimate foundation of holiness. It is no small matter that the saints of the early
Church and late antiquity came to be known as “the friends of
God.”15 Nor is it insignificant that the Christian God has tradi-
(New York/Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1995), 308-29.
12
For supervision in spiritual direction, see WILLIAM A. BARRY and MARY
C. GUY, “The Practice of Supervision in Spiritual Direction,” Review for Religious 37(1978): 834-42; WILLIAM A. BARRY and WILLIAM J. CONNOLLY, The Practice of Spiritual Direction (Minneapolis: The Seabury Press, 1982), 175-91;
MAUREEN CONROY, Looking into the Well: Supervision of Spiritual Directors
(Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1995). Ethical guidelines for spiritual directors are available in SPIRITUAL DIRECTORS INTERNATIONAL, Guidelines for
Ethical Conduct, (San Francisco: SDI, 1999), 1-8.
13
See THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, resp.
14
See IBID., I-II, q. 28. a. 2, resp. ; II-II, q. 23, a. 1, resp. See also PAUL J.
WADELL, Friendship and the Moral Life (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1989), 130-41.
15
See PETER BROWN, The Making of Late Antiquity (Cambridge, MA: Har-
439
tionally been identified with the transcendental values of GrecoRoman philosophy known as the One, the True, and the Good.16
Becoming a friend of God, in other words, involves not only
growing in holiness, but also sharing a deeper participation in
the Good. Growth in goodness has traditionally been associated
with leading a life of virtue. In the Christian tradition, this
means leading a life that is imbued with the theological and
moral virtues and open to the influence of the Spirit and the variety of gifts it bestows. Leading such a life means walking the
path of conversion and allowing God to heal the wounded areas
of one’s life so that one’s capacity for mature, loving relationships with oneself, others, and God is elevated and gently transformed.17
The Transformational
The ultimate goal of the covenantal process of spiritual direction is deepening intimacy with the divine. Such intimacy
comes about through the gradual transformation of the directee’s posture toward the threefold relational triangle of God,
humanity, and the world.
Spiritual direction, in other words, seeks a renewal and a
deepening of one’s relationship to the vast nexus of relationships
in which a person is immersed. That renewal comes about
through a simultaneous turning away from dysfunctional relationships and undue attachments (i. e., il distacco) and a turning
vard University Press, 1978), 54-80.
16
For the appropriation of the Christian faith by Hellenist Gentiles, see
JACK A. BONSOR, Athens and Jerusalem: The Role of Philosophy in Theology
(New York/Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1993), 27-35.
17
For the importance of the theological and cardinal virtues and gifts of
the Spirit for the supernatural organism, see JORDAN AUMANN, Spiritual Theology, (London: Sheed and Ward, 1980), 66-101, 247-315. For a helpful diagram, see SERVAIS PINCKAERS, The Sources of Christian Ethics, trans. Mary
Thomas Noble (Washington, D.C. The Catholic University of America Press,
1995), 179. See also IDEM, La vita spirituale del cristiano secondo San Paolo e
San Tommaso, trans. Antonio Tombolini (Milan: Jaca, 1996), 149-60.
440
DENNIS J. BILLY
toward the elusive but ever present face of the divine (i.e., l’unione).18
The path of conversion involves stepping away from those
things that prevent us from forming genuine, loving relationships with God, others, and the world and embracing those
things that further it. For most people, this path of conversion
involves a threefold process now typically referred to as the
purgative, illuminative, and unitive ways.19 It would be a mistake to consider these ways as isolated steps that are simply
passed through and never revisited in the spiritual moral life.
The goal of spiritual direction is not merely to help the directee
over the hurdles of purgation and illumination in order to experience union with the divine. Rather, it seeks to enable him or
her to embrace every aspect of his or her journey through life
and to place it under the compassionate and loving gaze of the
divine.
For most people, the path of conversion often involves covering ground already traveled. In their journey through life, they
find themselves, again and again, taking two steps forward and
one (sometimes two or three) back. Part of this experience of
repetitive loss may have to do with the fact that the closer one
gets to God the more one gets in touch with those areas in one’s
life that still need to be surrendered. The greatest of saints have
often referred to themselves as the worst of sinners. They do so
not out of a pious display of humility before God and others, but
because intimacy with God has caused them to see themselves
as they really are. For them, the processes of purgation and illumination are subsumed into their experience of union with the
divine – not merely left behind. For this reason, a more adequate
image of progress in the spiritual life is not that of separated and
isolated steps on the ladder of sanctity, but an upward spiraling
movement involving purgative, illuminative, and unitive mo-
18
See Dizionario di mistica, s.v. “Distacco,” by B. ZOMPARELLI and
“Unione con Dio,” by G. LAFONT.
19
For a concise treatment, see The New Dictionary of Catholic Spirituality, ed. Michael Downey (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1993), s. v.
“Purgation, Purgative Way,” “Illumination, Illuminative Way,” and “Union,
Unitive Way,” by THOMAS D. MCGONIGLE.
441
ments in the deepening process of the directee’s journey into the
divine.20
The Eucharist is the symbol par excellence of the transformational process involved in spiritual moral life. In it, the movements of purgation, illumination and union are intimately intertwined in the sacramental encounter of the Risen Lord. In each
Eucharist celebration, sorrow for one’s sins (i.e., purgation), insight into the meaning of the Word (i.e., illumination), and communion with the person of Jesus (i.e., union) converge in a ritual enactment of the messianic banquet.21
The already-but-not-yet character of this celebration is an
apt metaphor for the way the spiritual and moral spheres of the
community’s life converge in the process of spiritual direction.
The gradual transformation involved in direction necessarily involves confronting one’s shadow and turning away from sin
(purgation), gaining new insights into the nature of one’s relationship with God (illumination), and a deepening sense of communion with God and the members of Christ’s body (union). It
thus serves an important integrating function in the directee’s
life and helps him or her to find important threads of meaning
in his or her faith experience.
It would be a mistake, therefore, to consider the purgative,
illuminative, and unitive ways as pertaining only to the spiritual
life or as touching the moral life only to the extent that they
build upon or presuppose it. While the classical disciplines of
moral and spiritual theology were based on the hierarchical dis-
20
“In human living, the three ways are not separate paths. They merge,
overlap, intertwine – none can be taken in isolation from the others.” See
WILLIAM JOHNSTON, Mystical Theology: The Science of Love (London: Harper
Collins, 1995), 192. According to FREDRICA R. HALLIGAN, “Researchers into
both psychotherapy and the stages of spiritual development today tend to
agree with the spiral image of progress.” See “Keeping Faith with the Future:
Toward Final Conscious Unity,” in The Fires of Desire: Erotic Energies and the
Spiritual Quest, eds. Fredrica R. Halligan and John J. Shea (New York: Crossroad, 1992), 184.
21
For the relationship between the Eucharist and the spiritual life, see
Dizionario di mistica, s.v. “Eucharistia,” by A. DONGHI. For the theological
spirituality of the Eucharist, see BILLY, Evangelical Kernels, 135-50. For the
Eucharist in the relationship between virtue ethics and New Testament spir-
442
DENNIS J. BILLY
tinction between the way of the commandments and the way of
the counsels, contemporary theologians are increasingly interested in how the moral and spiritual spheres of life influence
each other and interrelate.22
As hinted at earlier, there is a moral side to all spiritual
knowledge and a corresponding spiritual side to all moral
knowledge. This insight comes to the fore most clearly when the
relational dimensions of the moral life are emphasized in addition to the responsibilities and obligations that flow from them.
Every purgative, illuminative, and unitive moment in a person’s
journey through life is spiritual to the extent that its ultimate
goal is growth in intimacy with the divine. It is moral, in turn, to
the extent that such intimacy necessarily involves a vast network
of deliberated relationships.
Intimacy with the divine, in other words, requires forming
and living in right relationships with oneself, others, the world
and, of course, God. To overlook any of these areas would risk
dividing one’s life into separate and unrelated spheres of behavior. It would thus run counter to the Second Vatican Council’s
ituality, see WILLIAM C. SPOHN, Go and Do Likewise: Jesus and Ethics (New
York: Continuum, 1999), 163-84.
22
See for example, TULLO GOFFI, Etico spirituale: Dissonanze nell’unitaria armonia (Bologna: Edizioni Dehoniane Bologna, 1884); SERGIO BASTIANEL, La preghiera nella vita morale cristiana (Casale Monferrato: Edizioni
Piemme, 1986); MAURICE ZUNDEL, Morale et mystique (Quebec: Editions Anne
Sigier, 1986); MICHAEL K. DUFFY, Be Blessed in What You Do: The Unity of
Christian Ethics and Spirituality New York/Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1988);
NEIL BROWN, Spirit of the World: The Moral Basis of Christian Spirituality
(Manly, New South Wales, Australia: Catholic Institute of Sydney, 1990);
MARK O’KEEFE, Becoming Good, Becoming Holy: On the Relationship of Christian Ethics and Spirituality (New York/Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1995);
DENNIS J. BILLY and DONNA L. ORSUTO, eds., Spirituality and Morality: Integrating Prayer and Action (New York/Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1996);
MARCIANO VIDAL, Moral y espiritualidad: De la separación a la convergencia
(Madrid: Editorial El Perpetuo Socorro, 1997); RICHARD GULA, The Good Life:
Where Morality and Spirituality Converge (New York/Mahwah, NJ: Paulist
Press, 1999); WILLIAM C. SPOHN, “Spirituality and Ethics: Exploring the Connections,” Theological Studies 58(1997): 109-23; IDEM, Go and Do Likewise.
See also the issues dedicated to spirituality and ethics in The Way Supplement 88(1997) and Listening 34(1999).
443
universal call to holiness and leave the false impression that it is
possible to lead a virtuous life apart from God and others. As a
result, it would fail to recognize the deeply integrated nature of
the moral and spiritual spheres of the Christian life and overlook
the intrinsic participatory nature of human and divine love.23
Christian Virtue and the Gifts of the Spirit
As described above, the anthropological, covenantal, and
transformational aspects of the process of spiritual direction
correspond closely to the incarnational, ecclesial, and eucharistic dimensions of the Christian faith. These correlations are
analogous in nature (i.e., involving both similarities and dissimilarities) and vary in emphasis depending on the particular
brand of Christian spirituality that sets the parameters for the
process under consideration. The great variety of Christian spiritualities that might be operative in the process of direction raises questions about possible points of reference with a universal
relevance for the spiritual moral life.24 Recently, the renewed interest in virtue ethics has surfaced as a possible touchstone for
integrating the insights of the spiritual and moral life.25 If such
23
For the universal call to holiness, see Lumen gentium, nos. 39-42. On
the role of right relationships in the spiritual moral life, see KEVIN J. O’NEIL,
“Forming Right Relationships,” in Billy and Orsuto, eds., Spirituality and
Morality, 97-111; O’KEEFE, Becoming Good, Becoming Holy, 75-90; WADELL,
Friendship and the Moral Life, 142-67. For the various kinds of participative
love, see EDWARD COLLINS VACEK, Love, Human and Divine: The Heart of
Christian Ethics (Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Press, 1994),
esp. 74-115.
24
For the variety of traditions in spiritual direction, see LAVINIA BYRNE,
ed., Traditions of Spiritual Guidance (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press,
1990); KEVIN G. CULLIGAN, ed., Spiritual Direction: Contemporary Readings,
167-229. For the variety of spiritualities in general, see GEOFFREY WAINWRIGHT, “Types of Spirituality,” in The Study of Spirituality, eds. Cheslyn
Jones, Geoffrey Wainwright, Edward Yarnold (London: SPCK, 1992), 592605; EMETERIO DE CEA, ed. Compendium of Spirituality, vol. 2, trans. Jordan
Aumann (Staten Island: Alba House, 1992).
25
See JEAN PORTER, “Virtue Ethics and Its Significance for Spirituality,”
444
DENNIS J. BILLY
a proposal holds true, this renewed interest may also become a
concrete locus for demonstrating the intimate union of spirituality and morality in the spiritual direction process itself.
Thomas Aquinas remarks in the Preface to the Secunda secundae of the Summa theologiae that all of moral matters can be
reduced to a study of the virtues, specifically the theological
virtues of faith, hope, and charity and the cardinal virtues of
prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.26 The renewed interest in the virtues is an attempt to place this insight of Aquinas
back in the center of Christian reflection on the nature of the
spiritual moral life. In doing so, it focuses on those habits of the
soul that will best help people today to lead upright moral lives.
Although this is not the place to go deeply into the virtue
theory of Aquinas or to focus on the various adaptations of that
theory in the recent literature, a few relevant comments on his
“God-originating” and “God-orienting” vision of the spiritual
moral life are in order.27 That vision follows the general contours
of the Exitus/Reditus schema used by Aquinas to structure his
thoughts on the dynamic outpouring and ultimate return of all
of reality to and from God.28 For him, the virtues are necessary
prerequisites for humanity’s ongoing participation in that return. He develops his teaching on them with an extreme sensi-
The Way Supplement 88(1997): 26-35; JAMES F. KEENAN, “Catholic Moral Theology, Ignatian Spirituality, and Virtue Ethics: Strange Bedfellows,” The Way
Supplement 88(1997): 36-45. See also the threefold integrating approach of
Gospel narrative, virtue ethics, and Christian spiritual practices developed in
SPOHN, Go and Do Likewise, 12-16.
26
“Sic igitur tota materia morali ad considerationem virtutum reducta,
omnes virtutes sunt ulterius reducendae ad septem: quarum tres sunt theologicae, de quibus primo est agendum; aliae vero quatuor sunt cardinales, de
quibus posterius agetur.” See AQUINAS, Summa theologiae, II-II, prol.
27
The terms “God-originating” and “God-orienting” are applied to
Aquinas’ theological spirituality by WALTER H. PRINCIPE, Thomas Aquinas’
Spirituality Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984), 15-26.
28
For Thomas’ use of the Exitus/Reditus schema, see M.-D. CHENU, Toward Understanding St. Thomas, trans. Edward Brennan and Albert Marie
Landry (Chicago: Regnery, 1964), 304-22. For other detectable patterns in
the Summa theologiae, see THOMAS F. O’MEARA, Thomas Aquinas, Theologian
(Notre Dame, IN/London: University of Notre Dame Press), 41-86.
445
tivity to humanity’s composite makeup and creaturely status before God.29
For the most part, Aquinas employs a Christianized form of
Aristotelian anthropology which, based on an analogous use of
the famous theory of hylomorphism (i.e., matter/form), posits a
continuity between human nature (i.e., body/soul), moral cognition (i.e., material/formal aspects of synderesis), and action (i.e.,
object/intention).30 This continuity of nature, moral knowledge,
and action serves as the backdrop against which he develops his
virtue theory. The strength of his theory is its comprehensive
and integrated way of looking at the various spiritual and moral
components of the acting subject. Criticisms often leveled
against it involve the limited insights of its sources and its appearance, at times, of being more Aristotelian than Christian in
outlook.31
For Aquinas, to act virtuously is to act according to reason.
His understanding of reason is not the narrow, univocal brand
of logic that was championed by Enlightenment thinkers, but a
common sense openness to reality. His scholastic way of thinking leads him to examine every area of the soul and name a corresponding virtue that moderated it in accordance with the well-
29
See BRIAN DAVIES, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1992), 227-49, esp. 239-44.
30
See DENNIS J. BILLY, “Aquinas on the Relations of Prudence,” Studia
moralia 33(1995): 247-48, 262-63; IDEM, “Aquinas on the Content of Synderesis,” Studia moralia 29(1991): 61-83. For Thomas’ anthropology, epistemology, and theory of human action, see ETIENNE GILSON, The Philosophy of
St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Edward Bullough(New York: Dorset Press, 1929),
204-220, 233-59, 304-36. See also the pertinent essays in Norman Kretzmann
and Eleonore Stump, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
31
Aquinas’ presentation of women , for example, is symptomatic of the
limited biological knowledge available in his day. See AQUINAS, Summa theologiae, I, q. 92, aa. 1-4; MONDIN, Dizionario enciclopedico del pensiero di San
Tommaso d’Aquino, s. v. “Donna.” An in-depth response to the criticism concerning Thomas’ heavy use of Aristotelian philosophy brings out the fundamental evangelical character of Thomas’ moral teaching. See PINCKAERS, The
Sources of Christian Ethics, 168-90. For contemporary challenges to Thomas’
thought see JEAN PORTER, The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for
Christian Ethics (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990), 172-79.
446
DENNIS J. BILLY
known Aristotelian adage of finding “the mean between the extremes.” 32
The soul with its rational, irascible, and concupiscible powers is oriented toward truly human goods by virtues which properly dispose not just reason (as in prudence) and the will (as in
justice) but even the passions (as in fortitude and temperance).33
These natural virtues are normally acquired, but could also be
enhanced by God through the infusion of grace (hence the designation of the infused moral virtues) in order to orient the person toward God, the Supreme Good. In addition, there are purely supernatural virtues that come entirely from the influence of
God’s grace (as in the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity), have no corresponding naturally human counterpart, and
serve to elevate the human subject so as to be able to participate
in the divine life.34
For Aquinas, this capacity to participate in the divine life
reaches its fulfillment in the beatific vision, the ultimate end toward which all human beings are called. This vision has an objective terminus in God (as finis cuius) and a subject terminus in
the beholder (as finis quo).35 The virtues function in such a way
32
For virtue and right reasoning, see AQUINAS. Summa theologiae, I-II, q.
55, a. 4, ad 3m; I-II, q. 58, a. 4, resp. See also DANIEL WESTBERG, Right Practical Reason: Aristotle, Action, and Prudence in Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1994), 216-28; BATTISTA MONDIN, Dizionario enciclopedico del pensiero
di San Tommaso d’Aquino (Bologna: Edizioni Studio Domenicano, 1991), s.v.
“Ragione” and “Virtù.” For the mean of virtue, see AQUINAS, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 17, a. 5, ad 2m; II-II, q. 123, a. 4, ad 3m; II-II, q. 126, a. 2, resp.;
II-II, q. 127, a. 2, resp.; III, q. 84, a. 9, ad 3m. See also ROMANUS CESSARIO, The
Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics (Notre Dame, IN/London: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1991), 128-38.
33
For an enumeration of the cardinal virtues, see AQUINAS, Summa theologiae, q 61, a. 2, resp. See also CESSARIO, The Moral Virtues and Theological
Ethics, 72-93. For the role of the passions in Aquinas’ theology, see G. SIMON
HARAK, Virtuous Passions: The Formation of Christian Character (New
York/Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1993), 71-98.
34
For the analogy of virtue, see RALPH MCINERNY, Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of
America Press, 1992), 151-52; BILLY, “Aquinas on the Relations of Prudence,”
236-40.
35
See AQUINAS, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 1, a. 8, resp.
447
that the human person is able to orient the will and affections
toward this ultimate end and find appropriate rational means to
achieve that end. What is sometimes overlooked by students of
Aquinas and even by many of the current-day virtue theorists is
that the virtues are themselves complemented by and reach their
fulfillment in the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit (wisdom, understanding, counsel, knowledge, fortitude, piety, and fear of the
Lord). Each of the gifts correspond to a particular theological or
cardinal and is Aquinas’ way of presenting to his readers a wonderfully unified and extremely comprehensive picture of the
spiritual moral life.36
Attending to the Virtues and Gifts in Spiritual Direction
Aquinas’ vision of the virtues and the gifts provides the basis for an integrated understanding of the relationship between
Christian spirituality and morality. As such, either it or some viable adaptation of it can be an invaluable touchstone for carrying this integrated vision over into the practice of spiritual direction.
The close historical relationship in the Catholic tradition between spiritual direction and sacramental confession already reveals a sensitivity to the relationship between these two important spheres of human existence. The general decline in recent
years, however, of Catholic moral theology’s traditionally strong
focus on sacramental confession has weakened the discipline’s
ability to implement its evolving pastoral insights and has left a
vacuum in the Church’s ability to respond to the spiritual and
moral needs of the faithful. The recent interest in the intimate
relationship between spirituality and morality may represent the
beginning of a paradigm shift in Catholic pastoral praxis, one
which brings to the fore the various incarnational, covenantal,
and transformational dimensions shared by both disciplines.37
36
For the gifts of the Spirit, see AQUINAS, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 78.
See also PAUL J. WADELL, Friends of God: Virtues and Gifts in Aquinas (New
York: Peter Lang, 1991), 121-39.
37
The Catholic practice of private auricular confession grew out of the
448
DENNIS J. BILLY
It also must be pointed out that Aquinas’ integrated vision of
the spiritual and moral life never fully made its way into the daily pastoral practice of the Church – not even in his own Dominican order. After his death, his Summa theologiae was passed
on in a truncated version and was itself eventually eclipsed by
confessional manuals and textbooks of casuistry that focused
more on particular acts and the obligations of the law rather
than on growth in the virtues and the gifts of the Spirit.38
What is more, there gradually evolved in the Church’s understanding a two-tiered approach to the Christian life which focused on the commandments (as the way of the laity) and the
evangelical counsels (as the way of religious and, to some extent,
the clergy). This development succeeded in driving a wedge between the moral and spiritual dimensions of Christian living.
Aquinas, as a result, was studied more for his insights into the
nature of divine and natural law than for his integrated understanding of the spiritual moral life. Moral theology became excessively associated with the identification of sins and application of law to particular cases rather than nurturing a dedicated
life of virtuous living. People were often treated anonymously as
“cases” needing to be solved.39
Celtic monastic practice of spiritual direction. According to JOHN MAHONEY,
“...the single most influential factor in the development of moral theology is
to be found in the growth and spread of ‘confession’ in the Church.” See The
Making of Moral Theology: A Study of the Roman Catholic Tradition (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1987), 1. For the relationship between spiritual direction
and the sacrament of reconciliation, see KENNETH LEECH, Soul Friend: The
Practice of Christian Spirituality (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1980),
194-225; SHAUN MCCARTY, “Pilgrim and Penitent,” Review for Religious
45(1986): 819-30. For the process of conversion as a locus for the unity of
spirituality and morality, see BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE, “The Dynamics of Conversion,” in Billy and Orsuto, eds., Spirituality and Morality, 32-48; O’KEEFE, Becoming Good, Becoming Holy, 27-43. For spiritual practices as the pedagogical and transformational link between New Testament spirituality and
virtue ethics, see SPOHN, Go and Do Likewise, 33-42.
38
See LEONARD BOYLE, The Setting of the Summa (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1982), 23-30; SERVAIS PINCKAERS, The Sources of
Christian Ethics, 229-39.
39
A brief summary of this movement in moral theology is given in JAMES
F. KEENAN, “Ethics and Spirituality: Historical Distinctions and Contempo-
449
If the virtues are to provide the content and spiritual direction the format for a paradigm shift in the practical orientation
of the Church’s spiritual moral teaching, the question arises
about how they will relate on the level of concrete implementation. On this score, Thomistic thought reminds us that form
gives shape to matter – and not vice versa.40 In the present context, the process of spiritual direction must be able to vivify the
content of virtue theory so that it will come alive for director and
directee alike. It must, in other words, be able to “inhabit” the
content of virtue theory and become closely one with it. A close
look at the values and goals of each reveal that this can and
should be so. Intimacy with God is the ultimate end of both.
That end is sought through the relational marks of friendship
and such important spiritual and moral skills as listening, personal reflection, giving and receiving counsel, and the various
rhythms and dimensions of prayer. What is more, both have
deep roots in Sacred Scripture (even Thomistic virtue theory41)
and seek to address the person on every level of his or her anthropological makeup. As it has developed and matured over the
years, the process of spiritual direction is especially suited to
helping a person grow in the virtues and gifts of the Spirit. The
virtues, in turn, provide a well-established and highly developed
language with which the director can help the directee to articulate his or her spiritual experience and come to a deeper understanding of his or her relationship with the divine.
rary Challenges,” Listening 34(1999): 167-179. See also O’KEEFE, Becoming
Good, Becoming Holy, 10-15. For a good summary of wider historical development of moral theology, see TERRENCE KENNEDY, Doers of the Word
(Liguori, MO: Triumph Books, 1995), 112-37. For more in-depth analysis,
see WALTER J. WOODS, Walking with Faith: New Perspectives on the Sources
and Shaping of Catholic Moral Life (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press,
1998), esp. chaps. 7-9.
40
“Forma nihil aliud est quam actus materiae.” See AQUINAS, Summa
theologiae, I. q. 105, a. 1 resp. See also MONDIN, Dizionario enciclopedico del
pensiero di San Tommaso d’Aquino, s.v. “Forma.”
41
See PINCKAERS The Sources of Christian Ethics, 168-90; IDEM, La vita
spirituale del cristiano: secondo San Paolo e San Tommaso, trans. Antonio
Tombolini (Milan: Jaca Book, 1996), 111-60.
450
DENNIS J. BILLY
Observations
The above considerations on the use of virtue theory as the
guiding language for the process of spiritual direction invites a
number of comments concerning how it should be used and the
influence it will have upon those involved in the ministry. The
following observations seek to raise some of the legitimate concerns that might arise in such an arrangement.
1. Directors would be in a better position to help their directees if they had a thorough knowledge of the Christian
virtues. An acquaintance with Aquinas’ treatment of the general
nature of virtue as well as a sensitivity to both the range and
types of virtues could provide a general blueprint for the spiritual moral life and serve as a useful touchstone for many aspects
of their ministry. This knowledge of the classical representation
of virtue theory should be complemented by more recent attempts to develop an ethics of virtue appropriate for today’s
world and become an integral part of training programs for spiritual directors. Directors, moreover, need to be sensitive to the
influence of the historical and cultural factors involved in any
formulation of virtue theory, as well as the relational triangle of
God, humanity, and world that forms the backdrop of all mature
theological reflection on the spiritual moral life.42
2. A corollary to the above observation would be the need for
directors to have a close familiarity with the corresponding vices
associated with each of the Christian virtues. Such knowledge
42
For Aquinas’ general treatment of the virtues, see Summa theologiae,
I-II, qq. 55-67. For his treatment of particular virtues, see Summa theologiae,
II-II, qq. 1-9, 17-19, 23-33, 47-51, 57-58, 60-62, 79-91, 101-04, 106, 108-09,
114, 117, 120-24, 128-29, 134, 136-37, 139-41, 13-47, 149, 151-52, 155, 157,
160-1, 168. For the virtues in Thomistic thought, see AUMANN, Spiritual Theology, 247-315; CESSARIO, The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics, 72-125;
PORTER, The Recovery of Virtue, esp. 100-171. For recent developments in the
area of virtue ethics, see JOHN W. CROSSIN, What Are They Saying about
Virtue? (New York/Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1985), esp. 13-35; JAMES F.
KEENAN, “Virtue Ethics: Making a Case as It Comes of Age,” Thought
67(1992): 115-27; IDEM, “Proposing Cardinal Virtues,” Theological Studies
56(1995): 709-29; JOSEPH J. KOTVA, JR. The Christian Case for Virtue Ethics
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1996), esp. 48-68.
451
will enable directors to identify disordered patterns of behavior
in the directee’s life and provide him or her with a language that
will first name the habitual disorder and then point out the direction for gradual, developmental growth. Aquinas’ presentation of the vices, when coupled with some of the more recent descriptions of the virtue ethicists and the sound insights of the
psychological sciences, will help the director to articulate areas
in the directee’s life requiring further examination.43
3. A theoretical knowledge of the virtues and vices provides
the director with a sense of what the directee should be detached
from (il distacco) and united with (l’unione). Theoretical knowledge, however, can only go so far. Spiritual direction is not only
a science, but also a practical art that needs to be realized creatively in very specific and concrete circumstances. For this reason, directors must pay very close attention to how they use
their theoretical knowledge in the direction session. Such
knowledge is to be used not as an intrusive form of control, but
as a helpful diagnostic tool and curing salve. His or her approach to the directee should be one of presence, careful listening, and prudent counsel. The director should always focus on
the person receiving direction and look to the virtues as a store-
43
For Aquinas’ general treatment of the vices, see Summa theologiae, III, qq. 71-89. For his treatment of particular vices, see Summa theologiae, IIII, qq. 10-15, 20-21, 34-43, 53-56, 59, 63-78, 92-100, 105, 107, 110-13, 115-16,
118-19, 125-27, 130-33, 135, 138, 142, 148, 150, 153-54, 156, 158-59, 162-67,
169. Treatments of the vices can also be found in traditional Thomistic manuals such as JOHN A. MCHUGH and CHARLES J. CALLAN, revised and enlarged
by EDWARD P. FARRELL, Moral Theology: A Complete Course Based on St.
Thomas Aquinas and the Best Modern Authorities, 2 vols. (New York/London:
Joseph F. Wagner/Herder, 1958). See also the particular entries in MONDIN,
Dizionario enciclopedico del pensiero di San Tommaso d’Aquino. For the insights of psychology into spiritual direction, see EUGENE GEROMEL, “Depth
Psychology and Spiritual Direction,” Review for Religious 36(1977): 753-63;
ROBERT ROSSI, “Staging, Typing, and Spiritual Direction,” Review for Religious 42(1983): 614-19; C. KEVIN GILLESPIE, “Listening for Grace: Self-Psychology and Spiritual Direction,” in Handbook of Spirituality for Ministers,
347-64. Spiritual directors in need of a grounding in sound psychological
theory can turn to FRANCO IMODA, Human Development: Psychology and Mystery, trans. Eugene Dryer (Leuven: Peeters, 1998).
452
DENNIS J. BILLY
house from which he or she can take out both new and old as
the occasion permits. A thorough knowledge of virtue theory, in
other words, puts the director in touch with some of the most
valuable treasures of the Christian tradition. Since one of the
goals of the direction process should be to make that tradition
come alive in the person receiving direction, special care should
be taken to insure that it is presented in a way that encourages
rather than hinders growth in the spiritual moral life.44
4. It would also be wise at some point in the direction
process, preferably at the beginning, for the director to go over
some of the general principles of virtue theory with the directee
and briefly outline some of the ways he or she will be employing
them. This sharing of knowledge emphasizes the mutuality of the
direction process and avoids making the directee overly dependent on the director’s knowledge of the material. At some point,
the director may even wish to suggest some spiritual reading that
will cover these general principles in a straightforward and easily digestible manner. Directors would do well to keep an eye out
for popular presentations of the virtues that would be useful to
their directees in their spiritual moral lives. In addition to spiritual reading, directors should be open to questions on the virtues
in general or any one of the virtues or vices in particular.45
44
For the role of listening and teaching in spiritual direction, see MARGUENTER, Holy Listening: The Art of Spiritual Direction
(Cambridge/Boston, MA: Cowley Publications, 1992),42-80. For its fundamental elements, see SHAUN MCCARTY, “Basics in Spiritual Direction,” in
Handbook of Spirituality for Ministers, 56-76.
45
A comprehensive treatment of the virtues for spiritual directors is
found in AUMANN, Spiritual Theology, 247-315. For a virtues approach in a recent moral theology manual, see BENEDICT M. ASHLEY, Living the Truth in
Love: A Biblical Introduction to Moral Theology (Staten Island, NY: Alba
House, 1996). Popular treatments, see JOSEF PIEPER, Belief and Faith , trans.
Richard and Clara Winston (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1963); IDEM,
On Hope, trans. Mary Frances McCarthy (San Francisco: Ignatius Press,
1986); IDEM, The Four Cardinal Virtues, trans. Richard and Clara Winston,
Lawrence E. Lynch, Daniel F. Coogan (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1965). See also BERNARD HÄRING, The Virtues of an Authentic
Life: A Celebration of Spiritual Maturity (Liguori, MO: Liguori, 1997); JAMES
F. KEENAN, Virtues for Ordinary Christians (Kansas City, MO: Sheed and
GARET
453
5. All during this time, it is essential that the director maintain an honest, trusting, and open relationship with the directee.
Only in the context of such a relationship will the directee feel
free enough to share with the director the most intimate details
of his or her spiritual moral experience. The story of one’s ongoing faith experience is the meeting place for virtue theory and
the spiritual direction process. Once it is shared, director and directee can engage in serious theological reflection and begin to
ask questions about its meaning for the spiritual moral life of
the directee. If it is not shared in an honest and open manner,
then both can become engaged in a mutual form of self-deception. The directee will assume a “persona” that does not correspond to his or her true experience, but that is acceptable to the
director. The director, in turn, will be responding to a mask and
may not have the sensitivity or wherewithal to ask the directee
to remove it.46
6. The convergence of virtue theory and the direction
process in the directee’s personal narrative of his or her experience of the divine should also resonate with the Biblical narrative. The director should look for possible parallels with the
Scriptures and suggest them to the directee at appropriate moments. The director should also encourage the directee to read
the Scriptures meditatively (as in lectio divina) and to listen actively for passages that resemble his or her experience. A knowledge of the various spiritual senses of Scripture will help the directee to delve below the literal meaning of the text and find adequate points of reference for growth in the spiritual moral life.
Ward, 1996); JAMES F. KEENAN and JOSEPH KOTVA, eds., Practice What You
Preach: Virtues, Ethics and Power in the Lives of Pastoral Ministers and Their
Congregations (Kansas City, MO: Sheed and Ward, 1999); JOHN W. CROSSIN,
Walking in Virtue: Moral Decisions and Spiritual Growth in Daily Life (New
York/Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1998).
46
“If story is the necessary genre for understanding human experience,
then all spiritual direction must be based not in abstract principles or doctrines but in knowing how to understand stories.” See The New Dictionary of
Catholic Spirituality, s. v. Story,” by TERRENCE W. TILLEY. For the importance
of narrative in theological reflection, see ANTHONY F. KRISAK, “Theological
Reflection: Unfolding the Mystery,” in Handbook of Spirituality for Ministers,
308-29, esp. 317-25.
454
DENNIS J. BILLY
Reading the Scriptures in this way can give the directee a greater
appreciation of the direction process and convey a deeper
awareness of how God is working in his or her life.47
7. One of the main purposes of the direction process is to
help the directee come to a deeper understanding of the various
ways in which he or she has been gifted by God. The subject of
“giftedness” has many dimensions, ranging anywhere from the
Holy Spirit itself (often referred to and named as “Gift”) to universal gifts given to all humanity (e. g., creation and life) to more
particular gifts given to believers (e.g., the infused virtues and
the gifts of the Spirit), to special gifts given to individuals (e.g.,
personal charisms). The director’s goal here should be to raise
the directee’s awareness of the various ways in which he or she
has been gifted by God, to deepen his or her gratitude for those
gifts, and to deepen his or her resolve to use those gifts for the
service of others.48
8. One special gift that God gives to everyone is the grace to
pray. A person’s prayer life should be not a mere other worldly
pursuit, but deeply rooted in the spiritual and moral issues of
the day. Aquinas makes a powerful point when he presents
prayer as an allied virtue of justice; many current day virtue theorists follow suit. Directors need to be knowledgeable in the
ways of prayer so that they will be able to help their directees re-
47
For a brief treatment of the senses of Scripture, see ROBERT M. GRANT
and DAVID TRACY, A Short History of the Interpretation of the Bible, 2d ed
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 59, 85-86 ; KARLFRIED FROEHLICH, ed., Biblical Interpretation in the Early Church (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 28-29.
The authoritative work on the subject is HENRI DE LUBAC, Exégèse médiévale:
les quatre sens de l’Ecriture. 2 vols. (Aubier: Editions Montaigne, 1959). For the
use of Scripture in prayer, see HILARY OTTENSMEYER, “Using Scripture in
Prayer,” Review for Religious 45(1986): 380-85. For the correlations between
Scripture and virtue ethics, see SPOHN, Go and Do Likewise, 12-16, 28-30.
48
See AQUINAS, Summa theologiae, I, q. 38, aa. 1-2; I-II, q. 68, aa. 1-8. See
also BARRY R. STRONG, “The Closest Divine Person,” in Handbook of Spirituality for Ministers,” 291-307; HERBERT ALPHONSO, “Docility to the Spirit: Discerning the Extraordinary in the Ordinary,” in Billy and Orsuto, eds., Spirituality and Morality, 112-26; Dizionario di mistica, s. v. “Doni dello Spirito
Santo,” by A. M. TRIACCA; The New Dictionary of Catholic Spirituality, s. v
“Gratitude,” by BENJAMIN BAYNHAM.
455
spond to the issues facing them in spiritual moral life. This
means helping them to discern the correct paths of action in the
concrete circumstances facing them. It also means encouraging
them to strike a proper balance and rhythm in their daily routine so that every anthropological dimension of their lives will be
oriented to God (e.g., the physical, the emotional, the intellectual, the spiritual, and the social).49
9. As the direction process unfolds, the language of virtue
theory should eventually help the directee to name those areas
that are preventing him or her from growing in intimacy (i.e.,
friendship) with God. In responding to these areas, the director
should encourage the directee to confront those areas of darkness in his or her life by giving them to God in prayer and by developing realistic and practical means for dealing with them.
This twofold movement of prayer and practical resolution gives
concrete expression to the theological notion of cooperation
with God’s grace. It also reveals another way in which the spiritual and moral dimensions of Christian existence converge in
the spiritual direction process. Prayer, in other words, is a practical way of responding to the concrete problems of the spiritual moral life. Practical resolutions, in turn, reveal the shape and
content of a person’s spirituality in the circumstances of daily
life.50
10. As the direction process unfolds, the language of virtue
49
For prayer as an allied virtue of justice, see AQUINAS, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 83. For the theological spirituality of prayer, see BILLY, Evangelical Kernels, 167-84. For a systematic presentation of prayer in the Thomistic
tradition, see FABIO GIARDINI, Pray without Ceasing: Toward a Systematic Psychotheology of Chritian Prayerlife (Leominster, Herefordshire/Rome:
Gracewing/Millennium, 1998).esp. 15-37. For a more popular presentation,
see SIMON TUGWELL, Prayer, 2 vols. (Dublin: Veritas Publications, 1974).
50
For the union of prayer and resolution, see JOHN GOVAN, “The Examen: A Tool for Holistic Growth,” Review for Religious 45(1986): 394-401; JOAN
L. ROCCASALVO, “The Daily Examen,” Review for Religious, 45(1986): 278-83.
For specific practices linking spirituality and virtue, see SPOHN, Go and Do
Likewise, 42-49. For the need of a practice-oriented spirituality in American
culture, see ROBERT WUTHNOW, After Heaven: Spirituality in America Since the
1950s (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1998):
168-98.
456
DENNIS J. BILLY
theory should also help the directee to name those areas that are
helping him or her to grow in friendship with God. In responding to these areas, the director should encourage the directee to
celebrate his or her relationship with the divine by resolving never to take it for granted. Growth in intimacy with God should
gradually become the center of the directee’s conscious awareness and ultimately permeate everything he or she does.
Through prayer, the directee should be encouraged to place his
or her relationship with God in God’s hands. The directee should
also be encouraged to find concrete ways in which that friendship can be deepened. Finally, the directee should be encouraged
to explore the ways in which one’s relationships with God affect
one’s relationship with others – and vice versa.51
These observations in no way exhaust the various ways in
which virtue theory can benefit the process of spiritual direction
and serve as a practical and concrete locus for integrating the
spiritual and moral dimensions of life. They seek only to demonstrate what use virtue theory might have for the direction process
and to show how that process can provide an experiential context
for coming to a deeper understanding of the spiritual moral.
While they can be added to (or adjusted), they represent an initial attempt at demonstrating what a decidedly concrete and
practical turn might look like for recent theoretical discussions
on the relationship between spirituality and morality.
Conclusion
There are many models of spiritual direction and this essay
in no way wishes to replace a balanced variety of approaches
with a monolithic systematization that would rob the ministry
of one of its greatest riches. At the same time, it recognizes that
an unwarranted proliferation of models might also produce the
51
AUMANN lists nine essential aids to spiritual growth: the presence of
God, examination of conscience, the desire of perfection, conformity to
God’s will, fidelity to grace, a plan of life, spiritual reading, holy friendships,
and spiritual direction. See Spiritual Theology, 358-98.
457
contrary effect of disorienting directors about the purpose,
scope, and method of their ministry. The use of virtue theory in
the process of direction is meant to provide a solid basis for
growth in the spiritual moral life, one that directors can refer to
with confidence and without hesitation. It is also meant to be
flexible enough to allow them to adapt its insights to their own
special preferences regarding the approach and implementation
of their ministry. As such, the union of virtue theory and spiritual direction can serve as a valuable touchstone that directors
and directees alike can use as a source of wisdom, creative insight, and continuity with the Catholic spiritual moral tradition.
Connecting virtue theory to spiritual direction, moreover, offers a practical point of convergence for the ongoing discussion
about the relationship between spirituality and morality. Each of
these dimensions of Christian life can be examined on different
levels (e.g., the experiential, the doctrinal, the analytical)52 and
have been found to interface on a broad range of issues, not the
least of which is the preeminence of right relationship for the
spiritual moral life. The anthropological, covenantal, and transformational dimensions of spiritual direction make it particularly receptive to a “virtues and gifts” approach to the spiritual
moral life. The possible benefits to each are encouraging. In the
process of spiritual direction, the proponents of virtue theory
will find a concrete locus for instilling its teaching concerning
the nature of spiritual moral life. Spiritual directors, in turn, will
discover that the insights of virtue theory provide a framework
of substantial content that the process can break open and make
available to those serious about growth in the spiritual moral
life. Spiritual direction thus becomes a discipline for growth in
the school of virtue and the gifts of the Spirit. Virtue theory, in
turn, brings into focus its emphasis on leading a person to
friendship and intimacy with God.
There are, of course, many questions that still need to be
asked and many difficulties that will be encountered in the ini-
52
See WALTER H. PRINCIPE, “Toward Defining Spirituality,” Studies in Religion/Sciences religieuses 12(1983): 135-36; The New Dictionary of Catholic
Spirituality, s. v. “Spirituality, Christian,” by WALTER H. PRINCIPE.
458
DENNIS J. BILLY
tial stages of implementation. Those interested in pursuing such
a union between virtue theory and the process of spiritual direction can receive solace from the knowledge that the attempt
is not without precedent in the history of the Church.53 They
may also be encouraged by the reception their attempt will be
received by those demonstrating a renewed interest in the virtue
theory of Aquinas and the classics of Christian spirituality. The
union of virtue theory and spiritual direction will not be accepted by all spiritual directors or by all moral theologians – nor
does it have to. It hopes merely to provide a concrete, practical
space where questions concerning the spiritual and moral
spheres of a person’s life can be explored, integrated – even celebrated. It also hopes to offer spiritual directors and moral theologians an opportunity to share mutual areas of concern and
competence in the hope of discovering common ground for future collaboration on the nature and scope of the spiritual moral
life.
DENNIS J. BILLY
Via Merulana 31
C.P. 2458
Roma
Italy
—————
Summary / Resumen
This essay focuses on the language of “virtue” and “gift” as an appropriate way of understanding the integrated nature of the spiritual
53
Despite the difficulties in the historical transmission and diffusion of
Aquinas’ virtue theory, the Dominican tradition has still provided a prominent locus for its implementation in the spiritual direction process. For a
historical exposition of the Dominican approach to spiritual direction, see
BENEDICT M. ASHLEY, Spiritual Direction in the Dominican Tradition (New
York/Mahwah,NJ: Paulist Press, 199), esp. 118-32. See also, IDEM, “St.
Catherine of Siena’s Principles of Spiritual Direction,” in Kevin G. Culligan,
ed., Spiritual Direction: Contemporary Readings,” 188-95; AUMANN, Spiritual
Theology, 247-315.
459
and moral life. It also puts forth reasons for viewing the ministry of
spiritual direction as a practical theological locus for developing further
integrating insights between the two fields.
Este ensayo se centra en los términos “virtud” y “regalo”, como una
forma adecuada de comprender la naturaleza constituida por la vida
espiritual y moral. También da un paso adelante en las razones para
considerar el ministerio de la dirección espiritual como un lugar
teológico práctico para desarrollar integrando aún más los puntos de
vista entre los dos campos.
—————
The author is an Ordinary Professor at the Alphonsian Academy.
El autor es profesor ordinario en la Academia Alfonsiana.
—————
461
StMor 39 (2001) 461-481
EDMUND KOWALSKI, C.SS.R.
LA MORTE PROIBITA
Il morire nella prospettiva filosofica,
antropologica ed etica
Nonostante l’enorme progresso della biomedicina negli ultimi anni, che ha aperto all’uomo orizzonti di speranza e di benessere, la morte resta per ogni uomo vivente, da una parte, una
realtà inevitabile, dall’altra, un’azione profondamente umana
che si vive in prima persona, in modo attivo e con sua irrepetibile ed irriproducibile drammaturgia. Questa realtà con cui ogni
uomo deve confrontarsi, paradossalmente, è il più grande problema della nostra esistenza. Factus eram ipse mihi magna quaestio – dice Agostino nelle sue Confessiones. Infatti, il morire è atto del vivente. Il morire è una situazione di vita, un’azione personale in cui l’uomo esprime la sua volontà. Il morire esprime
sempre una dimensione, l’ultima, del vivere personale. Ma come
e in qual modo l’uomo può affrontare la morte? La risposta è
unica: umanamente. Nel corso dei secoli tale risposta variamente formulata e diversamente percepita in rapporto alla specifica
sensibilità storica di ogni epoca ha contribuito a delineare specifici modi di “vivere” l’evento della morte. “Storia della morte in
Occidente” di Philippe Ariès mostra non tanto un processo nello sviluppo di una riflessione intellettuale, quanto piuttosto i
quattro grandi periodi nell’evoluzione di un diverso vissuto che
ha condizionato differenti atteggiamenti nei confronti della
morte1. L’uomo antico aveva saputo che doveva morire e aspettava l’evento con una certa tranquillità. Circondato dai suoi famigliari, attendeva la morte con gesti rituali celebrando quasi
una cerimonia pubblica ed organizzata2. La dimensione addomesticata e socializzata della morte vissuta dagli antichi diventa
1
2
PH. ARIÈS, Storia della morte in Occidente, Rizzoli, Milano 1989.
Ibidem, 24-25.
462
EDMUND KOWALSKI
nel Medioevo la morte del singolo individuo, la “morte di sé” e
“il luogo in cui l’uomo ha preso meglio coscienza di se stesso”3.
A partire dal XVIII secolo si sviluppa, s’integra e si proietta il vissuto della “morte di sé nella morte dell’altro”. “La sola idea della morte commuove”4. L’ultimo periodo, dal XIX secolo ad oggi,
è quello della “morte proibita”, frutto di un vasto movimento
culturale probabilmente originatosi in America del Nord e da lì
estesosi perlomeno ai paesi dell’Europa Occidentale5. “Ne è derivato – secondo Salvino Leone – un profondo mutamento di
sensibilità, atteggiamenti e comportamenti nei confronti della
morte che merita una più approfondita analisi”6. La più significativa trasformazione dei parametri etici nei confronti del morire umano è la nuova legge sull’eutanasia promulgata in Olanda
il 28 novembre 20007. Con la legalizzazione dell’eutanasia attiva,
volontaria e del suicidio medicalmente assistito, è stata introdotta la possibilità dell’opzione eutanasica del morire. La stretta
e inscindibile connessione fra suicidio ed eutanasia già ha indicato alcuni presupposti di una cultura eutanasica, in particolare
l’incapacità di dare senso alla sofferenza e alla morte, e una concezione della persona umana come soggetto di un diritto onnipotente sulla vita e sulla morte8.
Riguardo ad una cultura eutanasica ed ai problemi ad essa
connessi gli scopi dell’articolo presente sono principalmente
due: primo, difendere la tesi, che l’eutanasia, come “morte manipolata nelle mani di una terza persona” e il suicidio assistito,
come “morte usurpata”, non rispettano l’humanum della vita e
del morire dell’uomo in quanto persona; secondo, tracciare una
prospettiva filosofica, antropologica ed etica del morire per in-
3
Ibidem, 45; cfr anche, PH. ARIÈS, L’uomo e la morte dal medioevo ad oggi, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1985.
4
PH. ARIÈS, Storia della morte in Occidente, op. cit., 53.
5
Ibidem, 68; cfr S. LEONE, Lineamenti di bioetica, Ed. II, Medical Books,
Palermo 1990, 223-225.
6
Ibidem, 225.
7
Comunicato stampa dell’ADUC, URL: http://www.aduc.it.
8
L. CANTONI, G. FAVOLINI, Thanatos ed eutanasia, Cristianità, XXIV/
1996/249, 5-14.
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- IL MORIRE NELLA PROSPETTIVA FILOSOFICA
463
dividuare nella morte l’ultima azione personale della vita da
compiere umanamente.
Per capire meglio l’attuale atteggiamento nei confronti della
morte e del morire, occorre – prima di tutto – trovare e valutare
i fattori principali da cui è determinato.
1. Stato attuale dell’evoluzione antropologico-culturale
nei confronti della morte e del morire
S. Leone nei suoi Lineamenti di bioetica, già citati, ha enucleato i sei elementi peculiari da cui è stata determinata l’attuale evoluzione antropologico-culturale nei confronti della morte,
del morire e per conseguenza della persona morente: tabuizzazione, privatizzazione, deritualizzazione, medicalizzazione, oggettivazione e disassuefazione9. In compendio proveremo a sintetizzarli, soffermandoci sull’analisi del suo pensiero e integrandolo con quello di altri autori.
“Quello che un tempo era tabù del sesso, ora è il tabù della
morte”. Nella cultura occidentale contemporanea accade che
non si parli e non si discuta della morte e che il suo stesso nome
venga eufemisticamente mascherato ed evitato. Eppure la morte è la compagna di tutta la nostra esistenza: guerre e malattie,
dolori e delusioni ne sono come i segni premonitori. Le cause
dell’attuale occultamento della morte sono molteplici: da tutta
una serie di pressioni socio-culturali (“il trionfo del corpo sano
e giovanile” dei mass-media, l’“ossessione della salute”10, la carriera e il successo a ogni costo) a tutta una serie di fughe e divertimenti per evitare l’angoscia (il lavoro, la mentalità tecnologica con l’idea di un potere senza limiti)11. Il massimo della ta-
9
S. LEONE, Lineamenti di bioetica, op. cit., 225-229; cfr anche, S. LEONE,
Bioetica, fede e cultura, Armando Editore, Roma 1995, 147-152.
10
Cfr C. VIAFORA, Etica della malattia e ossessione della salute. Bioetica e
crisi del soggetto, in: AA.VV., La bioetica. Questione civile e problemi teorici
sottesi, Edizioni Glossa, Milano 1998, 55-74.
11
M. BAZZOTTO, Occultamento della morte, Camillianum, 17/1998, 47-68;
S. ZUCAL, La morte: una realtà da nascondere. Spunti per una riflessione antropologica, in: L. Sandrin (a cura di), Malati in fase terminale, Piemme, Ca-
464
EDMUND KOWALSKI
buizzazione lo si raggiunge certamente laddove la morte viene
nascosta allo stesso morente da parte dei medici e dei familiari.
La morte di un tempo – come abbiamo visto nell’indagine di
Ph. Ariès – era una morte estremamente socializzata. Famigliari e vicini partecipavano non soltanto agli eventi gioiosi, come
matrimoni, nascite o battesimi, ma esprimevano anche sensibilmente la loro solidarietà nel momento del dolore. Al giorno d’oggi il sofferente e il morente, concepito come “altro”, disturba la
vita. Nel deserto della metropoli la stessa collettività lo isola.
Inoltre l’uomo del nostro secolo vuole essere lasciato solo col
suo dolore, ma soprattutto solo con la sua morte. Tale privatizzazione provoca non soltanto l’isolamento individuale della
morte, ma anche quello sociale, perché non si sente il bisogno di
segnalarla alla società. La emarginazione e l’abbandono da parte dei famigliari, degli amici e del personale sanitario di chi è in
fase terminale, lasciandolo nel suo dolore, nella sua angoscia e
nella sua solitudine, viene definita da Giovanni Russo l’eutanasia psicologica12. Quest’ultimo parla anche dell’eutanasia “telematica” in riferimento al programma dei ricercatori inglesi Rest
in pace (RIP) che consiste nel “criterio elettronico per selezionare i pazienti terminali da curare e quelli da dimettere”13.
In rapporto al passato laddove la morte veniva inserita in
una ritualità estremamente complessa ed elaborata, oggi, invece, si osserva lo sviluppo del processo di semplificazione formale della civiltà contemporanea in modo generale, in modo particolare per quanto riguarda il rito funebre. Allo stesso tempo la
ritualità di altri eventi è, al contrario, aumentata (basti pensare,
per il matrimonio, ai servizi cine-fotografici).
L’allungamento della vita media, le rapidissime conquiste
della medicina, l’aumentato benessere individuale e sociale fanno sì che si muoia più frequentemente in ospedale che in casa.
La medicalizzazione della morte in ospedale diventa oggi, più
sale Monferrato 1997, 7-29; L. ALICI, Filosofia della morte, in: L. ALICI, F. D’AGOSTINO, F. SANTEUSANO, La dignità degli ultimi giorni, San Paolo, Cinisello Balsamo 1998, 51-99.
12
G. RUSSO, Le nuove frontiere della bioetica clinica, Editrice Elle Di Ci,
Torino 1996, 40.
13
Ibidem, 40.
LA MORTE PROIBITA
465
spesso, la disumanizzazione medica della morte non solo da
punto di vista ambientale, ma anche relazionale. Questo vuol dire che “non solo è in qualche misura innaturale medicalizzare fino a tal punto la morte ma anche gestirla in modo disumano
quando, per forze di cose, non si può fare a meno di tale assistenza”14. L’attuale rafforzamento della facoltà della tecnica medica non soltanto comporta “il rischio di favorire la scomparsa
delle relazioni intersoggettive”, ma propone soprattutto “una
nuova e più sottile forma di paternalismo medico”, in cui il medico viene ad avere “un ruolo e un potere decisivo”15. Nel caso
dell’eutanasia attiva e del suicidio assistito in cui – secondo
Maurizio Chiodi – “il medico si trasformasse in un tecnico che
‘dà la morte’, certo su procura, verrebbe obiettivamente rovesciato il senso originario della pratica medica, come prassi volta
a curarsi dell’altro, testimonianza di un’amicizia e di un’alleanza
terapeutica”16.
Inoltre oggi la morte non viene più solo accettata in quanto
evento profondamente coinvolgente la soggettività dell’individuo, come era in passato, ma viene sistematicamente indagata
da parte della medicina intensiva, analizzata (“morte cardiaca”,
“morte cerebrale”), definita (“morte clinica”, “morte biologica”,
“morte naturale” da parte della medicina; “morte ontologica” da
parte della filosofia), cioè prende una dimensione “oggettiva”,
distaccata dalla persona. Cercando e studiando le cause della
morte al tavolo anatomico “la viva esistenzialità di un individuo
si trasforma nella fredda oggettualità di un cadavere”. L’ultimo
contributo a tale processo di oggettivazione viene in particolare
da parte della medicina dei trapianti. Essa coi moderni progressi della rianimazione porta ad “anatomizzare la morte” definendone “gli elementi caratteristici al di sotto dei quali c’è la vita, al
di sopra la sua irreversibile perdita”17.
14
S. LEONE, Lineamenti di bioetica, op. cit., 227.
P. CATTORINI, La morte offesa, EDB, Bologna 1996, 88-90; M. CHIODI, La
morte occultata. Oltre l’alternativa tra eutanasia e accanimento terapeutico, in:
AA. VV., La bioetica. Questione civile e problemi teorici sottesi, Edizioni Glossa, Milano 1998, 129.
16
Ibidem, 129.
17
15
466
EDMUND KOWALSKI
L’ultimo elemento di questa panoramica di fattori che determinano l’atteggiamento e il comportamento dell’uomo moderno nei confronti della morte e del morire, secondo S. Leone,
è una considerazione di tipo psico-sociologico. Se ieri come oggi la morte è l’evento conclusivo di ogni esistenza umana, “la nostra epoca ci ha in qualche modo ‘disabituati’ alla sua presenza”.
La morte, infatti, si presenta oggi come un fatto individuale, accidentale ed effettivamente “inaspettato”18. Questo fatto, a mio
parere, è il risultato di tutti i fattori precedenti e costituisce la
parte più importante dell’atteggiamento personale nei confronti
del proprio morire. Anzitutto il tentativo di tabuizzazione, di
medicalizzazione e di oggettivazione della morte “tradisce in
fondo la paura della vita”19. Questa paura può rivelarsi sia a livello psico-individuale (la paura “da” morire) che a livello ontologico-esistenziale (la paura “di” morire). Al primo livello non è
“la morte in quanto tale l’oggetto fondamentale della paura nei
suoi riguardi – come afferma giustamente S. Leone – ma una serie di problemi a essa strettamente connessi: il timore di perdere irrimediabilmente ‘beni’ che si possiedono; l’incertezza di ciò
che ci attende; la paura della sofferenza; il dolore che proviamo
per la morte degli altri”20. Alcuni davanti al “paradigma di un incontro ineluttabile: l’uomo e la morte” – dice Giovanni Ancona –
si sforzano di non pensarla o fuggirla ma la morte è sempre qui
ad attenderli21. E già S. Freud notava una chiara tendenza a mettere da parte la morte e ad eliminarla dalla vita; a soffocarne la
voce, a trattarla con imbarazzato pudore. Sulla morte è calata
una graduale censura sociale22. La negazione è un importante
meccanismo di difesa del nostro Io che, disturbato dalla consapevolezza di una certa realtà, cerca inconsciamente di dimenticarla e di bloccare così la tensione emotiva (in modo particolare l’angoscia) che ne deriverebbe. È il tentativo di non vedere, il
18
Ibidem, 228-229.
C. ZUCCARO, La vita umana nella riflessione etica, Editrice Queriniania,
Brescia 2000, 22.
20
21
G. ANCONA, La morte. Teologia e catechesi, Paoline, Milano 1993, 5-6.
22
PH. ARIÈS, L’uomo e la morte dal medioevo a oggi, op. cit., 688-689.
19
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467
rifiuto di accettare le cose come sono23. Negare la morte porta
quindi a negare anche il morente e tutte le realtà che alla morte
sono collegate e la possano “simbolicamente” richiamare: la malattia, il dolore, l’invecchiamento e l’handicap24. Un meccanismo
di rimozione, un tentativo più o meno cosciente di fuggire e di
dimenticare, segna il rapporto dell’uomo contemporaneo con la
morte a livello personale e sociale. L’ethos contemporaneo della
“morte smarrita, rimossa, occultata, trafugata, nascosta, negata
e cancellata” dà l’impressione che l’uomo non sappia più come
morire e non sappia più nemmeno come accompagnare un altro
alla morte25.
