1 - Wiphala.org

EL CONFLICTO
PALESTINO-ISRAELI:
SOLUCIONES Y
DERIVAS
Profesor David Noel Ramírez Padilla
Rector del Tecnológico de Monterrey
Lic. Héctor Núñez de Cáceres
Rector de la Zona Occidente
Ing. Salvador Coutiño Audiffred
Director General del Campus Querétaro
Dr. Ricardo Romero Gerbaud
Dirección
Dr. Ricardo Romero Gerbaud
Director de Profesional y Graduados en
Administración y Ciencias Sociales
Mtro. José Manuel Velázquez Hurtado
María José Juárez Becerra
Edición
Mtra. Angélica Camacho Aranda
Directora del Departamento de Relaciones
Internacionales y Formación Humanística
Natalia Fernández, Alicia Hernández, Rodrigo
Pesce
Asistentes de Edición
Mtro. Kacper Przyborowski
Director de la Licenciatura en Relaciones
Internacionales
Dr. Tomás Pérez Vejo
Escuela Nacional de Antropología e Historia INAH
Dra. Marisol Reyes Soto
University of Queens, Ireland
Dra. Avital Bloch
Universidad de Colima
Dr. Tamir Bar-On
Tecnológico de Monterrey
Dra. Marie-Joelle Zahar
Université de Montréal
Dra. Claudia Barona Castañeda
Universidad de Las Américas Puebla
Dr. Thomas Wolfe
University of Minnesota, Twin-Cities
Dr. Janusz Mucha
AGH, Cracovia
GRUPO FORUM
Retos Internacionales, ISSN: 2007-8390. Año 5, No. 11, Agosto-Diciembre 2014, publicación semestral. Editada por el
Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey, Campus Querétaro, a través de la División de Administración y
Ciencias Sociales, bajo la dirección del Departamento deRelaciones Internacionales y Humanidades, domicilio Av. Eugenio
Garza Sada No. 2501, Col. Tecnológico, C.P. 64849, Monterrey, N.L. Editor responsable: Dr. Ricardo Romero Gerbaud. Datos
de contacto: [email protected], http://retosinternacionales.com, teléfono y fax: 52 (442) 238 32 34. Impresa por FORUM
arte y comunicación S.A. de C.V., domicilio Av. del 57, número 12, Colonia Centro, C.P. 76000 Querétaro, Qro., México, teléfono:
(442) 2158281. El presente ejemplar se terminó de imprimir en diciembre de 2014. Tiraje de 500 ejemplares. El editor no
necesariamente comparte el contenido de los artículos y sus fotografías, ya que son responsabilidad exclusiva de los autores.
Se prohíbe la reproducción total o parcial del contenido, fotografías, ilustraciones, colorimetría y textos publicados en este
número sin la previa autorización que por escrito emita el editor.
8 TEMA CENTRAL
EL CONFLICTO PALESTINO-ISRAELI: SOLUCIONES Y DERIVAS
9
BREAKING THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DEADLOCK
PARAMETERS FOR TWO STATE SOLUTION
Por. Raphael Cohen-Almagor
21
WOMEN AS THE DRIVING FORCE OF CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Por: Carmen Corona Artigas
35
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE-MAKING: A PARADIGM SHIFT
Por: James M. Dorsey
46
NEGLECTED NARRATIVES: THE IMPACT OF ARMED CONFLICT ON
CULTURAL HERITAGE OF THE MIDDLE EAST
Por: Andrea Galván Vélez
59
PRESENTE, PASADO Y FUTURO DEL CONFLICTO PALESTINO ISRAELÍ:
UN DESAFÍO ANTE EL SISTEMA DE SEGURIDAD COLECTIVA DE LA ONU
Por: Sergio García Magariño
93
PROTECTIVE EDGE AND HUMAN SHIELDS
Por: Neve Gordon and Nicola Perugini
103
RADICAL ISLAMISTS: ISLAM’S RASHIDUN OR HIJACKERS GROUPS?
Por: María José Juárez Becerra
119
LA DIÁSPORA Y EL RECONOCIMIENTO AL ESTADO PALESTINO:
LOS CASOS DE HONDURAS Y EL SALVADOR
Por: Sergio I. Moya Mena
130
THE APOCALYPTIC WAR AGAINST GOG OF MAGOG.
MARTIN BUBER VERSUS MEIR KAHANE
Por: Rico Sneller
152
ABDULLAH ÖCALAN’S THE ROAD MAP:
FROM THE ARMED STRUGGLE TO A GRAMSCI OF OUR TIMES?
Por: Dr. Tamir Bar-On
181
AMOR Y HUMOR PARA RUSIA Y DESDE RUSIA
Por: Imelda Ibañez Guzmán
184
RESEÑA DEL LIBRO: THE WORLD THROUGH SOCCER: THE CULTURAL
IMPACT OF A GLOBAL SPORT, DEL AUTOR TAMIR BAR-ON
Por: Mary Carmen Peloche Barrera
Por varias décadas la comunidad
internacional ha sido testigo de
la crisis existente entre Israel
y Palestina. Naciones con una
tradición y cultura más entrelazada
de lo que muchos creerían, han
estado cerca de lograr la paz por
medio del mutuo reconocimiento,
pero a la vez, se han acrecentado
los niveles de violencia cuando
esta búsqueda de reconciliación ha
fracasado. Los factores que afectan
este proceso de acercamiento y
entendimiento han sido tan diversos
como los intereses en juego al
declarar a Palestina como Estado.
del agua, la libertad de movimiento
y la legislación de los derechos
de los refugiados. A esto se
ha sumado la definición de las
fronteras y el sensible tema del
control de la ciudad de Jerusalén.
Las soluciones propuestas vienen
de muchas perspectivas, y quedan
preguntas como ¿cuáles son
las consecuencias futuras que
surgen de cada una? ¿Están Israel
y Palestina dispuestos a correr
con los costos de sus intereses a
fin de llegar a un acuerdo de paz
y convivencia armoniosa entre
ambos?
Las bajas en ambas partes han
sido notables; el odio inculcado
y reproducido de generación
en generación hace divisar un
panorama en el cual se buscan
respuestas de carácter diplomático
pero no de carácter social. El
mundo está ante un conflicto donde
el reto más importante será sanar
las heridas que los sentimientos
antagonistas, los atentados y la
intervención extranjera han dejado
como estragos a su paso.
En este número de Retos
Internacionales las áreas de
investigación incluidas contemplan
la cultura, la religión, la sociedad y la
política como algunos de los suelos
sobre los cuales se pueden plantar
las ideas para entender el conflicto
palestino-israelí.
Los
artículos
revelan las variables inmersas como
indicadores de que, de no haber
un deseo por el reconocimiento
del otro, por la cooperación y la
colaboración, la resolución será
imposible de formular: ¿cuánto
tiempo es necesario para reconciliar
a dos pueblos? Tal vez ya sea el
momento de tender los puentes
para hacerlo.
El escalamiento del conflicto
ha creado la necesidad de
llegar a acuerdos en cuestiones
fundamentales y básicas para la
supervivencia como los derechos
Dr. Ricardo Romero Gerbaud
BREAKING THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN
DEADLOCK
PARAMETERS FOR TWO STATE SOLUTION
Por: Raphael Cohen-Almagor
University of Hull, England
TEMA CENTRAL
EL CONFLICTO
PALESTINO-ISRAELI:
SOLUCIONES Y
DERIVAS
Raphael Cohen-Almagor received his DPhil in political theory from Oxford
University. He is Professor and Chair in Politics, University of Hull. He was member
of the Israel Press Council; Founder and Director of the Center for Democratic
Studies, University of Haifa, and (Acting) Associate Dean for Research, University
of Hull. He is Founder and Director of the Hull Middle East Study Group. Professor
Cohen-Almagor was Fulbright-Yitzhak Rabin Visiting Professor at UCLA School of
Law, Visiting Professor at Johns Hopkins University, and Fellow at the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars. Among his more recent books are The
Right to Die with Dignity (2001), Speech, Media and Ethics (2001, 2005), and
The Scope of Tolerance (2006, 2007). Web: http://www.hull.ac.uk/rca. Blog:http://
almagor.blogspot.com
ABSTRACT
KEYWORDS Since 1977, the Israeli society has been split over the question of
Israel, Palestine, peace, security,
borders, Jerusalem, refugees,
peace versus land. The aim of this paper is to outline the parameters
for a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Drawing upon
the Clinton Parameters, the Geneva Accord, the Arab initiative, and
the Olmert-Abbas talks, the paper argues for a two-state solution
and suggests a doable pathway to peace. If and when accepted,
these suggestions will constitute the foundations for resolving all
contentious issues.
PREFACE
Israel was established in May 1948. Ever since then its boundaries
are disputed. The boundaries have been disputed both by Israelis
and by foreigners. The major controversies relate to the West Bank,
Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. These territories, conquered
during the 1967 Six Day War, are claimed by Israel’s neighbours.
The Palestinian Authority (PA) wishes to end the state of occupation
in the West Bank, to lift the Israeli siege on Gaza, and also claims
neighbourhoods in the eastern part of Jerusalem, whereas Syria
claims the Golan Heights. The PA, like Israel, suffers from the land
dispute as it does not have defined boundaries. The PA also lacks
control over its territory and sovereignty. These are necessary
preconditions for its declaration of independence and statehood.
Since 1977, the Israeli society has been split over the question of
peace versus land. The main issue is: what price are we willing to pay
for peace? Here we need to distinguish between peace en abstractum
v. peace en practicum.
To build genuine peace, it is essential to have trust, good will
and mutual security. I believe that if there is a will, there is a
way. Peace is a precious commodity and therefore it requires
both parties to pay a high price for its achievement, reaching
a solution that is agreeable to both. The peace deal should
be attractive to both Israel and Palestine, equally. It cannot be
one-sided, enforced or coerced. Of all the possible solutions
presently on the table, a two-state solution is to be the most
viable.
In September 1993, Israel woke up to a new, dramatic reality. Out of
the blue, Israel had a peace treaty with its foe. After eight months of
secret negotiations and 14 meetings the enemy of yesterday became
a partner for peace. There was jubilation amongst those in the leftwing peace camp. At the same time, there were fears and anxieties
on the right where people realized that they now needed to grapple
with the issue of the price: What price would Israel pay for the treaty?
What follows is an attempt, from the point of view of diplomacy and
political science, to delineate the price by outlining the parameters
needed to end the Israeli-Palestinian protracted and most bloody
conflict. For such a momentous achievement of resolving a deep,
entrenched conflict, three things are absolutely essential:
a) An Israeli leader who is committed to bring peace to his people
and is willing to pay the necessary price;
b) A Palestinian leader who is committed to bring peace to his people
and is willing to pay the necessary price;
c) Shared belief by both leaders that the time is ripe for peace. By
“time is ripe” it is meant that both leaders believe that enough blood
was shed, that they need to seize the moment because things might
worsened for their people, and that they have the ability to lead their
respective people to accept the peace agreement and change reality
for the better.
The Palestinians aspire to have an independent state in
the 1967 borders, with Arab Jerusalem as its capital and a
substantial return of refugees to Israel. The Israelis wish to
retain the Jewish character of Israel, being the only Jewish
state in the world. Both sides wish to enjoy life of tranquility
and in security, free of violence and terror. Both parties should
explicitly accept UN Security Council Resolutions 242,5 338,6
and 13977 and then begin their full implementation. The
endgame will be based on the following parameters:
Palestinian sovereignty – will be declared and respected.
During the past two decades, at no given time the three
ingredients coexisted. In 1993 and 2000, Prime Ministers Rabin
and Barak were committed to peace and felt that the time was
ripe, but that commitment and feeling was not shared by their
Palestinian counterpart, Yasser Arafat. All three leaders did not
have the full backing of their people, and were either unable
or unwilling to instill in their people a sense of urgency and
yearning for peace, which must come with a high price. It is
argued that the way to escape the deadlock is to rely on the
Clinton Parameters,1 the Geneva Accord,2 the Arab initiative,3
and the Olmert-Abbas talks.4 These documents contain the
foundations for resolving all contentious issues.
1
2
3
4
Mutual recognition – Israel shall recognize the State of Palestine.
Palestine shall recognize the State of Israel.
Mutual diplomatic relations – Israel and Palestine shall immediately
establish full diplomatic relationships with each other, installing
ambassadors in the capital of the respective partner.
Capital – each state is free to choose its own capital.
Borders – These should be reasonable and logical for both
sides. Former military intelligence chief Amos Yadlin explained:
“Having a border is the best security arrangement.”8 Settling
the conflict would give Israel greater international legitimacy
to fight terrorism and enable it to deal with the more serious
emerging threat from Iran.
The Clinton Parameters, http://www.peacelobby.org/clinton_parameters.htm
The Geneva Accord, http://www.geneva-accord.org/mainmenu/english
The Arab Peace Initiative 2002, http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm
Aluf Benn, “Haaretz exclusive: Olmert’s plan for peace with the Palestinians”, Haaretz (December 17, 2009), http://
www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/haaretz-exclusive-olmert-s-plan-for-peace-with-the-palestinians-1.1970;
Ehud Olmert interview to Stephen Sackur, BBC HARDtalk (2009), http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/
search?q=cache:RhsmGjUhoY8J:www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b00n4fw3/HARDtalk_Ehud_Olmert_Israeli_
Prime_Minister_2006_2009/+Ehud+Olmert+talks+to+Stephen+Sackur+about+his+Palestinian+peace+pro
posals&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk
5
6
7
8
Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7D35E1F729DF491C85256EE700686136
U.N. Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/
Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/UN+Security+Council+Resolution+338.htm
UN Security Council Resolution 1397 (March 12, 2002), http://www.rewordify.com/index.php?wpage=2001-2009.
state.gov/p/nea/rt/11134.htm
Ben Birnbaum, “The End of the Two-State Solution: Why the window is closing on Middle-East peace”, The
New Republic (March 11, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112617/israel-palestine-and-end-two-statesolution#
Israel will withdraw to the Green Line, evacuating settlements
and resettling the settlers in other parts of the country. The
major settlement blocs − Ma’ale Adumim, Givat Ze’ev, Gush
Etzion, Modi’in Illit and Ariel − which account for approximately
70% of the Jewish population in the West Bank and for less
than 2% of its size, may be annexed to Israel upon reaching an
agreement with the PA of territory exchange that will be equal
in size.9 Border adjustment must be kept to the necessary
minimum and must be reciprocal. At the Taba talks, the
Palestinians presented a map in which Israel would annex 3.1
percent of the West Bank and transfer to the PA other territory
of the same size.10 Yossi Beilin said that they were willing to
concede Israeli annexation of three settlement blocs of at least
4 percent of the West Bank.11 Prime Minister Olmert offered
Palestinian President Abbas a similar or even slightly better
deal but Abbas did not reply positively.
The Palestinian state will be non-militarized. This issue was
agreed upon in 1995. Also agreed upon were joint IsraeliPalestinian patrols along the Jordan River, the installation of
early warning posts, and the establishment of a permanent
international observer force to ensure the implementation of
the agreed security arrangements.13 The early warning posts
will be periodically visited by Israeli security officers but they
won’t be permanently present on Palestinian soil. If there is a
need for a permanent presence, this would be trusted to an
agreed-upon third party.
Terrorism and violence – Zero tolerance in this sphere. Both
sides will work together to curb violence. Both sides will see
that their citizens on both sides of the border reside in peace
and tranquility. Zealots and terrorists, Palestinians and Jews,
will receive grave penalties for any violation of peace and
tranquility.
Territorial contiguity – a corridor would connect the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip to allow safe and free passage. As long as
peace is kept, the road will be permanently open and solely
Palestinian. No Israeli checkpoints will be there. Palestinians
will not be able to enter Israel from this corridor, nor shall
Israelis enter Palestine from the corridor. Palestine will ensure
that this safe passage won’t be abused for violent purposes.
Such abuse would undermine peace and trust between the
two parties.
In the past, the Palestinians failed to understand the gravity
of terrorism and were willing to accept it as part of life.
Nabil Shaath said: “The option is not either armed struggle
or negotiations. We can fight and negotiate at the same
time, just as the Algerians and the Vietnamese had done”.14
Democracies, however, see things differently. On this issue
there should be no compromise.
Jerusalem – What is Palestinian will come under the territory
of the new capital Al Kuds. Al Kuds would include East
Jerusalem and the adjacent Palestinian land and villages.
Abu Dis, Al-Izarieh and Al-Sawahreh will be included in the
Palestinian capital. The Israeli capital would include West
Jerusalem and the adjacent Israeli settlements. To maintain
Palestinian contiguity, Israel may be required to give up
some of the settlements around Arab Jerusalem. The Old
City will be granted a special status. Special arrangements
and recognition will be made to honour the importance of the
Western Wall and the Jewish Quarter for Jews, and similarly
special arrangements and recognition will be made to honour
the importance of the Islamic and Christian holy places.
The Old City will be opened to all faiths under international
The Separation Barrier creates a political reality. It should run
roughly along the 1967 mutually agreed borders.
Security – Both Israel and Palestine will take all necessary
measures to ascertain that their citizens could live free of fear
for their lives. Security is equally important for both Israelis and
Palestinians as this is the key for peace. Palestine and Israel
shall base their security relations on cooperation, mutual trust,
good neighborly relations, and the protection of their joint
interests.12
9
10
11
12
For pertinent maps, see http://www.geneva-accord.org/mainmenu/static-maps/. See also West Bank “Settlement
Blocs”, Peace Now, http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/west-bank-%E2%80%9Csettlement-blocs%E2%80%9D
Yossi Beilin, The Path to Geneva, p. 239.
Beilin, The Path to Geneva, p. 246.
The Geneva Accord, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article5019.htm
13
14
Beilin, The Path to Geneva, p. 169.
Shlomo Ben-Ami, Scars of War, Wounds of Peace, p. 240. Yossi Beilin tells the story of the Taba talks during which
two Israelis were murdered in Tulkarem. The Palestinians, he writes, expressed their shock at the murder but they
found it difficult to understand why “we always play into the hands of those who want to sabotage the talks”. Beilin,
The Path to Geneva, p. 243.
custodianship. There will be Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in
providing municipality services to both populations.
Languages – Starting in primary schools, Arabic will be a
mandatory language for pupils to study in Jewish schools.
Similarly, Hebrew will be a mandatory language for pupils to
study in Palestinian schools. Language is the most important
bridge between different cultures and nations. Israelis will
master Arabic to the same extent that they presently master
English. Palestinians will master Hebrew as their second
language.18
Haram al-Sharif – On March 31, 2013, a Jordan-Palestinian
agreement was signed between the PA and Jordan, entrusting
King Abdullah II with the defense of Muslim and Christian
holy sites in Jerusalem.15 While Jordan may be a party to any
agreement concerning the site, a broader arrangement is
welcomed. As agreed by Abbas and Olmert, it will be under the
control of a five-nation consortium: Palestine, Israel, Jordan,
Saudi Arabia and the United States. The Waqf will continue its
administration. Jews will enjoy right of access. Excavation for
antiquities may be undertaken only with the full agreement of
both sides. Similarly, alterations to the historical structures and
foundations can be made only upon the consent of both sides.
Incitement – Both sides need to clean up the atmosphere, fight
bigotry, racism, incitement and hate on both sides of the fence/
wall. This includes a close study of the education curricula
in both the PA and Israel. Both sides need to overhaul their
school books, excluding incitement, racism, bigotry and hate
against one another.19 The curricula should reflect a language
of peace, tolerance and liberty. Both sides should utilize the
media to promote peaceful messages of reconciliation and
mutual recognition.
Water – The UN secretary-general has said that Palestinians
“have virtually no control” over the water resources in the
West Bank, with 86 percent of the Jordan Valley and the Dead
Sea under the de facto jurisdiction of the settlement regional
councils.16 Israel and Palestine should seek a fair solution that
would not infringe the rights of any of the sides and will assure
that the Palestinian people will have the required water supply
for sustenance and growth.17
Prisoners – As an act of good will, part of the trust-building
process, Israel will release a number of agreed upon prisoners.
With time, as trust will grow between the two sides, all security
prisoners will return home.
Refugees and their right of return – This is a major concern for
both Palestine and Israel. For Palestinians, this issue is about
their history, justice and fairness. For Israelis, this is a debated
issue, where many Israelis are unwilling to claim responsibility
for the Palestinian tragedy and most Israelis object to the right
of return as this would mean the end of Zionism. The issue is
most difficult to resolve as the original refugee population of an
estimated 700,000-750,000 has grown to 4,966,664 refugees
registered with UNRWA at the end of November 2010. About
40% of the refugees live in Jordan, where they comprise about
a third of the population; another 41% are in the West Bank and
Gaza, 10% are in Syria, and 9% are in Lebanon. In the West
Bank, refugees constitute about one-third of the population
while in Gaza they comprise over 80% of the population.20
Fishing – Israel and Palestine will enjoy fishing rights in their
respective territorial waters.
Education – Israel and Palestine will institute a shared curriculum
on good neighborhood, understanding cultures and religions,
respect for others and not harming others. This education
program will commence at the kindergarten and continue at
primary and high schools. In every age group vital concepts for
understanding the other will be studied. This program is critical
for establishing peaceful relationships and trust between the
two parties.
15
16
17
Analysts: Jerusalem deal boosts Jordan in Holy City, Ma’an News Agency (April 3, 2013), http://www.maannews.
net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=581765
Briefing: Beyond the E-1 Israeli settlement, IRIN (March 18 2013), http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97676/BriefingBeyond-the-E-1-Israeli-settlement
For further discussion, see Hillel Shuval, “Is the Conflict over Shared Water Resources between Israelis and Palestinians an Obstacle to Peace?,” and Amjad Aliewi, Enda O’Connell, Geoff Parkin and Karen Assaf, “Palestine
Water: between Challenges and Realities,” both in Elizabeth G. Matthews (ed.), The Israel-Palestine Conflict (London: Routledge, 2011): 93-113, 114-138.
18
Bhikhu Parekh commented that there is no reason why all Palestinian children should learn Hebrew. Israeli Palestinians should but he does not see why this should be a requirement for all Palestinian Arabs. I think that requiring
the children of both societies to learn both Arabic and Hebrew is vital for facilitating connections the two communities, for promoting understanding of one’s other culture and for decreasing animosity and fear.
19
See Daniel Bar-Tal, “Challenges for Constructing Peace Culture and Peace Education”, and Salem Aweiss, “Culture of Peace and Education”, both in Elizabeth G. Matthews (ed.), The Israel-Palestine Conflict (London: Routledge, 2011): 209-223, 224-246.
20
Alan Dowty, Israel/Palestine (Cambridge: Polity, 2012): 243.
Israel and the PA have been arguing endlessly about this issue
as a matter of principle without examining by surveys how
many of the refugees and their families actually are intended to
return to Israel if this option were to be available to them. What
needs to be done is twofold: first, Israel needs to recognize
that it has a shared responsibility with the Palestinians to solve
the problem. Israel needs to honestly confront history, refute
myths and acknowledge the role it played in the creation of
the refugee problem. Second, there is a need to identify the
population, establish the numbers, and after mapping the
refugee population, conduct a survey among them that would
include the following options:
• Return to Israel;
• Return to the West Bank;
• Return to the Gaza Strip;
• Emigrate to third countries that would commit
to absorbing a certain quota (appeal will be
made to countries that receive immigration on
a regular basis to participate in this settlement
effort);
• Remain where they are.
The 1948 Palestinian refugees will be able to settle in Palestine.
The rest of the world is legitimate to set immigration quotas
for absorbing Palestinians who apply for settlement in their
designated choice of country. Unification of families should be
allowed in Israel on a limited quota annual scale. But massive
refugee return to Israel will not be allowed. This dream should
be abandoned. When Abu Mazen was asked whether he
would wish to have Safed, where he was born he replied:
“It’s my right to see it, but not to live there”.21 I suspect that
Abu Mazen’s view reflects the view of many Palestinians who
seek recognition, apology and compensation, not the right of
return. Thus Israel should recognize the Nakba, acknowledge
Palestinian suffering, and compensate the 1948 refugees and
their children (but not grandchildren) for the suffering inflicted
on them. An international tribunal of reputable historians and
international lawyers, including equal representatives of Israel
and Palestine, will determine the level of compensation. If
needed, Israel and Palestine may establish an international
relief fund to which humanitarian countries that wish to see
the end of the conflict contribute. I believe that between Israel,
21
Ben Birnbaum, “The End of the Two-State Solution: Why the window is closing on Middle-East peace”, The
New Republic (March 11, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112617/israel-palestine-and-end-two-statesolution#
Europe, the Moslem World, North America and other countries
of good will (the Geneva Accord mentions Japan; I would
add China, Australia and Brazil), the required funding can be
secured. The United Nations and the World Bank may also be
approached to offer assistance.
Economic Agreements - Israel and Palestine will consider
opportunities for economic cooperation for the benefit of
both societies, aiming to capitalize on the potential of both, to
optimize resources and coordinate efforts. Israel would help
Palestine develop independent economy and open doors for
Palestine in the Western world and elsewhere. Palestine will
pave the way for Israel’s integration into the Middle East as an
equal member in the community of neighbouring countries.
Palestine will help Israel develop economic, industrial, tourist
and other relationships with the Arab and Muslim countries.
International Commerce – Israel and Palestine will be free
to conduct international commerce as they see fit. In order
to develop trust between the two parties, some level of
transparency about logs of commerce will be agreed and
memorandums of understanding will be signed by the two
parties.
Tourism – Israel and Palestine will coordinate efforts in
promoting tourism to the region, this via collaboration with the
neighboring countries in order to facilitate cultural and religious
experiences that are unique to this region.
Communication and Media – Mutual channels of communication
will be opened on television, radio and the Internet. These
media channels will transmit their broadcast in two or three
languages: Arabic, Hebrew and possibly also English.
Communication and language are important for the
development of good neighborly relations.
Termination of the conflict – following the signing of a
comprehensive agreement covering all issues and concerns,
an official statement will be issued declaring the end of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Four Party Permanent Team – Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Palestine
will maintain a permanent organization that will meet periodically
to discuss concerns and resolve problems amicably. This
forum will discuss issues such as the Gaza ports, agriculture,
economic development, water, fishing, tourism, security
controls along the Jordan River, security concerns in Sinai,
counter-terrorism and counter-radicalism. All four parties can
build on the strengths of their societies and together ensure a
better future for their children.
International Arbitration – Difficult issues that won’t be resolved
by direct negotiations will be delegated to a special arbitration
committee. This special committee will have an equal number
of Israeli and Palestinian delegates plus an uneven number
of international experts. Only experts approved by both
parties will be invited to serve on the arbitration committee.
The committee will include lawyers, economists, human rights
experts and experts on the Middle East. Their resolutions
would be final, without having the right of appeal. Both
Israel and Palestine will commit to accept every decision of
the arbitration committee. One model to follow might be the
arbitration committee comprised to resolve the Taba dispute
between Israel and Egypt.
REFERENCES
Al-bab. (2002). Arab Peace Initiative. Al-bab. Available at http://www.al-bab.com/
arab/docs/league/peace02.htm
Amjad, A., O’Connell, E., Parkin, G. and Assaf, K. (2011). Palestine Water: between
Challenges and Realities. In Matthews, E. (ed.). The Israel-Palestine Conflict.
London: Routledge.
Aweiss, S. (2011). Culture of Peace and Education. In Matthews, E. (ed.). The IsraelPalestine Conflict. London, England: Routledge.
Bar-Tal, D. (2011). Challenges for Constructing Peace Culture and Peace Education.
In Matthews, E. (ed.). The Israel-Palestine Conflict. London, England: Routledge.
Benn, A. (2009, December 17). Haaretz exclusive: Olmert’s plan for peace with the
Palestinians. Haaretz. Retrieved from: http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/
haaretz-exclusive-olmert-s-plan-for-peace-with-the-palestinians-1.1970
CONCLUSION
To resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict there is a need for
courageous leaders on both sides who seize the opportunities
presented to them and make the most for their peoples. To
erect peace, it is essential to have trust, good will and security.
It would be far-fetched at present to hope for peace in the short
term. We should have little illusions about peace, at least so
long as Hamas is determined to wipe Israel off the map. Israel
does not even appear on Hamas maps. Israel should aspire to
enter a long-term interim agreement; to build trust; evacuate
isolated settlements; consolidate economic conditions for
Palestinians; bolster security on both sides; stop enlarging
existing settlements; dismantle checkpoints to make the lives
of Palestinian civilians easier; develop the nautilus Iron Dom
against rockets and other anti-rocket mechanisms. Finally,
international cooperation is required to lift the existential
Iranian threat.
Beilin, Y. (2004). The Path to Geneva. New York, United States: RDV Books.
Ben-Ami, S. (2005). Scars of War, Wounds of Peace. London, England: Phoenix.
Birnbaum, B. (2013, March 11). The End of the Two-State Solution: Why the window
is closing on Middle-East peace. The New Republic. Retrieved from: http://www.
newrepublic.com/article/112617/israel-palestine-and-end-two-state-solution#
Clinton Parameters. (2000, December 23). The Jewish peace lobby. Retrieved from:
http://www.peacelobby.org/clinton_parameters.htm
Dowty, A. (2012). Israel/Palestine. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity.Israel Ministry
of Foreing Affairs.
IRIN. (2013, March 18).Briefing: Beyond the E-1 Israeli settlement. IRIN. Retrieved
from:
http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97676/Briefing-Beyond-the-E-1-Israelisettlement
Ma’an News Agency. (2013, April 3). Analysts: Jerusalem deal boosts Jordan in
Holy City. Ma’an News Agency. Retrieved from: http://www.maannews.net/eng/
ViewDetails.aspx?ID=581765
Ofran, H. and Friedman, L. (2008). West Bank “Settlement Blocs”.
Peace Now. Retrieved from: http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/
west-bank-%E2%80%9Csettlement-blocs%E2%80%9D
Olmert, E. (2009). Interview to Stephen Sackur, BBC HARDtalk.
Retrieved
from:
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/
search?q=cache:RhsmGjUhoY8J:www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/
b00n4fw3/HARDtalk_Ehud_Olmert_Israeli_Prime_Minister_2006_200
9/+Ehud+Olmert+talks+to+Stephen+Sackur+about+his+Palesti
nian+peace+proposals&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk
Shuval, H. (2011). Is the Conflict over Shared Water Resources
between Israelis and Palestinians an Obstacle to Peace? In Matthews,
E. (ed.). The Israel-Palestine Conflict. London, England: Routledge.
Static Maps. (n.d.). Geneva Accord. Retrieved from: http://www.
geneva-accord.org/mainmenu/static-maps/
The Geneva Accord. A Model Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement.
(n.d.). Geneva Accord. Retrieved from: http://www.geneva-accord.
org/mainmenu/english
U.N. (1967). Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967. United Nations.
Retrieved from: http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7D35E1F729DF49
1C85256EE700686136
U.N. Security council. (1973, October 22). U.N. Security Council
Resolution 338. Retrieved from: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/UN+Security+C
ouncil+Resolution+338.htm
U.N. Security Council. (1973). Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973.
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from: http://www.mfa.gov.il/
mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/un%20security%20council%20
resolution%20338.aspx
UN Security Council Resolution 1397. (2002, March 12). United
Nations. Retrieved from: http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/4721362D
D7BA3DEA85256B7B00536C7F
WOMEN AS THE DRIVING
FORCE OF CHANGE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST
Por: Carmen Corona Artigas
ITESM, Campus Querétaro, México
Carmen Corona is a student of International Relations at the ITESM Campus Querétaro. She did a
certificate in Event Management at Victoria University in Melbourne, Australia and studied at Foxcroft
School in Virginia, USA. She also did her Professional Practices in the Mexican Embassy at Lisbon,
Portugal, at Periódico Am (a local newspaper), and volunteered for VICDA Organization at El-Shadaii
Orphanage in Gadanji, Kenya. Contact: [email protected]
ABSTRACT
KEYWORDS This article discusses the greater role played by
Women, Activism, Leadership,
Middle East, Discrimination,
Submission, Arab revolution
women from the Middle East not as a submissive
gender but rather as a force of change that has
lead the way through revolutions. The participation
of women during the revolts of the Arab Spring
and their activism thereafter has stated that a fight
for dignity is just the same as a fight for power.