Nella nostra riflessione non possiamo fermarci a questo livello personale, come primo e ultimo livello di approccio alla
morte umana, perché “l’approccio affettivo-esistenziale non può
pretendere di esaurire le possibilità di tutte quelle risorse antropologiche, come la coscienza e la libertà, che possono integrare
la morte all’interno del progetto esistenziale della vita”26. Si deve allora passare a un livello di riflessione di natura antropologico-filosofica, in cui – secondo G. Ancona – “la morte è colta all’interno di un progetto globale della vita umana, un progetto
che contempla la morte come un possibile principio ermeneutico, capace di dare significato alla stessa vita”27. Questo secondo
stadio tocca direttamente l’uomo, in quanto tale, per cui – nonostante secondo Heidegger la condizione umana sia l’“essereper-la-morte” (Sein zum Tode) – la morte non possiede un significato ontologico-esistenziale, riferito alla realizzazione personale della vita (Sein zum Ende), ma avvicina alla percezione dei
limiti individuali, costituiti dalla storicità e dalla finitezza dell’essere. Il disconoscimento della morte da parte dell’uomo, in-
23
Cfr L. SANDRIN, A. BRUSCO, G. POLICANTE, Capire e aiutare il malato, Camilliane, Torino 1995.
24
Cfr E. M. PATTISON, Il processo del vivere-morire, in: C. A. GARFIELD, Assistenza psicosociale al malato in fase terminale, McGraw-Hill, Milano 1987,
133-135; R. J. KASTEMBAUM, Death, society, and human experience, Allyn and
Bacon, Boston 1995, 15-23.
25
M. CHIODI, La morte occultata, op. cit., 103-104.
26
G. ANCONA, La morte, op. cit., 7-8.
27
Ibidem, 8.
468
EDMUND KOWALSKI
fatti, tradisce il disconoscimento della vita in sé e soprattutto il
disconoscimento di se stesso28.
2. Essere-per-la-morte – prospettiva antropologico-filosofica del morire dell’uomo
L’attuale homo potens, credendo nell’antica idea illuministica ossequente all’onnipotenza della ragione, della scienza e della tecnica, si è arenato davanti alla sua grande debolezza ed all’insuperabile vincolo: la morte. “E allora l’uomo contemporaneo, non sopportando questo segno di irriducibile debolezza e di
limite, cerca di spostare l’interesse e la cura, nel senso heideggeriano del termine, sulla mano, piuttosto che sulla persona, cioè
cerca di mettere in questione non se stesso, ma le parti di sé su
cui esercitare il suo dominio”29. La morte, come oggetto da osservare e da prolungare indefinitamente, non fa già parte della
propria vita. La morte notomizzata, strumentalizzata e nascosta, in realtà, “priva la persona della possibilità di aderire in pienezza all’evento culminate della sua vita”30. Di conseguenza nascondere la morte all’uomo significa nascondere l’uomo a se
stesso. Intanto l’uomo per la sua crescita, per la sua maturità e
per raggiungere l’autenticità e la verità deve innanzitutto tornare a se stesso, quindi deve ritrovare se stesso, raggiungere il proprio destino, risalire alla sua fonte. “Tornare a se stesso” e “ritrovare se stesso” significa essenzialmente “ritornare alla persona” e, dunque, “ripensare la vita umana”. Da questa prima constatazione occorre prendere coscienza del fatto che a causa della onnipresente e quasi onnipotente influenza degli attuali contesti culturali e sociali il vero volto della persona è stato radicalmente deformato. Intorno all’uomo bisogna restituire ampiezza
e spessore alla riflessione teoretica, per rivisitare criticamente i
contesti culturali e sociali entro i quali la persona è stata ridotta
oppure totalmente perduta. Ogni forma di dualismo e riduzioni-
28
29
30
Cfr C. ZUCCARO, La vita umana nella riflessione etica, op. cit., 22.
Ibidem, 18.
Ibidem, 19.
LA MORTE PROIBITA
469
smo della persona spezza la sua dinamica unità assoluta e, infatti, deforma l’essere-uomo-in-quanto-persona. Sostenendo
questo, non penso tanto all’interpretazione dualistica del neoplatonismo, all’interpretazione meccanicistica di Leibniz o all’interpretazione materialistica di Marx, sviluppate nel corso della storia del pensiero occidentale, quanto al dualismo e al riduzionismo dell’età contemporanea, cioè penso all’uomo ridotto a
numero, al robot, al corpo, oggetto di sperimentazione e di mercato. Ogni forma di reificazione e di strumentalizzazione dell’uomo, invece, svilisce la persona come unica realtà nel mondo,
quella fragile “canne pensante” e cosciente di se stessa. La nuova legge in Inghilterra sulla clonazione embrionale per curare
malattie gravi, come ad esempio le tecniche che implicano l’estrazione di cellule staminali da individui adulti, è uno dei più
estremi esempi della reificazione e della strumentalizzazione
dell’uomo considerato solo come résevoir e fornitore di pezzi da
scambio. “Ritornare alla persona” significherebbe quindi rimetterla al suo posto unico nel mondo e nella gerarchia dei valori
fondamentali da rispettare senza nessuna condizione. La persona, in forza dell’atto dell’essere, dotata di caratteri unici, possiede una dignità intrinseca e la dignità della persona ha una dimensione ontologica in quanto realtà inseparabile dall’essere
uomo. La dimensione personale dell’essere uomo è già un valore e si snoda in una serie di valori. Il valore va posto nell’uomo
in quanto è e diventa persona (Scheler, Windelband, Hartmann).
L’uomo come unità inseparabile delle sue peculiarità tipicamente umane (religione, arte, cultura, linguaggio, lavoro, società,
corporeità) si trova sempre in una condizione di manifestazione
globale come uomo-persona, che unifica così tutti i valori nella
linea ontologica: dal valore di partenza fino allo stesso valore da
compiere, realizzandolo. Anche il semplice fatto di essere uomo
determina la dignità personale. Questa è identica per tutti gli uomini e per tutto il percorso esistenziale nelle tappe della sua dinamica evoluzione di sviluppo e della sua maturazione (la vita e
la morte ne costituiscono un processo). La dignità dell’uomo in
quanto persona abbraccia, nella sua sfera assiologia, tutte le forme e tutti gli stati del processo dinamico dall’inizio, seguendone
lo sviluppo fino alla fine della vita umana. Ogni “tappa” ed ogni
“forma“ del processo di sviluppo individuale partecipa della dignità della persona umana, cioè è sempre persona e qualunque
470
EDMUND KOWALSKI
cambiamento restituisce sempre il ruolo di persona. Questo processo è – utilizzando il linguaggio di E. Mounier – mouvement de
personalisation. Mounier parlando di “personalizzazione” intende “il faticoso diventare persona dell’individuo, il risveglio dell’uomo mediante l’impatto e l’accettazione del reale, che suscita
la presa di coscienza e l’affermazione dell’io, in vista di una liberazione totale, che si esprime attraverso l’atto creativo di una
decisione volontaria”31. “Essere” e “diventare” uomo passa attraverso l’uomo-persona, quando egli stesso prende possesso di sé
nella pienezza della persona come valore-fine-a-se-stesso in ogni
tappa e in ogni stato della sua personalizzazione. “Essere” e “diventare” uomo è affermare che l’uomo in quanto persona deve
attuare se stesso, realizzando il profondo del suo essere, come il
valore da realizzare e da compiere dall’inizio alla fine della sua
vita. “In questo senso la morte appare come ciò che adempie tutto il progetto di personalizzazione che l’uomo intraprende sin
dal momento in cui nasce e, in quanto tale, rappresenta un momento estremamente serio e critico che non va fuggito o nascosto, ma atteso e vissuto”32. La morte, in altri termini, non rappresenta un fatto causale in cui l’uomo viene a imbattersi a un
certo punto della vita, ma è – secondo M. Scheler – “un atto del
vivente stesso”, “una della fasi vitali”, perché parte dello stesso
processo vitale di ogni uomo. La sua conoscibilità è immediata
e intuitiva. La morte è l’elemento integrante di ogni esperienza
vissuta. Essa è la compagna più vera della vita, la verità essenziale per ogni uomo, il necessario compimento di ogni esistenza. È l’uomo, allora, che “muore della sua propria morte” umanamente, indipendentemente dal tempo e dal modo33.
“Ripensare la vita umana” traccia la seconda dimensione e
via per “tornare a se stesso” e “ritrovare se stesso”. L’uomo consapevole del suo posto unico nel mondo deve anche prendere coscienza che si trova davanti a lui un cammino particolare, la sua
31
G. CAVALLON, Diventare persona, Edizioni Dehoniane, Bologna 1976,
54; E. MOUNIER, Che cos’è il personalismo?, Einaudi, Torino 1948, 19; idem, Il
personalismo, Edizioni Garzanti, Milano 1971, 13.
32
G. ANCONA, La morte, op. cit., 8.
33
M. SCHELER, Il dolore, la morte, l’immortalità, Ldc, Torino-Leumann
1983, 87-90.
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471
propria vita come “valore incomparabile”, “grande”, “prezioso”34
e “sacro”35. “Ripensare la vita umana” significa innanzitutto rivalutare la vita umana, cioè darle un significato assiologico: il
valore morale e la dimensione ontologico-antropologica. L’uomo, quindi, deve scegliere la propria via, evitando imitazioni artificiali e ripetizioni sterili che sviliscono la verità del suo essere
e l’autenticità del vivere il suo essere, come unica possibilità dell’unico essere in quanto persona. “L’uomo deve cioè fare della
sua vita un cammino – nota Enzo Bianchi nella prefazione del
libro di Martin Buber Il cammino dell’uomo – senza tentativi di
nascondimento o affermazioni di impotenza”36. Nel corso della
propria assunzione di responsabilità in conseguenza della fedeltà alla verità del suo essere, l’uomo riunifica tutto se stesso. Il
processo di unificazione si svolge continuamente attraverso
l’implicazione di tutte le potenzialità e le facoltà dell’essere nell’azione umana, ragionevole e libera, e, quindi, responsabile.
“Quando l’uomo diventa una simile unità di corpo e di spirito insieme – dice M. Buber - allora la sua opera è opera d’un sol getto”37. L’esigenza inderogabile e principale di ogni esistenza è
l’impegno allo sviluppo totale e armonioso della persona, in tutte le sue potenzialità ed in particolare della sua capacità di amare: essere verso gli altri ed essere con gli altri38. “Tu non morrai”
significa, dice G. Marcel in Il mistero dell’essere, che “nessun
evento esterno potrebbe negare la promessa di eternità inscritta
in una relazione di amore”39.
Scegliere la propria vita significa anche rinunciare alle opzioni che conducono alla divisione, alla riduzione e infine alla
perdizione. Abbandonando la concezione della vita come carpe
diem, quam minimum credula postero (Orazio), in quanto “flus-
34
GIOVANNI PAOLO II, Evangelium vitae, n. 2 [EV].
EV, nn. 2, 11, 22, 39, 53, 57, 61, 62.
36
E. BIANCHI, Prefazione, in: M. BUBER, Il cammino dell’uomo, Edizioni
Qiqajon (per la traduzione italiana Comunità di Bose), Magnano 1990, 9; da:
M. Buber, ivi, 22-24; 25-32.
37
Ibidem, 40.
38
G. CAVALLON, Diventare persona, op. cit., 55.
39
G. MARCEL, Il mistero dell’essere. 2. Fede e realtà, Borla, Torino 1971,
131; da: M. CHIODI, La morte occultata, op. cit., 139.
35
472
EDMUND KOWALSKI
so di eventi e sensazioni”40 oppure come semplice accumulo dei
beni materiali, l’uomo deve riprendere la sua vita nella dimensione dell’educazione profonda e personale, che ha - secondo
Buber - “il significato di un’alta disciplina o ascesi: una disciplina rivolta gioiosamente al mondo, per amore della responsabilità di un compito della vita affidatoci, sul quale dobbiamo agire senza intromissione né del desiderio di potenza” né dell’egoismo41. L’educazione, in quanto processo educativo complesso ed
incessante, deve fondarsi sulla formazione di una coscienza morale adeguata ad affrontare le sfide della modernità: secolarizzazione, edonismo, consumismo, materialismo o cultura eutanasica. Solo attraverso la sua totalità e responsabilità l’uomo può
compiere la sua grande ed unica opera, se stesso in quanto persona, con la sua capacità originale, creativa e trascendente. Insistere sull’autonomia responsabile e l’integrità coerente della
persona significa spingersi a “prendere in debita considerazione
la vita come progetto, scelta e decisione sulla propria identità e
sulla realizzazione di obiettivi critici”42. “Non si può comprendere la morte se non si è compresa la vita. D’altra parte – aggiunge S. Leone – dietro la richiesta di eutanasia da parte di un
malato non c’è spesso una richiesta di morte ma una richiesta di
senso. La vera vita priva di valore non è quella del neonato
malformato per cui viene richiesta l’eutanasia ma quella dell’uomo che non ha saputo darle significato”43.
3. L’uomo nella decisione ultima – prospettiva etica del
morire
Sembra che oggi il grande dilemma che coinvolge i moralisti sia quello di porsi di fronte ad una “morte anticipata” oppure ad una morte vissuta in pienezza di significato. Infatti l’uomo
40
S. MAFFETTONE, Il valore della vita. Un’interpretazione filosofica pluralista, Arnoldo Mondatori Editore, Milano 1998, 239.
41
M. BUBER, Il principio dialogico, Edizioni Angelo Guerini e Associati,
Milano 1959, 243.
42
S. MAFFETTONE, Il valore della vita, op. cit., 239.
43
S. LEONE, Bioetica, fede e cultura, op. cit., 145.
LA MORTE PROIBITA
473
d’oggi va in una duplice direzione: o scegliere “l’ora e il modo
della morte” (“Muori al momento giusto!” di F. Nietzsche), talvolta soccombendo perché manca di valori per superare le paure e le frustrazioni esistenziali, o cercando di superare la sua ambivalenza, andando alla ricerca di nuove interpretazioni. Optare
per la “ricerca di nuove interpretazioni” della morte significherebbe non tanto affrontare l’evento della morte come un fatto
negativo subito, talvolta rimosso, negato ed anticipato nell’opzione eutanasia, quanto interpretare la morte in vista della vita
nel senso dell’azione personale del vivente. Già una critica negativa degli “argomenti pro-eutanasia” può rappresentare una base di partenza per indirizzare l’interpretazione della morte verso
il suo vero significato.
Essendo d’accordo con la tesi di S. Leone - appena sotto citata - che “dietro la richiesta di eutanasia non c’è spesso una richiesta di morte ma una richiesta di senso” si deve innanzitutto
constatare un tragico nonsenso del circolo che racchiude in sé la
scelta eutanasica: se non c’è senso del vivere, non c’è neppure
senso del morire. La condizione per ammettere la legalità dell’eutanasia e del suicidio assistito è l’affermazione di un diritto
dell’uomo a disporre della propria vita, e a chiederne la soppressione, una volta che questa sia “senza valore”. Di fronte alla
tendenza contemporanea a giudicare il valore dell’esistenza
umana in relazione alle sue capacità produttive, di lavoro e di interazione sociale significativa, soprattutto la vita del malato o
dell’anziano cesserebbe di essere degna di apprezzamento individuale e collettivo. In secondo luogo le contemporanee teorie
utilitaristiche e naturali del morire e della morte (Engelhardt,
Karvnoski, Qualy, Rachels, Singer) fanno cadere nell’oblio il discorso sul senso del dolore, della sofferenza e della morte come
momenti forti del vivere dell’uomo e, di conseguenza, rendono
estremamente problematico attribuirvi un significato esistenziale, personale. A ciò si collega il grande ostacolo di plasmare un
ethos dell’ars moriendi che renda riconoscibile e promuovibile la
dignità propria delle fasi terminali della vita. Tre sono infatti gli
obiettivi da interconnettere nella scelta dell’eutanasia: l’autonomia del paziente (“rispettare la libertà del paziente”), i “suoi migliori interessi” (far cessare un dolore “insopportabile ed incessante”, porre fine alla vita “non degna dell’uomo”, non essere
“peso” per la famiglia e la società) e il valore intrinseco della vi-
474
EDMUND KOWALSKI
ta44. Di fronte a queste tendenze culturali, sociali e legali si deve
invece riaffermare che la vita non è proprietà accessoria dell’uomo, ma un bene-valore inerente al proprio essere da amministrare come condizione imprescindibile per attuare i valori e le
ragioni che gli permettono di diventare pienamente se stesso
(Dichiarazione sull’eutanasia, n. 5)45. Allora la vita umana è conditio sine qua non per essere e diventare la persona. La vita perciò precede la libertà e sorprende l’uomo dischiudendogli significati che chiedono il consenso della decisione umana. In questo
contesto ontologico-assiologico la richiesta del sofferente non
sarebbe tanto una rinuncia libera e consapevole alla libertà, alla
condizione fondamentale del suo esistere, cioè alla vita, quanto
un grido d’aiuto per alleviargli le sofferenze fisiche e spirituali.
Inoltre, una terza persona non può essere arbitro assoluto della
vita e della morte di un altro individuo, neanche giudice per stabilire quando un’esistenza è significativa e quando “senza valore”. Ogni vita umana è il valore intrinseco, fondamentale ed inviolabile. Introdotta la possibilità dell’opzione eutanasica si assisterebbe inoltre a una sorta d’inversione dell’onere della prova
della dignità e dell’importanza della vita umana. L’opzione eutanasica crea, infatti, un falso conflitto di valori: alla vita umana si
contrapporre il dolore, cioè si mettono ambedue sullo stesso livello assiologico nella gerarchia dei valori. Inoltre, per sopprimere questo dolore si sopprime la persona. E non si deve essere
un profeta per immaginare che nel nostro futuro – non troppo
44
R. BARCARO, Eutanasia. Un problema paradigmatico della bioetica,
FrancoAngeli, Milano 1998, 49-97; H. TEN HAVE, L’eutanasia in Olanda: un’analisi critica della situazione attuale, in: AA.VV., Quando morire?, Bioetica e
diritto nel dibattito sull’eutanasia, Lanza, Padova 1996, 117-141; D. NERI,
L’eutanasia in Olanda: una difesa (con qualche riserva), ivi, 143-172; M. RECHLIN, L’eutanasia in Olanda: contraddizioni, ambiguità, alternative, ivi, 173205; L. EUSEBI, Tra indisponibilità della vita e miti di radicale disponibilità della medicina: il nodo dell’eutanasia, ivi, 233-250; M. MARET, L’euthanasie. Alternative sociale et enjeux pour l’éthique chrétienne, Editions Saint-Augustin,
2000, 25-121.
45
Cfr Congregazione per La Dottrina della Fede, Dichiarazione sull’eutanasia (1980), Enchiridion Vaticanum, 7. Documenti ufficiali della Santa Sede 1980-1981, EDB, Bologna 1985, 333-351.
LA MORTE PROIBITA
475
lontano – in una cultura di morte dominante, un paziente,
un’anziano, un malato mentale oppure un portatore di handicap
dovrebbero continuamente giustificare la propria scelta di non
richiedere l’eutanasia di fronte ai famigliari, al personale medico e alla società giovane e sana, arbitri assoluti della vita e della
morte (tanatocrati, “signori della morte”46). Inoltre, l’uccisione
“pietosa” costituisce un fraintendimento radicale del senso della
prossimità, poiché viola la disposizione alla cura dell’altro, che
costituisce il presupposto stesso della solidarietà umana. “Anche
se non motivata dal rifiuto egoistico di farsi carico dell’eutanasia di chi soffre – ricorda Giovanni Paolo II nell’enciclica Evangelium vitae – l’eutanasia deve dirsi una falsa pietà, anzi una
preoccupante ‘perversione’ di essa: la vera ‘compassione’, infatti,
rende solidale col dolore altrui, non sopprime colui del quale
non si può sopportare la sofferenza. E tanto più perverso appare il gesto dell’eutanasia se viene compiuto da coloro che – come
parenti – dovrebbero assistere con pazienza e con amore il loro
congiunto o da quanti – come i medici -, per la loro specifica
professione, dovrebbero curare il malato anche nelle condizioni
terminali più penose”47.
La critica dell’opzione eutanasica ha mostrato le connessioni etiche dell’atteggiamento verso il morire: l’attentato violento
alla vita umana come valore fondamentale d’essere persona, la
rinuncia alla libertà per non compiere l’atto umano finale, l’abbandono della persona nel bisogno estremo da parte di coloro
che dovrebbero curare ed assistere con pazienza e con amore il
loro congiunto. Questi atti umani verso il morente servono a descrivere la dimensione morale del morire nell’opzione eutanasica. La riflessione morale, infatti, prende in esame le azioni nel
loro dinamismo di libera e consapevole responsabilità. Tutte e
tre le motivazioni della scelta eutanasica hanno la connotazione
morale scorretta perché sopprimono i tre valori fondamentali: la
vita, la libertà e la carità. La valutazione morale negativa dell’opzione eutanasica indica chiaramente l’apertura verso una dimensione morale nuova e positiva del morire e della morte co-
46
47
G. ANCONA, La morte, op. cit., 13.
EV, n. 66.
476
EDMUND KOWALSKI
me atto culminante e personale dell’esistenza umana. Questo atto fondamentale, nel quale la persona ricapitola se stessa, rendendo presente in modo contratto e simultaneo il proprio itinerario terreno, non può sfuggire alla scelta morale soggettiva, fatta di libera e consapevole responsabilità48. Contro ogni rischio di
ridurre a cosa la morte, il morire e il morente, occorre ricordare ancora volta che il morire è un’azione personale in cui l’uomo
esprime la sua volontà. Questo ultimo atto del vivere personale
pone il problema di una necessaria dimensione etica del morente, la quale coinvolge allo stesso livello chi gli vive attorno: la famiglia e il personale sanitario49. La morte dell’uomo fa parte della sua esistenza, fa parte essenziale della sua vita, proprio questo è un evento “umano”50. Una morte degna dell’uomo, perché
vissuta in modo umano, significa anche condividere il suo ultimo cammino di dolore, di scoraggiamento e di rimpianto da
parte dei familiari, accompagnandolo.
Il carattere personale ed attivo del morire, in quanto evento
che l’uomo vive con la massima intensità, è compimento che
porta a termine in forma adeguata e proporzionata quel progetto di fondo che ha animato tutta la vita. La morte come azione
personale consiste nell’affermazione della necessità morale di
gestire questo evento e viverlo con responsabilità e dignità. “Solo garantendo il diritto di morire – afferma Rosangela Barcaro –
sarebbe possibile garantire l’espressione massima ed inalienabile dell’esercizio dell’autonomia dell’essere umana”51. Tale responsabilità è davvero umana perché l’uomo fa tutto ciò che è in
suo potere per esercitare un corretto discernimento sulla propria decisione (la dignità del morente). Umiltà nella ricerca di
raggiungere un fine deciso in libertà e consapevole responsabilità ed umiltà davanti al mysterium mortis possono essere ostacolati da molteplici condizionamenti, che abbiamo chiamati la
paura “da” morire e la paura “di” morire. Vivere come un dram-
48
C. ZUCCARO, La vita umana nella riflessione etica, op. cit., 264.
Ibidem, 266.
50
Cfr S. LEONE, Lineamenti di bioetica, op. cit., 243-244.
51
R. BARCARO, Eutanasia, op. cit., 190; da: C. Viafora, Perché sono contrario all’eutanasia, Bioetica, 2/1993, 297-300.
49
LA MORTE PROIBITA
477
ma la propria morte con rifiuto, rivolta, patteggiamento, depressione ed accettazione – di cui parla E. Kübler-Ross52 - significa vivere umanamente il suo essere-alla-fine. La morte dell’uomo, in quanto “fine”, significa anche “compiere” ed il “compimento”, poiché dotato di “senso”, non cessa di essere “fine”. “Come fine essa attesta alla coscienza un evento che accade all’uomo per così dire dall’esterno, che egli subisce, e come compimento essa è atto, attivo compimento dall’interno, definitività
della propria temporalità, decisione di sé come un tutto, compimento personale di sé in relazione a Dio”53.
Conclusioni: Redemptor hominis – prospettiva teologica
della morte
La prospettiva filosofica del morire ha messo in evidenza il
fatto che la morte è il principio ermeneutico del vivere umano
come essere-per-la-morte. Il significato più profondo del morire
dell’uomo ha rivelato la prospettiva antropologica che nella visione esistenzialista immanentistica della morte umana ha preso in considerazione la dimensione più personalistica di essa. La
morte, in tal senso, è l’azione personale del vivente per adempire tutto un progetto di personalizzazione che l’uomo intraprende sin dalla nascita. Contro l’opzione eutanasica, da un lato, ed
una prassi socio-culturale contemporanea che rimuove la morte
e che impone il silenzio su di essa, dall’altro, l’uomo d’oggi deve
poter sentire l’urgenza antropologica di dover e poter riappropriarsi della morte, cioè di ritornare a se stesso in quanto persona e di ripensare la sua vita. Ritornare alla persona significa, prima, lottare incessantemente contro ogni forma di dualismo, di
reificazione e di strumentalizzazione dell’uomo, poi, rivalutare
la persona come unica realtà nel mondo e valore-fine-a-se-stesso. “Essere” e “diventare” persona è affermare costantemente
52
Cfr E. KÜBLER-ROSS, Les derniers instants de la vie, Labor et Fides,
Genève 1975, 19-144.
53
M. CHIODI, La morte occultata, op. cit., 135; da: M. HEIDEGGER, Essere e
tempo, Longanesi, Milano 1976, 297-299; K. RAHNER, Sulla teologia della morte, Morcelliana, Brescia 1966, 29-35.
478
EDMUND KOWALSKI
che l’uomo in quanto persona deve attuare se stesso, realizzando il profondo senso e destino del suo essere come il valore da
realizzare e da compiere dall’inizio alla fine della sua vita. In
questo senso la morte è la compagna più vera della vita, la dimensione costitutiva fondamentale dell’esistenza vivente e il
compimento di ogni vita. “Ripensare la vita umana”, invece, significa darle un significato assiologico: il valore morale e la dimensione ontologico-antropologica. La vita umana è il bene-valore inerente al proprio essere da amministrare come condizione sine qua non per attuare i valori e le ragioni che permettono
alla persona di diventare pienamente se stesso. Come ogni vita
umana è il valore intrinseco, fondamentale ed inviolabile, allora,
a nessun’uomo appartiene la facoltà d’essere arbitro assoluto
della vita e della morte e neanche d’essere giudice per stabilire
criteri relativi della vita. “Eticamente è necessario proclamare –
afferma G. Ancona – il diritto dell’uomo a morire della propria
morte, nel senso che l’uomo deve poter compiere, in questo momento estremo, un atto di suprema dignità che non gli può venir negato in alcun modo”54. L’opzione eutanasica non può liberare l’uomo né dall’angoscia della morte, né dalla domanda radicale sul senso della vita. Inoltre, dietro la richiesta di eutanasia non c’è spesso una richiesta di morte, ma una richiesta di
senso del proprio vivere. L’uomo, per raggiungere l’autenticità e
la verità del suo essere, deve risalire alla fonte della sua vita. Una
riflessione profonda sulle sue potenzialità e facoltà psico-spirituali può assicurare l’uomo che egli non è soltanto uno dei più
elevati esseri biologici nella scala evolutiva del mondo animato
e che l’evento della morte, perciò, non può ridursi ad un banale
incidente di percorso o ad una ineluttabile proprietà biologica
del vivente (“la piccola morte”), ma, al contrario, rappresenta
nel cammino di un homo viator il compimento che ha animato
quotidianamente la sua vita. A questa “piccola morte” Reiner
Maria Rilke contrappone “la grande morte”, quella che l’uomo
assume in sé come la propria morte, facendola entrare a far parte della propria esistenza, personalizzandola nella vita cosciente
54
G. ANCONA, La morte, op. cit., 106-107.
LA MORTE PROIBITA
479
come “la vera vita dell’uomo”55. La dialettica della vita e della
morte provoca, indubbiamente nell’intimo dell’uomo, la tensione interna “verso l’alto”, “aldilà” dell’esistenza terrena per realizzare pienamente le sue potenzialità e facoltà transcendentali
non compiute nel tempo. La morte, allora, non può essere per
l’uomo la fine definitiva della sua vita proiettata verso una realizzazione piena come compimento totale del suo essere-alla-fine-dei-fini in quanto persona-da-compiere-nel-senso-primo-edultimo-del-suo-essere. E se a volte uomo si sentisse svuotato di
senso relativo e individuale per vivere (“senso parziale”) oppure
per continuare a vivere, tuttavia, esisterebbe un soprasenso – afferma Viktor Frankl in Homo patiens - cioè il senso intero dell’universo e della vita in quanto vita. Il senso della vita è connaturato alla propria vita. L’esistenza umana ha un significato originale e immanente, profondo ed essenziale iscritto nella sua
provenienza, prima che l’uomo gliene attribuisca uno, personale e secondario. La credenza nel soprasenso è già il senso proprio. Tutto ciò che esiste ha un senso. Il non-senso non esiste,
non-senso equivale a nulla, a non-essere. Allora se l’uomo vive,
cioè la sua esistenza si colloca in un tempo e in uno spazio strettamente determinati, acquisisce un senso. Il suo essere in quanto persona è totalmente ed essenzialmente orientato verso il senso-fine. La sua esistenza umana è il cammino-senso-direzione
da passare e da vivere. Il suo stato ontologico-transcendentale
(facoltà, potenzialità ed aspirazioni innati) e etico-esistenziale
(essere compiuto e felice), da una parte, sproporzionalmente oltrepassano la portata delle realtà terreni, dall’altra parte, permettono all’uomo di scoprire se stesso come persona-da-compiere-pienamente. L’uomo, infatti, realizza il suo essere, cioè attua sé stesso, trascendendosi. L’apertura ontologica dell’uomo ai
valori si realizza nella ricerca del senso di tutta l’esistenza umana che presuppone un fondamento assoluto del senso. Esso non
può trovarsi nell’ambito immanente dell’essere e del valore. La
continua ricerca dei sensi-fini nell’azione umana concreta e responsabile conduce l’homo sapiens et religiosus a scoprire il Sen-
55
M BORDONI, Dimensioni antropologiche della morte. Saggio sulle ultime
realtà cristiane, Herder, Roma 1969, 15.
480
EDMUND KOWALSKI
so Primo ed Ultimo del suo essere: Dio. La questione del senso
dell’esistenza umana rinvia ad un fenomeno che chiamiamo religione (M. Eliade, L. Kolakowski, A. Lang, R. Otto) ed al ruolo
di preservazione dal suicidio svolto dalla religione, già messo in
evidenza da E. Durkheim56. Nelle sue molteplici forme storiche
la religione ha condotto l’uomo maturo (homo sapiens) al logos,
educato l’individuo ad associarsi (ethos), creato la prima comunità compatta e svelato il significato primordiale della vita
(bios). Il senso religioso-transcendente include sempre le costanti del fenomeno religioso che sono fondamentalmente tre:
rivelazione divina, che è la parola di Dio, fede come riconoscimento dell’evento divino e risposta di totalità dell’uomo e il Sacrum come esperienza di base, l’unità di parola di Dio e fede dell’uomo, dimensione dialettica di oggettività (trascendente) e di
soggettività (immanente)57. Nella esperienza intima di Sacrum
non “parla” tanto l’uomo, quanto Dio. “Dio, che aveva già parlato nei tempi antichi molte volte e in diversi modi ai padri per
mezzo dei profeti, ultimamente, in questi giorni, ha parlato a noi
per mezzo del Figlio” (Eb 1,1). “Dio è entrato nella storia dell’umanità – dice Giovanni Paolo II in Redemptor hominis – e, come
uomo, è divenuto suo ‘soggetto’, uno dei miliardi e, in pari tempo, Unico! Attraverso l’Incarnazione Dio ha dato alla vita umana quelle dimensioni che intendeva dare all’uomo sin dal suo
primo inizio, e l’ha data in maniera definitiva” (n. 1). La scoperta di Dio nel Volto umano di Gesù Cristo “accorcia” la via ontologica delle ricerche filosofico-antropologiche d’Assoluto. La
scoperta di Dio nel Volto umano di Gesù di Nazareth, che “ha assunto tutte le dimensioni dell’uomo, tranne il peccato”, è in realtà
la rivelazione stessa di Dio all’uomo (Novo millennio ineunte, nn.
22-28). Allo stesso tempo, Cristo Redentore “rivela pienamente
l’uomo all’uomo stesso”, perché nella dimensione umana del mistero della Redenzione “l’uomo ritrova la grandezza, la dignità e
il valore propri della sua umanità” (Redemptor hominis, n. 8).
56
Cfr E. DURKHEIM, Il suicido. Studio di sociologia, Rizzoli Libri, Milano
1987, 137, 239, 317, 335-336.
57
Cfr G. CENACCHI, Antropologia filosofica, Pontificia Accademia di S.
Tommaso, Città del Vaticano 1981, 171-179; E. CORETH, Antropologia filosofica, Morcelliana, Brescia 2000, 173-184.
LA MORTE PROIBITA
481
“L’uomo che vuol comprendere se stesso fino in fondo – non soltanto secondo immediati, parziali, spesso superficiali, e perfino
apparenti criteri e misure del proprio essere – deve, con la sua
inquietudine e incertezza ed anche con la sua debolezza e peccaminosità, con la sua vita e morte, avvicinarsi a Cristo. Egli deve, per così dire, entrare in Lui con tutto se stesso, deve ‘appropriarsi’ ed assimilare tutta la realtà dell’Incarnazione e della Redenzione per ritrovare se stesso” (Redemptor hominis, n. 10).
EDMUND KOWALSKI, C.SS.R.
Via Merulana 31
C.P. 2458
Roma
Italy
—————
Summary / Resumen
This article deals with two main issues arising from the culture of
euthanasia and its related problems. In the first place the article
defends the thesis that euthanasia, understood as “death manipulated
through the hands of a third person”, and euthanasia, understood as
the “usurpation of death”, do not respect the humanum of the life and
death of the individual as a person. In the second place a philosophical, anthropological and ethical perspective of life is outlined to show
how the moment of death is the final act of a person that can be completed in a human way.
El presente artículo aborda principalmente dos objetivos en torno
a la cultura de la eutanasia y los problemas relacionados con ella: primero, defender la tesis de que la eutanasia como “muerte manipulada
en manos de una tercera persona” y el suicidio asistido como “muerte
usurpada”, no respetan lo humanum de la vida y del morir del hombre
como persona; segundo, trazar una perspectiva filosófica, antropológica y ética del morir, para decidir en la muerte la última acción personal de la vida por cumplir humanamente.
—————
The author is an Invited Professor at the Alphonsian Academy.
El auctor es profesor invitado en la Academia Alfonsiana.
—————
483
StMor 39 (2001) 483-515
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE
AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE
Part Three: The Needs that Cry for Injustice
In the first and second parts of this series I surveyed a small
but important portion of the current experimentation and study
carried out in the field of moral psychology surrounding issues
of the origins and maintenance of situations of justice and injustice in human social interaction. Part one discussed some of
the ambiguities in the understanding and use of the very concepts themselves. Part two investigated the difficulties in formulating and using the many moral rules which flow out of and
which attempt to incarnate these underlying conceptual meanings in action. Both of these treatments focused primarily upon
cognitive factors, about how people think about justice and injustice and the effects that these ways of thinking might have upon their consequent behavior. But cognitive variables alone are
insufficient to understand social behavior. People act because
they want something.1 In this third part I would like to switch directions slightly and deal with moral psychology’s considerations concerning why people think the way that they do about
justice and injustice, as well as the more important question of
how and why good intentions to act justly are not translated into real concrete just behaviors, or in fact are actually perverted
in order to bring about the exact opposite of what was originally intended.
Several years ago, the well-known pop star Sinead O’Connor
1
E. TORY HIGGINS and A. KRUGLANSKI, “Motivational Science: The Nature
and Functions of Wanting,” in E. TORY HIGGINS and A. KRUGLANSKI, eds., Motivational Science: Social and Personality Perspectives. (Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 2000), p. 7.
484
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
appeared on an American comedy television program, Saturday
Night Live. Her performance consisted of a slightly altered rendition of Bob Marley’s song “War,” after which she added the
words “Fight the real enemy!” and proceeded to tear a photograph of Pope John Paul II into little pieces. The lyrics of “War”
are based upon an excerpt from a speech that H. I. M Haile Selassie delivered to the United Nations on October 6, 1963. It is
considered by the members of the Rastafarian religion, in which
Bob Marley was a believer, to be one of the most eloquent descriptions of the causes of injustice of our century:
Until the philosophy which holds one race
Superior and another inferior
Is finally and permanently discredited and abandoned
Everywhere is war, me say war
That until there is no longer first class
And second class citizens of any nation
Until the colour of a man’s skin
Is of no more significance than the colour of his eyes
Me say war
That until the basic human rights are equally
Guaranteed to all, without regard to race
Dis a war
That until that day
The dream of lasting peace, world citizenship
Rule of international morality
Will remain in but a fleeting illusion
To be pursued, but never attained
Now everywhere is war, war
And until the ignoble and unhappy regimes
That hold our brothers in Angola, in Mozambique,
South Africa sub-human bondage
Have been toppled, utterly destroyed
Well, everywhere is war, me say war
War in the east, war in the west
THE INJUSTICE OF JUSTICE AND THE JUSTICE OF INJUSTICE
485
War up north, war down south
War, war, rumours of war
And until that day, the African continent
Will not know peace, we Africans will fight
We find it necessary and we know we shall win
As we are confident in the victory
Of good over evil, good over evil, good over evil
Good over evil, good over evil, good over evil
O’Connor’s altered rendition universalized the call to fight
against the roots of injustice, removing explicit references to the
African continent, but also replaced the reference to the ignoble
and unhappy regimes of Angola, Mozambique and South Africa
with an ambiguous and veiled reference to the Catholic Church,
which became clear only with her tearing of the Pope’s photograph:
Until the ignoble and unhappy regime
Which holds all of us through,
Child-abuse, yeah, child-abuse yeah,
Sub-human bondage has been toppled,
Utterly destroyed,
Everywhere is war.
The response of the audience was predominantly one of
moral outrage, characterized by shock and anger. For weeks following the incident there were condemnations, apologies and
jokes made. More importantly, to this very day, many of those
who witnessed the performance cannot recall the words or even
the title of the song Ms. O’Connor performed. Yet the image of
her tearing apart a photograph of the Pope is still vivid in their
memories and effective in their cognitive and emotional evaluations of her both as a singer and as a person. She is remembered
not for having sung a powerful statement in defense of justice on
national television, but as an irreverent iconoclast who publicly
insulted and mutilated an image of a well-loved world religious
leader.
Interestingly, the question was rarely raised as to what her
486
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
intentions or motivations were in tearing the photograph of the
Pope. Yet a fair evaluation of what she did and the kind of person she is for having done so, would require a knowledge of
these. It makes a real difference in the definition of her action
whether her intention was to draw attention to herself; to upset
and insult others; to reveal to her audience the underlying philosophy behind reggae music; to make a religious statement in
favor of the Rastafarian faith’s belief that as leader of the West
(Babylon) and representative of the white man’s God (the devil),2
the Pope is responsible for all of the suffering and injustice historically brought upon the African races; to denounce what she
considered to be an overly paternalistic use of authority by the
current Pontiff; or even to protest the many cases of pedophilia
among Catholic clergy which were being reported in the news
media at the time. It also makes a difference in the judgment of
her as a person whether her motive was self-seeking, religious,
idealistic, or vindictive.
Rather than asking why, a question which would have enabled the viewer to make objective sense of her behavior, the
salient question became “How dare she?”. What mattered more
was that we didn’t like it. We believed she had no right to do it.
We felt insulted and upset by what she did. Not liking it led to
not liking her, and at that point no explanation was needed, nor
would any in all probability have sufficed. More importantly, liking or not liking what she did fueled a series of behaviors which
included denouncing her, rejecting her, defending her, ridiculing
her, buying her records, destroying her records, etc., all of which
were carried out by people who believed that they were fully justified and right in doing so.
Ms. O’Connor made the serious mistake of underestimating
the power of human emotional group identification, and a fundamental principle of person perception: “Behavior engulfs the
field,” a principle which is usually expressed in common parlance as “Actions speak louder than words.”3 In this case a sin-
2
For a detailed description of this Rastafarian tenet, see the following
web page on the internet: “The Judgments of Rastafari,” www.members.
aol.com/mamailu/judgements.htm.
3
E. JONES and R. NISBETT, “The Actor and the Observer: Divergent Per-
487
gle unpopular action, which formed only a small part of her entire performance, caused the eloquent words of the song to be
completely forgotten. Because of a perceptual reality known as
the “halo effect,” her single action also colored the response of
her audience to her as a person.4 The negative emotional force
engendered by the “Pope incident” completely undermined the
meaning of the words she sang, and masked any consideration
of the context which might have given a broader meaning to her
gesture. Rather than inspiring her audience to fight against her
perception of injustice, she moved them to anger and condemnation, not only of what she had done, but of her as a person. After all, how can we listen to someone who is so impious as to
publicly insult a man we admire, respect and love? What could
such a person possibly have to say to us which is worth our hearing? The emotional is fueled by and feeds the interpretations of
perception and at times precludes an intellectual analysis, making what is public highly personal. Yet on both sides, that of the
one who acts and the one who responds to an act, it is often essential to seek answers concerning the why and the how in order
to make sense of the what. We need to pay attention to motives.5
If there is one primary contribution to the understanding of
human reasoning which contemporary cognitive social psychology has provided, it consists in the recognition that our reasoning, like most other human behavior, is motivated. The way we
think, the information we pay attention to, the manner in which
ceptions of the Causes of Behavior,” in E. JONES, et. al., eds., Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior. (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press,
1971), p. 87.
4
G. REEDER and J. SPORES, “The Attribution of Morality,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 44 (1983), p. 742. See also, R. NISBETT and T.
WILSON, “The Halo Effect: Evidence for Unconscious Alteration of Judgments,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35 (1977), pp. 250-256.
5
In the words of John Cook, “In our philosophical reflections about
morality, we must assign priority to moral assessments of how we think
about matters and of how we perceive and represent them to ourselves;
moral assessments of actions must take second place. Hence the importance
of literature that explores the ways people think and perceive the world.” J.
COOK, Morality and Cultural Differences. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999), p. 127.
488
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
we encode, store, and recall experiences in memory, the logical
structure of our argumentation, all of these are dependent upon
what we want to accomplish by our thinking. And more often
than not, reasoning, including in its modality as moral reasoning, is not motivated by the pure search for truth or the desire
for objective uninterested justice. We think differently when we
want to blame than when we want to justify. We think differently when we want to explain and understand than when we want
to hold someone accountable.6
Motivational moral psychology, concerned as it is with the
nature and functions of wanting, and the relationship between
these and other human activities such as feeling, knowing, understanding, doing, etc.,7 frames these two fundamental questions in terms of the interplay between underlying and often unconscious motivational needs and the cognitive strategies designed and implemented to satisfy these needs and wants. Because the notion of justice one holds is tied to the motivation
one has for making use of it, and motivation can be either intrinsic or extrinsic,8 justice can be either a goal in itself, or jus6
Z. KUNDA, Social Cognition: Making Sense of People. (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1999), p. 224. For a more detailed description of these differing
forms of reasoning, see V. Hamilton, “Intuitive Psychologist or Intuitive
Lawyer? Alternative Models of the Attribution Process,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 39 (1980), pp. 767-772.
7
and Functions of Wanting,” p.15.
8
This distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is fundamental. Intrinsic motivation is that which issues forth from the integrated
self. Extrinsic motivation is that which responds to pressure from outside
the self. Normally, intrinsic motivation is linked to autonomy, volitional freedom and authenticity, whereas external motivation is linked to control, compliance, defiance and alienation. For a detailed description of the differences
between these two types of motivation, see E. DECI, Why We Do What We Do.
(New York: Penguin, 1996), pp. 1-11. See also, E. Deci, “Intrinsic Motivation,
Extrinsic Reinforcement and Inequity,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 22 (1972), pp. 113-120; R. RYAN, S. RIGBY, and K. KING, “Two Types of
Religious Internalization and their Relations to Religious Orientation and
Mental Health,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65 (1993), pp.
586-596; and R. Vallerand & R. Bissonnette, “Intrinsic, Extrinsic and Emotional Styles as Predictors of Behavior: A Prospective Study,” Journal of Personality 60 (1992), pp. 599-620.
489
tice can also be a means to a further end.9 In the latter case, the
very concept of justice, and action which is oriented toward establishing justice, can in fact often turn out to be a means which
brings about injustice. Psychological research tends to cluster
around a broad cross-section of motivational tendencies and influences inherent in human nature itself. In this article I will attempt to share some of the research salient to a deeper understanding of how basic human needs and wants can color and
distort our conceptions of justice and injustice, and of how the
limited and imperfect nature of human reasoning itself, affected
by and dependent upon both need and want, can actually transform a desire for justice into a justification of injustice.
I would like to consider here three of the fundamental factors which are studied in contemporary moral psychology and
have been shown empirically to influence people, normal and
good people, either to participate in acts of grave injustice in the
name of doing what is right, or to stand by and do nothing while
grave injustices are being perpetrated around them.
1. The innate and universal human needs for belonging and
self-esteem;
2. The fallible and miserly character of motivated reasoning;
3. Beliefs concerning the nature and existence of justice in
the world.
These three fundamental factors are interrelated, reinforce,
and build upon one other. The need for belonging affects and
motivates a person to reason in an interested manner, and motivated instrumental reason in turn can both create false beliefs in
service of its goals, ignore important aspects of reality, or make
use of pre-existing commonly shared beliefs and myths to justify its conclusions to act in a certain fashion or to refrain from
action in a given situation.
9
G. MIKULA, “Justice and Fairness in Interpersonal Relations: Thoughts
and Suggestions,” in H. Tajfel, ed., The Social Dimension. Vol. 2. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 204-227.
490
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
1. The innate and universal human need for belonging and self-esteem
Freudian psychology long ago made us aware of the power
that the hedonic motivations to seek pleasure and avoid pain
have in affecting human behavior at the unconscious level. In recent years, research carried out in the field of social psychology
has made us aware that there are powerful social motivations
tied to situational factors at work which also can and do affect
the way we think and act without our conscious awareness of
their impact upon us.10 There is a growing consensus among
motivational psychologists that two of the strongest drives innate within our human nature are manifested in the desire to belong to a group, and the need to be uniquely ourselves within
this group – to be liked and cared about by those we esteem.11
Group membership meets the demands of deindividuation, or
the need to feel a connection to others, while at the same time
providing an opportunity to express one’s unique distinctiveness
in relationship to others. “Our need for each other is not only
built into the foundation of our biological structure, it is also the
cornerstone of our psyche.”12 These two motivational needs, belonging and separateness, can have both a complementary and
an antagonistic effect with respect to one another.13
10
The clearest example of the influence of these situational factors is
provided in Philip Zimbardo’s 1971 simulated prison experiment, which
showed how normal, ordinary people could be moved by situational factors
and social roles to participate in and tolerate cruel and brutal behavior. See
C. Haney, C. Banks and P. Zimbardo, “Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison,” International Journal of Criminology and Penology 1 (1973),
pp. 69-97. For a detailed description of the experiment itself complete with
photographs, the reader is referred to P. Zimbardo’s internet web page:
“Stanford Prison Experiment: A Simulation Study of the Psychology of Imprisonment Conducted at Stanford University,” www.prisonexp.org.
11
M. BREWER, “The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the
Same Time,” in E. TORY HIGGINS and A. KRUGLANSKI, eds., Motivational Science: Social and Personality Perspectives. (Philadelphia: Psychology Press,
2000), p. 53.
12
H. BLOOM, The Lucifer Principle. (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press,
1995), p. 63.
13
For a detailed discussion of the possible interactions between these,
491
We often in fact identify our particular uniqueness by making reference to the groups to which we choose to belong. We associate with certain people rather than others because these
tend to think and act like we do. Those who share our perspective and outlook on life tend to be experienced as pleasant people with whom we feel a connection.14 Our religious affiliation
and our nationality for many of us are as much a defining aspect
of who we are as are our unique personal hopes and dreams; so
much so that we often make explicit reference to these in the descriptions of ourselves as individuals. In part this is due to the
identification of our own personal ego with the shared ego of the
group to which we belong. Thus, quite often an individual when
witnessing the burning of his nation’s flag, or an attack on a religious symbol, even when he might have personal and intellectual sympathy with the cause of the protestors, might respond
with intense anger to this gesture because the attack on the
country or the religion of which he is a part is experienced at the
deeper emotional level as an attack against him personally and
against those with whom he shares a personal relationship.
The need for positive self-esteem is also linked and operates
within the need for group belonging. We judge our own worthiness by the worthiness of those with whom we form a social
bond.15 But this same reality carries with it two negative consequences. The need to express our uniqueness often translates itself into the tendency to differentiate our group from other
groups who are not like us, and to perceive these other groups
as inferior to our own. It gives birth to stereotypes and judgments about other people which make notions of egalitarian jus-
see P. ZIMBARDO, “The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason and Order versus Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos,” in W. J. ARNOLD and D. LEVINE,
eds., 1969 Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970), pp. 237-307.
14
L. ROSS, “The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process,” in L. BERKOWITZ, ed., Cognitive Theories in
Social Psychology. (New York: Academic Press, 1978), p. 355.
15
A. BECK, Prisoners of Hate: The Cognitive Basis of Anger, Hostility, and
Violence. (New York: Perennial, 1999), pp. 50-53.
492
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
tice impossible to be taken seriously, which are often justified in
terms of equity principles, and which have serious implications
considering the manner in which we define membership in the
community to which the principles and rules of justice are applied.16 It is just a short intellectual and emotional step from the
assertion that “they are not like us,” to the conclusion that “they
deserve what they get.”17
A second consequence of the link between the need for selfesteem and individuation to that of belonging is that individuals
within the group are motivated to rise in the internal pecking order of the group itself. Self-esteem is concretely gauged and fed
by the position and roles one occupies within the group. These
roles themselves confer upon the individual both prestige and
power. Group membership affords control and stability over our
personal and shared world. This perceived sense of control is essential for physical and emotional health.18 Realistically though,
16
This effect was clearly exemplified in an experiment by M. Clark:
“When participants were confronted with a person who seemingly would not
be amenable to relationship formation (i.e. because she was already married), they interacted with her on the basis of norms of equitable exchange
and individuality; when they believed she would be a possible relationship
partner, however, they interacted with her on a communal basis (i.e. mutuality and sharing, without respect to individual equity concerns).” R.
BAUMEISTER and M. LEARY, “The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation,” in E. TORY HIGGINS and A.
KRUGLANSKI, eds., Motivational Science: Social and Personality Perspectives.
(Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 2000), pp. 31-32. The study referred to is M.
Clark, “Record Keeping in Two Types of Relationships,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 47 (1984), pp. 549-557.
17
This tendency is complicated. Internal group cohesion requires that
members of the group take control of their emotional lives and make use of
them appropriately. Frustration within the group is inevitable since not
everyone in any group is able to meet all of their needs satisfactorily at any
given moment. However, unless a channel for frustration is made available,
the group itself runs the danger of being torn apart from the inside: “…every
culture handcuffs hostility within the group. But in exchange for the imprisonment of anger, the culture offers a set of outsiders that it’s acceptable to
loathe and sometimes kill. These are the folks we call enemies.” H. Bloom,
The Lucifer Principle, p. 77.
18
and Functions of Wanting,” p. 4. See also, A. TESSER, M. MILLER and J. MOORE,
493
control of one’s own destiny is usually related to control over
that of others. The highest levels of status and power in a group
not only confer upon the individual a greater decision making
power over his own life, but also give him power to act in the
name of others. When the self-esteem need runs amok, when an
individual with unrealistically high expectations of what the social group should afford her feels that she is not getting the
recognition or attention that she deserves, when a person begins
to feel that he is losing control over his life, he may be motivated to begin to use the tools of reason and action to control the
lives and destinies of others rather than his own.19
The higher we rise in the social pecking order the more control we perceive ourselves to have. It is possible to rise in many
different ways. One can rise on the basis of her own personal
abilities and merits. Another very effective means is to discredit
those with whom one is in possible competition by showing that
they are not in synch with the goals and spirit of the group, accusing them of secret dissent, subterfuge or sabotage. Another
less obvious means is to manufacture a fictional threat and portray oneself as a crusader against the phantom enemy, thereby
demonstrating one’s own innate loyalty and care for the well-being of the group. Unfortunately, only very few within the group
are able to occupy the higher positions in the social ladder, and
therefore the majority have to settle for a lower position than
they would like to be able to occupy. Regardless of how they arrive there, those who attain the highest levels are highly motivated to remain there, and are also in a position to manipulate
social structures and institutions to not only ensure this, but also to convince others of the justness of their doing so. Authority
can be and often is used for the protection of power. As Howard
Bloom points out:
“Some Affective Consequences of Social Comparison and Reflection
Processes: The Pain and Pleasure of Being Close,” Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 54 (1988), pp. 49-61.
19
R. BAUMEISTER, Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty. (New York:
W. H. Freeman, 1999), pp. 128-168.
494
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
Leaders… have skillfully manipulated a few basic rules of human
nature: that every tribe regards outsiders as fair game; that every
society gives permission to hate; that each culture dresses the demon of its hatred in the garb of righteousness; and that the man
who channels this hatred can rouse the superorganism and lead it
around by the nose.20
But this is possible only because those who are unable to attain the higher levels of status may actively collaborate in these
processes by accepting the justness of unjust situations perpetrated by the group in order not to have to admit their ambition,
or to face the reality of their failure to attain desired goals. In
this way they are able to protect their self-esteem in the process.
Studies have demonstrated that those who do so have a marked
tendency to exacerbate the differences between their own group
and other groups and to intellectually and morally justify these
differences.21 In other words, the pain of recognition that I will
never distinguish myself within my own group motivates me to
salve this pain by turning my attention to the superiority of my
own group over that of others and to formulate a moral argument justifying this superiority. I may not be king in my own
country, but it is better to serve in heaven than to rule in hell.
This judgment of course, requires that hell remain hell so that
the superiority of my own group remain in evidence.
The need for deindividuation also carries with it a less subtle but equally hidden danger. In specific circumstances, one can
actually lose one’s self in the group. The realities of mob violence, football hooliganism, etc., as well as studies of helping behavior and altruism have provided extensive evidence of the
power of group belonging to affect our behavior without our
20
H. BLOOM, The Lucifer Principle, p. 94.
See for examples: D. FORSYTH and B. SCHLENKER, “Attributing the Causes of Group Performance: Effects of Performance Quality, Task Importance,
and Future Testing,” Journal of Personality 45 (1977), pp. 220-236; M. LEARY
and D. FORSYTH, “Attributions of Responsibility for Collective Endeavors,” in
C. Hendrick, ed., Review of Personality and Social Psychology. Vol. 8. (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1987), pp. 167-188; and A. ZANDER, Motives and Goals in
Groups. (New York, Academic Press, 1971).
21
495
conscious awareness.22 Losing ourselves in the group identity
can in fact anaesthetize the moral conscience in such a way that
we are able to participate in extreme brutality, or stand idly bye
while someone suffers and dies without raising a finger to come
to their aid, and more importantly, without experiencing remorse or guilt.23 When a member of our group is accused of having done something terrible, our immediate emotional reaction
is to come to his defense rather than to seek the truth concerning his guilt or innocence, since the immoral behavior of a member of the group reflects upon all members of the group and
therefore upon us personally. Quite naturally this motivation to
protect the group can and often does lead us to prolong situations of injustice or actually to defend the perpetrators of these
for the sake of maintaining our own self-esteem.24
This sense of belonging to a group, while at the same time
experiencing the need to be oneself within the group, has a profound influence upon the development of one’s own self-concept, and this in turn has serious behavioral and moral ramifications. The sense of fairness and justice develop through a
gradual reciprocal recognition, beginning as early as childhood,
that the desires of others are similar to one’s own desires.25 This
22
P. ZIMBARDO, “The Psychology of Evil, or The Perversion of Human Potential,” in T. Sarbin, ed., Challenges to the Criminal Justice System: The Perspectives of Community Psychology. (New York: Human Sciences Press,
1979), p. 153.
23
“In striking contrast to many or most processes they describe, social
psychologists describe this complex as universal and ineradicable. Taken to
an extreme, ingroup-outgroup bias effectively dehumanizes Them which
means that moral law does not apply to Them and that therefore, even ordinary and very moral people can do the most appalling things with a clear
conscience.” R. WRANGHAM and D. PETERSON, Demonic Males: Apes and the
Origins of Human Violence. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), p. 196.
24
As Gert points out: “When family, religion, or country provide the motives for immoral action, then the overcoming of temptation is complicated
by the difficulty in coming to see what all rational men would publicly advocate… That my family or country will benefit, and those I do not care for
will suffer, are considerations that almost invariably affect my judgment.
Distortion of the facts is almost inevitable.” B. GERT, The Moral Rules, p. 179.
25
M. KILLEN and L. NUCCI, “Morality, Autonomy, and Social Conflict,” in
M. KILLEN and D. HART, eds., Morality and Everyday Life: Developmental Perspectives. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 56.
496
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
empathic capability requires a fairly well-developed sense of
one’s own autonomy. In order to recognize that other’s needs
are similar to one’s own, it is essential to know what one’s own
needs are. However, on a broader plane, that which constitutes
membership in a group is the commonality of similar desires
and needs which are perceived to be both different and superior to those of other groups who are not like us. Thus, the sense
of fairness and justice which underlie our judgments and which
provide the driving force to translate our intellectual intentions
into real action can be highly fragile. The needs of the group
and the individual’s personal needs eventually merge. But the
needs of the group can often only be satisfied by ensuring that
the needs of another group will not be. Mutual as well as vicarious satisfaction of motivational needs becomes possible by
group membership, but so also do mutual and vicarious exploitation.
2. The fallible and miserly character of motivated reasoning
In classical philosophy, the two human experiences of wanting and thinking were each granted a more or less independent
status as separate powers of the soul. Reason informs the will.
But the will’s attraction to the goodness of truth drives the reason to do its work. While the will and reason were conceived as
constantly in dialogue with each other, each of these two was ontologically separate from the other. Contemporary cognitive social psychology suggests that this conceptualization may be
slightly exaggerated. Will and Reason are two sides of the same
reality and often cannot be separated, even at the conceptual level. What we know depends upon what we want. What we want
depends upon what we know. And that which we both perceive
and accept as true has a great deal to do with what is in harmony with our firmly held beliefs and our wishes:
Not only does knowing influence wanting, but wanting also influences knowing. This reciprocal relation has fascinated psychologists since unconscious motives were discovered. It means that
people can do exactly what they want to do and still believe that it
is simply the rational thing to do because their wants uncon-
497
sciously bias the knowledge they use to instigate (and later justify),
the action.26
Because both thinking and feeling are human activities
which depend upon the use of our bodies, and our bodies are organic systems which exist in a physical world, these activities entail costs. The human organism only has so much energy (physical or psychological), available to it at any given moment. Energy spent in feeling is not available for use in cognition, or acting, and vice versa. As physical as well as spiritual beings, like all
living organisms, we are biologically and psychologically preprogrammed to conserve our energy.27 Once we have already
done the hard and costly work of developing a systematic structure of firmly held beliefs about how the world is, how certain
types of people are, how things work, etc., we do not easily surrender or alter these beliefs. New information and experiences
which may call these into question are often distorted or ignored
because of the emotional and cognitive cost of restructuring our
entire system of beliefs about life that taking them seriously
would entail.28 In addition to this, the demands and constraints
of life in the real world often make it impossible for us to gather enough information about all of the possible aspects of each
and every situation in which we act, evaluate, judge, and respond to make a completely rational informed decision. More
often than not, we rely on shortcuts, and often we rely on severe
shortcuts, reasoning on the basis of a single experience, in many
of the most important and emotionally charged judgments
which guide and direct our behavior.29 The simplest and easiest
explanation is usually the most attractive to us.
When the needs for belonging and self-esteem join forces
26
and Functions of Wanting,” p. 12.
27
Z. KUNDA, Social Cognition, pp. 294-303.
28
L. Ross, “The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process,” in L. Berkowitz, ed., Cognitive Theories in
Social Psychology. (New York: Academic Press, 1978), pp. 370-371.
29
S. READ, “Once is Enough: Causal Reasoning from a Single-Instance,”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 45 (1983), pp. 323-334.
498
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
with the miserly economy of cognition and judgment, a whole
host of biases and errors show their faces. In dealing with a situation of perceived injustice in the world, the rational observer
can do one of two things. He can act in such a way as to change
the world, or he can act in such a way as to alter his perceptions.
Normally, given the economic nature of thought, he will be motivated to choose the alternative which carries the lowest cost in
his attempt to reduce the injustice which is real.30 At times it is
cheaper to misperceive than to accept the harsh objective reality of a situation because of the high future costs that a correct
perception might imply. This tendency operates at both the individual and group levels.
People do not ordinarily engage in acts of injustice willingly
and knowingly. More often than not, in order to participate, it is
necessary that they be able to redefine the situation in such a
way that the moral elements referent to justice or injustice lose
salience.31 However, to do this deliberately and consciously
would call into question one’s moral integrity, thereby threatening self-esteem. And so, “The influence of self-interest occurs beneath the person’s awareness and is manifest in a corruption of
the moral judgement process itself… not in temptation weakening the will or overshadowing a moral obligation. In addition, an
erroneous characterization of an unethical action as being
morally neutral or acceptable places the performance of that action in accord with one’s prosocial motivations.”32
The tendency to distort judgments about one’s self and others is often experienced as a bias in the reasoning process which
social psychologists call the “Fundamental Attribution Error.” It
is an asynchronous tendency, augmented by the motivations for
self-enhancement and self-protection within one’s social group
and across groups, to either overestimate or underestimate the
power of situational factors in making judgments about our own
30
K. SOLTAN, “Empirical Studies of Distributive Justice,” Ethics 92
(1982), p. 688.
31
A. BECK, Prisoners of Hate, p. 231.
32
D. BERSOFF, “Explaining Unethical Behaviour Among People Motivated to Act Prosocially,” Journal of Moral Education 28 (1999), p. 423.
499
actions and those of others. It is asynchronous in the sense that
we tend to attribute the positive, in this case justice-oriented,
outcomes of our actions to underlying dispositional traits of
who we are as persons. I have done justice because I am a just,
good, generous, loving person. My motivation was intrinsic. The
same outcomes and behaviors performed by others, however,
are attributed not to their underlying dispositional qualities, but
rather to the demands of the situation. They only did what they
had to do given the situation. Anyone would have done the same
thing. Their motivation was extrinsic. However, with respect to
the negative consequences of our behavior, acts of injustice, the
tendency reverses itself exactly. When it is brought to my attention that I have participated in injustice, the tendency is to justify this in terms of the situational constraints which made it impossible for me to do otherwise. It is not because I am an unjust,
unloving, miserly, selfish person. Even the saints would have
done the same thing if they were in the same situation. On the
other hand, we do not generously extend this same rationalization to the injustice of others. Their negative consequences are
the result of their underlying evil personal characteristics. The
same mental emotional process works as well at the group level.
In interacting with other people, attributors will tend to attribute to themselves the actions of other successful people
when these are consistent with their own interests, taking personal credit for the good that others have actually done.33
This tendency is influenced by both motivational and cognitive advantages. On the one hand, it enables me to consistently
look better than others, thereby boosting my own self-esteem
and helping me to rise within the social hierarchy of my group.
On the other hand, it minimizes the damage of my mistakes,
thereby protecting my image in the eyes of others, and my own
personal self-esteem, while at the same time enabling me to continue forward with my course of action, my style of living and
perceiving reality in my particular way, without having to do the
33
H. KELLEY, “Attribution in Social Interaction,” in E. Jones, et. al., eds.,
Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior. (Morristown, NJ: General
Learning Press, 1971), p. 19.
500
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
costly work of altering beliefs, goals, strategies, etc. More importantly though, the tendency works at the unconscious level. I
am unaware that I am actively distorting and blinding myself to
my own responsibility for the harm that I have caused, while at
the same time I am precipitously and without sufficient information passing judgments upon the personhood of others. We
see ourselves as more just and we see others as less just than objective reality warrants.34
Such a perceptual leap can have a powerful effect upon the
way that we respond to our own injustices and those of others.
Helping behavior, assignment of blame, and punishing behavior
have all been shown to be linked to these types of judgments
concerning the person-behavior nexus. If I can convince myself
that another’s good action is merely constrained by situational
factors, there is no need to concede merit. If I can convince myself that the negative consequences another is experiencing are
the result of his own underlying personal dispositions, this exonerates me from helping. In fact it might actually prohibit me
from intervening to minimize the suffering in the name of justice through an application of the equity rule. He is only getting
what he deserves given the kind of person he is. If the poor
around me are poor because they are living in an exploitative situation brought about by members of my own group, perhaps by
those I know or even admire, this means that I must in fact reevaluate both my membership and participation in the group. I
must rethink my friendship with these people, as well as dealing
with the more threatening question about the kind of person I
am for maintaining friendship with exploitative people. But if
the poor around me are poor because they are lazy, dependent,
incapable, or stupid (in other words because of the kind of peo-
34
The objective quality of particular actions is not at issue. Rather it is
the interpretation of the link between the action and the person who performed it which is at stake. When two people perform the same action resulting in the same consequences, one is seen as having done so because of
the kind of person he is, whereas the other is seen to be merely constrained
by the situation. The Fundamental Attribution Error shows its effects in
making the leap in judgment from what we do to the kind of person we are
without having gathered sufficient evidence to make such a judgment.
501
ple they are), then the exploitative situation becomes a less important issue. Helping would be immoral because it would be rewarding their laziness, increasing their dependency, allowing
them to feed their intrinsic motivation to remain poor, etc.
These people will fail regardless of the situation in which they
find themselves. The issue can then become cognitively transformed into one of taking care of the defective ( a matter of charity) rather than working to bring about a more equitable situation (a matter of justice).
It is important to recognize here that these judgments may
or may not be correct in and of themselves. A poor man may or
may not be lazy or psychologically dependent. The point is that
we are given to making a judgment about our own and other’s
personhood without gathering sufficient evidence either way,
and we appear to be hardwired at the preconscious level to make
a judgment which is skewed in favor of a negative evaluation of
another’s personhood rather than in favor of his goodness, and
vice versa with respect to ourselves. A variety of Phariseeism
seems to be an inherent tendency of fallen human nature. The
reasons for this are coherent and clear. It enables us to feel safe
in our world. It enables us to feel good about ourselves. It enables us to gain esteem in the eyes of others and to rise socially.
It enables us to continue to cling to our beliefs and prejudices
and avoid the costs involved in re-examining and altering them.
It enables us to solidify our group identity and protects our belief in the superiority of our own group over others. It simplifies
our life. It enables us, in short, to get and do what we want.
3. Beliefs concerning the nature and existence of justice in the
world
In perceptually classifying other persons and groups as unjust and ourselves as just, we both distance ourselves from them
and their activities, and at the same time reduce our own felt responsibility for the situation to which their behavior is a response. The social body provides certain shared beliefs about
justice and injustice which tend to facilitate the efficacy and applicability of such strategies. But in making use of these, we are
not only responding to, but also reinforcing and perpetuating
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STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
these specific beliefs about justice and injustice which are prevalent in human social thought and which have powerful motivational force:
a) The world we live in is a just world;
b) A good life protects me from the effects of injustice;
c) Injustice when it occurs is caused by those who are evil.
The power of these beliefs is eloquently demonstrated in the
prevalent tendency to assign blame to innocent victims for the
harm that befalls them; what in common parlance might be referred to as “adding insult to injury.” Whether this takes the
form of explaining the existence of poverty in terms of the low
intellectual ability or the laziness of the poor, explaining the rape
of a woman in terms of the clothing she was wearing at the time,
or explaining a horrible traffic accident in terms of the victim’s
poor driving ability, studies concerning normal people’s judgments concerning who or what causes poverty, accidental injury,
and rape show a consistent and recurrent tendency to blame the
innocent victims of these occurrences for the negative consequences which befall them. The studies of Walster, Shaw, and
Sulzer in particular have demonstrated that “…as the consequences of an accident grow more serious, observers tend to assign increasing responsibility for the event to some appropriate
person (often the victim).”35
Lerner first advanced and provided a wealth of evidence in
favor of the theory that this tendency is the result of a broadly
shared belief that since we live in a world ruled by justice, bad
things do not happen to good or innocent people.36 Piaget’s earlier work had demonstrated that this belief in automatic and cosmic justice is present even at the most primitive levels of moral
development and was itself a defining characteristic of moral
35
M. SHAW and P. SKULNICK, “Attribution of Responsibility for a Happy
Accident,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 18 (1971), p. 380.
36
M. LERNER, Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion. (New York:
Plenum, 1980). See also M. LERNER, “The Desire for Justice and Reaction to
Victims,” in J. Macauley and L. Berkowitz, eds., Altruism and Helping Behavior. (New York: Academic Press, 1970).
503
heteronomy. Thus Lerner’s research would suggest that under
certain circumstances, particularly when the harm suffered by
the innocent is more severe, ordinary people are motivated to
regress to a less mature form of moral reasoning and distort their
perception of reality in order to protect the very primitive belief
that “…there are only three basic causes of suffering, (a) the sufferer’s prior behavior, (b) his low intrinsic personal worth, or (c)
chance.”37 If bad things can happen to good people as a result of
chance, then there is no justice. If there is no justice, then there
is no guarantee of moral order in the universe. This cannot be,
and therefore this person’s suffering must be due to either her
low intrinsic self-worth or her prior behavior. Since this is so,
what happened to her was not unjust, since it was the just consequence of either who she is, or what she has done.
Walster offers an alternative but related explanation,
grounded in processes of defensive attribution, which are motivated by the desire to protect ourselves against the effects of evil
and injustice. The experience of seeing another suffer carries into our awareness the possibility that the same type of suffering
could befall us, or others who are important to us. This is further heightened if we perceive ourselves as being similar to the
person who suffers, or if we are likely to find ourselves in a similar situation to that in which the suffering occurred.38 Only by
blaming the victim and by stressing that he is a different kind of
person can the observer insulate himself from a similar disaster.39 In this way we convince ourselves that what happened to
37
K. SHAVER, “Defensive Attribution: Effects of Severity and Relevance
on the Responsibility Assigned for an Accident,” Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 14 (1970), pp. 112-113.
38
“Analysis of the concept of relevance reveals at least two major classes of contributing factors: those associated with situational similarity and
those associated with personal similarity. The former refer to perceived similarities between the circumstances of a stimulus person and the subject. In
contrast, personal similarity refers to the perceived congruence of beliefs,
values, and personal characteristics.” K. SHAVER, “Defensive Attribution: Effects of Severity and Relevance on the Responsibility Assigned for an Accident,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 14 (1970), p. 106.
39
M. SHAW and P. SKULNICK, “Attribution of Responsibility for a Happy
Accident,” p. 380.
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STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
them was not due to luck, or to the situation, but rather was the
result of something that they themselves did. In this way, we can
take steps to avoid doing the same thing, and thereby restore our
feelings of being safe and in control of our personal situations.40
In both of these cases, the tendency to blame has been
shown to be tied to the fundamental need to feel like we are in
control of our lives, our personal and social surroundings, and
our destinies, and above all is linked to our own feelings of power and helplessness in terms of responding to the suffering of the
victim, and in remedying the causes which brought about the
suffering.41 “When empowered to modify unjust conditions,
nonvictims are more likely to define an act as unjust, try to remediate it and to advocate for a victim. However, without such
power, nonvictims tend to deny injustice, justify it and often
derogate their victims…”42
Our sensitization to the tendency to victim derogation is
counterbalanced by the parallel tendency of almost every perpetrator of grave injustice in recent years to paint himself as a victim of circumstances. This of course is itself nothing more than
the fundamental attribution error at work. To offset and answer
this reality, the third common and apparently universal belief
comes into play. Evil and injustice are caused only by people
who are evil and unjust:
40
“If we can categorize a serious accident as in some way the victim’s
fault, it is reassuring. We then simply need to assure ourselves that we are a
different kind of person from the victim, or that we would behave differently under similar circumstances, and we feel protected from catastrophe.” E.
WALSTER, “Assignment of Responsibility for an Accident,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 3 (1966), p. 74.
41
“Laboratory studies have demonstrated consistently that nonvictims’
perceptions and treatment of victims vary as a function of their ability to
help. (Brickman, Karuza, Cohr, Rabinowitz, Contes & Kradder 1982; Fine
1979,1982; Lerner & Simmons 1966).” M. FINE, “When Nonvictims Derogate:
Powerlessness in the Helping Professions,” Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin 8 (1982), p. 638.
42
Ibid. See also, M. FINE, “When Nonvictims Derogate: Powerlessness in
the Helping Professions,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 8 (1982)
pp. 637-643.
505
…it assumes that the evil doer is different from the rest of us in
fundamental ways, since he or she did the evil deed and we have
not. Therefore, we need not identify with him or her, feel empathy
towards, nor share the guilt of such a person. It allows us to feel superior by virtue of this difference between “us” (as the good) and
“them” (as the bad). We thus distance ourselves and make the evil
act and its perpetrator alien to us.43
Bradley long ago suggested that the very foundation of the
vulgar notion of responsibility consists of an underlying need to
personally blame someone for the negative consequences of behavior, a tendency rooted in the perception of the unity of the
evil of an action and the one who performs that action. The evil
of the consequences are unleashed by the actions of the one who
is evil. Since the consequences are transient, the only place
where evil can perdure is in the person responsible for the coming into being of these consequences.44 In spite of a wealth of
empirical evidence provided by social psychologists such as
Stanley Milgram and Philip Zimbardo that ordinary good people
can be powerfully constrained by situational factors and easily
moved by these to perform outrageous acts of injustice and
harm to others, the myth remains that evil and injustice are perpetrated only by evil persons. Zimbardo in particular points out
the paradox that it is only by personalizing evil that we are able
to deal with it in an impersonal way.45
Baumeister, in his study of common beliefs concerning evil
and the persons who perpetrate it, as these are encoded and
communicated socially in literature, film, folk stories, etc., has
shown the tendency to portray perpetrators of evil as persons
who are outsiders (not members of our group), who derive pleasure from inflicting pain and harm on innocent others, who do
so deliberately and intentionally, who are exaggeratedly egoistic,
43
P. ZIMBARDO, “The Psychology of Evil, or The Perversion of Human Potential,” pp. 146-147.
44
F. BRADLEY, Ethical Studies. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1876), pp. 1-57.
45
P. ZIMBARDO, “The Psychology of Evil, or The Perversion of Human Potential,” p. 147.
506
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
and who are incapable of controlling their feelings, especially
those of rage and anger.46 This conglomeration of beliefs about
the kind of people who participate in evil and injustice adds
tremendous fuel to the already discussed motivational needs
and desires. It provides us with a social barometer against which
to measure the good and evil, the justice and injustice of our
own and our groups behavior.47 We are never as bad or unjust,
and we are always better and more just than the caricature. The
needs for group belonging, the need to bolster self-esteem by rising or protecting our place in the human pecking order, the need
to feel that our group is better than others, the need to distance
ourselves from the negative effects of our own behavior, are all
reinforced and their satisfaction is facilitated by these often false
underlying beliefs about justice and injustice.
Our beliefs in a just world, in our ability to control our lives
and isolate ourselves from the consequences of injustice, and in
the personal causation of evil are all responses rooted in a noncomparative egalitarian sense of justice. In a just world, good
and bad things should not befall some people and not others
without a reason. When they do, it must be because these people
are deserving. Rather than questioning the validity of our naive
and often motivationally distorted presumptions or our leaps in
judgment concerning the personal qualities and characters of
others, it is often easier and less costly to apply the equity rule in
order to discount or even nullify the perception of these injustices. This in turn engenders a feeling that what has occurred is
justified and satisfies many real motivational needs. It enables
me to ignore the suffering of the victim by blaming him for his
own lot; and often not only ignore his suffering, but perhaps even
feel that his suffering is right, given the kind of person I presume
him to be as the author of his own fate. It enables me to deal with
my own feelings of powerlessness to alter the conditions which
have given rise to these injustices. It reduces the anxiety I feel
over the possibility that the same lot might befall me or someone
close to me. It enables me to reduce my feelings of discomfort
46
R. BAUMEISTER, Evil., pp. 72-75.
P. ZIMBARDO, “The Psychology of Evil, or The Perversion of Human Potential,” pp. 146-147.
47
507
with the fact that others have less than I do, or suffer more than
I do. It enables me to exonerate and ignore the unjust behaviors
of my friends, my family, my church, my groups, thereby protecting the belonging with them that fulfills my deepest human
needs. It enables me to maintain the belief that I am a good and
caring person while either ignoring the real situations of injustice and their effects, or actively participating in them. And the
more frightening reality is that it not only enables me to do all of
these things, but often actually moves me to do them without my
conscious realization. Either way, the level of feeling which
touches the rooted nature of belief has a consequent effect upon
behavior, either motivating the believer to react to an injustice in
a harsh matter, compounding the pain, or by freeing one from
the responsibility to act.48 When this occurs, an injustice may be,
and often is, perpetrated in the name of justice.
When joined to group loyalties and self-interested motivations, the faith that does justice can also become a faith that
does injustice. Even our belief in a loving personal God can of
course be turned to the service of human need, even as some
people’s rejection of God can be justified on the basis of faith’s
justification of injustice. As William James pointed out long ago,
rather than implying a condemnation of piety or faith, this
merely reveals to us another quality of reason itself of which we
should be aware:
The plain fact is that men’s minds are built, as has been often said, in
water-tight compartments. Religious after a fashion, they yet have
many other things in them beside their religion, and unholy entanglements and associations inevitably obtain… The baiting of Jews, the
hunting of Albigenses and Waldenses, the stoning of Mormons and
48
For concrete examples of the effects of these tendencies see: C. BATand R. GRAY, “Religious Orientation and Helping Behavior: Responding
to One’s Own or to the Victim’s Needs,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 40 (1981), pp. 511-520; A. FURNHAM and B. GUNTER, “Just World Beliefs and Attitudes toward the Poor,” British Journal of Social Psychology 23
(1984), pp. 265-269; and A. CHAIKEN and J. DARLEY, “Victim or Perpetrator?
Defensive Attribution of Responsibility and the Need for Order and Justice,”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 25 (1975), pp. 268-275.
SON
508
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
the massacring of Armenians, express much rather that aboriginal
human neophobia, that pugnacity of which we all share the vestiges,
and that inborn hatred of the alien and of eccentric and non-conforming men as aliens, than they express the positive piety of the various perpetrators. Piety is the mask, the inner force is tribal instinct.49
Yet as long as piety and faith, our faith in our own interpretations of how reality works, in our own good intentions, and
our faith in the groups to which we belong, continues to mask
the deeper demands of tribal instinct, or worse, justifies it, we
will need to become comfortable with the reality of injustice in
our midst, and the multiple justifications for injustice that our
creative imaginations are capable of constructing and in which
our reasons are capable of believing.
Moral and Theological Reflections
Traditional Catholic moral theology might be accused of not
paying enough attention to the power and importance of motivations. Our analysis of the moral quality of human behavior begins with a framework that defines the sources of morality in
terms of object, end, and circumstances. Our definition of human action requires the presence of liberty and reason. The
salient moral questions deal primarily with the ends intended,
either as ends in themselves or as instrumental means to another end; with whether there was sufficient rational deliberation
about alternative means, possible consequences, the moral quality and worthiness of the ends intended, etc.; with whether or
not there was sufficient freedom to choose. The fundamental
questions have been and continue to be basically, “What did he
do and was it objectively sinful?”; “Could he have done otherwise?”; “Was it his intention to do this?”. Particularly since the
Freudian revelation that motivations are often unconscious and
therefore operative at a level not in consonance with our defini-
49
W. JAMES, Varieties of Religious Experience. (New York: Penguin Classics, 1902), pp. 337-338.
509
tion of what makes action human, the deeper questions concerning why she chose this as an end or as a means, of why he
perceived a possible means as objectively evil, neutral, or good,
of why she did not have the internal freedom to choose another
available means in order to attain her chosen end, were often
relegated to the realm of corollary circumstances which may either diminish or augment culpability or virtue but do not really
enter into the moral quality of the act itself.
The research of moral and motivational psychology suggests
that motivation may play a more important role in the definition
and understanding of human moral behavior than we have classically assigned to it. It is often the intrinsic or extrinsic character
of the motivation present which distinguishes an intentional end
as instrumental or as an end in itself. More importantly, underlying motivation can and does distort both perception and judgment. It can blind us to injustice. It can make us see what is just
as unjust. It can sensitize or desensitize us to the moral truth.
Furthermore, in the context of our discussion of justice and injustice, careful attention to the nature of motivation enables us to
respond to the real question that most people ask when confronting the experience of injustice in their lives and in the world
around them: “How could that person do such a thing?”.
It surely makes a difference in the definition of the objective
moral quality of an act whether an individual is acting in order to
satisfy a need to rise in status, for survival, for self-esteem, for
group belonging, or to maintain the strength of his underlying beliefs about how the world, and justice in the world, works. Our
tradition in fact does recognize this reality, particularly in its considerations of how underlying motivations have an influence upon intentionality, as well as the explicit recognition that some motivations are worthy of human beings and others are not. It is the
presence of an underlying motivational need for survival as opposed to the need to feel good about our group which differentiates an act of racially motivated murder from that of killing in
self-defense; the act of a starving man who steals a loaf of bread
from that of a wealthy corporation that underpays its employees
in order to maximize profit. But these types of considerations are
primarily retrospective in nature. They deal with how to intellectually and rationally analyze the moral character of what has already been done. Furthermore, this type of moral analysis is itself
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STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
a motivated activity which is influenced and guided by the purpose for which it is being carried out. Often this analysis is also
interested. Our conclusions will be influenced, perhaps even depend upon, whether we are searching for someone to blame,
whether we are motivated by the need to restore social locomotion or group stability, or whether we are merely looking for
someone to publicly criticize so that we can feel good about ourselves or look better in the eyes of others.
In part one of this series I began with Karen Lebacqz’s observation that in our starting point we should take a long hard look
at the reality of injustice in its many forms as it exists in the real
world, and listen to the discoveries of the social sciences in what
they have to say about its causes. They show us that in the minds
of most people, the concept of justice and injustice are flexible
and ambiguous in nature. In part two I surveyed empirical research concerning people’s understanding and use of moral rules
and how these are socially transmitted, change and develop over
time in response to an individual’s life experiences, and are applied according to the situation, circumstances and domains of an
individual’s life experience and self-concept with respect to the
tension between a drive for individual autonomy and interpersonal relationality. Motivational studies provide the link between
concepts and rules, and enable us to understand why one concept
is favored over another, why one rule is chosen and not another,
and why an individual, knowing quite clearly that a route of behavior is morally prohibited by a principle or its underlying rule,
will choose it knowingly and justify her choice in terms of another principle. Doing so satisfies a need.
This reality has some very challenging implications for us as
moral theologians. First of all, it reveals what we already as
Christians know. Injustice is deeply rooted in our very nature as
human beings. It is the result of our needs and our wants. We
engage in it because it serves us both as individuals and as
groups; it enables us to get what we want. We use others as a
means in satisfying our own personal and group ends, and we
use our powers of reason to rationalize and justify this violation
of a primary principle of Christian ethics.50 Unfortunately, we of50
As the current Magisterium reminds us, “The rational ordering of the
511
ten do not consciously know what our real wants are, and we are
often unaware of their influence upon our perceptions, judgments, and choices. Since morality dictates that we are not able
to be held responsible for what is unknown and beyond our conscious control, it is difficult to know how to deal with these very
real influences. This is further complicated by the fact of the almost limitless capacity of our interested imagination and it’s
power over reason which enables us to fabricate a host of explanations and reasons why we are justified in doing what we did.51
Rather than reason informing the will, often both the will and
the reason are informed by appetite. Often the finest, most perfectly formulated moral and ethical principles and rules, the
clearest, truest and most inspirational Magisterial pronouncements, seem to have little or no effect whatsoever upon people’s
ability to put these into concrete practice unless we deal also
with the underlying level of need. It’s not enough to point the direction to justice, it’s just as important, perhaps more important
to motivate people to want, to need justice–to experience it as an
intrinsic motivation. It’s also important to point the way to alternative courses of action which are more morally acceptable
but which are able to satisfy the same underlying needs at a similar personal and group cost. Admittedly, this is often not easy to
do. And there are also times when one should be encouraged,
perhaps even required to assume the greater cost in service of a
deeper personal moral growth. An ethics of motivational realism
does not necessarily preclude a call to moral heroism, nor
should it.
human act to the good in its truth and the voluntary pursuit of that good,
known by reason, constitute morality. Hence human activity cannot be
judged as morally good merely because it is a means for attaining one or another of its goals, or simply because the subject’s intention is good. Activity
is morally good when it attests to and expresses the voluntary ordering of the
person to his ultimate end and the conformity of a concrete action with the
human good as it is acknowledged in its truth by reason.” JOHN PAUL II, Veritatis Splendor, 72. I would suggest that this principle should also be extended to the use of reason itself in its motivated search to know the good.
51
P. ZIMBARDO, “The Psychology of Evil, or The Perversion of Human Potential,” p. 155.
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STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
Furthermore, we ourselves as theologians and as moralists,
as wise and as dedicated to the truth as we are, must recognize
that we are not immune either to the fundamental motivational
effects of our fallen human nature. We also require a deeper
awareness of the motivational drives behind our own tendency
to divide into groups within groups; to associate and support
those whose ideas are in consonance with our own and avoid
contact and dialogue with those whose perspectives challenge
us; to identify and label each other as liberals, conservatives, traditionalists, modernists, proportionalists, deontologists and the
like; to see others who in reality love the Church and wish to
serve her as much as we do as dangerous threats to her and as
enemies; to make use of these categories to personally disparage, denigrate, and denounce the work and personhood of others, and as excuses to justify refusing to dialogue and seek the
truth together; to make use of opportunities and weaknesses in
each others opinions and theories in order to rise in popularity
or power; to use doctrinal disputes to deal with our underlying
authority issues, to make use of our God-given talent, our intellect and our energy to justify injustices carried out against others because they are of benefit to ourselves; to do what is right
but for the wrong reasons, and to do what is wrong but salve our
consciences with the comforting knowledge that we did so for
the right reason. Our theological knowledge and our moral science do not place us in a privileged position when it comes to
knowledge of ourselves and control over our own wants and
needs. We also require insight into our own need to belong to
something greater than ourselves, to be in control of our own
lives and destinies, to distinguish ourselves in the eyes of others,
to be admired and respected and cared about, to maintain a belief that life is fair and that we can avoid misfortune, as well as
knowledge of the many ways in which these needs can and do
have power over us.
Fortunately, both Scripture and our tradition provide us
with a wealth of information about how to do just this. It was,
after all, Jesus who pointed out to us something that over the
years we may have forgotten. Ideas about evil and injustice may
come from the mind, but the power that transforms them into
real action is rooted in the deepest recesses of the heart. To deal
with evil and injustice requires more than just talking to the
513
mind. It also requires dealing with the needs of, and transformation of the human heart. Traditional practices such as the
daily examination of conscience, exhortations by the Magisterium to make frequent use of the sacrament of reconciliation,52
the admonition of St. Alphonsus quoted in Veritatis Splendor 78
that in addition to doing the right thing we must also do so for
the right reason,53 the very sacramental life and pastoral ministry of the Church in all of its forms and significance, these all
remind us of the need for introspection and an authentic humility which seeks the truth about ourselves–a truth which has the
power to motivate us to seek something greater than ourselves.
They remind us that the primary purpose of moral theology is
not to tell people what to do or not to do, to use the mind to discover the difference between what is right and what is wrong.
That may debatably be a sufficient description of the purpose of
morality or of ethics. But theology has to do with God. Moral
theology is supposed to call people to conversion and reconciliation, to embrace a profound personal relationship with the One
who is able to transform our hearts, to cleanse our motivations,
to satisfy our deepest and truest needs, to purify our perceptions, to free us from the illusions of selfishness, to draw us into communion with Himself and with each other, so that we can
discover the excellence of our vocation in Christ.54 Ultimately,
and fundamentally, the proper understanding of justice and its
realization rest upon and depend upon a deep spirituality
grounded in a personal relationship with God the Father in Jesus Christ–a relationship which can profoundly satisfy the two
52
However, the use of these two practices might be more effective if the
focus shifted away from an examination of what I did, to an examination of
the motives which led me to do these. Our actions are also windows into the
felt needs which give rise to them. One should not only ask, “What did I
do?,” but also, “Why did I feel the need to do so?” and “What does this tell
me about the kind of person I am?.”
53
“As the Patron of moral theologians and confessors teaches: ‘It is not
enough to do good works; they need to be done well. For our works to be
good and perfect, they must be done for the sole purpose of pleasing God’.”
John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, 78.
54
PAUL VI, Optatam Totius, 16.
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STEPHEN T. REHRAUER
deep human needs of intimacy and belonging with others and
self-esteem. We are to seek first the Kingdom of God, and only
then will a just satisfaction of all other needs and their proper
ordering be given to us.
Without this spirituality, this personal contact, relationship
with, this need for “The Lord, Our Justice”, who was himself unjustly and innocently condemned, ridiculed, and blamed for the
suffering that befell him, who reminded us that if we wish to be
great we should serve the needs of the least, that the way to selfesteem is through denial of self, that the last shall be first, that
we are not equipped to judge and are not to judge each other,
that we are to take the plank out of our own eye before removing the splinter from our brothers, that there is supposed to be
one fold, one shepherd, one on earth we call our father and
teacher and that we are all brothers and sisters, that we are not
to argue about who is more important or make our importance
felt, everything else is nothing but words which can just as easily be misinterpreted or distorted as justifications for the exact
opposite of the reality to which they call us. Until these words
are personally and relationally informed by the WORD, our beliefs about justice may continue to perpetrate injustice and we
may easily delude ourselves into believing that our injustice is
justifiable. The faith that does justice will be disfigured into a
faith that does injustice. How interesting it is that empirical science, a use of human reason in its study of human reasoning,
should remind us of something that the parables of Jesus taught
us long ago – the urgency and the importance of seeking a solution which goes beyond reason alone and points us in the direction of a more authentic faith grounded in a recognition of the
truth about ourselves.
Via Merulana, 31
C.P. 2458
00100 Roma
Italy
STEPHEN T. REHRAUER, C.SS.R
—————
515
Summary/Resumen
In this, the third and final part of a series on the theme of the ambiguity of justice and injustice, the author examines the power of underlying motivations which move people to participate in or perpetrate
situations of injustice. He surveys a broad spectrum of research carried
out by representatives of the cognitive social, evolutionary, and motivational schools of psychology with special emphasis upon the role of
control, self-esteem, and group belonging needs, as well as the related
underlying beliefs which serve and sustain these. He concludes by highlighting some of the empirical findings which better enable us to understand why good people want to sometimes participate in injustice,
and why even their best intentions may often result in the creation of
situations of injustice. He also reflects upon some of the implications
of these studies for both the matter and ministry of the discipline of
moral theology.
En esta tercera y última parte de una serie sobre la ambigüedad de
la justicia y de la injusticia, el autor analiza el poder de las motivaciones subyacentes que mueven a las personas a participar o a incurrir
en situaciones de injusticia. Observa un amplio espectro de investigación llevado a cabo por representantes de las escuelas sociales, evolutivas, y motivadoras de psicología, con énfasis especial en el papel de
mando, autoestima, y necesidades del grupo de pertenencia, así como
en las relativas creencias subyacentes que éstas sostienen. Concluye
resaltando algunos hallazgos empíricos que nos permiten comprender
mejor por qué las personas buenas quieren a veces participar en la
injusticia. El autor hace ver algunas implicaciones de estos estudios
tanto para la materia cuanto para el ministerio de la teología moral.
—————
The author is an invited Professor at the Alphonsian Academy.
El autor es profesor invitado de la Academia Alfonsiana.
—————
517
StMor 39 (2001) 517-552
JUAN CARLOS GARCÍA DE VICENTE
SAN ANTONINO Y GABRIEL BIEL:
SOBRE EL HOMICIDIO Y LA AUTODEFENSA
Ofrecemos los resultados de una investigación sobre el quinto mandamiento del Decálogo en dos grandes pensadores del
medioevo tardío: san Antonino de Florencia y Gabriel Biel. Este
estudio se inscribe dentro de un trabajo más amplio encaminado a conocer la naturaleza moral, la esencia, del pecado de
homicidio.1 El respeto por la vida humana es uno de los principios morales más universalmente reconocidos a lo largo de la
historia y, no obstante, pocas veces como en nuestra época ha
sido puesto en tela de juicio a los más diversos niveles.
Al aplicar el principio de la inviolabilidad de la vida humana, que la Encíclica Evangelium vitae afirma en un tono particularmente severo, los expertos en ética llegan a soluciones contradictorias. Algunos autores sostienen este principio pero
declaran a la vez que el aborto directo podría ser lícito en condiciones límite. Otros, con igual punto de partida, razonan la ilicitud sin excepciones de la pena de muerte. Y unos y otros fatigosamente ofrecen alguna argumentación válida para mostrar la
licitud de la guerra en algún caso, o la licitud de la muerte del
injusto agresor.
Por otra parte, el recurso a los principios morales de la legítima defensa sirve de expediente en nuestros días, según muchos
moralistas, para mostrar la licitud de acciones que, de otro
modo, serían calificadas de inmorales. Hablamos de casos como
el de las mujeres que toman anticonceptivos cuando se encuentran en peligro de estupro, la extirpación de un útero grávido
1
Han aparecido ya dos volúmenes como fruto de esta labor: J.M.
ANTUÑA ANTUÑA, Legítima defensa: doctrina teológica desde Abelardo hasta
Duns Escoto, Pontificium Athenaeum Sanctae Crucis, Roma 1996; J.C.
GARCíA DE VICENTE, Homicidio por necesidad. La legítima defensa en la teología tardomedieval, Peter Lang, Berne 1999.
518
que aloja un tumor maligno, resolver la urgencia clínica de una
hemorragia interna ocasionada por un embarazo ectópico, o eliminar al peligroso delincuente “in actu” mientras se encuentra
en el punto de mira de un experto policía francotirador. La lista
podría continuar. Ahora bien uno se pregunta si en razón de “la
legítima defensa” pueden caer también casos en los que, por
ejemplo, fuese lícito hacer un atentado contra una base militar
que se está preparando para atacar, o llevar a cabo medidas violentas contra clínicas abortistas, o hacer uso de un escudo
humano para evitar una agresión.
Por lo tanto, en este debate actual sobre la inviolabilidad de
la vida humana, la comprensión del quinto mandamiento y de la
lógica para justificar la licitud de la legítima defensa tienen un
puesto importante. Como reconoce la Encíclica que hemos citado: Desde siempre, ante las múltiples y a menudo dramáticas
situaciones que la vida individual y social presenta, la reflexión de
los creyentes ha tratado de conocer de forma más completa y profunda lo que prohíbe y prescribe el mandamiento de Dios.2
De entre los muchos autores sobre los que hemos trabajado,
san Antonino y Gabriel Biel nos parece que tienen un interés
particular. Ante todo por las innovaciones que introducen en
este tema, especialmente san Antonino. Pero también por la
actitud teológica con la que ambos pensadores afrontan esta
difícil cuestión moral. Ambos autores proceden de tradiciones
filosóficas y teológicas muy dispares, pero realizaron su trabajo
teológico con gran libertad de espíritu y amor a la verdad, por
eso llegaron a soluciones que, comparadas, resultan armónicas,
coherentes, no excluyentes. Tal libertad la mostraron también
enfrentándose a problemas nuevos sin aplicar soluciones a priori, ni tomarlas en préstamo de otras situaciones morales no
comparables.
Cuando Antonino y Biel han escrito sobre la autodefensa no
han podido echar mano de la doctrina revelada porque esta es
casi inexistente,3 por lo tanto el razonamiento moral debía
2
JUAN PABLO II, Carta Encíclica Evangelium vitae, 25.III.1995, n. 55.
Sobre el particular ha dedicado un espacio Antuña Antuña en su op.
cit. Como es sabido, el único pasaje donde aparece un caso de legítima
3
SAN ANTONINO Y GABRIEL BIEL: SOBRE EL HOMICIDIO Y LA AUTODEFENSA
519
hacerse sobre la base de una tradición doctrinal y de una reflexión antropológica. Precisamente hoy dia nos encontramos en
un escenario similar a la hora de afrontar multitud de temas. Se
piense por ejemplo en los problemas morales que plantean las
diversas formas de procreación artificial, o algunos tipos de
terapia génica, o el uso terapéutico de células-madre embrionarias, o la licitud del recurso a los parámetros de la muerte cerebral, etc. La metodología y el modo de argumentar que estos
autores usaron nos invitan a reflexionar, y pensamos que pueden
decirnos algo a los que nos ocupamos de teología moral en el
presente.
Una advertencia acerca de las citas. Debido a que las obras
escritas por estos teólogos resultan relativamente difíciles de
encontrar, nos ha parecido adecuado ofrecer los textos originales a pie de página, al modo de una edición de trabajo, intermedia entre la edición anastática y la edición crítica, conforme es
frecuente encontrar en otros trabajos científicos para acercar a
los lectores un texto medieval.
1. La renovación del tomismo: san Antonino de
Florencia
El “tomismo” a trancas y barrancas había podido asomar la
cabeza en el panorama intelectual del siglo XIV. De un lado las
duras críticas y condenas que había sufrido, de otro la difusión
del nominalismo por doquier, parecían no dejar espacio a este
sistema filosófico-teológico dependiente de Tomás de Aquino.
Es a finales de ese siglo cuando se asiste a la paulatina desaparición del nominalismo; entonces, si bien los seguidores de
Escoto continúan teniendo un gran predicamento intelectual, el
tomismo recobra vigor merced a algunos insignes dominicos
estudiosos de santo Tomás. Con ellos comienza el periodo de
alumbramiento de la Segunda Escolástica, que brillará a lo largo
del Renacimiento. Nos referimos particularmente a Antonino
defensa es en el homicidio del fur nocturnus, de Ex 22,2.
520
Pierozzi, Jerónimo Savonarola y Pedro Crockaert. Al hilo del
tema que nos ocupa, trataremos de Antonino Pierozzi,
Arzobispo de Florencia.4
1. Personalidad y ubicación histórica
Antonino Pierozzi nace en el año 1389. Ingresa en la Orden
dominica en 1406, y el año 1446 es nombrado Arzobispo de
Florencia; allí transcurre trece años hasta su muerte en 1459,
ocupando la sede de dicha ciudad. Este hombre de extraordinaria talla intelectual crece en un ambiente propicio para la deseada reforma disciplinar de los dominicos, que verá en el siglo XV
un nuevo alborear. Antonino vivió de cerca acontecimientos
importantes que habrán debido influir sensiblemente en su concepción de las cosas: entre otros el fin del Gran Cisma con la
eleccion de Martín V en el Concilio de Costanza (1417), el concordato de los Husitas (1433), el intento de unión de las iglesias
Latina y Griega en el Concilio de Florencia (1439), la caída de
Constantinopla (1453) y diversos levantamientos e insurrecciones populares.
A causa de las tareas que le encomendaron, de él se recuerda más su perfil de hombre de acción que de concienzudo estudioso. Y sin embargo en sus obras, tanto teológicas como históricas – que también escribió –, demuestra vastos conocimientos
en áreas diversas del saber de la época, y una doctrina filosófica
notable, más acusadamente presente cuando ha de tratar de
materias morales o jurídicas. Su contribución a hacer prevalecer
en la teología los tratados sobre cuestiones morales más que los
especulativos ha sido decisiva, sabiendo escapar a la trampa de
entrar en polémicas contra unas u otras escuelas.
Desde luego le ayudó no poco el ambiente científico del
4
Acerca de datos biográficos, literarios, etc. de nuestro autor, recomendamos las obras siguientes: M. DE WULF, Storia della filosofia medievale, vol.
3, Libreria Editrice Fiorentina, Firenze 1957, pp. 67-71; C. GIACON, La seconda scolastica: i grandi commentatori di san Tommaso, Bocca, Milano 1944,
pp. 25-30; A. WALZ, Antonino, Arcivescovo da Firenze, EC, vol. I, cols. 15291531; J. QUETIF-J. ECHARD, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum, t. I, Paris 1719,
cols. 817-819; P. MANDONNET, Antonin (Saint), DTC, t. I, cols. 1450-1454.
521
momento: había la conciencia de que estaban iniciándose tiempos nuevos en la historia, las condiciones sociales del
Renacimiento planteaban problemas nuevos que requerían soluciones creativas, ya que muchos temas hasta entonces sólo se
habían afrontado tímidamente. ¿Ejemplos?: la usura, el cambio
y los intereses, los seguros, los bancos, los préstamos forzosos,
el derecho de represalia y de guerra, la educación, el salario
justo... Temas todos ellos que Antonino supo tratar con gran profundidad y acierto. No es de extrañar por tanto que nuestro
autor haya ejercido un hondo influjo en los grandes maestros de
la renaciente escolástica. Particularmente sobre Vitoria, el cual
cita al Arzobispo florentino en múltiples ocasiones a lo largo del
Comentario a la Suma de santo Tomás y también en las
Relectiones.
La obra principal del Arzobispo florentino es la Summa
Theologiae. Además escribió una Chronica conocida también
como Summa historialis, que viene a ser una especie de enciclopedia de historia universal. También nos ha dejado, en diferentes versiones, varios manuales para uso de los confesores.5
En la Suma, Antonino trata las cuestiones de moral razonando a partir de principios teológicos firmes. Para dar una
base fuerte metafísica a las materias de moral y de derecho,
nuestro autor empieza la obra escribiendo acerca de la naturaleza del alma humana, preparando el terreno al estudio sobre la
moralidad de los actos que afronta posteriormente. Deja así
establecidas, al inicio del tratado, nociones tales como la espiritualidad e inmortalidad del alma, su aptitud para estar unida a
un cuerpo, etc.
Llama la atención que, para dirimir estas cuestiones,
Antonino reseña muy someramente las opiniones de los filósofos de la antigüedad, y no da un gran espacio a los argumentos
racionales de Tomás de Aquino u otros teólogos. Todo el peso de
la prueba lo hace recaer, en cambio, en afirmaciones de la
Revelación cristiana.6 Este modo de enfocar la teología significa
5
P. Michaud-Quantin las considera el mejor trabajo en su género durante la Edad Media. Antonino propone hacer al penitente una lista de preguntas con una agudeza incomparable.
6
Consiguientemente, por ejemplo, debido a que en la Escritura se habla
522
una cierta novedad respecto al panorama teológico de los años
precedentes. Y no se podrá decir que Antonino lo haga así porque en sus escritos quisiera enseñar teología y no filosofía; todavía en su época, lo mismo que durante todo el medioevo, el teólogo manejaba la filosofía como algo que le pertenecía como
propio.7
En relación con el homicidio san Antonino ha escrito detenidamente en diversos lugares de sus obras. Nosotros pasaremos revista a los textos que aparecen en la Suma Teológica.8
2. “No matarás”: precepto obligatorio siempre y en todo
momento
Acerca del mandamiento de no matar, Antonino da una
explicación del sentido que tiene que Dios promulgue este pre-
mucho más explícitamente sobre la inmortalidad del alma que sobre su espiritualidad, en san Antonino encontramos menos argumentos en favor de la
espiritualidad que de la inmortalidad.
7
Sobre el particular pueden leerse los comentarios que hace Giacon en
la op. cit., pp. 26-27. En esta última página, por ejemplo, escribe en relación
a la dependencia de san Antonino respecto a santo Tomás: “S. Antonino
segue fedelmente S. Tommaso, e commenta Aristotele seguendo l’interpretazione tomistica, si sente però già molto vivamente la distanza che separa le
due speculazioni, quella prevalentemente teoretica di S. Tommaso e quella
prevalentemente pratica di S. Antonino. In questa inoltre si può notare l’uso
frequente, in ordine alla formulazione di norme morali, di paragoni e di
espedienti mnemonici tanto graditi all’ingenuità e alla semplicità del ‘500 e
del ‘600, ma oggi ritenuti puerili e ridicoli. Si è lontani dal rigore scientifico
e dalla concisione e sobrietà proprie di S. Tommaso; abbondano invece le
leziosaggini letterarie, le interpretazioni allegoriche e le digressioni curiose.
Nell’insieme però si può scorgere in S. Antonino, tra i ceppi e le scorie d’un
periodo di decadenza, l’anelito del rinnovamento”.
8
La Suma Teológica de san Antonino es un libro relativamente raro de
encontrar. Hemos accedido a ella en la Biblioteca Vallicelliana de Roma,
donde poseen los cuatro volúmenes de un trabajo titulado genéricamente
“Suma de Teología”. El primer volumen adolece de algunos defectos de
encuadernación. Así, tras el fol. 160, aparece el frontispicio de la obra, el el
que se lee Summae Sacrae Theologiae Eximii Doctoris B. Antonini
Archiepiscopi Florentini Ordinis Praedicatorum, y está impresa en Venecia el
año 1582. En dicho frontispicio se señala que la obra está enriquecida con
las decisiones del Concilio de Trento en relación al Matrimonio. Tras un pró-
523
cepto y de por qué viene colocado en el lugar en el que está dentro del Decálogo.9 Sus explicaciones y textos no son novedosos:
se encuentran en otros teólogos contemporáneos y precedentes.
Por este motivo no nos vamos a detener en ellos.10
Seguía habiendo, en los años que Antonino vivió, errores
comunes en relación con el homicidio, como por ejemplo pensar que es ilícito matar animales, o que el juez no puede condenar a muerte, etc..11 El Arzobispo de Florencia mantiene las mis-
logo de 6 cols., ofrece una Tabula con los temas que tratará en los capítulos
que componen los 20 Títulos de la Prima Pars, así llamada por Antonino. Los
primeros 160 fols. (hay una errata de imprenta en la numeración), en recto
y vuelto a dos columnas, están dedicados a proporcionar varios índices al
lector: de toda la Suma, de las materias predicables sobre la Virgen, de las
autoridades bíblicas citadas, de los evangelios y epístolas durante el año, y
de todos los ejemplos de Santos que se pueden proponer a los fieles. Los
volúmenes segundo, tercero y cuarto están dedicados enteramente a la Pars
Secunda, Tertia y Quarta, respectivamente.
Las ideas sobre el homicidio y la autodefensa que encontramos en las
dos sumas para confesores que escribió san Antonino no aportan nada a lo
que este autor ha escrito en la Suma de Teología. Las referencias bibliográficas son: Confessionale di Santo Antonio, Girolamo Scotto, Vinegia 1566;
Summa Confessionalis D. Antonini Archiepiscopi Florentini, Dominicum de
Farris, Venetiis 1567.
9
Se encuentra en Summa Theologiae, I Pars, Titulus Quartusdecimus
(De lege Mosayca), Capitulum 4 (De decalogo et singulis praeceptis eius in particulari), & 9; en la edición manejada está en Vol. I, fol. 238vb - 239vb.
10
Las ideas pertenecen a la tradición teológica. Escribe, por ejemplo:
“Omne enim nocumentum quod infertur alteri, vel est in personam propriam quod pertinet ad homicidium, vel in coniunctam per modum libidinis
(...). Et quia inter nocumentum maximum est quod fit in persona propria per
homicidium, ideo primum in negativis quae obligant semper, et ad semper
non occides”; Ibid., fol. 239ra.
11
Transcribimos el que atañe al juez o al verdugo: “Secundus error fuit
dicentium quod prohiberetur hic occisio cuiuscumque hominis, etiam malefactoris, unde iudices, et officiales occidentes reos, appellant homicidas.
Contra quos dicit Augustinus quod Deus qui hoc praeceptum dedit, non sibi
per hoc potestatem occidendi abstulit. (...) Iudices autem occidendo reos
iuridice occidunt mandato Dei qui legem statuit ut rei occiderentur”. San
Antonino ve en los jueces el brazo punitivo de Dios para restablecer la justicia en la tierra; ellos no actúan en nombre de su propia autoridad, sino bajo
la autoridad de Dios. Por eso trae concatenados a renglón seguido varios tex-
524
mas posturas que Tomás de Aquino en aquellas secciones análogas de la Suma.
Según nuestro autor, los cuatro modos posibles de perpetrar
un pecado de homicidio son: con el deseo, con la palabra, de
obra y por omisión. Esta división es, si se quiere, obvia, pero
más simplificada que las que nos brindaban otros teólogos. ¿En
qué se les diferencia? Los esquemas de Buenaventura,
Raimundo o Alejandro de Hales afrontaban el tema del pecado
de homicidio a partir del resultado material: el hecho de que “un
hombre ha sido muerto a manos de otro”. Ellos trataban de ver
cuándo esa muerte caía bajo la prohibición del quinto mandamiento y cuándo no. San Antonino, en cambio, plantea las cosas
a partir del resultado formal, valga la expresión: es decir el
hecho de que “se ha cometido un pecado contra el quinto mandamiento”, independientemente de que haya resultado realmente muerta una persona o no. Es un pequeño cambio de enfoque
que introduce nuestro autor, aunque no va a tener mayores consecuencias para la doctrina que se sigue. Pensamos que se debe
a que Antonino se propone tratar de estos temas en cuanto
transgresiones del Decálogo y, por lo tanto, son siempre pecado.
Es revelador, no obstante, de su deseo de realzar el papel de la
interioridad, de la elección voluntaria, en el estudio moral de un
acto humano.
Tratar sobre el homicidio cometido con el deseo da pie a
Antonino para hacer una exégesis de dos lugares de la Escritura
que hablan del odio contra un semejante: 1 Jn 3 y Mt 5. El que
odia a alguien muchas veces desea su muerte, por ello quien
arrastrado por la ira desea la muerte o un daño grande a alguien,
comete un grave pecado.12 Tratar después sobre el homicidio de
tos escriturísticos: Deut 32 -“Ego occidam et vivere faciam”-, Rom 13 -“non
sine causa gladium portant”-. Poco después escribe: “(...) Minister enim Dei
est iudex in iram ei qui malefacit. Intelligitur ergo, non occides hominem
scilicet propria auctoritate”. O sea, la ira divina contra el malhechor se ejecuta por medio del poder judicial. Todos los textos proceden de Ibid., fol.
239ra.
12
“(Homicidium) perpetratur autem quatuor modis, scilicet interiori
deliberatione, exteriori locutione, manuali actione, notabili omissione.
Quantum ad primum dicitur 1 Jn 3: omnis qui odit fratrem suum homicida
est. Odiens aliquem communiter appetit mortem eius. (...) Cum scilicet
525
obra le brinda la ocasión de poner en evidencia que el juez, tan
sólo por serlo, no está libre de cometer un homicidio al aplicar la
ley capital: en efecto, quien ajusticiase al reo con livore vindictae,
por deseo de vengarse y no por amor a la justicia, debe ser tenido por homicida. También el uxoricidio es siempre criminal, sin
que venga exculpado por el hecho del adulterio del cónyuge.13
En otra sección de la Suma vuelve san Antonino al tema del
homicidio. Esta vez ya no es bajo el punto de vista del estudio
del Decálogo, sino dentro del estudio particularizado de los
pecados capitales, en concreto de los pecados de ira. Ahí encontramos su concepción acerca del objeto moral prohibido cuando
se quita la vida a un hombre. Precisa así nuestro autor su definición de homicidio: Homicidium autem sic diffinire potest, quod
homicidium est hominis occisio illegitime facta. Tal definición
excluye, por tanto, la consideración de la muerte de otros seres
distintos al hombre. Pero sobre todo quiere excluir del homicidio, con el término illegitime facta, la muerte del malhechor llevada a cabo por el juez en aplicación de la justicia.14 No toda
muerte humana es ilícita. El mandamiento requiere ser correctamente interpretado para atender a los casos de homicidio no
culpable por parte de quien lo realiza.
Dicho lo cual san Antonino saca a la luz el tema de la legíti-
Dominus ait Mt 5: Dictum est antiquis non occides et qui autem occiderit
reus erit iudicio, ego autem dico vobis, quia omnis qui irascitur fratri suo,
reus erit iudicio et damnatione. Et loquitur de ira mortali, qua quis desiderat mortem vel notabile nocumentum proximi. Unde et secundum Thomae
(sic), hic prohibetur vitium irae prout est mortale”; Ibid., fol. 239rb.
13
“Tertio perpetratur opere. Ex 21: qui percusserit hominem volens eum
occidere morte morietur. (...) Etiam iudex vel minister eius occidens reum
non amore iustitiae, sed livore vindictae ex delectatione effundendi humanum sanguinem homicida reputatur. (...) Unde occisio uxoris (...) nec etiam
propter adulterium perpetratum permittitur”; Ibid., fol. 239va.
14
Tanto el texto reportado como este que sigue proceden de la II Pars,
Titulus Septimus (De ira), Capitulum 4 (De septima filia irae, scilicet homicidio), que corresponde al Vol. II, fols. 272va-276va. “Signanter autem dicitur
hominis, quia occisio animalis irrationalis, sicut nec destructio plantarum
(...) est homicidium. (...) Additur etiam in diffinitione illegitime facta, quia si
homo occidatur propter maleficium a iudice suo, non est homicidium, quod
sic peccatum vel contra praeceptum de quo loquitur”; fol. 272va.
526
ma defensa para escribir sobre los homicidios cometidos sin que
tenga lugar un pecado.
3.“Aliquando” puede cometerse un homicidio sin pecar
La palabra homicidio admite un doble sentido en su manera de significar. Cuando un hombre es injustamente matado, nos
encontramos ante un caso de homicidio en sentido estricto, y
por lo tanto ante una transgresión grave del quinto mandamiento. Pero la palabra homicidio es usada también en un sentido
amplio, para referirse simplemente al hecho de que un hombre
ha sido muerto a manos de otro.
En este último caso ocurre a veces que la muerte tiene lugar
sin que el que la provoca cometa un pecado, lo cual puede acontecer de cuatro modos posibles: por necesidad o en defensa de
sí; en ejecución de la justicia; por casualidad; y en pugna contra
el ejército enemigo.15
No es propiamente homicida, por tanto, dice Antonino,
aquel que llevado de una necesidad inevitable de defenderse
contra quien quiere matarle o herirle gravemente, y no pudiendo huir, lo mata, siempre que actúe con moderación.16 Nuestro
autor encuentra el motivo esencial para hablar así en el texto de
Tomás de Aquino sobre el homicidio para defenderse que es de
sobra conocido: la intención – el propósito – con que actúa el
agredido define el acto moral que se realiza. Antonino sigue a
pie juntillas toda la explicación que Tomás de Aquino escribe en
el cuerpo del artículo 7 dentro de la cuestión dedicada al homi-
15
“Homicidium potest dici dupliciter. Uno modo stricte pro iniusta occisioni[-one] hominis, et sic est semper mortale peccatum et contra praeceptum non occides. Alio modo large, pro quacumque occisione hominis, et sic
potest esse aliquando sine peccato. Vir sanguinum, id est occisor, et effundens sanguinem humanum potest esse quis quadrupliciter. Primo necessitate, vel sui defensione. Secundo iustitiae executione. Tertio casus occursione.
Quarto hostili impugnatione”; Ibid., fol. 273ra.
16
“Et primo cum quis occidit alium necessitate ductus inevitabili, quia
scilicet invasus ab alio volente occidere, vel graviter vulnerare, se defendendo occidit, servato debito moderamine cum aliter non possit evadere manus
eius non est proprie homicida pro ut scilicet homicidium dicimus peccatum”; Ibid.
527
cidio.17 No sólo adopta sus mismas ideas, sino que usa textualmente el mismo lenguaje conciso y terso que empleó santo
Tomás.18
El Arzobispo de Florencia, con su estilo práctico, propone
interesantes ejemplos bien concretos de situaciones en las que
aparentemente puede darse una acción defensiva, y en las cuales
sin embargo el daño causado al agresor es culpable y homicida:
aquel que por vergüenza de que piensen que es un cobarde hace
frente al agresor en lugar de huir; o aquel que haciendo frente a
la agresión intendit vengarse y no defenderse; o el que excede la
moderación razonable en la defensa; o el que después de la
inmediata agresión, habiendo quedado el agresor débil y sin
fuerzas, lo hiere causándole la muerte; o el que combate haciendo frente al agresor con la espada cuando el agresor viene contra él usando del puño, y lo mata; o, finalmente, cuando uno sin
necesidad – sponte – se pone en tales condiciones, por el lugar o
por las circunstancias, que requieren una legítima defensa, las
cuales se podrían haber evitado puesto que era previsible que
sobrevendría tal necesidad...19
17
Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 64, a. 7. El lector interesado encontrará
valiosos comentarios sobre este lugar de santo Tomás en la obra de Antuña
citada, pp. 258-292. Habida cuenta de que, sobre el particular, Antonino no
añade nada, omitimos comentar el texto.
18
El texto de Antonino dice así: “Pro huiusmodi declaratione Thomae
II.II, q. 64, art. 7 dicit quod cum moralis actus accipiat speciem ab eo quod
est secundum intentionem, quia ex fine, non ab eo quod est praeter intentionem. Ideo ex actu alicuius se defendentis duplex effectus sequi potest.
Unus quidem conservatio vitae propriae alius est occisio invadentis. Actus
igitur qui ex hoc intenditur, qui est conservatio vitae propriae non habet
rationem illiciti cum hoc sit naturale cuilibet, quod conservet se quantum
potest in esse. Unde de iure naturae est vim vi repellere, sed tamen cum
moderamine inculpatae tutelae. Nam potest actus aliquis ex bona intentione
proveniens illicitus reddi, si non sit proportionatus fini. Unde si aliquis ad
seipsum defendendum utatur maiori violentia quam oporteat erit illicitum,
quia excedit moderamen inculpatae tutelae. Illicitum autem est quod homo
intendat occidere alium, ut se defendat, non autem ei qui habet publicam
auctoritate referens hoc ad publicum bonum, sed servato debito moderamine si contingat alium occidi non imputatur occidenti, quia plus tenetur quilibet providere vitae suae quam alienae. Haec Thomae”; Ibid., fol. 273ra-rb.