Women in the region have struggled to integrate
into society; they have been discriminated and
rejected. However, the mobilization of women into
the work force will demonstrate that they are active
and capable members of society, as they have
proven to be during the revolts.
“The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is
not usually associated with women’s movements.
In the popular imagination shaped by media
accounts, the region is better known for Islamist
movements, authoritarian governments, and
unending conflicts.” (Moghadam, 2010:19)
Women have power in the Middle East and North Africa region, not
as a submissive gender, but as a movement with incredible force that
is able to change the course of the world forever. The testimonies
and stories of brave women from the Middle East will be presented
as evidence of the changes that have occurred in the world as a
result of their activism. Also, the participation of women in different
conflicts of the region will also serve to understand the extent of
women’s involvement as a main force of change in all sectors of
society. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that this struggle is
a common struggle: it involves the participation of women without
discrimination or fear of rejection. The international community
should pay close attention to this growing force in the region, for it is
a display of fearless citizens seeking due recognition.
Women throughout the world have always played a basic role in
society. Some have become important political and economic
leaders in today’s hectic world. However, little is know about the
women that are always portrayed as submissive in the Arab world.
In the West, these women seem to have little to do with the issues
of their countries and of their own lives. In some cases, it is believed
that they are even told how to dress and how to behave, always under
the careful watch of suppressive men. So why is it that women in
the West are so different from women in the Middle East? Are there
women born to be submissive to a higher authority, whether Allah or
the government? And, is it really the case that these women are truly
that different, or is it only the perception of the West?
Amanda Riggs form the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on the Middle
East recalls how some of her colleagues felt like in Egypt in 2011:
“The Arab Spring signalled opportunity, new beginnings, possibility,
and most of all hope. My friends and colleagues were so proud to
be Egyptian −they stood with their heads high for achieving the
unthinkable.” (2012) During the Arab Spring people protested with
equality− men, women, children and elders, they all stood up for
their rights. Then shouldn’t they all deserve the same rewards for
fighting the same way everyone else did? If women were involved in
the public demonstrations, it means that they are not weaker or that
they have fewer rights than men do. In conjunction with women, the
rest of society were able to attain results, this could be a signal of the
strength and power that this gender has.
Isobel Coleman, Senior Fellow of the Council on Foreign Affairs,
says that women were at the heart of the struggle for freedom by
participating in the front lines of change. Women protested, led
demonstrations, transmitted and organized society via media,
relayed information, and even smuggled munitions. During that
period women became icons of a revolution that demanded not only
political reforms but for basic human rights as well. Coleman wrote
about women during the Arab revolts and explained that,
From Tunis and Cairo to Riyadh and San’a, female protesters have
become the iconic image of the Arab revolutions. Their defiance has
surprised many in the West who have long viewed Arab women as
oppressed victims of conservative patriarchy and religion. Yet young
Arab women today are significantly better educated, marry later, have
fewer children, and are more likely to work outside the home than
their mothers’ generation. Their demands for greater freedom have
been building for years. (Coleman, 2011:215)
Although women have advanced in comparison to their mothers’
generations, there is still a lot to be done, especially in countries ruled
by the Shari’a law, where the participation of women in any public
realm is rather limited, if not non-existent. Coleman mentions how
women in these countries have been pushed to the sidelines and
been cheated of their support, promising a bright future for them. This
was the case of the women that supported the Ayatollah Khomeini
during the Iranian Revolution. Events such as the Islamic Revolution,
call for a regeneration of principles in societies as a whole.
Zainab Salbi is the founder of Women for Women International, an
organization that helps women form marginalized countries affected
by war and conflict, to attain economical stability and self-sufficiency.
Zainab is an Iraqi-American humanitarian that has made it to the
list of the 100 Most Influential Women of 2011 (Newsweek and The
Guardian) and 2012 (Fast Company), one of the most inspirational
women in 2011 (The Economist Intelligence Unit). She has also
received several other recognitions for her dedication to serving
women. In her article Women and the ‘Third Way’, she is determined
to demonstrate the political weight of women in the transformation of
the Middle East. She begins by analysing the case of the Arab Spring
and the following: “God is at the heart of how this ideological war is
being expressed and women have become the battlefield. Whoever
controls the landscape of their whole will set the future direction of the
Middle East.” (2013: 235) Once again she verifies the fact that women
have been actively struggling for the imposition of new democracies,
a functioning state, and most of all, to attain their rights.
Zainab interviewed several women, with different nationalities and
ideologies. However, they all share the same passion for justice and
recognition. She narrates the story of a Tunisian woman that was
imprisoned when she was accused of ‘unlawful gathering’ when
she started wearing her hijab. Another revolutionary mentioned by
Zainab is Han’a, a Libyan civil rights lawyer, that when asked about
the revolution she described: everyone worked together in the
revolution—Everyone: Islamists, women, men, secular folks, it didn’t
matter. If the Devil himself was against Qaddafi, then he was our
friend.” (2013: 236) Another blogger called Fatima told Zainab that:
Tunisian women were never in the middle, they were at the front. When
Tunisian women were on the street for protest or demonstrations, they
were not females, they were citizens. We were all citizens in the street
trying to achieve our goals, because it is our battle to live without
restrictions or limitations. (2013: 236)
And a Libyan political female activist, called Jamila, told Zainab that:
“Women were everywhere. In every place there was a woman. Women
were organizing the protests; we were also burying and cleaning the
death. We were getting charity and donations together.” (2013: 237)
Never has been the participation of women clearer during the revolts,
to have women at the very front of these protests only reassures their
ability to lead the way to change. These battles gave people hope
and a chance to start a fresh beginning. It gave women a voice that
had been stolen because of the abuse of power by authoritarian
governments and other ideologies. Nevertheless, women who
participated in the Arab Spring are unknown and unrecognized heroes
of their revolutions. But how were these brave women repaid? Soon,
after the revolutions had ended, the political institutions that were
once filled with dictators were once again occupied by suppressive
leaders that returned to degrading women to the traditional roles that
they once played. These women were being portrayed as an inactive
and submissive sector of the society again. According to Zainab, in
Egypt:
They also took away the quota or women´s representation in the
parliament, which single-handedly reduced women’s representation
from sixty-four seats to nine. Furthermore, women political activists
were targets of sexual assault in the streets and in prisons. They
were also subject to virginity test—a horrifying violation of a woman’s
identity. This became a major issue for female political activists and
led to the realization that they had not had when they first participated
in the revolutions: that the political response to their activism was
sexist and gendered, even though women saw themselves as
citizens. This led to a new awakening about their specific gendered
identity, leading some to call for a women’s revolution in the regions.
(2013: 237-238)
Zinab insists that women should rise in a revolution again, and to
make the world listen to the injustices and the repeated abuses of
their rights. This story is the repetition of many, and it is time to stop
the cycle and change the course of history, however this possess a
challenge especially in this region. As Bar-On (2014) explained in his
lecture about the Origins of the Middle East, what the region has in
common are the following elements: Islam, tribalism, Arabic language
and culture, and a recent history of colonialism. In the case of women
from the Middle East, Islam is the major source of the denial for their
recognition and participation in the public sphere.
Radical Islamists, like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, “(…)
undermined women’s scholarly knowledge and credibility through
character assassination, leaving little space for any compromise of
ideologies on how to address the role of women in a contemporary
way and within the framework of the spirit of Islamic laws.” (Zinab,
2013: 239) With radical movements or parties, such as the Muslim
Brotherhood, in power the status of women and their recognition will
hardly be improved or attained. The radical ideologies view women
as a submissive gender, not as the clearly strong and active one as
it is. In any respect, this is a post revolution era in the Middle East, in
which women and men have had a taste of their strength and impact
that can be attained when one fights for a common cause. Although
there is a political and ideological struggle, the subject of women is
still an issue of main concern to any in the political sphere.
Women from the Middle East are the only ones that will fully
comprehend what it feels like to be in their situation. This paper does
not aim to describe their feelings towards oppression by men because
of their ideologies, to be used, or to have their rights taken from them,
rather than to explain that despite the misfortunes they have been
able achieve their goals. Zainab explains that there is an emergence
of a renewed, empowered, and frankly exhausted group of women is
in itself their very own hope. She describes them as a generation of
women activists that is identified with the youth and that are “more
responsive to honesty and consistency on what is happening in the
political transitions.” (2013:240). It is basically a group of female
activists of a wide range of sectors, beliefs, and nationalities that fight
for one same cause. They represent a threat to the Middle Eastern
system, which has tried for so long to silence them, because they
have mastered different tools that will organize and mobilize masses.
The international community is now listening to this group that was
once silenced because of their gender. In the words of Zinab:
They go beyond the confinement of political parties and are pushing
for a true meaning of citizenship− freedom beyond gender, religion,
or politics. They include women from all diverse religions and
socioeconomic backgrounds in this new community of activists.
The scene is far more inclusive than the political division that is
happening in there three counties (Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia). (…)
They are carving a third way, a middle ground where they accept
each other´s differences with no judgement and unite their call for
personal freedom. (2013: 240-241)
Zinab suggests that in order to maintain peace in the Middle East,
this group of activists should be given a political and social platform.
She continues to explain that since they hold the only true voice in
the region, “they are the only real hope for a stable, peaceful, and
prosperous Middle East.” (2013: 241) Therefore, it is time to give
these women a chance to speak for them and for us to listen to what
they have to say.
Carla Power in The Price of Sexism (2011) insists that having women
sitting at home in the Middle East, rather than working in the market
can prove to be a devastating decision for any ruler. She points out
that women’s rights and economy are issues that have continuously
been studied separately. However this needs to be analysed again.
Addressing this issue Power mentions that:
The economy and women’s rights have long been separate issues
in the Middle Eastern public debate. But sexism is a costly business,
holding back not just women but entire economies. This is true the
world over but particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, which
have the lowest rate of female participation in the global workforce.
Only a quarter of Middle Eastern and North African women participate
in the labor market, compared with over 50% in other developing
regions, including sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia. (2011)
Allowing women to work and providing jobs for them is a control
tactic that leaders in the Middle East should be analysing. By proving
them with the possibility of employment the government would also
tackle some of the problems in the recognition with subjects such
as human rights; all this, while boosting the national economy to
a new sector that has not been known because of the narrow job
areas that have been opened before. Besides, if women work, they
don’t only produce, but they are more likely to spend their salaries
promoting economic participation. Still governments of the Middle
East have failed to improve their opportunities. Statistics from the
study: Women’s Empowerment: Measuring Global Gender Gap,
from the World Economic Forum, have shown that women from the
Middle East and Africa have the lowest overall score of women’s
empowerment. The study stated that:
While it is encouraging that the countries of the Middle East and
North Africa region have invested impressively in women´s education
in recent years, increasing their productive potential and earning
capacity, it is clear from the low ranks of these countries on labour
force participation—among the lowest in the world—that the region
is not benefiting from the potential returns on this investment. (2005)
The study covers seven Muslim nations; the bottom four ranks are
attributed to Middle Eastern countries, Jordan (55), Pakistan (56),
Turkey (57), and Egypt (58). The study suggests that these nations
conservative attitudes have been the reason why it has been hard
for women to integrate the world of public decision-making. The
new Arab governments should definitely give access to proper
education and employment to women if they want to improve their
competitiveness in relation to the other nations. The 2014 Global
Gender Gap Index Rankings shows a general study of 142 countries;
economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment,
health and survival, and political empowerment were considered for
the realization of the study. The overall results show that out of the 142
new countries included, countries of the Middle East such as Yemen,
Pakistan, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
Oman, Turkey are ranked among the last 17 countries of the list. The
report quantifies the magnitude of gender-based disparities and
tracks their progress over time. It also seeks to measure the aspect
of gender equality. The results easily demonstrate that the indignant
inequality in the Middle East is greater than in any other region of the
world. Governments need to commit to their societies and provide
the due recognition to women and empower them to become active
members of the society and the economy, if they want their countries
to prosper.
Dr. Moghadam has analysed the impact that urbanization has had
in women’s activism. She suggests that urbanization has created
favourable conditions for women to engage in collective action
because it includes the access education and to information.
Moghadam uses the example of Iranian women after the revolution
and she quotes Golnar Mehran who says that “education provided a
platform for women’s increased gender consciousness and political
awareness. Indeed, the feminization of higher education in Iran has
been accompanied by the growth of advocacy for women’s rights
in Iran.” (2010: 22) Educated women are more aware of what is
happening in their countries and therefore are the ones that are taking
action against the submission that has had them controlled for ages.
Women are now conscious that they are not created only to stay at
home and care for the family. Women know that they are capable to
choose what they want to do with their lives. Urbanization, as stated
by Moghadam, has brought to the region questions about society,
their advances and inequalities; these have served as platform for the
creation of women’s groups that search for equality. These groups
strive for power through their participation in civil society, for it is
through power that they will obtain safely the protection of women’s
rights.
Lucy Nusseibeh is the founder and director of Middle East
Nonviolence and Democracy (MEND), which is an organisation
that promotes nonviolent alternatives throughout Palestine, and the
director of the Institute for Modern Media al Al-Quds University. In her
article entitled Women and Power in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,
Nusseibeh suggests that women are the soul-driving force that could
bring peace and stability to the conflict:
If women are included at all levels of peace talks, and there is a truly
gendered approach—with equal representation and respect for the
concerns of all members of society—perhaps we could at least be on
our way to a sustainable future. (2011: 46)
Lucy Nusseibeh continues to explain that the continuous conflict is a
result of the different narratives that exist regarding the circumstances.
Therefore it has not been possible to reach a resolution, for it has
always been seen with the same predetermined ideas as ever. In
order to achieve peace, all people involved should look and analyse
the conflict form different perspectives that will allow for a better
understanding of the situation as a whole, and in order to propose
different solutions to the conflict. Nusseibeh argues that women are
often credited with being more peaceful than man, thus she proposes
to analyse a possible solution to the conflict through women’s
perspective.
There are different reasons why women should be consulted and
should actively participate in the drafting of peace resolutions. They
are more understanding to the priorities for public policy, such as the
well being of society as a whole. Women have insight to for policymaking, and their perspective is maintained even when leadership
positions have been reached. Women’s empathy to humanity can
be the answer to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. One of the
main issues that should be first dealt with is the fact that there are
military armaments everywhere, so no one in the society can be safe.
Nusseibeh analyses as well the security dilemma of the region, and
proposes that women should reframe the concept to include the
need for human dignity and self-respect, issues that have been taken
away from women throughout the suppressive regimes of the Middle
East. In order to achieve this level of recognition and to assure that
they are heard, the Nusseibeh suggests the following:
One crucial point is that women in the peace process should not be
seen only in the context of women as “victims of war and conflict” or
as needing “protection and empowerment” but as women playing
a proactive role in the process of peace negotiations and long-term
peace building. Women are agents and can have power; in fact they
simply need to assert that power to really start to make a change
towards peace. (2011: 50)
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been going on for decades and
has undergone a series of peace negotiations that have not been able
to stop the conflict and end in disasters. Entire families have been
torn apart and thousands have died in the struggle for recognition.
Women however have not ceased to work for a peaceful nation
and for the protection of their families and society. In Palestine, in
the year 1980, the Union of Palestinian Women Committees (UPWC)
was founded with the objective to empower women of all sectors of
society to defend their rights and to: “contribute in the Palestinian
national struggle against the Israeli military illegal occupation of the
Palestinian territories.” (UPWC, 2014) Israeli women are also a motor
of change in the conflicts of their societies, because no matter which
nationality, ethnicity, or religious belief each has, they are all targeted
as the weaker sex that cannot speak up for their rights. This is a
completely wrong belief and whoever holds this view should be ware
because, as the author Nusseibeh points out, “Women can use the
fact of their being weak or victims or in the receiving end of oppression
in effect change—both as the reason to insist on inclusion and as the
way to unite and gain traction toward inclusion.” (2011: 52)
It is rather important the objectives of women’s fights that are stated
before they execute their plans to attain them, because a fight for
dignity is just the same as a fight for power. Those who are more
prepared and have the complete desire for change, can only obtain
success. In the relation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and women,
this change involves the security and statehood for both nations, the
recognition and protection of women’s rights and dignity and, once
again, it can only be reached if women from both nationalities work
together. Nusseibeh suggests that Palestinian and Israeli women
would have the desired change more easily if they join international
organizations in order to have the international community’s support
and counsel, in addition she mentions:
As women start to find their voices around the world, the voices of
women peacemakers among Palestinians and Israelis can carry
more weight as they resonate with all those, women and men, who
sincerely want lasting peace for the region. (…) If women leaders,
especially from the mid- and grassroots levels, can be engaged by
the leadership so that the gap between young and old, social and
political, as well and Palestinian and Israeli, starts to be bridged, they
can help bring peacemaking back to the streets. (2011: 54)
The Middle East is a region with women that are deeply committed
to the fight for women’s rights. A powerful 17-year-old girl form
Pakistan made the whole world turn heads in disapproval towards
the violation of basic human rights. Malala Yousafzai was born in
MIngora, Pakistan on July 1997. At the age of 17 she was awarded
with the Nobel Peace Price of 2014 for her active fight for the right of
education for girls. During her youth, her hometown was a popular
tourist destination but soon, the area was taken over by the Taliban.
On the year 2008, Malala delivered her first speech, “How dare the
Taliban take away my basic right of education?”, and soon, she after
began to blog for the BBC about the difficulties of girl’s education
under Taliban watch. BBC News states that, “she first came to public
attention through that heartfelt diary (…) which chronicled her desire
to remain in education and for girls to have a chance to be educated.”
Fearless, she challenged the Taliban for taking away her chance to be
educated at a school, but made it clear that it did not matter that her
chance to attend to a school was taken away but no one will ever be
able to stop her from learning. In an interview given to Rick Westhead
on October 2009, Malala stood clear on her opinion about education
and said: “Education is not a gift for children, it should be their right,
(…) hopefully, out country’s leaders will give us the rights we deserve.
This is their responsibility”.
Although the Taliban are determinant on their view about the
participation of women and girls on any public realm, Malala has
shown great courage and has set an example for all the international
community, because while many applaud her determination, many
radical Taliban think that she would be better of death for criticizing
the Islamic religion. “When she was 14, Malala and her family learned
that the Taliban had issued a death threat against her.” (Bio, 2014)
She was targeted for assassination on 2012 and received three
gunshots; one went straight through her head, then she received
medical attention in England. The attempt of the Taliban to silence
Malala only made her voice sound stronger. For soon after she got
better, she delivered a speech for the United Nations in 2013 and
also wrote a memoir titled, I Am Malala: The Girl Who Stood Up for
Education and Was Shot by the Taliban. Even though Malala is now
living in England with her family and attends school there, the echoes
of her fight are still visible. Even more so after the Pakistani Taliban
spokesman Shahidullah Shahid told the ABC News as seen in The
Free Thinker News that:
We targeted Malala Yousafzai because she attacked Islam and make
jokes of Islam, if we found her again then we would definitely try
to kill her and will feel proud on her death. We didn´t target her for
spreading education in her area, we targeted her for making jokes of
Islam, and that was enough reason for attacking her.
The group who attacked this young activist claim that the attacks
are “against her ideology” (The Telegraph, 2013) and that she will
be considered as a target as long as she continues with her secular
ideology and with her campaigns against the religion of Islam.
Despite the horrors that Malala has faced and the constant threats
that she has received, she continues to play an important role in the
defence of women and children`s rights. “The shooting resulted
in a massive outpouring support for Yousafzai, which continued
during her recovery.” (Bio, 2014) It would be a shame that after the
struggles that she has been through, she had not been recognized.
Nevertheless, it is terrible that a young girl had to go through such a
terrible experience in order for the rest of the international community
to demonstrate their support for her cause. Malala represents an
enormous segment of society, not only in Pakistan or in her hometown,
but also throughout the Middle East. On one side, it is a positive fact
that she has now the international community on her back because
hopefully it will keep her safe, but, on the other side it is also now
the responsibility of the community to provide help for the rest of the
women and children that have had their rights stolen.
Another Nobel Peace Prize winner is Tawakkol Karman, who was
awarded the in 2011 for her activism in building a safe environment
for women in Yemen. She witnessed the unification of the State of
Yemen in 1990 and, four years later, the war that was fought because
of this. During this time she organized a group of journalists who
reported the human rights abuses that were occurring during the
struggles. Nobel Women Initiative Organization reported that “In
2005, she founded the organization Women Journalists Without
Chains, (WJWC) which advocates for the rights and freedoms and
provides media skills to journalists.” Together with her team she has
outspoken corrupt regimes and mobilized society into supporting
the Arab Spring. Tawakkol has been imprisoned several times for her
peaceful protests, and still today continues to support the movement
against corruption and injustice. On her Nobel Lecture delivered on
December 2011 in Oslo, Tawakkol said:
I have always believed that resistance against repression and violence
is possible without relying on similar repression and violence. I have
always believed that human civilization is the fruit of the effort of both
women and men. So, when women are treated unjustly and are
deprived of their natural right in this process, all social deficiencies
and cultural illnesses will be unfolded, and in the end the whole
community, men and women, will suffer. The solution to women’s
issues can only be achieved in a free and democratic society in
which human energy is liberated, the energy of both women and
men together. Our civilization is called human civilization and is not
attributed only to men or women.
There is no wonder she is known as the ‘iron woman’ or the ‘Mother
of the Revolution’, she has fought with her life to achieve a state of
equality and safety for both men and women. She has encouraged
and given voice to other women to speak out for the rights of other
who have been suppressed, and has demanded the government to
fulfil its duty in bringing peace and safety to its people. In her lecture
she mentioned that with the help of millions of Yemeni citizens they
were able to achieve through non-violent means their demands.
Tawakkol Karman said: “We were able to efficiently and effectively
maintain a peaceful revolution in spite of the fact that this great nation
has more than seventy million firearms of various types.” (2011)
Karman also emphasized that the Revolutions that started with the
Arab Spring were the result of the people’s demand of their rights and
general dissatisfaction. This is a plea that should not be forgotten; it
stated the beginning of people fighting for their dignity. She finalized
her lecture by thanking all the women who have made sacrifices
for their society, who have stumbled with no social justice or equal
opportunities, because they represent the motor of the battles that
are yet to be fought.
REFERENCES
Bar-On, T. (2014). Lecture Week One, Origins of the Middle East.
CONCLUSION
A year after the Arab Spring facilitated for a series of changes
to occur, “the events of the past year in the Middle East have not
only upended political order, but are also unleashing new social,
religious, and cultural dynamics.” (Coleman, 2011: 226) This is the
time for women to raise and speak for their own gender, fight against
submision and stand up for their rights. If women were to engage in
this fight together as they have done recently it will be just a matter of
time until the whole world bows in awe at what they have been able
to achieve.
Women are the motor of society since the beginning of times in all
civilizations, therefore they play an essential role in the continuation of
humankind. The world has witnessed the extraordinary power women
have,the extents to where their influence can reach. Therefore it is
time for the intenational community to empower women from the
Middle East regardless of their political or religious views, ethnic
background, place of birth, and all the other characteristics that have
so far prevented these wome from fighting.
Througout the paper the accounts of different women from the region
have been presented as examples of their dailylife struggles and how
their participation has been able to change the course of the world.
Many have helped to outrule oppresive regimes, others have fought
for the preservation of rights. These women exemplify the fact that no
matter what the contribution is, if it is for the right cause it will echo
and create a change. Hopefully, by the end of this paper the idea
that women from the Middle East are submissive members of their
society has been diminished of the mind of the reader, for they are
the ones that have supported the waves of change. Therefore, the
fact that these women are different from the women of the West, is
only a misconseption and a lack of information. It is in fact the exact
opposite, for they have lived through oppression and have risen to
stand for their rights as citizens of the world.
BBC News. (2014, October 10). Malala Yousafzai. Retrieved on October 14, 2014
from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-23241937
Bio. (2014). Malala Yousafzai Biograophy. Retrieved on October 15, 2014 from: http://
www.biography.com/people/malala-yousafzai-21362253#synopsis
Coleman, I. (2011). Women and the Arab Revolts. Brown Journal of the World Affairs.
Moghadam, V. (2010). Urbanization and Women’s Citizenship in the Middle East.
Brown Journal of World Affairs,17, P:19-34.
Nusseibeh, L. (2011). Women and Power in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. PalestineIsrael Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture. 17, P: 46-54.
Nobel Prize. Nobel Lecture by Tawakkol Karman, Oslo, December 10th 2011.
Retrieved on November 10, 2014 from: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/
peace/laureates/2011/karman-lecture_en.html
Nobel Womens Initiative. Tawakkol Karman- Yemen, 2011. Recuperated on
November 10, 2014 from: http://nobelwomensinitiative.org/meet-the-laureates/
tawakkol-karman/
Power, C. (2011). The Price of Sexism. Time International (Atlantic Edition, 179, Issue
22 %3d#db=bth&AN=76301891 P:39-42.
Riggs, A. (2012). What Role for Women After the Arab Spring?. Forbes. Retrieved on
October 13, 2014 from: http://0-search.ebscohost.com.library.vu.edu.au/login.aspx?
direct=true&db=bth&AN=70347331&site=bsi-live
Salbi, Z. (2013). Women and the ‘Third Way’. Journal of International Affairs. P: 235241.
(2014). Malala was shot for ‘attacking Islam’, rather than for supporting girls’
education in Pakistan. The Free Thinker. Retrieved on October 15, 2014 from: http://
freethinker.co.uk/2013/10/07/malala-was-shot-because-for-attacking-islam-ratherthan-for-supporting-girls-education-in-pakistan/
(2013). Pakistan Taliban issues fresh threat to kill Malala Yousafzai. The Telegrapher.
Retrieved on October 15, 2014 from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
asia/pakistan/10360502/Pakistan-Taliban-issues-fresh-threat-to-kill-Malala-Yousafzai.
html
UPWC. (2014). Union for Palestinian Women Committees. Retrieved on October 17,
2014 from: http://www.upwc.org.ps/
Westhead, R. (2012). ‘You will not stop me from learning’: Teen activist
awes us with her courage. The Star. Retrieved on October 15, 2014
from: http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/10/09/you_will_not_
stop_me_from_learning_teen_activist_awes_us_with_her_courage.
html
(2014). Zainab Salbi. Women for Women International. Retrieved on
October 16, 2014 from: http://www.womenforwomen.org/about-us/
leadership/zainab-salbi
Riggs, A. (2012). What Role for Women After the Arab Spring?. Forbes.
Obtained on October 13, 2014 from: http://0-search.ebscohost.com.
library.vu.edu.au/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=70347331&si
te=bsi-live
Salbi, Z. (2013). Women and the ‘Third Way’. Journal of International
Affairs. Vol. 67 Issue 1, p. 235-241
(2014). Malala was shot for ‘attacking Islam’, rather than for
supporting girls’ education in Pakistan. The Free Thinker. Obtained
on October 15, 2014 from: http://freethinker.co.uk/2013/10/07/malalawas-shot-because-for-attacking-islam-rather-than-for-supportinggirls-education-in-pakistan/
(2013). Pakistan Taliban issues fresh threat to kill Malala Yousafzai.
The Telegrapher. Obtained on October 15, 2014 from: http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/10360502/PakistanTaliban-issues-fresh-threat-to-kill-Malala-Yousafzai.html
UPWC. (2014). Union for Palestinian Women Committees.
Recuperated on October 17, 2014 from: http://www.upwc.org.ps/
Westhead, R. (2012). ‘You will not stop me from learning’: Teen activist
awes us with her courage. The Star. Obtained on October 15, 2014
from: http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/10/09/you_will_not_
stop_me_from_learning_teen_activist_awes_us_with_her_courage.
html
Lopez-Claros A. and Zahidi, S. (2005). Women’s Empowerment:
Measuring the Global Gender Gap. World Economic Forum.
(2014). Global Gender Gap Report 2014: Ranking. World Economic
Forum. Recuperated on November 10, 2014 from: http://reports.
weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2014/rankings/
(2014). Zainab Salbi. Women for Women International. Recuperated
on October 16, 2014 from: http://www.womenforwomen.org/aboutus/leadership/zainab-salbi
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN
PEACE-MAKING:
A PARADIGM SHIFT
Por: James M. Dorsey
Nanyang Technological Universit
Senior Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. Codirector, Institute of Fan Culture, University of Wuerzburg [email protected]
ABSTRACT
KEYWORDS Wars inevitably spark change. That is no truer than with the war in
Israel, Palestine, Middle East,
Peace, Military
Gaza in 2014, no matter what Hamas and Israel say. The signs of
changing attitudes of Israel and Hamas towards one another go
significantly beyond the fact that the two sworn enemies who refuse
to recognize one another are negotiating even if only indirectly. They
also go beyond the fact that the road to the Cairo talks was paved in
part on indirect negotiations between Hamas and the United States,
which like Israel has declared Hamas a terrorist organization.
For much of Israel’s existence, Israelis believed that their security
depended on achieving full-fledged peace with the Jewish state’s
Arab neighbours. That notion was refined in the 1980s and 1990s
with Israeli and Palestinian realization that peace would have to entail
the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.For Palestinians,
this meant acceptance of painful compromises involving surrender of
claims to pre-1967 Israeli territory and the effective surrender of the
right of 1948 refugees to return to their homes. Palestinian difficulty in
translating that acceptance into policy allowed Israel to evade taking
the painful decisions peace would require such as a withdrawal from
the West Bank and some form of sharing of sovereignty in Jerusalem.
Unwittingly, the Palestinian inability to grab opportunity by the horn
enabled Israel to instead tighten its grip on the West Bank and
Jerusalem and make any partition increasingly difficult.
The Israeli-Palestinian peace-making paradigm has shifted three
decades later. After peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan; historic
agreements with the Palestinians on mutual recognition, cooperation
in a variety of sectors; various failed roadmaps to peace; and multiple
wars between Israel and non-state actor such as Lebanese Shiite
Muslim Hezbollah militia and Islamist Hamas, peace is no longer
perceived in Israel as a must. For Israelis, the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict has become an issue of management rather than solution.
Changed Israeli perceptions of peace-making were long mirrored
on the Palestinian side. A debilitating feud between Hamas and the
Palestine Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’ Al Fatah movement that
put the Islamists in control of Gaza coupled with Israeli intransigence
effectively stymied Abbas’ ability to achieve peace. In effect, Israel
and Hamas shared tacit common interests. Neither wanted a final
solution but both favoured a long-term ceasefire provided that
enabled them to further social and economic development. That
prospect however was undermined by a debilitating Israeli land, sea
and air blockade of Gaza designed to prevent Hamas from arming
itself – a policy that ultimately failed with the Islamist group’s use of
underground smuggling tunnels.
Abbas’ helplessness coupled with Israeli and Hamas intransigence
nonetheless reaffirmed a long-standing fact of life of the IsraeliPalestinian equation: hardliners can serve each other’s needs to
mutual benefit without making the kind of wrenching concessions
that thwart the ambitions of peacemakers and moderates on both
sides. A prisoner swap in 2011 in which Israel bought freedom for
Staff Sergeant Gilad Shalit after five years in Palestinian captivity in
exchange for the release of 1,027 prisoners − many of whom were
responsible for deadly attacks on Israelis – highlighted the fact
that sworn enemies found it easier to do business than those who
advocate compromise and living in peace and harmony side by side.
Underlying, the swap was a belief on the part of Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu and Hamas that there is no realistic chance
for an agreement on peace terms that would be acceptable to both
Palestinians and Israelis. Given the nature of his coalition government,
Netanyahu has been unwilling or unable to give Abbas the bare
minimum he would need to push forward with peace without at least
the tacit backing of Hamas.
While Netanyahu officially refused to negotiate with Hamas, for
its part, Hamas refused Israeli conditions for its inclusion in a
peace process, including the recognition of Israel’s right to exist,
abandonment of its armed struggle, and acceptance of past IsraeliPalestinian agreements. If anything, the prisoner swap and its military
performance in military confrontations with Israel reinforced the Islamist
movement’s conviction that its hard line is paying off. Netanyahu
strengthened Hamas in its conviction not only by excluding Abbas
from the prisoner swap, but also by his decision at the time to build
a new Jewish settlement on the southern edge of Jerusalem and the
granting of legal status to settlements established
without his government’s approval. Netanyahu’s
move flew in the face of Abbas’ efforts to make an
Israeli freeze on settlements a core pre-condition
for peace talks with the Israelis.
Netanyahu announced changed Israeli attitudes
towards Hamas when he defined Israel’s goal
in the Gaza war as the weakening of Hamas
military capability, if not the demilitarization of the
group, rather than his long standing objective of
total destruction of the organisation. While Israel
The paradigm of a tacit Israel-Hamas understanding seemed to be indiscriminate in its risking of civilian
bolstered intransigence on both sides and neutered casualties during the war, Hamas’ senior leadership
Abbas shifted in 2014 with the military coup in in the Strip emerged from the fighting unscathed.
Egypt of Hamas’ foremost ally, Islamist President The negotiations despite their cyclical breakdowns
Mohammed Morsi; a rift between Hamas and Iran did not only acknowledge Hamas as a key player
over Hamas’s refusal to back the regime of Syrian in any long lasting arrangement with Israel but
President Bashar al-Assad; the Israeli blockade’s also constituted a recognition of the fact that the
increasing destruction of the Gaza economy; and Islamist group looks a lot better than other militant
mounting international criticism of Israel fuelled by Palestinian groups in Gaza, such as Islamic
its brutal assault on the Gaza Strip. If Israel was Jihad, which has often played the role of an agent
long the proponent of peace, Hamas has opened provocateur trying to force conflict in an environment
the door to Palestinians replacing it in that role.
in which both Hamas and Israel would have wanted
to avoid military confrontation. Even if Hamas
Indirect ceasefire talks in Cairo designed to does not comprise the moderate Palestinians that
end the 2014 Israel-Hamas war and achieve a Israel and its western backers prefer to deal with, it
lasting ceasefire and post-cease fire negotiations looks better than the Islamic State which occupies
effectively constitute discussions about the significant chunks of Syria and Iraq.
parameters of a potential future peace agreement.
Israeli rhetoric notwithstanding, signs of changing Israel’s acknowledgement of Hamas as the best of
attitudes of Israel and Hamas towards one another a bad bunch was evident in the substance of the
went significantly beyond the fact that the two sworn Cairo talks: the building blocks of a future state
enemies who refuse to recognize one another were and a two-state resolution to the Israeli Palestinian
negotiating even if only indirectly. They also went conflict −rule by a Palestinian national unity
beyond the fact that the road to the Cairo talks government, open borders, a sea port, extended
was paved in part on indirect negotiations between territorial waters, and an airport −in exchange for
Hamas and the United States, which like Israel has military and security arrangements that ensure the
declared Hamas a terrorist organization.
security of both Israel and the Palestinians.
Anat Kurz, director of Tel Aviv University’s Institute for national
security studies, which has close ties to Israel’s government
and security establishment, reflected the changed attitudes
in official Israeli thinking: “Israel does not want to destroy
Hamas. There’s a shift in the Israeli position (…) Israel wants
to leave Hamas enough capability because it is the most
organised force in the Gaza Strip,” Kurz told The Guardian.
She acknowledged that the labelling of a group as terrorist
often served as a way of avoiding negotiations that could
involve painful compromises. (Fraser, 2014)
Ironically, Kurz’s articulation of changed Israeli attitudes
mirrored statements by Hamas leader Khaled Mishal,
including his assessment of Israel’s demand that Hamas first
recognize the Jewish state and denounce armed struggle
before any potential direct talks. In a lengthy interview with
Al Jazeera, Mishal described the Israeli demands as a tool
to evade negotiations, noting that the United States and the
Vietcong negotiated an end to the Vietnam War while the
fighting continued. “The argument throws the ball into the
Palestinian court (…) We will not surrender to Israeli blackmail,”
Mishal said. He noted further that a quarter of a century after
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat first renounced violence and
then recognized Israel Palestinians have yet to secure their
rights. (Khaled, 2014)
More importantly, both in his explicit remarks and in the tone
of his interview Mishal made clear that Hamas had signed on
to a two-state resolution that would end the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict with the establishment of an independent Palestinian
state alongside Israel.” We accept a state with the 1967
borders but Israel doesn’t. That makes a solution difficult to
achieve,” Mishal said referring to the borders before the 1967
Middle East war in which Israel conquered the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip.(Khaled, 2014)
Changed Israeli and Hamas attitudes however do not
automatically lead to a solution. Nevertheless they are a sine
qua non for any longstanding arrangement whether a ceasefire
or a final peace agreement. So far neither Israel nor Hamas
have demonstrated the political will to build on the change in
the way they eye each other. Intractable hostility suited both
Israel and Hamas until the last Gaza war.
The change is nonetheless significant. Hamas has clearly
stated what it has long been signalling: Israel is there to
stay. Mishal has downplayed the Hamas charter that calls
for Israel’s destruction, saying that it is “a piece of history
and no longer relevant, but cannot be changed for internal
reasons.”His number two, Mousa Abu Marzouk, noted that
“the charter is not the Quran. It can be amended.” Their statements
echo the words of the late Israeli Defence Minister Ezer Weizman,
who stood in front of his Likud Party emblem that showed Jordan
as part of Israel and said with regard to the charter of the Palestine
Liberation Organization that at the time called for Israel’s demise: “We
can dream, so can they.”
The changing Israeli and Hamas attitudes reflect the fact that the most
recent Israeli destruction of Gazan infrastructure failed to prevent the
Islamist group from inflicting significant political and psychological
damage on Israel. Hamas’ refusal to bow to Israeli military superiority
as well as its uncompromising insistence on a lifting of the eight-year
old Israeli-Egyptian blockade of the Gaza Strip and the right to furnish
it with an airport and sea port caught Israel by surprise. Hamas’
steadfastness left Israel with few good options.
The effects of Hamas’ strategy were evident on the ground. Beyond
having been forced into a war of attrition, Israeli towns and settlements
adjacent to the Gaza Strip turned a majority of their residents into
internal refugees. “This is a strategic achievement on a par with
Hamas’ success in closing (Tel Aviv’s) Ben Gurion international
airport for a couple of days” during the war, commented DEBKAFile,
a news website with close ties to Israel’s military and intelligence
establishment. (2014, August 28) In addition, Israel’s international
standing was significantly dented highlighted by US and British
suggestions that they may review arms sales to the Jewish state
more stringently and stepped up calls for sanctions against Israel.
An Israeli newspaper headline read: After seven weeks of Gaza war,
Hamas: 1, Israel: 0 (Oren, 2014, September 12)
The Israeli-Palestinian conflagration in Gaza constituted
a watershed with Israel struggling to counter mounting
international criticism of its disproportionate use of force and
Palestinians’ increasingly united refusal of agreements that
do not take into account their interests. The new Palestinian
resolve was rooted in a measure of reconciliation between
Hamas and Abbas; Hamas’ transition from an embattled
group, unable to pay public sector salaries prior to the Israeli
assault, into a resistance movement with street credibility; and
in the absence of Arab support in the Gaza war, a realisation
that Palestinians will have to rely on their own resources.
Palestinian resolve was further strengthened by the
performance of Palestinian fighters on the ground. Palestinian
rockets were able to target urban centres deep inside Israel
even if they were unable to defeat the Jewish state’s Iron
Shield anti-missile system. Moreover, Palestinian fighters
several occasions reached Israel through their tunnels killing
a significant number of Israeli soldiers on Israeli soil. In
addition, international public opinion was turning against Israel
as casualties in Gaza mount and the recognition seeped in
that Hamas will have to be a party to any lasting ceasefire or
credible effort to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Similarly, many Arab governments saw whatever street credibility
they had reduced because of their silent endorsement of the
Israeli assault on Hamas which they view as an extension of
their effort to destroy the Muslim Brotherhood; at the same
time Qatar was gaining popularity with its support of Hamas,
an offshoot of the Brotherhood.
The newly-found resolve has translated into Palestinians
across the board demanding that any lasting ceasefire be
linked to their political demands, first and foremost among
which a lifting of the seven-year old Egyptian-Israeli blockade
of Gaza. The demands were endorsed not only by Hamas but
also the Palestine Authority, which, incapable of coming to the
aid of the embattled population in Gaza, had been weakened
and appeared helpless as Hamas fighters took on the Israelis.
With mass protests in support of Gaza across the West Bank,
both Hamas and the Authority needed to be watchful that
the demonstrations did not turn against them given that their
seven-year old feud has rendered Palestinians ineffective in
peace efforts and effectively played into Israel’s divide-and-rule
strategy.While some analysts believe that economic progress
on the West Bank makes it unlikely that its residents will want
to risk their well-being with a third Intifada or popular revolt,
both Hamas and the Authority may see a civil disobedience
campaign as a way to keep Palestinian anger focussed on
Israel.
Gaza may have aligned the interests of Hamas and the
Authority and this was reflected in the little-noticed Palestinian
demand that Israel recognise the reconciliation between the two
groups as part of any lasting ceasefire. Israel had denounced
a reconciliation agreement that earlier this year created the
basis for the formation of a national unity government backed
by both Hamas and Al Fatah, the backbone of Mr. Abbas’
Palestine Authority. The primary motive of Israeli assault on
Gaza is widely believed to have been the undermining of the
reconciliation. That effort has clearly backfired and, if anything,
strengthened the basis for a greater degree of Palestinian
unity. “Hamas is no longer a terror group carrying out attacks,
it’s a mini-army in a mini-state,” said Amir Oren, a columnist for
Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz(2014, August 31).
The turning of international public opinion against Israel; the
private, if not public, dismay in Western capitals at the heavy
handedness of the Israelis in Gaza; Israeli Prime Minister
Benyamin Netanyahu’s potentially politically damaging post
mortem of the war; as well as the strengthened Palestinian
resolve; all had the makings of a paradigm shift in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. How the shift plays out will depend on
whether the war in Gaza sparks a third Intifada as well as
on developments in Israel, including the fallout of the postmortem and the impact in Israel of the loss of significant
empathy in international public opinion as well as among its
most important allies, the United States and Europe.
In a bid to manage a unilateral Israeli end to the fighting in Gaza,
Netanyahu and other Israeli officials have already embarked
on their ‘victory campaign’ claiming significant damage to
thousands of alleged terror targets; the destruction of dozens
of tunnels; a strengthening of ties with Arab states such as
Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia; and a warning that if Hamas
continues to attack Israel Palestinians will pay an intolerable
price. This narrative could be easily punctured by a Palestinian
attack with the guns having fallen silent. As Ha’aretz columnist
Yossi Verter warned:
The dangers facing (Netanyahu) are immeasurable: if the
rocket fire on the south continues even after IDF (Israel Defence
Forces) forces withdraw from the (Gaza) Strip, he is likely to be
held responsible for national humiliation, which would cause
him to lose support from within his coalition, his party, and
ultimately, the Prime Minister’s Office as well. (2014)
Post-ceasefire talks have bought Netanyahu time but would
only eliminate the threat if agreement is reached on Palestinian
demands.
Whether the fall-out of the Gaza war ultimately leads to an Israeli
government more inclined to make the painful concessions
necessary for an Israeli-Palestinian peace − or one that is
even more intransigent and hard line than the one Netanyahu
heads. Whichever way, it would together with the newly-found
Palestinian resolve, constitute a paradigm shift.
The fall-out is also likely to impact Israeli military and intelligence
strategies and focus. Israeli military and intelligence sources
attributed their failure to predict Hamas’ ability to stand up
to punishing military strikes to a decision in the last decade
to focus the country’s intelligence resources on gathering
tactical intelligence and its military on ensuring weapons and
training superiority rather than on understanding the enemy’s
strategy, mindset and evaluation of the local and international
environment in which it operates. As a result, Israeli intelligence
and security agencies had cut back on personnel seeking to
understand the broader picture in which Hamas and other
groups operate.1
While Israel and Hamas were negotiating the 2014 ceasefire,
says DEBKAFile (2014), the intelligence failure left, as
The initiative in Hamas’ hands and Israel ignorantly navigating
its military moves towards a ceasefire instead of winning the
war. Despite its inferiority in fighting strength and weaponry,
Israel’s enemy uses this ambivalence to retain the element of
surprise and keep the IDF moving without direction.
It has also made Netanyahu more vulnerable to criticism that
Israel would be unable to militarily defeat Hamas in a war of
attrition that takes an increasing toll on Israel’s population
and limited his freedom to manoeuvre in the post-ceasefire
negotiation with the Palestinians. As a result, some of the
prime minister’s critics, including former defence minister
Moshe Arens, appeared willing to concede to some of Hamas’
demands in the absence of Israel’s ability to wage a military
campaign aimed at complete disarmament of Hamas on
condition that the government prepared for another round
of fighting which they view as inevitable at some point in the
future (Arens, 2014).
Proponents of the shift in focus pointed to Israeli successes
in recent years including the 2008 assassination in Damascus
of Imad Mughnieyh, a widely respected Hezbollah and Iranian
operative, who masterminded attacks on Israeli and US targets
as well as a host of kidnappings of foreigners in Lebanon,
including the CIA’s station chief. They also listed the killing of
Iranian nuclear scientists in Iran and elsewhere, the Stuxnet
cyber-attack on Iranian computer systems related to the
Islamic republic’s nuclear program, and the 2007 destruction
of a Syrian plutonium reactor built with the help of Iran and
North Korea. They further argued that Israeli forces involved in
Gaza benefitted from superior tactical knowledge.
Criticism in Israel focuses on the military’s politically mandated
strategy and its failure in recent years to reorganize and review
its doctrine and strategy in a world in which Israel is more likely
to confront unconventional rather than conventional forces.
Israel’s last four wars were against the Hezbollah, and Hamas
rather than conventional Arab armies.
Those successes notwithstanding Israeli intelligence was
unable to provide Netanyahu and members of his security
cabinet with the necessary strategic analysis to pre-empt
what had become a classic example of Machiavelli’s pursuit
by Hamas of diplomacy by other means. Israeli intelligence’s
inability was already evident in faulty analysis of the popular
Arab revolts that toppled the leaders of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya
and Yemen as well as of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s
strategy of allowing the Islamic State, the jihadist group that
controls a swath of Syria and Iraq, to emerge as the major
rebel group so that he could substantiate his claim that he
was fighting a terrorist phenomenon that threatens not only his
regime but also the region as a whole and the West.
1
Interviews with the author
Said Amos Harel, one of Israel’s most respected military
commentators stated:
These phenomena show that the IDF, especially the ground
forces, needs to think hard and plan anew. Israel’s technically
advanced forces found an enemy playing in a different
field, thus eroding its advantages. The Israel Air Force, with
the assistance of MI (military intelligence) and the Shin Bet
(Israel’s internal security service), can strike its targets with
great precision. But against Hamas or Hezbollah, this may not
be enough to win decisively… If the IDF wants to preserve its
ability to win using manoeuvres, quite extensive changes must
be considered.2 (Harel, 2014)
2
Amos Harel. August 5 2014. Gaza war taught IDF: Time to rethink strategies, Ha’aretz, http://www.haaretz.com/
news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.608896
The debate about the Israeli military came
against the backdrop of its changed
demography. Israel’s military today is not
what it was in the late 1980s when it told then
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin during the first
Intifada or Palestinian popular uprising against
Israeli occupation: “We can solve this militarily
but not on terms that would be politically or
morally acceptable to the Israel Defence
Forces (IDF) or the government (…) you, Mr.
Prime Minister have to solve it politically.” A few
years later Rabin engaged in the failed Oslo
peace process with Yasser Arafat’s Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO).
With analysts predicting increased differences
between the military and Israel’s political
leadership in the wake of the Gaza war, both
entities are coping with very different political
and demographic constituencies. Israel’s
right-wing has moved further to the right
forcing Netanyahu to fend off pressure from
coalition partners like Foreign Minister Avigdor
Lieberman whose Yisrael Beytenu (Israel is our
Home) Party ended its alliance with the prime
minister’s Likud early in the war, and economy
minister Naftali Bennett’s Habait Hayehudi
(The Jewish Home) Party that both advocated
reoccupation.
Nor is the Israeli government similar to that
of Rabin. Netanyahu’s government in the first
week of the assault on Gaza turned down a
proposal to conduct lightning strikes inside
Gaza that would have destroyed Hamas’
command and control centres and other
military infrastructure. It also refused to
entertain a proposal for a full re-occupation of
the Gaza Strip. Debkafile suggested that had
Israel opted for lightning strikes “at an early
stage in the conflict, instead of ten days of air
strikes, it might have saved heavy Palestinian
losses and property devastation, the extent of
which troubles most Israelis too.” (DEBKAFile,
2014, August 6).
Similarly, religious and conservative forces
have become more prominent in the Israeli
military. The commander of Israel’s elite
infantry Givati Brigade Col. Ofer Winter, that
suffered high casualties in the last month,
declared holy war on the Palestinians in a
message to his troops at the beginning of the
Gaza war that went on to say: “The Lord God
of Israel, make our way successful (…) We’re
going to war for your people Israel against an
enemy that defames you.” (Misgrav, 2014).
Reorganizing the military and revamping
its doctrine and strategy is no mean task. It
involves a debate that by definition will have to
also include Israel’s broader policies towards
Israel’s liberal Ha’aretz newspaper added in the Palestinians at a time that popular antian editorial: When you’re too heavy, big or Arab and anti-Palestinian sentiment is running
bloated, it’s hard to move, run or even bend high.
down. Your arm is so fat it can’t reach into
a tunnel. It gets stuck and you stand there
helplessly. That’s precisely the situation with
the Israel Defence Forces. It’s a King Kong
of an army — big and cumbersome; every
move unintentionally knocks down a house,
bridge or UN school in Gaza... The top brass
has forgotten that line in the Book of Proverbs:
‘with wise advice thou shalt make thy war.’
(Shtrasler, 2014).
REFERENCES
Arens, M. (2014, August 25). A war of attrition is not an option in Gaza. Haaretz.
Retrieved from http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.612178
DEBKAFile. (2014, August 6). Iran, Al Qaeda took note of curbs on IDF vanquishing
Hamas, which now has core of a Palestinian army. DEBKAFile. Retrieved from:
http://www.debka.com/article/24166/Iran-Al-Qaeda-took-note-of-curbs-on-IDFvanquishing-Hamas-which-now-has-core-of-a-Palestinian-armyDEBKAFile. (2014, August 28). Though militarily inferior, Hamas has hit Israel
strategically with attrition and population flight. DEBKAFile. Retrieved from: http://
www.debka.com/article/24215/Though-militarily-inferior-Hamas-has-hit-Israelstrategically-with-attrition-and-population-flight
Fraser, G. (2014, August 15). Sometimes it’s good to talk - even to ‘terrorists’. The
Guardian. Retrieved from: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2014/
aug/15/good-to-talk-terrorists
Harel, A. (2014, August 5). Gaza war taught IDF: Time to rethink strategies.
Haaretz. Retrieved from: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.
premium-1.608896
Khaled, M. (2014, August 17). Not a war of choice. [Video]. Al Jazeera. Retrieved
from:http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2014/08/khaled-meshaalnot-war-choice-201481516939516479.html
Misgav, U. (2014, August 15). Israel should get God out of the army. Haaretz.
Retrieved from: http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.609495
Oren, A. (2014, August 31). Israel’s defense establishment recommends easing
Gaza restrictions. Haaretz. Retrieved from:
http://www.haaretz.com/news/
diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.613239
Oren, A. (2014, September 12). After seven weeks of Gaza war, Hamas 1, Israel 0.
Haaretz. Retrieved from: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israelgaza-conflict-2014/.premium-1.612437
Shtrasler, N. (2014, August 5). The IDF has put its brain in storage - or lent it to Hamas.
Haaretz. Retrieved from: http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.608859
Verter, Y. (2014, August 6). Top brass sees Gaza diplomacy as an opportunity, not a
threat. Haaretz. Retrieved from: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/
israel-gaza-conflict-2014/.premium-1.609213
Heritage is our legacy from the past,
what we live with today and
what we pass on to future generations.
(World Heritage Information Kit, Paris: UNESCO)
NEGLECTED NARRATIVES:
THE IMPACT OF ARMED CONFLICT ON
CULTURAL HERITAGE OF THE MIDDLE
EAST
Often missing from the mainstream narratives and
even from the Middle Eastern ‘metanarratives’, the
impact of armed conflict on the cultural heritage
of the region must be addressed immediately.
The systematic degradation of cultural heritage in
the Middle East due to armed conflict is a rarely
told tale, a neglected narrative competing for the
spotlight with several others and it is very rare that
light in fact shines on the issue since attention is
often diverted towards economic and political
perspectives and more so now towards narratives
concerning gender issues and environmental
concerns, among others. Cultural heritage has
been the silent victim, the unknown soldier lost in
battle, of the seemingly never ending conflict in
the Middle East; whereas as collateral damage
or intentionally carried out, the systematic looting
and destruction of heritage sites1 in the region
needs to be stopped immediately as it is a non-rebuildable component of Middle Eastern societies
and a founding pillar of the history and identity of
humanity as a whole. It is after all, the Middle East
where the first civilization sprung between rivers
Tigris and Euphrates2 and where too, it could be
argued, history may have started since according
to Carr (1987): “History begins with the handing
down of tradition; and tradition means the carrying
of the habits and lessons of the past into the future.
Records of the past begin to be kept for the benefit
of future generations.” (p.108). Cultural heritage,
represents precisely that: the history of a people,
of a nation, and of humankind as a whole. The
urgency of the need for action and protection in
the region commonly known as the Middle East is
rooted in the notion of cultural heritage itself.
Por: Andrea Galván Vélez
ITESM, Campus Querétaro, México
Andrea Galván is an International Relations student at the Tecnológico de Monterrey in the city of
Querétaro, Mexico and she has just concluded a term as a visiting student at King’s College in London,
England. She has also worked as an intern at the Mexican General Consulate in New York City and
she currently works at the Coordination for International Relations and Governmental Innovation of the
Government of the State of Querétaro.
ABSTRAC
KEYWORDS Armed conflict and war in the region known as
Middle East, Cultural Heritage,
World Heritage, war, degradation,
destruction.
the Middle East has occupied news headlines
and international agendas for the pas fifty years
at least. Often discussed and analyzed is the
impact of this constant state of war on economics,
energy, military and technological capabilities, and
of course, the losing of millions of lives; however,
the discussion of the impact of war on cultural
heritages of the peoples of the region and of
the world as whole is little to almost inexistent. It
is of vital need to address the issue of heritage
destruction and degradation as a result of war in
the Middle East or future generations will inherit a
broken history with no symbols to represent it. By
analyzing the cases of Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria,
a picture can be drown of how whether deliberately
or as collateral damage, cultural heritage in Middle
Eastern countries is another victim of armed
conflict in the region; and differently to most victims
of the conflict, it has no advocate: it is neglected
and silenced.
1
Cultural Heritage may also refer to/include intangible components such as language, religion, traditions, etc. The
aim of this paper however is to analyse the impact of conflict on tangible representations of cultural heritage; for
further reading please see: Silverman, H; Fairchild, D. (2007) Cultural Heritage and Human Rights. New York City:
Springer. And Blake, J. (2008) On defining the Cultural Heritage. International and comparative Law Quarterly; Vol
49, Pp 61 to 85.
2
See Kramer, N. (1969). Cradle of Civilization. Little Brown & Co.
On Cultural Heritage
later, in an effort to broaden the protection of cultural heritage,
another UNESCO convention would be held declaring a
collective responsibility of humankind as a whole to protect all
forms of cultural and natural heritage because of the inherent
relation between heritage and civilization:
Part of the problem that represents the lack of attention to the
damaging and destruction of cultural heritage is agreeing on
a definition for what cultural heritage actually is. Constantine
Sandis in his book Cultural Heritage Ethics: Between Theory
and Practice (2014), defines heritage as “what has been or
may be inherited regardless of its value.” (p.11). Boswell (2008)
classifies it more as a construction, defining it as irreplaceable
‘points of reference’ and ‘our identity’. (p.4), while J. Blake
(2008) somehow combines both these notions by defining
it as “a form of inheritance to be kept is safekeeping and
handed down to future generations” (p.80). The definition that
will be referred to for the purposes of this paper will be the one
agreed on by the caucus of nations in the Article 1 of the 1972
UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage:
(…) deterioration or disappearance of any item of the cultural
or natural heritage constitutes a harmful impoverishment of
the heritage of all the nations of the world,
Considering that parts of the cultural or natural heritage are
of outstanding interest and therefore need to be preserved as
part of the world heritage of mankind as a whole (UNESCO,
1972)
The convention in question sought out to institutionalize a
permanent framework for active protection and preservation
of cultural and natural heritage including the establishment
of an overlooking committee and the funding of conservation
projects by ratifying states.3 The convention also attributed to
the committee the task of doing an inventory of World Heritage
sites and to publish when required the ‘List of World Heritage
in Danger’.4 As with most UN legislation, enforceability is
hard, especially since each State’s sovereignty ‘entitles’ it with
rights over its land and whatever is in it, including heritage;
yet simultaneously a sense on collective ownership coexists:
“Thus, cultural heritage remains under the legislation and
sovereignty of the territorial State while also representing
a universal value towards whose protection the whole
international community should co-operate”. (Blake, 2008:
p.71). The Convention came into force on December 17th,
1975; and as of 2014, it has been ratified by 191 states, which
includes 187 UN member states plus the Cook Islands, the
The following shall be considered as “cultural heritage”:
Monuments: architectural works, works of monumental
sculpture and painting, elements or structures of an
archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and
combinations of features, which are of outstanding universal
value from the point of view of history, art or science;
Groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings
which, because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their
place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal value
from the point of view of history, art or science;
Sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and
man, and areas including archaeological sites which are of
outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic,
ethnological or anthropological point of view. The first
indications of a joint global interest in cultural heritage under
a legal framework surfaced after WWII. During the aftermath,
the pillaging of museums, confiscation of collections and
desolation of spaces made evident the necessity of a
regulatory framework for the protection of cultural heritage
in times of war. In the 1954 UNESCO Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, the
parameters of action during wars in regards to the protection
of cultural heritage were set. For instance, the requirement to
indoctrinate soldiers in time of peace to “a spirit of respect
for the culture and cultural property of all peoples” (Article 7)
and to establish persecution and punishment mechanisms
to whoever party fails to do so. (Article 28). Nearly 20 years
3
According to Article 11 of the 1972 Convention: “Every State Party to this Convention shall, in so far as possible, submit to the World Heritage Committee an inventory of property forming part of the cultural and natural
heritage, situated in its territory and suitable for inclusion in the list”.
4
According to Article 11, fraction 4: “a list of the property appearing in the World Heritage List for the conservation of which major operations are necessary and for which assistance has been requested under this
Convention. This list shall contain an estimate of the cost of such operations. The list may include only such
property forming part of the cultural and natural heritage as is threatened by serious and specific dangers,
such as the threat of disappearance caused by accelerated deterioration, large- scale public or private projects or rapid urban or tourist development projects; destruction caused by changes in the use or ownership
of the land; major alterations due to unknown causes; abandonment for any reason whatsoever; the outbreak
or the threat of an armed conflict; calamities and cataclysms; serious fires, earthquakes, landslides; volcanic
eruptions; changes in water level, floods and tidal waves. The Committee may at any time, in case of urgent
need, make a new entry in the List of World Heritage in Danger and publicize such entry immediately”
Holy See, Niue, and the Palestinian territories.5 The evolution
of the concept and framework for cultural Heritage is of a
notable significance for the Middle East as it has as a region,
partly because of the significant number of Heritage sites it
possesses and partly because of the alarming number of
these sites listed as ‘in danger’ by the UNESCO.
The region of the Middle East, as shown by the map in Figure
1.1, currently has several sites in danger. Of the 46 sites included
in the list, 13 are located in the Middle East,7 representing the
28% of the list and the highest concentration of cultural World
Heritage Sites in danger in the world as reflected by Figure 1.2:
On Cultural Heritage and the Middle East
The Middle East, according to Abdullah Ocalan (2007),
is not only the birthplace of civilization, as the first urban
civilizations appearing nearly 5,000 years ago in the
valleys of the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates, but also
the birthplace of the three major monotheistic religions:
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. These conditions
are sufficient alone to deduce the vast presence of
ancestral sites, monuments, artefacts all across the
Middle East representing National Heritage but World
Heritage as well due to their civilization-founding nature.
It is, therefore, especially alarming the amount of sites
currently listed in the UNESCO List of World Heritage in
Danger.6
Figure 1.2 List of World Heritage in Danger by Region. UNESCO (November 2014)
Moreover, the latest (2013) cultural additions to the list are sites
in fact located in the Middle East, in the territories of Palestine
and Syria. Syria is in fact the country with the most Cultural
Heritage sites in danger on the whole list, with six. Iraq, Iran,
Afghanistan, and Palestine have each two sites listed and
Yemen, with one site, rounds up the list. Reports emitted by the
UNESCO World Heritage Committee in regards to the status
of sites on the list, reflect how almost in every case for the sites
located in the Middle East armed conflict and war is to blame
for the endangering of the site. In Afghanistan for example,
the report for the Cultural Landscape and Archaeological
Remains of the Bamiyan Valley cites military occupation and
the presence of antipersonnel mines as responsible for the
“risk of imminent collapse of the Buddha niches with the
remaining fragments of the statues”. (UNESCO WHC, 2013).
In Iraq, specifies the report, the Samarra Archaeological City,
a once very important capital for Islam, is subject to the state
of conflict in the country that “does not allow the responsible
authorities to assure the protection and management of the
Figure 1.1. UNESCO. Map of sites listed as World Heritage in Danger.
(October 2014.)
5
6
Ratifying states and treaty status is available from
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13055&language=E
Available (updated) from http://whc.unesco.org/en/danger.
7
Referred to by UNESCO as the ‘Arab States’ region. Statistics available from http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/
stat/#d1
Lebanese archaeologist, Joanne Farchakh, who assisted in
the investigation of the stolen historical wealth from Iraq after
the invasion, “Iraq may soon end up with no history.” (Baker,
Shereen & Tareq, 2009: p.25)
property” (UNESCO WHC, 2007) And still, rarely is it present in
the news the immediate need for action to protect these sites.
Looking deeper into the relation between war and the damaging
of cultural heritage it becomes evident that is not the same
everywhere or in every case. More often than not, heritage
sites are ‘collateral damage’ to military attacks, air strikes and
used as military bases; yet in the case of the Middle East, the
deterioration of cultural heritage serves as well an underlying
yet very specific purpose: attack specific identities. That is
why this continuous mutilation and looting of sites; in the case
of the Middle East the desecration of cultural heritage is not
only collateral damage of war, it has been “weaponized” and
deliberately used as explained by J. Blake (2008):
According to Baker, Shareen, and Tareq (2009) under US
factual ruling, Iraq suffered the theft of “no less than 15000
invaluable Mesopotamian artifacts from the National Museum
in Baghdad, and many others from the 12000 archeological
sites that the occupation forces, unlike even Saddam’s
despotic regime, left unguarded. While the Museum was
robbed of its historical collection, the National Library that
preserved the continuity and pride of Iraqi history was
destroyed by deliberate arson.” (p.26).The authors explain that
the allowing, better yet, the enabling, of these atrocities by the
US government because it was a tactic for what they call the
‘cleansing of Iraq’:
The role of cultural heritage as a vehicle for the expression and
even the construction of a nation group’s cultural identity (…)
can lead to an aggressive assertion of identity, whether national
or ethnic, which may cause and certainly foster armed conflict
in which the destruction of cultural monuments-the symbols of
the cultural identity of one of the parties to the conflict- often
becomes a weapon of war. (p.70)
Such cleansing began in the very early days of the invasion,
with the wide scale looting of all of the symbols of Iraqi
historical and cultural identity. Museums, archeological sites,
places, monuments, mosques, libraries and social centers all
suffered looting and devastation. They did so under the very
watchful eyes of the occupation troops. (p.26)
Looking through this prism, from this perspective, several
pieces start falling into place.
Terminating with the State, according to Baker, Shareen, and
Tareq, was the goal of the American occupation; troops were
to allow the looting and destruction to destroy the Iraqi nation
as it existed up to that point “because strong Iraq was an
impediment to American imperial designs and Israeli insistence
on un-impedimental regional hegemony.” (p.xii) The authors’
argument was that “in willful violation of international law against
preventive war and complete disregard for its responsibilities
as an occupying power, the Unites States and its allies have
failed to protect Iraq’s incomparable cultural treasures.” (p.xii).