19
“Unde si potest aliter evadere, sed ob verecundiam ne reputetur pusi-
528
Como se ve, en todos estos casos prácticos está ausente de
un modo u otro alguna de las condiciones esenciales que hacen
legítimo el homicidium necessitatis: la inevitabilidad de la agresión (necesidad), el enfrentamiento hasta que el agresor deja de
serlo (defensa), el uso de una fuerza razonable contra el agresor
(moderación).20
4. Pena de muerte, guerra, suicidio para evitar una violación,
homicidio por negligencia21
La razón por la cual es lícito que el delincuente peligroso para
la comunidad sea ajusticiado al precio de su vida no es otra, para
san Antonino, que la escrita tiempo atrás por Tomás de Aquino y
otros: el miembro corruptor puede eliminarse para no poner en
peligro el entero organismo. Tal miembro, por ende, llega incluso
llanimis vult resistere, vel etiam si in ipso actu intendit vindicationem non
defensionem, aut post factum aggredientem eum debilem et non valentem
eum laedere occidit, vel etiam notabiliter excedit modum in defensione, ut si
aggressus pugnis ense repugnans occidat, non excusaretur ab homicidii crimine. Et idem est quando sponte se ponit ad talem locum vel casum, unde
existimat vel existimare potuit talem necessitatem sibi venturam”; Ibid., fol.
273rb.
20
Si hacemos dialogar a san Antonino con santo Tomás en los ejemplos
referidos, parece que el Arzobispo de Florencia va más allá que el Angélico.
La doctrina de II-II, q. 64, a. 7 no da pie automáticamente a declarar ilícita
la autodefensa de quien siendo agredido quiere evitar ser tenido por cobarde (debido a la lesión de su fama que le sobrevendría), o de quien hubiera
podido prever que en tal situación sería necesario el recurso a la autodefensa. Sin duda que santo Tomás no fue tan explícito, pero en los principios que
escribió están contenidas éstas y otras aplicaciones, en mi opinión. Así,
quien puede huir no necesita de la violencia para defenderse, puesto que le
basta la fuga. Y lo mismo quien pudo preverlo: el artículo 8 de esa misma
cuestión escrita por el Angélico trata acerca de los homicidios casuales, que
cuando se producen por falta de precaución han de ser considerados quodammodo homicidium voluntarium. Además san Antonino se está refiriendo
a casos en los que la aparente defensa no simplemente causa lesiones al agresor, sino que produce efectivamente su muerte. Es razonable que deba existir proporción entre los bienes que se ponen en peligro y el bien que está en
juego.
21
A lo largo de las páginas que san Antonino dedica al homicidio
529
a rebajarse en su dignidad humana, convirtiéndose en un ser peor
que una bestia. En casos así, ni el juez, ni el verdugo, ni los testigos, ni ninguno de los que cooperan a que se produzca esta muerte son culpables de pecado de homicidio.22 Con todo, si el juez
condenase a muerte a un reo digno de tal pena, pero lo hiciese sin
ajustarse al ordenamiento jurídico, o motivado principalmente
por un beneficio material que recibirá, o para vengarse, o para ser
alabado, entonces peca mortalmente.23
Acerca del que incurre en homicidio fortuito recuerda san
Antonino que no siempre está libre de culpa, pues a veces el homicidio resultante en cierto modo es un homicidio voluntario. Son
encuentra el lector unos pocos párrafos dedicados a estos temas. Sin perder
de vista el interés de fondo que mueve nuestro trabajo, permítasenos traer a
la luz brevemente algunos de los textos más pertinentes.
22
“Quantum ad secundum cum iudex habet legitimam auctoritatem,
seu potestatem servato ordine iudiciario reum condemnat ad mortem, quam
meruit, ex zelo iustitiae non peccat, immo meretur servando quod Dominus
mandat Ex 22: Maleficos non patieris vivere. Unde non est homicida, et si
sanguinem fundat, nec ipse nec lictor, nec aliquis eorum qui cooperantur ad
mortem eius ut assesor, testis, accusator, associantes, et capientes, et huiusmodi. Hoc tamen clericis non liceret, quia eis prohibita est omnis effusio
sanguinis (...). Et huius ratio est secundum Thomae II.II, q. 64, ar. 2 quod
omnis pars est naturaliter propter totum (... etc.). Quaelibet autem persona
particularis comparatur ad totam communitatem, sicut pars ad totum. Et
ideo si aliquis homo reperitur periculosus communitati, et corruptivus
ipsius propter aliquod peccatum, laudabiliter et salubriter occiditur, ut
bonum commune conservetur modicum enim fermentum totam massam
corrumpit”; Ibid., fol. 273rb.
23
“Quamvis enim occidere hominem in sua dignitatem (sic) manentem
(...) sit secundum se malum, et contra charitatem, tamen hominem peccatorem occidere ei qui habet auctoritatem est bonum, sicut occidere bestiam,
peior est enim malus homo bestia, et plus nocet ut dicit Philosophus in Polit.
(...) Si autem iudex reum dignum morte ad mortem condemnat non servato
ordine iudiciario, vel ex amore pecuniae, quia de hoc emolumentum percipit principaliter motus, vel ex livore vindictae, vel odii, vel delectatione
effundendi sanguinem, vel habendi laudem, peccaret mortaliter, et quilibet
cooperans ad hoc simile intentione”; Ibid., fol. 273va. Hace pensar, a la luz
de las condenas a muerte ejecutadas recientemente, esta afirmación de san
Antonino: aun cuando el reo sea culpable de un delito penado con sentencia
capital, quien ordena la ejecución ha de estar movido por zelus iustitiae; de
otro modo, es decir si actuase principalmente por ciertos beneficios que se
530
aquellos casos en que no se puso la diligencia debida para evitar
el homicidio que podría seguirse, por ejemplo: la madre gestante
que hace un ejercicio brusco, los padres o la nodriza que duermen
junto al neonato, el médico que cura mal al enfermo...24
En estas situaciones, ¿dónde reside el mal – la culpa – del
pecado contra el quinto mandamiento? Sin duda no en el mero
efecto, pues ya vimos que aliquando puede cometerse un homicidio sin culpa.
En todos los casos Antonino parece dejar siempre claro que
la muerte de un hombre es una intención que nunca puede ser
querida en sí misma.25 En tal intención no hay nada bueno, no
puede ser lícita, no puede ser buscada. La muerte puede ser querida, en todo caso, en razón de un valor superior: es lo que hace
el juez (por el zelus iustitiae) o lo que hacen el policía y el solda-
deriven para él, comete un grave pecado.
24
“Casus est causa agens praeter intentionem, et ideo ea quae casualia
sunt simpliciter loquendo non sunt intenta, nec voluntaria, et quia omne peccatum est voluntarium secundum Augustinum consequens est ut casualia
inquantum huiusmodi non sunt peccata. Contingit tamen quod id quod non
est per se volitum, et intentum actu, per accidens sit volitum, et intentum
secundum quod causa per accidens dicitur removens prohibens. Unde ille qui
non removet, quae debet removere ex quo sequitur homicidium erit ei quodammodo homicidium voluntarium. Quod potest contingere dupliciter. Uno
modo quia dat operam rei illicitae. Alio modo, quia et si dat operam rei licitae non adhibet debitam sollicitudinem vel diligentiam ad tollendum homicidium quod potest sequi. Et in quolibet horum reputatur homicidium quo ad
peccatum et ad irregularitatem (...). (Verbigratia si...) pater et mater, vel
nutrix ponit filium parvulum iuxta se in lecto, et dormiendo calcat, vel mulier
pregnans saltat, aut magnus pondus portat, vel medicus ex notabili ignorantia, vel negligentia infirmum male curat, quando in aliquo praedictorum
casuum sequitur homicidium imputatur ei ad mortale, et erit reservatus
casus episcopo, alias ut dictum est dando operam rei licite[-tae] et adhibendo diligentiam non imputabitur ei”; Ibid., fol. 273va-vb. Como se habrá reconocido los textos son copiados casi literalmente da Tomás de Aquino.
25
Tampoco dicha muerte puede ser realizada lícitamente por la propria
auctoritas. No vamos a traer textos sobre la propria auctoritas porque
Antonino no ofrece ningún desarrollo particular de doctrina que aventaje a
lo logrado por la teología hasta ese momento. El tema lo expone en Ibid.,
fols. 274va-275ra. El interés de esas páginas reside sobre todo en la tipología
de casos que examina y muestran el esfuerzo de san Antonino por mitigar la
violencia social.
531
do, obligados en ocasiones a matar hombres referendo hoc ad
publicum bonum. A más razón es lo que hizo Abraham cuando
fue a inmolar a su hijo Isaac.26 Todos ellos actúan, además, no
por poseer un especial poder privado, sino bajo mandato de una
autoridad superior.
Es decir, el punto de partida en su razonamiento lo constituyen tres premisas. Primera: una autoridad superior (Dios, la
ley justa – cuya fuerza proviene de Dios –, el que está puesto al
frente de la sociedad – cuyo poder recibe de Dios –), que sí tiene
potestad para quitar la vida, pide que sean eliminados ciertos
indeseables (malhechor, combatientes enemigos) debido al daño
que realizan en ciertos casos. Segunda: determinados hombres
reciben el encargo de hacer valer el orden social (policía, juez,
soldado). Tercera: el amor a determinado bien (bien común, justicia social) encuentra una adecuada expresión en la muerte de
esos indeseables, a pesar – valga la expresión – de tener que
matarlos: no se pretende su muerte, aunque sea procurada. El
pesar de matarlos haría renunciar gustosamente del deber de
ejecutarlos, pero el amor a ciertos valores superiores (ya dichos)
es irrenunciable: obliga a que, de seguir las cosas igual, de no
darse otra alternativa, tales hombres deban ser muertos.27
26
“Quantum ad quartum, scilicet hostili pugnatione cum quis in iusto
bello occidit, non ex odio vel delectatione effundendi sanguinem humanum,
sed quia non potest aliter hostes suos subiicere, seu inducere ad debitum iustitiae. Dicit enim Thomas ubi supra, ar. 7, quod licet ei qui habet publicam
auctoritatem intendere occidere hominem ad sui defensionem, referendo
hoc ad publicum bonum, ut patet in milite pugnante contra hostes, et in
ministerio iudicis pugnante contra latrones, quamvis peccarent hi si privata
libidine moverentur. Unde Augustinus si homicidium est hominem occidere
potest hoc aliquando sine peccato occidere, nam et miles hostem, et iudex
vel minister eius nocentem, cui telum a manu fugit invito, non mihi videtur
peccare cum occidunt. (...) Similiter si aliquem in particulari quis occidit ex
mandato Dei manifeste, vel per occultum instinctum ei facto non peccabit,
nec erit proprie homicida. (...). Unde Augustinus dicit (...) quia Deo auctore
bella gesserunt aut personam gerentis publicae potestatis secundum ius legis
sceleratos morte punierunt. Et Abraham non solum est non inculpatus crudelitatis crimine, sed laudatus, quia voluit filius[-um] obedienter occidere”;
Ibid., fol. 273vb-274ra.
27
Así me parece que se debe entender la postura de san Antonino.
532
Cae por su peso la pregunta siguiente: ¿se cuenta la castidad
entre esos valores que pueden obligar a elegir indirectamente la
muerte?, la muerte propia, en este caso. Sin dudarlo Antonino
reprueba el suicidio o incluso una mutilación propia como
medida para evitar cometer o consentir un pecado carnal en una
violación, valga el caso. ¿Cómo juzgar entonces ciertos suicidios
que conocemos en la historia de Israel (el de Sansón o el de ciertas santas mujeres que se suicidaron en época de persecución)?
No hay más salida que afirmar que esas personas recibieron una
particular luz del Espíritu Santo para actuar así.28
Naturalmente habría mucho que decir sobre la hipótesis de valores superiores por encima del de la vida humana y otras cuestiones aquí involucradas.
Basta con esto, habida cuenta del objeto de nuestro artículo. Por lo demás,
en época de san Antonino la noción de que hay una retribución aneja al delito no dejaba lugar a dudas: todos distinguían entre el homicidio que comete un asesino y el homicidio resultante de ajusticiar a dicho asesino.
Permítasenos sólo añadir que, como resulta claramente de cuanto se ha
dicho, la legítima defensa corre por derroteros extraños a las argumentaciones referidas, aunque tenga puntos en contacto. Sólo por decir un ejemplo,
la persona que se defiende no puede reclamar para sí una publica auctoritas.
El homicidio del agresor social compete al poder social (publica auctoritas)
y puede ser querido (sufrido) por la autoridad en razón del bien social. El
homicidio del agresor privado ni compete a nadie ni puede ser querido; si de
hecho se produce tal homicidio no puede ser más que como un efecto involuntario, ante la grave necesidad de salvar mi vida que está siendo puesta en
peligro actual por un agresor.
28
“Quinto movere potest timore, ne consentiat in aliquod peccatum,
puta ne violentata mulier in actu consentiat delectationi. Vel etiam eum abscindit sibi virilia ne labantur in vitia carnalis. Sicut fecit Origenes ut posset
per domos mulierum securius praedicare, ut dicitur in historia ecclesiastica,
quod prohibetur tamquam homicidium (...). Sed nec hoc licet, quia non sunt
facienda mala ut eveniant bona, secundum Apostolum, vel ut evitentur mala
praesertim minora, et minus cetera. Incertum est enim an aliquis in futurum
consentiat in peccatum. Potens est enim Deus eripere a quacumque tribulatione, seu tentatione superveniente a peccato liberare. Quod autem Sanson
se ipsum cum hostibus ruina domus oppraesserit (sic), excusatur a peccato,
quia ex instinctus[-to] Spiritus Sancti fecit. (...). Et eandem rationem assignat (Augustinus) in I. de Civi. Dei de quibusdam sanctis faeminis, quae se
occiderunt tempore persecutionis, quarum memoria in ecclesia celebratur,
Nicolaus de Lyra videtur simili ratione excusare allegans opinionem
Haebreorum (sic) Saulem ut scilicet hoc faceret, ne ipso illuderetur Deus
533
5. La defensa de la castidad y la legítima defensa de terceros
El Arzobispo de Florencia trata también del caso de la mujer
a la que se intenta forzar. ¿Le sería lícito matar al agresor si no
tuviese modo de escapar?29
No es fácil dar una respuesta inmediata, dice Antonino, pues
el mismo Raimundo de Peñafort dudó sobre qué parecer dar.
Desde luego es seguro que, lo mismo que en la defensa de la propia vida, la intención de la mujer no puede ser matar a quien
intenta forzarla. Pero como ciertamente a ella le asiste el derecho natural de vim vi repellere, habrá que afirmar que si defendiéndose de no ser violada, se produjese la muerte del malhechor, tal muerte sólo le debe se imputada al propio malhechor.30
Se podría objetar que cuando la mujer mata al agresor le
causa no solamente la muerte del cuerpo, sino también la del
alma, ya que el asaltante muere queriendo realizar un estupro.
verus Haebreorum (sic)a Philisteis. Sed contrarium sentit Augustinum (...).
Nec mirum. Et communiter a doctoribus reprobatus (...)”; Ibid., fol. 274va.
29
Este caso práctico no está exento de un particular interés. Defender
la propia vida puede significar rechazar al agresor con tal violencia que se
produzca su muerte, aunque no sea querida: la doctrina moral considera que
se puede prever la muerte del agresor y llegar hasta ese extremo mientras me
defiendo para poner a salvo mi vida. ¿Y si se trata de defender otros bienes
distintos a la propia vida física? No parece fácil a primera vista justificar una
respuesta recurriendo al homicidio en legítima defensa, pues la agresión no
es contra la vida de la mujer.
30
Ofrecemos el texto completo de san Antonino al final del párrafo. Nos
parece entender, por cuanto lleva dicho, que también la necesidad de evitar
un pecado mortal muy probable (consentir en un pecado contra la castidad)
es un motivo proporcionado para que la defensa requerida pueda llegar a la
muerte del agresor: las expectativas de defensa pueden prever la muerte del
agresor, no existe un límite que obligue a detenerse antes de dejarle sin vida.
No deja de ser un poco sorprendente para nuestra sensibilidad actual que
san Antonino tome estos derroteros. La muerte del agresor de estupro es lícita, parece querer decir, por estar referida a la defensa de un bien comparable – mayor, incluso – a la vida misma física: la vida de gracia del alma. El
acento está puesto en que la mujer ha de hacer lo posible por evitar el consentimiento en algo gravemente pecaminoso. Gustaría, quizá, leer que en la
defensa contra una violación se puede llegar a la muerte del agresor por el
bien temporal que está en juego – la integridad personal física y psicológica
de una mujer –, pero esto Antonino no lo ha escrito, ni tampoco otros teólogos hasta varios siglos más tarde.
534
A lo cual responde Antonino que aquel que hace injusticia a otro
es causa del mal que a él le ocurre. La mujer se vale de su derecho natural de repeler la agresión, y está más obligada a proveer por su salvación que por la del otro. Ha de tenerse en cuenta que la mujer se expone a consentir el pecado si no hace resistencia a ser violada (“permitiendo” ser violada, dice el texto, lo
cual sugiere oposición escasa), a causa de lo difícil que es a la
voluntad rechazar tal apetito sin procurar hacer al mismo tiempo lo posible para huir.31
Ahora bien si ella, resistiendo en su mente al pecado, se
defendiese en lo posible pero evitando las acciones de las que
puede seguirse la muerte del malhechor, no pecaría. Lo mismo
que no pecaría – sería incluso virtuoso – alguien que está siendo
atacado y permitiera que le mataran para que no sea él quien
mata al defenderse. En todo caso si la mujer en cuestión pudiera huir de otro modo (p. ej. gritando, escapando, u otras cosas
por el estilo), no estaría excusada de pecado mortal si matara.32
31
Entendemos el texto en el sentido siguiente. Antonino encuentra difícil conciliar el que alguien se oponga verdaderamente al pecado con la
voluntad, sin que a la vez ofrezca algún tipo de oposición luchando físicamente o huyendo. El mismo movimiento interno de la voluntad que rechaza
el pecado pide coherentemente un movimiento externo que rechace la agresión.
32
El texto que hemos ofrecido en una traducción libre – la defectuosa
sintaxis latina empleada lo exige – dice así: “Sed queritur si mulieri licet occidere volentem se opprimere non valentem aliter evadere manus eius?
Respondit Raynerius in summa ponit circa hoc duplicem opinionem contrariam alteram alteri, et neutram praefert. Sed videtur dicendum quod non
licet intendere aliquo modo occisionem volentis opprimere, sicut nec est
invadentem ad mortem pro sui defensione. Sed si defendendo ne violetur
contingat illum occidi sibi imputetur. Et si dicatur quod occidendo est causa
mortis illius non solum corporis: sed animae cum in actu voluntatis peccandi moriatur. Respondeo, quod ipsae est sibi causa qui alteri iniuratur. Illa
autem utitur iure suo naturali, quo licet vim vi repellere. Et magis tenetur
saluti suae providere, quam alterius. Nam exponit se periculo consentiendi
actui peccati permittende se opprimi propter dificultatem renitentiae voluntatis, dum non facit quod potest ad evadendum. Sed et si tueatur quantum
potest salvo eo, unde potest sequi mors illi renitendo mente peccato non ipsa
peccaret. Sicut et si quis invasus ne se defendendo contingat occidere per-
535
Renunciar a una defensa que costará la vida al enemigo
puede ser un acto de virtud. Junto a ello, nunca será lícito proponerse la muerte del violador. Para conseguir lo más importante, evitar el pecado mortal, la mujer se puede defender del agresor violentamente, aunque no use medios que lo maten.
Antonino postula, nos parece, una defensa externa cum
moderamine unida a la oposición de la voluntad: ella no está
obligada a defenderse hasta llegar a la muerte del agresor, pero
sí a rechazar la agresión coherentemente con el rechazo interno
de la acción pecaminosa. San Antonino reconoce que, si en esta
defensa, la mujer mata al agresor, ella no es culpable de tal
muerte. Pero al mismo tiempo es de la opinión que la imperativa defensa de la castidad no obliga a acciones de tal violencia
que prevean la muerte del agresor.33
Respecto al otro tema, es decir la licitud de salir en defensa
de terceros, como es sabido fue tratado años más tarde en la
Suma Angélica.34 En ninguna otra obra teológica contemporánea
o precedente aparece planteado este problema. Otra importante
Suma de Confesores, la Suma Astesana,35 había mencionado
mitteret se occidi non peccaret, sed maioris virtutis esset. Si autem talis possit aliter evadere, ut clamando, fugiendo, et huiusmodi non excusaretur a
mortali occidendo”; Ibid., fol. 275va.
33
La literatura quodlibética anterior al 1320, estudiada ampliamente
por Glorieux, arroja sólo un título relativo a la legítima defensa, y se refiere
precisamente a la defensa de la virginidad. Hacia 1255 y no más tarde de
1275 un Maestro que no nos es conocido y que ha pasado a los catálogos
como Anónimo XIV, sostuvo una disputa en cuya Cuestión 13 estudia el caso
siguiente: “ecce aliqua vovit virginitatem; aliquis impetit eam ita improbe
quod non potest evadere nisi occidat eum; quaeritur an debeat eum occidere et votum servet et suam virginitatem”. Cfr. P. GLORIEUX, La littérature quodlibetique de 1260 a 1320, vol. 2, Kain, Le Saulchoir 1925, p. 292.
34
La Suma Angélica significa la síntesis entre la doctrina pastoral y la
doctrina jurídica elaboradas hasta el siglo XV. Era, junto con la Suma
Astesana una de las más importantes Sumas de Confesores por calidad, difusión e influjo. Fue escrita por Ángel de Clavasio (el beato Ángel Carletti) en
el año 1486.
35
La Summa casuum conscientiae Astesana, también conocida como
Summa Astensis, está escrita presuntamente por un franciscano llamado
Astesanus de Ast, y data del 1317. Fue una obra ampliamente usada por los
franciscanos y que alcanzó una gran difusión en su época.
536
meramente la excomunión en que incurre quien no defiende a un
clérigo que está siendo atacado, pero no resolvía la cuestión a la
que nos estamos refiriendo. Puede afirmarse con bastante exactitud que san Antonino se encuentra entre los primeros que han
tratado teológicamente este asunto de manera explícita.
¿Está obligado alguien a librar a otro de una muerte injusta,
si puede hacerlo? La caridad obliga a librar al prójimo de las
ofensas cuando se puede. Ahora bien tal obligación admite grados, en función de la autoridad que uno detente. El que tiene
publica potestas está obligado a defender otras personas usando
incluso de las armas y aunque al hacerlo corra peligro su propia
vida. Las personas privadas, por el contrario, han de hacerlo solo
verbo, o bien con la fuerza física – guardando el moderamine
inculpatae tutelae – siempre que no se expongan a peligro para
ellos mismos; de otro modo Antonino no cree que estén obligados.36
Si el remedio para que alguien no sea matado injustamente
fuese proporcionar una suma de dinero, según Antonino si consta que la muerte es injusta, cualquiera está obligado a hacer
económicamente lo que pueda para evitarlo, dejando a salvo las
propias necesidades para vivir.37 Si, contrariamente, no supiese
nada acerca de la justicia de tal condena a muerte, o no lo consintiesen las propias necesidades económicas, no existiría tal
obligación.38
36
“Quaeritur autem utrum teneatur quilibet liberare alium ab iniusta
morte si potest? Respondeo quod ex debito charitatis quilibet tenetur repellere iniuriam a proximo si potest. (Citas de autoridades: Ambrosio,
Raymundo, Thomás de Aquino...). In hoc autem est diversitas notanda, quia
ille qui habet publicam potestatem tenetur defendere etiam cum armis si
oportet, dum tamen praesumatur, quod possit. Personae vero privatae si possunt solo verbo, vel facto sine periculo suarum personarum tenentur cum
moderamine tamen inculpatae tutelae (...). Sed non credo, quod tales teneantur se periculo exponere”; Ibid., fol. 275rb.
37
Antonino tenía presente seguramente las Ordenes dedicadas a librar
cautivos. ¿Pensaba también en casos de secuestro de persona para cobrar un
rescate bajo amenaza de muerte?
38
“Utrum autem quis teneatur dare pecuniam ne aliquis iniuste occidatur. Glossae dist. 83 in principio ponit duas opiniones, una est quod tenetur
quilibet. Alia est quod tenentur solum praelati. Mihi videtur distinguendum:
quia si constat illum iniuste occidi, quilibet tenetur quantum sua possibili-
537
6. No es lícito provocar la muerte del feto para que se salve la
vida de la madre39
Entre las muchas novedades con las que san Antonino enriquece a la teología, una sin duda se refiere a este tema.
Al estudiar el quinto mandamiento, en la parte de la Suma
dedicada al Decálogo, el Arzobispo de Florencia se preguntó si
en algún caso el médico podía provocar lícitamente el aborto.
Allí respondió exponiendo fielmente y sin condenarlo el parecer
de Juan de Nápoles, teólogo dominico que vivió a inicios del
siglo XIV. Juan de Nápoles, en la número 10 de sus Quaestiones
quodlibetales, sostenía que en caso de estar frente a un embarazo que pusiera en peligro la vida de la madre, el médico no sólo
podía sino que debía incluso intervenir con el aborto, siempre y
cuando el feto no estuviese ya animado; de esta manera el médico, aunque habría impedido una animación, habría evitado la
muerte de la madre sin hacerse reo de homicidio.40 Antonino no
tas potest pecunialiter subvenire salva sua necessitate. Quod si nescitur an
iuste vel iniuste, aut si necessitas istius non potest, non tenetur”; Ibid.
39
Acerca del problema del aborto y la doctrina moral que existía en la
época de san Antonino ha escrito P. Sardi (L’aborto ieri ed oggi, Paideia,
Brescia 1975, pp. 163-164): “Il secolo XV arreca delle novità. Esse non provengono dal settore canonistico, che si presenta generalmente fermo sulle
posizioni già acquisite. (...). Le novità si annunciano sul fronte dei teologi
moralisti, il cui apporto alla discussione sul nostro problema si fa in questo
secolo più consistente. È la forza stessa delle cose che li spinge a studiare
l’argomento: il loro interesse principale si concentra, infatti, sull’amministrazione del sacramento della penitenza; ed è al confessore che affluisce la
maggior parte delle vicende abortive, che la ben comprensibile discrezione
delle persone interessate ha provveduto a mantenere segrete. Sarà il confessore a dover giudicare se nel caso vi sia vero e proprio ‘delitto’ o ‘peccato’ soltanto, e in quest’ultima ipotesi se vi siano o meno eventuali attenuanti. Il
moralista, a cui il confessore si rivolge per ricevere lumi, deve dare una risposta il più possibile chiara e completa; soprattutto deve dare una risposta
che non sia soltanto rispettosa delle esigenze della norma, ma tenga conto
anche delle moltiplici difficoltà soggetive, che possono condizionarne l’adempimento da parte dell’individuo concreto. (...) Da questa sensibilità ai
condizionamenti soggettivi, che scaturiscono le parole più nuove dei moralisti in questo periodo”.
40
Juan de Nápoles es la figura más sobresaliente entre los dominicos
538
hace propia esta afirmación, se limita sin más a recogerla.
Cuando Antonino vuelve a estudiar el homicidio en la Suma,
dentro de los pecados de ira, trata otra vez del aborto. Opina
nuestro autor que a nadie es lícito cometer un homicidio para
evitar un escándalo o un mal cualquiera a sí mismo o a otros, ya
que no es lícito hacer el mal para que venga un bien, como dice
la Carta a los Romanos, ni tampoco para evitar que venga otro
mal, como escribe Tomás de Aquino.
En este reato caen las mujeres que conciben a causa de una
fornicación, adulterio, incesto, etc., y matan la criatura concebida en su seno con medicinas, o la matan nada más ser alumbrada, buscando de este modo evitar la propia infamia, escarnio o
incluso la propia muerte o la de otros, o la apropiación de bienes ajenos, de llegarse a conocer tal embarazo.41
Pues bien, nada de estas cosas les excusa de un pecado mortal gravísimo. Y es más grave todavía si matan la propia criatura antes de recibido el bautismo, ya que entonces no sólo le privan de la vida del cuerpo, sino también de la del alma. Ahora
bien no sería, sin embargo, un homicidio si el feto no estuviese
formado, aunque esté ocupando el útero. Formado debe entenderse, dice san Antonino, como dotado de alma racional, lo cual
acontece en el hombre unos 40 días después de la concepción, y
italianos en el siglo XIV. Llevó a cabo la defensa de santo Tomás (contra
Durando y otros) con tal penetración de pensamiento que es considerado
por algunos el intérprete del tomismo más grande de inicios del siglo XIV.
No se conservan sus Comentarios a las Sentencias, pero poseemos 13
Quaestiones quodlibetales y algunas Quaestiones disputatae. Lamentablemente estas obras se encuentran en raros manuscritos de difícil localización.
Estando a lo que nos ocupa, llama la atención que las audaces afirmaciones
de Juan no tuviesen ningún eco entre sus colegas teólogos contemporáneos.
El texto de la cuestión 27 del décimo Quodlibet dice así: “Utrum medicus
debeat dare medicinam mulieri pregnanti, ex qua sequeretur mors filii, et si
non daret eam sequeretur mors utriusque. Si (puerperium) non est animatum anima rationali (...) tunc talem medicinam dando, licet impediret animationem talis fetus, tamen non esset causa mortis alicuius hominis et liberaret matrem a morte. Unde in tali casu deberet talem medicinam dare”
(manuscrito original en: Cod. Tortosa, Bibl. Capitular., 244).
41
La riqueza de posibilidades con que Antonino pinta el cuadro no parece que sea inventada.
539
en la mujer algo más tarde.42 Como es de sobra conocido, la
ciencia de la medicina del momento no permitía poder afirmar
una humanización más que cuando la morfología de visu lo consentía. Este hecho es irrelevante para nuestro tema.
No sería lícito tampoco que la madre, que padece una enfermedad mortal de la que no se cura, anticipe voluntariamente la
muerte de un feto que habría de morir en cualquier caso. Ni
tampoco matar a la prole aún no nacida para que la madre se
salve. Todos los que cooperasen a tales cosas con su consejo, o
su oficio (médicos, boticarios, etc.) serían desde luego homicidas.43 Antonino en este interesante texto es muy parco en consideraciones que ayuden a profundizar en su pensamiento. La
segunda hipótesis parece referirse a un caso de los que tratamos
anteriormente con Juan de Nápoles: son homicidas todos aquellos que matan al hijo para salvar a la madre.44
Por el momento, con san Antonino, se ha llegado hasta ahí.
42
“Quarto non licet commitere homicidium propter quodcunque scandalum vel malum vitandum sui vel alterius, quia sicut non sunt facienda
mala ut eveniant bona secundum Apostolum ad Romanos, ita nec etiam ut
vitentur mala secundum Thomam. In quo delinquunt mulieres, quae cum
conceperint per fornicationem, adulterium vel incestum, et huiusmodi, creaturam conceptam in utero occidunt diversis medicinis, vel ex utero natum,
ne manifestetur scelus earum, et inde sequatur infamia sua vel occisio sui,
vel aliorum, vel occupatio haereditatis alienae. Sed nil horum excusat a mortali gravissimo. Et si ante baptismum occidat ipsum, adhuc gravius, quia
corpus et animam occidit. Non tamen reputatur homicidium cum in utero
est, nisi fuerit puerperium formatum, scilicet anima rationali. Quod vero
non formatum. Dicitur autem formati masculus spacio 40 dierum vel circa,
et femina spacio 80”; Ibid., fol. 275rb-275va.
43
“Sed nec licet matrem ex infirmitate non valentem evadere mortem
citius eius mortem accelerare (sic!), ut proles in utero non moriatur, nec prolem nondum natam occidere, ut mater salvetur, et omnes qui cooperantur ad
huiusmodi opera consulendo, vel dando opera ad huiusmodi ut medici, aromatarii, et alii sunt homicidae”; Ibid., fol. 275va. El texto, en su primera
parte, es muy oscuro, ya que eius gramaticalmente se refiere al feto; en tal
caso no se entiende eius mortem: debería haberse referido al nacimiento, si
lo que quería decir era que no se debe anticipar el momento del parto (seguramente por la altísima mortalidad neonatal de esos casos en la época)...
44
Se supone que el hijo es ya un feto formado, de otro modo no se llamaría homicidio.
540
Un rechazo de plano en todo lo referente a acciones que causen
la muerte del “feto formado”, junto a una postura que toma en
consideración la posibilidad de acciones para salvar la vida de la
madre que acarreen la muerte del “feto no formado”.45
2. Continúa el atractivo del nominalismo: Gabriel Biel
Entre los epígonos de Ockham con mayor personalidad e
influjo encontramos al teólogo alemán Gabriel Biel.46 Sus seguidores en Erfurt y en Wittemberg recibirán el nombre de “gabrielistas”, y no ocamistas, lo cual permite hacerse idea del autorizado ascendiente de que gozó.
1. Personalidad y ubicación histórica
Nació en Espira hacia 1425, realizando sus estudios en
Heidelberg y en Erfurt.47 Hacia 1460, siendo licenciado en teología, fue nombrado vicario y predicador de la Catedral de
Maguncia, dando muestras de gran talento como orador. Biel
tomó parte resueltamente en favor de la obediencia al Papa
45
Vale la pena en este momento anunciar tan sólo que serà el Cardenal
Cayetano (1468-1543) quien abrirà camino a la consideración de una acción
terapéutica abortiva moralmente lícita. Cfr. P. Sardi, op. cit., p. 168 y ss. Esto
no invalida nada de lo escrito por san Antonino: por un lado porque siempre
ha de estar ausente la voluntad homicida en los casos de aborto indirecto,
como el mismo Antonino señala en los ejemplos que juzga de ilícitos. Y por
otro lado porque es posible que en su época la medicina no haya puesto aún
de manifiesto que el feto podría ser agresor, por así decir, directo aunque
involuntario de la vida materna.
46
Conocido por hipérboles tales como “el último de los escolásticos” y
también “el rey de los teólogos”.
47
En las obras siguientes se encontrarán elencos de bibliografía más
especializada para el lector interesado: F. COPLESTON, Storia della filosofia,
vol. 3 (Da Occam a Suarez), Paideia, Brescia 1966, p. 191 ss.; W. WERBECK,
U. HOFMANN (edit.), Gabrielis Biel Collectorium circa quattuor libros sententiarum, edición crítica en 5 vols., C.B. Mohr, Tübingen 1973-1992; C. RUCH,
Biel, Gabriel, DTC, t. II, cols. 814-825; A. PENNA, Biel, Gabriel, EC, t. II, col.
1626.
541
durante una grave disputa político-religiosa entre Pío II y el
Arzobispo de esa ciudad. Ello le valió censuras y rencores de
parte de algunos, pero también fue la ocasión para que el Papa y
algunos nobles alemanes conocieran sus cualidades y su lealtad.
En el año 1468 entró a formar parte de la Congregación de
los Hermanos de Vida Común de Windesheim, de la que llegó a
ser prior muy poco tiempo después. En 1484 fue nombrado profesor de filosofía y teología en Tubinga, donde contribuyó no
poco a dar a esta universidad el prestigio de que goza hasta el
presente. Allí enseñó abiertamente las doctrinas de Ockham
desde su cátedra de “teología moderna”, o sea teología nominalista del más puro cuño. Murió en el año 1495 en la localidad de
Schönbuch.
Su obra más conocida es el Epitoma pariter et collectorium
circa quattuor Sententiarum libros.48 En este texto capital para
conocer a Biel, vienen recogidas la segunda serie de lecciones de
teología que imparte durante su docencia en Tubinga. No llegó
a terminarlo pues faltan las partes correspondientes a los sacramentos del Orden y del Matrimonio. Si toda la doctrina de Biel
es deudora del Ockham, en esta obra salta a la vista especialmente que se propone seguir en todo al Venerabilis inceptor.
Sólo cuando Ockham haya dejado sin tratar de alguna materia,
Biel consultará – así lo avisa – qué dicen otros maestros e intentará hacerlos concordar con los principios ocamistas. Biel ejecutará escrupulosamente este programa a lo largo de la obra.
Nuestro autor conoce y cita con soltura en multitud de ocasiones a san Anselmo, Hugo y Ricardo de San Víctor, san
Bernardo, Alejandro de Hales, santo Tomás de Aquino, san
Buenaventura, Escoto, Durando, Holkot, Palude, Pedro de Ailly,
Marsilio de Inghen, Gerson... Lo más interesante es que, contra
lo que pueda parecer, Biel no es un compilador: sabe ser original y dar un toque personal allí por donde pasa.49 Sin ir más
48
El título completo es Epitoma pariter et collectorium circa quatuor
Sententiarum libros egregi viri magistri Gabrielis Biel sacrae theologiae licenciati bene meriti. La primera edición impresa no vio la luz hasta 1499.
Nosotros hemos trabajado sobre la edición crítica de la misma llevada a
cabo por WERBECK-HOFMANN en su obra apenas citada.
49
Otras obras de Biel son la Lectura super canone missae in alma uni-
542
lejos Biel no interpretaba que la teoría moral de Ockham significase negar un orden moral natural: la “recta razón” puede dictaminar como buenas ciertas acciones cuyos objetos y fines no
son Dios. Por tal motivo algunos filósofos paganos como
Aristóteles, Séneca o Cicerón han podido cumplir actos moralmente buenos, virtuosos. La potencia absoluta de Dios – a la que
Biel, como buen nominalista, saca gran partido – y la soberana
voluntad de Dios son reglas primeras de la moralidad.50
Ni rigorista ni laxista, da pruebas de poseer un prudente
sentir cuando resuelve casos de conciencia. Ha estudiado con
extrema atención los problemas sociales y políticos más graves
de su tiempo: la licitud de la guerra, el derecho a la propiedad
privada, el origen del poder, las condiciones del impuesto justo
y del salario justo, los deberes de los magistrados, etc. Biel
habría podido ejercer un influjo muy duradero en la teología
católica si no hubiese sido por el decaer de la escolástica y el
abandono de las disputas entre escuelas.51
versitate Tuwingensi ordinarie lecta, conocida también por otros títulos, en la
que realiza un largo comentario doctrinal, moral, canónico, litúrgico y ascético sobre las palabras y ritos de la Misa; compuso también una serie de
Sermones para el año litúrgico; conocemos de él un tratado de gramática;
mención particular merece el Tractatus de potestate et utilitate monetarum,
reeditada múltiples veces, en la que Biel hace una disertación de economía
política y de teología moral sobre el dinero.
50
“Un acte est juste s’il (Dieu) le veut. (...) Biel insiste sur la nécessité de
la liberté, elle est la glorie de l’homme, la condition du mérite. Il pense qu’il
y a des actes indifférents, soit dans l’ordre naturel, soit dans l’ordre surnaturel. Cette distinction lui sert à établir, contre les augustiniens de l’epoque,
que toutes les oeuvres des pécheurs ne sont pas des fautes, toutes les vertus
des philosophes des vices”; C. RUCH, op. cit., col. 824.
51
Influjo, no obstante, ha tenido y mucho. Lutero conoció bien los escritos de Biel y lo admiraba; él mismo confiesa que el libro sobre el canon de
la Misa es la mejor obra del género que poseen los católicos. No pocos hoy
día hablan del impacto de Biel sobre el protestantismo luterano, dejando a
salvo su absoluta fidelidad a la Iglesia. Acerca de ello pueden consultarse las
obras referidas al inicio de esta sección. Los maestros católicos, por su parte,
cuando han de contradecir a Biel lo hacen con gran respeto y deferencia;
todavía en el siglo pasado Franzelin, Palmieri, Mazzella, Stentrup y otros,
citan a Biel a lo largo de sus escritos.
543
2. El quinto mandamiento no pertenece estrictamente a la ley
natural
En continuidad con otros teólogos predecesores suyos, Biel
afirma que los preceptos de la segunda tabla del Decálogo, tanto
los afirmativos como los negativos, no son de ley natural en sentido propio, sino sólo en sentido lato.52 Por consiguiente se podría
alcanzar el fin último igualmente siendo un adúltero, un ladrón o
un homicida, de no estar prohibidos tales comportamientos.53 El
aroma nominalista de esta posición es inconfundible.
52
“Quantum ad articulum secundum est conclusio prima secundum mentem Scoti: Non omnia decalogi praecepta sunt de lege naturae stricte accepta.
Probatur: Quia non omnia illa praecepta sunt principia practica ex terminis
evidentia aut conclusiones ex illis in consequentia necessaria illatae; ergo non
sunt de lege naturae stricte. Consequentia nota per quid nominis legis naturalis stricte acceptae. Antecedens patet ex sequentibus duabus conclusionibus...”.
También lo mismo aparece algo más adelante: “Tertia conclusio: Secundae
tabulae praecepta tam affirmativa quam negativa sunt de lege naturae non
stricte, sed large accepta. Quod non stricte, probatur: Quia eorum, quae ibi
praecepta sunt aut prohibita, non sunt principia practica simpliciter necessaria, nec conclusiones simpliciter necessariae”. Los textos proceden de Super III
Sent., d.37 (Utrum ad praecepta decalogi legis naturae indispensabilia referantur
omnia alia legis mandata), q.un., art 2, concl. 1 y 3.
53
“Non enim est necessaria bonitas in his, quae ibi praecipiuntur, ad
bonitatem finis ultimi, nec in his, quae prohibentur, malitia necessario avertens a fine ultimo. Quia si illud bonum non esset praeceptum, et hoc malum
non prohibitum, staret cum illo acquisitio finis ultimi; ergo non sunt de lege
naturae stricte. Tenet consequentia, quia in his, quae lege naturae sunt praecepta vel prohibita, est bonitas necessario ad finem ultimum convertens aut
malitia necessario a fine ultimo avertens; alioquin principia practica illarum
legum non essent ex se simpliciter necessaria. Antecedens patet, quia circumscripta lege, et parentum contemptor et proximi occisor, fur et moechus
etc. possunt ad finem ultimum converti. Ex eo enim, quod Deus non est irreverendus, neque quod falsus deus pro Deo colendus, non sequuntur opposita prohibitorum illis praeceptis aut aliis prioribus principiis, nec ea, quae
sunt praecepta, ut satis patet. Quod vero sint de lege naturae, communiter
accipiendo, patet, quia multum consona sunt illi legi, licet non sequantur ex
primis principiis practicis, quae nota sunt ex terminis omni intellectui et
necessaria. Primum enim de honore parentum multum consonat huic principio: Benefactori sunt beneficia rependenda. Cetera negativa consona sunt
huic: Non est proximus iniuste damnificandus”; Ibid., concl. 3.
544
Biel pensaba que los preceptos de la ley natural – tomada en
sentido estricto – no son dispensables.54 Al mismo tiempo admitía cierta posibilidad de dispensa en los mandamientos de la
segunda tabla, lo cual le obligaba a reconocer que no todos esos
mandamientos son de ley natural. Según Biel la potencia absoluta de Dios no encuentra óbice para poder dispensar de los mismos, si bien de facto no lo hace en razón de la proximidad de los
mismos a los preceptos de ley natural en sentido estricto.55 Que
los mandamientos de la segunda tabla sean dispensables, escribe, es claro, ya que no son ni necesarios ni formalmente deducibles de los dos primeros preceptos: es innegable, por ejemplo,
que Dios puede mandar matar al inocente por ser Señor de la
vida y de la muerte.56
54
Ibid., concl. 4: “Quarta conclusio: Legis naturalis stricte praecepta
non sunt primo modo nec secundo dispensabilia. Patet, quia illa fundantur
in primis principiis evidentibus et necessariis, quae quia necessaria, mutari
non possunt, quia evidentia sunt, declaratione non indigent; ergo neutro
modo sunt dispensabilia”. Enseguida añade que, no obstante, no sería
improbable que determinadas conclusiones remotas de la ley natural pudieran ser en algún sentido dispensadas por Dios, por ejemplo declarando cuál
es su intención de obligar como legislador: “Videtur tamen non improbabile
quod lex naturalis quantum ad remotiores conclusiones recipiat dispensationem secundo modo, hoc est declarationem, an talis casus occurrens sub
tali praecepto secundum intentionem legislatoris contineatur, quia errores
aliquando in formis consequentiarum contingunt, ut videatur sequi conclusio ex principiis per se notis, ex quibus tamen propter aliquem defectum non
sequitur. Sic quandoque in materia peccatur, dum falsum apparens verum
subsumitur aut quod particulariter verum est universaliter accipitur. Et
horum declaratio quaedam dispensationis species est”; Ibid.
55
“Quinta conclusio: Quamvis legislator Deus circa observantiam praeceptorum secundae tabulae simpliciter dispensare posset per praecepti relaxationem, non tamen sic dispensat de facto propter magnam eorum cum
lege naturae proprie proximationem”; Ibid., concl. 5.
56
“Primum patet, quia, ut dictum est, cum non sint de lege naturae
stricte, non possunt deduci formaliter ex principiis necessariis in consequentia formali et simpliciter necessaria; ergo illa posse mutari a Deo negandum non est, cum nullam implicet contradictionem. Unde negandum non
est, quin Deus praecipere posset alicui occidere innocentem, cum plenum
habeat dominium et potestatem occidendi et vivificandi. In quo casu revocaret praeceptum de homicidio quantum ad illum, cui oppositum eius prae-
545
Ahora bien, Biel no necesita recurrir al razonamiento de la
dispensa para afrontar la licitud del homicidio en defensa propia. La licitud de repeler la violencia usando de la fuerza contra
el agresor pertenece al derecho natural.57 Por ello les está permitido defenderse también a los clérigos, y usando armas si
fuese necesario.58 Por tratarse de un derecho como tal, quien privase injustamente a alguien de la posibilidad de ejercerlo estaría
obligado a restituir.59 Este planteamiento novedoso encontrado
ciperet. Sic enim legitur praecepisse Abrahae, ut occideret Isaac filium
suum, Gen. 22. Sic Osee mandavit, ut acciperet fornicariam et faceret filios
fornicationis, Os. 1; quamvis secundum doctores non praecepit Osee fornicari, sed contrahere matrimonium cum fornicatrice, post contractum tamen
continente; licet etiam ad litteram haec praecipere potuisset, cum non sit
magis legi naturae dissonum fornicari quam occidere innocentem”; Ibid.
57
“Sic ius naturale vim vi repellere concedit, dist. I Ius naturale. Unde
Raymundus I titulo 5 ß 17 ait: Videtur casus (et re vera ita est, addit Glossa),
in quo sine auctoritate principis vel ecclesiae possit moveri bellum, videlicet
pro rebus repetendis et pro defensione patriae. Nam de iure naturali cuilibet
licitum est vim vi repellere in continenti et cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae. Hoc autem moderamen inculpatae tutelae est, dum quis causa tuendi vel
defendendi se resistit adversario cum tanto moderamine, quod non excedit
modum in defendendo, plus laedendo ex proposito adversarium quam illata
exigat violentia. Et additum est in continenti, id est quam cito novit vim illatam, antequam divertat ad contrarium actum, quae continuatio aestimanda
est secundum qualitatem negotii, secundum quod exigit ad praeparationem
maiorem vel minorem temporis tractum”; Super IV Sent, d. 15, q.4 (Utrum
in bello acquisita sint suis dominis restituenda), Articulus 1, Notabile 1. La
Glossa a la que se refiere es la que hace Juan de Friburgo, Glossa in
Raymundi de Peniafort Summam de paenitentia et matrimoniis. La cita de
Raymundus es de la Summa de paenitentia et matrimonio de san Raimundo.
La cita del Ius naturale es Corpus Iuris Canonici, Editio Lipsiensis Secunda,
ed. Aem.Lud.Richter Aem.Friedberg, 1879 (reimpr. 1959).
58
“...quod sacerdotes, etsi propria manu arma arripere non debent nisi
forte ad proprii corporis defensionem, tamen vel his quibus huiusmodi officia commissa sunt, persuadere, vel quibuslibet, ut ea accipiant, sua auctoritate valent imperare, ut dicit Gratianus XXIII q. 8 Quicumque ex clero ß His
ita”; Super IV Sent, d. 15, q.4 (Utrum in bello acquisita sint suis dominis restituenda), Articulus 1, Notabile 1.
59
“Quinta conclusio: Dominus impediens subditos suos in usu licito
suarum rerum aut prohibens earundem concessam naturali iure defensionem tenetur eisdem ad damnorum passorum restitutionem. Probatur: Quia
546
en Biel sale al paso de atropellos que no debieron ser raros
entonces por parte del poder constituido en un lugar.
Una cuestión surgida a raíz de los homicidios que se producen durante la guerra injusta da ocasión de comprender ulteriormente el pensamiento de Biel. Cuando los soldados nos atacan injustamente hay que intentar no matarlos, ya que su muerte les acarrearía la condenación eterna. Se debe obrar así a
menos que lo obligue la necesidad de defenderse uno mismo o
defender a otros, o defender incluso bienes.60 La necessitas
defensionis, por tanto, continúa siendo el discriminante que
decide la licitud de un homicidio, aunque Biel no se para a explicar por qué tal homicidio cae fuera del quinto mandamiento.
Vale la pena detenerse un momento en la afirmación de que
el combatiente debe intentar no matar al enemigo de cuya condenación eterna está moralmente seguro. Asumamos – sin
entrar en otros aspectos de la cuestión – que mientras el hombre
enemigo hace una guerra injusta está en situación de pecado
mortal. Que este hombre, cuando muere, vaya al infierno no se
le podrá imputar al que le quita la vida física. Y sin embargo Biel
damnificans iniuste tenetur ad damni restitutionem, ut frequenter dictum
est, De iniuriis et damno dato Si culpa; sed impediens alium in usu rerum
suarum impedit eum in iure suo, quia quilibet ius habet rebus suis utendi,
licite tamen, et per consequens damnificat iniuste. Similiter qui prohibet
defensionem naturalem”; Super IV Sent., d. 15, Q. 5 (Utrum habentes temporale dominium in subditos omnia teneantur restituere, in quibus inveniuntur
subditos tam suos quam alienos aggravasse), Articulus 2, Conclusio 5. El De
iniuriis citado es el Corpus Iuris Canonici, op. cit., c. 9, X De Iniuriis, V 36.
60
“Cavendum tamen est omni studio quantum fieri potest a caedibus
hominum, ut non (nisi defensionis sui et aliorum aut rerum necessitas compellat) occidantur. Tanto siquidem gravius est iniuste bellantes occidere
(dummodo commode et sine notabili damno salvari possunt), quanto tales
sunt in maiori animae suae periculo, puta in actuali peccato iniuste bellando. Non enim tantum eorum corpora prosternuntur, sed etiam animae in
mortem perpetuam transmittuntur. Si tamen necessitas occidere compellit,
non occisoribus, sed occisis culpa imputatur. Dicit enim Iohannes in Summa
II tit. 1 q. 13: »In casu inevitabilis necessitatis«, hoc est »se et sua liberando,
licet sine dubio laico occidere, qui potest patriam vel res suas armis« defendere”; Super IV Sent, d. 15, q.4 (Utrum in bello acquisita sint suis dominis restituenda), Articulus 2, Conclusio 4. El Ioannes que aparece es Juan de
Friburgo, Summa confessorum, Augustae Vindelicorum 1476, II, tit. 1, q. 13.
547
propone como un deber que los que combaten contra él hagan
lo posible para que no muera estando en pecado. Evitar causar
su muerte en tal situación es lo más correcto moralmente, dice
Biel. Compárese con el razonamiento de san Antonino, que
hemos escrito en las páginas precedentes, en relación con la
muerte de quien atenta una violación carnal.
Como se recordará esta era una dificultad clásica contra la
licitud de la legítima defensa: quitar la vida al que perpetra
voluntariamente la agresión es ser ocasión – cuando menos – de
su condenación eterna. Trayendo esa misma idea cuando trata
de la guerra, Biel nos muestra que la dificultad está plenamente
justificada y el principio de caridad y de justicia con el prójimo
que la inspira, sigue vigente. Uno debe hacer lo posible para que
tal hombre no muera. Aunque naturalmente excluye de su aplicación la necesidad de defender la vida humana ante un peligro
real e inminente. Fuera de este caso, en los demás siempre se
debe hacer lo posible por asegurar la salvación eterna de los
hombres. Tan sólo el deber de defender una vida inocente o bienes extremamente necesarios para la vida justifica que la acción
contra tal agresor sea mortal.
3. El homicidio no es malo considerado bajo algunos aspectos
Si es un mal mayor el homicidio que la usura, ¿por qué en
algún caso es lícito el homicidio y en cambio la usura jamás es
lícita y Dios nunca la ha dispensado? Esta interesante pregunta
que se hace nuestro autor nos va a dar pie para profundizar algo
más en la noción de pecado de homicidio que mantiene Biel.
Ante todo se impone una distinción. Existen cosas que son
malas in se, pero no secundum se. El homicidio y la usura son
malos in se, pero solamente la usura (en esta comparación) es
también mala secundum se. No todo homicidio es necesariamente malo, pues puede ser realizado justamente: no incluye la
razón de mal, de injusto, el acto “homicidio”. En cambio al
hablar de usura nos referimos a una conducta en cuya razón
propia está incluida la injusticia, contraria al querer divino.61
61
“Tum quia homicidium est maius peccatum quam usura, et tamen in
548
¿Quién es, entonces, aquel que puede matar u ocasionar un
daño corporal justamente? Escoto, a quien Biel sigue en este
punto, había dicho que es muerto justamente aquel a quien la
ley justa – para todos los casos, generaliter – o Dios – para algunos casos, specialiter – mandan matar.62 Ley justa que, por ende,
requiere al menos que no esté en discordancia con la ley divina
para poder recibir tal nombre.63 Por consiguiente, nunca será
justa la ley que ordena el homicidio en determinados casos no
exceptuados (sic) por Dios. Sería injusta la ley que mandase la
muerte del “ladrón diurno”, ya que nunca Dios exceptuó al
ladrón del precepto “non occides”, antes bien prohibió expresamente que fuese matado, contrariamente a como manifestó
acerca del “ladrón nocturno”.64
casu licet occidere; ergo in casu licet ad usuram dare. (...) Ad quintam de
homicidio (...) in nullo casu licet recipere usuram, nec in hoc Deus dispensare potest. Rationem assignans: quia homicidium peccatum est et malum
in se, sed non secundum se; usura autem est malum in se et secundum se.
Quod si sic intelligitur quod homicidium non est malum secundum se, id est
in ratione termini non includit malum, sed dicit simpliciter occisionem
hominis, non connotando aut iuste fiat vel iniuste; usura autem in sua ratione propria includit iniustitiam, quia est recipere rem alienam manente aliena invito domino: sic recipere usuram stante hoc quid nominis termini simpliciter iniustum est, quia divinae voluntati contrarium. Nec potest Deus dispensare, ut recipiatur usura licite in sensu composito. Attamen si de sua
absoluta potentia concederet alicui recipere ultra sortem ex mutuo, iam non
reciperet alienum, nam recipiendo faceret suum; nec invito domino, quia
superiore domino iubente vel consentiente; et sic non esset usura”; Super IV
Sent., d. 15, q. 11 (Utrum possidens aliqua per usurariam acquisitionem teneatur de necessitate salutis ad eorum restitutionem), Articulus 1, Notabile 2.
62
“Quantum ad tertium articulum dubitatur primo, quis iuste possit
occidi aut in corpore laedi, quoniam dictum est in conclusione de restitutione iniuste laesorum; ideo a contrario sensu qui iuste laeditur, poenam suam
fert, nec restitutio sibi debetur. Ad hoc sententialiter respondet Scotus quod
iuste occiditur, quem lex iusta generaliter vel Deus specialiter iubet occidi.
Et sunt verba beati Augustini in probatione primae conclusionis allegata”;
Super IV Sent., d. 15, q. 15 (Utrum damnificans proximum in bonis corporis
teneatur ad damni retitutionem de necessitate salutis), Articulus 3, Dubium 1.
63
“Consequenter inquirit, quae sit lex iusta. Et respondet breviter: Nulla
nisi quae descendit a lege divina sicut conclusiones practicae a principiis
practicis, vel quae concordat legi divinae vel adminus non discordat”; Ibid.
64
“Ex illo infert quod quia lex divina absolute prohibuit: Ne permittas
549
En todo caso Biel se cuida de atenuar el rigor de Escoto en
este enfoque del poder coercitivo de la ley humana: precisamente la misma ley natural reclama que los perturbadores de la paz
pública, cuales son los ladrones, puedan ser quitados de enmedio. Muy a propósito llama en causa nuestro autor a la ley natural pues, como vimos para la legítima defensa, la necessitas
defensionis – de la sociedad, en este caso – justifica una acción
homicida sin necesidad de invocar ni la dispensa divina ni la
excepción al quinto mandamiento.65
hominem occidi, et nulli inferiori licet in lege superioris dispensare, ergo nulla
lex positiva constituens hominem occidendum iusta est, si in illis casibus statuat, in quibus Deus non excepit. Excepit autem in multis, ut in blasphemia,
homicidio, adulterio et aliis, ut patet in Exodo et aliis pluribus locis, in quibus
casibus lex positiva iuste potest transgressoribus determinare poenam mortis.
Ex illo consequenter elicit quod lex statuens furem (maxime diurnum) occidi
est iniusta, quia nullibi Dominus excepit furem ab illo praecepto: Non occides;
immo videtur quod Dominus non velit furem illa poena plecti, quoniam aliam
poenam Dominus infligit, scilicet restitutionem quadrupli vel quintupli, ut
patet Ex 22. Et dicitur maxime diurnus, quoniam si nocturnus occidatur, percussor non erit reus sanguinis. Unde ibidem dicitur: “Si effringens fur domum
sive suffodiens fuerit inventus et accepto vulnere mortuus fuerit, percussor
non erit reus sanguinis. Quod si orto sole hoc fecerit, homicidium perpetravit
et ipse moriatur”. Ubi expresse Dominus prohibet furem diurnum occidi.
Secus de nocturno, qui invasor est, quoniam praesumitur homicida et velle
occidere, si quis vult sibi resistere. Et addit Scotus: Esto etiam, quod aliquo
modo licuisset Iudaeis pro furto occidere, magis videretur per misericordiam
evangelicam rigor ille revocatus quam rigor contra adulterium. Et secundum
hoc omnes iudicantes furem ad mortem essent homicidae et peccarent graviter contra quintum praeceptum”; Ibid.
65
“Verum licet haec opinio apparentiam quandam habeat, quia tamen
in oppositum est communis consuetudo et practica et durum est in hoc casu
omnes iudices secundum municipalia tolerata iudicantes damnare, videtur
aliter dicendum quod occidentes fures secundum leges generales aut speciales iustas non peccant nec dicendi sunt homicidae. (...) Et quod additur
Dominus absolute prohibuit etc., si absolute tantum valet: id est simpliciter
in omni casu, non est verum, cum et ipse Dominus multos casus excepit,
inter quos et ille, quo Dominus mandat quod qui superbiens non oboedit
sacerdotibus et iudici, ex decreto iudicis morietur, Dtn 17; ubi videtur
Dominus dedisse potestatem praesidentibus statuendi leges rationabiles,
quibus populus tenetur oboedire, et qui has contemnit, morte moriatur. Et
per hoc sub poena mortis statuere possunt ea, quibus pax rei publicae conservetur, et prohibere unde turbatur, sicque praevenire mala, seditiones,
550
3. Balance comparativo de estos autores.
Tomadas en su conjunto, la propuesta de Antonino parece
más realista y práctica que la de Biel. Tiene más en cuenta al
hombre concreto al que va dirigido el mensaje moral: con su
naturaleza, sus pasiones, su debilidad, y también su capacidad
de obrar virtuosamente. Además, no obstante la profunda actitud religiosa que subyace en el nominalismo, Antonino ha sabido sacar más partido que Biel de los textos bíblicos.
¿Qué prohíbe el quinto mandamiento? Gabriel Biel se sabe
mantener acertadamente en la línea especulativa que reconoce
el peso de la actitud interior para cometer un pecado. Así,
encuentra la especificidad moral del quinto mandamiento en el
mismo deseo, como tal, de que un hombre muera: en cualquier
homicidio se comete un pecado grave a menos de que el causante carezca de la intención homicida. Hoy hablaríamos de la
voluntariedad homicida directa o indirecta, en este caso. El
Arzobispo de Florencia, por su parte, también entiende que lo
específico del pecado de homicidio es el deseo de hacer daño
privando de la vida a un hombre, y que la prohibición del quinto mandamiento consiste en concreto en el odio contra un semejante, del cual procede la ira y el deseo de su daño.
Gabriel Biel no oculta en ningún momento su dependencia
de Ockham, leído bajo la óptica de Holkot (por ejemplo en lo
relativo a la potentia Dei) o de Durando (como cuando éste escribió sobre las cosas incluidas en la ley natural secundum se). No
extraña, pues, que escriba que el homicidio – lo mismo que
todos los mandamientos de la segunda tabla – no pertenece a la
ley natural. En cambio sorprende algo más leer en él que la
defensa violenta es una prerrogativa que todos tenemos, cuyo
homicidia et huiusmodi, ac transgressores etiam ultimo supplicio punire.
(...) Videtur namque quod iuste poterat statui, ut fur occidatur, ne, si poena
ista tollatur, propter furum frequentiam, quae etiam statuta hac poena vix
prohiberi possunt, maxima turbatio pacis rei publicae et homicidia multa ac
bella plurima consequantur. Legi autem naturali consonum est, ut inutiles
homines communis pacis et rei publicae turbatores, quales sunt fures, de
medio tollantur”; Ibid.
551
origen se encuentra en la ley natural, porque es bien sabida la
sospecha y desconfianza de los nominalistas hacia todo lo que
no sea ley divino-positiva, más aún tratándose de justificar un
comportamiento violento, aparentemente opuesto al mensaje de
Jesucristo.
San Antonino, deudor – siempre en el fondo, y a menudo
también en la forma – de Tomás de Aquino, ofreció a sus contemporáneos un completo estudio del homicidio y la legítima
defensa. Entre sus méritos se cuenta el brindar una exposición
ricamente casuística del tema, en la que afronta sin recelo los
incidentes de homicidio invocando una aparente autodefensa, la
defensa de la integridad corporal, la defensa de terceros, ciertas
intervenciones sobre el feto para salvar la vida de la madre, etc.
La siguiente frase, sugerida por san Antonino, puede condensar
los cuatro puntos necesarios para que el homicidio por necesidad de defensa pueda ser lícito: la inevitabilidad de la agresión
(necesidad), el enfrentamiento hasta que el agresor deja de serlo
(defensa), y el uso de una fuerza razonable contra el agresor
(moderación).
Con sagacidad Biel dejó ver que no hay límites a la legítima
defensa, en razón de invocar cierta particular cualidad personal,
frente a quien de facto se comporta como agresor. Ni siquiera
ante el Papa, escribió Gerson unos años antes, cedería este derecho de defenderse usando la violencia. Lo necesario, obviamente, es que la acción defensiva se dirija contra el agresor y mientras éste lo esté siendo. Al respecto la Suma Astesana proponía
el término in continenti, expresión que hemos visto usar también a Gabriel Biel.
Es significativo comprobar que, ni nuestros autores ni los
demás autores del medioevo, entienden el homicidio defensivo
en términos de excepción o de dispensa al mandamiento non
occides. La muerte acarreada durante la legítima defensa tiene
un puesto entre los homicidios que no se oponen a la ley de Dios.
Bien a mano había dejado la doctrina canónica del momento la
institución dispensatoria para haberse acogido a ella, adaptándola lo necesario para aplicarla analógicamente a la ley de Dios.
El modelo teórico correspondiente sólo debía satisfacer el triple
requisito de causa – que para nuestro caso sería la causa defensionis –, necessitas – la necessitas inevitabilis – y que la conducta
fuese buena si desaparecía la prohibición merced a la dispensa.
552
Sin embargo la razón teológica eligió siempre discurrir por
otros rumbos.
General Yague 11, 3E
28020 Madrid
Spain
JUAN CARLOS GARCÍA
DE
VICENTE
—————
Summary / Resumen
The author investigates the fifth commandment of the Decalogue
through an analysis of two thinkers of the late middle ages: Anthony of
Florence and Gabriel Biel. Current debates on the inviolability of
human life demand that we have an adequate understanding of the
prohibition of killing and the justification of legitimate defense. One
can note a particular interest in the two thinkers in the theological
actuality and the innovative ways with which they introduce the theme.
The fifth commandment does not allow exceptions: the problem of legitimate defense is an essentially different one.
El autor investiga el quinto mandamiento del Decálogo, analizando la doctrina de dos pensadores del medioevo tardío: san Antonino de
Florencia y Gabriel Biel. El debate actual sobre la inviolabilidad de la
vida humana exige comprender adecuadamente la prohibición de
matar y la justificación de la legítima defensa. Se nota un interés particular de parte de los dos teólogos, en la actitud teológica y en las
innovaciones que le introducen al tema. El quinto mandamiento no
admite excepciones; la legítima defensa es un problema esencialmente
diverso.
—————
The author is a Doctor of Theology conferred by the Pontifical
University of the Holy Cross, Rome.
El autor es doctor en Teología por la Universidad de la Santa
Cruz en Roma.
—————
553
StMor 39 (2001) 553-581
MARTIN MCKEEVER C.SS.R.
ONE LAST RIGHT?: THE POLITICS AND ETHICS OF
LIBERALIZING EUTHANASIA LEGISLATION
The interplay of politics, law and ethics is a telling “litmus
test” of the character of a given society. The ideological shading
of a community shows up in the relative weight given to these
spheres of action and thought, and in the institutional procedures through which they influence and determine each other.
Thus a centralized State, with a subordinate judicial system and
a merely notional interest in ethics might show up red, as an indicator of totalitarian tendencies. Or a decentralized State, with
a genuinely independent judiciary and a sincere interest in
ethics (if one could find such a thing) might show up white, as a
sign of humanitarianism, peace and social justice.
What colour best depicts the interplay of politics, law and
ethics involved in the process leading to the new legislation on
euthanasia in the Netherlands? Some would suggest blue because they consider the legislation a further, if still imperfect, expression of modern, enlightened, liberal culture. Others will suggest black because they consider the same legislation an expression of social self-destruction based on a form of ethical nihilism. Others again may prefer orange because they consider
the legislation an expression of the particularity of the Dutch
way of dealing with controversial moral issues. In each case the
positions adopted on the specific issue of euthanasia are ultimately derived from more fundamental convictions of a political, juridical and ethical nature. The range of opinions expressed
in the ongoing debate and the vehement tones of the discussion
are a reminder of how divergent such deeper convictions actually are.
1
M. MCKEEVER, “The Ethical Ambivalence of Liberalism”, Studia
Moralia 35 (1997) 401-425; “The Use of Human Rights Discourse as a Category of Ethical Argumentation in Contemporary Culture”, Studia Moralia 38
(2000), 103-125.
554
MARTIN MCKEEVER
One of the key ideas used in public debate leading to new
legislation of this kind is that of rights. In its most direct expression this takes the rather glaring form of an alleged “right
to die”, in its more subtle expressions it takes the form of a right
to something more attractive like autonomy or beneficence. In
whatever form, it is noticeable that the use of rights discourse
is central to the discussion on euthanasia as it has been, and is,
to the discussion of so many social issues of a biomedical nature. In former articles, I have studied the question of rights
within the context of liberal culture in general and as a form of
ethical discourse1. In this piece I propose to take the euthanasia
debate as a “case in point” with regard to the use of rights discourse in public policy debates. The specific case of Holland
will serve as a point of departure for a more general reflection.
In this sense, the purpose of the article could be described as
“metabioethical”, in that it does not propose to study the specifically bioethical questions involved in the euthanasia debate,
but rather to study the rights question within the euthanasia debate as an instance of broader issues of a political, juridical and
ethical nature.
In analysing the use of human rights discourse in ethical discourse (in the article cited) three perspectives were adopted:
pragmatic, semantic and normative. By adopting these same perspectives in the case of euthanasia legislation it will become
clear that the process leading to such legislation is a complex
and at times confusing interaction of forces at quite different
levels. In particular, it will be argued here that these perspectives, and the relations between the different levels of discourse
and action which they reveal, permit us to see how juridical and
political processes tend to displace or subjugate ethical considerations, not least through the use of rights discourse.
A pragmatic perspective
By “pragmatic” here is intended the immediate, practical actions of individuals and institutions which have brought about
the liberalization of euthanasia legislation in the Netherlands.
Leaving aside for the moment the substantial semantic and normative problems involved in making and responding to the spe-
ONE LAST RIGHT? THE POLITICS AND ETHICS OF LIBERALIZING EUTHANASIA
555
cific claim of “the right to die”, this section will simply attempt
to answer the question “who did what?” in bringing about the
new legislation. By tracing back the processes which led to the
promulgation of this law it should be possible to identify, at least
in general terms, the key agents involved, the fora in which they
engaged and the course of their interaction. The case of the
Netherlands is a good illustration of the issue as it exists elsewhere and will serve us as a way of identifying, mutatis mutandi, the key agents and processes currently involved in public debate on this issue in other countries.
A chronological overview of the liberalization of euthanasia
legislation in the Netherlands
In April 2001, the upper house of the Dutch Parliament approved the bill entitled “Control of the ending of life at the request of the patient and help with suicide”, which had been
passed in the lower house on the 28.12.2000 (104 votes in favour,
40 against). The substance of the legislation is that, under certain defined conditions2, doctors may be involved in euthanasia
or assisted suicide, without risking prosecution. This is so because an “exemption from prosecution” clause has been introduced which covers the legal prohibition of euthanasia and assisted suicide (based on articles 2933 and 2944 of the Criminal
2
The “criteria of due care” as formulated in the Dutch Ministry of Justice Press Release, 28/11/00 require that the doctor: “be convinced that the
patient’s request was voluntary and wellconsidered; be convinced that the
patient was facing unremitting and unbearable suffering; have advised the
patient concerning the latter’s situation and prospects; have reached the
firm conclusion together with the patient that there was no reasonable alternative to the patient’s situation, have consulted at least one independent
physician, who has examined the patient and has formed a judgement concerning the requirements of due care as set out above; have carried out the
termination of life in a medically appropriate manner.”
3
“A person who takes the life of another person at that other person’s
express and earnest request is liable to a term of imprisonment of not more
than twelve years or a fine of the fifth category” (The fifth category fine corresponds to 100. 000 gulden)
4
“A person who intentionally incites another to commit suicide, assists
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MARTIN MCKEEVER
Code). In other words euthanasia remains punishable by law in
principle, but in practice the conditions under which no prosecution will take place have been formalized. Whereas formerly
all cases of euthanasia and assisted suicide were supposed to be
reported to the Public Prosecution Service (via regional review
committees), now the committees need only report to the Prosecution Service when there is doubt that the doctor has complied with the criteria of due care.
In a pragmatic perspective, this legislation can be seen as
the point of arrival (for the moment) of a long and complicated
history5. For the limited purpose of this section, namely that of
identifying the main agents and processes involved in the liberalization process, a brief chronological overview of this process
must suffice:
1952: District Court finds Einhoven doctor guilty of killing
on request but imposes minimal sentence.
1972: Report of The Committee on Medical Ethics of the
Health Council (Gezondheidsrad) distinguishes between voluntary and non-voluntary, and between active and passive eu-
in the suicide of another, or procures for that other person the means to
commit suicide, is liable to a term of imprisonment of not more than three
years or a fine of the fourth category, where the suicide ensues.” (The fourth
category fine corresponds to 25.000 gulden). Text of articles as quoted in J.
GRIFFITHS, A. BOOD, H. WEYERS, Euthanasia and Law in the Netherlands (Amsterdam. Amsterdam University Press, 1998) 308.
5
As is to be expected, the way of narrating this history tends to depend
on the position of the authors. For a range of readings from which this minimal chronology has been constructed see: J. GRIFFITHS, A. BOOD, H. WEYERS,
Euthanasia and Law in the Netherlands -with extensive bibliography- (Amsterdam- Amsterdam University Press, 1998); C. F. GOMEZ, Regulating Death:
Euthanasia and the Case of the Netherlands (New York: The Free Press, 199
1); G. FRAVOLINI, “La nuova normativa sull’eutanasia nei Paesi Bassi” Aggiornamenti sociali 12 (1994) 839-848; J.P. WILS, “Schwierige Abwägungen,
Die Euthanasiediskussion in Belgien und den Niederlanden” Herder Korrespondenz 55\3 (2001) 120-125; C.A. DEFANTI, “L’eutanasia in Olanda: A
proposito del nuovo rapporto Van der Mass”, Bioetica Rivista Interdisciplinare I (1997) 11-27; M. de WACHTER, “Euthanasia in the Netherlands” Hastings Center Report 22\2 (1992) 23-27; H. JOCHEMSEN and J. KEOWN, “Voluntary euthanasia under control? Further empirical evidence from the Netherlands.” Journal of Medical Ethics 25 (1999) 16-2 1.
557
thanasia, but recommends no change in the law.
1973: Postma trial: Court imposes conditional jail sentence
of one week with one year probation on Dr. Postma for giving
lethal injection to her mother. The Medical Inspector lists the
conditions under which pain relief with the risk of anticipating
death may be delivered.
1973: Dutch Association for Voluntary Euthanasia (NVVE)
is founded.
1975: Report of Medial Association: considers passive euthanasia legitimate and in exceptional circumstances would also accept active euthanasia.
1976: European Council urges legislation on euthanasia.
1978: NVVE proposes legislation which would include voluntary active euthanasia under “absence of substantial violation
of the law” (= art. 293 of the Criminal Code)
1981: Wertheim case: a 76-year-old voluntary euthanasia activist is given a conditional sentence of six months for not observing the conditions laid down by the District Court for justifying assisted suicide.
1982: Report of Health Council: restricts sense of “euthanasia” to “intentionally terminating or shortening a patient’s life at
his request or in his interest”. A wide range of other procedures
and omissions are deemed “normal medical practice”.
1982: The Committee of Procurators-General decides that
all cases of euthanasia or assisted suicide must be referred to the
Committee for a decision about prosecution.
1984: Schooneheim case: the Court of Appeals, the Hague
accepts defence based on “necessity” (overmacht)6 in face of a
conflict of duties.
1984: Report of Medical Association: articulates the conditions (“requirements of careful practice”) under which it considers euthanasia performed by a doctor acceptable.
1985: Admiral Case: doctor who follows conditions is not
6
“A person who commits an offense as a result of a force he could not
be expected to resist (overmacht) is not criminally liable” (art. 40, Criminal
Code). GRIFFITHS (99) explains that this principle is interpreted in two ways:
“duress” and “necessity”, the former having been rejected as a line of defence
of accused doctors in various euthanasia trails.
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MARTIN MCKEEVER
prosecuted; the Minister of Justice accepts Medical Association’s
“requirements of careful practice”.
1985: Report of State Commission on Euthanasia.
1986: Council of State advises that time is not ripe for legalizing euthanasia.
1989: Stinissen case: artificial feeding held to be medical
treatment.
1989: NVVE publishes extra-parliamentary bill which would
remove euthanasia and assisted suicide form the Criminal Code.
1991: Remmelink Committee reports on the practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands.
1993: Document of Dutch Government on Euthanasia.
1993: Amendment to the Burial Act : four-step notification
procedure given statutory authority.
1995: Prins case: defence of necessity accepted by Court of
Appeals, Amsterdam in a case of euthanasia without request
(spina bifida baby).
1996: Report van der Wal\ van der Maas, “Euthanasia and
other medical decisions concerning the end of life. Practice and
reporting procedures”: Acknowledges increase in practice of euthanasia and the limitations of the reporting procedure.
2000: Lower Houses passes new legislation.
The most important protagonists in promoting the liberalization of euthanasia legislation, as indicated in the above
chronology, are: the Dutch Parliament, the various Committees
and Commissions appointed by Parliament, the Dutch judiciary, the professional bodies of doctors and lawyers, the medical
institutions (hospitals, nursing homes, hospices), the lobbies,
the individual doctors, the patients and their families. Clearly
these various protagonists operate at very different levels and in
quite different ways, but it is in the complex interactions between them that the promotion of the legislation is to be understood at a pragmatic level. Before proceeding to a review of
the whole process in a semantic and normative perspective,
some brief explanatory comment will first be offered on these
interactions.
559
Protagonists and Procedures
At an immediate level, the decisive pragmatic role in the liberalization of the legislation is played by the Parliament as the
primary legislative organ of the Netherlands. The law voted on
is of course the result of a long and complicated process of investigation, reporting, discussion, negotiation, lobbying and
compromise involving many other agents (see below). In fact on
issues such as euthanasia, the key task of government tends to
be that of considering the claims of the various parties, calculating their political weight and trying to find the form of legislation that will best win the necessary degree of “consensus”. As
the title of the Bill indicates, its immediate purpose is rather limited. The Minister of Justice, Benk Korthals and the Minister of
Health, Dr. Els Borst, explained in a joint statement that the government wanted to bring the existing practice of euthanasia under more appropriate legislative control. In preceding years Parliament had given increasing approval to an administrative and
judicial procedure in which doctors who performed euthanasia
at the patient’s request, fulfilling certain specified conditions,
could presume that no prosecution would take place. The new
legislation therefore constitutes a liberalization of the terms governing an already existing practice.
In political terms the euthanasia issue is a “hot potato” in
that it provokes strong and divisive reactions. Faced with lobby
pressure for legislation the Dutch government has tended not to
act directly but in response to other official structures (e.g. State
Commission, Council of State). In the face of public concern and
agitation caused by specific cases such as those listed above, the
government, at the request of Parliament, decided to commission two reports which were to inform and make recommendations. It is important to notice at a pragmatic level of analysis
that the conditions laid down in the new legislation correspond
to a considerable degree to those formulated in these reports. In
this sense the role of the Parliament is often to endorse positions
which are the result of negotiations and compromises worked
out in extra-parliamentary bodies.
The key institutional interlocutors of such commissions are
the professional bodies representing the professions involved
(medics, lawyers etc). Since these professions have their own
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MARTIN MCKEEVER
codes of practice and their own internal disciplinary boards,
they tend to be involved directly in negotiating the terms of policies which are proposed by the government appointed bodies.
Examples of the pragmatic importance of the professional bodies in promoting the liberalization of euthanasia legislation are
the guidelines issued by the Prosecutors General in 1982 and the
guidelines issued by the Medical Association in 1984. One of the
key reasons for introducing the Dutch legislation was the unsatisfactory legal position of doctors before the law. The new legislation provides for the establishment of special committees comprising at least one lawyer, a doctor and an ethicist to which doctors who practice euthanasia or assist in suicide must report.
The operation of the new legislation presumes the on-going cooperation of the various levels of medical and legal authority.
Another set of political protagonists of undoubted weight
are the lobbies or pressure groups which support the legalization
of euthanasia. The main lobby concerned in the Netherlands is
the Dutch Association for Voluntary Euthanasia, while at an international level EXIT plays a prominent role. It is at this level
that individual citizens tend to become directly involved in influencing the legislative process, either out of personal conviction or because directly affected by the problem. Of their nature
such groups tend to be “one-issue” associations, formed with a
view to promoting a specific cause. They do this by putting pressure on individual politicians, political parties, professional bodies and the government. They bring the issue to the attention of
the press, mobilize “public opinion” and press for or propose
legislation. Since such lobbies tend to present their message in a
polemical form in order to provoke reaction, it is perhaps here
more than elsewhere that the use of rights discourse in the form
of the “right to die” is most in evidence.
Alongside these protagonists active in the political sphere,
we find the various protagonists active in the Dutch judiciary
(the Supreme Court, the Courts of Appeals, the Procurators, the
District courts). In theory the role of such structures is the interpretation and application of existing law. In the case of euthanasia this is extremely delicate, particularly where existing
law seems to be at odds with current medical practice, public
opinion and broader legal theory. The role of the courts in bringing about the liberalization of euthanasia legalization is hard to
561
underestimate in that the reasoning used in the specific judgements given in cases such as those listed above, particularly the
use of overmacht as a line of defence, tends to pass into formulations of policy by committees, professional bodies, hospitals
etc. Whatever the intentions of the judges, it seems hard to deny
that such judgements have been instrumental in bringing about
the de facto extension of the practice of euthanasia and its increasing legal recognition7. While the new legislation does not
formally legalize euthanasia, it does mean that defence lawyers
may now make appeal to a formal legal sanction when euthanasia is performed in accordance with the stipulated conditions.
A pragmatic account of the liberalization of euthanasia legislation must move now to quite a different level of behaviour in
considering the concrete relations between doctors and patients,
located as they usually are in medical institutions. The role of
these parties in the liberalization of legislation is obviously of a
less public and direct nature than that of the legislative and judicial authorities. The “pragmatic” questions at this level extend
to such complex medico-technical issues as the criteria for human death, the efficacy and legitimacy of the use of palliative
drugs, the authority to take decisions on artificial nutrition and
life-support machines, judgements about the autonomy of patients and so forth. Given the complex and technical nature of
these issues, the question arises as to how far the law can and
should lay down what may or may not be legitimately decided
between doctors, families and patients. Our interest is in the way
in which what has actually been done at this level has contributed to the liberalization of the legislation. It seems beyond
dispute that it has been the actual decision by specific doctors
7
“Am wichtigsten war vielmehr der induktive Weg durch die vershiedenen gerechtlichen Instanzen, deren Urteile - aus Anlass einiger in die Öffentlichkeit getragener Präzedenzfälle - zu heftigen Diskussionen führten. In
diesen Urteilen reifte sowohl das Konzept einer Regelung der Euthanasie auf
der Basis des Selbstbestimmungsrechts des Patienten heran als auch das
Spektrum an “Sorgfältigkeitsbestimmungen”, das einen substanziellen Bestandteil der momentanen Neuregelung ausmacht. Politisch würde für ein
“kontrolliertes Experiment” optiert.” WILS, 120.
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MARTIN MCKEEVER
(and at times family or friends of the patient) to engage in euthanasia that has provoked the need for legislation. Such doctors presumably acted in a manner which they consider medically and ethically legitimate and yet they found themselves
open to prosecution. A certain number of them at least also reported their actions to the relevant authorities so that it has been
possible for the reports to supply (limited) information on the
numbers of both voluntary and non-voluntary euthanasia cases
which were actually taking place. In the light of these reports on
medical practice the government decided to maintain the illegality of euthanasia in principle and insisted on reporting procedures. In this sense a good case can be made for the claim that
in pragmatic terms the primary protagonists in promoting the
liberalization of euthanasia legislation have been those doctors
who perform euthanasia and fulfill the criteria of due care.
The final agent to be considered in this analysis is of course
the patient or suffering person who requests that his or her life be
ended. In considering such a person as a protagonist in the legislative process, a number of factors need to be kept in mind.
First among these is the distressing, often dramatically distressing, condition of the patient who may well be faced with severe
and continual physical and mental suffering. Precisely for this
reason, a range of problems arises about the ability of such a
person to make an autonomous and reasonable choice.
Nonetheless, it seems undeniable that considerable numbers of
patients do make such a request either in advance or during the
actual illness. In this sense such patients must be considered
among the protagonists who have brought about the new legislation, in so far as decisions by doctors to perform euthanasia
are generally responses to such requests.
When the patient, for a number of medical reasons, both
physiological and mental, no longer has (or never has had) the
competence to decide what he\she wants, other agents find themselves in the position of taking decisions for the patient. In the
first instance these will be spouses, relatives, friends of the patient, but the role may extend to nursing and medical staff. Considered at a pragmatic level, the step between an individual making a decision to take his own life (or to ask that this be done by
another) and the intervention of a second party to make this decision for the patient is an extremely important one. The most
563
obvious complication is in the widening range of possible motives, intentions, attitudes and interests that come into play
when we pass from the decision of the interested party to the decision of related parties.
In the light of this schematic history of the new Dutch legislation, what can we conclude about the processes and protagonists at a pragmatic level? If we consider this process in reverse
(relative to the above account), that is as starting from the doctor- patient relationship, it could be described grosso modo as
follows: patients ask doctors\relatives to give them lethal drugs,
doctors\relatives act in accordance with these requests, dramatic and disturbing cases are brought to court, the courts interpret
the law in a manner which partially justifies and excuses the offence, media coverage puts the issue on the political agenda,
medical and legal bodies study and formulate conditions for the
regulation of such cases, interest groups press for legislation,
parliament establishes commissions to report on the issue, the
government responds by formulating a bill, the parliament passes an act liberalizing existing legislation.
From these comments on the interactions between the protagonists leading to the liberalization of the Dutch legislation, it
is obvious that we are dealing with a very complex process. As is
the case in other countries, the political and ethical issues involved extend well beyond the hospital bedside to include fundamental questions about the relationship between citizens, intermediate authorities and the State. It is within this complex
set of questions that the use of rights discourse in promoting the
liberalization of euthanasia legislation must be evaluated. Before attempting such an evaluation in a normative perspective,
it will be interesting to notice what emerges if we consider the
role of rights discourse in a semantic perspective.
A Semantic Perspective
The word “semantic” at times carries a somewhat negative
nuance in the sense that it is used to refer to aspects of an issue
which are not substantive but “merely” terminological in nature.
As used here the word carries no such diminutive nuance, but is
rather used to refer to an extremely important, at times perhaps
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MARTIN MCKEEVER
even decisive, dimension of the euthanasia legislation debate.
As distinct from a pragmatic perspective, a semantic perspective brings to light the way in which various nuances of
terms such as “right”, “rights” and “the right to die” take on particular importance when used in specific cultural contexts for
certain political and juridical purposes. In this section, then, our
objective is to study how the semantics of such terms influence
the discussion about liberalizing euthanasia legislation. While
the considerations which follow apply very much to the Dutch
case, they are equally in evidence in such discussions in the
United States, Australia and elsewhere8. It will be suggested here
that the pragmatic dynamics already reviewed and the normative issues yet to be studied are substantially influenced by the
semantics of rights, at times in quite an anomalous and confusing manner.
To appreciate why this is so, one must realize that when
someone, located in contemporary culture, claims the “right to
die” they inscribe that claim in an (on-going) emancipative history in which individuals and groups have struggled for freedom, dignity and equality. Various “parallels” come to mind: the
right to vote was won at the price of campaigning, particularly
on the part of women; the right to express one’s views publicly
was won in the face of censorship and repression; the right to
strike in the face of lock-outs and organized violence; the right
to practise one’s religion freely in the face of bigotry, repression
and war. Through all these processes the very word “right” has
become loaded with the semantic force of a whole constellation
of correlative concepts such as justice, freedom, autonomy, lib-
8
H. KUHSE, “Eutanasia volontaria, politica e diritto. Un resoconto dall’Australia.” Bioetica Rivista Interdisciplinare 2 (1997) 292-300; CARSON, R.
“Washington’s 1- 119” Hastings Center Report 22\2 (1992), this number contains a colloquy on euthanasia and assisted suicide involving a range of authors and positions; among the more recent studies in Italy see G. DE ROSA,
“Eutanasia anche in Italia?” La Civiltà Cattolica 1 (2001) 299-315; S. PRIVITERA, “Il dibattito sull’eutanasia in Italia” Rivisita di teologia morale 129 (2001)
115-122; R. BARCARO, “A proposito del diritto di morire” Bioetica Rivista Interdisciplinare 3 (1996) 499-510.
565
eration and humanitarianism9. The self-understanding of contemporary “Western” society is so intimately linked with this
emancipative history that to question the idea of rights is to appear to put in question the very basis of liberal culture10.
To present the case in favour of euthanasia in such a cultural context in terms of the “right to die” is, then, to locate one’s
claim among those listed above, and so, by semantic association,
to lend a level of moral and political legitimacy to the claim. To
question or resist such a claim, on the other hand, leaves one
open to the charge of denying legitimate rights and therefore of
being politically obstructive or oppressive. It is often more
polemically effective in public debate simply to assert rights
rather than to engage in reflective ethical and political argumentation concerning their justification and application.
Such claims find their most ideological expression when euthanasia is pursued as an item on the so-called “liberal agenda”
(= the liberalization of legislation on contraception, homosexuality, divorce, abortion, assisted procreation, euthanasia, narcotic drugs, experimental research etc.). There are complex moral
issues involved in each of these questions which warrant differentiated ethical analysis and careful judgement about the form
of legislation which best serves in a given cultural context. Within such discussions there is a perfectly legitimate use of rights
discourse as a way of articulating the claims, freedoms and du-
9
For an eloquent, if typically intemperate, exposition of this position in
the context of a defence of euthanasia in terms of individual autonomy see
P. FLORES D’ARCAIS, D. TETTAMANZI “La bioetica tra fede e disincanto”, MicroMega 1 (2001) 31-75. “Per uscire da una situazione di latente o dispegata
guerra civile [...] L’Occidente ha inventato lo strumento di un nucleo minimo di diritti individuali, da sottrarre ad ogni conflitto e che nessuna maggioranza per quanto schiacciante possa rimettere in discussione, dichiarandoli inalienabili (anche se, per dichiararli tali, ha inizialmente dovuto
adottare proprio la strategia di fingerli diritti naturali)” [...] (73).
10
Recently, of course, and not only from ecclesiastical sources, there has
been a lacerating critique of the cultural form which conceives of itself as
liberal and modern in this way. While it is beyond the scope of this piece to
pursue the implications of this critique for the euthanasia question, there is
no doubt that it exposes some of the unquestioned presuppositions and perduring illusions of liberal culture.
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MARTIN MCKEEVER
ties of citizens between themselves and with the State. Rights
discourse becomes blatantly ideological, however, when euthanasia is held to be a right simply because it is (or is held to
be) another step in the programme of extending individual autonomy. An ideological resolution of the problem does not tackle the extremely complex ethical and political issues involved but
assumes that every extension of autonomy is ipso facto a gain.
The semantic force of “right”, in its civil and political connotation, ultimately derives from its use in epistemological and ethical discussion. We will consider this problem at a normative level in due course, but it has its importance at a sheerly semantic
level. Three aspects of the use of rights discourse in this perspective seem to warrant particular attention: i.) the grammar of
the word “right” ii.) the euphemistic character of the phrase “the
right to die” iii.) the relationship between rights and obligations
in the context of euthanasia.
The grammar of the word “right”
The word “right”, taken simply in grammatical terms, is an
extremely interesting heuristic tool for unearthing a range of underlying epistemological, ethical, juridical and political issues.
At a grammatical level the first thing to be noted about this
word as used in a phrase such as “the right to die” is that it is a
noun. This noun is used to refer to a claim of an ethical, juridical or civil nature. A range of such rights is ascribed to all human beings, apparently as self-evident, in such documents as the
1948 Universal Declaration. Used in this way, “rights” are understood as attributes of the autonomous human subject. To
speak of the “right to die” is to use the same terminology as such
documents, even though no such right is recognized by them. In
the promotion of euthanasia legislation, particularly in the context of lobbying and journalism, the “right to die” terminology
has become very widespread11 although it is normally used with-
11
In radio and television interviews in Italy the illustrious nonagenarian Indro Montanelli, - recently deceased - not without a touch of self-irony,
has spoken of euthanasia as “un diritto sacrosancto”(!).
567
out explaining which type of claim in being made and on what
basis12.
The second thing to notice in grammatical terms about the
word “right” is that it also has a very wide use as an adjective.
This adjective carries two main semantic charges: “right” in the
sense of correct (true, veracious) and right in the sense of just
(fair, equitable, reasonable). It is important to notice the difference between describing a course of action as “right” in the
sense of fair, reasonable and just and ascribing a “right” to a subject. It is one thing, that is, to describe a given behaviour in the
face of a dying patient as “right” (both in the sense of reasonable
and in the sense of fair) and it is quite another to assert on this
basis that the patient has a right to die or to be killed13. The substantive form (having a right) is of course closely associated semantically with the adjectival form (being right). There is a tendency, however, to bypass the epistemological, ethical and juridical justification involved in describing something (adjectivally) as right and simply to assert the (substantive) right at a
12
The semantics of the phrase “the right to die” have been articulated
over the years by numerous authors from various intellectual traditions. Of
perduring interest in this respect H. JONAS, “The Right to Die” The Hastings
Center Report 4 (1978) 31-361; D. M. HIGH, “Is ‘Natural Death’ an Illusion?”
The Hastings Center Report 4 (1978) 3 7-42; L.R. KASS, “Is There a Right to
Die?” Hastings Center Report 23 (1993) 34-43. For an anthology of classical
and contemporary texts on death and euthanasia see A. BONDOLFI, Malattia,
Eutanasia e Morte nella discussione contemporanea (Bologna: Dehoniano,
1989).
13
J. FINNIS offers a lucid study of the idea of right and rights in a philosophical and juridic perspective in his recent Aquinas: Moral, Political, and
Legal Thought. Series: Founders of Modern Social and Political Thought, 1.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). Finnis, however, would appear to
have little difficulty passing from jus as understood by Aquinas to the use of
human rights in contemporary juridical discourse: “When Aquinas says that
ius is the object of justice, he means: what justice is about, and what doing
justice secures, is the right of some other person or persons - what is due to
them, what they are entitled to, what is rightfully theirs.” (133) However legitimate as a reading of Aquinas, the use of this line of reasoning as the foundation of “human rights” in contemporary political culture (see 132-140) is
a move which would seem to require considerably more qualification at the
level of political and juridical mediation than Finnis offers.
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MARTIN MCKEEVER
civil and political level. In terms of polemical conflict this may
work (one may get one’s bill passed) but if the underlying issues
have not been addressed the basis of the claimed rights remains
obscure. We will have reason to observe some of these problems
presently in a normative perspective.
The euphemistic quality of the term “The right to die”
As in the word “euthanasia”, so in the word “euphemism”,
the prefix indicates that something is being made better or
sweeter than it might otherwise be. The phrase “the right to die”,
examined in semantic perspective, proves to be a euphemism in
that it is a sweeter way of describing actions which can be more
accurately described in quite different terms14. Taken literally,
the term “the right to die” (surely better expressed as “the right
to be allowed to die”) might be used to assert nothing more than
the claim that a person who is dying should not be prevented
from doing so by the use of ineffective and burdensome means
of preserving life, particularly if he or she has indicated such a
wish. In the context of highly advanced and innovative medical
technology, there is no doubt that problems of this kind do arise.
There are complex questions to be faced when confronted with
situations of this kind, but what must be acknowledged is that
they are not the same questions as those involved in a decision
to end the life of the patient directly and deliberately15. “The
right to die” can be a quite misleading form of euphemistic
shorthand for saying that I have a right to kill myself, that others have the right to kill me, that I have the right to ask others to
kill me or that (under certain circumstances) I have the right to
kill others. Each of these is a possible position for which ethical
14
For a sharp critique of this tendency to use euphemistic language in
the context of euthanasia see KASS, 41-42.
15
For critical discussion of this distinction between killing and letting
die see in particular: T. BEAUCHAMP, “The medical ethics of physician-assisted suicide” Journal of Medical Ethics 25 (1999) 437-439; L. SOWLE CAHILL,
“Respecting Life and Causing Death” Concilium (1985) 29-38; M. MORI, “Dal
vitalismo medico alla moralità dell’eutanasia” Bioetica VII\1 (1999) 109-123.
569
arguments can be brought, but surely every such position should
be proposed and defended as such (“in its own right”, as we
tellingly say) and not subsumed under the more general expression “the right to die”. If used at all, in the interests of clarity and
honesty the term “the right to die” should be reserved for the
narrower claim concerning the legitimate refusal of ineffective
and burdensome treatment.
The correlation of rights and obligations
One of the most perduring and vexed points of debate in discussions about rights is the correlation between rights and
obligations. Some authors seem ready to ascribe rights wholesale without ever explaining who (if anybody) is obliged to guarantee these rights, not to mention how they are supposed to do
so; other authors focus on the bearer of the rights and ascribe to
that same bearer a neatly corresponding set of obligations; others again suggest that we should reverse the traditional emphasis on rights and think primarily in terms of obligations. This is
not the place to broach this complex theoretical question16, but
the question itself is illuminating if we apply it to the “right to
die” claim.
However one construes the relationship between rights and
obligations, at a semantic level it is important to note that the assertion of the right to euthanasia (as opposed to the act of euthanasia, the desire for euthanasia, the need for euthanasia etc.)
implies that (some) others are under an obligation to perform
euthanasia. Who these others are, and just what their obligation
consist in, will depend on the way in which the right-obligation
axis is conceived. Those who maintain that doctors or nursing
homes have an obligation, under certain conditions, to perform
16
For further discussion and extensive bibliographical reference see: N.
LERNER, “A Secular View of Human Rights”, The Journal of Law and Religion
XIV\I (1999-2000) 67-76; J. PORTER, “From Natural Law to Human Rights:
Or, Why Rights Talk Matters”, The Journal of Law and Religion XIV\ I (19992000) 77-96.
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euthanasia if requested, generally do not suggest that therefore
each individual doctor is under such an obligation, regardless of
his or her personal convictions.
If one tries to translate right claims into terms of obligations, the semantics of the discussion prove interesting. It may
be asserted, for instance, uncontroversially, that the human being has certain obligations toward himself (herself) and also that
there are limits to these obligations. Such an assertion concerning the limits of the obligation to sustain one’s own life can be
made without imposing obligations on others (beyond those of
recognizing the said limits). If a right to end one’s life, or have it
ended, is asserted, this implies that others are under some form
of obligation to collaborate in ending the life of the claimant. It
is one thing, in other words, to assert a limitation on the obligation to sustain one’s own life and another to say that one therefore has a “right to die”. It is of course a lot more comfortable to
talk about other people’s rights rather than about our own obligations. What is it easier to say: that the cancer patient has “the
right to die” or that we (the family, the medical institution, the
society) have the obligation to give him or her a lethal injection?
If there is no obligation on anyone to guarantee such a right,
then it would seem both nonsensical and hypocritical to simply
attribute it. At a semantic level one notes in the case of euthanasia, as in so many other cases, that rhetoric concerning the
rights of others can afford to be generous, whereas declaration
of one’s own obligations tends to be much more economical.
It is within a cultural context highly charged polemically
with rights discourse that the semantics of the “right to die”
claim must be read and evaluated. In order to be able to do this
more effectively, and in order to be able to include deliberations
of an informed and systematic ethical nature, we pass on now to
the consideration of the problem in a normative perspective.
A Normative Perspective
Adopting a normative perspective on the liberalization of euthanasia legislation means attempting to evaluate the whole
process of liberalization, and in particular the moral arguments
used within that process, according to some declared ethical cri-
571
teria. In attempting to do so, it is important to note at the outset
that rights discourse is often used in such a process without any
attempt to explain the basis of the claims being made in systematic ethical terms. The interplay of political and judicial
forces, particularly when operating under pressure, may leave
little room for serious ethical discussion. Nonetheless claims
such as that of “the right to die” can be located and analysed in
ethical terms because they imply some kind of judgement about
what is morally right and morally wrong in euthanasia cases. It
is not our purpose here to enter into the extremely complex
moral judgements which arise in specific cases, but rather to
present and elucidate the normative issues involved in an orderly way, pointing out in particular where the arguments used in
favour of euthanasia give most cause for pause. Since a number
of the normative considerations which follow are common to
those who view the question in a religious perspective and those
who do not, it seems best to present the explicitly theological arguments in a separate section. As in the previous section the new
Dutch legislation will serve as an illustration of similar dynamics in evidence elsewhere.
Normative considerations deriving from general ethical theory
1. In normative terms, it is important to notice, first of all,
that the new legislation in the Netherlands does not entail any
change to the formal legal norm prohibiting killing17. This is perhaps so obvious that it is simply taken for granted, but it means
that there is still a basic conformity in principle between the legal and the ethical prohibition on killing18. The new law does not
17
For purposes of law, “euthanasia” in Dutch law is limited to those cases in which a doctor deliberately acts so as to cause the death of a patient,
usually at the patient’s request or that of relatives.
18
It may of course be argued on the basis of the "slippery slope" image
that such a law de facto weakens the legal prohibition on killing in that it
adds momentum to the forces engaged in promoting euthanasia. See the
statement of the Dutch Bishops in L'Osservatore Romano, 2\12\2000. See also R.Gillon's editorial "Euthanasia in the Netherlands - down the slippery
slope?" Journal of Medical Ethics 25 (1999) 3-4.
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MARTIN MCKEEVER
acknowledge a general “right to die”, much less a general “right
to kill”, but specifies circumstances in which no prosecution will
take place even if “ending life” takes place. Furthermore the law
stipulates constraints and limitations on what doctors may do
for (to? with?) dying patients, indicating that there are legal reasons to control and limit the kind of behaviour involved. Where
individuals abrogate the right to take the lives of others to themselves, or where doctors fail to follow the procedure indicated,
they violate the existing laws prohibiting killing and remain
open to persecution.
There is presumably an ethical basis to this abiding legal
prohibition on killing. The problem is to articulate this in such
a way that claims about exceptions to it can be measured against
some declared criteria. It would greatly help the legal debate
about euthanasia if the ethical foundation of the general prohibition were more adequately articulated Where this ethical
foundation is presumed but not articulated, and where the euthanasia claim is asserted but not justified, there is no framework within which one can evaluate the arguments brought in
favour of making an exception to the general prohibition. In this
way it is possible to maintain one position on taking life in general and another on taking the life of sick or old people, for example, without having to face the task of normative justification.
We will consider the underlying reasons for this fission of law
and ethics below, but for the moment it is important to notice
that the onus is on the proponents of liberalization to produce a
normative articulation of the reasons why an exception should
be made to the existing prohibition on killing.
2. Similar ethical groundwork needs to be done with regard
to suicide. If it is morally legitimate for a person to commit suicide in other circumstances then there is no need to agonize
about the morality of suicide in circumstances of suffering and
imminent death, tragic as these may be they are not ethically decisive if it is morally legitimate for someone to commit suicide
anyway19. Even where the moral legitimacy of suicide is admit-
19
Suicide has been a matter of moral debate since antiquity and remains a distinct, if closely related, question from that of euthanasia. Recent
573
ted, however, there remains the question of passing from this
normative judgement on an action to the assertion of a right to
commit suicide, with the concomitant implications with regard
to obligations on others, the legitimacy of assisting etc.
3. There is of course a serious moral difference between injecting someone with an overdose of morphine because you want
to inherit their money or because you hate them and doing so because you cannot bear to see them suffer. It is also reasonable that
this moral difference be given legal expression in that tribunals
take this fact into consideration when judging particular cases
and deciding sentences. Dissenting from the liberalization of the
law does not commit one to undifferentiated moral assessment or
undifferentiated application of the law in the wide range of cases
which occur under the umbrella term “euthanasia”.
4. Another level of normative analysis concerns not so much
the detailed contents of a specific law as the simple fact that it is
a piece of positive legislation. Such a law may, as in the Netherlands, give a certain legal validity to what is already happening
in practice. If what is happening is morally wrong, then in normative terms the introduction of the legal sanction does not
change this fact. The moral objection to the law therefore is not
simply that it permits illicit killing but that it gives this action a
juridical justification. In particular the use of the legal principle
of necessity (overmacht) by no means constitutes a moral argument justifying such action20. The concrete response of individuals to the law should therefore include a moral evaluation of
what the law permits or tolerates. Thus, for example, medical
staff who are convinced that it is morally wrong to practise euthanasia or assist in suicide must make moral decisions about
what they are prepared to do and what they are not prepared to
do in the face of such requests. This distinction between the
legally permissible and the morally right has implications for the
discussion is to be found in D. DE LEO\P. MARIETTA, “Considerazioni sulla
razionalità del suicidio e sul diritto alla morte.” Bioetica Rivista Interdisciplinare 2 (1997) 193-208; D. M. CLARKE, “Autonomy, rationality and the wish
to die.” Journal of Medical Ethics 25 (1999) 457-462.
20
A. M. CAPRON elaborates on this position in “Euthanasia in the Netherlands, American Observations” Hastings Center Report 22\2 (1992) 30-33.
574
MARTIN MCKEEVER
citizens in general and for their political representatives.
Those who are convinced of the immorality of euthanasia
are faced with the delicate judgement as to whether and how
they should seek to translate this moral conviction into political
and juridical terms. At this point the normative question includes both the moral problems involved in the specific issue of
euthanasia plus the additional moral problem as to what kind of
legislation best serves a given society, particularly a society in
which there is little agreement on the specific issue at a normative level21. It is important to note that these normative questions
can and do arise without necessarily making appeal to theological norms. (There is a disreputable polemical tendency among
some commentators to present all opposition to euthanasia as if
it were ipso facto the result of clerical obscurantism).
5. As noted above, the new Dutch law does not acknowledge
the alleged “the right to die” in the broad sense of the right to euthanasia on request. Yet this claim, in its various formulations,
remains germane to the public campaign for further liberalization. An important normative question concerns the category of
rights (natural, human, civil, political) to which such a claim is
held to belong. To place it in the category of natural rights
(which seems the most reasonable given the arguments used) is
embarrassing for the proponents because it implies an ethical vision based on some form of natural law, so anathema to such
circles; to place it in the category of human rights is not easy
since in these terms it must appear as a kind of oversight on the
part of those who articulated the existing human rights declarations; to place it in the last two categories is to raise the sceptre
of positivism with its concomitant difficulties in terms of ethical
justification, cultural diversity and arbitrariness. The difficulty
of classification of an alleged “right to die” is symptomatic of
more fundamental normative problems involved in moving from
21
At this point one has to revisit the arguments about the relationship
between morality and law in such matters as contraception, divorce and
abortion. For an interesting discussion by an expert moralist and lawyer see:
P. HANNON, Church, State, Morality and Law. (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan,
1992).
575
an ethical judgement to a rights claim. If this is a difficult move
in the case of other rights, it is particularly perplexing in the case
of a right which would lead to the elimination of the claimant.
6. Finally, and more generally, a normative perspective alerts
us to the fact that underlying all of these considerations is a
large degree of dissent at the level of fundamental ethical theory.
Among the many ethical theories which can be found in the arguments brought in favour of liberalizing euthanasia are utilitarianism, emotivism and juridic positivism. Whole books have
been written on each of these ways of doing ethics and it is clearly not possible to revise them here. It is worth noting however
that these ethical systems are by no means the only ones and
that they themselves are the products of the cultural context
studied earlier. When “an ethicist” is appointed to a review committee it is important to remember that she or he will presumably be operating within some ethical system such as those mentioned above. There are however other “ethicists” who operate
within quite different and often conflicting systems. This is true
even among “secular” ethicists, but it will become all the more
obvious as we pass on now to consider arguments of a specifically theological nature.
Normative considerations deriving from theological ethical
reasoning
Needless to say, Christianity is not to be reduced to an ethical system: the christian responds to the fact of suffering, sickness and death (his\her own or that of others) in a whole range
of ways on the basis of faith, prayer, grace and salvation. What
is of interest here is the normative import of the christian vision
of human life for the issue that we have been examining. Introducing theological considerations in a separate section does not
imply that the normative considerations noted above will be absent from a comprehensive ethico-theological evaluation of euthanasia legislation. It is simply that the considerations which
follow make explicit claim to theological authority, whereas
those above do not.
The most obvious sources for an articulation of the Catholic
position on euthanasia and assisted suicide are the 1981 SCDF
Declaration on Euthanasia, the encyclical Evangelium Vitae and
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MARTIN MCKEEVER
the The Cathecism of the Catholic Church. The ethico-theological
argumentation of these texts has been widely discussed over the
years and will not be rehearsed here22. All three texts move from
a faith conviction concerning creation, through an assertion of
human dignity as rooted in the belief that man is made in the
image of God, to a declaration of the inalienable right to life. It is
from these theological convictions that the moral prohibition on
taking innocent life follows, under which both euthanasia and
assisted suicide are to be included. Our purpose at this point is
limited to considering the import of this line of argumentation
for the debate about liberalizing euthanasia legislation, particularly with regard to the use of rights discourse.
Any attempt to locate the doctrine of creation within the euthanasia debate exposes immediately the fact that the underlying problem is not simply ethical in nature but extends to fundamental positions of a theological, philosophical and anthropological nature. In this perspective the euthanasia debate is
seen to be one more example of a clash of quite incompatible
views of the world and of human life. On the one hand there are
those who approach the euthanasia question basing their
thought on the presuppositions of secular liberalism (= the selfsufficiency of human reason, the autonomy of the individual,
the private nature of morality etc.) and attempt to discern the
rights and wrongs of the matter by using a pragmatic or utilitarian ethics. On the other hand there are those who believe that
the mystery of God is the daily source of human life, which is
first and foremost sheer gift and which calls us to respond to this
gift through a life nourished by grace and guided by virtue. The
22
Ample bibliographical references concerning both Catholic bioethical principles in general and the euthanasia question in particular can be
found in: M.P. FAGGIONI, “Stato vegativo permanente” Studia Moralia
XXXVII\2 (1999) 371-411; E. KOWALSKI, “Quale uomo e quale etica per la
bioetica?” Studia Moralia XXXIX\1 (2001) 175-195. Useful studies which
treat the juridical aspect of the question include: L. SOWLE CAHILL, “Rights
as Religious or Secular- Why Not Both?” The Journal of Law and Religion
XIV\I (1999-2000) 41-76; P. BORSELLINO, Bioetica tra autonomia e diritto.
(Milano: Zadig, 1999); F. D’AGOSTINO, “Diritto e eutanasia” Bioetica VII\1
(1999) 94-108; A. TARANTINO, “Euthanasia, diritto alla vita e diritto penale”
Medicina e Morale 5 (1994) 865-901.
577
radically contrasting nature of these visions is well brought out
in the contrasting reactions to the idea of a “right to die”. In the
former vision such a claim seems the logical, self-evident and utterly reasonable corollary of being the author of one’s own destiny. In the latter vision the idea of a “right to die” (in the sense
of a right to active voluntary euthanasia) is absurd in that it projects the juridical and political relations that are possible between human beings into the utterly different kind of relationship that exists between Creator and creature. This is not to say
that the fact of being created of itself indicates the right course
of action in traumatic medical circumstances, here as elsewhere
christian ethics presumes a form of human autonomy. The point
is that there is no form of discourse which can contain and reconcile both visions or traditions in such a way as to reach “consensus”. The root of ethical dissent on euthanasia, as on so
much else, is not to be found in the alternative judgements about
the legitimacy of a given action but rather in the underlying
views of God, of the human being and of the world. Whereas one
might succeed in deluding oneself as to reaching consensus on
the morality of a particular action, it is hard to delude oneself
about the fact that between conceiving human life as created
and conceiving human life as not created there is (literally) a
world of a difference, with all the consequences of that difference for ethics.
Does this mean that dialogue about euthanasia between
christians and non-christians is destined to remain a dialogue de
sourds? If “dialogue” assumes or implies a discourse capable of
overarching these theological, philosophical and anthropological differences then the answer to this question has to be yes. If,
on the other hand, dialogue refers to the more modest project of
searching for convergences between different but not utterly incommensurable discourses then there would seem to be some
possibility of contact. The classical example of this in the field of
ethics is the idea (or the ideas) of natural law, which attempts to
articulate the morally good by making appeal to (a certain conception of) reason. In the specific case of euthanasia the most
promising candidate for the point of convergence between the
christian tradition and that of secular liberalism is the dignity of
the human person. This idea finds easy consent, at least notionally, among all parties. While in theological terms the idea is
578
MARTIN MCKEEVER
linked to the relationship between Creator and creature, the idea
itself is accessible to and shared by many who do not share the
religious conviction. The frailty of this idea as a basis for a common ethic, however, shows up clearly in the euthanasia debate
where is proves to be a two-edged sword. In the polemical use of
such suggestive phrases as “dying with dignity” one sees how the
idea can be deployed in the articulation of autonomy arguments
in favour of euthanasia. This does not of course mean that christians should abandon the idea of human dignity, but it does alert
us to the fact that such ideas are not free-floating but are intimately tied to the broader theological \ ethical visions within
which they are used.
So we come inevitably to the use of rights discourse within
theological reasoning itself The normative prohibition on
killing (of the innocent), present in Catholic ethical tradition
long before rights discourse, at least as we know it today, became so popular, is often expressed today in the recognition of
the “right to life”. This is not the place to go into the historical
origins of this terminology, but it should at least be noticed that
this phrase, so often presented as self-evident, needs a considerable degree of explanation. The same semantic and normative
questions which arise around the idea of a “right to die” arise also concerning the idea of a “right to life”. When the idea is used
in specifically theological terms, additional elucidation is necessary in order to locate this idea in the relationship between
Creator and creature. In particular, perplexity arises concerning
the relationship between this right and specific ethical norms
concerning euthanasia. Do the norms derive from the right or
vice-versa? If such questions are not clarified in terms of fundamental ethical theory there is a grave risk that the use of
rights discourse within theological ethics will be confused with
the often ambiguous use of rights discourse in secular discourse. Once again the problem is to locate a term such as the
“right to life” within the ethical tradition in which it is deployed
by explaining how it is integrated into that tradition and why it
cannot be extirpated from it and inserted arbitrarily into rival
ethical systems.
579
Conclusion
This article began by considering the different types of society which result from the different ways in which politics, law
and ethics interact as spheres of action and thought. Our illustrative study of euthanasia legislation in the Netherlands, and
the more general considerations to which that study gave rise,
amply demonstrate the complexity of the interaction of these
spheres. In particular, we have had occasion to note the way in
which rights discourse plays a pivotal role in this interaction in
that it is used in all three spheres. The pragmatic, semantic and
normative perspectives adopted on this interaction helped to unveil the different ways in which rights discourse is understood
and used in the euthanasia debate. In the light of these various
perspectives, what can we conclude about the kind of society
which liberalizes euthanasia legislation in the way that the
Netherlands has just done?
The most obvious characteristic of such societies, and here
the Netherlands is more or less typical, is a pronounced fission
between politics and law on the one hand and ethics on the other. While there is no shortage of ethical discussion, both in
favour of euthanasia and against it, it is not at all clear what role
such discussion has in the overall process which leads to new
legislation. Ethical argumentation would seem to be an ineffective force within political and legislative processes such as the
one studied above. Ethics appears to be conceived of as a subsidiary and optional contribution to a political process which ostensibly functions better without any explicit appeal to ethical
theory. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the supposed
integration of ethics in this dynamic is more notional than real
and that the conclusions reached derive from the interplay of
political and juridical forces operating at quite other levels.
Second, and as a direct consequence of this first conclusion,
one must recognize that the euthanasia question is much more
than a debate about certain traumatic medical situations. It is
rather exemplary of a wider and deeper dissent as to who and
what human beings are, what is right and wrong, what is suffering and what is life and death. Questions of this kind, however,
as we have seen above, cannot be answered without reference to
the cultural milieu in which they are posed. The idea of a “right
580
MARTIN MCKEEVER
to die”, in particular, is not being promoted on the moon or in
ancient Mesopotamia but in contemporary, Western, liberal,
capitalist culture. Based on the presuppositions and prejudices
of such a culture the idea of such a right can appear reasonable
and sensible, if not actually imperative. It is naive to broach the
ethical discussion of such claims without taking cognizance of
the more fundamental questions of social and political ethics to
which such a culture itself gives rise.
Finally, within discussions about liberalizing euthanasia the
use of rights discourse warrants particular attention and vigilance. While no system of law has formally established the “right
to die”, this form of propaganda is very much in use. As time
goes on it is to be expected that efforts will be made to have
such a right formally recognized. Institutional response to such
a proposal is likely to be decided through a complex interaction
of forces such as that studied above. The conclusion of this piece
is that there is a pressing need in political, juridical and ethical
circles to engage in critical reflection upon rights, upon the relationship between rights and ethics and upon the use of rights
discourse in political activity. If such positions are not articulated more adequately and presented more effectively in public debate, then it is by no means beyond the bounds of possibility
that the current drive to acknowledge this one last right, however illusory, will ultimately be juridically successful.
MARTIN MCKEEVER, C.Ss.R.
Via Merulana, 31
C.P. 2458
00100 Roma
Italy
—————
Summary / Resumen
In this article the author applies the general argument concerning
the use of human rights discourse in ethics to the particular case of euthanasia, sometimes presented under the idea of “the right to die”. The
new euthanasia legislation in N etherlands is taken as an illustration of
how rights discourse is inserted in a complex political and juridical
process. Having recorded this process in a pragmatic perspective, the
581
focus broadens to consider the idea of the “right to die” in a semantic
and normative perspective. It emerges that the euthanasia question is
one more example of the fission of ethics and politics in liberal culture,
a fission in which rights discourse tends to play an important role.
En este artículo el autor aplica el argumento general sobre la práctica de los derechos humanos a disertar en ética sobre la cuestión especial de la eutanasia, presentada a veces bajo la idea del “derecho a
morir”. Se toma como referencia la nueva legislación sobre la eutanasia en Holanda, para demostrar cómo el tema de los derechos se ubica
en un complejo proceso político y jurídico. Al mostrar este proceso en
una perspectiva pragmática, el enfoque se amplía para examinar la idea
del “derecho a morir” en una perspectiva semántica y normativa. Se
nota cómo la cuestión de la eutanasia es un ejemplo más de la ruptura
de ética y política en la cultura liberal, una fractura en la que el tema
de los derechos tiende a jugar un cometido importante.
—————
The author is an Invited Professor at the Alphonsian Academy.
El auctor es profesor invitado en la Academia Alfonsiana.