When asked about the well-documented failure to protect Iraq’s
cultural heritage during US occupation, US Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld replied: “stuff happens”. Yet in many cases
the US made it happen: “Since the invasion in March 2003,
the US-led forces have transformed at least seven historical
sites into bases or camps for the military. The desecrated sites
include Ur, one of the most ancient cities in the world, which is
said to be the birthplace of Abraham.”8 (P.29). And yet, it is not
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria: War and Cultural
Heritage
The Iraqi case is an excellent example of how the destruction
of cultural heritage is utilized to attack a specific identity, in
this case, pre-invasion pro-Saddam Iraqi identity. Iraq has
always been appealing to power because of its geopolitical
and historical significance: “Mesopotamian antiquities
became a focus of international interest in the 19th century,
when British and French commercial representatives and
diplomats began to explore Iraq.”(Nafzinger & Nicgorski,
2009: p.185) The vast archaeological richness of the region
and the continuous unearthing of ancient artefacts made Iraq
a target for looting and trafficking. During Saddam Hussein’s
administration, the Iraqi government continuously funded
conservation and protection projects as a way of preserving
the physical representation of Iraqi nationalism embodied in
Cultural Heritage. However after the 2003 US invasion, the
systematic looting of museums and theft of antiques became
a problem in Iraq, a problem so serious that according to
8
See UNESCO.(1999).Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict, when an amendment was made to reserve the right to attack when site is occupied
and being used as military base.
very often that the impact, whether collateral or fully intentional
of conflict on the sites, is seldom part of most narratives. It
is absolutely imperative for it to be since, as Baker, Shareen,
and Tareq conclude, these “ancient sites are not Sunni, Shi’ite,
Yazidi, or Christian, nor are they Turkoman, Kurdish or Arab.
These historical sites are Mesopotamian historical patrimony
of all Iraqis. (p. 29) and one should argue for mankind as a
whole.
Another example of cultural heritage desecration as a result or
as a part of armed conflict in the Middle East is the destruction
of the Buddhas of Bamiyan in Afghanistan in 2001. According
to Comiteau for TIME magazine (2008), “The Taliban’s
dynamiting of the giant Buddhas of Bamiyan in March 2001
was only the most dramatic expression of their mission to
obliterate all “idolatrous” images from Afghanistan’s preIslamic past. They also destroyed 2,500 other cultural artifacts
from Kabul’s National Museum of Afghanistan, many of
them priceless.” Destruction of Cultural Heritage in this case
was openly deliberate as the Taliban army dynamited the
1400 year old Buddhas to destroy the non-Muslim identity
they embodied. According to Morgan (2012) “The men who
ordered the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in 2001
claimed it as an impeccably Islamic act. The statues were
idols; Islam repudiated idol-worship; their demolition was
thus the duty of any true Muslim. Many Muslims disagreed,
including that delegation of senior Islamic scholars, led by
Yusuf al-Qaradawi (not exactly a liberal himself), who travelled
to Qandahar to try to persuade Mullah Omar not to pursue
a course of action that (the scholars insisted) was contrary
to Islamic law. (p. 85) In the case of Afghanistan, however,
the outrage from the international community was evident
and widely expressed; it even prompted the World Heritage
Committee to issue a declaration (UNESCO WHC; 2003)
“Recalling the tragic destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan
that affected the international community as a whole”. In this
declaration, some sanctions were established:
States should take all appropriate measures, in accordance
with international law, to establish jurisdiction over, and provide
effective criminal sanctions against, those persons who commit,
or order to be committed, acts of intentional destruction of
cultural heritage of great importance for humanity, whether or
not it is inscribed on a list maintained by UNESCO or another
international organization. (Article 8)
Nonetheless, armed conflict in the Middle East is still
threatening and actively destroying cultural heritage.
Recent upheaval in Syria has caused the inclusion of
numerous sites located within its boundaries in the List
of World Heritage in Danger. According to Salam Al
Quntar (2013):
Damage to cultural heritage sites in Syria, including
World Heritage sites, museums, and cultural
landscapes, has been taking place for over two years.
Both the regime army and the armed rebels have
exchanged accusations of the destruction of Syria’s
heritage sites and used it for propaganda purposes.
The regime blames the “terrorists” of the Free Syria
Army (FSA) and jihadi groups for the looting, while the
opposition emphasizes the regime’s indiscriminate use
of heavy artillery against historic sites where rebels are
hiding. (P 349)
Now, Syria is fighting a two-front war: it is not anti-Assad
rebels anymore, but also ISIS militia engaging in armed
conflict with State military. Damage is not collateral
anymore, but intended, as the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria is systematically destroying any representation of
non-Muslim beliefs. In 2013, the shrine and burial site of
Yemeni Muslim Martyr Owais al- Qarani in al-Raqqah,
official capital of ISIS, was blown up because it belonged
to a different strand of Islam. Other sites destroyed by
ISIS include the reliefs carved at the Shash Hamdan, a
Roman cemetery in Aleppo province. Also in the Aleppo
countryside, statues carved out of the sides of a valley
at al-Qatora have been deliberately targeted by gunfire
and smashed into fragments. (Cockburn, 2014)
It may seem justifiable to some extent that the destruction
of cultural heritage due to armed conflict in the Middle
East is not considered ‘as important’ or is as present
in the mainstream narratives of the region. As Stone
(2011) explains “it is often judged ‘ridiculous’ to bring
up issues of heritage and archeology when the very
existence of the country itself is under threat. During the
long years of [war] it is forbidden to raise the question
of heritage, looting, or the use of archeological sites as
military bases.” (p.182) Yet, how will a country still exist
if all the traces and testimonies of its past are gone? The
impact of conflict on cultural heritage on the Middle East
needs to be prioritized and included in the big picture
because it is an expression of the nations that compose
the region. It needs to be known what was to figure out
what is going to be, and only by preserving the heritage
can these peoples know it. Furthermore, as Stone (2011)
later reflects: “Every region and every nation knows or
recognizes its heritage. Every community seeks to keep
its history alive, to maintain or rediscover their roots:
the guarantor of the community’s future. In this context,
no one nation’s heritage is more important or more
attractive than another’s. All aspects of heritage belong
to humanity as a whole, and all, therefore, should be
protected.” The caucus of nations should provide and
enforce a working mechanism for the active protection
of cultural heritage and really sanction the failure to
doing so. The impact of war on the cultural heritage of
the region needs to be brought out of the shadows and
inscribed in the dominant narratives because it matters,
not only to the Middle East or UNESCO, but to mankind
and its future generations.
REFERENCES
Al Quntar, S. (2013). Syrian Cultural Property in the Crossfire:
Reality and Effectiveness of Protection Efforts. Journal of Eastern
Mediterranean Archaeology & Heritage Studies, Vol. 1(4), 348-351
Baker, R; Shereen, T; Tareq, Y. (2009).Cultural cleansing in Iraq: Why
Museums Were Looted, Libraries Burned and Academics Murdered.
London: Pluto Press.
Blake, J. (2008). On defining the Cultural Heritage. International and
comparative Law Quarterly, 49(1), 61-85.
Boswell, R. (2008). Challenges to Identifying and Managing Intangible
Cultural Heritage in Mauritius, Zanzibar and Seychelles. Senegal:
CODESRIA.
Carr, E.H. (1987). What is History?. England: Penguin.
Cockburn, P. (2014). The destruction of the idols: Syria’s patrimony
at risk from extremists. The Independent Retrieved from http://www.
independent.co.uk/news/science/archaeology/news/the-destructionof-the-idols-syrias-patrimony-at-risk-from-extremists-9122275.html
Comiteau, L. (2008). Saving Afghanistan’s Art. TIME. Retrieved from
http://content.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1701306,00.html
Morgan, L. (2012).The Buddhas of Bamiyan. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Nafziger, J.A. Nicgorski, A.M.(2009).Cultural Heritage Issues : The
Legacy of Conquest, Colonization and Commerce. Leiden: Brill
Academic Publishers.
Sandis, C. (2014). Cultural Heritage Ethics: Between Theory and
Practice. United Kingdom & United States: OpenBook Publishers.
Silverman, H; Fairchild, D. (2007). Cultural Heritage and Human
Rights. New York City: Springer.
Smith, L. (2006). Uses of Heritage. Oxon: Routledge
Stone, P; Farchakh J. (2011). The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in
Iraq. UK: Boydell Press.
PRESENTE, PASADO Y FUTURO DEL
CONFLICTO PALESTINO ISRAELÍ:
UN DESAFÍO ANTE EL SISTEMA DE
SEGURIDAD COLECTIVA DE LA ONU
Stone, P. (2011). Heritage Matters. Volume 4: Cultural Heritage, Ethics,
and the Military. Suffolk: Boydell Press.
Ocalan, A. (2007). Prision Writings Vol. 1: The Roots of Civilisation.
London: Pluto Press.
UNESCO.(1954) Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the
Convention. The Hague, Neatherlands. Retrieved from http://portal.
unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13637&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_
SECTION=201.html
Por: Sergio García Magariño
Think Tank Globernance
Doctor en Sociología; Investigador Asociado del Instituto de Gobernanza
Democrática, coordinador de la oficina de asuntos públicos de la comunidad
bahá’í de España: área de investigación y discurso; miembro de distintos grupos
de investigación en la Universidad Pública de Navarra, Universidad Jaume I de
Castellón y la Universidad Camilo José Cela. Ha sido publicado en numerosas
ocasiones por la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Universidad de Oviedo,
entre otros.
UNESCO. (1972). Convention Concerning the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage. Retrieved from http://whc.unesco.org/
en/conventiontext/
UNESCO. (2014). List of World Heritage in Danger. Retrieved from
http://whc.unesco.org/en/danger
UNESCO. (1999). Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of
1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict. The Hague, Neatherlands. Retrieved from http://portal.
unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15207&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_
SECTION=201.html
RESUMEN
PALABRAS CLAVE Este artículo puede dividirse en tres partes. La
Israel, Palestina, conflicto,
religión, justicia internacional,
sistema de seguridad colectiva
UNESCO. (2003). Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction
of Cultural Heritage. Paris, France. Retrieved from http://portal.
unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=17718&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_
SECTION=201.html
UNESCO World Heritage Committee. (2007). Samarra Archaeological
City. Retrieved from http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/276/indicators/
UNESCO World Heritage Committee. (2013). Cultural Landscape and
Archaeological Remains of the Bamiyan Valley. Retrieved from http://
whc.unesco.org/en/list/208/indicators/
primera ofrece un análisis causal, holístico, del
conflicto palestino-israelí. La segunda utiliza este
conflicto como estudio de caso que, por un lado,
pueda dar luz sobre la necesidad de un sistema
de seguridad colectiva1 imparcial y efectivo para
estabilizar conflictos de esta índole, y por otro,
muestre la utilización arbitraria de diferentes
principios a la hora de implementar medidas –
sanciones en particular– dependiendo del Estado
y los intereses en cuestión, con los concomitantes
problemas que esto suscita en términos de
legitimidad del sistema y de eficacia. Por último, se
exploran algunas posibles vías de actuación para
su resolución. A pesar de no renunciar al recurso de
enfoques empíricos y críticos, el estudio, dado que
presta bastante atención al factor religioso, adopta
una perspectiva principalmente hermenéutica2.
1
En este artículo no definiremos el sistema de seguridad colectivo, dado que ya lo hicimos en uno previo: Sergio
Garcíá, “Evolución de la noción de seguridad colectiva a la luz de ciertas circunstancias históricas”, en Seguridad
y Defensa en el actual marco socio-económico, Instituto General Gutiérrez Mellado, 2011.
2
Las razones para adoptar esta perspectiva metodológica son similares a las esgrimidas por Séverine Deneulin
y Carole Radodi en “Revisiting religion: development studies thirty years on”, World Develpment, Vol. 39, 2011,
pp. 45-54.
Introducción
Para lograr los objetivos expuestos en el resumen, haremos una
exploración relativamente profunda del conflicto palestino-israelí y de
los factores en juego, por resaltar su complejidad y la imposibilidad de
ser resuelto a menos que haya una mediación internacional efectiva.
Además, haciéndonos eco de un estudio empírico acerca del uso del
derecho a veto por parte de EEUU en las propuestas de resolución
del Consejo de seguridad en las que ha estado involucrado Israel
desde 1973, elaborado por el profesor pakistaní Dr. Masoor Akbar
Kundidel, y de otras bases de datos similares, ejemplificaremos el
trato ambivalente que desde el Consejo de Seguridad –supuesto
garante imparcial de la paz y seguridad internacionales– se le
ha dado a este caso. Por último, tomando algunos datos de la
“Operación Plomo Fundido”, se ofrecerá un ejemplo concreto del
desvío de atención por parte del Consejo de Seguridad cuando
Israel efectúa comportamientos que violan el derecho internacional.
Estos dos últimos puntos servirán de simple indicador general de la
sistematicidad con la que el Consejo de Seguridad, dependiendo
los Estados en cuestión, sigue diferentes principios, produciéndose
regularmente una situación que no puede sino menoscabar la
legitimidad y efectividad del sistema de seguridad colectiva3.
Antes de comenzar con la primera parte anunciada, cabrían unas
palabras acerca de lo que supone el conflicto palestino-israelí para el
sistema de seguridad colectiva. Para poder objetivar las respuestas
de este sistema, valoraremos la atención y relevancia que se le
da a un caso en materia de seguridad colectiva con base en las
resoluciones que se emiten sobre él desde el Consejo de Seguridad.
En esta línea, el conflicto palestino-israelí ha supuesto desde 1948
el caso que más atención ha recibido por parte del Consejo de
Seguridad hasta 20114. Analizando los temas de resolución del
Consejo de Seguridad durante ese período, observamos que todos
los años, exceptuando 1952, 1954, 1957, 1959, 1960, 1963 y 1964,
este caso ha estado presente en las resoluciones del Consejo bajo
denominaciones diversas como “la cuestión palestina”, “la situación
en Oriente-Medio”, “Israel-Líbano”, “Israel-Egipto”, “Israel-Irak”, o
“Israel-Siria”5. Con muchísima diferencia, ha sido el más presente
3
Por sistema de seguridad colectiva se hace referencia a un acuerdo entre Estados por medio del cual se comprometen a no utilizar la guerra en sus relaciones internacionales. Los miembros de tal pacto, además, acuerdan
responder concertadamente ante un Estado que decide utilizar la guerra contra otro. Este sistema vendría a
reemplazar el anterior sistema de equilibrio de poderes, donde la guerra es un recurso más a utilizar en las relaciones internacionales. La Liga de Naciones fue el primer intento serio de crear un sistema tal. La Organización
de las Naciones Unidas, finalmente encarna ese ideal. Además de lo dicho, hoy día el sistema de seguridad colectiva no sólo pretende evitar la amenaza de la guerra entre Estados, sino que aspira a responder colectivamente
ante aquellas amenazas que trascienden los ámbitos nacionales, como el terrorismo internacional, la pobreza y
los problemas económicos, la proliferación de armas de destrucción masiva, el crimen organizado, el cambio
climático y las guerras civiles y otras atrocidades a gran escala.
4
5
http://www.un.org/es/documents/sc/
Para simplificar el análisis, so pena de ser poco preciso con la categoría palestino-israelí, he incluido dentro
de la misma las relaciones del Estado de Israel con otros países árabes aledaños, así como con los territorios
palestinos.
en las discusiones del Consejo de Seguridad desde la constitución
de las Naciones Unidas, así que como corolario se podría afirmar
que es visto como una amenaza persistente a la paz y seguridad
internacional. Es por ello que representa un caso idóneo para
analizar el sistema de seguridad colectiva. Además, a pesar de esta
atención desmesurada, la carencia de una solución definitiva –sin
menospreciar su extrema complejidad– es a su vez un indicador de
la poca efectividad con la que se ha dirimido este conflicto.
El problema del excesivo uso del veto
Además, este conflicto ha puesto de manifiesto ciertas
paradojas concernientes al derecho de veto. El derecho
a veto puede ser visto como un mecanismo de protección
para asegurar que los esfuerzos por establecer un sistema
de seguridad colectiva no menoscaben el interés nacional de
las cinco potencias que salieron victoriosas tras la Segunda
Guerra Mundial: EEUU, China, Inglaterra, Francia y Rusia.
Esta cuestión, como ya hemos analizado, que pudo ser
comprensible en un momento histórico, hoy puede suponer
un lastre e incluso reducir significativamente la capacidad del
sistema de seguridad colectiva para combatir las amenazas
comunes. De hecho, el ejercicio indiscriminado de este
derecho, puede ser uno de los factores que hagan que surjan
nuevas amenazas, por los resentimientos que hace despertar
en muchos actores internacionales.
Hasta el año 2009, en el Consejo de Seguridad se había
ejercido el derecho a veto en 261 ocasiones: Rusia 123, EEUU
82, Inglaterra 32, Francia 18 y China 6. Rusia lidera el uso del
veto, aunque muchos de ellos se dieron entre 1950 y 1960 en
relación a la admisión de otros países en la ONU. EEUU, a su
vez, de las 82 veces en que lo utilizó, 42 fueron en cuestiones
concernientes a Israel o Medio Oriente. El profesor pakistaní
Mansoor Akbar, intenta demostrar que el factor israelí en la
utilización del derecho a veto en la ONU por parte de EEUU
desde 1972, desafiando el derecho internacional, ha supuesto
un ataque a los principios de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas,
cuyo objetivo era mantener la paz y seguridad internacional,
salvaguardar los derechos humanos, proveer un mecanismo
de regulación internacional, promover el progreso social y
económico, mejorar los estándares de vida y luchar contra las
enfermedades. De hecho, asevera que esta utilización ha sido
la misma negación de los principios para los que la ONU fue
creada (Akbar Kundi, 2009).
Hemos tomado este estudio porque conecta cabalmente
con el hecho que queremos resaltar. El sistema de seguridad
colectiva intenta abordar aquellas cuestiones que afectan
a la seguridad y paz internacionales, pero el encargado de
ponerlo en acción es el Consejo de Seguridad, institución
donde algunos países, como EEUU, ejercen un dominio
sobresaliente gracias a su derecho al veto. Sin entrar en
las razones por las que EEUU apoya a Israel, utilizaremos
los datos del estudio del Dr. Akbar Kundi así como de otras
fuentes de las Naciones Unidas e incluso del Departamento
de Estado de EEUU, para constatar que ese comportamiento
imparcial, no de EEUU, sino del sistema en sí, es recurrente.
Tal como he señalado reiteradamente, esto puede hacer
que la misma forma en que está configurado el sistema de
seguridad colectiva genere otras amenazas mayores de las
que pretende combatir. Pero sigamos desglosando algo más
los vetos de EEUU en relación a Israel.
Hemos señalado que de las 82 ocasiones en que EEUU
ha utilizado el veto, 42 hacen referencia a Israel y al Medio
Oriente. Los temas específicos en torno a los que se ejerció
dicho veto son: la situación en los territorios ocupados tras
medidas israelíes, quejas del Líbano o de Siria contra Israel,
violaciones de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas y del derecho
internacional y la expansión de asentamientos judíos en Gaza
y Jerusalén Este. Muchas de estas resoluciones truncadas
iban encaminadas a llamar la atención de la opinión pública
y las organizaciones internacionales para presionar a Israel a
que flexibilizara sus medidas.
En una tabla extraída de la “American-Israeli cooperative
enterprise”6, aparecen detalladas de manera pormenorizada
las propuestas de resoluciones al Consejo de Seguridad
llamando la atención a Israel que fueron objeto de veto por
parte de EEUU.
Como se refleja en los datos recogidos en esa tabla, EEUU vetó
en 42 ocasiones las propuestas de resoluciones contra Israel.
Esto genera grandes resentimientos dentro del mundo islámico
y de otros sectores amplios de la comunidad internacional, ya
que demuestra la parcialidad del funcionamiento del sistema
de seguridad colectiva. Estos hechos nutren el odio y recelo
hacia las mismas Naciones Unidas, y sirven de justificación
6
www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/usvetoes.html
y de acicate para el surgimiento de grupos terroristas como
Al-Qaeda. El sistema pierde legitimidad con este tipo de
comportamientos.
Para finalizar cabe mencionar que el propósito de utilizar los
datos sobre EEUU e Israel referentes al veto dentro del Consejo
de Seguridad, no ha sido criticar a ninguno de esos Estados,
sino utilizarlos de indicador de un fenómeno más amplio que
empaña el sistema de seguridad colectiva; y es que, ante
casos de seguridad internacional o violaciones de derechos
humanos similares, no se siguen los mismos principios debido
al papel que siguen desempeñando los intereses nacionales
en un sistema que pretende trascenderlos en aras del bien
colectivo. Esta utilización arbitraria de diferentes principios
dependiendo del tipo de actores e intereses nacionales en
juego, como hemos aseverado repetidamente, menoscaba
la legitimidad del mismo sistema, dificulta su funcionamiento
e incluso puede generar amenazas casi igual de dramáticas
pero más difíciles de resolver que las que pretende abordar.
Naturaleza del conflicto
La literatura sobre el conflicto palestino-israelí abunda en las
bibliotecas. Sin embargo, ésta suele consistir en una serie
de hechos de naturaleza bélica, en su mayoría, ordenados
diacrónicamente. Pero, ¿es eso suficiente para comprender
este problema anquilosado? También existe mucha
bibliografía que aborda esta problemática desde enfoques
más comprensivos e interpretativos, pero suelen ser arbitrarios
–claramente pro-palestinos o pro-israelís–, reduccionistas
–esbozando un único factor omnicomprensivo– o ambas
cosas. En este trabajo, en aras de comprender con mayor
profundidad la naturaleza de este conflicto y de, por tanto,
observar su complejidad y difícil resolución a menos que el
sistema de seguridad colectiva funcione eficazmente, se ha
considerado preciso recurrir a otros factores que no aparecen
en el relato más aséptico de los hechos, prestándole especial
atención al factor religioso-simbólico, por considerarlo una de
las claves actuales para el entendimiento del caso –sin eludir el
reconocimiento de que en sus orígenes puede que hubiera una
cuestión más claramente territorial. No obstante, el enfoque
elegido para analizar esta problemática será holista, ya que
sólo a través de la revisión sistémica de una multiplicidad de
factores, que parecen reforzarse mutuamente para acrecentar
la complejidad del problema, puede que sea posible hacer
una exploración seria del conflicto en cuestión. Es cierto que
algunos autores pretenden que desde las ciencias sociales
sólo se hagan análisis explicativos, intentando buscar una
variable clara, pero la realidad social normalmente es siempre
demasiado compleja e impredecible como para retratarse
mediante métodos que en ocasiones se asemejan a los de
las ciencias naturales7.
Cosmovisiones religiosas
Si nos remontamos a las tradiciones de judíos y árabesmusulmanes, nos encontramos con un relato que los
entronca familiarmente. Tanto los árabes-musulmanes, como
los judíos religiosos –es importante hacer esta distinción
ya que el judaísmo ha sufrido una fuerte secularización–
se consideran hijos de Abraham, unos por parte de Isaac
(judíos), y otros por parte de Ismael (beduinos nómadas).
Ismael parece que fue el primer hijo de Abraham, fruto de la
unión de Abraham y una esclava egipcia llamada Agar. La
verdadera esposa de Abraham, Sara, ante su imposibilidad
de concebir, animó a éste para que mantuviera relaciones
con Agar. Posteriormente, Sara pudo quedar embarazada a
edad avanzada y dio a luz a Isaac. Entre estas dos mujeres
surgió una animadversión, viéndose así Abraham obligado a
expulsar a Agar y a su hijo Ismael. Éstos se establecieron en
Arabia e Ismael tuvo doce hijos de los que surgieron las tribus
árabes. De Isaac brotaron las tribus judías. Se dice que Isaac
e Ismael se veían regularmente, aun después de la muerte de
su padre. Sin embargo, el desarrollo cultural de ambos grupos,
especialmente a partir del año 622 d.C. con el surgimiento del
Islam, tomó caminos dispares. El conflicto palestino-israelí
puede tener sus raíces en la supuesta oposición virulenta que,
según los musulmanes, los judíos mostraron a Muhammad, el
profeta del Islam.
Sobrevolaremos brevemente la cosmovisión judía y la
islámica para comprender un poco el universo simbólico que
puede estar contribuyendo de manera relevante al conflicto
geopolítico y económico que enfrenta a palestinos e israelíes.
Según la tradición de la Torá que es aceptada por judíos y
musulmanes, a los hijos de Isaac se les prometió una tierra
7
No se pretende ahondar en este debate candente sobre la naturaleza de las ciencias sociales. Baste mencionar
que el autor tiene una concepción cercana a los planteamientos de Richard Bernstein. Para una exploración muy
interesante y asequible de este debate ver: Bent Flyvberg, Makind social science matter, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 2002.
fértil donde vivirían en paz y prosperidad. Tras la
dominación egipcia de los judíos, Moisés guiaría a
su pueblo a esa zona (Scheindlin, 1998). Los judíos
sostienen que el Israel de hoy es esa tierra. Después
de que los descendientes de Isaac se asentaran en
Israel, este pueblo tuvo momentos de gran prosperidad
y brillantez. Se sucedieron una serie de reyes-profetas
que permitieron hacer que su civilización floreciera. Sin
embargo, en el año 70 d.C., el emperador romano Tito
expulsó definitivamente a los judíos de Jerusalén. Desde
entonces, los judíos han estado dispersos por distintas
partes del mundo y han sido objeto de desprecio
y persecución reiterados, sin un Estado ni territorio
propios hasta 1948. Esta animosidad de otros pueblos
por diferentes motivos –envidias, desprecio…–, junto
con un sentido fuerte de comunidad y una autoimagen
de pueblo escogido, forzó a los judíos a replegarse
hacia dentro de su comunidad en una especie de
endogamia colectiva, permitiendo mantener parte de su
cultura a través de los siglos. Durante todo este tiempo,
los líderes religiosos judíos mantuvieron en la memoria
colectiva la idea encerrada en su libro sagrado de que al
final de los tiempos les sería devuelta su Tierra Sagrada.
Las facciones más ortodoxas del pueblo judío hoy día
ven en el asentamiento judío en Israel el cumplimiento
de sus promesas ancestrales. Esta convicción, junto
con una memoria histórica de naturaleza victimista,
sirve de legitimidad para mantener las posturas más
radicales frente a los palestinos musulmanes (Culla,
2005). Hace cuatro años y medio, cuando visité Israel
por primera vez, asombrado por la capacidad de ese
pueblo que consiguió mantener su cultura a pesar
de estar disperso por más de 1800 años, fascinado
por el desarrollo económico y tecnológico alcanzado
en sólo 60 años, y sorprendido por su poder militar,
pregunté a una judía bien educada nacida en Alemania
y ciudadana israelí qué mecanismos colectivos habían
utilizado durante esos siglos para alcanzar esos logros.
Su corta respuesta en inglés me descolocó: “You know.
We are the chosen people” (Ya sabes. Somos el pueblo
elegido).
La cosmovisión que anima a los palestinos musulmanes, si
bien tiene los mismos orígenes que la de los judíos, es de una
naturaleza distinta. Este universo simbólico tomó un curso
diferente al de los judíos, como se mencionó antes, a partir del
siglo VII después de Cristo con la aparición de Muhammad
y del Islam. Las enseñanzas de Muhammad llamaban a los
pueblos de Arabia a crear una nueva nación fiel al mismo Dios
hebreo que hizo un pacto o alianza con Abraham, renovado
por Moisés, posteriormente por Jesús, y ahora revitalizado
por el “sello de los Profetas”, Muhammad. Esta concepción
ha conducido a los musulmanes a creer también que son el
pueblo escogido, que son objeto de la gracia de Dios a través
de la más reciente revelación divina inscrita en el Corán y que
los judíos, al no reconocer al “Profeta”, siguen unas creencias
anacrónicas.
Lo mencionado anteriormente tiene que ver con las
cosmologías tradicionales de ambos pueblos. Esta
cosmovisión nutre el conflicto haciendo imposible
que, a no ser que ambas sociedades se secularicen
completamente8 (y ésta no parece ser la tendencia,
como se analizará más adelante) o se genere una
nueva cosmovisión compartida, la lucha simbólica se
resuelva, por mucho que traten de lograrse acuerdos
territoriales. Pero observemos cómo han evolucionado
las concepciones religiosas en tiempos más recientes.
Como vimos al principio, el sionismo nació como un
movimiento secular socialista. Intelectuales judíos
alemanes y norteamericanos bastante influenciados
por el espíritu ilustrado y, en algunos casos, por la
utopía comunista, diseñaron el proyecto. A principios
del siglo XX, la posición de la mayor parte de los
religiosos ortodoxos judíos con respecto el sionismo
era clara. Para ellos (representados por las primeras
agrupaciones de Polonia) el regreso de los judíos a la
tierra de Israel sería posible sólo como parte del proceso
de “redención”, por intervención divina. Por tanto,
estaban en contra del sionismo y del establecimiento
del Estado de Israel. De hecho, algunos asentamientos
judíos en la antigua Palestina, tras la constitución del
Estado de Israel, no quisieron siquiera tener ciudadanía.
No obstante, esta concepción fue reformulándose,
fruto de las reinterpretaciones del Rabino Kook. Rabí
Kook, símbolo del movimiento sionista religioso creado
por su padre, afirmaba que la conquista del ejército
israelí secular contribuía al propósito divino (Perlmutter,
1987), ya que después de la Guerra de los Seis días
el territorio del Estado de Israel coincidía casi con la
Tierra de Israel (Bíblica). Pocas semanas después se
conquistó Jerusalén occidental. Esta nueva visión
propiciaba una nueva interpretación sobre la actitud
apropiada del religioso judío hacia el Estado de Israel.
Antes se rechazaba este Estado por ir en contra del
judaísmo que debía esperar la llegada del Mesías para
Sin duda, el desenvolvimiento del Islam en Arabia y su
posterior extensión mediante un espíritu de conquista es en
sí un objeto de investigación muy complejo y profundo como
para abordarlo en este trabajo. Baste mencionar dos cosas
relativas a la relación de la nueva nación musulmana y el
pueblo judío, basadas en interpretaciones hechas del Corán:
1. Hubo serios conflictos debido a la asociación de los judíos
con algunas tribus beligerantes árabes hostiles a Muhammad
y al Islam. La memoria de esta “traición” de los judíos se ha
ido transmitiendo generación tras generación. 2. La tradición
musulmana comenzó a considerar a Jerusalén como ciudad
sagrada íntimamente ligada al “Profeta” ya que, según las
tradiciones islámicas, en su famoso sueño nocturno –que
algunas facciones musulmanas consideran un viaje real–,
Muhammad voló desde la Meca hasta el Templo de Salomón
en Jerusalén, lugar hacia donde primeramente se volvían en
oración los árabes-musulmanes, siguiendo claramente la
tradición judía.
Si hemos hecho este repaso por el universo simbólico
judío y musulmán, es porque lo consideramos un elemento
imprescindible para comprender la naturaleza del conflicto
palestino-israelí. En ocasiones se pasa por alto este factor
por centrarse exclusivamente en otras causas –también
fundamentales– de índole política, económica, y de
reconocimiento.
8
El tema del retorno de la religión es un debate abierto. Algunos autores proclamaban al principio del siglo XX
la pronta desaparición de la religión, a medida que las sociedades se modernizaran. Los hechos parecen
descartar esta hipótesis, mostrando que la religión y la sociedad siempre están unidas. La religión puede
que adopte naturalezas distintas, pero es un elemento de la vida social, sin el cual, como dice Durkheim,
sería imposible comprender la sociedad misma. Para más información sobre este tema véase: Daniel Bell,
“The return of the Sacred”, British Journal of Sociology, 27 (4):419-449, 1977. O también el libro que ya
hemos referido anteriormente de Ignacio Sánchez de la Yncera y Marta Rodríguez Fouz (edits.), Dialécticas
de la postsecularidad.
establecer el Estado judío. Ahora, la creación del Estado de
Israel y la ocupación de la totalidad de Palestina acelerarían la
venida del Mesías.