—————
StMor 39 (2001) 583-590
PETER DRUM
“AIDS PREVENTION AND THE LESSER EVIL”:
RESPONSE
In the context of his “AIDS Prevention and the Lesser Evil”1,
Brian Johnstone refers to St Thomas Aquinas and the Principle
of Double-Effect. Johnstone says: “St Thomas does not require
that an act in itself be objectively good or indifferent, since such
a question does not make sense in his framework. It would not
be meaningful to ask, for example, whether swinging a battle axe
at one’s attacker’s head, was ‘objectively’ in itself good or indifferent, since this is to attempt to consider the object as separate
from the subject, and to discern its moral condition in this separated state.”2 But this cannot be Aquinas’s position, for two reasons. Firstly, Aquinas himself distinguishes between objectively
good acts and subjectivity. Thus: “…when a man wills to give
alms for the sake of vainglory, he wills that which is good in itself, under a species of evil; and therefore, as willed by him, it is
evil”3. Secondly, the suggestion is quite clearly absurd. There is
an obvious distinction between what agents are actually doing –
their objective activities – and what they are trying to do – what
they subjectively intend. As Aristotle notes, there is a class of involuntary actions termed compulsory, where “the moving principle is outside, being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who is acting or feeling the passion, e.g.,
if he were carried somewhere by a wind, or by men who had him
in their power”4. Thus, it is possible for someone to commit “a
wrongful act under pressure which overstrains human nature
and which no-one could withstand”5. Furthermore, there is an-
1
2
3
4
5
Studia Moralia, 39 (2001), pp. 197-216.
Ibid, p. 205.
Summa Theologica, 1a2ae. 19, 7 ad 2. (Emphasis added.)
Nicomachean Ethics, III, 1.
Ibid.
584
PETER DRUM
other class of involuntary actions which are due to ignorance:
“…of what he is doing a man might be ignorant, as for instance
people say ‘it slipped out of their mouths as they were speaking’,
or ‘they didn’t know it was a secret’ …or a man might say he ‘let
it go off when he merely wanted to show its working’, as the man
did with the catapult. Again, one might think one’s son was an
enemy… or that a pointed spear had a button on it, or that a
stone was pumice stone; or one might give a man a draught to
save him, and really kill him; or one might want to touch a man,
as people do in sparring, and really wound him”6. Thus, wrongful acts can also be committed unwittingly. Indeed, Johnstone
himself is well aware that for Aquinas violence against attackers
must be proportionate to the offence and should not go beyond
what is required in self-defence7. Consequently, unless these requirements of objective rectitude are in fact met by agents in
their actions, the actions will be objectively wrong whatever the
agents are trying to do. (Naturally this does not mean that
agents are blameworthy for doing the wrong thing, unless of
course their compulsion and /or ignorance is self-induced8).
Johnstone now proceeds to discuss the issue of counselling
the lesser evil, such as persuading those infected with the HIV
virus who will not abstain from sexual activity to at least use
condoms. He observes: “In the context of the objectivist version
of the principle of double-effect, if such counselling is to be justified, it must be shown that the act of counselling the lesser evil
is not evil in itself”9. This is correct – the Pauline Principle states
that evil should not be done that good might come10, so a counsellor is only permitted to direct the person to the lesser evil if
giving such advice is considered to be a good, or at least indifferent, act. However, Johnstone then concludes: “Counselling
the lesser evil will not be acceptable within the objectivist model, since this model requires that the source of morality be located in the object, separated from and standing over against the
6
Ibid.
Op cit, p. 205.
8
Nicomachean Ethics, III, 5.
9
Ibid, p. 212.
10
See Romans, 3: 8.
7
“AIDS PREVENTION AND THE LESSER EVIL”: RESPONSE
585
subject”11. But why should this follow? The objective rectitude of
actions depends upon the objective circumstances of the actions,
as Aristotle notes: “…in the abstract no one throws goods away
voluntarily, but on condition of its securing the safety of himself
and his crew any sensible man does so”12. So, if the circumstances dictate that the only probable outcomes are lesser and
greater evils, directing agents to choose a lesser evil cannot be
wrong but right. Thus, Aquinas argues against laws forbidding
all vices precisely along these lines: “Wherefore it [human law]
does not lay upon the multitude of imperfect men the burdens
of those who are already virtuous, viz. that they should abstain
from all evil. Otherwise these imperfect ones, being unable to
bear such precepts, would break out into yet greater evils…”13.
That is, legislators should choose the lesser evil of an incomplete
system of laws, as sanctions against all vices would be socially
catastrophic.
Therefore, Johnstone is wrong in thinking that Aquinas’s
version of double-effect does not require that an act in itself be
objectively good or indifferent, in addition to the subjective consideration of intentions. Furthermore, he is also mistaken in
thinking that objectivists cannot rightfully counsel people to
choose the lesser evil.
PETER DRUM
—————
(Peter Drum is Lecturer in Philosophy at the School of Philosophy,
St. Patrick’s Campus, Australian Catholic University, Locked Bag
4115, Fitzroy 3065, Victoria, Australia.)
—————
11
12
13
Op cit, p. 214.
Op cit, III, 1.
Op cit, 1a2ae. 96, 2 ad 2.
586
BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
AIDS Prevention: A Response to Peter Drum
I am grateful for the opportunity to make some clarifications and comments. In the text under discussion, S.Th. II-II,
q. 64, a. 7, St. Thomas treats the question of the lawfulness of
killing in self-defence. I pointed out that, in this text, St.
Thomas does not raise the question of whether the act is objectively good or indifferent in itself. In particular he does not
ask whether the material act, in itself, has a moral status (goodness or indifference) such that it may be chosen as the embodiment of the intention to protect one’s life. Nor does he ask
whether the material act is objectively evil in itself such that it
may not be so chosen. It is simply a matter of fact: these questions, in this form, are not to be found in St. Thomas’s text. St.
Thomas does not employ the categories of the “principle of the
double effect” as these were developed later.
I did not claim that St. Thomas has no place in his general
moral theory for the notion of acts that are good or evil in
themselves. I was seeking to trace the principle of double effect
in the tradition, not to analyse St. Thomas’s moral theory. St.
Thomas speaks of acts that are de se bonum and secundum se
malum, which may be translated as good in themselves and evil
in themselves. These terms refer to a moral act, that is the willing of the object presented by the reason. When St. Thomas
designates an act as de se bonum (or malum) he considers such
an act prescinding from the intention of the end. But he is not
considering the act as separated altogether from the reason
and will of the subject. Nor does he consider the subject as separated altogether from the object. He does not use the term
“subjectivity” which would presumably imply such a separation, that is, the condition of a form of inner consciousness, detached from acting in the world. “Subjectivity” is a term that is
characteristic of the later theories, developed in the so-called
modern era.
Thus St. Thomas, in writing of acts which are in themselves good or evil, is clearly not thinking about acts which are
done unwittingly, to use Drum’s phrase, that is, where the agent
is ignorant of the real nature of the act. Such actions, mentioned in the citation by Drum from Aristotle (III, 1) are involuntary, as is clear in the text. They are not moral acts. St.
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Thomas is discussing moral acts, that is, acts where the object
is presented to the will by reason, where the agent knows what
is going on, and freely chooses to act. To say that an act is good
or evil in itself means that it is morally good or evil, prescinding from the further consideration of the intention. The issue is
not the physical condition of the act apart from the reason and
will of the subject.
To be killed by a spear is a physical evil, brought about by the
physical act of the thrower. Killing another is out of order,
whether the agent was aware of what he was doing or not. But
this disordered condition is not what Thomas means when he
says that an act is evil “in itself “ As has been already pointed out,
he refers to a moral act, whose moral meaning is established,
prescinding from consideration of the intention of the end. (St.
Thomas’s distinction between malum, peccatum and culpa, made
in De Malo, would be helpful here.) Whether there is moral evil
present in the moral act of the thrower depends on whether he
knew or should have known what he was doing, when he threw
and brought about the disorder. Drum seems to miss the fundamental distinction between physical and moral evil.
Let us turn now to a text cited by Drum in support of his
claim that St. Thomas distinguished between “objectively good
acts” and “subjectivity,” namely S. Th. I-II, q. 19, a. 7. ad 2. The
article addresses the question of whether the goodness of the
will, which means here the willing of the means to an end, depends on the intention of the end. This can be explained in
terms of the example given by St. Thomas. An agent wills to
give alms to a poor person. But this particular agent wills to
give these alms in order to build up for himself an enhanced
reputation (vain-glory). It is presumed that such a willing, the
intention to promote his own reputation, is evil. The question
is: does this affect the goodness of the willing of the alms giving itself. I use this somewhat cumbersome expression “willing” to indicate that St. Thomas is discussing the moral act of
alms giving, not simply the physical act.
In this article, St. Thomas uses the terms de se bonum (ad
2) and secundum se malum. (ad 3). These terms refer to the
moral meaning of the act, prescinding from the intention, that
is, the willing of the act for a further end. He does not use the
terms “objectively good acts” or “subjectivity.” He does of
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BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
course employ the word “object.” St. Thomas writes that the
good is presented to the will as object, and insofar as the object
falls within the order of reason it belongs in the moral order,
and causes moral goodness in the act of the will. (S.Th. I-II, q.
19, a. 1, ad 3.). Thus reason presents the good of almsgiving to
the will as object. But reason may present almsgiving to the
will as evil, when the reason for giving the alms is to gain vain
glory.
St. Thomas argues that the goodness of the will, in regard to
the alms giving, does indeed depend on the intention, or willing,
of the end. He considers the case where the intention of the end,
that is the willing of one’s own vain-glory, is the cause of the willing of the alms-giving. The structure of the moral act is now
such that the alms-giving is ordered to the end (finis) of one’s
own glory. That is, the agent now wills the alms-giving precisely
as a means to self-exaltation. This now becomes the ratio, or
morally determinative meaning, according to which he wills the
alms-giving. In other words, this modifies the object of the act of
the will, that is, the will bearing on the giving of alms. In short,
he now judges that this almsgiving is a good way to boost himself, and for this reason, wills to give the alms. The notion of object is thus a most important one, both in the particular article
under discussion and in St. Thomas’s general moral theory. But
“object” as used in these texts has a particular meaning and it is
not necessarily that implied in the term “objectively” which was
introduced at a later time.
Drum might well have referred to S. Th. I-II, q. 20, a. 2,
where St. Thomas abbreviates a classic text of St. Augustine
from Contra Mendacium: 7 (18), as “(Q)uaedam sunt quae nullo quasi bono fine aut bona voluntate possunt bene fieri”:
(“There are some deeds which cannot be done well for some
seeming good purpose or good will.”) Here St. Thomas argues
that in the “exterior” act there can be a double goodness or badness: one comes from the appropriate matter and circumstances, the other from the ordering of the act to the end. The
moral meaning of the act of lying, that is willing to lie, derives
from reason, and this cannot be modified by a further will (for
example, to will the lying as a means to a good end.) The point
is that, where the willing is evil because it is directed to what is
presented by reason as evil, then the willing of a good end can-
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not cancel out that evil, and thus render the whole act good.
Reason here means ultimately the divine reason, which is participated in by the human reason of the subject and by the
meaningful structure of the moral act. Where the meaningful
structure of an act does not participate in this reason, the act is
contrary to reason, and therefore to will that act is to will evil.
But this argument cannot be adequately construed in terms of
“objectivity” and “subjectivity” in the modern sense.
The second major critique is directed to my claim that
counselling the lesser evil will not be acceptable within the objectivist model. By objectivist I mean a model which emerged
historically within the tradition of Catholic moral theology in a
certain period, and which was characterised by isolating the
object from the subject. In the context of this model, the standard objection to the views of those who accepted the principle
of “counselling the lesser evil” was that the course of action
which was proposed was still an evil, by reason of its object.
One may then neither perform the act nor counsel that it be
done. It was the logic of this position which I sought to analyse
in my article. If there is another version of the “objectivist” theory which would allow the choosing of the lesser evil, this
would be an important contribution to the debate.
The last paragraph of Drum’s critique deals with Aquinas’s
treatment of (human) laws. Legislators should choose the lesser evil of an imperfect system of laws, rather than attempt to
impose a system forbidding all vices, which people could not
sustain. Thus, a moralist who held that the use of condoms was
intrinsically morally evil, could also accept that legislators may
choose to accept an “imperfect” legal system, which does not
prohibit the use of condoms in AIDS cases. But this is a question of civil law. The problem is whether the principle of choosing the lesser evil may be admitted by the moral law itself, as
distinct from the civil law. There seem to me to be two distinct
questions here.
A final correction to my article is needed. Suarez does use
the term “actus intrinsece... mali”. See F. Suarez, Omnia Opera,
T. IV, tractatus III, disp. VII, De Malitia, 4 and 13 (Paris: Vivès,
1856), p. 372 and p. 375.
BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
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BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE
—————
(Brian V. Johnstone C.Ss.R. is Ordinary Professor of Systematic
Moral Theology at the Alphonsian Academy, Via Merulana 31, C.P.
2458, Rome, Italy).
—————
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Chronicle / Crónica
ACCADEMIA ALFONSIANA
Cronaca relativa all’anno accademico 2000-2001
1. Eventi principali
1.1.Inaugurazione dell’anno accademico
Il 10 ottobre 2000 l’Accademia Alfonsiana ha inaugurato il
nuovo anno accademico sotto la presidenza di S.E.R. Mons.
Walter Kasper, allora Segretario del Pontificio Consiglio per la
Promozione dell’Unità dei Cristiani.
La cerimonia ha avuto inizio con una messa solenne, concelebrata dai Proff. Bruno Hidber e Sabatino Majorano, rispettivamente Preside e Vicepreside illo tempore dell’Accademia Alfonsiana, e da numerosi altri professori e studenti.
Durante l’omelia, tenuta dal Prof. Brian Johnstone e riportata nell’opuscolo Inaugurazione dell’anno accademico 20002001, Roma, Edacalf, 2000, pp.35-39, è stata sottolineata l’attualità di S. Alfonso e del suo pensiero per la teologia morale odierna.
Al termine della celebrazione, nell’aula magna dell’Accademia ha avuto luogo un atto accademico articolato in due momenti:
• il primo, sostanziatosi nella Relazione del Preside sull’anno
accademico 1999-2000 (Cf. Idem, pp.27-34), durante il quale
sono stati richiamati gli avvenimenti più significativi avvenuti durante lo scorso anno accademico;
• il secondo, marcato dalla relazione Unità della Chiesa e comunione ecclesiale nella prospettiva cattolica (Cf. Idem, pp. 326) tenuta da S.E.R. Mons. Kasper, nella quale Sua Eccel-
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lenza ha tracciato l’iter del dialogo ecumenico svoltosi, constatando con soddisfazione, la realizzazione di notevoli passi avanti.
Inoltre egli ha posto in rilievo le questioni ancora aperte, i
punti della prospettiva cattolica, i disaccordi ancora esistenti, ed
il cammino anche arduo da percorrere.
Malgrado il permanere di alcune difficoltà, la conferenza era
permeata dalla fiducia che con l’assistenza dello Spirito Santo e
con l’impegno instancabile di coloro che portano la responsabilità
della Chiesa, si potrà e si dovrà giungere ad una meta positiva.
L’intero atto accademico, conclusosi con un rinfresco che,
come ogni anno, ha costituito utile occasione per un ricco
scambio d’idee tra professori, ufficiali e studenti, è stato accompagnato per tutta la sua durata da un intrattenimento musicale,
curato dal quartetto da camera “I solisti di Roma” che hanno
eseguito brani di musica classica.
Il 20 ottobre 2000, nella Basilica di San Pietro, il Preside
Prof. Bruno Hidber, accompagnato dal Prof. Jules Mimeault e da
numerosi studenti dell’Accademia, hanno partecipato alla messa
d’inaugurazione dell’anno accademico di tutti gli atenei ecclesiastici romani, presieduta da S.E.R. Mons. Zenon Grocholewski, Prefetto della Congregazione per l’Educazione Cattolica.
Alla celebrazione ha preso parte il Santo Padre, che ha tenuto l’omelia ed impartito la benedizione finale.
1.2. Nomine
Quest’anno accademico ha fatto registrare numerose nuove
nomine da parte:
• del Gran Cancelliere della Pontificia Università Lateranense,
Sua Eminenza il Sig. Card. Camillo Ruini, che il 3 ottobre
2000 ha nominato i Professori Dennis Billy e Maurizio Faggioni rispettivamente Professore Ordinario e Professore
Straordinario dell’Accademia Alfonsiana;
• del Moderatore Generale dell’Accademia Alfonsiana, Rev.mo
P. Joseph Tobin, che il 1 marzo 2001 ha nominato Economo
dell’Accademia il R. P. Alfeo Prandel, C.Ss.R.;
• dello stesso Moderatore Generale che ha nominato, il 1 maggio 2001, il R.P. Joseph Nolen, C.Ss.R., quale Prefetto della
Biblioteca.
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1.3. Nuovo Preside dell’Accademia Alfonsiana
Il 4 giugno 2001, Sua Eminenza il Sig. Card. Camillo Ruini
ha nominato il Prof. Sabatino Majorano Preside ad triennium
dell’Accademia Alfonsiana.
1.4. Attività accademiche, avvenimenti ed incontri
1.4.1. Incontro Preside/Studenti
Il 12 ottobre 2001, durante il consueto incontro d’inizio anno tra Preside, Segretario Generale e nuovi studenti, questi ultimi sono stati informati su diversi aspetti riguardanti la struttura dell’Accademia, e la vita accademica in generale.
Al termine dell’incontro, i vari Consulenti accademici hanno
ricevuto i nuovi studenti appartenenti ai rispettivi gruppi linguistici, per poterli orientare verso una programmazione sistematica dei corsi e seminari del biennio per la licenza;
1.4.2. Inaugurazione dell’anno accademico alla Pontificia
Università Lateranense
L’8 novembre 2000, il Prof. Seán Cannon e la Segretaria Generale, Sig.ra Danielle Gros, hanno rappresentato l’Accademia
all’atto d’inaugurazione dell’anno accademico della Pontificia
Università Lateranense;
1.4.3. Presentazione di libro
Il 24 novembre, nell’aula magna dell’Accademia, dopo un saluto del Prof. Bruno Hidber, il Prof. Marciano Vidal ha presentato il libro del Prof. Lorenzo Alvarez, Caminar en el Espíritu. El
pensamiento ético de S. Pablo.
1.4.4. Elezione dei Rappresentanti degli Studenti
Il 1 dicembre 2000 l’assemblea degli studenti ha eletto, quali propri rappresentanti, Fabiola Stella e Maria Antony Savarimuthu, entrambi studenti ordinari iscritti al primo anno del
programma biennale per la licenza. Questi rappresentanti, con
la loro elezione, diventano membri del Consiglio Accademico, e
fungono da portavoce degli studenti presso le autorità accademiche ed amministrative dell’Accademia;
1.4.5. Incontro per festeggiare il nuovo anno civile
Il 19 gennaio 2001 gli studenti hanno organizzato un incontro festoso tra professori, ufficiali, personale e studenti dell’Accademia in occasione dell’inizio del nuovo anno civile.
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In questa occasione il Preside ha tenuto un breve discorso e
l’incontro, permeato da un forte taglio di spiritualità, si è caratterizzato anche per un suo lato umoristico;
1.4.6. Settimana di Preghiera per l’unità dei Cristiani 2001
Il 25 gennaio, nella Basilica di San Paolo fuori le mura, il
Santo Padre, assieme ai delegati delle altre Chiese e Comunioni
Cristiane Mondiali, ha concluso la Settimana di preghiera per
l’unità dei Cristiani 2001.
Alla cerimonia ha preso parte, a nome dell’Accademia Alfonsiana, la Segretaria Generale.
1.4.7. Dialogo accademico
Il 22 febbraio 2001 si è tenuto, presso l’aula magna dell’Accademia, un dialogo accademico intitolato Ambiente, al quale
hanno partecipato la Dott.ssa Vincenza Mela, dell’Università
Cattolica Agostino Gemelli, il Prof. Maurizio Balistreri, dell’Università La Sapienza ed il Prof. Maurizio Faggioni, dell’Accademia
Alfonsiana;
1.4.8. Preghiera quaresimale
Durante la quaresima, ogni mercoledì alle ore 10.00, presso
l’aula magna, gli studenti hanno organizzato la salmodia dell’ora terza: un modo per condividere l’impegno prezioso della preghiera, oltre a quello accademico;
1.4.9. Associazione Teologica Italiana per lo Studio della
Morale - ATISM
Il 17 aprile, l’Accademia ha ospitato l’incontro annuale dei
soci dell’ATISM del Centro Italia a cui ha partecipato il Prof. Sabatino Majorano. Tema della riunione: Etica e società multirazziale;
1.4.10. Festa di S. Alfonso
Come ogni anno, il Preside ha invitato le autorità della Pontificia Università Lateranense, dell’Accademia Alfonsiana ed i
Rettori dei collegi, seminari e convitti che affidano i loro studenti al nostro Istituto, ad un pranzo festivo che si è tenuto il 26
aprile;
1.4.11. Tavola rotonda
Il 2 maggio 2001, i Rappresentanti degli studenti hanno organizzato nell’aula magna una tavola rotonda sul tema Quale
progetto di vita cristiana dalla Novo millenio ineunte?
Sono intervenuti, con letture diverse della lettera apostolica,
i Proff. Dennis Billy, Raphael Gallagher e Andrzej Wodka;
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1.5. In memoriam
Il 24 novembre 2000 è giunta notizia del decesso del Rev.mo
P. Josef Pfab, C.Ss.R..
Padre Pfab è stato Superiore Generale della Congregazione
del Santissimo Redentore dal 1973 al 1985 e, in tale veste, anche
Moderatore Generale dell’Accademia Alfonsiana, per il bene della quale si è sempre impegnato a fondo.
Il Rev.mo P. Joseph Tobin, Superiore Generale della C.Ss.R.
e Moderatore Generale dell’Accademia, ed il Prof. Bruno Hidber
hanno partecipato a Gars am Inn (Germania) ai funerali di P.
Pfab.
2. Consiglio di amministrazione
Dal 19 al 21 febbraio 2001, convocato dal Moderatore Generale che lo ha presieduto, si è riunito il Consiglio di Amministrazione dell’Accademia Alfonsiana.
A questo incontro hanno preso parte tra gli altri:
- il Preside, che ha svolto un rapporto sulla situazione accademica;
- la Segretaria Generale, che ha relazionato sulla situazione
amministrativa e su vari aspetti inerenti gli studenti;
- il Prof. Sabatino Majorano, quale delegato del Consiglio
dei Professori, per descrivere la situazione del corpo docente;
- l’Economo, per esporre la situazione finanziaria;
- l’Executive Director for Development, per informare sullo
status delle pubbliche relazioni.
Dopo aver esaminato i vari rapporti con grande attenzione,
il C.d.A. ha preso atto che l’insegnamento svolto nell’Accademia
è di buon livello accademico, rispondendo esso ai requisiti di un
Istituto di specializzazione, ed ha espresso il proprio apprezzamento per la grande professionalità negli uffici.
Il C.d.A., dopo aver formulato alcune raccomandazioni, grazie alle quali potranno essere potenziati sia l’aspetto amministrativo che quello accademico, ha espresso la propria gratitudine al Prof. Bruno Hidber, che per sei anni ha assunto, con grande impegno e dedizione, la carica di Preside dell’Accademia
Alfonsiana.
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É stato rammentato che durante il suo mandato, l’Accademia ha completamente rinnovato il proprio volto, potenziando
l’aspetto professionale ed organizzativo, e migliorando le relazioni con gli altri Istituti romani, nonché con i vari enti della
Congregazione del Santissimo Redentore.
Il C.d.A. ha anche preso atto con soddisfazione che l’Accademia ha potuto assumere un nuovo Professore Redentorista
per la sezione di antropologia empirica (il Prof. Rafael Prada),
un nuovo Economo ed un nuovo Prefetto della Biblioteca.
3. Corpo insegnante
3.1. Stato attuale
Quest’anno accademico l’Accademia Alfonsiana si è avvalsa
della collaborazione di 34 professori, di cui 7 ordinari, 2 straordinari, 21 invitati e 4 emeriti.
Tra questi, 30 hanno svolto ventinove corsi, diretto ventuno
seminari e numerose tesi di licenza e di dottorato. Altri ancora,
in veste di professori invitati, hanno anche insegnato presso diversi centri ecclesiastici.
3.2. Nuovi docenti
Quest’anno accademico, il Prof. Rafael Prada, C.Ss.R., ha
iniziato a collaborare con l’Accademia Alfonsiana, offrendo un
corso ed un seminario nella sezione dell’antropologia empirica.
3.3. Pubblicazioni dei Professori
Da evidenziare che molti docenti, oltre alla loro principale
attività didattica e di assistenza agli studenti, hanno anche pubblicato diverse opere, offrendo in tal senso un utile contributo
alla ricerca scientifica.
3.4. Notizie sugli ex professori
Il Prof. Joachim Ntahondereye, già Professore dell’Accademia Alfonsiana per quattro anni ed ex studente della stessa, è en-
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trato a far parte del corpo docente del Grand Séminaire JeanPaul II di Gitega (Burundi), dove insegna la teologia morale.
4. Studia Moralia
L’impegno della Commissione per Studia Moralia e la collaborazione dei Professori interni ed esterni, hanno permesso la
regolare pubblicazione dei due fascicoli della rivista Studia Moralia, per l’anno 2000.
5. Studenti
5.1. Notizie generali
Quest’anno accademico gli studenti sono stati 256 (245 uomini e 11 donne), di cui 243 ordinari (125 del secondo ciclo 118
del terzo) che si sono preparati a conseguire i gradi accademici,
e 13 ospiti.
La provenienza degli studenti è riferita a tutti i continenti:
120 dall’Europa, 52 dall’Asia, 20 dall’America del Nord, 21 dall’America del Sud, 39 dall’Africa e 4 dall’Australia/Oceania.
Divisi per appartenenza religiosa, 164 erano del clero secolare, 79 tra religiosi e religiose appartenevano a 39 diversi ordini, mentre 13 erano i laici.
Durante l’anno accademico 2000-2001 sono state difese con
successo 19 tesi di dottorato e 25 studenti e, dopo la pubblicazione delle loro rispettive tesi, sono stati proclamati dottori in
teologia della Pontificia Università Lateranense, con specializzazione in teologia morale.
Inoltre, 56 studenti hanno conseguito la licenza in teologia
morale.
Durante il mese di marzo il Preside ha incontrato, personalmente, tutti gli studenti del primo anno di licenza per verificare
con loro la propria programmazione accademica, ed il loro
orientamento.
Da segnalare anche i numerosi incontri avvenuti tra il Preside ed i Rappresentanti degli Studenti, che hanno consentito di
deliberare su varie questioni riguardanti gli studenti stessi.
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5.2. In memoriam
Il 9 aprile 2001 è deceduto lo studente Pierluigi Faraldo, regolarmente iscritto al primo anno del programma biennale per
la licenza in teologia morale.
Don Faraldo era nato a Roma il 21 giugno 1959.
Giovedì 10 maggio, nella cappella della comunità, è stata celebrata in suo onore una messa commemorativa, presieduta dal
Preside, Prof. Bruno Hidber, che ha tenuto anche l’omelia. Alla
cerimonia ha partecipato Mons. Pietro Fragnelli, Rettore del Seminario Romano Maggiore, dove risiedeva lo studente.
6. Informazioni sugli ex studenti
6.1. Nomine
Nel Concistoro del 21 febbraio 2001, tra i nuovi Cardinali
creati dal Santo Padre, figuravano anche due ex studenti dell’Accademia Alfonsiana:
Sua Em.za Rev.ma Mons. Severino Poletto, Arcivescovo di
Torino (Italia). É stato studente dell’Accademia dal 1975 al
1977;
Sua Em.za Rev.ma Mons. Oscar Rodriguez Maradiaga, Arcivescovo di Tecucigalpa (Honduras). É stato studente dell’Accademia dal 1972 al 1974.
Inoltre, durante l’anno accademico 2000-2001, 8 ex studenti
dell’Accademia Alfonsiana di seguito specificati, sono stati
elevati alla dignità episcopale:
- S.E.R. Mons. Matthew Ishaya Audu, nominato primo Vescovo di Lafia (Nigeria). É stato studente dell’Accademia dal
1989 al 1991 e dal 1997 al 1999;
- S.E.R. Mons. Luc Cyr, nominato Vescovo di Salaberry-deValleyfield (Canada). É stato studente dell’Accademia dal
1985 al 1987;
- S.E.R. Mons. Sérgio da Rocha, nominato Vescovo Ausiliare
di Fortaleza (Brasile). É stato studente dell’Accademia dal
1994 al 1997;
- S.E.R. Mons. James Naanman Daman, o.s.a., nominato Vescovo di Jalingo (Nigeria). É stato studente dell’Accademia
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-
-
-
-
dal 1985 al 1987 e dal 1992 al 1994;
S.E.R. Mons. Luigi Martella, nominato Vescovo di MolfettaRuvo-Giovinazzo-Terlizzi (Italia). Ha terminato i suoi studi
all’Accademia nel 1997;
S.E.R. Mons. John Clayton Nientstedt, nominato Vescovo di
New Ulm (U.S.A.). É stato studente dell’Accademia dal 1975
al 1977 e dal 1983 al 1985;
S.E.R. Mons. Brendan Michael O’Brien, nominato Arcivescovo Metropolita di Saint John’s, Newfoundland (Canada).
É stato studente dell’Accademia dal 1971 al 1975;
S.E.R. Mons. Josef Wróbel, nominato Vescovo di Helsinki
(Finlandia). É stato studente dell’Accademia dal 1980 al
1985.
Da segnalare infine che il Prof. Frans Vosman, già studente
dell’Accademia negli anni dal 1978 al 1981, è stato nominato
Professore di teologia morale a tempo pieno alla Università Cattolica di Utrecht (KTU) – Olanda.
6.2. In memoriam
É giunta notizia del decesso dell’ex studente Hilary Akpunku, nato il 14 dicembre 1953 a Isuikwato (Nigeria). Egli ha
frequentato l’Accademia dal 1984 al 1989, dove ha ottenuto la licenza nel 1986 ed il dottorato nel 1989. Era Vicario Generale
della diocesi di Maiduguri (Nigeria).
7. Inaugurazione dell’anno accademico 2001-2002
L’inaugurazione del prossimo anno accademico è fissata per
il 10 ottobre 2001.
La celebrazione eucaristica, che si terrà nella Chiesa di S.
Alfonso, sarà presieduta dal Rev.mo P. Joseph Tobin, C.Ss.R., Superiore Generale della Congregazione del Santissimo Redentore,
nonché Moderatore Generale dell’Accademia Alfonsiana.
All’atto accademico che seguirà nell’aula magna, il neo Preside, Prof. Sabatino Majorano, presenterà la relazione dell’anno
accademico 2000-2001, mentre il Prof. Ignazio Sanna, Pro-Rettore della Pontificia Università Lateranense, nonché Professore
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Invitato dell’Accademia Alfonsiana, terrà una prolusione dal titolo L’antropologia della postmodernità e la coscienza umana.
8. Gradi accademici conferiti
8.1. Dottori designati
Nel corso dell’anno accademico 2000-2001, 19 studenti hanno difeso pubblicamente la loro dissertazione dottorale:
AROCKIA SAMY SOOSAI, John Peter (India - diocesi di Tanjore):
Parent’s Role as Co-Creators with God of New Life. A Critical
Study of the Development of the Theme in Selected Magisterial
Documents from Casti Connubii to Evangelium Vitae. - 24
maggio 2001; Moderatore: Prof. Cannon.
Pope John Paul II has stated that “conjugal love … makes a
couple capable of the greatest possible gift, the gift by
which they become cooperators with God in giving life to a
new human person”. The scope of this work has been to examine magisterial documents from Pius XI to John Paul II
to discover how the role of parents in bringing new life into
the world has gradually come to be clarified and is now presented by John Paul II as that of being co-creators with God.
AUNGWIN, Cyprian (Myanmar - diocesi di Mandalay): The
Choice: Non-violent or Violent Struggle? An Analysis of Recent
Papal and Episcopal Teachings in Relation to the Current Situation in Burma - 30 maggio 2001; Moderatore: Prof.
Johnstone.
This thesis is entitled “The Choice: Non-violent or violent
struggle?” I chose this title because of the current situation
in Burma where two groups, both struggling for the same
end, i.e., for democracy, human rights and equality, use precisely two different means: non-violent and violent. To give
a mature and Christian response to these struggles, the
guidelines of the Pope and Bishops, including those on the
rights of victims, the principles of just-defensive war, and
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particularly the principles of discrimination and proportionality are fully considered and applied. After various considerations have been taken into account, we strongly affirm
that Burma’s non-violence is the only authentic way and
means for arriving at the goal of constructing real peace in
Burma.
BATTAGLIA, Santo (Italia - diocesi di Reggio Calabria): L’impegno
sociale del cristiano nella riflessione di Madeleine Delbrêl - 29
marzo 2001; Moderatore: Prof. Gallagher.
L’argomento della tesi ha come centro lo studio della riflessione di Madeleine Delbrêl prendendo in analisi quegli scritti che permettono di riflettere sull’impegno sociale del cristiano e sulla missione sociale della Chiesa. Il lavoro presenta una prima parte nella quale è messo in evidenza l’ambiente storico, sociale ed ecclesiale, all’interno del quale la
Delbrêl vive la sua vicenda personale. La seconda parte è tutta centrata sull’analisi degli scritti, attraverso uno studio che
mira a mettere in evidenza il valore teologico di questa riflessione. Ci si sofferma su un insieme di scritti editi o inediti, raccolti attorno ai temi in lei più rilevanti quali: l’impegno sociale da lei vissuto, l’identità e la missione della donna, il confronto con un ambiente ateo, il rapporto tra vita
spirituale e l’impegno sociale. Quest’itinerario di analisi conduce a trarre delle indicazioni per la riflessione teologicomorale: esso illumina, anzitutto, la riflessione sulla fondazione e sulla giustificazione dell’etica sociale e della missione sociale della Chiesa; è da qui che è possibile trarre i presupposti teologici dell’impegno sociale del cristiano. In secondo luogo emerge la relazione tra la vita spirituale e l’impegno del cristiano per il mondo. Terzo aspetto importante
che emerge da quest’analisi, è la relazione tra l’impegno sociale e la missione evangelizzatrice della Chiesa.
CACCAVALE, Charles (U.S.A. - diocesi di Brooklyn): As I Have Loved You. The Fundamental Nature of Christian Love as Revealed in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ - 11 maggio 2001;
Moderatore: Prof. Johnstone.
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What is the nature of Christian love? This is an important
question for fundamental moral theology, for our understanding of what constitutes perfect love impacts our moral
discernment and ethical evaluation. Some define Christian
love or agape as a unilateral self-sacrifice for the other in
which there is no reciprocity and distinguish different kinds
of love. Others wish to include reciprocity in an understanding of Christian love and seek answers through an exploration into God’s revelation in the eschatological event of the
Resurrection of Jesus. Through reflection on the whole paschal mystery, what it reveals and effects, we come to recognize that love is one, it is reciprocal in every act, and its goal
is always union in communion. Thus the paradigm of Christian love is not unilateral self-sacrifice but mutual and reciprocal self-giving. It is with such an understanding of the
nature of Christian love that moral evaluation and discernment should take place.
CARBAJO NUÑEZ, Martín (Spagna – O.F.M.): Intimida y etica en
la sociedad de la información. Estudio ético-teológico del dinamismo revelación/ocultación - 16 marzo 2001; Moderatore: Prof. Majorano.
La società dell’informazione ha cambiato le circostanze in
cui si svolge il normale svelarsi/nascondersi della propria intimità e obbliga a riformulare la proposta etica. Le sempre
migliori possibilità di comunicazione globale vengono accompagnate da un individualismo narcisista, “virtuale”, la
valorizzazione della “privacy” convive con un crescente esibizionismo e con nuove intromissioni nell’intimità personale. La tesi intende orientare nella ricerca di un nuovo equilibrio tra svelarsi/nascondersi e informarsi/rispettare l’intimità. L’analisi di cinquantasette documenti deontologici
della stampa e di numerosi studi sulla privacy è contrastata
con le fonti bibliche e teologiche per arrivare a un superamento dell’antropologia negativa in cui si basa l’attuale impostazione conflittuale tra il rispetto della privacy e il diritto all’informazione. L’uomo è immagine del Dio trinitario e
quindi essenzialmente portato a una comunicazione che ha
come scopo la comunione nel rispetto della dignità altrui.
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DENIS, Philip (India - diocesi di Varanasi): A Theology of Media
Use: A Moral Perspective - 10 maggio 2001; Moderatore: Prof.
Johnstone.
This thesis presents the theological foundations for an ethical use of the media. In conformity with the Church documents it affirms that the media and technology are God’s gift
and fruit of human creativity. The ritual communion model
of communication presents media as instruments of social
construction of culture and meaning. The media very often
use the narrative form of communication which is one of the
oldest means of teaching moral values. Therefore to use media in the moral formation, media education is a moral imperative for the proper use of the media.
HARSANYI, Pal (Ungheria – O.F.M.): Il dibattito bioetico sull’eutanasia e una proposta nella prospettiva della teologia della
pace - 13 giugno 2001; Moderatore: Prof. Faggioni.
Il dibattito sull’eutanasia sta assumendo nelle società postindustriali aspetti inediti e paradigmatici di una mutata temperie socioculturale. Attraverso l’analisi storico-fenomenologica
della prassi eutanasica e delle interpretazioni etico-giuridiche
che essa ha avuto dall’antichità ai nostri giorni, viene dimostrata l’insufficienza delle risposte che fino ad oggi sono state
date all’eutanasia. La dissertazione cerca di proporre una
nuova via profondamente radicata nella fede cristiana e, allo
stesso tempo, più persuasiva per gli uomini del nostro tempo,
basata sul principio architettonico della pace. Nella tradizione cristiana il fondamento ultimo della pace è la risurrezione,
in quanto essa rappresenta la sconfitta della logica della violenza attraverso la morte redentrice. Compito dei cristiani è
di essere testimoni della risurrezione e strumenti per una sua
estensione nella storia, diffondendo la pace del Risorto. L’eutanasia si configura come una contraddizione all’azione pacificatrice di Cristo e quindi come una risposta inadeguata al
dramma del dolore e della morte.
IGWE, Veronica (Nigeria – D.M.M.M.): Celibate Chastity as a Moral Living Out of Human Sexuality in Interpersonal Relation-
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ships: A Theological Evaluation - 2 aprile 2001; Moderatore:
Prof. Rehrauer.
A theological evaluation of a moral living out of celibate chastity in interpersonal relationships, which is the object of this
dissertation show that celibacy is a life worth living and its
values will be realized more effectively when it is freely and
consciously chosen. A person who does not have the charisma of celibacy will simply mess it up in trying to live up to
what is expected of him or her. Relationships, which are central to every life situation are also a necessity since celibacy
is a valid lifestyle like all others, and as such celibates are
bound to develop and live properly the chains of relationships that are involved in their life and mission. A list of
valuable sources from the modern sciences that could be
very helpful for celibates, formators and people in formation
is given.
JULIAN, Baiju (India - diocesi di Quilon): A Study on Sarvepalli
Radhakrishnan with a Special Reference to His Thought on
Evil, Sin and Liberation - 12 marzo 2001; Moderatore: Prof.
Petrà.
This study on Sarvepalli Radhakrisnan, the most gifted modern exponent of Hinduism and Indian thought opens the way
to the treasures of Indian thought. Exploring the thinking
pattern of Radhakrishnan, this study explains the Hindu anthropology and the basic ethical principles, which govern the
spiritual journey of a Hindu. The discussion of the ethical
teaching of Radhakrishnan gives a clear exposition of the
meaning and the function of the ethical principles such as
dharma, law of karma, and the doctrine of rebirth. A special
reference to his thought on evil, sin and liberation also provides a brief account of the predominant Hindu understanding
of them. Thus the main objective of this study is to describe
the philosophical basis of the ‘Hindu vision of life’ and the
foundations of the ‘Hindu way of life’ through the person of
Radhakrishnan. Since he is known as the defender of human
dignity, an attempt is also made to show how far his views are
in harmony with the social teachings of the Catholic Church.
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Thus this study suggests that Radhakrishnan is an authentic
source for Indian theologians and especially for moral theologians to acquire a sound knowledge of the foundations of
the Hindu way of life.
KABEMBA BADIBANGA, Bruno (Repubblica Democratica del
Congo - diocesi di Kananga): Salut intégral et libération dans
la conception de la faute et de la réparation chez les Bantu-Luba du Kasaï. “Défis d’une sotériologie inculturée” - 24 novembre 2000; Moderatore: Prof. Tremblay.
Le raccord voulu entre les germes de vie issus de la croyance aux esprits, d’une part, et les catégories de la rédemption,
d’autre part, a été assuré, d’abord, en faisant graviter notre
recherche autour de deux axes essentiels: anthropologique
et théandrique. Tandis que la faute apparaît comme ce qui
porte atteinte à la vie (et fracture l’harmonie) et sa réparation, l’accès aux symboles et à la réciprocité, la médiation du
salut, articulant l’identité du Sauveur sur l’Evénement pascal fait passer l’humanité pécheresse de la mort à la vie.
Pour être inculturés ensuite, les éléments de la culture Bantu-Luba ont du subir la loi purificatrice de l’Evangile en 3
moments d’Assomption, de Purifìcation et de Dépassement.
C’est ainsi que, récupérant le donne révélé, la solidarité totale du Verbe incarné (“qui vient de et va vers”), réussit a rendre stérile la virulence extrême du mal pour rapporter
l’homme réconcilié dans l’étreinte éternelle du Père.
KAGGWA, William (Uganda - diocesi di Kampala): A Theory of
Moral Conversion Constructed from the Pastoral Letters of the
Uganda Catholic Bishops in Dialogue with Walter E. Conn.
Towards a Restoration of Personal Responsibility in Uganda 1 giugno 2001; Moderatore: Prof. Gallagher.
This theory of moral conversion has been constructed from
the dominant theme of moral conversion in the pastoral letters of Catholic bishops of Uganda. Their main argument is
that: Uganda’s politico-social foundation at the time of independence was flawed, later caused horrendous suffering and
deformed many people’s personal conscience; thus, the end
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result is a moral vacuum. Hence the solution is moral conversion through the reformation of personal consciences,
the possibility of which lies in self-trascendence which
must be guided by new evangelisation.
KIRWAN, Christopher (U.S.A. - diocesi di Boston): The Role of the
Person in Society. A Critical Analysis of the Philosophical
Vision of Charles Taylor as one Approach to the Application of
Cath. Social Teaching as Outlined in the Encyclicals Laborem
Exercens, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, and Centesimus Annus of
Pope John Paul II - 6 aprile 2001; Moderatore: Prof. Gallagher.
This thesis seeks to show a convergence of thought between
the social encyclicals of Pope John Paul II and the philosophy of Charles Taylor as they both address the nature of
the person in modern society within their respective writings. Such convergence of thought is sought in order to
analyze critically Taylor’s system as a possible instrument in
the application of Catholic social teaching. The final part of
the thesis examines possible areas in which the two can be
put into dialogue, not only for the benefit of modern social
structures, but also in the hopes of using philosophy as it
contributes to the theological task of discerning the new requirements of evangelization.
KLAFKA, Zdzislaw (Polonia – C.Ss.R.): Il Cristo Redentore come
icona della misericordia di Dio Padre: Centro della proposta
morale alfonsiana - 13 dicembre 2000; Moderatore: Prof.
Majorano.
La tesi mira a delineare una visione d’insieme della proposta
morale alfonsiana, cercando di individuare nella “copiosa
redemptio” una chiave interpretativa fondamentale: a livello
sia di contenuti sia di metodo. Il Cristo Redentore come
“chenosi misericordiosa” di Dio o la “copiosa redemptio”
(secondo il lemma dato ai Redentoristi) appare come fondamento, che chiede di cogliere la verità morale come verità
pratica “salutare” e di articolarla e proporla in fedeltà allo
“esempio” o alla “condotta” con cui il Redentore si è posto
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tra noi come verità che salva. Il lavoro, oltre ad approfondire una chiave di lettura fondamentale della visione alfonsiana, cerca di trovare in essa stimoli preziosi per quella proposta morale, che oggi siamo chiamati a fare, capace di permettere il “riconoscimento” da parte della coscienza, indispensabile perché si abbia imperatività morale (Veritatis
Splendor 36).
LYLE, Dennis (U.S.A. - diocesi di Chicago): Virtues of Discipleship: The Contribution of the Evangelical Counsels to Catholic Moral Theology in the Light of the Universal Call to Holiness in the Documents of the Second Vatican Council. - 16 novembre 2000; Moderatore: Prof. Billy.
This dissertation proposes that the evangelical counsels of
chastity, poverty, and obedience be understood as virtues of
discipleship applicable to all the faithful. The step from
counsel to virtue is a consequence of the universal call to holiness as expressed in Lumen gentium. The terms are studied
as they are found within the documents of Vatican II and
then described as virtues of discipleship based on scriptural
quotations incorporated into the conciliar material. The
human desire for communion, justice, and purpose in life
are advanced through the practice of these virtues. They
order our relationship with God, others and the environment and provide a holistic approach to life.
MORAES BRITO JUNIOR, Pedro (Brasile - diocesi di Feira De Santana): A fundaçao em Cristo como ponto de encontro entre o
ético e o espiritual na teologia moral pós-conciliar. Confronto
entre a proposta de Domenico Capone e de Jon Sobrino - 29
maggio 2001; Moderatore: Prof. Majorano.
La ricerca prende l’avvio dalle indicazioni del Vaticano II per
la vita cristiana e per la teologia e, riconoscendo in esso il
momento di convergenza tra l’etico e lo spirituale, ha come
scopo quello di far risaltare l’importanza della relazione fra
queste due dimensioni. Alla base del lavoro c’è la convinzione che una riflessione teologica, impostata alla luce del mistero di Cristo, è il presupposto di un vivere e di un sapere
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che si configurino come etico-spirituale. Concretamente,
questo studio, sottolineando l’importanza di far dialogare i
diversi modelli teologici, cerca di verificare i contributi dati
da D. Capone e da J. Sobrino e di confrontarli fra loro.
MULAKKAL, Franco (India - diocesi di Jullundur): A Theological
Investigation into the Moral Teachings of Guru Nanak from a
Catholic Perspective - 8 maggio 2001; Moderatore: Prof. Billy.
Guru Nanak is the founder of Sikh religion, and his teachings form the basis of it. This work makes a theological investigation into his moral teachings from a Catholic perspective. The research brings out the elements of convergence and divergence from the teachings of the Guru Nanak.
For example, the issue of ‘divine incarnation’ keeps Sikhism
and Christianity divided, but the theme of ‘universal
brotherhood’ unites them. We also see the integration of spiritual and moral life in the teachings of Guru Nanak and the
Catholic Church, based on the concepts of loving devotion to
God and the universal brotherhood.
SHOFANY, Saba (Israele - diocesi di Galilea): La contribution des
prélats melkites au Concile Vatican II, au renouveau de la
théologie morale - 12 febbraio 2001; Moderatore: Prof. Majorano.
L’objet de notre thèse “La contribution des Prélats Melkites
au Concile Vatican 11, au renouveau de la théologie morale”
est à situer parmi les études qui proposent une nouveauté,
une originalité et une actualité dans le domaine des recherches faites sur la théologie morale conciliaire. Il présente un
jalon de l’histoire de l’Église grecque melkite catholique, et
propose un essai sur la nature de la théologie morale de cette Eglise. Met en relief l’ampleur, la richesse, la variété d’aspects, les nouvelles impulsions, les réponses données pendant les interventions des prélats melkites sur certains problèmes abordés par le Concile. La recherche est enrichie par
une vaste bibliographie sur le grand intérêt suscité par les
interventions des ces prélats, auprès des théologiens conci-
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liaires et post-conciliaires, et détermine le rôle et le type de
contribution des prélats melkites au renouveau de la doctrine morale du Concile Vatican II.
TONDE, Bernard (Burkina Faso - diocesi di Bondoukou): Diaconie de la famille dans la formation de la conscience morale en
Côte d’Ivoire - 28 maggio 2001; Moderatore: Prof. Majorano.
Pour aider la Côte d’Ivoire à sortir de la difficile crise des valeurs et de la morale qu’elle traverse, il faudrait commencer
par libérer la famille de l’égoïsme, et lui permettre d’exercer
sa diaconie dans le cadre de la formation de la conscience
morale, par le témoignage d’une vie d’amour. Cette éducation, pour être intégrale, devra viser dès la base, d’un esprit
critique aiguisé, capable de hiérarchiser et d’harmoniser les
valeurs, dans le choix renouvelé de l’amour du bien et de sa
promotion gratuite. Dans cet effort des parents, l’État et les
autres agences d’éducation ont un rôle important, quoique
subsidiaire, à excercer dans un dialogue constructif avec les
familles.
WICKRAMASINGHE, Raymond Kingsley (Sri Lanka - diocesi di
Galle): An Analysis of the Definition of a Refugee from the
Point of View of Catholic Social Teaching - 4 maggio 2001;
Moderatore: Prof. Johnstone.
Millions of people in the world are forcibly displaced due to
various reasons. However, only a fraction of those people are
recognized by the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees, as “refugees”. Responding to those forcibly displaced
is first and foremost a matter of respecting basic human
rights, which the international community is under an obligation to recognize and guarantee. This dissertation exposes
and evaluates in the light of Catholic social teaching, some
of those international and regional instruments that are responsible for bringing about a change in the refugee regime.
It then suggests some positive comprehensive proposals to
expand the existing definition of a refugee.
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8.2 Dottori proclamati
Durante l’anno accademico 2000-2001, 25 studenti di seguito indicati, ai quali è stato conferito il titolo di dottore in teologia con specializzazione in teologia morale, hanno pubblicato,
alcuni in versione integrale, la loro tesi dottorale:
CACCAVALE, Charles, As I Have Loved You. The Fundamental Nature of Christian Love as Revealed in the Resurrection of Jesus
Christ. Roma 2001, 285 pp.
CIPRESSA, Salvatore, Il fenomeno transessuale fra medicina e morale. (Excerpta). Roma 2000, 259 pp.
DENIS, Philip, A Theology of Media Use: A Moral Perspective. (Excerpta). Roma 2001, 82 pp.
FERNANDES, Stephen Eustace, Justice as Participation in John
Rawls and in the Social Teachings of Pope John Paul II. (Excerpta). Roma 2000, 150 pp.
FERRARI, Roberto, L’azione dei Minori Osservanti nei Monti di
Pietà. Il Defensorium di Bernardino de Busti. (Excerpta). Milano 2001, 170 pp.
GONSALVES, Archibald R., The Beginning of the Human Individual: A Western and an Indian Perspective. (Excerpta). Roma
2000, 174 pp.
GUIMARAES, Fernando, Homem, Igreja e Sociedade no pensamento do Padre Julio Maria, C.Ss.R. Aparecida 2001, 415 pp.
JULIAN, Baiju, A Study on Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan with a Special Reference to His Thought on Evil, Sin and Liberation. Roma 2001, 261 pp.
KABEMBA BADIBANGA, Bruno, Salut intégral et libération dans la
conception de la faute et de la réparation chez les Bantu-Luba
du Kasaï. “Défis d’une sotériologie inculturée”.(Excerpta). Roma 2001, 191 pp.
611
KLAFKA, Zdzislaw, Il Cristo Redentore come icona della misericordia di Dio Padre: Centro della proposta morale alfonsiana.
(Excerpta). Roma 2001, 158 pp.
KIRWAN, Christopher, The Role of the Person in Society. A Critical
Analysis of the Philosophical Vision of Charles Taylor as one
Approach to the Application of Catholic Social Teaching as
Outlined in the Encyclicals Laborem Exercens, Sollicitudo Rei
Socialis, and Centesimus Annus of Pope John Paul II. Roma
2001, 293 pp.
LAVASTIDA, José Ignacio, Health Care Delivery in the U.S.A.: A
Critical Analysis in the Light of a Catholic Theory of Justice.(Excerpta). Roma 2001, 167 pp.
LYLE, Dennis, Virtues of Discipleship: The Contribution of the
Evangelical Counsels to Catholic Moral Theology in the Light
of the Universal Call to Holiness in the Documents of the
Second Vatican Council. Roma 2000, 304 pp.
MARIANI, Andrea, La vita morale come cammino di crescita nel
catechismo della Chiesa cattolica. Per una formazione della
coscienza morale. (Excerpta). Roma 2000, 119 pp.
MBULA MALENGO, Faustin, L’enjeu éthique du rapport avec le cosmos pour une inculturation du message du salut en milieu
Bantu-Ngombe. (Excerpta). Roma 2000, 110 pp.
MIKODA, Dariusz, La “vita in Cristo” nella proposta di don Giuseppe Dossetti: Un solo battesimo, un solo fine, due vie. Roma
2000, 380 pp.
MULAKKAL, Franco, A Theological Investigation into the Moral
Teachings of Guru Nanak from a Catholic Perspective. (Excerpta). Roma 2001, 104 pp.
PARAYIL, Thomas, The Position of India on Nuclear Disarmament: A Moral Assessment in the Light of the Teaching of the
Catholic Church. (Excerpta). Roma 2000, 129 pp.
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PERCHINUNNO, Michele, La dimensione pneumatologica della vita cristiana nei manuali italiani di teologia morale degli ultimi due decenni (1970-1990).(Excerpta). Roma 2000, 73 pp.
PETROSINO, Luigi, La catechesi morale missionaria redentorista
nel Mezzogiorno d’Italia a metà ottocento. (Excerpta). Roma
2000, 134 pp.
POTTEMPARAMPIL, Mathew, Mythical Concept of Cyclic Time and
its Influence on Moral Life. A Study Based on Mircea Eliade:
A Christian Critique.(Excerpta). Bangalore 2000, 280 pp.
POZNIC, Andres Marko, Un futuro para la nación en la Unión Europea. Una propuesta ético-moral. (Excerpta). Roma 2001,
116 pp.
RANIERO, Lorenzo, Gesù Cristo è il fondamento della morale per
ogni uomo? Analisi e confronto con alcuni laici in Italia.(Excerpta). Roma 2000, 184 pp.
SHOFANY, Saba, La contribution des prélats melkites au Concile
Vatican II, au renouveau de la théologie morale. (Excerpta).
Roma 2001, 107 pp.
WICKRAMASINGHE, Raymond Kingsley, An Analysis of the Definition of a Refugee from the Point of View of Catholic Social
Teaching. (Excerpta). Roma 2001, 107 pp.
8.3 Licenza in teologia morale
Nel corso dell’anno accademico 2000-2001, 56 studenti hanno ottenuto la licenza in teologia morale:
AHOKPE, Laurent (Benin - diocesi di Abomey): La famille au service de l’évangélisation de la vie en milieu Fon à la lumière de
“Evangelium vitae”.
ANNICCHIARICO, Francesco (Italia – S.J.): L’Internalizzazione dei
valori morali e religiosi: contributi
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AUGUSTINE, John (India - diocesi di Trivandrum): Structural Sin
in the Light of Sollicitudo rei socialis: An Analysis of its Theological Meaning and Pastoral Implications.
BACKHAUS, Hermann (Germania - diocesi di Münster): Die postmoderne Moderne Wolfgang Welschs und der traditio-Gedanke
Hansjürgen Verweyens: Ansätze sur Lösung moraltheologischer Probleme im Christenteum.
BROWN, Grattan (U.S.A. – diocesi di Memphis): The Moral Conscience in Catholic Health Care Institutions.
CARLIN, Paolo (Italia – O.F.M.Cap.): Telegiornale ed etica: Tra dovere della notizia e diritto di informazione.
CARRIERI, Giuseppe (Italia - diocesi di Taranto): Una bioetica per
la famiglia.
CAVANI, Matteo (Italia - diocesi di Modena-Nonantola): La visione di coscienza in Luigi Sturzo. Analisi di “Politica e morale”
e “Coscienza e politica”.
CUNLELA, Francisco (Mozambico - diocesi di Gurué): Moçambique: a dignidade da pessoa humana e o desafio da igreja local.
DAVEDASSAN, Clarence Sandanaraj (Malaysia - diocesi di Kuala
Lampur): Health Care as a Social Right in the Light of Health
Care Reforms in Malaysia.
DELI, Lajos (Ungheria - diocesi di Eger): La pace e la guerra nelle encicliche di Papa Giovanni Paolo II. Il Papa ha cambiato
la sua posizione?
DI NARDI, Vincenzo (Italia - diocesi di Nocera Inferiore): Cammino verso la santità secondo l’epistolario di S. Alfonso.
FITZPATRICK, Daniel (Gran Bretagna - diocesi di Paisley): Grace
and Freedom in Modern Moral Theology.
GAMBA, Giancarlo (Italia - diocesi di Roma): Il ministero coniu-
614
gale. Una strada per la partecipazione della coppia alla vita
della Chiesa
GOMES, Bernardo António (Guinea-Bissau - diocesi di Bissau): A
virtude moral da justiça. Aplicada à Guiné-Bissau
GRILL, Rupert (Austria - diocesi di St. Polten): Begründung moralischer Normen bei Karl-Wilhelm Merks und Eberhard
Schockenhoff.
GUERRA, Hirilene Aparecida (Brasile – I.A.S.C.J.): Critério de comunhao na dinâmica comunitária. Reflexao teológico-moral
para a vida consagrada.
HERREROS RECIO, Jesús Manuel (Spagna - diocesi di Palencia):
El acto moral antes, en y después de “Gaudium et spes”.
HOINATZ DE ANDRADE, Braz (Brasile – O.A.D.): Preparar o jovem
para formar uma família.
HWANG, Chang Hee (Corea Del Sud - diocesi di Inchon): La responsabilità morale della Chiesa di fronte alla comunità politica: un’analisi alla luce della “Gaudium et spes” nn. 73-76.
KIM, In Hye (Corea del Sud - diocesi di Ascoli Piceno): Igino Giordani: “Maria modello” e la sua “imitazione” nella vita morale.
KISHE, Venance Max (Tanzania - diocesi di Mandeville): Psychotherapy and Reconciliation. From the Moral and Relational Dimensions.
KOOTTALA, Paul (India - diocesi di Mananthavady): Abortion in
India. Hinduistic and Catholic Understanding.
KOWALSKI, Jerzy (Polonia – O.F.M.): “L’uomo nuovo” secondo i
codici domestici neotestamentari.
LAKOMY, Vojtech (Slovacchia - diocesi di Kosice-Exarchat): Il
padre come educatore morale in alcune testimonianze epistolari di P.A. Florenskij.
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LOPES, Pedro Cézar (Brasile - diocesi di Patos De Minas): A
Esperança em Rubem Alves.
MAFFIOLETTI, Gianangelo (Italia – S.M.M.): La formazione alla
fedeltà nel cammino di preparazione al matrimonio alla luce
delle indicazioni pastorali della CEI.
MAGALLANES MEDINA, Ruben (Messico - diocesi di Mexicali):
Cristo como el centro en la formación de la conciencia según
la VERITATIS SPLENDOR.
MARTINEZ CANTERO, Miguel Angel (Paraguay – C.Ss.R.): Consideraciones ético-teológicas en torno al problema de la deuda
externa.
MEZZABARBA, José Maria (Argentina - diocesi di Rafaela): Los
Condicionamientos de la Vida Moral en la “Moral de Actitudes” de Marciano Vidal.
MULI, Killian Wambua (Kenya – I.M.C.): Family Planning: A
Moral Evaluation of Contraception.