Esta nueva visión fue enardecida por las victorias sorpresivas
del 67 y del 73. Un movimiento juvenil fuerte fue aún más
allá, anunciando que la venida del Mesías era inminente
y que esos últimos acontecimientos habrían sido claves a
la hora de apresurar la Redención de Israel. Estos hechos
tienen gran calado en la resolución del conflicto, ya que estas
facciones se niegan a la cesión de Cisjordania, la franja de
Gaza y Jerusalén Este. Es más, iniciaron un fuerte movimiento
de colonización de esos territorios, impulsados por esa
reinterpretación legitimadora.
Las ideas de Kook cristalizaban en el ámbito político en el
grupo Gush Emunim (Bloque de fieles). Formado en 1974
con el propósito de influenciar en la política, cuestionaba
tenazmente el modelo de sociedad laica y socialista y
abogaba por la rejudaización de Israel. En 1984 se detuvo
a varios terroristas judíos que habían asesinado a jóvenes
de la universidad islámica de Hebrón. Sorprendentemente,
pertenecían al núcleo dirigente del Gush Emunim. Este grupo
extremista, reconocido legalmente, se mantiene hasta hoy día
y parece tener bastante influencia en la política israelí (Fraser,
2004).
Gush Emunim inició en 1977 la ocupación de Gaza y
Cisjordania, apoyado por el partido del gobierno elegido ese
mismo año, empresa en la que no ha cejado hasta ahora.
Esta situación es muy preocupante de cara a la resolución
del conflicto ya que la influencia en el gobierno de este grupo,
que no descarta acciones terroristas, como hemos señalado,
es considerable. Han unido nacionalismo y judaísmo, y
sustituyeron la idea de que el Estado de Israel está en
contra del pueblo judío por otra que dice que los sionistas,
inconscientemente, están contribuyendo al plan mesiánico
de Dios para el pueblo judío. Además, su lema es afianzar
la soberanía israelí sobre toda la Tierra de Israel, rechazando
el desalojo de los territorios ocupados. Curiosamente, no se
organizan en un partido político sino que tratan de influenciar
a distintos partidos afines a sus ideas, sin sacrificar su pureza
ideológica.
Ésta era la rama política –y terrorista– pero también se había
iniciado en Israel y en EEUU un movimiento de rejudaización
más amplio. Crecían notablemente los grupos ultraortodoxos
entre jóvenes universitarios, el mundo sefardí y entre los
inmigrantes de países árabes. En el parlamento israelí los
partidos políticos que representaban los jaredim (temerosos
de Dios) crecieron hasta convertirse en componente
necesario de cualquier coalición electoral. En los 70 surge
también, dentro del mundo judío, el movimiento teshuvá,
que designa “el retorno al judaísmo” y el “arrepentimiento”.
Este movimiento exige la práctica de las leyes de la Torá
exclusivamente y la separación de judíos y gentiles para evitar
la asimilación. Por esas fechas comienzan a abrirse institutos
talmúdicos para arrepentidos; asciende al poder en 1977
la coalición conservadora religiosa liderada por Menahem
Begin (quien apoyó considerablemente al Gush Emunim);
viejos militantes que se habían formado en la contracultura
o el izquierdismo del 68 se pasaron a la ortodoxia. En el
mundo intelectual, brotan textos de académicos ateos que
redescubren el judaísmo y cuestionan la modernidad y su
secularización. Éstos afirman que la fe y la rigurosidad de la
práctica religiosa son compatibles con la técnica y el saber
científico. En América, judíos americanos escriben sobre la
diferencia abismal entre la auténtica cultura judía (religiosa)
y la cultura occidental. Científicos, profesores universitarios
e intelectuales judíos reconocidos internacionalmente, como
Herman Branover (autoridad mundial en el complejo campo
de la magnetohidrodinámica) se convierten en exponentes del
movimiento y apoyan la creación de comunidades cerradas
que ponen en práctica al pie de la letra los preceptos de la
Torá. Esto es la rejudaización desde abajo que Gush Emunim
pretende desde arriba (Patiño, 2006).
En el flanco palestino también han ocurrido transformaciones
significativas relacionadas con el posicionamiento religioso
y con la modificación de la cosmovisión islámica; siendo
esta última línea producto de un fenómeno global más que
particular. La Organización para la Liberación de Palestina,
simbolizada por Yasser Arafat, fue un movimiento de corte
nacionalista, sin mucho peso religioso. Sin embargo, en
1983, cuatro años después de la revolución islámica en Irán,
fue fundado Hamas. A partir de entonces Hamas ha venido
desarrollándose hasta llegar a su clímax con la victoria en
las elecciones del 2006. Hamas, organización considerada
terrorista por las Naciones Unidas y la Unión Europea, niega
el Estado de Israel. Sin duda9, en la “Operación Plomo
Fundido”, la intransigencia de Hamas ha tenido gran parte
de responsabilidad. Podríamos decir que la toma de la Franja
de Gaza por parte de Hamas en junio del 2007 simboliza la
islamización del conflicto10.
El fortalecimiento de la posición religiosa en Palestina está
relacionado, además de con una decepción respecto de AlFatah y la Autoridad Nacional Palestina, incapaces de una
negociación eficaz y objeto de ciertos escándalos, con una
transformación más amplia que se ha ido produciendo dentro
del mundo islámico. Quizá la primera gran transformación,
como pondré de relieve en el capítulo sobre el terrorismo de
Al-Qaeda al analizar el surgimiento del islamismo político, se
remonte a Arabia Saudí en el siglo XVIII con el wahabismo,
movimiento que pretendía limpiar al Islam del sufismo y
aplicar estrictamente la ley islámica en las leyes del gobierno.
Posteriormente, en Egipto, con la sociedad de Hermanos
Musulmanes, esta línea se desarrolló aún más, ya que se
planteaba la necesidad de tomar el poder en los países
islámicos, contaminados, por culpa de sus políticos, del
individualismo y materialismo occidental. La figura de Sayyid
Qutb, condenado y ejecutado en su país, Egipto, despunta
como la del gran ideólogo de este nuevo islamismo. De
este movimiento surge el que podría ser considerado primer
movimiento terrorista islámico, la Yihad Islámica, actuando en
Egipto (Kepel, 2003).
Inspirados en esta nueva concepción que pretendía restaurar
el brillo islámico aplicando las leyes del Corán a la política
y la ciencia y tecnología a los procesos sociales, los
voluntarios musulmanes que auspiciados por EEUU lucharon
en Afganistán contra los comunistas rusos, se organizaron
y declararon la guerra a Occidente configurando la Yihad
Islámica Internacional. Su nuevo análisis, que abordamos
posteriormente en profundidad, era que el verdadero problema
de los países islámicos radicaba en Occidente (Kepel, 2003).
Consideraban que sus políticos –los de Occidente– estaban
9
10
Diciembre 2008-enero 2009.
Otros autores ya habían hecho referencia a este proceso de islamización del conflicto años antes. Ver: Meir
Litvak, “The Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: the case of Hamas”, en Middle Eastern Studies, Volume
34, Issue 1, 1998, pp. 148-163.
destruyendo los pueblos musulmanes. Por tanto, la idea de
atacarlos comenzó a tomar cuerpo. Además, sus ciudadanos
también se convertían en blanco, ya que eran corresponsables
por el hecho de elegir a esos líderes incompetentes.
El último impulso transformador puede tener que ver con la
Revolución Islámica iraní. Al igual que el triunfo comunista
en Rusia se vio como el cumplimiento de las profecías
marxistas, y se convirtió en el ideal a seguir por todos aquéllos
que veían en esta ideología una salvación secularizada
inspirando movimientos revolucionarios en casi todo el
mundo, la revolución iraní, criticada actualmente, supuso
un nuevo horizonte a emular por los grupos islámicos más
tradicionalistas.
Estos cuatro acontecimientos están muy ligados a lo ocurrido
en Palestina, especialmente en relación a dos organizaciones
consideradas terroristas. Por un lado, Hamas está vinculada,
y parece que financiada, por los Hermanos Musulmanes de
Egipto. Y por otro, hay serios indicios de que Hezbollah –
organización libanesa involucrada en el conflicto y que apoya
a grupos radicales palestinos– tiene fuertes vínculos con Irán
(Gleis, 2012). Estos dos grupos que legitiman el uso de la
violencia en la persecución de sus intereses, y que rechazan
cualquier forma de Estado judío, nutren, como dijimos al
principio, una cosmovisión evolutiva que ve a los judíos como
un problema.
La pugna por un territorio
En el plano más obvio, el conflicto es de naturaleza territorial.
Se inicia con la entrada progresiva de judíos en la llamada
Palestina a partir de 1844, cuando el imperio otomano emite
un edicto de tolerancia que permite a éstos entrar en la zona.
A partir de entonces comienza a aumentar la comunidad judía
en ese territorio, llegando el proceso a su punto álgido tras
la conquista de esta parte del imperio otomano por parte de
Inglaterra.
Durante el mandato inglés, y debido a la parcialidad de
algunos agentes internacionales –y de la misma Inglaterra–
en pro de judíos o palestinos dependiendo de intereses
cambiantes, la situación se tornó insostenible. Tras la Segunda
Guerra Mundial sucedió lo previsible: Inglaterra tuvo que salir
de escena. Este país miró más por sus propios intereses que
por la estabilidad y paz de la región, abandonando el territorio
y liberándose de lo que se había convertido en una carga.
Agentes internacionales occidentales, movidos por cierta
compasión hacia los judíos –no fue el caso de Inglaterra–,
mediaron para la creación de dos Estados diferentes (BenAmi, 1991). Los judíos aceptaron. Sin embargo, los países
árabes musulmanes, al menos en primera instancia, no. Este
hecho es de gran relevancia, ya que el primer pueblo decidió
por sí mismo qué quería hacer, pero los palestinos –concepto
que analizaremos después– no quisieron seguir el mismo
camino, ya que rechazaban toda posibilidad de compartir
el territorio con un Estado judío adyacente. Por ello, tras la
proclamación del Estado de Israel en parte del territorio, los
palestinos apoyados por los países árabes circundantes se
levantaron en armas con la esperanza equivocada de poder
derrotar a Israel.
Luego de conflictos recurrentes con Jordania, Egipto, Siria
y Líbano principalmente, y de la recuperación de varios
territorios por otros países, Gaza, Cisjordania y Jerusalén
Este se convierten en los “territorios ocupados”. En 1993,
mediante el tratado de Oslo, se pretendía que Israel se retirara
de ellos, pero esta retirada nunca se ha podido consumar.
A pesar de que el ejército de Israel haya salido de algunos
de estos territorios, los controles militares son tan férreos que
la comunicación entre estas ciudades es casi imposible, y la
creación de instituciones palestinas operativas, por tanto, casi
un sueño.
La llamada “Hoja de Ruta” del 2003 para la pacificación de
la zona en el 2005 incluía tres fases que no han llegado a
culminar (Fraser, 2004). Lo ocurrido entre diciembre de
2008 y enero 2009 habla por sí solo. Israel, en una acción
militar desproporcionada, haciendo oídos sordos a la
presión internacional y a las resoluciones de la ONU, dejó,
en sólo 23 días, según estimaciones de varios observatorios
internacionales, más de 1300 muertos (al menos 300 niños) y
alrededor de 5500 heridos.
Las guerras y conflictos posteriores han contribuido a agravar
más el problema, pero la raíz geopolítica puede estar en lo
mencionado en el párrafo anterior. Debido a la negativa de los
países árabes musulmanes a aceptar la repartición territorial
en dos Estados, y a la hoy constante negación a reconocer el
Estado judío por parte de algunos actores musulmanes, se
hace muy difícil que haya un acuerdo sólido. No obstante, lo
ocurrido tras 1948 con la autoproclamación de Israel como
Estado, es importante a la hora de comprender el presente. En
las guerras posteriores que se desataron en la región, Israel
se apropió de más territorios de los que le asignaba la hoja de
ruta de las Naciones Unidas en 1947. Especialmente notorios
son los casos de Gaza y Cisjordania, desencadenantes
recurrentes de luchas armadas, y la ciudad “doblemente
sagrada” de Jerusalén (Lorck, 1986).
El territorio que la carta de partición de las Naciones Unidas
otorgaba a Israel en 1947, como hemos dicho, es bastante
menor al que actualmente ocupa. Tras la primera guerra
árabe-israelí, Israel tomó un 26% más de territorio del que le
correspondía. Posteriormente, tras la guerra de los seis días
llevada a cabo en 1967 entre Israel por un lado y Egipto, Siria
e Irak por otro, el primero se apropió de la Franja de Gaza,
de Cisjordania, de Jerusalén Este (recordemos que Jerusalén
y Belén, según la carta de partición, debían ser ciudades
internacionales administradas por la ONU), de la Península
del Sinaí y de los Altos del Golán.
Es sabido además, que las facciones más ortodoxas dentro de
Israel, no sólo no abogan por la salida de esos territorios, sino
que promueven planes de colonización para incrementar la
población judía en dichos territorios ocupados, y así, en virtud
del elevado índice de reproducción de los judíos ortodoxos,
superar en proporción a la población palestina en la zona.
Estas facciones tampoco aceptan la posibilidad de tener un
Estado palestino, complicando también las posibilidades de
negociación.
El recurso de la violencia de dos pueblos
Un factor añadido del conflicto es la desproporción con la que
uno y otro bando se atacan mutuamente11. A medida que Israel
ha ido desarrollando una capacidad militar más amplia y los
países musulmanes han reconocido su imposibilidad de llegar
a buen puerto por medio de la lucha armada, las acciones
de Israel, llamadas “represalias”, contra los palestinos
han ido tomando una envergadura desmesurada. Esto ha
conducido a la opinión pública internacional a solidarizarse
11
Para un análisis detallado de la desproporcionalidad del uso de la violencia entre estos dos colectivos ver: Stephen Graham, “Bulldozers and bombs: the latest Palestinian-Israeli conflict as asymmetric urbizide”, en Antipode,
Volume 34, Issue 4, septiembre 2002, pp. 642-649.
con el pueblo palestino, poniéndose así del lado del más
débil. Estas sobreactuaciones de Israel han servido para
enconar aún más el resentimiento de grupos pro-palestinos,
que cada vez asocian más el poder de Israel con el apoyo
occidental (aunque no consideramos que esto sea totalmente
cierto como veremos en un punto posterior). Durante las
dos Intifadas, por ejemplo, mientras que el ejército israelí
atacaba al pueblo palestino con su armamento moderno,
los palestinos, muchos de los cuales eran adolescentes, se
armaron con piedras, palos, cócteles Molotov y neumáticos
quemados. La acción militar israelí mencionada anteriormente,
la “Operación Plomo Fundido”, también constituye un ejemplo
paradigmático. Mientras que los palestinos lanzaban cohetes
Qazzam con muy poca capacidad destructiva y precisión12,
el ejército israelí hizo un despliegue de medios sobrecogedor,
utilizando tecnología militar punta. Durante la operación, el
número de bajas israelíes fue 13 y el de palestinas, como ya
hemos dicho, más de 1300.
un clima de tensión permanente dentro de Israel que
favorece la utilización de la violencia por parte del
gobierno14.
El miedo, sin duda, es un elemento con gran influencia
movilizadora dentro de Israel. Este pueblo ha sido
sometido durante cientos de años a persecuciones,
desprecios, intentos de genocidio, etc. Estas
condiciones han desarrollado en la cultura judía una
actitud a la defensiva, un ostracismo que quizá no haya
sido más que un mecanismo de defensa para poder
sobrevivir. De otro modo, tras más de 1800 años en el
exilio, probablemente no habría sido posible mantener
la cultura. Esta actitud se ha enardecido últimamente
por la llamada amenaza iraní, por Hezbollah, Hamas
y Al Qaeda. Estas organizaciones suscitan miedo,
pero este miedo, en mi opinión, perjudica al pueblo
palestino. Si el pueblo judío tiene miedo y se siente
amenazado, siempre va a ser más proclive a apoyar la
violencia de su gobierno. Pero a pesar de que dentro
del mundo judío a nivel internacional parece haber
cierto rechazo a las políticas de Israel, cuando se vive
dentro de un Estado donde el miedo y la amenaza son
una constante, la situación varía.
Por otro lado, a pesar de las desmedidas respuestas israelíes,
hay que observar el potencial desestabilizador de los ataques
terroristas. Éstos se han sucedido desde los tiempos del
mandato británico y, de hecho, fueron uno de los motivos
que condujeron a Inglaterra a salir del llamado entonces
territorio palestino. Los judíos estaban muy bien organizados,
y existían varios grupos terroristas que atacaban con fuerza.
Los musulmanes árabes situados en aquel territorio también
se valían del terrorismo en aquel entonces. Esto muestra que
el terrorismo ha sido un elemento presente desde el inicio del
conflicto. Aunque por parte del pueblo judío hoy día parece
no haber terrorismo organizado13, el Gush Emunim, al que
ya prestamos atención anteriormente, ejerce una presión
muy amplia en el gobierno, influyendo en la instrumentación
de la violencia por parte de éste. En cambio, los palestinos,
en parte alentados por la frustración y desesperación, en los
últimos años han recurrido al terrorismo en mayor medida
como elemento de presión. Ataques suicidas y lanzamiento
permanente de cohetes se suceden de forma continuada,
sin causar normalmente muchas víctimas, pero generando
12
Un dato que se suele obviar es que entre 2008 y 2009 se lanzaron más de 3000 cohetes Qassam al territorio
israelí.
13
Algunos autores como Noam Chomsky se atreven a denominar “terrorismo de Estado” a las acciones desproporcionadas utilizadas por un gobierno que, aunque se reserva el derecho legítimo de utilizar la violencia, ha de
ejercerla responsablemente. Sin embargo, nos hemos abstenido de referirnos así a la violencia desproporcionada por parte del Estado judío, ya que podría provocar confusión innecesaria.
El deseo de reconocimiento y la división palestina
pueden ser otro elemento que enquista el problema.
En este conflicto se dice que los actores directos
son los judíos y los palestinos. Pero, ¿qué significan
esos dos términos? Cuando exploramos el universo
simbólico de los judíos, se observaba con claridad que
su proceso de construcción nacional ha sido largo y
tiene fuertes raíces. Tras la expulsión de los judíos de
Israel, en el año 70 d. de C., el futuro de este pueblo era
incierto, siendo imposible la formación de un Estado
judío que sirviera para reconocer a esta nación hasta el
año 1948. Podría decirse que este acto de constitución
representa simbólicamente el reconocimiento universal
de la nación judía, a pesar de la negación de algunos
musulmanes.
14
Para comprender mejor la relación entre el uso del terrorismo –especialmente el de los terroristas suicidas– y
la violencia de Estado ver: Barder Araj, “Harsh Sate repression as a cause of suicide bombing: the case of
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict”, en Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 31, Issue 4, 2008, pp. 284-303.
¿Pero qué ocurre con los palestinos? ¿Son un pueblo? ¿Qué
significado tiene ese nombre?
Palestina es el nombre con el que los romanos designaron
a la antigua tierra de Canaán o del antiguo Reino de Israel a
partir de la revuelta judía (132-135) en que la antigua Judea,
que formaba parte de la provincia romana de Siria, pasó a
denominarse Siria-Palestina o simplemente Palestina, en
honor a los filisteos, antigua civilización enemiga de Israel.
Los romanos esperaban que con esta nueva denominación
territorial se desvinculara toda relación histórica del pueblo
judío con esta tierra (Culla, 2005).
Volviendo a tiempos presentes, durante el mandato británico,
en esa región confluyeron judíos y árabes musulmanes.
Los árabes musulmanes no ciudadanos de Egipto, Siria,
Arabia Saudí, Irak ni Líbano, y asentados en su mayor parte
en lo que se conocía por territorios palestinos, comenzaron
a llamarse palestinos. Algunas interrogantes que brotan de
esta afirmación son: ¿cuándo y cómo surge el sentimiento
nacional palestino?, ¿desde 1948 hasta 1967, cuando los
territorios palestinos fueron anexionados a Egipto y Jordania,
el sentimiento nacional palestino seguía existiendo o se ha
desarrollado con la ocupación israelí? ¿Qué habría ocurrido si
estos países árabes hubieran nacionalizado a los palestinos,
en vez de considerarlos refugiados? Estas preguntas no son
centrales para nuestra investigación, pero sí necesarias a la
hora de conocer mejor a uno de los actores del conflicto.
Para poder avanzar consideraré a Palestina como una unidad
nacional, a pesar de que esa categoría puede ser algo
problemática.
El que Palestina no tenga una voz unánime acrecienta la
complejidad de las relaciones entre ambos colectivos. La
identidad nacional judía, salvaguardada por un Estado fuerte
es reconocible. Los procesos políticos democráticos del
gobierno de Israel hacia sí misma permiten que haya una voz
que represente sus intereses. En los diálogos y procesos de
paz, Israel, a pesar de las diferencias políticas que conviven
en su interior, habla con una sola voz. El pueblo palestino,
en cambio, tiene problemas para poder articular una voz
unánime, por varios motivos. Por un lado, el pueblo palestino,
debido a su fragmentación territorial y a sus limitaciones en
términos de comunicación, tiene muy difícil verse como uno.
Por otro, dentro del pueblo palestino existen sectores casi
autónomos que se arrogan el derecho de representar a su
pueblo. Es significativa la división entre Hamas y al Fatah.
Esta división cristalizó en la toma del poder en Gaza por
Hamas. El pueblo palestino, supuestamente representado por
la Autoridad Nacional Palestina, pero gobernado también en
Gaza por Hamas, no tiene una clara representación.
La situación presentada se agrava aún más por dos factores.
Hamas es una facción extremista que no reconoce al Estado
de Israel; e Israel, la ONU y ciertos Estados occidentales
mediadores, consideran a Hamas una organización terrorista
y, por lo tanto, en muchas ocasiones, no se plantea siquiera la
posibilidad de dialogar con dicha organización.
Otro ingrediente que dificulta la representación de Palestina
–y el proceso de resolución del conflicto– es que algunos
países musulmanes como Irán y Siria, apoyan más o
menos explícitamente a las facciones más extremistas que
no reconocen la existencia de un estado judío, financiando
incluso a grupos terroristas como Hezbollah (Gleis, 2012).
Mediación internacional
El aval de Estados Unidos y de otros países occidentales, por
un lado, y el apoyo de la antigua Unión Soviética durante la
guerra fría a los países árabes, por el otro, no pueden ser
considerados la causa del conflicto palestino-israelí, pero sí
una condición que ha contribuido en parte al enconamiento
de la relación. La política exterior de EEUU, además, ha
sido siempre favorable a Israel por diversos motivos. En
una encuesta del 2006 del Anuario Judío Norteamericano,
publicada por el American Jewish Committee y realizada
por el Profesor Ira Sheskin de la Universidad de Miami y el
Profesor Arnold Dashefsky de la Universidad de Connecticut,
calculaba que había 6,4 millones de judíos en Estados
Unidos, estando especialmente concentrados en Nueva
York (1.618.000), California (1.194.000), Florida (653.000),
y New Jersey (480.000). Además, las posiciones de poder
económico, político e intelectual que ostentan los judíos
en el país norteamericano son tan considerables que no
pueden dejar a ningún gobierno de la Casa Blanca imparcial
frente a este tema. De hecho, algunos autores, como John
Mearsheimer y Stephen Walt en El lobby de Israel y la política
exterior de Estados Unidos, consideran que el respaldo
de Estados Unidos a Israel no está basado en cuestiones
estratégicas, sino que se explica por la presión de los ‘lobbies’
judíos de derecha y los grupos de cristianos fundamentalistas
o conservadores favorables al sionismo (Mearsheimer, 2006).
Este argumento, aunque fuertemente criticado15, muestra el
grado de influencia que estos grupos sionistas pueden llegar
a tener en la política exterior de EEUU y, específicamente, en
lo relativo a Oriente Medio.
geopolítica de Israel para EEUU y Occidente en general,
y el peso judío en la política exterior de EEUU en relación a
Oriente Medio, son dos elementos más, pero no los únicos,
que arrojan luz sobre esta compleja problemática.
Lo mencionado anteriormente no debería llevarnos a la
conclusión de que todos los judíos, especialmente aquellos
que no viven en Israel, están a favor de las medidas militares
que el país está tomando. Intelectuales, historiadores e
individuos judíos residentes fuera de Israel se han manifestado
mostrando el rechazo a las políticas de dicho país hacia
Palestina. En EEUU, mientras que las organizaciones judías
pro sionistas apoyaban al candidato McCain, un 77% de los
votantes judíos apoyaron a Obama, quien abogaba por una
relación con Israel más basada en el derecho internacional
que en la hermandad. Parece existir una apatía generalizada
dentro de esta comunidad fuera de Israel hacia las políticas
de ese gobierno. El problema reside en que los moderados,
a pesar de ser mayoría, no se movilizan tanto como los
extremistas, quienes sí están muy bien organizados y están
teniendo más peso en la política de Israel16.
Aparte de lo mencionado anteriormente, para Occidente,
Israel, a pesar de estar situado en Oriente Medio, es un país
cercano, un país considerado casi occidental. Esta condición,
junto con la localización geográfica de Israel, convierte a este
país en un lugar estratégico desde el cual poder defender
los intereses norteamericanos –pero también europeos–
en Oriente medio. Desde ahí se puede contener mejor el
terrorismo islámico, se puede tener mayor acceso a las ricas
fuentes petrolíferas de la zona, se puede controlar –o al menos
vigilar– el eje energético Rusia-Irán y se puede supervisar la
situación de Irak, por mencionar algunas razones. Lo ocurrido
en octubre de 2011 entre EEUU, la UNESCO y Palestina
es representativo. La UNESCO reconoció a Palestina
como miembro de la organización, haciendo un guiño al
reconocimiento de éste como Estado, e inmediatamente
EEUU, como medida de presión, suspendió su financiación
a esta entidad, que suponía el 22% de sus ingresos totales.
El analista social Noam Chomsky –aunque lingüista de
formación– recurre constantemente a explicaciones del
conflicto centradas en la consideración de Israel como
lugar estratégico para los intereses nacionales de EEUU
(Chomsky, 2004). Las críticas a esta argumentación sostienen
que el sector industrial-militar, y las grandes compañías
petrolíferas norteamericanos no se benefician en absoluto de
las incursiones militares norteamericanas en la zona, ni de
la tensión generada en la misma, quejándose incluso de la
política exterior estadounidense.
Sin este peso relevante de la comunidad judía en EEUU (donde,
como hemos dicho, existe un fuerte movimiento sionista) las
sobreactuaciones de Israel no se habrían producido con tanta
frecuencia. Sin embargo, la argumentación simplista que trata
de explicar a Israel sólo desde la perspectiva de dependencia
de EEUU, parece ser poco seria. La estratégica situación
15
Véase: Abraham H. Foxman, The Deadliest Lies: The Israel lobby and the myth of Jewish control, Palgrave,
Macmillan, January 2009.
El antisemitismo sigue siendo un problema añadido17.
Un sector fundamentalista del mundo islámico se niega
a reconocer la existencia de un Estado judío. Como se
apuntó, alrededor de 1947, las Naciones Unidas y otros
agentes internacionales estaban mediando para que, tras el
fin del mandato británico en Palestina, hubiese una división
del territorio en dos Estados. Una vez llegado el momento
y definidos los términos, en 1948 los representantes judíos
proclamaron la creación del Estado de Israel aceptando las
disposiciones del documento de repartición. En ese momento,
los países árabes circundantes, como muestra máxima de
rechazo frente a tal proclamación, declararon la guerra a
Israel, con nefastas consecuencias para los intereses árabes
(Morris, 1989). Desde entonces, la actitud de algunos de esos
Estados frente a Israel ha cambiado, pero siguen existiendo
poderosas fuerzas que se resisten a aceptarlo y que dificultan
las negociaciones.
16
Reportaje de Público.es, publicado el 12 de enero de 2009.
17
Para una mayor exploración de las barreras que suponen entre estos dos colectivos las representaciones estereotipadas a veces presentes en la literatura, estereotipos que nutren posturas racistas, leer: Toine Van Teeffelen,
“Racism and Metaphor: the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in popular literature”, en Discourse and Society, Volume 5,
nº 3, julio 1994, pp. 381-405.
Dentro del pueblo palestino tenemos a Hamas,
organización que ya hemos dicho es considerada
terrorista por la ONU pero que tiene mucho poder
y arraigo popular. Hamas ha adoptado una postura
bastante radical –aunque en los últimos años está
variando– no aceptando bajo ningún término a Israel.
Ésta es una posición insostenible, ya que Israel ya es un
hecho insoslayable, y esa postura sólo puede constituir
un escollo más para que haya un avance certero hacia
la resolución final.
El planteamiento de algunos grupos fundamentalistas
islámicos en torno a Israel varía. Algunos consideran la
eliminación de Israel como un objetivo secundario. Estos
grupos abogan por una transformación del mundo islámico,
de modo que en las instituciones de gobierno –como es el
caso de Irán– se apliquen las leyes del Corán. Los grupos que
consideran la eliminación de Israel como objetivo principal
de su lucha, ven en este Estado y en el sionismo la raíz de
los problemas del mundo islámico y, por tanto, consideran
su destrucción necesaria para el avance de los países
musulmanes. La defensa de la causa palestina por parte de
estos últimos gobiernos y grupos enemigos acérrimos de Israel
parece ser algo instrumental. Debido a las consecuencias
terroríficas que podría desencadenar una guerra directa con
Israel –podemos volver a recurrir al mencionado caso de Irán–,
hace que se actúe en Israel a través de Palestina. Palestina así
se convierte no en un fin, sino en un medio para atacar a Israel
y, si es posible, destruirlo. Estas posiciones, sin ningún tipo
de dudas, obstaculizan severamente el proceso de paz que
pueda conducir a la convivencia pacífica de Israel y Palestina.
Otras organizaciones terroristas islámicas también
son enemigas declaradas de Israel y del sionismo.
Por un lado tenemos al mentado Hezbollah, que bien
podría ser considerado el máximo representante
del fundamentalismo chiíta. Por otro lado tenemos la
Yihad Internacional y la Yihad Palestina. Todas estas
organizaciones, algunas con gran acogida en las bases,
sostienen posiciones muy hostiles hacia Israel. Las
acciones militares desmesuradas, o sobre-reacciones
(depende desde qué posición se mire, Israel actúa o
reacciona) de Israel hacia los palestinos, alimentan la
legitimidad de la existencia de estos grupos entre la
opinión pública musulmana.
La cuestión de la memoria y la desigualdad
económica
Otro factor que acrecienta el fragor del conflicto es el
resentimiento que una historia de violencia ha tatuado en
ambos bandos. Tanto israelíes como palestinos se sienten
víctimas de una historia de guerra que ha acabado con
amigos y familiares19.
Dos países especialmente reacios a Israel son Siria
e Irán, especialmente este último. Irán, a pesar de
su campaña pública por Occidente, no esconde su
aversión por Israel. La influencia de Irán, que aspira
a convertirse en el máximo exponte del mundo
islámico, es considerable en este entorno, por lo que
sus planteamientos tienen fuerte influencia entre los
voceros diversos que en nombre de Palestina negocian
los procesos de paz. La posición de Irán con respecto
Israel es extremadamente controvertida. Su presidente,
en repetidas ocasiones, ha afirmado que Israel debería
ser borrado del mapa18, a pesar de haberse descubierto
que Ahmadineyad proviene de familia judía.
18
En la Conferencia Mundial contra el racismo auspiciada por las Naciones Unidas en abril del 2009, nueve
países –entre ellos EEUU– invitados se abstuvieron de participar por el espíritu antisemita que parecía impregnar el evento. Uno de los motivos era la participación del presidente de Irán, quien había hecho las
declaraciones antisemitas mencionadas arriba.
En algunos casos la violencia ha producido un odio enquistado
difícil de extirpar. En otros, los muertos se sacralizan y son
convertidos en mártires que no pueden ser traicionados. Este
argumento es extensamente utilizado en otros conflictos.
Los muertos se utilizan como justificación para defender
posiciones parciales, haciendo aún más complicado un
análisis objetivo de la situación.
19
Para un estudio pormenorizado de las fatalidades generadas por el conflicto a partir del año 2000, ver: David A.
Jaeger y M. Daniele Paserman, “The Cycle of Violence? An Empirical Analysis of Fatalities in the Palestinian-Israeli
Conflict”, American Economic Review, American Economic Association, Volume 98, nº 4, septiembre de 2008,
pp. 1591-1604.
En un tren que iba de Tel Aviv a Haifa, en febrero del 2007,
escuché con sorpresa e interés a un judío boliviano de
nacionalidad israelí. Mientras me explicaba con progresiva
agresividad cómo los palestinos querían matar a sus familias
me increpó: “¿Tú qué harías si viniesen a matar a tu madre,
a tu mujer, a tu familia? Sólo podemos defendernos. Si van a
matar a los nuestros, mejor matarles a ellos”.
Esta violencia y odio conduce a la estigmatización del otro
pueblo, y a la naturalización mutua de su maldad. Los judíos
más ortodoxos afirman que los árabes son gente mala,
deshonesta, violenta. Algunos musulmanes, especialmente
aquellos influenciados por Mullás, prejuiciosos, desprecian
la naturaleza del judío, utilizando grandes categorías
homogéneas para referirse a cualquier individuo de este
colectivo.
Estos últimos análisis sobre el resentimiento y los estereotipos
no son de ningún modo aplicables a la generalidad del pueblo
judío ni palestino, sino aspectos relevantes aplicables a ciertas
facciones que enturbian el eventual diálogo.
El abismo en términos de desarrollo económico y social entre
Israel y Palestina es uno de los principales motivos por los que
la balanza del conflicto, desde el punto de vista de número
de víctimas, parece siempre decantarse positivamente a
favor de Israel. El ejército israelí es considerado uno de los
mejores del mundo, si no el mejor en términos de eficiencia.
Su servicio de inteligencia está también entre los tres mejores
del mundo. Y su mecanismo de control de vuelos es el
mejor. Estos indicadores no reflejan su grado de desarrollo
económico ni social, pero de ellos se puede inferir el nivel
de desarrollo tecnológico de Israel. Esta gran diferencia ha
hecho que Israel lleve el control del conflicto. Mientras que
los grupos terroristas pro-palestinos realizan actos con armas
casi caseras, el ejército israelí reacciona de tal forma que
amenaza la supervivencia digna de un pueblo.
En el Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano20 (IDH) del Programa
de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) publicado
en 2008, haciendo referencia al 2006, Israel aparece en el
número 24. Los territorios palestinos, sin embargo, están
situados en el puesto 106. En un informe del 2005 de la ONG
20
Este indicador toma en consideración el Producto Interior Bruto, la esperanza de vida y la tasa de escolarización.
internacional Social Watch, se muestra que la
ocupación israelí de los territorios palestinos
está teniendo graves consecuencias en
las condiciones sociales de la gente de
dicha zona, especialmente en las mujeres
(Social Watch, 2005). Una Comisión de las
Naciones Unidas para asuntos humanitarios
publicó en el 2004 otro informe resaltando las
condiciones precarias en las que se vivía en
Cisjordania y Gaza (Naciones Unidas, 2005).
Baste mencionar que un 22% de los niños
palestinos sufre desnutrición crónica o aguda
debido, exclusivamente, al hambre. Tras la
última gran intervención militar de Israel a la
que hemos hecho referencia (la “Operación
Plomo Fundido”), comenzada en diciembre
del 2008, la situación se ha agravado mucho crecen a un ritmo superior que el resto de
más. La ocupación impide que el pueblo países de la organización (OECD, s.f.).
palestino emprenda un sendero de sólido
Lo expuesto con anterioridad muestra un
desarrollo.
conflicto entre un David y un Goliat. Por ello,
Israel, en cambio, ha logrado desarrollar sin intervención internacional, la superioridad
una cultura científica y técnica fuerte, de Israel podría convertir este caso en una
convirtiendo a este Estado relativamente gran tragedia.
joven en un ejemplo de capacidad militar y
agrícola, por mencionar algunas áreas donde Es conocido en el mundo del desarrollo
sobresale. El pueblo judío fue desarrollando, socioeconómico, que la interacción de dos
a través de sus vicisitudes en su condición de pueblos nunca es saludable si no se da en
errante, una memoria histórica fuerte que se condiciones de igualdad. Palestina debería
transmitía generación tras generación y que ser apoyado para que alcance niveles de
les impulsaba a esforzarse por progresar, les desarrollo social y económicos dignos. Éste
solicitaba que no se dejaran arrastrar por la es un derecho que la comunidad internacional
corriente, les decía que debían resistir y, ante debería salvaguardar. Como ha mostrado
todo, les conducía a adoptar una mirada la historia reciente de los países en vías de
crítica hacia su alrededor. A este factor, desarrollo, cuando un colectivo siente que
como se dijo al principio, se une el hecho de está siendo oprimido y no ve ninguna solución,
que la religión judía instaba a este pueblo a recurre a la violencia. Es menester que se
distinguirse por encima de la muchedumbre. establezcan instituciones internacionales con
Hoy día estos rasgos han quedado impresos poder suficiente para evitar estas situaciones
en su cultura, sirviendo de acicate para todo y para apoyar el desarrollo de cada pueblo,
su avance. Lo mencionado no es óbice para especialmente de los menos favorecidos.
reconocer que las desigualdades en el interior Sin un sistema de seguridad colectiva que
de Israel, como desvela el informe publicado atienda a todos los elementos que contiene,
en diciembre de 2011 por la Organización para muy difícilmente se podrían cumplir estos
la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económico, objetivos.
Conclusiones
Trayendo a colación algunos puntos del apartado anterior
sobre la historia reciente del conflicto armado y algo de lo
dicho en esta sección, procedamos a resumir algunas de las
causas posiblemente más relevantes de esta pugna: el factor
religioso; una mala transición tras el mandato británico; la
ocupación extra de territorios por parte de Israel tras varias
guerras; ataques terroristas de grupos pro-palestinos y las
medidas draconianas del gobierno de Israel; la pugna entre
Hamas y Al Fatah que impide la representación unánime de
Palestina; el apoyo a Israel por parte de EEUU y otros países
occidentales; el antisemitismo existente en algunos círculos
–incluso gobiernos, como el de Irán– que instrumentalizan
la causa palestina para canalizar este prejuicio; y diferentes
grados de desarrollo social y económico. El giro que tras las
últimas elecciones a principios del 2009 parece estar sufriendo
Israel, hace que la situación sea aún menos halagüeña y se
incorporen nuevos elementos en la trama del conflicto. La
coalición entre el Likud y partidos ultraderechistas parecía
haberse suavizado tras unir en el grupo al partido socialista.
Algunas declaraciones iniciales parecían mostrar que existía
disposición para seguir con el plan para la creación de un
Estado palestino, pero, en unas declaraciones recientes,
el presidente Netanyahu ha dejado entrever que no está
dispuesto a comprometerse con ningún plan anterior. Sólo
el curso de los acontecimientos mostrará la posición final
del nuevo gobierno de Israel, pero, como ya aparecía en los
titulares de algunos diarios (El País, 2009) tras las primeras
negociaciones entre EEUU e Israel acerca de la situación de
Oriente Medio, el Estado judío puede pasar de ser un aliado en
la zona a un problema. Lo mismo parece comenzar a ocurrir
en relación a la UE, institución que está tratando de presionar
al actual gobierno de Israel –sin ningún resultado– para que
se abra a negociar la creación de un Estado palestino21. La
tensión que desde principios del 2012 se vive con Irán por
causa de su supuesto programa nuclear con fines bélicos,
que ha logrado en mayo formar una coalición de todos los
partidos, tampoco favorece el clima que se vive en la región.
21
El sábado 24 de abril de 2009, en un artículo del diario El País, se lee este titular: “Israel rechaza toda imposición
de la UE para negociar la paz”. Netanyahu rechaza aceptar los compromisos adoptados por los gobiernos anteriores. La UE proporciona 1000 millones de euros anuales a la Autoridad Palestina, pero algunos líderes ya están
cuestionando esta estrategia si no se enmarca en un plan institucional para crear un Estado palestino.
Todos los factores señalados con anterioridad probablemente
no constituyen las causas primigenias del conflicto, pero todos
han sido condimentos que han contribuido a enconarlo. Otros
elementos a tener en cuenta a la hora de explorar el conflicto
son los apoyos internaciones que reciben ambos bandos y
sus intereses; la presión de la opinión pública; la actuación
de los organismos internaciones no gubernamentales; la
mediación impotente de las Naciones Unidas; el rol de los
medios de comunicación; y la utilización de un lenguaje
demagógico y sutil por parte de las diferentes partes que
imposibilita comprender la realidad de los acontecimientos.
Este análisis causal, como se ha podido observar, es
multifactorial y, como todo problema social complejo, requiere
un tratamiento sistémico. Por ello no hemos buscado causas
últimas, sino que hemos señalado una plétora de factores
que en diferentes grados impiden la resolución del entramado
palestino-israelí. Cada factor requiere unas acciones distintas,
pero siempre dentro de un plan global coherente.
En conclusión, si tuviésemos que destilar las causas
mencionadas en un esfuerzo por encontrar la quintaesencia
de la razón de ser del conflicto, diríamos que la injusticia
está en el corazón del problema. Esta injusticia tiene dos
dimensiones. La primera está relacionada con el análisis
del problema. Analizar una problemática implica liberarse
de prejuicios, de nociones preconcebidas, de posiciones
parciales, y exige pureza de intención para llegar al fondo del
asunto. Según lo que hemos podido observar, las diferentes
miradas que enfocan esta problemática están teñidas de
posicionamientos parciales y tan cargadas de emociones que
nublan la posibilidad de observar con claridad. Esta afirmación
que parece un tanto abstracta es fundamental aunque tiene
un componente filosófico ineludible. Mi postura teórica es
que detrás de cada asunto hay una realidad alcanzable.
Este asunto debe explorarse por parte de varios actores que
dialogan sobre sus descubrimientos. En esta situación, los
diferentes observadores retratan una parte, pero eso no implica
que la realidad se haya multiplicado. Un esfuerzo compartido
por abordar un problema requiere el reconocimiento de esta
postura. Una vez reconocida dicha posición, el análisis sería
mucho más fiel. Los diferentes aspectos del conflicto extraídos
por parte de diferentes investigaciones deberían tomarse para
dibujar un retrato completo (casi completo), lo más fiel posible
a la realidad.
La siguiente dimensión de la falta de justicia que exacerba esta
problemática está en el plano social y es bastante compleja.
Tanto judíos como palestinos sufren opresión, porque no
pueden dar expresión a su verdadera identidad colectiva que
exige colaboración, confianza y reciprocidad, y tienen que
adoptar posturas defensivas, agresivas e interesadas que no
se corresponden con su nobleza inherente. En unos casos
unos más que los otros. Hasta que la solución que se esboce
no siga el principio rector de la justicia, y todos los actores se
aferren a ella, será imposible una resolución satisfactoria. Sin
justicia, la armonía y la paz son imposibles. Esta noción de
justicia social es muy amplia y algunos podrían afirmar: “Cada
uno tiene una concepción de justicia diferente”. Para resolver
este asunto me remito al mismo planteamiento filosófico
del principio, existe un ideal de justicia, muy amplio con
significados infinitamente profundos, pero uno al fin y al cabo.
Los implicados necesitan de un agente externo, imparcial, que
se comprometa con este principio. De este modo se buscará
el mejor cauce de acción que beneficie a ambas partes.
Este agente puede ser el sistema de seguridad colectiva
implementado por la ONU. Con esto no estamos diciendo
que la resolución del conflicto descansa en el incremento de
la efectividad del sistema de seguridad colectiva, sino que
es un factor sin el cual difícilmente se podrían implementar
las medidas que serían necesarias para un proceso de paz
efectivo y que en breve pasaremos a enumerar.
Esta noción social de justicia tiene que ver también con los
diferentes grados de desarrollo social y económico del que
disfrutan ambos pueblos. Cualquier acuerdo, para que sea
justo, ha de darse entre iguales. Mientras uno esté en una
condición de desventaja –en este caso, económica, social
y militar– es muy difícil que pueda haber colaboración y
coexistencia pacífica, especialmente cuando una de las
partes es corresponsable de la condición del otro.
Lo dicho en los párrafos anteriores es un desafío a la
complejidad del concepto de justicia, ya que es amplísimo
y en sí mismo ya requeriría un trabajo de conceptuación
largo. Habría que traer a colación a Marx, Habermas, Rawls,
Dworckin, hablar de formas de desarrollo socioeconómico
de nuevo, de derechos humanos, de tribunales de justicia y
de cuerpos legislativos que emitan leyes… pero éste no es
el espacio idóneo para ese asunto. Lo que sí mencionaré es
que la justicia sólo se puede aplicar cuando existen cuerpos
86
que velan por ella. En el escenario internacional todavía no ha
cuajado un sistema con fuerza suficiente, ni con legitimidad
y representatividad, como para velar por la aplicación de
la justicia en el ámbito interestatal. Ése ha de ser un foco
de atención para los comprometidos con los procesos
conducentes a un orden internacional justo y armonioso. Las
Naciones Unidas con sus agencias, encarnando el principio
de seguridad colectiva, como hemos venido señalando,
quizá sean la semilla que debe ser nutrida para que adquiera
la envergadura necesaria para poder liderar y regular las
acciones internacionales.
Con el fin de observar con mayor claridad la dificultad de
resolver este conflicto sin un sistema de seguridad colectiva
sólido e imparcial, a continuación enumeraremos algunas
posibles medidas parciales, realmente necesarias, que
se deberían introducir para la pacificación del caso. Estas
medidas podrían constituir –de hecho muchas están en
marcha– los factores principales para la solución del conflicto,
pero tendrían que ser apoyadas desde mediación exterior, ya
que la experiencia ha demostrado que, sin ella, los acuerdos
no se cumplen:
o
La creación de un Estado palestino. Esta línea abre todo un mundo.
Desde 1947 se ha intentado crear un Estado palestino. La ONU, como vimos,
asignó territorios para un Estado judío y para otro palestino. Sin embargo,
diferentes circunstancias han hecho imposible que esto se materializara.
Actualmente el problema es todavía más complejo, ya que Israel se ha
apropiado de mucho más territorio del que le había asignado la ONU, y existen
sectores influyentes de la población que se niegan a hacer concesiones. El
proceso de colonización de Gaza, Cisjordania y Jerusalén Este, por parte
de judíos ortodoxos, debería detenerse. La mayoría de los países árabes
circundantes tampoco quisieron nacionalizar a los palestinos refugiados y
hoy día ése es uno de los grandes obstáculos para el proceso de paz: casi
cinco millones de palestinos viven como refugiados. Lo único claro es que
se requiere un Estado palestino. El proceso de negociación entre Palestina
e Israel ha sido muy tortuoso, entre otras causas, por la exigencia de ciertos
requisitos previos para la negociación, como la detención de asentamientos
en Gaza y Cisjordania por parte de Israel.
o
Apoyo al desarrollo social y económico y al establecimiento de un
gobierno democrático en Palestina. Hasta que ambos pueblos no se encuentren
en igualdad de condiciones, el odio, el rencor serán inevitables, y las relaciones
saludables entre ambas poblaciones seguirán siendo imposibles. Siguiendo
el modelo teórico de Ignacio Aymerich para el desarrollo de un indicador de
87
efectividad de los derechos humanos, basado en las condiciones sociales
que permitieron la constitución del Estado moderno, diríamos que el apoyo al
desarrollo podría partir por asegurar que en Palestina se dieran las siguientes
condiciones: el monopolio legítimo de la violencia por parte de una autoridad
central, la autosuficiencia fiscal, la unificación de las funciones legislativas así
como de las jurisdiccionales, y unas pretensiones de legitimidad efectivas
(Aymerich, 2001).
Para que cualquiera de las líneas de acción mencionadas
pudiera acometerse sistemáticamente, se requeriría una
institución internacional con peso que monitorizase y
supervise el proceso. El fortalecimiento paulatino de la ONU
y de su sistema de seguridad colectiva parecería ser un paso
decisivo para que este conflicto pueda alcanzar resolución.
Sin una institución internacional que vele por la justicia en
el orden internacional y que esté respaldada por un ejército
mundial y por el respeto de la sociedad civil, las pugnas entre
Estados son muy difíciles de resolver, especialmente cuando
uno de ellos es mucho más poderoso que el otro. En este
caso sólo existe un Estado, el de Israel, pero Palestina puede
verse como una entidad similar.
o
La implementación de un programa educativo consensuado entre
palestinos e israelíes moderados, auspiciado por la ONU, que se centre en
trabajar con las bases. Los objetivos de este programa, que ha de tener a
los niños, adolescentes y jóvenes como principales destinatarios, podrían ser,
por un lado, educar en el concepto de unicidad de la humanidad, a pesar de
su diversidad y en el principio de la libre e independiente investigación de
la realidad, y, por otro, eliminar todo tipo de prejuicios. Para ello, un equipo
interdisciplinario serio y competente debería desarrollar el programa. Los
medios de comunicación y las escuelas principalmente, pero también grupos
formados por voluntarios de barrio, podrían ser los espacios de socialización.
El proyecto de las Naciones Unidas de la “Alianza de civilizaciones”, como
estaba concebido en sus inicios, pretendía algo similar entre los diferentes
pueblos y culturas, aunque ha sido objeto de profusas críticas por sus fútiles
resultados.
El sistema de seguridad colectiva, tal como está configurado
actualmente, no puede mediar efectivamente ante este
conflicto, por lo que su reestructuración, como sugeríamos,
si se aspira a incrementar su efectividad, es un imperativo.
Unos datos bastarán para poner esto de relieve. UNISPAL, el
sistema de información de la ONU sobre la cuestión palestina,
contiene una base documental en la que se publican las
resoluciones de la ONU, tanto de la Asamblea General –de
carácter simbólico– como del Consejo de Seguridad sobre este
caso. Existen cerca de cien resoluciones, muchas aludiendo a
los capítulos VI y VII de la Carta de Naciones Unidas, llenas de
admoniciones, recomendaciones, llamamientos a cumplir los
acuerdos, etc. El incumplimiento de las mismas por parte de
Israel y Palestina, pero especialmente del primero, es notorio.
La ONU también tiene múltiples programas y proyectos para
mediar en este conflicto y su Comisión de derechos humanos
trata este caso de forma recurrente. No obstante, a pesar de
toda la atención que se le presta, la efectividad es muy baja.
Tras haber explorado la naturaleza del conflicto, pasemos al
siguiente apartado.
o
La creación de un grupo compuesto por líderes religiosos judíos y
musulmanes, dispuestos a explorar todos aquellos elementos comunes
de sus religiones. Esa parte quizá también podría incorporarse dentro del
programa educativo que hemos mencionado antes y los medios también
deberían prestarle atención para socializar los avances. Los proyectos de
diálogo interreligioso, que desde hace unos años se han ido implementando
en cada vez más lugares, son un buen ejemplo de la dinámica que habrían
de adoptar los líderes religiosos palestinos y judíos comprometidos con este
proceso. El diálogo interreligioso busca encontrar elementos comunes dentro
de las diferentes tradiciones religiosas. En una época en que el fanatismo y
las identidades basadas en la religión parecen estar tomando fuerza, resulta
importante tomar con seriedad esta línea de trabajo.
o
Fomentar proyectos colectivos de base que permitan trabajar, actuar,
colaborar y relacionarse a palestinos y judíos. De este modo, los estereotipos
irían desapareciendo mediante la amistad y el acercamiento. Algunos
proyectos ya en marcha podrían servir de modelo: “Open House”, “Neve
Shalom”, y “Promesas”.
o
Proyectos para trabajar la memoria histórica y la reconciliación,
dirigidos a víctimas directas de ambos bandos y a sus familiares22.
88
Dado que el fortalecimiento del sistema de seguridad
colectiva de la ONU exigiría una serie de reformas que en
el corto plazo no se pueden acometer23, tampoco se puede
supeditar el proceso de paz a ello. En el corto plazo, habría
que encontrar un conjunto de interlocutores internacionales
22
Hay numerosos ejemplos de este tipo de proyectos en los que las víctimas dispuestas a avanzar en el proceso
de reconciliación se juntan para compartir sus experiencias para crear lazos. En relación al conflicto palestino
israelí se puede extraer un buen ejemplo de un proceso llevado a cabo en Alemania para judíos víctimas del
nacional-socialismo y otros alemanes. Su posible aplicación al conflicto palestino-israelí se explora en el artículo:
Dan Bar-On y Fatma Kassem, “Storytelling as a way to work through intractable conflicts: the German-Jewish
experience and its relevance to the Palestinian-Israeli Context”, en Journal of Social Issues, Volume 60, Issue 2,
junio 2004, pp. 289-306.
89
que apoyaran a ambas partes a materializar el proceso de paz
impulsado desde la Conferencia de paz de Madrid en 1991, pero
dentro del marco de las resoluciones 242 y 338 del Consejo
de Seguridad, para darle a la negociación un cariz legal. EEUU
ha querido jugar siempre un papel importante como mediador,
pero su proximidad excesiva a los intereses israelíes lo delata
como un mediador poco imparcial. Un Estado que podría
hacer de contrapeso en este proceso es el nuevo Egipto,
donde los hermanos musulmanes en el poder –moderados por
otras fuerzas políticas–, ideológicamente cercanos a Hamas
y conectados a los intereses palestinos, podrían hacer de
contrapeso. Sin embargo, los antiguos problemas de Egipto
con Israel pueden hacerse sentir aún hoy día. China, si no fuera
por sus reticencias a intervenir en asuntos domésticos, también
podría ser un buen anfitrión del proceso de paz. La razón por
la que se buscan interlocutores es porque estas negociaciones
entre Israel y Palestina, que parecieron llegar a su clímax en los
acuerdos de Oslo, han sido muy tortuosas y sus condiciones
no se han respetado. Los asentamientos en Jerusalén Este y
Cisjordania por parte de Israel y la seguridad en tierra israelí
parecen ser los elementos más escurridizos de cara a efectuar
la solución concerniente a los dos Estados.
El posible reconocimiento de Palestina como Estado observador
por parte de la Asamblea General el 29 de noviembre de 2012
podría contribuir en el proceso de mediación internacional, ya
que Palestina accedería a ciertos privilegios como someter a
Israel al tribunal penal internacional por acciones como el posible
envenenamiento de Yaser Arafat, actualmente investigado. No
obstante, Israel considera este movimiento de Palestina como
una deslealtad con dichos acuerdos de Oslo que todavía se
utilizan como referencia. El paso de Palestina es unilateral y no
negociado, pero la experiencia parece haber mostrado que la vía
legal no ha conducido a nada definitivo. Pero este movimiento
de Palestina que a corto plazo puede parecer un avance, a
largo plazo podría traerle más problemas, ya que la negociación
se truncaría por completo y probablemente Israel recurriría
a represalias también fuera del marco legal. Y si a alguien le
favorece el recurso a la fuerza es a Israel, ya que la diferencia
de poder entre ambos es tal, que solo la vía diplomática, con
mediación internacional, parece ser la mejor estrategia para
llegar a una solución determinante, aunque fuera a largo plazo.
23
90
Existen múltiples documentos que abordan esta cuestión, pero resultan notorias las propuestas que Kofi Annan
elaboró como consecuencia de las dificultades que vivenció como secretario general de la ONU y que se pueden descargar en la siguiente página: http://www.cinu.org.mx/onu/reforma.htm#rkofi
REFERENCIAS
Akbar Kundi, M. (2009). Israel Factor in US veto behaviour, en Margalla Papers. Islamabad:
National Defence University.
Araj, B. (2008). Harsh Sate repression as a cause of suicide bombing: the case of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. Volume 31, (4).
Aymerich, I. (2001). Sociología de los derechos humanos: un modelo weberiano
contrastado con investigaciones empíricas. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch.
Bar-On, D. y Kassem, F. (Junio 2004). Storytelling as a way to work through intractable
conflicts: the German-Jewish experience and its relevance to the Palestinian-Israeli
Context. Journal of Social Issues. Volume 60 (2).
Bell, D. (1977). The return of the Sacred. British Journal of Sociology. 27 (4), 419-449.
Ben-Ami, S. y Medin, Z. (1991). Historia del Estado de Israel. Madrid: Ediciones Rialp
Chomsky, N. (2004). Piratas y Emperadores: Terrorismo Internacional en el mundo de hoy.
Barcelona: Ediciones B.
Culla, J. B. (2005). La tierra más disputada: el sionismo, Israel y la tierra de Palestina.
Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
Deneulin, S. y Radodi, C. (2001). Revisiting religion: development studies thirty years on.
World Development. Vol. 39.
El País (2009). 18 de abril de 2009. Recuperado de http://elpais.com/tag/fecha/20090418/
Flyvberg, B. (2002). Makind social science matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Foxman, A. H. (2009). The Deadliest Lies: The Israel lobby and the myth of Jewish control.
New York: Palgrave, Macmillan.
Fraser, T. G. (2004). The arab-israeli conflict. New York: Palgrave Macmilan.
García, S. (2001). Evolución de la noción de seguridad colectiva a la luz de ciertas
circunstancias históricas. Seguridad y Defensa en el actual marco socio-económico.
Instituto General Gutiérrez Mellado.
Gleis, J. L. y Berti, B. (2012). Hezbollah and Hamas: a comparative study. Maryland: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Graham, S. (Septiembre 2002). Bulldozers and bombs: the latest Palestinian-Israeli
conflict as asymmetric urbizide. Antipode. Volume 34 (4).
Jaeger, David. A. y Paserman, M. D. (Septiembre 2008). The Cycle of Violence? An
Empirical Analysis of Fatalities in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. American Economic
Review. American Economic Association, Volume 98, (4).
91
Jewish Virtual Library. (s.f.). U.N. Security Council: U.S. Vetoes of Resolutions Critical to
Israel. Recuperado de www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/usvetoes.html
Kepel, G. (2003). La Yihad: expansión y declive del islamismo. Barcelona: Pirámide.
Litvak, M. (1998). The Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: the case of Hamas.
Middle Eastern Studies. Volume 34 (1).
Lorck, N. (1986). Las guerras de Israel. Barcelona: Plaza & Janés.
Mearsheimer, J. J. y Walt, S. M. (2006). El lobby israelí y la política exterior estadounidense.
Buenos Aires: Universidad de Harvard.
Morris, B. (1989). The birth of the Palestinian refugee problem. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Naciones Unidas. Centro de información (s.f.). Reformas propuestas por el Sr. Kofi
Annan. Recuperado de http://www.cinu.org.mx/onu/reforma.htm#rkofi
Por: Neve Gordon and Nicola Perugini
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel.
Brown University, Rhode Island, United States.
Naciones Unidas. Oficina de la ONU para la coordinación de Asuntos
Humanitarios. (2005). Review of the humanitarian situation in the occupied
Palestinian Territory for 2004. Recuperado de http://unispal.un.org/Unispal.Nsf/
cf02d057b04d356385256ddb006dc02f/de9906e4d567199a85256fda00549d88?Open
Document
Neve Gordon is a member in the department of Politics and Government at BenGurion University of the Negev. He is the author of Israel’s Occupation (California
University Press 2008) and the co-author (with Nicola Perugini) of The Human Right
to Dominate (Oxford University Press 2015). He is currently working on a book on
human shields.
Nicola Perugini is an anthropologist and Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow at Brown
University. He is the author (with Neve Gordon) of The Human Right to Dominate
(Oxford University Press, 2015) and has published articles on law and spatial
practices, embedded anthropology, asylum seekers, humanitarianism, politics of
the gaze, and trauma and settler colonialism in a number of international journals
and edited volumes.
The authors appear in alphabetical order and acknowledge equal contribution.
OECD. (s.f.). Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising. Recuperado de www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/40/58/49170768.pdf
ABSTRACT
KEYWORDS One of the most prominent claims repeated by the
Naciones Unidas. Documentos. (s.f.). Resoluciones del consejo de seguridad.
Recuperado de http://www.un.org/es/documents/sc/
Patiño, C. A. (2006). Guerras de religiones: transformaciones sociales en el siglo XXI.
Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
Perlmutter, A. (1987). Israel. Madrid: Espasa Calpe S.A.
Rodríguez Fouz, M. y Sánchez de la Yncera, I. (eds.) (2012). Dialécticas de la
postsecularidad. Pluralismo y corrientes de secularización. Barcelona: Anthropos.
Sánchez-Bayón, A. (2011). Sistema de Derecho Comparado y Global. Valencia: Tirant
lo Blanch.
Scheindlin, R. P. (1998). A short history of the Jewish people: from legendary times to
modern statehood. New York: Oxford University Press.
Social Watch. (2005). Informe anual. Recuperado de www.socialwatch.org/es/
node/10025
Van Teeffelen, T. (Julio 1994). Racism and Metaphor: the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in
popular literature. Discourse and Society. Volume 5 (3), pp. 381-405.
92
PROTECTIVE EDGE
AND HUMAN SHIELDS
Human Shields, International
Law, Israel, Palestine, Urban
Warfare.
Israeli government throughout the 2014 Gaza war
is that Hamas uses human shields and therefore
it is to blame for the killing of hundreds of civilians
during the military campaign. The constant
reiteration of this trope—the use of civilians as
human shields—is fascinating particularly due
to its relative absence in the coverage of other
contemporary theatres of violence where civilians
are caught in the midst of urban warfare. Why is
human shielding a prominent topic of discussion
in relation to Israel/Palestine and almost completely
absent when analyzing violence in its neighboring
countries? What does the legal concept human
shield do? And why does the accusation of using
human shields apply only to certain actors? The
article addresses such questions by providing an
overview of the use of human shields in the context
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
93
Hamas attacks Israelis indiscriminately and does so from residential
areas and even from mosques, hospitals, and schools. It produces
ammunition on a university campus and stores its rockets in
mosques and UNRWA schools. Its commanders and their commandand-control system often operate out of the basement of a hospital,
and its fighters do not fight in uniform (except, when useful, the IDF
uniform). Hamas unscrupulously violates every norm in the book.
the principles of International Humanitarian Law. In terms of just war
theory, Israel has the right to self-defense and has a duty to protect its
own citizens before it protects non-citizens; in terms of IHL, Israel was
following both the principles of distinction and proportionality. “The
commander in charge of a particular military mission,” he notes, “is
usually the person best equipped to evaluate the military advantages
of accomplishing it. In the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the commander
is assisted by a staff ‘population officer’ in assessing the extent of
probable collateral damage. Human shields may be attacked together
with the terrorists, but attempts should be made to minimize collateral
damage among them...” (Kasher, 2014) In this way Kasher basically
repeats the argument made by the Israeli government and military,
which claimed that throughout “Protective Edge” Hamas deliberately
used human shields as a warfare technique and therefore it was to
blame for the hundreds of civilian deaths.
Asa Kasher, “The Ethics of Protective Edge,” Jewish Review of Books,
Fall 2014.
While Asa Kasher blames Hamas for violating every norm in the
book, the norm he is referring to in the above quote is the principle
of distinction between civilian and combatant as it is formulated in
international humanitarian law (IHL). Kasher, an emeritus professor
of philosophy at Tel-Aviv University and the co-author of the IDF code
of ethics goes on to query: “What is Israel supposed to do in this
situation? Does the presence of large numbers of non-combatants in
the vicinity of a building that is directly involved in terrorist assaults on
Israelis render that building immune to Israeli attack?” His response
is unequivocal. “The answer,” he insists, “is, and must be, no. Israel
cannot forfeit its ability to protect its citizens against attacks simply
because terrorists hide behind non-combatants.”1
As Kasher’s justifications underscore, human shields discourse has
come to the fore in the latest Gaza war and is one of the sites where
the ethics of violence is negotiated. In what follows, then, we analyze
how the legal concept human shield has been used in the 2014 Gaza
war. We begin with a concise definition of human shields according
to international law, followed by a brief overview of how the discourse
of human shields emerged in the context of Israel/Palestine. Next,
we examine the way Israel used the concept human shield in the
latest Gaza war by analyzing a series of posters distributed by the IDF
on its twitter account, Facebook and blog. By way of conclusion, we
argue that the deployment of the phrase human shield helps liberal
regimes both constitute the legality and morality of slaying civilians
while simultaneously shielding those who carry out the killing.