NOMBRE, Ronnie (Filippine - diocesi di Marbel): The Moral
Ground of the Philippine- Church. Involvement in the Electoral Process 1949-1998: A Critical Analysis in the Light of Moral-Theological Principles
PEDRO SOBRINHO, Jamir (Brasile - diocesi di Caratinga): A questao agrária e a justiça social no Brasil.
POOPPANA, Jude Joseph (India – S.D.B.): Friendship and the Moral Life: A Critical Analysis on the Views of Paul J. Wadell and
Edward Collins Vacek.
POOVAMNILKUMTHOTTIYIL, Joseph (India – H.G.N.): Prenatal
Diagnosis and Therapy: A Moral Theological Analysis.
RAKOTO HAJANIRINA, Patrick M. (Madagascar - diocesi di Antananarivo): Les fidèles divorcés remariés, un problème théologique et pastoral. Les réponses de Michel Legrain.
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RUAN, Guozhang (Cina - diocesi di Fujan): L’inculturazione cristiana della famiglia cinese.
SAMEI, Lawrence (Papua-Nuova Guinea - diocesi di Bougainville): The Christian and Power: A Study of the Ethics of Power
according to Karl Rahner, Paul Tillich and Catholic Social Teachings.
SAVARIMUTHU, Michael R. (India - diocesi di Tuticorin): La pena
di morte nella tradizione e nel dibattito teologico attuale.
SEANE, Valentine Tsamma (Sud Africa – C.S.S.): Social Change
brings about Conflict in making Moral Decisions.
SHERIDAN, Eamon (Irlanda – S.S.C.): Migrant Workers in the
Global Economy. A Moral Evaluation of the Situation of Migrant Workers in Taiwan, in the Light of the Social Teaching of
Pope John Paul II
TEATER, Kristian (U.S.A. - diocesi di S. Louis): The Contribution
of John Paul II to the Debate on the Relationship between Preferential Love and Christian Agape.
THUNDIPARAMBIL, Joseph Nixon (India - diocesi di Fiesole): Personalità morale del cristiano e la teologia asiatica: una morale basata sul modello cristocentrismo trinitario.
TIMCHIA TUBUO, Ernest (Camerun - diocesi di Bamenda): The
Enneagram and Christianity. A Moral Analysis of its Origin,
link to Sufism and Modern Development in the Catholic Church.
TITTARELLI, Egidio (Italia - diocesi di Macerata): La famiglia comunità aperta e accogliente alla luce del cammino attuale della Chiesa in Italia.
TJIVELA, Gabriel (Angola – O.F.M.Cap.): Dimensao dialógico-cultural da proposta moral crista à luz do sinodo africano.
TODISCO, Vito Angelo (Italia - diocesi di Avellino): La proposta
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cristiana del lavoro oggi. La visione sintetica del catechismo
della Chiesa cattolica.
TUMA, Richard (Repubblica Ceca – S.J.): La verità vi farà liberi.
UDAYA KUMAR, Stanislaus (India - diocesi di Bangalore): A Reaffirming Call to Protect Life - specially in its earlies Stages. An
Analytical Study in the Encyclical “Evangelium vitae” by Pope
John Paul II.
UPAKARN PATTANA, Luke (Tailandia - diocesi di Udon Thani):
The Law of Karma in Buddhism and Natural Law in Catholic
Teaching.
VADAKKEDATH, Clement John (India – C.Ss.R.): Christian Freedom and Sin: A Study of the View of Bernard Häring.
VEGA ARRIETA, Neris Artemio (Paraguay - diocesi di Castrense):
La objeción de conciencia al servicio militar. Perspectivas éticas a la luz del magisterio eclesiastico.
VICAR, Martin (Slovenia – C.M.F.): La morale negli aforismi di
Franz Kafka.
WETE, Joao Pedro (Angola – F.S.A.): La formazione della coscienza morale nella cultura Bantù.
WORAKO, Hailemariam (Etiopia – O.F.M.Cap.): The Identity of
the Unborn Child and its Moral Status.
YENNY GARCIA, Roberto (Messico - diocesi di Tampico): La procreación responsable y el “camino” de la formación de la conciencia.
DANIELLE GROS
Segretaria Generale
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Reviews / Recensiones
AA.VV., Il male morale come problema teologico. Trieste: Centralgrafica, 2000, 112 p. (Centro Culturale Evangelico Albert
Schweitzer, V).
Il presente volume contiene gli atti della tavola rotonda promossa annualmente dal Centro Culturale “Albert Schweitzer” a Trieste. Una tavola rotonda, per sua natura, non affronta e neanche
analizza una tematica con rigore sotto il suo aspetto di unità tematica intrinseca; offre invece approcci diversi e riflessioni varie secondo gli interessi e orientamenti particolari dei partecipanti. Nel contempo questi contributi, per diventare “rotondi” e corrispondenti,
dovrebbero lasciarsi comporre in una specie di mosaico. L’idea guida del mosaico è espressa dal titolo: „Il male morale come problema
teologico“.
Stelio Zeppi (11-30) contribuisce con una riflessione presa dalle
radici della cultura occidentale, dalla mitologia e filosofia greca. Fa
vedere come le nozioni di bene e male emergono da quelle di giustizia e ingiustizia. Mentre riesce a delineare bene come l’ingiustizia
del male, nel processo dell’evoluzione del pensiero filosofico, si focalizza nella hybris, rimane piuttosto nell’oscuro lo specifico del
“morale” in quanto appare poco chiaro il rapporto spinoso tra fato e
libertà.
Maurizio Pagano (77-88) evoca alcuni elementi scelti, ma fondamentali presi dell’ambito filosofico: la necessità di affrontare la complessità del problema del male con una filosofia non unilaterale, bensì ermeneutica; la necessità di superare la mera dimensione etica verso la “domanda teorica sul senso generale dell’essere” (80) il che
richiama sempre anche la dimensione religiosa; la necessità di una
riflessione seria e approfondita sull’essere (e non solamente il godimento) della libertà… Indica piste di ricerca servendosi soprattutto
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della “Simbolica del male” di P. Ricoeur.
Sergio Rostagno (65-75) tenta di articolare il male morale specificamente come problema teologico. Si concentra sul pensiero complesso del grande Agostino, senza però prenderne in considerazione
il suo aspetto evolutivo. Mette bene in risalto come la dimensione
teologica, la questione su Dio, induca Agostino a superare il dualismo dei manichei. Mi pare invece problematica la contrapposizione
tra metafisica e teologia che Rostagno pensa di dover costruire in
questo ambito. Interessante e attuale invece in una specie di appendice la sua sottolineatura che l’impresa scientifica attuale, soprattutto nella sua veste di ingegneria genetica può condurre a una ricaduta dall’altezza della libertà sotto un dominio nuovo del fato. Purtroppo il tema della libertà viene articolato soltanto in questo contesto,
mentre risulta assente nelle riflessioni sintetiche su Agostino.
Aldo Magris (31-41) giustamente evidenzia che il problema del
male trascende l’ambito puramente etico. Pone in questione la stessa nozione di Dio. Ha quindi la valenza di un vero problema teologico. Lo dimostra servendosi di pensieri gnostici, apocalittici,
manichei e biblici. Riguardo alla Bibbia stupisce l’affermazione del
Magris che in nessun “posto della Genesi si dice che Dio aveva creato l’uomo <libero>…che l’uomo risulta in questo momento (del
trasgredire il divieto di mangiare dall’albero del bene e del male) essere privo proprio di quella condizione che renderebbe <libero> il
suo agire…”. Claus Westermann, nel suo commento classico su Genesi 1-11 (cf Claus Westermann, Genesis, BKAT, Neukirchen-Vluyn
1976) aveva dimostrato in modo molto chiaro quanto il libro della
Genesi, dall’inizio della creazione dell’essere umano, è permeato dall’idea della libertà come dono originario da parte di Dio creatore; in
questa linea è anche da interpretare il rapporto tra albero del bene e
del male da un lato e albero della vita dall’altro. Quindi l’affermazione del Magris ci lascia perplessi.
Dario Fiorensoli (89-94) riferisce sommariamente tentativi di fuga e di rifiuto di responsabilità dinanzi al male. Definisce il male nel
suo nucleo come “regressione dell’amore” (93). Riguardo al suo superamento fa appello alla speranza escatologica in Dio. Tre autori
presentano brevi considerazioni su diverse esperienze religiose. Umberto Piperno (43-48), Rabbino, articola l’alternativa tra bene e male
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tramite il modello tradizionale ebraico delle due vie poste davanti all’uomo e gli conferisce attualità con un racconto messianico tratto
dall’inferno di Auschwitz.
Khaled Fouad Allam (49-53) osserva e lamenta la tendenza preocuppante nel mondo dell’Islam di identificare il male con l’occidente. Aldo Natale Terrin (55-64) caratterizza il “New Age” come distacco dal moderno funzionale e post-moderno frammentato e come
ritiro in un interiore spirituale dove il male verrebbe superato con le
sole capacità immanentistiche del pensare positivamente. Infine si
presenta interessante il “Sommario Tematico” (99-105) in quanto indica in 62 punti una specie di panoramica complessa e anche contraddittoria di diversi tentativi di riflettere sul problema del male il
quale appare proprio così come “mysterium iniquitatis” da affrontare sempre in modo nuovo.
Le considerazioni presentate in questo volume in buona parte
saranno già conosciute da un lettore istruito. Ciononostante appaiono non di rado in contesti e combinazioni che fanno pensare. Va
criticamente osservato: La “tavola rotonda” si era proposta di studiare il problema del male come male morale. Questo, per definizione
e in distinzione dal male fisico e metafisico trova la sua “non-qualità” specifica in rapporto con la libertà e responsabilità dell’uomo.
Tale rapporto evoca una panoramica complessa di questioni aperte e
tentativi di risposte sempre passibili di discussione. Allora sorprende
che questo rapporto, tranne nel contributo di M. Pagano, appare solamente in considerazioni secondarie o risulta del tutto assente. Inoltre: a volte appare una specie di avversione contro ogni trattazione
metafisica del problema del male, avversione espressa però solamente con affermazioni prive di argomentazioni. I diversi interventi,
senza dubbio, possono servire come osservazioni in vista di un mosaico più o meno organico sul “male morale come problema teologico”. Si tratta di osservazioni interessanti, ma piuttosto sparse e rappresentano così, secondo le parole dell’introduzione, la “cultura attuale frammentata più che pluralista” (9).
BRUNO HIDBER, CSSR
Bombaci, Nunzio, Una vita, una testimonianza, Emmanuel
Mounier. Messina: Armando Siciliano Editore 1999, 368 p.
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Per ben comprendere i movimenti culturali, sociali, politici ed
anche ecclesiali del secolo scorso dobbiamo necessariamente ritornare al “personalismo”. Come fenomeno storico, il “personalismo”
nasce in Francia, tra le due guerre, nella forma della “rivoluzione
personalistica”, come risposta pacifica ai sistemi totalitari nascenti
nella Russia Sovietica e in Germania, per difendere la dignità di ogni
uomo ed affermare il primato dei valori personali. “Nella sua breve
esistenza ha già recato un notevole influsso sul socialismo umanista,
sul neoliberalismo, e, per endosmosi, su quasi tutte le ideologie contemporanee, perfino sul comunismo dell’Europa occidentale” – ha
notato J. Folliet in L’avènement de Prométhée, nel 1950, cioè nell’anno della morte del “padre del personalismo”: Emmanuel Mounier. La
conseguenza è chiara: per ben comprendere il “personalismo” dobbiamo ritornare alla persona di E. Mounier, “che fu, incontestabilmente – secondo Folliet – il filosofo più coscienzioso, lo scrittore più
felice e la vita più irradiante del movimento personalistico” (ibidem,
136). Infatti, molte affermazioni e posizioni mounieriane verrebbero
facilmente giudicate “pomposa retorica” se non fossero avallate da
un’eloquente coerenza di vita (M. Montani).
In questa prospettiva si inserisce Una vita, una testimonianza,
Emmanuel Mounier di Nunzio Bombaci, studioso di filosofia contemporanea, traduttore ed intenditore delle opere del personalista
francese. In questo libro, contrariamente al suo primo significativo
lavoro Impegno personalista e testimonianza cristiana in E. Mounier
(Messina 1995), Bombaci non presenta l’insieme del pensiero mounieriano, ma la biografia intellettuale e spirituale del pensatore francese per far emergere “i complessi problemi legati alla formazione e
alla maturazione di Mounier, alle sue frequentazioni e alle sue amicizie, alle polemiche e alle battaglie condotte fra il 1930 e il 1950”
(Prefazione). I ventidue capitoli evidenziano periodi cruciali del
cammino intellettuale e spirituale di Mounier: da Grenoble, dove
nacque nel 1905, alla Sorbona (l’agrégation nel 1928), dalla fondazione di Esprit nel 1932 all’opposizione al governo di Vichy (19401945), dal tormentato dialogo con il partito comunista francese alla
“nuova cristianità” nell’interpretazione del rapporto fra cristianesimo e storia in Feu la Chrétienté (1945-1949). Inoltre, ogni periodo
del suo percorso è stato stigmatizzato non soltanto per gli eventi
forti della sua vita, ma soprattutto per gli incontri amichevoli e professionali con l’élite degli intellettuali francesi (J. Daniélou, J.
Guitton, J. Maritain, G. Marcel, P. Teilhard de Chardin). La rico-
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struzione dell’itinerario intellettuale di E. Mounier da parte di N.
Bombaci non sfugge dai problemi difficili, come ad esempio: il controverso rapporto fra Mounier e il governo di Vichy o la mancanza
della contrapposizione frontale al comunismo, ma piuttosto la
distinzione tra un “marxismo scolastico, chiuso” con il quale ogni
dialogo risultava impossibile e un “marxismo aperto”, di ispirazione
umanistica (chiamato da Mounier “un socialismo extra-comunista”), con il quale i credenti avrebbero potuto compiere insieme un
tratto di strada. La monografia di Bombaci mostra indubbiamente
che l’impegno di Mounier come intellettuale si fonda sulla convinzione d’essere presente ed attivo nella vita dei contemporanei e delle
generazioni a venire. La sua riflessione concentrata sulla categoria
della persona è sopravvissuta alla rage antihumaniste espressa da
alcuni indirizzi di pensiero del Novecento. La persona – secondo P.
Ricoeur – “rimane il miglior candidato per sostenere le battaglie giuridiche, politiche, economiche del nostro tempo” (Muore il personalismo ritorna la persona). “Se il personalismo comunitario è ‘morto’
– afferma Bombaci, citando Ricoeur – il personalismo cristiano
perennis mantiene tutta la sua validità. Il costante richiamo alle sue
ricchezze costituisce, senz’alcun dubbio, la cifra del Magistero di
Giovanni Paolo II” (Conclusioni). Rapportandosi ad esse con fedeltà
e immaginazione, come Mounier ha elaborato una mediazione culturale dei suoi principi, l’intellettuale cristiano di oggi, e ancora
quello di domani, dovrà operare la propria mediazione culturale. A
tale fine sarà necessaria la fedeltà alla tradizione del pensiero cristiano e alle indicazioni del Magistero, ma essa non basterà: bisognerà coniugarla con una costante attenzione agli événements, fare
all’immaginazione che sa elaborare risposte inedite a problemi inediti. Si tratta, in fondo – secondo Bombiaci – di quella capacità in
virtù della quale il pensiero cristiano si rinnova continuamente
restando sempre fedele a se stesso. Mounier ha evidenziato la
dimensione comunitaria della persona, che si esplica nella relazionalità. Il carattere relazionale della persona è oggi un tema di centrale importanza nella riflessione etica, in particolare, il più valido
fondamento di un’etica della solidarietà, valore in primissimo piano
nei documenti del Magistero della Chiesa negli ultimi anni, soprattutto nella Centesimus Annus e nella Sollicitudo Rei Socialis di
Giovanni Paolo II. Se il valore cardine della società è la libertà, ad
esempio nel pensiero di Popper, in Mounier essa sembra essere
subordinata ad una prioritaria esigenza di giustizia. “La libertà non
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fa la giustizia, essa la serve”. Questa esigenza di giustizia anima l’opzione rivoluzionaria di E. Mounier. Integrare una scelta rivoluzionaria in una visione cristiana – afferma Bombaci nelle sue conclusioni – suscita indubbiamente delle difficoltà. Le difficoltà suaccennate possono essere ridimensionate se si pensa al significato fondamentalmente spirituale che la rivoluzione ha per Mounier. Essa è
innanzitutto quella conversione (autorealizzazione attraverso mouvement de personalisation), quella trasfigurazione interiore premessa alla trasformazione delle realtà concrete (“piena comunità degli
uomini”, “mondo delle persone”). Una risposta adeguata al processo di secolarizzazione nel mondo cristiano – secondo Mounier - non
sarà la “nuova cristianità” come realtà sociale nella concezione della
cristianità medievale, ma una solida spiritualità cristiana, la fede
incarnata nel mondo, il rapporto reciproco tra cristianità e mondo.
Se il suo amico J. Daniélou considerava il suo cristianesimo “elitario”, avendo grande fiducia nella capacità educativa delle élites,
Mounier, invece, era – secondo P. Siena – “un profeta della Chiesa
proletaria”. E’ altrettanto vero – aggiunge Bombaci – che la sua vita
è stata una testimonianza di amore per i poveri. Non si può in nessun modo negare, inoltre, che Mounier sia stato un grande educatore e creatore di amicizie, un ragguardevole promotore e organizzatore di cultura, un coerente testimone della fede cristiana e un laico
animato da una grande fame di santità, addirittura, un santo secondo F. Mauriac. Una testimonianza che si coglie nel suo vivere il cristianesimo come “una natura profonda”, nella coerenza di una
povertà scelta come “gioia luminosa, in un’oblatività che richiama la
spiritualità dei grandi autori carmelitani che gli sono familiari, in
una mistica dell’abbandono che fa pensare a Ch. Péguy e a Ch. De
Foucauld (Conclusioni).
EDMUND KOWALSKI C.SS. R.
Boswell, J.S. / McHugh, F.P. / Verstraeten, J., Catholic Social
Thought: Twilight or Renaissance? Leuven: University Press,
2000, 307 p. (Biblioteca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium CLVII).
In a survey on the teaching of the social doctrine of the Church
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in Europe, over forty different titles for courses covering this area
were identified by the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in 1998
(Quaderno n. 6, 37). The diversity of titles given to the same area of
study is a strikingly simple testimony to the underlying problem discussed in this present work, the fruits of a seminar organised by experts gathered under the general auspices of the Universities of Leuven and Cambridge. The scope of the book is to examine the area, referred to as middle ground thinking, between the broad principles
and values of Catholic Social Teaching and concrete action and decisions. Comprising eighteen chapters in five sections, there is a general thematic unity to the book, despite some annoying overlapping. Two chapters sketch an historical background, four chapters engage with the sources that give an identity to Catholic Social Teaching, five chapters discuss the relationship of this with contemporary
social thought, and six chapters analyse concrete projects for social
action. The final chapter is a postscript from an outside expert (John
Coleman) who was not involved in the collaborative project. Coleman’s chapter is a sort of review of the book’s contents (quite possibly the best review there will be), but the reader would do well to reflect on the contents of the whole work first and not slip into the
temptation of taking the insightful evaluation of Coleman as equivalent to grappling with a complex study.
To understand the methodology of the book it is important to
read the short introduction (xii - xxi). Not only is the overall summary well done but, more practically, abbreviations that appear through
the book are explained: CST (for ‘Catholic Social Teaching’), CNOST
(for ‘Catholic Non-Official Social Teaching) CathST (for ‘Catholic Social Thought’). Abbreviations are cumbersome but necessary in a
work of this genre that is seeking to unravel different strands of a
broad tradition to seek a new pattern. That seems to be the presupposition of the book: there has been a tradition, particularly since
Rerum novarum (1891), that reached its high-water mark in the period
between Quadragesimo anno (1931) and Gaudium et spes (1965) but
is in a clear decline since. That decline is not immediately obvious in theological circles, accustomed as we are to take social encyclicals with appropriate seriousness. But who, outside such
circles, now takes such writings as important analyses of the social
dilemmas of the day? Hence the question mark in the title of the
book. The contributors to this study are divided on whether the tradition of Catholic Social Teaching is in a twilight zone which precedes
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an impending darkness or in a period of renaissance that might herald a new dawn. Hellemans (13 - 32) is clearly of the former view, suggesting that the Ultramontane Catholicism which is at the background of Rerum novarum has run its course, and with it all its theological currents. Verstraeten (59 -77), Clague (125 - 140) and McHugh
(35 - 57) would tend towards the latter view, though with different
nuances, seeing possibilities of retrieval for a renaissance through,
respectively, a narrative approach, a correct interpretation of rights
and a theological representation of the natural law tradition.
I would support the renaissance-leaning essays, but with some
provisos. Behind the terminology of Catholic Social Teaching and
Catholic Social Thought, both official and non-official, is theological
confusion on another level, that of doctrine. We commonly refer to
the ‘social doctrine’ of the Church, but too easily forget that this is
used in one sense in the social encyclicals of Pius XI (who uses it to
point to a body of principles deduced from a duplex ordo understanding of natural law) and in quite another sense in those of John
Paul II (who uses the term to cover a broad anthropological understanding of the dignity of the human person). Between these contrasting uses of the one term, it is important to recall that Gaudium
et spes practically ignores the term altogether, using it but once. A
clarification on this matter is of importance because of the current
trend which presumes that the area of study covered by this book belongs to the discipline of moral theology. Without clarity on what
‘doctrine’ means, how can we hope to integrate it into the tradition
of sacra doctrina? This terminological ambivalence confuses the debate at a second level: that of the proper scientific autonomy of our
dialogue partners from the world of finance markets, political theory
and economic analysis. Van Gerwen (201 - 219), Beretta (221 - 238)
Bruni (239 - 248) or Zamagni (149 - 170) do not, I admit, set out to
make the case for the autonomy of an analysis of financial markets
and institutions but the cumulative evidence of their contributions
convinces me that theologians are still seriously under-informed on
such matters. The reason is not ill-will on our part: it is a simple consequence of the fact that the questions of a theologian are not necessarily those of a financial expert or an economic theorist. We may, for
instance, dismiss the view of F. Von Hayek that there is no such thing
as social justice as a theological nonsense. But have we read the author’s argument in the first place? Greater clarity on the meaning of
‘doctrine’ and a more positive disposition towards the legitimate ‘au-
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tonomy’ of the sciences with which we should dialogue could then
lead to a more analytic understanding of the place of Catholic Social
Teaching/Thought within moral theology. The affirmation of such a
relationship is widely repeated, especially since Sollicitudo rei socialis (1987). But: what moral theology? Virtue theories, to take one
example, are not so amenable to the analysis of social questions, as
is pointed out by McHugh (42). There are difficult questions of terminology still to be sorted out. This book does not solve these questions, but it has convinced me of the urgency of moving on to this
level of research.
I have concentrated on the more theoretical chapters of this
book. That is not meant to imply that other contributions such as
those of Hogan (183 -190), Thomasset (191 - 200) or Dorr (249 - 262)
are to be ignored. Indeed the practicality of these analyses confirms
the importance of the theoretic questions. Hogan’s analysis of the
Irish agency Trocaire is an enlightening case study of how new practices can emerge from the older tradition in a way that forces a rethinking of the original tradition. This only reinforces my assessment
that the importance of this book is its theoretic probing of the
middle ground thinking between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’. One can only conclude that such thinking is now so confused, analytically weak
and imprecise that it is better work with different categories. The solution, I suggest, will come from ecclesiological studies. It has been
clear for some time, such as in the studies of Eduardo Benvenuto,
that the problem is an epistemological one relating to the fact that
social teaching (thought, doctrine) has been shaped by the Magisterium in a way that had little ecclesial context, as distinct from giving a content to be taught. This not only betrays the origin of encyclicals like Rerum novarum, which is a papal response to movements from local churches as much as a Rome-engendered intervention, but it also ignores the deeper tradition of the social dimension
of faith as classically expressed in De Lubac’s Catholicisme (1938) or
recently reiterated in a different form in Coste’s Les dimensions sociales de la foi (2000). The truly radical social thinkers within the
Church will be those who return to the sources (biblical metaphors
and patristic formulations) in order to dialogue with the autonomous sciences of a global universe using categories that have
been theologically well-honed before the Enlightenment period. That
is a tall order, and risks sounding overly vague. On the evidence of
the book under review such a programme is possible and could lead
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to a renaissance: ignoring the challenge would hasten the encircling
dark of the twilight, leaving this field of thought to pragmatic utilitarians. This is a most stimulating study for anyone who is interested
in the contemporary analysis of the social involvement of the
Church. There is little comfort here for those who rely on the trite
repetition of others’ formulae as an excuse for social thinking. Reading this book takes you, in a sense, beyond the questions of the book
that, unfortunately, are still too Western in their conception and
scope. The lacunae of official teaching, to which Calvez refers (11),
will find rich words and abiding images from this book to shatter
that silence.
RAPHAEL GALLAGHER C.SS.R
Christen, Eduard/ Kirchschläger, Walter, (hrsg) Erlöst durch Jesus
Christus, Soteriologie im Kontext. Freiburg, Schweiz: Paulusverlag, 2000, 147 p (= Theologische Berichte XXIII).
Even more than “salvation”, the term “redemption” is heavy with
nuances which render its use in contemporary culture quite problematical, even within Christian circles. The most obvious of these
concern the analogy with paying money in order to reacquire property, liberate a slave or free someone who has been kidnapped. The
use of such analogies, especially out of cultural context, can easily
cast God, Jesus Christ and the one to be saved in theologically dubious roles. More fundamentally still, the idea of redemption implies
not just the resolution of a problem or crisis but the existence of
same. It is anything but self-evident that human beings in a contemporary cultural context share this conviction. If no one seems to be
drowning what use is a life-saver?
Those responsible for the production of this volume have clearly decided to broach these questions in a systematic and serious
manner. Within the space of less than 150 pages the key issues surrounding this thorny problem are presented and discussed in a way
that is informative, interesting and helpful. The texts are arranged
according to a lose thematic logic which minimizes repetition and
has the effect of gradually drawing in a wider and wider range of pertinent considerations. Since each of the contributors deliberately
adopts a different focus and since each author exhibits a certain particularity of theological stance and of expression, it seems best to
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review the pieces in the order presented noting their contribution to
the overall project.
The first contribution, by the emeritus Professor of Scripture and
Hebrew Studies at Luzern, Clemens Thoma, is entitled “Redemption
in a Jewish perspective”. This piece serves as an eloquent and stimulating reminder of a basic truth which we all know but tend to forget:
that Christianity can only be adequately understood against the backdrop of Jewish culture. The theology of redemption is a particularly
striking instance of this principle. One of the most interesting aspects
of Thoma’s contribution is the use he makes of Jewish liturgical texts
to illustrate convergences in the theological positions of Judaism and
Christianity concerning redemption
With this backdrop in place, Walter Kirchschläger broaches the
problem in a systematic perspective with a piece entitled: “Did God
send his Son to his death? On the biblical understanding of
Redemption”. This is the longest and most wide-ranging of the studies collected here. In a lucid and coherent style, the author succeeds
in arranging the essential themes which need to be taken into consideration in responding to the provocative question posed in the
title. Kirchschläger effectively locates and rehearses the familiar
argument that the death of Jesus must be seen in the context of his
whole life and his fidelity to his mission. While these ideas may be
familiar to many readers they are presented here with a clarity, a
conviction and a plausibility that is often lacking. The only point at
which the treatment falters, in the opinion of this reviewer, is the
somewhat drastic separation in the treatment of the seminal scriptural texts of “what happened” (Geschehen) and “how it was interpreted” (Deutung). It is a basic principle of hermeneutics that any
account of happenings is already an interpretation, which is then
open to further interpretations. In a piece that is otherwise so informative and prudent at least an acknowledgment of this fundamental
principle would seem necessary.
There follows a joint effort by Helmut Hoping and Jan-Heiner
Tück under the heading “<<Died for us>> - The soteriological meaning of the death of Jesus and the hope of Universal Reconciliation”.
Ironcially, this is perhaps the most theologically daring of the pieces in
that it attempts to make sense of the “substitutive” or “procuratory”
(stellvertretend) dimension of the death of Jesus expressed in the term
pro nobis. With equal courage, and considerable intellectual honesty,
the piece also attempts to answer these questions in the light of the
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human catastrophe of the Shoah. The authors thus trace a delicate
line between the offensive and incoherent idea of facile and cheap
solutions to the dark mysteries of human evil and the understandable,
but equally facile, temptation to project our human psychological limitations onto the living God. Each reader will have to decide for himself or herself whether the authors succeed in steering this course, but
there is surely something noble about the endeavour in itself.
The final two contributions are of a somewhat different type,
less overtly theological in nature, with a greater emphasis on social,
pastoral and practical issues. This is not at all to suggest that they are
of a lesser professional quality, simply to note a change of focus.
Dietrich Widerkehr writes briefly but effectively on “The theology of
liberation in Switzerland”. He convincingly argues that a contemporary soteriology cannot directly tackle the considerable social problems such as unemployment being caused by, among other factors,
globalization. Neither can soteriology ignore such problems, however, and so one is faced with the need for methods of analysing social
injustices of this kind. When he gets to this point Widerkehr looks
rather longingly, and perhaps rather optimistically, to the efforts
made along these lines in the theology of liberation of Latin America.
In an otherwise stimulating and refreshing piece Widerkehr leaves
the tough questions concerning the alleged legitimacy of Marxist
social analysis for christian theology untackled.
In the final essay Ludwig Mödl offers a series of “pastoral-theological considerations” concerning Redemption. As his argumentative
springboard Mödl uses the forthright demands of the
“Kirchevolksbegehren” in Austria and German. Without taking on the
polemical tones of these declarations, Mödl attempts to see their
implications for a contemporary, socially located soteriology. The conclusion is telling, if rather predictable: the institutional Church does
poor service to a needful world by persisting in the promulgation of
teachings which do not correspond to the needs of that same world.
Apart from the merit of each of these studies and their cumulative
effect in studying the theme of redemption, one fact deserves note by
way of conclusion: this book is an excellent example of interdisciplinary work within a theological faculty. As fields of specialization drift
further and further apart, all of us who work in moral theology have
something to learn from this example of Swiss coordination.
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631
De Liguori, Alfonso (a cura di Nino Fasullo, con una nota di Guido
Corso), Maria nostra avvocata, Palermo: Sellerio editore, 2000,
110 p.
The Doctors of the Church can perform their teaching function
in the ecclesial community only if their ideas are rethought and reassimilated in each epoch. St. Alphonsus is no exception, for even
though his writings were extremely popular and widely propagated
over the last two centuries, they can now appear stale and outdated
in the Church since Vatican 11.
The problem is largely that his rhetoric is presumed to betray
devotion without content. On the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the publication of the The Glories of Mary Nino Fasullo has
reissued the section on Our Lady as Our Advocate before the throne
of divine grace. He wants to show how St. Alphonsus presented doctrine in a way that would penetrate the affectivity and imagination of
all people, whether learned or unlettered. He argues that St.
Alphonsus’ rhetoric has managed to deceive many who read him
without perceiving his evangelising purpose. Though his stories are
quite unhistorical and fantastic, he knew they were the necessary
means to teach all types of people that in the history of salvation
God’s grace reached them through Mary’s prayers.
Fasullo’s introduction is a true piece of theological reflection
that uncovers what some will find are the unsuspected dogmatic presuppositions supporting St. Alphonsus’ preaching. He makes two
main points. First, The Glories of Mary is theology in the classic sense
of talk about God. Mary reveals the face of God as mercy and grace
to the whole of humanity. In this time of redemption she cannot but
communicate this truth to those who appeal to her as their advocate.
Second, she is crucial in bringing about a changed emotional
response through the process of conversion so that people can now
approach God with confidence. St. Alphonsus as a theologian saw
that Mary was necessary to moral life for people’s peace with God. By
discerning the dogmatic sources of this narrative and rhetorical
approach to Our Lady Fascullo has helped awaken today’s theology
to St. Alphonsus’ continuing relevance as an ecclesial Doctor.
TERENCE KENNEDY C.SS.R
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Dianin, Giampaolo, Luigi Taparelli D’Azeglio (1793-1862). Il significato della sua opera, al tempo del rinnovamento neoscolastico, per
l’evoluzione della teologia morale. Milano: Edizioni Glossa, 2000,
436 p. (Dissertatio Series Romana - 30).
This work is an exception to the general norm that doctoral theses rarely read well in book form. The thesis structure of the Doctorate obtained at the Gregorian University is still obvious, but the author, a priest of the diocese of Padova, has an ability to communicate
the flow of an intricate argument without being smothered by footnotes in the process. Not that the footnotes are lacking, as the
amount of primary research material is enormous. Dianin’s clarity of
analysis helps him overcome the torture that so many thesis-based
works impose on the reader where thousands of references obscure
the core results of the research that should be clear, concise and communicable.
The subject of the study, Luigi Taparelli D’Azeglio, is timely and
worthwhile. Taparelli is perhaps the least known of a remarkable
group, which also included M. Liberatore, J. Kleutgen and S. Sordi,
who were the key players in the far from straightforward revival
story of 19th century neo-scholasticism. There have been previous
studies on Taparelli, listed here at 406-412, but in general he has been
treated as a social thinker, political theorist and contributor to the
neo-scholastic networking, especially through his association with La
Civiltà Cattolica. Dianin breaks new ground in studying him as having significance for the evolution of moral theology. This thesis complements rather than contradicts what we already know about Taparelli through standard works such as P. Dezza’s Alle origini del
neotomismo (1940) or G. A. McCool’s Nineteenth-Century Scholasticism (1989). Because of Dianin’s close study of the original writings
and personal letters of Taparelli, a more rounded picture emerges. As
a result it is now clearer why Taparelli failed as the first Rector of the
re-established Collegio Romano, a post to which he was appointed in
1824 and from which he was brusquely removed in 1829. The consolation post, an appointment as Provincial of the Naples Province of
the Jesuits, was also to end in dismissal in 1834. Taparelli’s southward
exile continued as he was based in the Palermo area for the next 15
years. All these would be incidental details closer to ecclesiastical gossip than theological significance were it not for the importance of
Taparelli’s developing thought on key people and events.
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633
Dianin’s thesis traces this story. Taparelli’s fascination with neoscholasticism was born out of an unease with his own patchy formation, but it is the special fruit of his frustration with what he considered the confusing plethora of views among the Professors of the
Collegio Romano where everything, bar heresy, seems to have been
allowed, as he wryly notes. Nor were the brethren in Naples all that
willing to accept their Provincial’s desire to impose a more systematic
study pattern in the years between 1829-1834. The gathering political clouds that were to burst into the movement for the reunification
of Italy only deepened Taparelli’s sense that the times needed a sturdier system of thought if truth (and the Church) were to survive.
Dianin explains in Chapter One (11-82) how the neo-scholastic project
was as much a search for a resolution of the socio-political questions
of the day as a deep desire to know the ‘true’ St. Thomas. Not that the
philosophical questions were ignored, as Dianin takes up in Chapter
Two (83-144). The new elements in the research of this Chapter show
Tapaarelli to be open to dialogue with contemporary thinkers like A.
Rosmini, V. Gioberti and, most notably in terms of influence on
Taparelli, V. Cousin. The too common dismissal of the 19th century
neo-scholastics as not willing to dialogue with their contemporaries
is shown to be untrue, at least in Taparelli’s case. Certainly he shared
the view of his closest collaborators that the twin philosophical evils
of the day were traceable, respectively, to the philosophical subjectivism of Descartes and the religious individualism of the Reformers.
But Taparelli emerges from this study as one who is convinced of the
need to return to the neo-scholastic synthesis, yes, but only if one
also listens to the thinkers of the day who are in some sense compatible
with Church tradition and, a very important factor for Taparelli,
not overly hostile to the Society of Jesus. This explains his interest
in Cousin’s very particular view of the eclectic method and the common-sense approach to philosophy. Chapter Three (145 - 199) takes
up the gnoseological, metaphysical and anthropological presuppositions of Taparelli. The emphasis on a philosophy of realism and a
creation-based metaphysics of knowledge are hardly a surprise. This
was the typical fare of the neo-scholastic response to the philosophical ontologism and political liberalism that were seen as the enemy
of both truth and the Church. More surprising is how Dianin has
been able to find a more coherent system of thought in Taparelli than
has been hitherto explained. Chapter Four (201 - 269) looks at the
presuppositions of Taparelli’s fundamental moral position. Once
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more there are no surprises here: the importance of causes, the significance of the difference between the object and subject of morality, and role of the voluntary act within the moral evaluation of conscience. Whether Taparelli would have thought of himself as a moralist, in our sense, is open to question in my view but Dianin is very
skilled in extracting the neo-scholastic framework from Taparelli’s
thought. A useful feature of the Chapter is the further consolidation
of the evidence that the commentary of F. Suarez has been a disaster
for those wishing to understand the thought of St. Thomas. It is curious how the neo-scholastics were probably more familiar with the
text of Suarez than with that of Thomas, presuming the near identity
of both when it is clear that on crucial questions, notably the role
of justice and right, they had very opposed presuppositions. The
book closes with Chapter Five (327 - 391) which is an assessment of
Taparelli’s contribution to moral theology. The judgment is nuanced:
clearly Dianin cannot be too harsh on the subject of his thesis, and
he praises Taparelli where possible. But he does not spare the necessary criticisms, noting in particular the inherent weakness of a neoscholastic method (341, 362). A difficulty with this chapter is related
to the reservation already noted: I do not think that Taparelli particularly saw his project in the theological terms of morality.
Dianin has done us a service in presenting a full account of an
important figure in 19th century theology. Because Taparelli died in
1862, which is well before the ‘victory’ of neo-scholasticism, he tends
to be forgotten. But it was he who introduced Vicenzo Gioacchino
Pecci (the future Leo X111) to scholastic ideas during his time as a
student at the Collegio Romano. It is a plausible thesis to surmise that
the seeds of Aeterni Patris (1879) were sown by Taparelli. At another
level of significant effect, Dianin shows how Taparelli had influence
on the people who shaped the Ordinatio Studiorum which became
obligatory in the Society of Jesus by order of the Father General
Beckx. The ideas of Taparelli, if they influenced the Church at these
crucial levels, are therefore worth studying in themselves, and this
Dianin does with thoroughness. Though I am not entirely convinced
that Taparelli’s influence is best studied from the optic of moral theology, I think Dianin is correct on one aspect of the problem. Taparelli’s decisive thought patterns are shaped by certain factors: the theological confusion of his age, the political uncertainty in Italy, the
role of the Papacy, the lack of systematic foundations in the study of
philosophy. The neo-scholastic project, to which Taparelli most cer-
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635
tainly belongs, is best interpreted in this hermeneutical key. That has
important implications for moral theology. If we want to know what
neo-scholasticism has to offer to moral theology, we must contextualize it. The influence of neo-scholasticism, both good and bad, is
linked to the questions that gave birth to it. Not all these (for instance, the Italian question) have such enduring significance for
moral theology. Dianin’s study is a tribute to his own intelligent research and shows the signs of skilled imput from the director of his
thesis, Professor Klaus Demmer. The result is a notable contribution
to our understanding of a still misunderstood century of theological
controversies whose legacies remain with us.
RAPHAEL GALLAGHER C.SS.R.
Doldi, M., Picozzi, M., Introduzione alla bioetica, Torino: Elle Di Ci
2000, 96 p.
Il libro presentato è nato come frutto di un corso di
Aggiornamento per insegnanti tenuto da Marco Doldi - organizzato
dall’Ufficio Scolastico dell’Archidiocesi di Genova nella primavera
del 1999 - con la collaborazione di Mario Picozzi, ricercatore presso
il Dipartimento di Medicina e Sanità Pubblica dell’Università
dell’Insubria-Valese. Secondo l’intenzione dell’autore “il presente
testo vorrebbe essere uno strumento facile per insegnanti ed educatori per introdursi nel mondo della bioetica” (Introduzione). Lo
scopo introduttivo, infatti, emerge nella composizione del volume.
Punto di partenza della sua riflessione metaetica è Il contesto attuale
in cui alcuni valori morali non sono più universalmente condivisi e,
di conseguenza, questo fatto ha ripercussioni teoretico-pratiche
sulla sfera esistenziale e relazionale dell’uomo, sull’epistemologia
della medicina e sui fondamenti stessi dell’etica (Cap. I). I capitoli
successivi sono un tentativo di dare le risposte sull’origine della bioetica (Cap. II Dall’etica medica alla bioetica), di precisare la definizione della bioetica (Cap. III) e, infine, di cercare – attraverso i paradigmi etici contemporanei – un sistema etico adeguato alla bioetica
d’oggi (Cap. IV Quale etica per la bioetica). Il modello etico di riferimento non può essere che il modello personalistico entro cui il valore della persona costituisce il fondamento assoluto e trascendente in
campo morale e bioetica. Il personalismo cristiano nella interpreta-
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zione di E. Sgreccia e di D. Tettamanzi è – secondo Doldi – il modello ritenuto valido per fondare l’oggettività dei valori e delle norme a
risolvere le diverse questioni nel campo della bioetica (Cap. V). Il personalismo cristiano riceve slancio ed energie grazie agli ultimi testi
del Magistero, innanzitutto del Concilio e dell’insegnamento di
Giovanni Paolo II, i quali delineano la grandezza e la dignità dell’uomo nel suo riferimento a Cristo (pp. 69-70). Il compito più difficile
per l’etica personalistica cristiana d’oggi è salvare il valore della persona e l’aspetto relazionale dell’uomo nel rapporto reciproco tra
Morale e legge (Cap. VI) e nel dialogo con l’etica laica (Cap. VII Il
dibattito in Italia). Dopo aver riflettuto in modo teoretico sulla bioetica, nell’ultimo capitolo, M. Doldi propone alcune attività da svolgere con studenti e ragazzi, così da renderli attenti alle questioni bioetiche e capaci di discernimento critico.
La mancanza di una panoramica sulle problematiche tipicamente bioetiche con l’applicazione dei principi etici rilevati e sostenuti dall’autore, a mio parere, non fa di questo libro, in realtà, “uno
strumento facile per insegnanti ed educatori”, come segnala l’autore
stesso nell’introduzione. Dopo una lettura di questo testo, secondo
me, troppo generale e teoretico, non sono sicuro che un’insegnante,
tanto più uno studente o un ragazzo, possa rispondere adeguatamente alle domande dettagliate proposte dall’autore nell’ultimo capitolo, come nel punto attività in bioetica, dove Doldi, sollecitando una
riflessione concreta, interroga i suoi lettori: “nell’ipotesi si decida di
comunicare la verità al paziente, quale strategia mettereste in atto?”,
“Come giungere ad un reale consenso informato, mediante il quale
medico e paziente scelgono responsabilmente?”, “Quali limiti si possono fissare nell’assistenza sanitaria a persone provenienti da culture e religioni diverse?” (pp. 88-90). A propos, ogni domanda appena
citata, come problema difficilissimo da discutere e da risolvere, fa
parte del dibattito interdisciplinare contemporaneo fra gli specialisti,
dietro il quale, inoltre, sta una bibliografia ampia e molto complessa. Il presente testo – come giustamente afferma D. Tettamanzi nella
sua presentazione a questo libro – “permette di avvicinare il mondo
della bioetica”, ma, al contrario – a mio parere – non riesce a “raggiungere l’odierna pratica medica”.
EDMUND KOWALSKI C. SS. R.
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637
Frattallone, Raimondo. Antropologia ed etica sessuale. Messina:
Cooperativa S. Tommaso 2001, 207 p. (Cultura e Vita 4).
I problemi, che l’etica della sessualità si trova oggi a dover
affrontare, sono sempre più numerosi e di non facile risposta. È sotto
gli occhi di tutti la profonda e rapida evoluzione culturale, enfatizzata dai media, che non solo modifica radicalmente i comportamenti, ma pone con forza l’interrogativo sul significato e sulla stessa possibilità di una valida normativa etica in questo campo. Una chiara
fondazione antropologica diventa allora indispensabile per la credibilità della proposta morale. Il contesto pluralista indica come via
obbligata quello del dialogo, data la molteplicità e la diversità delle
antropologie. Per la comunità cristiana deve però trattarsi di un dialogo avvalorato dall’annunzio: diversamente il suo vivere non sarebbe più testimonianza.
Appare retto da queste preoccupazioni il saggio di R.
Frattallone. La chiarezza dell’impostazione e del linguaggio, l’equilibrio delle indicazioni operative e la maniera con cui riesce a selezionare e presentare gli elementi più importanti delle diverse problematiche ne fanno uno strumento valido anche per coloro che, nell’ambito dell’insegnamento o dello accompagnamento personale,
sono più direttamente interpellati dalla vita.
Il libro è articolato in due parti. La prima è di carattere più generale e tende a chiarificare il rapporto fondativo dell’antropologia nei
riguardi dell’etica sessuale. La seconda parte affronta invece le problematiche più concrete e diffuse, leggendole sempre con una preoccupazione pedagogica. Le risposte che vengono suggerite si caratterizzano per il chiaro radicamento nella visione cristiana; ci si preoccupa però di spiegarne adeguatamente le motivazioni e di indicare i
passi migliori per la traduzione pratica.
Il percorso che, nella prima parte, si impegna ad approfondire
“la sessualità come identità della persona umana nelle sue strutture
dell’esistenza”, è complesso e risulta articolato in tre momenti. Si
parte da un quadro critico dei più importanti modelli di antropologia filosofica, privilegiando quello personalista e aprendoli alla luce
della rivelazione biblica, colta “in maniera essenziale” nelle “linee
generali” della proposta antropologica (p. 11-67). Si delinea poi “una
visione organica della persona umana” mettendone in rilievo i “principi sottostanti al dinamismo dell’esistenza” (p. 68-72). Si possono
così analizzare (terzo momento di questa prima parte) le “concezio-
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ni della esistenza umana e della sessualità”, corrispondenti alle diverse antropologie (p. 73-114). Di quella biblica viene posta in rilievo la
collocazione “all’interno della visione teocentrica dell’intera rivelazione” (p. 110) e, per quanto riguarda il Nuovo Testamento, si sottolinea
“l’originalità cristocentrica”, che “anche quando affronta problemi
legati alla sessualità, è concentrata nella fondazione “nuova” della
vita morale “in Cristo”, più che da motivi di ordine teoretico razionale” (p. 113).
Chiarificata l’impostazione teoretica, la seconda parte affronta le
problematiche più concrete, raggruppandole “attorno a due nuclei
principali: problemi riguardanti la singola persona e problemi specifici della coppia”, considerando ad essi “connessa la dimensione
sociale e religiosa della persona” (p. 115).
Riguardo al primo gruppo ci si sofferma innanzitutto sui problemi concernenti la maturazione personale e l’educazione sessuale,
in coerenza con la prospettiva pedagogica che sostiene tutto il discorso. Successivamente vengono presi in esame l’autoerotismo, l’omosessualità e le deviazioni dell’istinto sessuale, prima di trattare le
tematiche della vedovanza e del celibato. Riguardo al secondo gruppo, si segue il cammino storico della coppia: preparazione, rapporti
prematrimoniali, apertura alla vita e regolazione della natalità,
fedeltà coniugale e problemi del divorzio.
Il quadro delle problematiche può apparire troppo ambizioso
per il numero di pagine del libro. E questo soprattutto per alcuni
punti più caldi, come l’omosessualità o la paternità/maternità
responsabile. Generalmente però l’autore riesce ad evidenziare i
punti nodali della riflessione, indicando una sufficiente bibliografia
per l’ulteriore e necessario approfondimento. La franchezza, con cui
viene presentata la posizione del magistero ecclesiale, è accompagnata sempre dallo sforzo sincero per individuare i passi che meglio
permettono di comprenderla nel suo significato e quindi di farla
incontrare costruttivamente dalle coscienze. Questa maniera di procedere rende il libro uno strumento valido anche a livello pastorale.
SABATINO MAJORANO C.SS.R.
Lienkamp, Andreas, Theodor Steinbüchels Sozialismusrezeption.
Eine christlichsozialethische Relecture. Paderborn; München;
Wien; Zürich: Schöningh, 2000, 803 p.
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639
In the light of the slowly-healing wound inflicted on Europe by
Soviet Realsozialismus it will understandably take some time before
the myriad unresolved questions concerning the relationship
between socialism and christianity get a new airing. A not uncommon reaction on the part of christians to the collapse of the Soviet
system is a kind of complacent “told you so”. This is understandable,
particularly on the part of the victims of that system, but it is theologically and philosophically myopic if it implies a wholesale rejection of socialist thought and the challenges it poses to Christian faith
and ethics. Such tendencies will not disappear easily, however, and in
the meantime this “Relecture” of the question in an author of the calibre of Theodor Steinbüchel by a scholar of Lienkamp’s competence
is to be heartily welcomed.
The tense historical context, the attractive and interesting personality of Steinbüchel, the scholarly skills of Lienkamp and, most of
all, the topical and controversial nature of the question itself combine to make this a genuinely readable piece of doctoral research.
A German Catholic theologian before, during (in so far as he was
permitted) and after (Steinbüchel died in 1949 as Rector at
Tübingen) the Nazi regime, who dedicates himself to the study of
socialism in order to learn from it, is bound to provoke at least our
curiosity. Several aspects of Steinbuchel’s life enhance this interest:
his academic background in economics, his pastoral experience with
factory workers in the “rheinisch-westfälischen Industriegebiet”, his
deep intellectual roots in both the Scholastic theological tradition
and the Idealist philosophical tradition. Given these credentials and
given his genuinely moderate intellectual temperament,
Steinbüchel’s openness to socialism simply cannot be dismissed as
naive or ill-informed. In fact, the more interesting tension in this
book is not that between Steinbüchel and the Nazis but that between
Steinbuüchel and other theologians who were interested in socialism, or rather who were interested in refuting socialism (at times
without seriously studying it!). Lienkamp’s talent lies partly in his
capacity to locate this rather acrimonious debate in its historical
context and to bring out the particularity of Steinbüchel’s contribution as a fruit of his learning and ultimately of his character.
While maintaining the focus on the selected theme, Lienkamp’s
treatment of his subject is so thorough that it is effectively an intellectual biography of the author in a particular optic. Steinbüchel
(1888-1949) emerges as one of those Christians whose intelligence
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and integrity lead him into honest dialogue with sources which at
first sight seem unpromising if not actually anathema. In the course
of almost 700 pages (apart from the elaborate notes and appendices),
through Lienkamp’s generous and effective use of quotations from
the author’s works, papers and letters one develops a certain familiarity with this voice from the past. It is a voice which speaks with an
attractive and unusual combination of reasonableness, prudence,
insight, criticism and intellectual passion. Rather cautious and agonized when speaking of socialism, it takes on prophetic tones when
denouncing the aberrations of capitalism.
The depiction of the intellectual setting is extremely well done.
Anybody who is anybody in German theological history (at least in
the sphere of social ethics) in the 20th century is here to be found.
Some of those who receive substantial treatment in that they are
located by Lienkamp in his narration of Stienbuchel’s reception of
socialism are: Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, Heinrich Pesch, Leonhard
Ragaz, Max Scheler, Oswald von Nell-Breuning, Victor Cathrein,
Wilhelm Hohoff, Ernst Michel, Walter Dirk, Theordor Brauer and
Fritz Tillman (Steinbüchel’s “Doktorvater”). One of the most attractive sides of Lienkamp’s presentation is the way in which his reading
of these authors, and of Steinbüchel himself, is accompanied by
extended references to major philosophical figures in the background (Marx, Engels, Hegel, Feuerbach, Kant, Nietzsche) and to
more recent theological scholarship (Rahner, Grundlach, Metz, Auer,
Haunhorst, Häring and a host of others). The cumulative effect of
these many and varied references is not at all eclectic, however,
because they are handled in quite different ways, as the logic of the
treatment of the primary theme requires.
The key to Steinbüchel’s reception of socialism is to be found,
Lienkamp plausibly proposes, in the title of his doctoral thesis: Der
Sozialismus als sittliche Idee. Ein Beitrag zur christlichen Sozialethik
(1921). That is to say, one can only understand Steinbüchel’s reception of socialism in general and of Marx in particular if one appreciates the philosophical nature of his intellectual quest. Knowing and
appreciating the thought of his two great masters St. Thomas and
Kant, Steinbüchel finds in Marx an additional philosophical
resource, even when he does not share his presuppositions or agree
with many of his conclusions. At this point the thorny question arises for Steinbüchel (and for all of us) as to how this particular philosophical resource is to be deployed in theological ethics. Lienkamp is
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at pains to point out that Steinbüchel rejects and refutes many of the
principle ideas of Marxism and yet insists that he has learned a great
deal for his christian ethics from Marx. The ongoing theological and
philosophical treatment of this question is of vast importance and
the conceptual bridges which Steinbüchel was attempting to build in
the twenties and thirties may prove to be still serviceable in this
regard.
One clear conviction guides Steinbüchels project: to try to construct the history of Western society since the Enlightenment and to
compose a theological (social) ethics which takes cognisance of this
history, without coming to terms with the ethical issues raised by
socialism is to condemn oneself to massive oversimplification. This
by no means implies that he is blind to the historical horrors of
Sovietism, or to some undeniable links between socialist theory and
Soviet practice. Rather he sees both capitalism and marxism as children of philosophical liberalism, and christianity, with its inherent
commitment to social justice, as an alternative vision, supplying
(along with so much else) a critique of both political systems.
While the concluding section of the book allows Lienkamp to
express his own views on the contribution of Steinbüchel to social
ethics, it serves also to point out the value of Steinbüchel’s thought
for the ongoing discussion of the relationship between socialism and
christianity. Apart from numerous thematic points that require more
adequate answers from christian ethicists (neatly laid out on pp.455464), it is perhaps the intellectual and emotional attitude of
Steinbüchel to socialism which is most remarkable. In terms of mental openness, thoroughness of investigation, equilibrium of judgement and courage in articulating his convictions, Steinbüchel can
serve as a model in studying this difficult question.
Lienkamp’s book is the proverbial “must” for anyone interested
in the relationship between christianity and socialism in the twentieth century and can be highly recommended to anyone interested in
the wide range of historical, social, political and religious themes
indicated above. Apart from expressing one’s admiration for his
remarkable academic Gründlichkeit, the best praise of Lienkamp is
perhaps to say that he himself emerges as someone who has learnt a
great deal from the one he has so carefully studied.
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McInerny, Ralph M., L’analogia in Tommaso d’Aquino, a cura di
Stephen L. Brock, traduzione di Fulvio Di Blasi. Roma: Armando Editore, 1999, 189 p. (Studi di Filosofia 18).
This book is a very accurate and highly useful translation of
McInerny’s Aquinas and Analogy (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University of America Press, 1996). According to the editor’s remarks
in the opening presentation, it is the first of a series of translations
of the works of eminent contemporary authors to be put out by the
series Studi di Filosofia. The purpose of this ambitious project is to
provide useful tools to Italian scholars and teachers wishing to familiarize themselves with currents of thought from other linguistic
circles. The editor goes on to cite three particular points of interest
for readers of the present work. First, there is contact with the creative work going on in America in the area of medieval philosophy.
Then there is the topic of analogy itself, which is absolutely essential
for a proper understanding of Aquinas’s thought. Finally, there is exposure to a controversial set of theses that differ substantially from
the traditional interpretation of analogy in St. Thomas. Taken together, these three points of interest make McInerny’s work on analogy an excellent candidate for its introduction to a learned Italian
readership.
The work itself is an exquisite example of probing analysis and
scholarly exposition. McInerny reminds us that Aquinas never wrote
a treatise specifically dedicated to the topic of analogy. Because of
this lacuna in his literary corpus, some of his disciples have tried to
pull together the various observations on the topic spread throughout his writings in order to see what such a treatise might have
looked like if he had had the opportunity to write one. One such attempt was Thomas de Vio’s De nominum analogia (1498), a work
which set in place the traditional interpretation of Aquinas’s teaching
on analogy and which, according to McInerny, is based on a fundamental misunderstanding. The great Cajetan, it is claimed, misinterpreted a key passage in Aquinas’s Commentary on the Sentences by insisting that the Greek understanding of the derived Latin word analogia should regulate the interpretation of the concept in Aquinas’s
thought. The result was the now classical distinction between the
analogy of inequality, the analogy of attribution, and the analogy of
proportionality, something which McInerny claims does not exist in
Aquinas’s thought and which, if care is not taken, can easily confuse
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“the analogy of being” with the analogy of “being.” McInerny claims
that Aquinas never talked of the causal dependence of all things in
hierarchical succession from God in terms of analogy. That is not to
say that Aquinas did not support what others would eventually refer
to as the analogia entis, but that he would not have confused the
ordo rerum with the ordo nominis. From McInerny’s viewpoint, any coincidence between the two in Aquinas’s thought is purely accidental.
The definition of analogous names is, in his mind, the field of the logician, not the metaphysician. Even the statement that “being” itself
is analogical is something whose significance must be determined by
logic.
As stated earlier, the Italian translation is very competently done.
A comparison with the original English text shows that the translator has taken great pains to provide his readers with a precise rendering of the work’s primary linguistic context. He does so, however,
without making excessive demands on his readers. The style is crisp
and clear, the kind you would expect to find in a critical analysis of a
medieval scholastic like Aquinas. In an opening note, the translator
provides his readers with the criteria he used in rendering certain
English words and phrases into their appropriate Italian counterparts. He also includes the names of the various Italian translations
used in the book’s numerous citations from Aristotle and Aquinas. At
appropriate places in the book, he also makes good use of explanatory footnotes to provide his readers with the information needed to
understand various English wordplays that have no Italian equivalent. Such added helps demonstrate the high level of professional
care that went into the preparation of this translation. The translator
has done his Italian readers an important service in making
McInerny’s thought available to them in such an accurate and readable form.
Taken as a whole, the work represents McInerny’s mature reflection and development of insights presented in his earlier work The
Logic of Analogy (1961). Because of its critical stance toward the traditional understanding of analogy in Aquinas’s work, it deserves to be
read with care and will, in all likelihood, be hotly debated by
Thomistic scholars for years to come. McInerny is intent on making
sure that the interpreters of Aquinas do not succumb to a latent Neoplatonism which states that what is first ontologically is also first in
human knowledge. This error, he states, was the “capital sin” of Platonism, one consistently refuted by Aquinas in his writings and
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which has no place in a proper understanding of his teaching on
analogy.
DENNIS J BILLY, C.SS.R.
MARCIANÒ Santo – PELLICANÒ Paola, “......secondo il mio cuore....”
(Ger, 3,15). Sessualità, affettività e vocazione all’amore: un itinerario formativo, un cammino spirituale. Torino: San Paolo,
2001, 407 p.
Este es un libro para quien desee tener una visión cristiana y
espiritual de la sexualidad humana. Los autores son: un sacerdote
católico, Santo Marcianò, de larga experiencia en la formación sacerdotal en el Seminario Teológico Arzobispal de Reggio Calabria, y la
doctora Paola Pellicanò, médico en la Universidad del Sacro Cuore
de Roma y profesora en aquel seminario.