According to preliminary data gathered by the UN, at least 2,133
Palestinians were killed during Israel’s military campaign in Gaza
(July 2014), dubbed “Protective Edge.” This figure includes 362
people who, at the time of writing, could not be identified or their
status established. Of the initially verified cases, 1,489 are believed
to be civilians, including 500 children (187 girls and 313 boys), 257
women and 282 members of armed groups. Many fatalities involved
multiple family members, with at least 142 Palestinian families having
three or more relatives killed in the same incident, for a total of 739
deaths.2 Notwithstanding this information, in Kasher’s view there is
no doubt that the culpability for the hundreds of civilians killed in the
Gaza Strip “lies with Hamas, which first sacrificed their well-being
(building attack tunnels rather than schools and so on) and then their
lives in its unremitting war against Israel.” (Kasher, 2014)
Human Shields in International Law
Human shielding involves the use of persons protected by international
humanitarian law (IHL), such as prisoners of war or civilians, to deter
attacks on combatants or military sites.3 Placing civilians on train
tracks, in airports or in any site that is considered to be a legitimate
enemy target in order to prevent the latter from striking is illegal
according to IHL. Along similar lines, carrying out military operations
from within civilian spaces, particularly schools, hospitals, religious
sites, civilian neighborhoods and even industrial areas is illegal due to
the inevitable transformation of the non-combatant populations into
human shields. Article 28 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states:
“The presence of a protected person may not be used to render
certain points or areas immune from military operations.”4 The 1977
Indeed, Kasher’s major publications in recent years focus on the
relationship between ethics and warfare. His work in this field can be
defined as an attempt to articulate a systematic philosophical and
moral shield for Israeli violence and colonial occupation. He argues,
for instance, that, ethically, Israel was left with no other choice but
to kill civilians; it followed both the principles of just war theory and
1
2
94
Asa Kasher, “The Ethics of Protective Edge,” The Jewish Review of Books, Fall, 2014.
United Nations, Gaza: Initial Rapid Assessment (East Jerusalem: United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory,[2014]).
3
4
Michael Schmitt, “Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law,” Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 38 (2008),
17-59.
Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949, Article 28.
95
Additional Protocol I to the Convention explains in Article 51(7) that,
The presence or movement of the civilian population or individual
civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune
from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military
objectives from attacks or to shield, favor or impede military
operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement
of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to
shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.5
In an attempt to stop this form of state violence, seven liberal Israeli
human rights NGOs submitted a petition against the Prime Minister,
the Minister of Defense and the Israeli military, asking the High Court
of Justice to ban the use of human shields.8 In 2005, the Court
reached a decision. Citing Jean Pictet (1958), who wrote the official
commentary on the Four Geneva Conventions, Chief Justice Aharon
Barak characterized the use of people as human shields as a “cruel
and barbaric” act. He noted that “a basic principle, which passes
as a common thread running through all of the law of belligerent
occupation, is the prohibition of use of protected residents as a part
of the war effort of the occupying army.” In addition, he claimed that
according to humanitarian law, everything possible must be done
to separate the civilian population from military activity; this rule, in
turn, indicates that local residents are not to be brought, even with
their consent, into a combat zone because the notion of consent is
meaningless within a situation of inequality between the occupying
force and the local resident.9 In this instance, the High Court of
Justice took into account the asymmetrical context in which violence
was being deployed and ruled that people cannot be used as military
shields.
More recently, the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court characterized the use of human shields as a war crime.6 The
significance of human shield clauses in international law cannot be
overstated considering that urban settings are rapidly becoming the
most prominent arenas of contemporary warfare. Urban areas, as
Stephen Graham proposes, “have become the lightning conductors
for our planet’s political violence,” while “warfare strongly shapes
quotidian urban life.” (2011, p. 16). The dramatic increase in urban
warfare entails that civilians inevitably occupy the front lines of the
fighting. Insofar as this is the case, then practically all fighting within
cities involves warfare practices that, according to IHL, include the
use of human shields.
One year after the High Court ruling, the Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center (ITIC), a conservative Israeli think-tank whose
offices are located in the Ministry of Defense, published a 305page report about Hezbollah’s use of Lebanese civilians as
human shields during the 2006 Lebanon War.10 In this report, the
arguments originally made by Israeli and international human rights
organizations against the IDF, and which were validated by the High
Court of Justice, were slightly reframed. Appropriating the same logic
advanced by the liberal human rights NGOs, the anti-terrorism thinktank accused Israel’s enemies of human shielding. Yet, the think-tank
also reasoned that Hezbollah’s violation served to legitimize Israel’s
killing of Lebanese civilians.
The Development of the Human Shields Discourse
in Israel
Civilians have often been at the forefront of violence in Israel/Palestine.
Yet, it was only in the midst of the second Intifada that several liberal
human rights NGOs decided to use International Humanitarian Law
clauses pertaining to human shields to criticize practices deployed
by the Israeli military. In a report entitled Human Shield, the Israeli
human rights organization B’Tselem describes how, during the 2002
military operation “Defensive Shield,” Israeli soldiers would randomly
take Palestinian civilians and force them to enter buildings suspected
of being booby-trapped, made them remove suspicious objects
from roads, stand inside houses where soldiers had set up military
positions, and walk in front of soldiers to shield them from gunfire.
Just a few months earlier, Human Rights Watch had published a
similar report, In a Dark Hour, which documented how within the
same military operation the Israel Defense Forces routinely coerced
Palestinian civilians into performing life-endangering acts that assisted
its military operations.7 These liberal human rights organizations
condemned Israel for violating the fundamental principle of civilian
immunity inscribed in IHL.
5
6
7
96
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, 1977, Art. 51(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, Art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998).
Art. 8(2) (b)xiii.
Miranda Sissons, In a Dark Hour: The use of Civilians during IDF Arrest Operations (New York: Human Rights Wa
tch,[2002]).
The military think-tank pointed out that such an “exploitation”
of a civilian population is “considered a war crime and gross
violation of international laws governing armed conflict” and
went on to argue that “the IDF’s air strikes and ground attacks
against Hezbollah targets located in population centers were
carried out in accordance with international law, which does
not grant immunity to a terrorist organization deliberately
8
9
10
Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel and others vs. GOC Central Command and others, “HCJ
3799/02,” Adalah, http://www.adalah.org/features/humshields/decision061005.pdf. (accessed 05/01, 2014).
Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel and others vs. GOC Central Command and others,
HCJ 3799/02.
Reuven Erlich, Hezbollah’s use of Lebanese Civilians as Human Shields: The Extensive Military Infrastructure
Positioned and Hidden in Populated Areas. from within the Lebanese Towns and Villages Deliberate Rocket Attacks were Directed Against Civilian Targets in Israel (Tel-Aviv: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the
Center for Special Studies,[2006]).
97
hiding behind civilians, using them as human shields.” (Erlich,
2006: 8-10) Hence, the use of human shields is not only a
violation, but, in contemporary asymmetric urban wars, can
also help validate the claim that the death of “untargeted
civilians” is merely collateral damage. A few years later, in the
aftermath of the Israeli military campaign in Gaza, called Cast
Lead (winter 2008-2009), the same conservative think-tank
published a report entitled Evidence of the Use of the Civilian
Population as Human Shields.11 In this and other reports
released in subsequent months, the ITIC provided a series of
images and testimonies as evidence of how Hamas and other
militant groups had used homes, schools and mosques for
military-operational purposes.12
ITIC’s descriptions help corroborate Eyal Weizman’s claim that
cities are not simply the site but the very medium of warfare
as urban spheres increasingly become primary theatres of
violence. Accordingly, within urban warfare the noncombatant
and combatant as well as civilian and military edifices overlap.
But since the non-combatant and the civilian are protected
according to IHL this overlapping creates a problem for liberal
regimes which insist on the legality of their actions in order
to underscore the ethics of the violence they deploy. As
Laleh Khalili points out in a different context, the insistence
on legal action “goes hand in hand with the will to improve
that is inherent to liberal imperial invasions, occupations, and
confinements.” “If,” she continues, “our intent is to better
the condition of living of the ‘lesser’ people (by making a
gift of our civilization, or development, or modernization, or
democracy), then what happens in the process matters little,
even if what happens in the process is cruelty, torture, or
indefinite confinement. A virtuous intent to improve is one of
the strongest characteristics of liberal [warfare] and is what
distinguishes it from its illiberal kin.” (Khalili, 2012, p. 41).
example of how the liberal logic of contemporary warfare
operates. Therefore, analyzing how it has been deployed
during Israel’s 2014 Gaza war provides us with some insight
into the subtle ways liberal ethics helps to shape violence, and
violence helps to shape liberal ethics.
Protective Edge
During Israel’s operation “Protective Edge,” human shielding
became a central trope in the “semiotic warfare” (to use the
phrase of Edward Said (1980, p. xix) surrounding the military
campaign. An analysis of the series of posters disseminated by
the Israeli military on its twitter account, Facebook and blogs
provides an unparalleled illustration of how Israel strived to
provide legal and moral justification for the killing of hundreds
of civilians.
The poster “Where do Gaza Terrorists Hide Their Weapons?”
(Figure 2) is a paradigmatic example, where the subtext does
the speaking: houses, mosques, schools, and hospitals are
legitimate targets because they are presumed to be weapon
depositories. This is also the message in “When is a House
a Home?” (Figure 3) −which simply zooms in on one of the
images in the previous poster−showing how Palestinians
presumably hide rockets in civilian homes. The logic is
straightforward: insofar as Hamas hides weapons in houses
(illegitimate), Israel can bomb them as if they were (legitimate)
military targets. Within this semiotic warfare about the meaning
of architectural structures, a single function (hiding weapons)
out of many existing functions (home, shelter, intimacy, etc.)
determines the status of an urban site (in our case the house),
so that the edifice’s form loses its traditional signification.
Khalili’s analysis of liberal warfare and the desire to frame its
deployment of violence as legal and therefore ethical, helps
to explain why the discourse of human shields is prominent
within the Israeli context, but nearly absent in relation to
regimes that−at least at this point in time−do not claim to
adhere to liberal humanitarian and human rights principles,
such as Syria. Moreover, human shielding provides a concrete
11
12
98
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Evidence of the use of the Civilian Population as Human Shields (TelAviv: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center,[2009a]).
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Using Civilians as Human Shields (Tel-Aviv: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center,[2009b]).
Figure 2
Figure 3
99
It is precisely the inevitable overlapping of civilian and military
functions in urban warfare alongside the re-signification of the
urban architectural structures (as well as human subjects)
that creates new challenges for international law and the
articulation of ethical violence for liberal regimes. Accordingly,
the question posed in Figure 3: “When does it become a
legitimate military target?” should be understood as merely
rhetorical. The answer the Israel Defense Forces expect is:
“All houses in Gaza can be legitimate targets since, all houses
are potentially non-homes.” In this way, the IDF resolves the
ethical dilemma of bombing civilian sites.
Israel’s warfare is, however, not only about the re-signification
of architectural structures, but also about the transformation
of human beings into collateral damage, subjects who can be
killed without violating international law. The legitimization for
its indiscriminate bombing is premised upon a profound moral
disjuncture between Israelis and Palestinians. In the poster
“Israel uses weapons to protect its civilians. Hamas uses
civilians to protect its weapons” (Figure 4) Palestinians are
depicted as barbarians who ignore the elementary grammar of
international law. This trope was also reiterated by Elie Wiesel,
who during Protective Edge published –in collaboration
with the US based “This World: The Values Network”—an
advertisement in The Guardian entitled “Jews rejected child
sacrifice 3,500 years ago. Now it’s Hamas, turn.”13 The thinly
veiled racist statement included an analogy between Hamas
and the SS brigades: “In my own lifetime,” Weisel wrote, “I
have seen Jewish children thrown into the fire. And now I have
seen Muslim children used as human shields.” The equation
between Palestinians and Nazis is explicit.
This is also the subtext of the poster featuring Israel’s Chief
of Staff saying: “Even as we carry out strikes, we remember
that there are civilians in Gaza. Hamas has turned them into
hostages” (Figure 5). Again, the logic is clear. All civilians in
Gaza are being held hostage by Hamas, which is considered
a war crime and a gross violation of international law governing
armed conflict. This, then, provides legal and moral justification
against the accusation that Israel is the one killing civilians.
Presumed human rights violations carried out by Palestinians
against Palestinians –taking hostages and human shielding–
13
100
Elie Weisel, “Jews rejected child sacrifice 3,500 years ago. Now it’s Hamas turn.” Ad published in The Guardian,
September 10, 2014 online at http://www.algemeiner.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Elie-Wiesel-Hamas-ChildSacrifice.pdf (accessed 10/10, 2014).
thus become the legitimization of lethal and indiscriminate
violence on the part of the occupying force.
Figure 4
Figure 5
Hence, the use of human shields is not only a violation. In
contemporary asymmetric urban wars, accusing the enemy of
using human shields helps validate the claim that the death
of “untargeted civilians” is acceptable “collateral damage.”
When all civilians are potential human shields, when each
and every civilian can become a hostage of the enemy, then
all enemy civilians become killable. In order for all this to be
convincing, the Israeli military depicts the asymmetric context
in which it unleashes its violence against a whole population
as symmetric. This is carried out, for instance, through the
poster “Some bomb shelters shelter people, some shelter
bombs” (Figure 6). Here a radically disproportionate situation
is presented as if it were balanced. The residents of Gaza are
bombed by cutting edge F-16 fighter jets and drones, yet they
do not have bomb shelters, and they have nowhere to flee.
Israel’s residents are bombed mostly by makeshift rockets,
many of which have been intercepted by Iron Dome missiles.
The majority of the population in Israel has access to shelters
and can flee out of the rocket’s range.
Figure 6
101
These powerful images, spread by the Israeli military through
social media, attempt to transform the very presence of civilians
as suspect in the areas it bombards, regardless of the fact
that these areas are urban centers. For Palestinians living in
Gaza, simply spending time in their own homes, frequenting a
mosque, going to a hospital or to school became a dangerous
enterprise since any one of these architectural edifices could
become a target at any moment. One can no longer safely
assume that the existence of masses of human bodies in
civilian spaces can serve as defense against the lethal capacity
of liberal hi-tech states. Thus, in Israel, the deployment of the
legal concept human shield helps the liberal state authorize
and legitimize its extensive civilian killings and in this way to
preserve its place among “civilized nations.”
REFERENCES
Adalah (2014). The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel and others
vs. GOC Central Command and others, “HCJ 3799/02”. Retrieved on January
5, 2014 from http://www.adalah.org/features/humshields/decision061005.pdf.
Erlich, R. (2006). Hezbollah’s use of Lebanese Civilians as Human Shields:
The Extensive Military Infrastructure Positioned and Hidden in Populated Areas.
from within the Lebanese Towns and Villages Deliberate Rocket Attacks were
Directed Against Civilian Targets in Israel. Tel-Aviv, Israel: Intelligence and
Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies.
Graham, S. (2011). Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism. London,
UK: Verso Books.
Kasher, A. (2014). “The Ethics of Protective Edge”. The Jewish Review of Books.
Pictet, J. (1958). The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva:
International Committee of the Red Cross.
Schmitt, M. (2008). “Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law”. Israel
Yearbook on Human Rights. Vol. 38. 17-59.
Sissons, M. (2002). In a Dark Hour: The use of Civilians during IDF Arrest
Operations. New York: Human Rights Watch.
RADICAL
ISLAMISTS:
ISLAM’S RASHIDUN OR HIJACKERS
GROUPS?
Por: María José Juárez Becerra
ITESM, Campus Querétaro, México
María José Juárez is an International Relations student at the ITESM Campus
Querétaro. In 2014 she received the UAM-Santander scholarship in order to study
a term on anthropology at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain. She has
been part of the editorial board of Grupo Retos Internacionales since 2010. She
has also collaborated as a volunteer in migration-NGOs at Querétaro and Madrid.
Various articles of María José have been published by the ITESM Querétaro and
the Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, CA. Contact: mari.
[email protected]
ABSTRACT
KEYWORDS Are Islamists truly representing Islam’s nature? Or
Islamism, Islamists movements,
ISIS, Terrorism, Islam, Jihad
are they, in the end, hijacking Islam? Does Islam
foster violence more than any other religion in the
world? There are several narratives around these
debates which had their peak during the 9/11
attacks. The first part of this essay will analyze
how Islam has been hijacked by Islamists groups,
arguing that Islam is a religion of peace. The second
part, will examine the current Islamist scenario in the
Middle East, focusing on ISIS as a main character,
which raises the question again about Islam’s
nature as this group claims to be following the right
path of Islam because of the several achievements
that it has reached so far. In addition, the essay
argues that through the erroneous use of concepts
such as Islam, Islamism, jihad and terrorism the
prestige of Islam is being damaged.
Stein, Y. (2002). Human Shield: Use of Palestinian Civilians as Human Shields in
Violation of High Court of Justice Order. Jerusalem: B’tselem.
102
103
Every region in the world has its own everlasting debates,
in relation to the Middle East Region one of these debates
(besides the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) is that associated to
radical Islamists’ nature: are they a Rashidun (Rightly Guided)
group in representing Islam? Or are they, in the end, hijacking
Islam? This debate also underlies the question about the
nature of Islam, whether if it is a religion of Sword or peace1.
This essay will be divided into two main topics by comparing
different narratives in order to respond to these questions. The
first part will explain why radical Islamists are hijacking Islam
while the second part will focus on ISIS as an example of the
radical Islamists organizations and how it claims to be the
Rashidun Islamist group.
are they not screaming?...Muslims in the West, too, seem
unnaturally silent on these topics. If you’re yelling, we can’t
hear you. (2002)
These three authors, among others, emphasized the positive
nature of Islam. They argued that Islam had been hijacked
provoking the association of Islam with the terrorism within the
Western social imaginary. But what is Islam’s nature?
The nature of Islam
Islam as a monotheistic religion “and as an ideology of
change and societal living, is akin to the two other main
revealed religions: Christianity and Judaism” (Akbarzadeh
and Mansouri, 2007, p. 14). Islam officially emerged when
Muhammad, the Prophet, migrated (hijrah) from Mecca to
Medina in 622 AD, having Allah as the only god and Quran
as its holy book. But besides these important facts, one of
Islam’s main characteristic is that it is “monolithic at a doctrinal
level”, Islam in fact “does not recognize compartmentalization
of life in terms of racial, political, social, cultural and territorial
divisions, and essentially calls for the creation of a unified
source of earthly power and authority as a reflection of those
of God. (Akbarzadeh and Mansouri, 2007, p. 15) As Islam
establishes that there should not be a division between politics
and religion, this causes diverse interpretations among its
adepts on how these aspects should be put together, some of
these interpretations attempt peaceful ways while others, like
ISIS, sustain that the only way to achieve this is through jihad
or violent techniques.
I. Hijacking Islam
The globe was deeply alarm about the terrorist attacks to the
World Trade Center in September 2001, discourses about
this major event overrun media, some blamed Islam’s nature,
others al-Qaeda’s suicide bombers among others. In addition,
everyone was too affected by the events that they did not
notice that the terms Arabs, Muslims, Islamists, jihadists and
terrorists were used carelessly as synonyms. Nevertheless,
there were some profound analysis of the tragedy. Martin
Kramer, in September 19, 2001 wrote for the National Review:
“Islam, the religion of more than a billion believers, has been
hijacked”. Following the same argument, Thomas Friedman
argued in his article World War III published in the New York
Times:
Where are the Muslim leaders who will tell their sons to resist the
Israelis-but not to kill themselves or innocent non-combatants?
(…) Surely Islam, a grand religion that never perpetrated the
sort of holocaust against the Jews in its midst that Europe did,
is being distorted when it is treated as a guidebook for suicide
bombing. (September 13, 2001)
Disputes about the nature of Islam have remained through
history, one of the debates relates to the question: “is it a
religion of peace or a religion of the sword?”2 Evidently, this
discussion gained importance since the events of 9/11 in
New York. After 13 years of these attacks, Islam (as a religion)
has been losing its legitimacy because of the terrorist tactics
that the Islamist group Al-Qaeda applied. This, at the same
time, has caused confusion among people (especially in the
western hemisphere) about the differences between Islam
and Islamism, or even, in an extreme position, confusing Islam
with terrorism. Some academics sustain that Islam, because
its history, is a religion of sword while others may argue that
One year after, Salman Rushdie also wrote in relation to the
hijacked Islam:
Where, after all, is the Muslim outrage at these events? As their
ancient, deeply civilized culture of love, art and philosophical
reflection is hijacked by paranoiacs, racists, liars, male
supremacists, tyrants, fanatics and violence junkies, why
1
104
Bar-On, T. (2014). The spread of Islam in the Arab world and beyond. Middle East Politics.
2
Questions were discussed by Bar-On, T. (2014) in the lecture of the week #5 in the Middle East politics course:
Expansion of Islam.
105
this statement responds to the orientalism3 perspective and
interests.
extremist adepts. Nevertheless, no other religion in the world
has been so demonized like Islam.
On one hand, authors like Bale sustain that Islam “due to
its peculiar and in many respects extraordinary pattern of
historical growth, has often been more prone to adopt a hostile
and belligerent attitude towards on-believers even than other
missionary monotheistic religions (…) For this very reason, it
is likewise arguably more prone to produce violent extremists,
as is painfully obvious in the preset era. (Bale, 2009, p. 77)
Even well-known discourses like The clash of civilizations?
by Samuel Huntington, have contributed to this debate.
Huntington mentions that the relationships between the
Western and Islamic civilizations are conflictive. Javier Cordán
and Luis de la Corte (2007) affirm that indeed, there have been
conflicts between these civilizations and that Huntington did
well in emphasizing the role of religion on the political conflicts
because religion has been usually undermined.
Islam, Islamism, jihad, terrorism: how come they
have been treated as synonyms?
Nevertheless, Cordán and de la Corte sustain that in his
discourse, Huntington oversimplifies Islam by exalting the
jihad phenomenon. (2007, p. 19) In fact, jihad does not
represent the majority of Islam’s adepts, within Islam there is
a clash among its different branches (just like happens within
Judaism, for instance, between Orthodox and Non-orthodox
Jews). Following the same line, Mustapha Chérif (2008)
argues that discourses like The clash of civilizations? seeks to
confirm the idea that violence could be inherent to the Muslim
culture and that the Quran could be one of its sources (2008,
p. 139). In addition, authors like Akbarzadeh and Mansouri
mention that the main three monotheist religions: Judaism,
Christianity and Islam, are “rich in fundamental moral and
social principles from which strong notions of universal ethics,
justice and dignified existence can be drawn, and in relation to
which a virtuous life can be organized on earth”. (2007, p. 14).
Thus, Martin Kramer (September 19, 2001) rejects the Islam as
a religion of sword argument by stating that “Islam is no more
inclined to terrorism than any other monotheistic faith. Like
its sisters, Christianity and Judaism, it can be both merciful
and stern in practice; (…) Islam has served as the bedrock of
flourishing, tolerant, and peaceful orders”. So Islam, just as
any other religion in the world, is susceptible to be hijacked by
3
106
Orientalism, criticized by Edward Said, for providing a Western colonialist study on the Middle East, describing it as
different and inferior and thus justifying the Western intervention on the region.
Islam’s negative perception around the globe responds
to the fact that the concepts of Islam, Islamism (including
its radical versions such as jihad) and terrorism have been
unjustly seen as interchangeable concepts. This confusion (or
intended plan?) occur as result of various reasons, some of
them have been appointed by Johns and Lahoud: “because
Islamism constantly reiterated claim to authenticity, a superior
commitment to the Islamic revelation” and also because of
“the political configuration of the world, and the popularity
of expressions such as “Islam and the West”, has resulted
in the general use of the word of Islam as an abstract noun
which phonetically is suggestive of Islamism”(2005, p. 17)
This misunderstanding on those concepts is one way in which
Islam is being hijacked.
But then, what is Islamism and what is its relation with jihad and
terrorism? For Mozzafari, “Islamism is a religious ideology with
a holistic interpretation of Islam whose final aim is the conquest
of the world by all means.” (2007, p. 21) According to the same
author, Islamism have different variations, the “division inside
the universe of Islamism is around two axial pillars: division
determined by sub-religious affiliations” which he divides into
Sunni, Shi’a and Wahhabi, “and division emanating from the
diverse scope of claims and ambitions” relating to national and
global Islamism. Nevertheless, “Islam itself is not necessarily
the prime reason or eve the catalyst for [Islamism]” (Johns and
Lahoud, 2007, p. 19) it can be argued that the political context
in which Islamists groups emerge and the external factors that
surround them take also an important role for establishing their
origins. For instance, Graham Fuller considers that US’ policies
have contributed to the radicalization of Islamist movements.
(Johns and Lahoud, 2007, p. 20)
When Mozzafari talks about the final aim of the Islamists:
to conquest the world by all means he sustains that the
Islamists’ “spectrum of means to reach the goal is quite wide,
expanding from propagation, peaceful indoctrination and
political struggle to violent methods such as assassination,
hostage taking, terrorist and suicide actions” (2007, p. 24)
107
and he emphasizes that the use of violence by Islamists is
not a golden rule. In fact, Bar-On (2014) argues that there are
three types of Islamists: Takfiris, who declare other Muslims as
impure and excommunicate them from the faith; nationalists,
like Hamas who seek the independence of Palestine and
pragmatics, such as the Muslim Brotherhood who−in a nonviolent way− are part of the civil society and politics of their
countries. The use of violence depends on what the strategy of
the Islamist group is. For the purpose of this essay, I will focus
only on the branch of the radical Islamists groups which claim
that the only way to achieve their objectives is through jihad
and therefore recur to violence.
jihad we know today I linked, with these Muslim holy wars
which began more than 1300 years ago in Arabia and spread
during the next 13 centuries to the Middle East, Europe, Africa,
and Asia, and which are now also part of the North and South
American scene. (1998, p. 14)
Also, terrorists in the 11/S for example, had their own
interpretations of Islam, as Hotaling said: “neither the Quran
nor any other Muslim teaching gave Bin Laden or Al Qaeda the
right to conduct a jihad, or holy war” (2003, p. 152) actually
the mission of imposing an Islamic regime goes against the
Quran’s “no coercion in religion” Hotaling keeps arguing
that some terrorists “have based on the hadith: I have been
commanded to fight against the people till they testify that there
is no God but Allah”. (2003, p. 153) Other of the most appealed
suras from the Quran by the radical Islamists are the following
ones:
The pagans wherever ye find them,
And seize them, beleaguer them,
And lie in wait for them
In every stratagem (of war) (Quran: 9:5)
Fight in the cause of God
Those who fight you,
But do not transgress limits:
For God loveth not transgressors. (Quran: 2:190)
Nevertheless, it is important to mention three aspects about
jihad. First, it is not one of the five pillars of Islam but it is also
an important element for the religion. Second, Jihad “literally,
means ‘exertion’. For the individual believer, it is a spiritual
exertion that makes him better and more pious; for the mystic
it is the ecstasy that leads towards a fusion with God.” (Kepel,
2003, p. 92) Third, jihad traditionally has a distinction between:
Offensive jihad – giving a religious cover to the military expansion
of the Islamic world, to conquest and then exploitation of the
land of the unbelievers – and a defensive jihad, proclaimed by
the ulama (the Islamic religious establishment) and jurists: a
general mobilization for the ‘homeland under threat’, whenever
the country is under attack from the infidels.(Kepel, 2003, p.
92).
In fact these radical groups (terrorists or not) can justified
their violent actions by interpreting any sura or hadith from the
tradition of Islam. Tony Blair said days after the terrorist attacks
in New York: “It angers me, as it angers the vast majority of
Muslims, to hear bin Laden and his associates described as
Islamic terrorists. They are terrorists pure and simple. Islam is
a peaceful and tolerant religion, and these people are contrary
to the teachings of the Quran”4. This is very important because
not all the terrorist acts are related to Islamists groups. There
are different types of terrorism that can even be applied by
States to its own citizens. So terrorism is neither Islam nor,
necessarily, jihad.
While the offensive jihad is “within the realm of political authority
and has no relevance for Muslims as a whole” (Kepel, 2003, p.
93), Islamists usually proclaim defensive jihad, so then “fighting
becomes the supreme virtue, and regulates the mobilization of
all energies. All means justify the end, the safeguarding of the
community.” (Kepel, 2003, p. 93) These last meanings of jihad
are the ones that prevail in the media, while the exertion jihad
−which, as mentioned before, is a peaceful and personal path
to become a better Muslim− has been mostly neglected.
According to Fregosi, jihad is not a recent phenomenon:
The Jihad has had a long presence on our planet, going back
to the early 600s when Muhammad preached the Quran, ruled
over Medina and sent his followers to fight against the pagan
Arab tribes of the peninsula, demanding they acknowledge
his suzerainty and convert to Islam. (…) the terrorism called
108
II. ISIS a Rashidun group
In the first part of this essay, I have analyzed what the academics
sustain about Islam and how it has been hijacked by radical
4
Retrieved from: Hotaling (2003, p. 55).
109
Islamists. Now I would like to examine how ISIS5, considers
itself as a rightly-guided group. For doing so I am going to
first, consider briefly the history of ISIS and then analyze its
arguments through their official magazine Dabiq.
What is ISIS?
Aaron Zelin (2014, p. 1) sustains that since the Islamic State of
Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) took Mosul -one of the richest oil-areas
in the region- invading at the same time the news worldwide,
many people have been confused over how to describe ISIS
per se and what its relation to al-Qaeda is. For Zelin, ISIS
and al-Qaeda “are now in an open war for supremacy of the
global jihadist movement. ISIS holds an advantage, but the
battle is not over yet”. (2014, p. 1) So in order to have a better
understanding about ISIS, a brief analysis of ISIS history and
its relation with al-Qaeda will be provided in this essay. Zelin
points out that:
Both Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who founded Jamaat al-Tawhid
wa-l-Jihad6(JTWJ) in 1999 and al-Qaeda head Osama bin
Laden came of age during the Afghan jihad against the Soviet
Union in the 1980s, but their respective organizations have
distinct genetic material, attributable in part to their different
backgrounds7, leadership styles, and aims. (2014, p. 2)
This ideological division between the leaders: bin Laden and
Zarqawi, was determinant for al-Qaeda and ISIS’ divorce.
Brian Fishman explains that:
part of this was because Zarqawi felt that the only way to
save the umma (global Islamic community) from itself was
through purging it, whereas bin Laden’s number two, Ayman
al-Zawahiri, believed that Muslims were not the problem, but
that instead the “apostate” institutions needed to be changed
(Zelin, 2014, p. 3).
In addition, Zelin sustains that another important division is the generational
one, because some of the jihadists were trained al-Qaeda during the 1980s
and 1990s in Afghanistan while other jihadists were trained within AQI (alQaeda in Iraq, another of the historical name of ISIS) so these jihadists have
different strategies, aims, and leaders.
5
6
7
110
I have chosen ISIS because it has been the most “successful” radical Islamist group and for its importance in today’s
international affairs.
When during the last decade both sides were still
working together, the group headed by Zarqawi (AQI)
“controlled resources and the flow of foreign fighters,
helping it gain loyalty from individual fighters” in Iraq
(Zelin, 2014, p.2). So those new loyalties are meaningful
to understand how ISIS was able to consolidate itself
and stablish a different agenda with its own followers.
In fact, the formal divorce act was signed on February
2, 2014, when “al-Qaeda’s general command (AQGC)
released a statement that said: ISIS is not a branch of
the Qaidat al-Jihad [al-Qaeda’s official name] group, we
have no organizational relationship with it, and the group
is not responsible for its actions”. (Zelin, 2014, p. 5)
Only two months later of the divorce, the fitna (state of
discord) started between al-Qaeda and ISIS when Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi (ISIS’ current leader) announced that
he was “extending the Islamic State of Iraq into Syria
and changing the group’s name to the Islamic State of
Iraq and al-Sham. He also noted an open secret that
ISIS and JN [Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria] were one and the
same”. (Zelin, 2014, p. 5) But the true is that JN was not
consulted for this expanding plan of the Islamic state
into Syrian territories8.
Since then, the dispute among ISIS and al-Qaeda is
about who has more authority in the region and which
methodology is the best to achieve their Islamists goals.