Estamos acostumbrados a leer libros sobre el tema con enfoque
especializado en teología o en psicología, pero esta obra aparece
como una meditación cristiana e interdisciplinar de una de las principales preocupaciones del hombre de hoy, la sexualidad.
“Meditación cristiana”, porque lo es, y sin ella no se podría entender
el hilo conductor del libro: la sexualidad y el amor como regalo de
Dios. Al terminar cada unidad hay una reflexión y una plegaria para
integrar el contenido biológico, psicológico o teológico en una relación de agradecimiento al Señor. E “interdisciplinar”, porque el tema
se enfoca desde las ciencias humanas, como la biología y la psicología, y desde las ciencias eclesiásticas: la Palabra de Dios y el
Magisterio de la Iglesia.
La obra está dividida en 12 unidades. Comienza con un estudio
de la sexualidad y la persona humana, insistiendo en su dignidad y
en su característica fundamental de don. Luego presenta la afectividad y la vocación al amor basándose en estudios psicológicos, de
modo especial en Erik Erikson, para continuar con una visión de la
dimensión espiritual de la sexualidad a la luz de los documentos de
Juan Pablo II.
Los autores analizan aspectos concretos de la sexualidad humana: cómo es el comportamiento sexual, qué decir de la masturbación
y de la homosexualidad, cómo se manifiesta el amor en la comunión
con los demás y en la vida de la comunidad. Se trata de manera par-
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ticular la sexualidad en la familia y en la procreación a la luz de la
responsabilidad. Tienen cabida también temas de candente actualidad: como las técnicas antiprocreativas, aborto, cultura de la muerte, fecundación artificial, castidad virginidad y pastoral vocacional.
El libro termina con dos capítulos en los que los autores insisten
en la sexualidad como verdad y como camino de santidad.
La peculiaridad del libro es su enfoque espiritual meditativo, sin
el cual no se puede entender, y tal vez ahí podría estar su debilidad
para quien busque solamente argumentos racionales y científicos.
Los autores se esfuerzan en el difícil diálogo de la razón y de la fe, de
la ciencia y de la revelación, del argumento científico y de la autoridad teológica, del dato experimental y de la invitación a la oración.
La persona que desee solamente ciencia no quedará satisfecha con la
lectura de la obra. Tampoco lo será quien pretenda continuar con el
tabú sexual. Pero el lector que desee una obra que presente la sexualidad abierta a su aspecto transcendente, aspecto éste indiscutiblemente humano, podrá gozar de la lectura de este libro que nace de la
experiencia de muchos años en la formación eclesiástica y en la consejería pastoral.
P. JOSÉ RAFAEL PRADA RAMÍREZ, CSSR.
Maret, Michel, L’euthanasie. Alternative sociale et enjeux pour
l’étique chrétienne. Langres: Éditions Saint-Augustin 2000, 394 p.
“Qui ne souhaiterait pas une bonne mort, ou autrement dit, une
euthanasie selon le sens étymologique du terme? Mais ce mot, qui
avait à ses origines une coloration positive, a pris aujourd’hui la signification dominante de mettre fin délibérément à la vie d’un patient pour écourter ses souffrances”. Avec ces phrases Michel Maret,
théologien laïc suisse romand, commence son livre et, en même
temps, son enquête sur l’évolution de la connotation négative de l’euthanasie qui tend aujourd’hui à être présentée comme la seule solution conforme aux progrès de la psychologie, de la morale et de la
science. Mais cette euthanasie-là, selon lui, ne réalise pas l’unanimité. De plus, “l’acte de liberté et de la charité”, que veulent y voir les
personnes qui lui sont favorables, n’est pas à la hauteur de l’être humain et de sa dignité. Pour démontrer cela l’ouvrage de M. Maret se
situe en grande partie à un niveau anthropologique, avant de se si-
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tuer au niveau théologique, pour nous aider à mieux comprendre
l’être humain et les questions du sens de la vie, de la souffrance et de
la mort. Par rapport à l’euthanasie une solution plus respectueuse de
la dignité humaine consisterait - selon l’auteur - dans les soins palliatifs correctement administrés, puisque la phase terminale d’une
maladie mortelle n’est pas dépourvue de sens, mais au contraire est
une des étapes les plus significatives de l’existence humaine. Voici la
thèse qu’il défend à travers les dix chapitres de son livre, le seul ouvrage global en français sur ce sujet.
Étant donné qu’il règne aujourd’hui une grande confusion autour du terme euthanasie, le premier chapitre vise à clarifier la terminologie utilisée pour montrer l’évolution sémantique de cette notion de l’Antiquité gréco-latine - ou euthanasia désigne toujours le
vécu du mourant, la qualité des derniers instants de la vie - à nos
jours avec sa connotation négative en vue de procurer au mourant
une mort douce et sans souffrance. Dans le deuxième chapitre - intitulé Pratiques de l’euthanasie - Maret examine, tout d’abord, l’histoire de la pratique et de la pensée relatives à l’euthanasie, ensuite,
l’évolution des législations de quelques pays (France, Suisse, PaysBas, Belgique, États-Unis, Canada et Australie) durant ces dernières
années et, enfin, les chiffres actuels sur la pensée des soignants et du
public par rapport à l’euthanasie. Les enquêtes réalisées aux PaysBas en 1990 et 1995 révèlent que, par exemple, près d’un cinquième
des morts dans ce pays, résulte d’une décision médicale avec l’intention d’abréger la vie du patient. D’autre part, le nombre de demandes d’euthanasie et d’assistance au suicide s’est accru de 37% (p.
50). Aux origines du probleme est le titre du troisième chapitre qui
prend la forme d’une enquête sur les causes du grand mouvement de
revendication en faveur de l’euthanasie que l’on constate en Occident ces dernières décennies. M. Maret en résumant présente les
quatre facteurs qui sont devenus le terrain nourricier de la revendication actuelle d’un “droit à la mort”: une modification du rapport à
la mort (occultation de la mort et conspiration du silence, déplacement de la mort vers l’hôpital, désocialisation de la mort: la solitude
et l’isolement), le changement du contexte hospitalier (déshumanisation des soins médicaux et hospitaliers), la révolution des techniques médicales et l’acharnement thérapeutique (prolongement de
la vie, de la vieillesse et de l’agonie, maitrise de l’heure de la mort),
l’insuffisance du traitement de la douleur en contexte hospitalier (les
soins palliatifs négligés). Après avoir examiné les causes médico-so-
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ciales de la demande d’euthanasie, Maret, en relève d’autres qui sont
plutôt d’ordre culturel, voire philosophique: il s’agit de la revendication de l’autodétermination (chap. 4 L’Euthanasie, figure paradoxale
de l’autonomie). L’auteur a retenu trois exemples s’inscrivant dans le
mouvement contemporain acceptant l’euthanasie: la solution du
cancérologue français L. Schartzenberg, la réponse d’ADMD (Association pour le Droit de Mourir dans la Dignité) et “la motion Ruffy”
(le conseiller national suisse). Ces trois positions peuvent faire ressortir les valeurs communes auxquelles font référence tous ceux qui
sont favorables à l’euthanasie et au suicide assisté: une mort dans la
dignité, le respect de la vie humaine, la liberté, la compassion, la tolérance. Paradoxalement toutes ces valeurs sont généralement partagées par ceux qui s’opposent à l’euthanasie, mais les termes n’ont
pas chez les uns et les autres le même contenu. Cette différence de
contenu - selon M. Maret - implique deux conceptions divergentes
de l’être humain et de la société. D’ailleurs, l’auteur examine ces différentes valeurs, avec leur ambivalence de sens et les conséquences
qui en découlent, dans le chapitre 7 Valeurs en jeu et conséquences.
Avant de se situer au niveau axiologique, Maret met en évidence
quels sont les grands enjeux médicaux et juridiques de l’euthanasie,
entreprenant dans le cinquième chapitre (Aspects médicaux et juridiques) une approche de la déontologie ainsi que l’éthique médicales
et de la philosophie du droit. L’Église catholique, tenant compte des
aspects médicaux (le respect de la vie humaine, l’assistance médicale près du malade et l’accompagnement des mourants) et juridiques
(le droit de tout homme à vivre, et à vivre dans la dignité), qui viennent d’être relevés dans le chapitre précédent, refuse toutes les
formes de la mort provoquée par compassion. M. Maret expose
quatre prises de position du Magistère (deux discours de Pie XII, la
Déclaration sur l’euthanasie de la Congrégation pour la Doctrine de
la Foi et l’Encyclique l’Évangile de la vie de Jean-Paul II) qui réaffirment l’inviolabilité de la vie humaine et le caractère gravement immoral de l’euthanasie (chap. 6 Prises de position de l’Église Catholique). Dans les chapitres 8 (Promouvoir la croissance de la vie humaine jusqu’à son terme) et 9 (Le sens de la vie, de la souffrance et de
la mort), l’auteur met en évidence que la vie humaine, même lorsqu’elle est marquée par la souffrance, les dégradations et l’approche
de la mort, peut être riche en signification. Les valeurs cultivées par
une société peuvent conditionner l’attitude de ses membres envers la
vie, voire créer un climat suicidaire, à l’opposé, un climat pro life.
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Les soins palliatifs et l’accompagnement du malade forment la solution de remplacement sociale, culturelle et vraiment humaine à l’euthanasie et au suicide assisté comme signes visibles de la “culture de
la mort”, en faisant ressortir quelle anthropologie est liée à ceux-ci:
les valeurs humaines qu’ils tentent de promouvoir et la possibilité
d’un ultime épanouissement de l’être humain. Le message chrétien
sur la souffrance invite, d’une part, à sublimer en amour comme Jésus les souffrances inévitables provenant des épreuves, des échec ou
des maladies, et d’autre part, à agir comme le Bon Samaritain en luttant dans ce monde contre toute forme de souffrance. La résurrection du Christ d’entre les morts, prototype de la résurrection de tout
être humain, donne au chrétien la certitude de la victoire de la Vie
sur la Mort.
Personnellement confronté au problème de la souffrance et témoin du courage qui ouvre un merveilleux chemin de croissance à
l’être humain vers sa plénitude, Michel Maret, théologien et animateur dans une maison d’accueil spirituel en Suisse romande, tente de
nous montrer que les enjeux éthiques de l’euthanasie ne touchent pas
seulement la foi chrétienne, mais également certaines valeurs humaines fondamentales. Son livre, fruit d’une grande compétence
scientifique, d’une expérience et d’une réflexion personnelles, nous
montre aussi que l’on peut être parfaitement “tolérant” en tout refusant l’euthanasie, qu’ainsi l’on respecte mieux la liberté et la dignité
humaines et que l’on pratique une compassion plus authentique en
mettant tout en oeuvre pour soulager les souffrances du malade et lui
découvrir sa dignité inaliénable, en lui offrant un contexte qui réduit
au maximum les facteurs d’aliénation qui peuvent perturber voire
manipuler sa liberté (Introduction).
EDMUND KOWALSKI C. SS. R.
MAURI, Margarita, y OTROS, Crisis de valores. Modernidad y tradición.
Una reflexión ética sobre la sociedad contemporánea. Barcelona:
Edit. Euro, 1997, 180 p.
Como parte del subtítulo lo dice, esta obra es el estudio de 3 publicaciones de Alasdair MacIntyre (*1.929): After Virtue (1.984), Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1.988) y Three Rival Versions of Moral
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Enquiry (1.990). Se trata de cinco artículos, fruto de un Seminario
preparado durante cuatro años acerca del pensamiento alasdariano.
La obra se abre con seis páginas de Prólogo suscrito por el mismo MacIntyre y se cierra con un artículo suyo titulado “Persona corriente y Filosofía Moral: reglas, virtudes y bienes” (pp. 143-164) y
con el elenco bibliográfico de su producción filosófico-literaria. En el
Prólogo, MacIntyre dice: “estoy agradecido y me siento honrado por
el espíritu atento y constructivo con que los autores (de los cinco artículos) han intentado exponer y criticar varios temas y tesis centrales de mis escritos” (p. I).
La síntesis que ofrece el mismo MacIntyre de las tesis centrales
de su pensamiento es, precisamente, el objetivo del análisis hecho
por los articulistas: “una dimensión política, una dimensión que sitúa sus tesis centrales en desavenencia, no sólo con las doctrinas del
Liberalismo Moderno, sino también, y más fundamentalmente, con
las instituciones características de las economías modernas y de los
estados modernos” (p. VI).
El primer análisis hecho por Margarita Mauri, “Autoridad y tradición” (pp. 7-21), es un estudio interesante sobre la naturaleza y el
valor de la tradición para una persona y para una comunidad: “vivir
comporta formarse en una tradición que provee a toda la persona de
esquemas conceptuales, de puntos de referencia necesarios para la
orientación personal” (p. 9). Para MacIntyre, la tradición es algo dinámico, pues incluye “el pasado, los retos del futuro, los conflictos
internos y externos del presente que dan forma a la tradición” (p. 12).
El segundo análisis, “Práctica de la virtud e ideal ilustrado” (pp.
23-56), elaborado por Joan Carles Elvira pretende ser un estudio crítico en torno a las obras de MacIntyre sobre cuestiones de educación
moral. En After Virtue se plantea “una alternativa al pretendido fracaso ético de la modernidad” y se pone el acento en “la necesidad de
volver a un modelo ético basado en la recuperación de las virtudes
como instrumentos apropiados de formación moral” (p. 24).
El tercer estudio realizado por Begoña Román se titula “La propuesta comunitarista de A. MacIntyre: análisis y crítica” (57-82). Se
trata de una crítica a la Ilustración por haber hecho del ‘Yo’ un individuo que, sin los otros, autónomamente, puede pensar por sí mismo
fuera y al margen de la comunidad” (p. 69), cayendo desafortunadamente en “algunas incongruencias” que han pasado inadvertidas al
filósofo escocés.
El cuarto análisis se titula una “Crítica a MacIntyre: una lectura
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kantiana” (pp. 83-114) presentado por Antoni Bielsa Drotz. “A pesar
del merecido reconocimiento de su interés y originalidad, escribe
Bielsa, es posible detectar algunas grietas que afectan a los cimientos del sistema macintyreano” (p. 83), entre otras, una visión filosófico-antropológica de corte ‘proto-aristotélico-tomista desde la cual
se opone a la Modernidad.
El último estudio es de Carmen Corral: “Acción, identidad y narratividad” (pp. 115-142). En After Virtue el autor parte de un desencantamiento respecto de la sociedad moderna a causa de las consecuencias que ésta desencadena (carencia de racionalidad, adhesión
emotiva, falta de un esquema moral válido) y que produce “la atomización del individuo y la disgregación de la identidad…” (p. 119).
Las cinco presentaciones del pensamiento alasdariano, si bien
asumen aspectos diversos, mantienen una unidad de fondo en cuanto destacan los elementos de base de MacIntyre y hacen el diagnóstico de los puntos débiles.
J. SILVIO BOTERO GIRALDO, C.SS.R.
Melina, Livio, e Zanor, Pablo ( a cura di), Quale dimora per l’agire?:
Dimensioni ecclesiologiche della morale, Roma: PUL Mursia,
2000, 270 p.
One of the themes at the front of scholarly attention today is the
ecclesiological ramifications of moral theology. The essays collected
in this volume are the fruit of the Second International Colloquium
organised by the John Paul 11 Institute for Studies on Marriage and
the Family in November 1999 to examine the status of this discipline.
Its title, as explained by the editors in the introduction, is inspired by
Heidegger’s conception of morality as the home of humanity, as its
dwelling place (p. 8-9). Monsignor Scola, the Rector of the Lateran
University, underlined how this evinces no merely academic question
because it interrogates us about the meaning of “we” as agent in
morality, and so about the significance of the Church for people’s
moral life.
There are nine major studies divided in three sections that make
up the substance of the book. The first section sets the tone and
framework for the whole colloquium. S. Th. Pinckaers provides a
magisterial treatment of St. Thomas’ way of relating Church and
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morality under the title of “The Body of Christ for the life of the
world.” He sketches an overview of St. Paul’s moral catechesis from
St. Thomas’ commentaries on the apostle’s letters. He develops his
thought on the grace of Christ as head of the Church and how this is
the source of the Church’s life in the sacraments, with the gifts, the
virtues and the beatitudes enlivening it. The III Pars of the Summa
gives a more systematic presentation, particularly regarding the
Eucharist as the sacrament that realises Christ’s Pasch for us. Two
points that result from his study are that the relation of the II and III
Pars of the Summa could be more fully examined to see how and why
morality leads to ecclesiology, and that this needs to be founded on
the extremely rich Scriptural and patristic sources in both parts.
P. J. Wadell begins his conference on friendship, virtue and the
excellence of action from Veritatis Splendor no. 20 which links the
moral goodness connected with virtue to friendship with Jesus. He
then expounds first Aristotle on friendship and then St. Thomas on
charity as the supernatural love of God that forms our whole moral
existence. But this divine friendship grows out of our life in Christ,
and so is expressed as discipleship or imitatio Christi. Charity then
gives birth to a community committed to Christ’s life-style so that “la
vita della carità è finalmente una pratica ecclesiale” (p. 55) that testifies to the peace, joy, mercy, goodness, truth and generosity it has
discovered in him.
J. Noriega Bastos then contends that it is the Holy Spirit that
animates the vision already proposed by Pinckaers and Wadell. He
builds his argument in three stages, first from our natural desire for
beatitude which can only terminate in God, second from the exercise
of liberty which is an act of self-determination by which we turn to
God in conversion, making our desire for felicity concrete and determined through our actual choices, and third that this turning to
Christ occurs through the outpouring of the Spirit in our hearts. The
author emphasises the paradox of Christian existence, the transcendence of our desire and the concrete particularity of choosing Christ
in faith as our way to God. Christian morality is therefore universal
and particular, and it is the Holy Spirit who makes the grace of salvation in Christ available to the whole human race. The Spirit is the
guarantee of the universality of Christian morality by which people
of every period and place enter into relationship with Christ.
The second section concentrates on the theme of communion. B.
Petrà demonstrates the ecumenical dimensions of this theme in the
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World Council of Churches, in current Orthodox theology particularly in Greece, and the strengths and weaknesses of the christocentric vision developed by Catholic moralists since Vatican II. He believes that Catholic scholars have not succeeded in sufficiently elaborating the ontological aspect of their vision of existence in Christ. J.
Laffitte explains how the universal call to sanctity that has now become part of theology implies that the Church is the subject of this
sanctifying action and so the human act should be understood in
terms of its unity with the Church’s sanctifying power. J. J. PérezSoba applies this insight into human action to the Eucharistic
memorial. His is the only essay that bases itself explicitly on a passage in Scripture, namely St. John’s Gospel, chapter 6.
The third section focuses on the fruit that an ecclesial morality
should bear. L. Melina reflects on the diachronic and synchronic effects of the life of the Church as the seed and beginning of eternal
life. He underlines the eschatological dimensions of Christian morality. E. Schockenhoff is concerned with what such a morality might
mean in contemporary secular society, and suggests a two level explanation of practical reason, one for secular society rather like
Habermas’ conception of universal practical reason, and another
faith informed conception for the Church community. T. NadeauLacour examines, following the indications given in Veritatis Splendor, the cases of St. Ignatius of Antioch in the early Church, St. Isaac
Joques and the Canadian martyrs, and St. Edith Stein to demonstrate how martyrdom is a supreme act of love that makes the splendour of a Christian’s vocation evident to the world.
There are eight other “contributi” that are lesser studies on a
wide range of issues broadly touching the main theme. Worthy of
mention are J. Mimeault’s study of what indwelling in the Church
means for human action, and R. A. Gahl’s study of what Alasdair
Maclntyre’s moral philosophy can add for a renewal of ethics and
moral theology.
There are many approaches possible toward unravelling the relationship between the ecclesial community and its consequences for
moral living. The current volume is a reflection furnished by a group
of specialised moralists. It therefore does not approach the topic as
Scripture scholars or experts in ecclesiology might. Nor is it preoccupied by many of the burning questions in contemporary theological debate, e.g. the relationship between Christian morality and that
the world religions, particularly regarding their ideas of salvation. Its
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focus, in fact, is more precise and closely defined. At its centre is St.
Thomas, his theological synthesis in its moral and christological aspects, and this based on his way of interpreting Scripture. Understood in this perspective, Quale dimora per l’agire is a valuable contribution to what is a current multifaceted discussion.
TERENCE KENNEDY C.SS.R.
Merkx, Karl-Wilhelm, Hacia una ética de la fe. Moral y autonomía,
Tópicos ‘90-9, Santiago de Chile: Centro Ecuménico Diego de
Medellín, 1999, 185 p.
El Centro Ecuménico Diego de Medellín ofrece en sus Cuadernos de Estudio (Tópicos 90-9) el texto de un curso impartido por el
Prof. K.W. Merkx en dicho centro en 1998. Al texto de Merkx siguen
dos breves juicios sobre el mismo, el uno es del jesuita José Aldunate (123-127), y el otro Waldo Romo (128-136), Profesores de la Universidad Católica de Chile. El cuaderno se cierra con un artículo de
J. Aldunate sobre los Derechos humanos en la Doctrina de la Iglesia
Católica (137-187). Dado que el curso de Merkx constituye la parte
fundamental del volumen, nos limataremos a él en nuestra recensión.
K.W. Merkx, teólogo y moralista laico alemán, es Profesor en la
Universidad católica de Tilburg (Holanda) desde 1982. Su línea de
pensamiento nos es conocida particularmente por su artículo “Autonome Moral”, publicado en la obra de colaboración editada por D.
Mieth, Moraltheologie im Abseits? Antwort auf die Enzyklika “Veritatis Splendor”, Freiburg 1994, 46-68, y por su libro Gott und die Moral; Theologische Ethik heute, Münster: Lit. Verlag, 1998.
Con su proyecto de “moral autónoma” el autor intenta ante todo
tender puentes entre la moral clásica y la cultura moderna. Un intento digno de toda loa ya que el moralista debe hacer cuanto está en su
mano para lograr conectar la ética de la fe con las propuestas éticas
del hombre real de nuestra sociedad. ¿Hasta qué punto logra Merkx
su objetivo? Comenzaremos exponiendo lo más fielmente posible sus
principios para hacer a continuación una valoración crítica.
El curso de Merx consta de 8 capítulos o documentos colocados
bajo 4 epígrafes o “partes”: 1) el problema de la inculturación de la
moral (pp. 11-35); 2) La libertad y la responsabilidad. El concepto de
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una moral autónoma (pp. 37-62); 3) Los diez mandamientos y nuestra libertad (pp. 63-84); 4) Las consecuencias de una moral autónoma para la responsabilidad social y política (pp. 85-119).
Para Merkx la crisis que en el post-Concilio ha sufrido la moral
debe ser considerada ante todo como una crisis de “estructuras” o
modelos de pensamiento, empleados en la fundamentación de las
normas. Lo que está en juego no es, por tanto, un problema concreto sino la moral fundamental. En esta línea el a. hace su propuesta
de una “moral autonoma” o moral de la “autolegislación”, que adopta como punto de partida el valor de la libertad (p. 14). La libertad
está en el centro de la cultura actual; inculturarse significa, por tanto, aceptar la centralidad de la libertad. Sólo así se podrá llegar a una
ética de la fe “en formato moderno” (p. 15). Al hacer tal afirmación
el a. se da cuenta de los riesgos que ello comporta, como el compaginar libertad y “obligatoriedad” ética, ética humanista (fundada en
la razón) y ética de fe. Tales riesgos cree que pueden ser marginados
desde el momento en que la libertad por él propuesta no se identifica con la arbitrariedad, ya que se trata de una ética de la responsabilidad. Por otra parte, la experiencia de libertad responsable (en el
prescribirse a sí mismo la ley) se realiza “completamente bajo la exigencia de Dios” . “La ética de la fe es la interpretación de esta situación a la luz del evangelio” (p. 16). Naturalmente la ética de la fe es
en cada época una síntesis nueva (integración actualizada de las experiencias de Dios, de sí mismo y del mundo).
El principio fundamental que garantiza la correcta integración
moral-cultura es, pues, el de la libertad responsable, que recubre 5
aspectos “que determinan y marcan de forma típica el pensar y sentir (asimismo el pensar y sentir morales) de nuestros contemporáneos”. Estos aspectos serían: secularización, autonomía, racionalidad,
democracia y pluralidad. La integración de estos elementos comporta un cambio de paradigma en la moral fundamental, el “paso de una
ética de la norma a una ética de la responsabilidad” (p. 32).
El nuevo paradigma de moral autónoma de responsabilidad supone, entre otras cosas, un vuelco en las relaciones conciencia-normas (p. 39ss.), que supere la relación desequilibrada entre norma y
conciencia. Mientras en la moral tradicional vigía la primacía autoritaria de la norma sobre la conciencia, hoy “tiene validez lo contrario: se pone en evidencia el rol central de la conciencia” (p. 42).
La referencia a la doctrina expuesta en la Const. GS, nº 16 lleva
al autor a admitir la importancia de las normas: “Las normas son im-
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portantes por diversas razones… Las normas no son necesarias sólo
socialmente sino que lo son también moralmente” (p. 52). En el momento, sin embargo, de precisar el origen y obligatoriedad de las
mismas, recurre a la “experiencia de que algo tiene sentido” en cuanto representa bienes y valores de la vida humana. Pero, dado que las
normas expresan tales valores en forma general y abstracta, mientras
que el actuar moral es siempre concreto y circunstanciado, nos encontramos con que “al principio y al final del actuar moral, en el origen y en la culminación… está el ser humano dotado de conciencia,
dispuesto a aceptar su respondabilidad original” (p. 53).
En el cap. 5 el a. aborda el tema del binomio subjetividad-objetividad en el contexto de una moral autónoma. Considerando el “descubrimiento del individuo” como una característica de la modernidad, Merkx no tiene dificultad en declarar que la moral autónoma no
“es una defensa del subjetivismo en la ética, pero sí, en cambio, del
derecho inalienable del sujeto” (p. 56). De esta manera, el sujeto no
sustituye a la objetividad moral, sino que él mismo es fundamento
(ib.). En consecuencia, se puede hablar de “exigencias normativas
objetivas”, en cuanto resultado, “no de un orden esencial metafísicamente concebido, sino sólo del contenido apelativo de los respectivos
bienes” (p. 58). Tales bienes y valores son “objetivables” a través de
la comunicación intersubjetiva y del consenso.
Resumiendo su punto de vista sobre el carácter cristiano de la
ética autónoma, Merkx hace las siguientes puntualizaciones: a) La
moral autónoma es fundamentalmente una ética racional, en línea
con el planteamiento del derecho natural, en la medida en que éste
es en realidad una teoría racional ética (59). b) Lo moral es por lo
mismo un “saber” (no en sentido intelectualista), no un “creer”. c) La
cuestión del carácter cristiano no debe identificarse con el problema
de la competencia del Magisterio (autoridad) de la Iglesia ni reducirse a la pregunta sobre qué aporta la fe contra la razón o sin ella a
la moral. Específicamente cristiano debe entenderse en el sentido de
“típicamente” cristiano. Por ello, “la pregunta central no es la singularidad cristiana, sino la comunicabilidad y capacidad consensual de
las consecuencias prácticas de la fe. Para corroborar esta afirmación
Merkx recurre a la autoridad de Böckle que (según él) habría “subrayado una y otra vez” esta idea (p. 60).
Merkx concluye su obra con una referencia al dato bíblico centrándose en los diez mandamientos y en el Sermón de la Montaña,
que constituyen sin duda los dos documentos fundamentales de la
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ética cristiana.
En el momento de hacer una valoración de la propuesta de “moral autónoma” de K.-W. Merkx debemos comenzar reconociendo el
mérito indudable de su esfuerzo por hacer que la moral cristiana entre realmente en diálogo vivo y eficaz con la cultura actual. Es inútil
construir torres de marfil desde las que contemplar al mundo con aire de una supremacía teórica, que el hombre de hoy ni ve ni reconoce. Como Pablo frente a los estoicos y gnósticos de su tiempo, tenemos que sentarnos a la mesa con los representantes de la cultura actual, tenemos que escucharlos y sintonizar con el hilo de su argumentación, aceptando todo aquello que ahí se encuentra de bueno
(Fil 4,8). En este diálogo el hilo conductor no puede ser otro que el de
la “razón”, que el Creador ha puesto en el interior de todo hombre
(Rom 1,20ss.). De ella tendrá que hacer uso el sujeto moral (sea cristiano o no cristiano) para “discernir” (dokimavzein) lo que es bueno y
perfecto (Rom 12,2). Tenemos que agradecer a Merkx su insistencia
en lo “bueno” y en lo “justo” como indicadores de la verdad moral.
No todos los puntos defendidos o insinuados por Merkx nos parecen, sin embargo, perfectamenete digeribles desde el punto de vista de la moral cristiana. Aunque el a. insiste, por ejemplo, en que el
uso de la “libertad responsable” no debe confundirse con la “arbitrariedad”, quedando siempre a salvo el problema de la “obligatoriedad
moral”, no resulta claro en base a qué criterio una persona se puede
sentir “obligada” cuando la objetividad de las normas se funda sólo
en la experiencia de la vida y en el consenso. ¿Cuándo puede el sujeto tener la suficiente certeza de que esa ”experiencia” y ese “consenso” tienen la consistencia debida a nivel sincrónico y diacrónico? Todos conocemos la posibilidad de manipulación de tales “consensos”,
particularmenete en nuestra época dominada por las tendencias globalizantes. Algunos interrogantes pondríamos también a los cinco
puntos que Merkx reconoce como fundamentales en la moderna cultura de la libertad y que, por tanto, deben estar presentes en una moral autónoma: secularización, autonomía, racionalidad, democracia
y pluralidad. A la secularización, por ejemplo, parece atribuírsele un
carácter casi sacro, poco de acuerdo con cuanto el Concilio Vaticano
II nos ha legado sobre el correcto significado de la autonomía de la
realidad terrena (GS, 36). Resulta difícil hablar de un diálogo Iglesiamundo cuando la función activa aparece como exclusiva del mundo.
Por cuanto se refiere a la racionalidad, como signo de nuestra
cultura, quizá fuera conveniente no olvidar la desconfianza que ha-
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cia la razón vienen manifestando, por ejemplo, los representantes del
pensamiento débil y, en general, el post-modernismo. Reservas parecidas podríamos avanzar sobre otros puntos, como el “pluralismo”.
¿No existe quizá el peligro de que un respeto incondicionado hacia
la pluralidad nos lleve a buscar un consenso tan diluido y frágil que
haga imposible una ética con valor universal?
Estas y otras reservas que sin duda pudieran formularse no pretenden poner en tela de juicio el proyecto en cuanto tal de una moral autónoma, sino más bien estimular a una reflexión más completa sobre el argumento. Tratándose de un modelo de moral que introduce un cambio radical en los polos de referencia de la moral clásica, será necesario estar preparados para dar razón de las dificultades
que los adversarios puedan proponer. Sabemos que es ya un hecho
irreversible el paso de una moral del ser (bajo el principio “agere sequitur esse”) a una moral de la persona y de la libertad responsable.
Se trata de un paso de las esencias (en cuanto tales inmutables) a lo
real histórico, al individuo que se autoconstruye al ritmo del tiempo
y de las circunstancias concretas. Aquí la moral autónoma conecta
sin dificultad con el orden protológico y con el derecho natural. El
orden soteriológico, central en toda moral cristiana, no sólo no entra
en conflicto con una ética de la libertad responsable - para esta libertad precisamente nos ha liberado el Señor (Gál 5,1.13) - sino que
potencia al sujeto para poder llegar al discernimiento pertinente
(Rom 12,2) en el campo moral. De esta manera la fe no es algo posterior que se limita a ofrecer espacio de experiencia vivencial a lo
operado por la razón autónoma, sino que se combina operativamente con la razón misma. En esta dirección creemos que cobre sentido
el título dado por Merkx a su obra: Hacia una ética de la fe.
LORENZO ALVAREZ VERDES C.SS.R.
Nuti, Enrico. Giuseppe Capograssi (1889-1956): un capitolo del rinnovato diritto naturale. Implicazioni teologico-morali per una
riflessione sulla coscienza morale. Roma - Milano: Pontificio
Seminario Lombardo in Roma - Glossa 2000, 224 p. (Dissertatio /
Series Romana 29).
Il rapporto tra diritto ed etica è da sempre un tema complesso e
spinoso. Il contesto pluralistico e multiculturale lo ripropone oggi in
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termini nuovi e urgenti, anche a livello di riflessione teologico-morale: sono in discussione non solo i contenuti della normativa giuridica in rapporto alle istanze etiche, ma soprattutto la precisazione di
una corretta metodologia per individuarli e, conseguentemente, il
nesso che essi hanno con le coscienze.
Il saggio di Enrico Nuti si pone come un valido contributo, a un
duplice livello: quello storico, attraverso una rilettura critica della
proposta di Giuseppe Capograssi, una delle personalità più significative della prima metà del Novecento filosofico-giuridico italiano; e
quello sistematico, mediante l’esplorazione di “alcuni capisaldi della
tradizione del diritto naturale” per sondarne le nuove possibilità di
comprensione (p. 201).
Le esigenze dell’interdisciplinarietà determinano, in maniera
corretta, le scelte metodologiche e la stessa articolazione della ricerca, pur essendo predominante la prospettiva della teologia morale
fondamentale. Il costante confronto con le diverse interpretazioni
del pensiero di Capograssi è ulteriore garanzia della serietà del cammino ermeneutico proposto dal Nuti, anche se a volte si desidererebbe un più immediato ed esplicito contatto con gli stessi testi.
Sono due le parti in cui risulta strutturato il libro. Nella prima
(“L’esperienza etica”), viene ricostruita a grandi linee la maniera in
cui Capograssi elabora il rapporto tra diritto e morale; nella seconda
(“Il diritto e la coscienza morale”), si cerca di evidenziare il significato di tale proposta proiettandola nel dibattito attuale. Alle due
parti viene premessa una sintetica presentazione dell’autore. Il libro
si chiude con una bibliografia essenziale, tematicamente distribuita,
e l’indice analitico dei nomi.
La ricostruzione bio-bibliografica del primo capitolo procede in
maniera sintetica, ma efficace. Ricordate a grandi linee le tappe fondamentali della vita e tracciato il quadro delle opere, si precisa l’ambiente culturale, sottolineandone le problematiche maggiori. Una
considerazione più dettagliata viene data agli autori che hanno
influito su Capograssi, prima di focalizzare “la sfida del soggetto”
come centro della crisi filosofica in cui egli si inserisce e va letto.
Stabilite le coordinate per la corretta interpretazione, la presentazione della visione di Capograssi pone in rilievo innanzitutto la
centralità e la peculiarità del soggetto (cap. 2: “L’individuo di fronte
alla catastrofe”): nel soggetto “la coscienza, in quanto centro unificante della persona, è illuminata nel suo sviluppo fino al raggiungimento della propria auto-consapevolezza. Ciò si attua attraverso il
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cammino storico dell’azione nella progressiva formazione dell’esperienza”, intesa “non come l’insieme delle condizioni esteriori ed
empiriche dell’azione, ma come già intimamente compenetrata dalla
forza della ragione che coglie ed articola, secondo modi e limiti propri, la verità dell’essere” (p. 9).
All’interno dell’unitarietà dell’esperienza è possibile cogliere la
specificità di quella etica e quindi di precisare il rapporto tra la
morale e il diritto (cap. 3: “La dimensione pratica del soggetto”).
Fondamentale è “la distinzione tra azione e agente al cui servizio si
pongono l’imperativo giuridico e quello morale”. Ne deriva che “la
legge giuridica prescrive la salvezza dell’azione, mentre quella morale prescrive la salvezza dell’agente. Postosi sulla linea di un’analisi
dell’azione, come posizione privilegiata per affrontare il tema dell’individuo, Capograssi vede, in quest’articolarsi delle dimensioni della
prassi, il modo caratteristico per affrontare il tema cruciale del rapporto tra diritto e morale” (p. 87).
Questa visione viene poi proiettata nel dibattito attuale. Ci si
chiede innanzitutto quali ne siano “le implicazioni teologiche” (cap.
4), attraverso la lettura dell’esperienza religiosa e poi della maniera
di rapportare tempo e eternità, fede e sapere, fede e morale. Tali
implicazioni vengono infine approfondite nella capacità di contribuire all’attuale ricerca sul diritto naturale, visto come “una categoria contestata” e “un nodo problematico ineludibile” della riflessione
teologico-morale (cap. 5).
Il rapporto tra diritto e morale viene enucleato nella prospettiva della centralità del soggetto: un orientamento che permette di
porre in dialogo fecondo “la sollecitazione”, proveniente dalla proposta di Capograssi, con i filoni teologico-morali ispirati alla teologia trascendentale, ponendo in risalto spunti significativi per l’ulteriore ricerca. Mi limito a segnalare quello relativo alla rilettura teologica della epikeia come risposta alle sfide di un contesto in cui si
“finisce per attribuire un compito eccessivo all’istanza legale”,
accentuando “i pericoli di riduzione della sfera etica alla sola
dimensione pubblica, privata della densità del riferimento alla
coscienza” (p. 203).
Complessivamente il saggio offre un contributo costruttivo e stimolante per l’approfondimento del rapporto tra morale e diritto.
Dispiace che nella lettura teologico-morale si privilegi troppo una
determinata impostazione e soprattutto che non si dedichi un’adeguata considerazione all’approccio biblico e all’attuale proposta
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magisteriale. Si tratta di limiti riconosciuti dallo stesso autore (cf p.
202), anche se le motivazioni addotte non appaiono del tutto convincenti.
Palumbieri, Sabino. L’uomo, questo paradosso. Antropologia filosofica II. Trattato sulla con-centrazione e condizione antropologica.
Roma: Urbaniana University Press 2000, 434 p. (Manuali 7).
Con questo nuovo saggio, don Sabino Palumbieri ci offre un ulteriore e prezioso frutto di quel cammino di appassionata e critica riflessione intorno al mistero dell’uomo che porta avanti da tempo. Come
indicato nel sottotitolo, il volume costituisce la seconda parte di un
trattato organico di antropologia filosofica: avendo già analizzato la
complessa costituzione dell’uomo (L’uomo questa meraviglia. Roma:
Urbaniana University Press 1999), l’autore cerca ora di approfondirne
la condizione esistenziale, in tutta la sua paradossalità.
La metodologia è quella fenomenologica, preoccupata però di
valorizzare l’invocazione di senso, presente nella complessità e perfino contraddittorietà della storicità, che apre sul trascendente. Il dialogo costante e attento con le principali antropologie (sia del patrimonio classico, sia oggi più diffuse) permette all’autore di delineare
una proposta capace di arricchirsi dei diversi contributi e al tempo
stesso di orientare nella loro corretta valutazione.
La prospettiva di fondo è la ricerca di una visione integrale, che
porti non solo ad evitare le interpretazioni riduttive e integraliste, ma
soprattutto permetta di fecondare l’amore della verità con la verità
dell’amore. La meraviglia per l’uomo, scaturente dalla profondità e
ricchezza della sua costituzione, si fonde con il paradosso della sua
condizione storica: l’uomo “come meraviglia, è una realtà capace
radicalmente di superare il puro sé, per raggiungere l’altro da sé, passando per la fase intermedia della conoscenza di sé, del possesso del
sé, del progetto al meglio di sé. Come paradosso, poi, è compresenza
di contrari ma non contraddittori. Che tuttavia possono convivere in
un equilibrio, che è insieme dono e compito. Che è sforzo e gaudio.
Che è fobia e ardimento. Che è rassegnazione e speranza” (p. 27).
Sono due le sezioni in cui risulta articolato il libro. La prima
(che, rimandando al primo volume, viene indicata come seconda del-
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661
l’intero trattato), cerca di approfondire la concentrazione ontologicoesistenziale che dà unità all’uomo: si impegna cioè a “rendere ragione del dato fenomenologico della convergenza vitale di tante espressioni e operazioni pur così diverse, analizzate nella fase di studio
della costituzione antropologica. La chiamiamo con-centrazione
ontologica, proprio perché è ricerca del centro di questo cantiere pulsante di dimensioni complementari che costituiscono l’uomo” (p. 33).
Il punto di partenza è l’analisi della fondamentale condizione in
forza della quale l’uomo si scopre in tensione “tra interiorità e ulteriorità” (cap. 1) e che porta ad indicare nell’autotrascendenza l’asse
di tutto il discorso antropologico: “L’uomo è autotrascendimento in
quanto essere teso vero il suo dover-essere e il suo poter-essere” (p. 44).
Tale lettura viene successivamente sviluppata nella considerazione
dell’uomo come spirito (cap. 2), sempre però alla luce della sua “unitotalità” (cap. 3).
La persona si svela così come “il punto di con-centrazione” che
dà unità a tutta la ricchezza dell’uomo (cap. 4): è il “centro” o il
“luogo” metafisico in cui si realizza “l’uni-totalità dell’uomo” (p. 87).
Determina perciò la dignità intangibile di ogni uomo, additandola
“inscritta nel suo codice ontologico, nelle sue strutture d’essere” e
perciò come “possibilità radicale del soggetto uomo” (p. 101). La sintetica e critica presentazione delle principali proposte personaliste
(cap. 5) permette di ulteriormente sviluppare tale visione: “ogni
uomo è persona impegnata a farsi personalità, lottando contro la
minaccia permanente dell’esclusivo personaggio” (p. 126).
La seconda parte del libro (terza sezione dell’intero trattato) è
dedicata allo studio della condizione esistenziale, senza del quale
ogni proposta antropologica risulterebbe monca e falsante: “È necessario che la conoscenza dell’essere uomo contenga oltre che il livello
dell’analisi della costituzione e della concentrazione, anche il completamento di quello della condizione. Si tratta, per dir così, di analizzare il liquido di immersione del dato fenomenologico dell’uomo come
spirito incarnato” (p. 129).
Precisata la fondamentale dialetticità ontologica, in cui esse si
collocano (cap. 6), vengono analizzate le principali dimensioni o
“aree di limite d’essere, in cui l’esistenza si viene a trovare” (p. 135):
il mondo (cap. 7); la storia (cap. 8); il linguaggio e la cultura (cap. 910); la sessualità (cap. 11); l’agire, colto come contemplazione, lavoro e gioco (cap. 12-14).
Un’ampia analisi viene poi dedicata al male, visto come “scacco
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d’essere” (cap. 15) e “mistero da esplorare” (cap. 16), soprattutto
nella sua espressione suprema, la morte (cap. 17). La ricchezza dei
dati e il tono sentito di partecipazione danno a queste pagine un particolare valore.
Lo sbocco è sulla speranza colta come struttura onto-fenomenologica prima che come virtù (cap. 18): “La nostra trattazione antropologica poggia sulla scoperta dell’uomo come incessante autotrascendimento”. In realtà l’uomo è “un oltre-ogni-altro-oltre. La sua
struttura fondamentale è la tensione verso un sempre-ulteriore.
Comunque si risolva poi il problema, questo è un dato fenomenologico. E ha nome tensione di speranza” (p. 348).
Queste prospettive vengono ribadite con forza nella “conclusione aperta”, che costituisce l’ultimo capitolo del libro: l’uomo è essenzialmente “pellegrino e nomade”, che “se pur colleziona disfatte, continua a rilanciare progetti. Che viaggia tra un già, sempre più carico,
e un non-ancora, sempre più ampio. E così si rivela bensì animal
rationale, ma in funzione del suo essere animal sperans. E l’animal
sperans non è che l’animal amans. Infatti, la speranza altro non è se
non l’amore che si protende in avanti. È questo l’ambito che regge
tutti gli altri. Il futuro è la sua patria di identità” (p. 408).
In un contesto, come il nostro, in cui da più parti viene indicata
come unica possibilità quella del sopravvivere e del minimo etico,
escludendo qualsiasi vera progettualità, l’itinerario antropologico
proposto dal libro si svela coraggioso: la leale aderenza alla realtà
non diventa mai chiusura, ma franca individuazione di orizzonti
sempre più aperti. Pur senza mai perdere di vista le esigenze proprie
di un trattato organico di antropologia filosofica, il testo va oltre
l’ambito strettamente scolastico: per la chiarezza dei passi, l’ampiezza e la costruttività del dialogo con le visioni oggi più diffuse, la carica evocativa del suo linguaggio (anche se a volte appare ricercato e
può porre perciò delle difficoltà a chi è all’inizio dello studio antropologico), si svela uno strumento coinvolgente e stimolante per
chiunque voglia approfondire il mistero dell’uomo, retto dalla stima
e dall’amore sincero per ogni uomo.
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663
Schumacher, Bernard N., Une philosophie de l’espérance: la pensée
de Josef Pieper dans le contexte du débat contemporain sur l’espérance, Fribourg Suisse / Paris: Éditions Universitaires / Éditions du Cerf, 2000, 281 p. (Études d’éthique chrétienne / Studien zur Theologischen Ethik 86).
This work was published by the department of moral theology
and ethics at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland. Its author
has two specific goals: (1) to analyse the concept of human hope in
the philosophy of the German philosopher, Josef Pieper, and (2) to
compare this understanding with the contemporary discussion of the
subject. To do so, he studies Pieper’s entire philosophical corpus, not
simply those works that are devoted specifically to the topic. This approach enables him to better situate the problematic of hope within
Pieper’s work as a whole and to draw out some of its underlying ontological and anthropological presuppositions. When making his
comparison with other philosophical approaches to hope, he focuses not only on those authors, such as Ernst Bloch and Gabriel
Marcel, who directly influenced Pieper, but also on other schools of
thought that have a bearing on the topic (e.g., existentialism, neoMarxism, phenomenology, analytical philosophy).
The author is well aware that “hope” was never a dominant
theme in the history of philosophy and that it was generally treated
only “in passing,” as most philosophers treat it today. His fundamental claim is that Pieper contributed with Marcel and Bloch to the
rediscovery of the fundamental ontology of human hope, an ontology
of “not-yet-being” (ne-pas-encore-etre) accompanied by an eschatological dimension expressing the internal structure tending toward
its coming (à-venir). Provoked by Bloch and stimulated by Marcel,
Pieper completed and deepened his philosophy of hope only after the
second world war when he entered into a fruitful discussion with the
contemporary philosophers of hope and of the absurd. In his attempt
to establish a philosophy of hope, Pieper opposed nihilism, which
proclaimed that nothingness was better than being and that existence was an imperfection and even an absurdity. He also opposed
those social religions that promised in the name of science or praxis,
the coming of a perfect, unending happiness with the establishment
of a new earthly Jerusalem.
The work itself is divided into six chapters, each of which is well
researched and meticulously documented. The first chapter analyzes
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the ontological and anthropological foundations of a philosophy of
hope. Chapters two through five consider the nature, the characteristics, the object, the content, the reason, and the justification of human hope, as well as the attitudes that oppose it (i.e., presumption,
despair, death). The sixth chapter studies the relation between hope
and history as its ultimate end or term.
Among the many insights presented in this comprehensive account of Pieper’s work on hope, a few in particular stand out and deserve special mention. The author, for example, is quick to point out
that Pieper conceives of human existence as a dialectic between a
given human nature (or être-minumum) and its simultaneously free
and determined orientation towards its own actualization and completion (or être-pleinement). Key to Pieper’s philosophical analysis of
human hope is the distinction that he and other philosophers make
between “hope” or “expectation” (l’espoir) and “fundamental hope”
(l’espérance fondamentale). While the former refers to the many
hopes and concrete expectations that fill our daily lives, the latter
pertains to a more fundamental (and positive) attitude toward the
very nature of human existence itself. Because of this more profound
attitudinal mindset, human beings are able to hope with a hope that
is not affected by the non-realization of their concrete expectations.
Such hope, for Pieper, constitutes the domain of the homo viator. It
is the virtue of the pas-encore, whose principal mover is the natural
desire of actualization and the full completion of the person and human community. With Marcel, Pieper understands the “choral” nature of human hope. It requires not only desire of and attention toward the good (as well as the fear of losing it), but also a modicum
of love or friendship whereby an interpersonal relationship between
two persons is synthesized into a communal “we.” The author distances himself from Pieper on one significant point. The latter holds
that, properly speaking, human hope can exist only as a theological
virtue; the former, by way of contrast, maintains that it is reasonable
to speak of a natural virtue of hope which accompanies the passionhope (la passion-espoir) described by Hume, Bloch, and even Pieper
himself.
This book constitutes a major contribution to the study of
Pieper’s thought. It offers the reader a thorough presentation of
Pieper’s thinking on hope and situates it well within the various currents of twentieth-century philosophy. The author reveals a commanding knowledge of Pieper’s writings and engages them critically.
REVIEWS
/ RECENSIONES
665
From beginning to end, the author leads the reader through a systematic and very probing presentation of a theme that could well become a central focus of philosophical thought in the twenty-first century.
DENNIS J. BILLY, C.Ss.R.
Scola, Angelo, Il Mistero Nuziale 2, Matrimonio-Famiglia. Azzate
(Va): PUL-Mursia, 2000, 212 p.
Como el mismo autor lo dice, ésta es la segunda parte de Il mistero nuziale 1, Uomo–donna, ya anunciada al publicar el primer volumen (1998). Los dos volúmenes tienen por objeto ‘Il mistero nuziale’. El término ‘nupcial’ expresa el carácter relacional del amor
que es el aspecto concreto que Mons. Angelo Scola, Rector Magnífico de la Pontificia Universidad de Letrán, se propone analizar en este segundo volumen.
Il Mistero Nuziale 2 se abre con una nota para el lector y un prefacio en los que el autor subraya el carácter ‘unitario’ que quiere dar
al estudio de los dos fenómenos del matrimonio y la familia. Se cierra la obra con dos Apéndices (pp. 171-188 y 189-196) sobre la Humanae Vitae y el noviazgo, respectivamente.
Como el primer volumen, también éste aparece con dos partes
que se distribuyen el conjunto de los 10 capítulos: la primera parte
(1-4) se centra sobre dos aspectos claves de la pareja-familia (cambio
cultural y tareas), mientras que la segunda (5-10) se orienta a ofrecer
una perspectiva teológica de las relaciones de pareja-familia.
El autor se propone hacer de este nuevo volumen ‘la continuación natural del primer volumen, cuya lectura juzga necesaria para
una mejor comprensión de la nueva obra. Su proyecto es plantear
una base sólida de corte antropológico-teológico (p. 8) para corregir
la tendencia que se observa desde hace algunas décadas hacia una
profunda ambigüedad que amenaza el sentido de lo que es auténticamente ‘humano’. Siguiendo el hilo conductor de la ‘nupcialidad’, le
interesa denunciar la doble pretensión del pensamiento occidental
de separar y de abolir la diferencia entre uomo-donna (primer volumen), y entre matrimonio-famiglia (segundo volumen). Scola los analiza en forma unitaria, pues los dos binomios son inseparables, aunque la cultura dominante se empeñe en desconocer el carácter nup-
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cial del amor.
Los cuatro primeros capítulos exponen el tema del atentado de
la sociedad postmoderna contra la conyugalidad y contra la experiencia de paternidad-maternidad a causa del individualismo y la privatización que conducen a la eliminación de las dos dimensiones del
ser humano, su irrepetibilidad singular y su estructura relacional. El
vínculo bio-instintivo y psicológico-espiritual hace entender que la
relación con el otro y con la vida del otro funda el sentido de comunión del ser humano con los demás, y de todos con Dios (p. 39). La
paternidad–maternidad no puede consistir sólo en el hecho de prestar un servicio a la especie; son, por el contrario, el ‘paradigma’ de todo el fenómeno educativo. En una perspectiva sociológica se ha de
definir la familia como ‘ámbito primordial imprescindible’ de relaciones sociales’ (p. 54).
En los capítulos 5-10 el autor entra en ambiente netamente teológico al plantear la insuperable diferencia entre varón-mujer, las relaciones entre matrimonio y familia con cada una de las tres Personas Divinas que revelan los tres grandes momentos del designio divino (origen, camino y destino) (p. 107), y la relación entre los sacramentos del Matrimonio y de la Eucaristía. Estos capítulos revelan
originalidad y novedad, pues en la literatura en circulación no es fácil encontrar referencias sobre estos tópicos.
Il Mistero Nuziale 2, Matrimonio-Famiglia es una obra en que el
autor ha sabido conjugar, despertando interés creciente, los tres elementos (diferencia sexual, amor nupcial y fecundidad humana) que
integran el misterio nupcial, yendo en búsqueda del fundamento último - l’imago Trinitatis- para desde esta plataforma desmantelar el
razonamiento que la mentalidad postmoderna está sugiriendo.
La obra es particularmente rica en bibliografía: las 439 notas de
pie de página ofrecen una amplia, variada y bien seleccionada literatura teológica. El autor logra su objetivo de fundamentación teológica de la nupcialidad como propiedad esencial del amor (p. 155).
J. SILVIO BOTERO GIRALDO, C.SS.R.
667
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CHIMIRRI, GIOVANNI, Lineamenti di estetica. Filosofia dell’opera d’arte.
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prof. Giorgio Gozzelino. Roma: LAS 2001, 400 p. (Biblioteca di
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673
INDEX OF VOLUME XXXIX 2001
ÍNDICE DEL VOLUMEN XXXIX 2001
ARTICLES / ARTÍCULOS
ÁLVAREZ VERDES, L., Dinamismo creador de la libertad
cristiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
BILLY, D. J., The Depth of Human Knowledge. The Contemplative Hermeneutic of Bonaventure’s De reductione artium ad theologiam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
BILLY, D. J., Growing in the Virtues and the Gifts. Spiritual Direction As a Practical Theological Locus for
the Convergence of Spirituality and Morality . . . . .
BLACK, P., KEENAN, J. F., The Evolving Self-Understanding
of the Moral Theologian: 1900-2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FLEMING, J., Reputation Reconsidered. The Contemporary Relevance of Casuist/Manualist Legacies Concerning Detraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
GARCÍA DE VICENTE, J. C., San Antonino y Gabriel Biel: sobre el homicidio y la autodefensa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JOHNSTONE, B. V., AIDS Prevention and the Lesser Evil .
KELLY, A., A Trinitarian Moral Theology . . . . . . . . . . . . .
KOWALSKI, E., Quale uomo e quale etica per la bioetica?
Una proposta di umanizzazione della riflessione
bioetica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
KOWALSKI, E., La morte proibita. Il morire nella prospettiva filosofica, antropologica ed etica . . . . . . . . . . . .
MCKEEVER, M., One Last Right? The Politics and Ethics
of Liberalizing Euthanasia Legislation . . . . . . . . . . .
MIMEAULT, J., Paternité de Dieu et pénitence des fils.
Deuxième partie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MURPHY, W. F., JR., The Pauline Understanding of Appropriated Revelation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
of Injustice. Part Two: Moral Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
333-370
83-112
433-459
219-327
159-174
517-552
197-216
245-289
175-195
461-481
553-581
217-244
483-515
5-60
674
of Injustice. Part Three: The Needs That Cry for Injustice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
RHONHEIMER, M., Praktische Prinzipien, Naturgesetz und
konkrete Handlungsurteile in tugendethischer Perspektive. Zur Diskussion über praktische Vernunft
und lex naturalis bei Thomas von Aquin . . . . . . . . .
TREMBLAY, R., La morale filiale, qu’est-ce à dire? . . . . . . .
TREMBLAY, R., Le thème de l’étoile dans les Sermons pour
l’Épiphanie de saint Léon le Grand . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
483-515
113-158
61-81
411-431
CHRONICLE / CRÓNICA
GROS, D., Accademia Alfonsiana: Cronaca relativa all’anno accademico 2000-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
591
CONTROVERSY / CONTROVERSIA
DRUM, P. “AIDS Prevention and the Lesser Evil”: Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
JOHNSTONE, B. V., AIDS Prevention: A Response To
Drum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
REVIEWS / RECENSIONES
AA.VV, Il male morale come problema teologico (B. Hidber) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
BOMBACI, N., Una vita, una testimonianza: Emmanuel
Mounier (E. Kowalski) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
BOSWELL, J. S., MCHUGH, F. P., VERSTRAETEN, J. (ed.),
Catholic Social Thought: Twilight or Renaissance?
(R. Gallagher) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CHRISTEN, E., KIRCHSCHLÄGER, W. (ed.), Erlöst durch Jesus
Christus: Soteriologie im Kontext
(M. McKeever) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DE LIGUORI, A., Maria nostra avvocata (T. Kennedy) . . . .
DIANIN, G., Luigi Taparelli d’Azeglio (1793-1862). Il signi-
583-585
586-590
619
619
621
624
628
631
675
ficato della sua opera, al tempo del rinnovamento
neoscolastico, per l’evoluzione della teologia morale
(R. Gallagher) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Doldi, M., Picozzi, M., Introduzione alla bioetica
(E. Kowalski) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Frattallone, R., Antropologia ed etica sessuale (S. Majorano) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lienkamp, A., Theodor Steinbüchels Sozialismus-rezeption. Eine christlich-sozialethische Relecture
(M. McKeever) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
McInerny, R. M., L’analogia in Tommaso d’Aquino
(D. J. Billy) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Marcianò, S., Pellicanò, P., “…secondo il mio cuore…”
(Ger 3,15). Sessualità, affettività e vocazione all’amore: un itinerario formativo, un cammino spirituale (R. Prada) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maret, M., L’euthanasie. Alternative sociale et enjeux
pour l’éthique chrétienne (E. Kowalski) . . . . . . . . . .
Mauri, M., Elvira, J. C., Román, B., Bielsa, A., Corral, C.
(ed.), Crisis de Valores. Modernidad y Tradición.
Una reflexión ética sobre la sociedad contemporánea. Un profundo estudio sobre la obra de A.
MacIntyre (J. S. Botero Giraldo) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Melina, L., Zanor, P. (ed.), Quale dimora per l’agire? Dimensioni ecclesiologiche della morale (T. Kennedy)
Merks, K.-W. (ed.), Hacia una ética de la fe. Moral y Autonomía (Curso de Teología Moral) (L. Álvarez
Verdes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nuti, E., Giuseppe Capograssi (1889-1956): un capitolo
del rinnovato diritto naturale. Implicazioni teologico-morali per una riflessione sulla coscienza morale
(S. Majorano) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Palumbieri, S., L’uomo, questo paradosso. Antropologia
filosofica II: Trattato sulla con-centrazione e condizione antropologica (S. Majorano) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Schumacher, B. N., Une philosophie de l’espérance. La
pensée de Josef Pieper dans le contexte du débat
contemporain sur l’espérance (D. J. Billy) . . . . . . . .
Scola, A., Il mistero nuziale. 2. Matrimonio-famiglia
(J. S. Botero Giraldo) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
632
635
637
638
642
644
645
648
650
653
657
660
663
665
676
BOOKS RECEIVED / LIBROS RECIBIDOS . . . . . . . . .
667
INDEX OF VOLUME XXXIX /
ÍNDICE DEL VOLUMEN XXXIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
673

Studia Moralia – Vol. XXXIX / 2

Transcripción

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110A Capdepera una n`hi ha

está bien que lo digas.

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Salta un conejo

Qualcuno raccontò che la speranza le usciva dalle