In this fitna, or warfare, some Islamists groups such
as “Ansar al-Sharia in both Tunisia and Libya as well
as jihadists in Gaza/Sinai and Indonesia have posted
pro-ISIS propaganda” while many “other independent
jihadist ideologues, such as Abu Qatada al-Filistini,
Iyad Qunaybi, and Hani al-Sibai, have disavowed ISIS”.
(Zelin, 2014 , p.4).
ISIS explaining itself through Dabiq
In order to complement its religious, political and
military strategies, ISIS has been publishing the Dabiq
magazine during wartime. Beyond being an ordinary
magazine, Dabiq is a great tool of propaganda for ISIS.
JTWJ was the first name of what nowadays we know as ISIS. Zelin has provided a historical research of ISIS’ names
that can be consulted in the Chart 1 annexed to this essay.
On one side, bin Laden grew up in the upper middle class and did receive university education, on the other side
Zarqawi grew up in a poor and uneducated background.(Zelin, 2014, p.2)
111
Dabiq also appeals to an apocalyptic vision in order to
gain the support of many Muslims. Its second edition
has “The Flood” in the cover and narrates the story
of the Ark of Noah, where The Islamic State is the ark
who will save the good Muslims and those infidels
will die in the flood. Dabiq, as a propaganda weapon,
emphasizes the virtues of ISIS and of its members (its
leader, administrative groups and adepts) while on the
other hand completely rejects those non-supporters
and repel them by threatening them, making clear that
they will be chastised10.
The first edition was published on July 5, 2014 only after ISIS
overtook Mosul. Within Dabiq the reader can find the religious
base of the Islamic Caliphate that ISIS is aiming to implement
and at the same time it provides social, religious and military
arguments that legitimize this group as the Rashidun (rightly
guided) group for implementing an Islamic State, moreover it
calls all Muslims to support ISIS and to execute hijrah9 from
their homes (within the Middle East or abroad) to the Islamic
State.
ISIS tries to demonstrate that it is the religiously rightly-guided
Islamist group. “ISIS’s global expansion likely depends on
its ability to wrest religious authority from rival organizations
such as al-Qaeda by demonstrating that its own methodology
is both more successful and more justified” Gambhir (2014,
p. 2) In addition, Gambhir mentions that ISIS aims to have
solid religious authority as it “takes care to use only either
Quranic verses or hadiths from the major and most trusted
collections”(Gambhir, 2014, p. 6) these verses are wisely
selected and used in Dabiq to legitimize the Islamic Caliphate,
leaded by Baghdadi, as the correct government that unites
political and religious power. In the first publication of Dabiq
the reader can find the following:
ISIS claims that it is not only a military/terrorist
organization, but also that it has its own political façade.
ISIS “is a proto-state that is testing out the best ways
to get the world’s attention, and broader support from
the Muslim community abroad” (Gambhir, 2014, p. 2)
and for this proto-state ISIS has implemented its own
political institutions supported on religious justifications
and not only that, ISIS is even including minority groups
such as tribes:
ISIS seeks to demonstrate that it can win the allegiance
of popular tribal leaders in Iraq and Syria, both in
order to persuade other groups, and to retain control
of territory. To initiate and maintain tribal relationships
in Syria’s Aleppo Wilayat, or governorate, ISIS set up a
public affairs office. An ISIS tribal affairs representative
works underneath the Wilayat’s head of Public
Relations, indicating that the group has a sophisticated,
hierarchical infrastructure set up to interact with different
local groups. (Gambhir, 2014, p. 5)
[The Islamic State] “has carried out the command of Allah – as
much as it can – in the best possible manner. It established the
religion in the areas where it exists and continues to pursue this
effort vigorously. All this, after Allah had granted the imam of
The Islamic State the blessing of performing hijrah and fighting
jihad in His cause, on top of already having been characterized
by his noble lineage, sound intellect, and a prestigious level”
(2014:1, 27,)
The Islamic State, Dabiq argues, has been “blessed” with
victory, which means Allah approves ISIS as the only one
fighting His cause. So beyond ISIS military strategies and
Baghdadi’s leadership, Allah’s desire and support are the
reason why they have been so successful on implementing
the Islamic State. And as they have Allah’s unquestionable
blessing, those who fight ISIS, or do not support it, are infidels
that must be punished. In addition, ISIS’s Dabiq in its second
edition mentions that they will stop following Baghdadi only
when he orders them to disobey Allah, and they will punish
anyone who attempts to usurp his leadership.
9
112
Isis is currently demanding the implementation of hijrah (migration) especially of well-prepared Muslims such as
doctors or scientists.
Doesn’t Islam calls for unity? This could be an argument
for ISIS to demonstrate that, under Baghdadi’s
leadership, the organization has the right political
system which includes minorities groups and that aims
to be home to those loyal Muslims.
Following the same political line, ISIS proposes a
welfare society. As the representatives of ISIS go around
convincing people to support ISIS, they explain to the
tribal audiences that “the Islamic State would enforce
10
The reader can even find corpse-pictures on the defeated in the magazine.
113
property rights, provide security, distribute aid, and
ensure the availability of food and goods for civilians.”
(Gambhir, 2014, p. 5). For instance, in the first edition of
Dabiq, the report “Halab tribal assemblies” (1, 12-15)
shows that once the leaders of the tribes have pledge
bayat (alliegancie) to ISIS, the Islamic State asks for
the collection of zakat in order to help the less fortunate
within the communities.
ISIS’ scope is global (following Mozaffari’s proposal
for Islamism division). On one side through e-Sword
–using modern tools such as the internet− ISIS is
recruiting immigrants abroad to populate the Islamic
State, besides it is gaining the support of the regional
and tribal groups -as I have mentioned before-. Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi, has emphasized the global nature
of the Caliphate, even he invites Muslims around the
globe to perform hijrah to the Islamic State with their
whole families: “There are homes here for you and
your families. You can be a major contributor towards
the liberation of Makkah, Madīnah, (...) Would you not
like to reach Judgment Day with these grand deeds in
your scales” (Dabiq, 2014: 2, 3). Again, by appealing
to salvation and propaganda ISIS seek to consolidate
itself as the Rashidun organization.
In relation to a plan to expand the Islamic State to the
near neighbors-like Palestine- ISIS’ Dabiq mentions:
“massacres taking place in Gaza against the Muslim
men, women, and children, then the Islamic State will
do everything within its means to continue striking down
every apostate who stands as an obstacle on its path
towards Palestine” (Dabiq, 2014: 2, 4). If ISIS keeps
accumulating victories and occupying territories, “it is
only a matter of time and patience before it reaches
Palestine to fight the barbaric Jews and kill those of
them hiding behind the gharqad trees – the trees of the
Jews”. (Dabiq, 2014: 2, 4). ISIS declares itself as the
most successful Islamist group, son in consequence, it
has the moral and military legitimacy to protect Muslim
land from those who are attempting Muslims’ rights.
This, nevertheless, doesn’t mean that ISIS will unite
forces with Hamas. In fact, ISIS seems to be struggling
for power among other Islamist organizations.
114
One strategy for ISIS to gain religious, political, economic and
military power is through discrediting of the opponent Islamist
movements (or political parties). ISIS, for instance, criticizes
the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas in Dabiq’s first edition
for implementing a weak methodology, after the old jihadi
leaders’ death, which “never fuel the jihad caravan on its path
to Khilafah (Caliphate), rather it only brings indecision and fear,
thus ruining the caravan’s ability to persist, and naively filling
the road with obstacles that only serve the tawaghit”. (2014:
2, 39) In addition, ISIS accuses them of “abandoning Shari’a
“fundamentals” in an effort to gain popularity” (Gambhir,
2014, p. 9) so these movements can be attacked by ISIS at
any moment. If ISIS keeps growing, and its attitude in relation
to other Islamists movements remains the same, there can
hardly exist an alliance with other ones, so as Gambhir points
out, “If ISIS refuses to interact with any organization or leader it
deems impure, then it will likely have to pursue military, rather
than political forms of expansion in the region”, which is very
worrying for the West and the near neighbors of ISIS.
What does ISIS says about Jihad? It’s an essential question for
this research. According to Dabiq’s first edition: “Jihad would
be based upon hijrah [migration], bay’ah, sam’ (listening),
ta’ah (obedience), and i’dad (training), leading to ribat and
qital (fighting), then Khilafah [Caliphate] or shahadah [Islamic
creed]”. (Dabiq, 2014: 1, 35) In ISIS’ strategy, military and
violent forces play an important role. We can even notice this
violent philosophy in ISIS’ Dabiq. At the end of the magazine,
they emphasize the military victories of the period adding
some illustrative pictures that can appeal to its readers-target
support and enthusiasm easily. In fact, Gambhir (2014, p.
10) declares that this tactic within the magazine is coherent
because one part of ISIS’ Caliphate vision claims that this
religious authority is “based upon military success and the
ability to retain control in held territories”.
Future scenarios for ISIS
As I have explained before, ISIS and al-Qaeda (AQ) have
different strategies, “even Al-Qaeda considers ISIS’ tactics as
extremely violent” (Bar-On, 2014). ISIS’ success to implement
a proto-state, its triumphs over some regions in Iraq and Syria,
115
the economic power11 that it has and the increasing number
of followers and jihadist combatants it is gaining represent
a difficult time for al-Qaeda and those who oppose to ISIS
around the world. In fact, Zelin points out that:
Annex:
The composition of foreign fighter flows to Syria (and now
to Iraq again) indicates that the movement’s future is being
decided by Saudis, Libyans, Tunisians, and Jordanians. In
terms of Westerners, most of whom come from European
Union countries (three thousand–plus), most are now with ISIS.
Any plots or attacks in the West will thus more likely emanate
from ISIS than from al-Qaeda. (2014, p. 7)
In addition, we are facing a different historic context which is full
of technology and military facilities but at the same time lacks
of a “force like the United States on the ground [like in Iraq in
the 1990s] to consolidate insurgent gains against ISIS” (Zelin,
2014, p. 7). And as long as ISIS keeps collecting victories in
the region, and continues investing in effective propaganda it
would be difficult to impose a counterforce to ISIS.
REFERENCES
Conclusion
Akbarzadeh, S., Mansouri, F. (2007) Islam and Political Violence. London, Great
Britain: I.B. Tauris. Retrieved on 25 October 2014, from ProQuest ebrary.
Radical Islamists organizations will always found their way to
justify its existence within the Quran and hadiths, nevertheless,
these groups did not emerged independently to their political
-regional and international context, so they are not a merely
result of Islam. In fact, we as students and as academics share
certain responsibility on the hijacking of Islam as we don’t
raise our voices when the leaders or the media use wrongly
the concepts of Islam, Islamism and terrorism as if they had
the same meaning. A new wave of radical Islamism has
begun, and this is the right moment to stop the demonization
of Islam. Today, the world media is infested of news related to
ISIS and, with the participation of the social media, it is easy to
interchange those concepts at any time by anyone, damaging
Islam´s image. Gambhir (2014) stated: “ISIS wants to be seen
as the jihadist group that will lead the Muslim community
into worldwide domination”. In the case that ISIS continues
succeeding and it can achieve its goal of implementing the
Islamic Caliphate, we should pay attention on how badly this
would affect Islam and its adherents. If ISIS succeeds, would
Islam be hijacked to a point of no return?
11
116
Source: Zelin, A. (2014). The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of
the Global Jihadist Movement.
Bar-On, T. (2014). Lecture: Islamists movements in the Middle East. Middle East
politics course. México: ITESM Campus Querétaro.
Chérif, M. (2008). Tolerancia e intolerancia en el Islam. Barcelona, España:
Bellaterra.
De la Corte, L., Jordán, J. (2007). La yihad terrorista. Madrid, España: Síntesis.
Fregosi, P. (1998). Jihad in the west. Muslim conquests from the 7th to the 21st
centuries. New York, United States: Prometheus books.
Friedman, T. (2001). World War III. Retrieved on October 24, 2014, from: http://
www.nytimes.com/2001/09/13/opinion/foreign-affairs-world-war-iii.html
Gambhir, K. (2014). Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State.
Retrieved on October 25, 2014, from https://www.understandingwar.org/
backgrounder/dabiq-strategic-messaging-islamic-state
Hotaling, E. (2003). Islam without illusions. Its past, its present, and its challenge
for the future. United States of America: Syracuse University Press.
Huntington, S.(1993). The clash of civilizations? Foreign Affairs (72) 3, p. 22
Some sources like CNN, mention that ISIS’ oil sales are rated between $1 million and $2 million per day.
117
ISIS. (2014). Halab tribal assemblies. Dabiq, 1, pp. 12-15.
------. (2014). A call to Hijrah. Dabiq, 1, p. 17.
------. (2014). Part five: The Islamic State is a true Imamah. Dabiq, 1, pp.
27-29.
------. (2014). From Hijrah to Khilafah. Dabiq, 1, pp. 34-41.
------. (2014). Foreword. Dabiq, 2, pp. 3-4.
------. (2014). It’s either Islamic State or the flood. Dabiq, 2, pp. 5-8.
Kepel, G. (2003). The origins and development of the Jihadist movement:
from anti-comunism to terrorism. Asian Affairs, (34):2, pp. 91-108
Kramer, M. (2011). Hijacking Islam. A religion in danger of deteriorating
into a manifesto for terror. Retrieved on October 22, 2014, from http://www.
meforum.org/76/hijacking-islam
Lahoud, N., Johns, A. (2005). Islam in world politics. New York, United
States: Routledge.
Mozaffari, M. (2007). What is Islamism? History and Definition of a concept.
Totalitarian movements and political religions. Retrieved on October 2, 2014,
from http://pure.au.dk/portal/files/22326292/What_is_Islamism_Totalitarian_
Movements_article.pdf
LA DIÁSPORA Y EL RECONOCIMIENTO
AL ESTADO PALESTINO: LOS CASOS
DE HONDURAS Y EL SALVADOR
Por: Sergio I. Moya Mena
Escuela de Relaciones Internacionales, Universidad Nacional, Costa Rica
Teólogo, licenciado en relaciones internacionales y candidato a doctor en filosofía. Profesor e
investigador de las Escuelas de Relaciones Internaciones de la Universidad Nacional y Ciencias
Políticas de la Universidad de Costa Rica. Coordinador del Centro de Estudios de Medio Oriente y África
del Norte CEMOAN. Autor y co-autor de 17 libros sobre relaciones internacionales, entre ellos: Medio
Oriente Imagen y Conflicto, 2009; El programa nuclear iraní y los desafíos políticos geoestratégicos: tres
enfoques, 2014 y El Islamismo en Túnez: de la independencia al renacer salafista, 2014. Dirección de
correo electrónico: [email protected]
RESUMEN
PALABRAS CLAVE En 1947 los votos de los países centroamericanos fueron
política exterior - Centro América
- Palestina - Israel - diáspora
palestina.
Roy, O. (1995). Geneología del islamismo. Barcelona, España: Bellaterra.
Rushdie, S. (2002). No More Fanaticism as Usual. Retrieved on october 24,
2014 from: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/27/opinion/27RUSH.html
Scott, B. (2014, October 7). Self-funded and deep-rooted: How ISIS makes
its millions. CNN. Consulted on October 23, 2014. Retrieved from: http://
www.cnn.com/2014/10/06/world/meast/isis-funding/
Tibi, B. (2008). Political Islam, World Politics and Europe. Democratic Peace
and Euro-Islam versus Global Jihad. New York, United States: Routledge.
Zelin, A. (2014). The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the
Global Jihadist Movement. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
(20) pp. 1-11.
118
fundamentales para la aprobación de la Resolución 181 que
recomendaba la partición de Palestina. A partir de ese año, muchos
países de la región reafirmaron su apoyo a Israel. Sin embargo, en
los últimos años se ha producido un cambio sustancial en el enfoque
hacia el conflicto árabe-israelí, y en consecuencia, varios países han
reconocido a Palestina como Estado. Una de las razones de este
cambio en la política exterior de los países de América Central ha sido
el intenso cabildeo realizado por la Autoridad Nacional Palestina. Sin
embargo, este artículo demuestra la importancia de otro factor que
hasta ahora ha recibido poca atención por parte de los analistas: el
papel de la diáspora palestina.
ABSTRACT
KEYWORDS In 1947 the votes of Central American countries were fundamental
foreign policy - Central America
- Palestine - Israel - Palestinian
diaspora.
in the approval of Resolution 181 which called for the partition of
Palestine. From that year, many countries in the region reaffirmed
their support for the Zionist project. However, in the last years,
there has been a substantial change in the approach toward the
Arab–Israeli conflict, and some countries have as a consequence
recognized Palestine as a State. One of the reasons for this shift in the
foreign policy of Central American countries has been the intensive
lobbying conducted by the Palestinian National Authority. However,
this article demonstrates the importance of another factor that has so
far received little attention from analysts, i.e. the role of the Palestinian
diaspora.
119
Introducción
A la hora de asumir posicionamientos frente al conflicto árabeisraelí, los países centroamericanos se contaron durante
mucho tiempo entre los aliados más incondicionales de Israel.
No obstante, en los últimos años una mayoría significativa de
países en la región ha reconocido a Palestina como Estado,
y apoya su ingreso como observador en la Organización de
las Naciones Unidas (ONU). Una de las razones que explican
este giro en la política exterior de los países latinoamericanos
es la intensa labor de lobby llevada a cabo por la Autoridad
Nacional Palestina (ANP) en la región. Sin embargo, hay un
factor que hasta el momento no ha recibido suficiente atención:
el papel de la diáspora palestina. En los casos analizados:
Honduras y El Salvador, se muestra que, a pesar de haber sido
culturalmente asimiladas dentro de sus países de acogida,
las comunidades palestinas en El Salvador y Honduras han
experimentado en los últimos años un redescubrimiento
de su identidad y una creciente identificación política con
las aspiraciones nacionales palestinas. Se concluye que
este redescubrimiento de la identidad, junto a la influencia
económica y política de la diáspora en estos dos países,
han ejercido una influencia significativa en el cambio de
una política exterior marcadamente favorable a Israel, a una
política exterior de apoyo a las aspiraciones palestinas y que
se expresa de manera diáfana en el reconocimiento oficial del
Estado Palestino por parte de estos dos países.
El conflicto palestino-israelí a través de los
ojos centroamericanos
En 1947, el voto de los países centroamericanos fue decisivo
en la aprobación de la Resolución 181 de la Asamblea
General de la ONU que propuso la partición de Palestina. A
partir de ese año, el conflicto árabe-israelí fue considerado
por los países del istmo como una confrontación enmarcada
dentro de la Guerra Fría, y casi todos -alineados por los
Estados Unidos- reafirmaron su apoyo al proyecto sionista,
hecho que fue fundamental en la incipiente legitimación
internacional de Israel. Los países de la región se destacaron
por ser algunos de los más entusiastas aliados del Estado de
Israel, y formaron parte del abrumador apoyo latinoamericano
que durante mucho tiempo fue crucial, aportando votos para
asegurar la aprobación de resoluciones de la ONU favorables
a Israel y bloqueando resoluciones hostiles a este (Sharif,
1977, p. 99). Aun cuando los patrones de apoyo a Israel
empiezan a cambiar a mediados de los años setenta y varios
países latinoamericanos asumen posiciones anti-israelíes, no
fue este el caso de los países centroamericanos.
120
La sólida relación que sostuvo Israel con América Central entre
los años setenta y ochenta se fundamentó en buena medida en el
apoyo militar a las dictaduras de derecha. Hacia inicios de los años
ochenta, Israel se convirtió en el principal proveedor de armas de El
Salvador, Guatemala y Nicaragua. Israel llegó a proveer a la dictadura
de Anastasio Somoza en Nicaragua el 98% de sus importaciones
de armas, un hecho que, como lo dijo Israel Shahak, profesor de la
Universidad Hebrea de Jerusalén, resulta muy significativo si se toma
en cuenta que en sus últimos años el régimen asesinó casi a 50.000
personas (Shahak, 2007, p. 47). En los casos de Honduras y El
Salvador, la “cooperación” israelí implicaba, además de la provisión
de armas y equipo electrónico de comunicaciones, adiestramiento
militar en contrainsurgencia y asesoramiento a escuadrones de la
muerte que fueron responsables de numerosas violaciones a los
derechos humanos. La agencia de inteligencia israelí MOSSAD
operaba desde su base regional en Tegucigalpa (Beit-Hallahmi, 1988:
77-90), y en El Salvador asesores israelíes entrenaban a la Agencia
Nacional de Seguridad Salvadoreña (ANSESAL) y a militares, a los
que más tarde se señaló como responsables de masacres de civiles
(Cockburn et al. 1991, p. 238).
Por su dependencia de los EE.UU., y como resultado de la cooperación
en el campo militar, los gobiernos de Honduras, El Salvador, Costa
Rica y Guatemala se convirtieron en algunos de los más fervientes
aliados de Israel. Hacia mediados de los años ochenta, Guatemala
y Nicaragua no habían apoyado una sola resolución crítica hacia
Israel en la ONU, mientras que Honduras sólo había apoyado cuatro
y El Salvador siete. Honduras, El Salvador y Costa Rica incluso
trasladaron sus embajadas de Tel Aviv a Jerusalén, decisión que
irrespetaba una gran cantidad de resoluciones sobre esa ciudad
adoptada por el Consejo de Seguridad o la Asamblea General y que
provocó la ira de los países árabes (Bahbah & Butler, 1986, p. 144).
Por otro lado, aunque las primeras vinculaciones entre América
Central y la lucha de los palestinos por su autodeterminación se
remontan a los años treinta (Moya, 2013, p. 69), es en el marco de la
lucha de las guerrillas izquierdistas que surgen a partir de los años
setenta que se generan contactos directos entre la Organización
para la Liberación de Palestina (OLP) y organizaciones como
el Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, (FSLN) o el Frente
Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), (Norton, 1989,
p. 183). Varios guerrilleros sandinistas tomaron parte en operativos
de distintas facciones palestinas. Uno de estos fue Patricio Argüello
Ryan, que participó junto a la famosa guerrillera palestina Leila Khaled
en un fallido intento del Frente Popular para la Liberación de Palestina
(FPLP), para secuestrar un avión de la aerolínea israelí El Al que
seguía la ruta Tel Aviv-Nueva York. Khaled fue capturada y Argüello
Ryan asesinado. Por otro lado, Jorge Schafik Handal, líder histórico
del FMLN, viajó en varias ocasiones a Medio Oriente y estableció
vínculos con Yasser Arafat y otros líderes palestinos como Nawef
Hawetmeh, comandante del Frente Democrático para la Liberación
121
de Palestina, (FDLP). (Hoffman, 1988, p. 32). Más adelante, con el
triunfo de los sandinistas, la OLP abrió una oficina en Managua,
y Arafat visitó el país para participar en el primer aniversario de la
Revolución Sandinista.
Influencia y activismo
Mientras se desarrollaban estos contactos, el progreso alcanzado por
muchas familias palestinas en El Salvador y Honduras se hacía cada
vez más notable. Actualmente, los palestinos se han consolidado
como una comunidad comercial y económica sumamente influyente
de Honduras. De hecho, la mayoría de los grandes empresarios del
país son de origen palestino.
Originalmente dedicados a las actividades comerciales y algunas
incursiones en la actividad industrial hondureña, familias palestinas
como los Facussé, Andoine, Bendeck, Kafati, Kattan, Larach,
Canahuati, Hasbun, Sikafy, Handal y Kafie, han incursionado también
en el campo de las finanzas (Romero, 2009, p. 73), la generación de
energía y los medios de comunicación. Por ejemplo, Jorge Canahuati
Larach es presidente de dos de los diarios de más tiraje en el país,
La Prensa y El Heraldo, que representan los intereses de los sectores
empresariales más conservadores (Torres, 2009, p. 173).
También en El Salvador, familias como los Sablah, Siman o Bahaia
han llegado a constituir negocios bastante prósperos. Algunas de
estas familias integran sectores económicos que han registrado un
proceso de modernización y diversificación que los ubica en los
sectores más dinámicos de la economía local, como los servicios,
las exportaciones no tradicionales (incluyendo la maquila), el turismo
y el comercio (Segovia, 2005, p. 24).
El poder económico de las comunidades palestinas se ha venido
expresando también en una creciente influencia política. En
Honduras, los palestinos empezaron a abrirse paso entre las élites
políticas desde los años ochenta, pero es la elección de Carlos
Flores Facussé como Presidente de la República en 1998 el hecho
que muestra con más contundencia el peso de esta comunidad.
Flores Facussé es sobrino de Miguel Facussé Barjum, uno de los
hombres de negocios más ricos de Honduras, y que representa
claramente los intereses del grupo empresarial que controla la
economía del país (Amaya, 2012, p. 3). A partir de este significativo
hecho, los palestinos-hondureños han acrecentado su influencia
política, ocupado cargos a nivel ministerial o en el parlamento. Tal es
su poder económico y político que, según Jorge Amaya, profesor de
la UNAH y autor de Los Árabes y Palestinos en Honduras 1900-1950,
el apoyo de algunas de las familias palestinas más influyentes como
los Facussé, Canahuati, Nasser y Atala fue decisivo en el golpe de
Estado que derrocó al presidente Manuel Zelaya en junio de 2009.
122
En El Salvador, durante la Guerra Civil (1979–1992), algunos
palestinos decidieron exiliarse en la ciudad de Miami, mientras
que otros participaron activamente en las guerrillas izquierdistas.
Es el caso del ya mencionado Schafik Handal, hijo de inmigrantes
palestinos, que fue candidato presidencial del FMLN en las
elecciones de 2004. Como un caso inédito en la diáspora palestina
a nivel mundial, en las elecciones de ese año, Handal enfrentó a
otro descendiente de palestinos, Elías Antonio Saca, candidato
de la ultraderechista Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA),
quien a la postre fue electo presidente. Curiosamente, tanto Handal
como Saca pertenecen a familias que emigraron juntas de Belén
en 1913. Actualmente muchos palestinos-salvadoreños participan
activamente en la política, ocupando escaños en el parlamento,
puestos ministeriales y dirigiendo alcaldías.
El activismo de la diáspora y la diplomacia palestina
Las comunidades palestinas en El Salvador y Honduras han
experimentado en los últimos años un redescubrimiento de su
identidad cultural y una creciente identificación política con las
aspiraciones nacionales palestinas. En El Salvador, se constituyó
en 2009 la Asociación Palestina Salvadoreña (APS), con el objetivo
de cohesionar a los salvadoreños de origen palestino, contribuir a
profundizar su integración con el resto de la sociedad salvadoreña
y difundir la cultura árabe-palestina. La APS ha convocado actos
de protestas contra la ocupación israelí y eventos ecuménicos de
solidaridad con los palestinos en los territorios ocupados en los que
han tomado parte líderes religiosos como Munib Younan, presidente
de la Federación Luterana Mundial. Los palestinos-salvadoreños han
demandado también la aplicación de las resoluciones de la ONU, y
han denunciado las violaciones a la libertad de culto impuesta por
Israel en los territorios ocupados, especialmente contra los palestinos
cristianos (el 98% de los palestinos-salvadoreños son cristianos).
Desde su fundación, APS pidió al Gobierno el reconocimiento del
Estado Palestino con sus fronteras de 1967, el establecimiento de
relaciones diplomáticas y el apoyo a Palestina para ingresar en la
ONU. Esta labor de lobby ejercida por los palestinos-salvadoreños
ante el poder ejecutivo y el parlamento, fue un factor decisivo en
el reconocimiento del Estado Palestino por parte del Gobierno de
El Salvador el 25 de agosto de 2011. En esa ocasión, el presidente
Mauricio Funes afirmó que la decisión de reconocer a Palestina
como Estado libre, soberano e independiente buscaba “saldar una
deuda histórica”, y elogió la “activa e importante” diáspora palestina
en El Salvador.
Un día después de que El Salvador reconociera al Estado Palestino, el
Gobierno de Honduras, encabezado por el presidente Porfirio Lobo,
tomó la misma medida, reconociendo a Palestina como “Estado
libre, soberano e independiente”. En esta decisión igualmente fue
determinante el apoyo de la influyente comunidad palestina, bien
123
representada en el Gobierno por Mario Canahuati, Ministro
de Relaciones Exteriores. Cabe decir que, el apoyo de la
comunidad palestina local al reconocimiento del Estado
Palestino no se remitía únicamente a factores políticos,
algunos analistas señalan que había un interés por atraer
inversión de los países árabes (Colbert, 2011).
La diplomacia palestina en acción
A partir del reconocimiento, la diplomacia palestina
incorporó a América Central dentro de las prioridades
de su política hacia Latinoamérica. En este esfuerzo
participaron activamente, tanto el Canciller palestino
Riad Al-Malik, como el embajador palestino en la
ONU Riyad Mansour y el embajador en Nicaragua,
Mohamed Saadat. Unos días antes del reconocimiento,
Al-Malik participó en la III Cumbre de Jefes de
Estado y de Gobierno del Sistema de la Integración
Centroamericana (SICA) y de la Comunidad del Caribe
(CARICOM) con el fin de abogar por el reconocimiento
al Estado Palestino. En sus declaraciones el Canciller
palestino hizo referencia a la diáspora afirmando que:
“si bien Palestina está ubicada en otro continente,
nuestras historias no son tan diferentes y nuestros
conciudadanos forman parte hoy de la vida de sus
pueblos” (citado por Hasfura, 2011, p. 10). Aunque el
asunto no fue tratado formalmente durante la Cumbre,
Al-Malik tuvo la oportunidad de hablar bilateralmente
con todas las delegaciones participantes para pedir su
apoyo a Palestina.
Dos meses después, en octubre de 2011, el presidente
de la Autoridad Palestina, Mahmud Abbas visitó
El Salvador para agradecer al presidente Funes el
reconocimiento que El Salvador otorgara al Estado
palestino, y para reunirse con la comunidad palestina
local. Unos días después, El Salvador, Honduras y el
resto de países centroamericanos (con la excepción
de Panamá), apoyaron el ingreso de Palestina a la
Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Educación,
la Ciencia y la Cultura (UNESCO), y en noviembre de
ese año, ambos países otorgaron un voto a favor de
la resolución para incluir al Estado palestino como
observador de la ONU, lo cual condujo directamente al
establecimiento de las relaciones diplomáticas.
124
En mayo de 2013 el canciller palestino Al-Malik llevó a cabo
una gira por América Central. Con Honduras y El Salvador,
se firmaron acuerdos encaminados al establecimiento de
embajadas permanentes. En Honduras, los cancilleres de
ambos países firmaron un comunicado conjunto para el
establecimiento formal de relaciones diplomáticas y el fomento
de relaciones de entendimiento, amistad y cooperación, que
favorezcan el progreso humano, cultural y técnico, así como
el desarrollo económico de ambas naciones. Al terminar la
gira, Al-Malik afirmó que había percibido un apoyo muy fuerte
y claro “de América Latina y el Caribe para el reconocimiento
de Palestina como Estado”.
La reacción de Israel y los sectores cristianossionistas
El acercamiento a Palestina, su reconocimiento como Estado
y el establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas, han implicado
una transformación histórica en las estrechas relaciones que
Honduras y El Salvador mantenían con Israel, cuyo gobierno
reaccionó con sorpresa e indignación ante la nueva relación
establecida con Palestina. En el caso de Honduras, a
pesar de que el gobierno de este país declaró que “seguía
reconociendo el derecho de Israel, a un territorio propio y a
poder convivir en paz dentro de fronteras estables y seguras”,
Israel reaccionó con resentimiento ante el giro diplomático.
Cuando Honduras abogó en agosto de 2011 para que
Palestina fuera reconocida ante la ONU, el embajador israelí,
Elihau López, dijo:
(…) recibir de un país y de un presidente amigo una decisión
sin consultar con nosotros, eso no se hace, son cosas que
no se hacen entre gobiernos amigos. (…) Nosotros no
merecemos recibir una decisión de esta naturaleza, es un
obstáculo para la paz. Es como un cuchillo al corazón de
Israel, (El Heraldo, Tegucigalpa).
En Jerusalén, el Director General Adjunto para América Latina,
Dorit Shavit, llamó al embajador hondureño para expresarle
la “sorpresa” y “decepción” del gobierno israelí y para
recordarle que “Israel había estado junto a Honduras hace
dos años, cuando pasó por una crisis institucional que llevó a
la condena generalizada en todo el mundo”, aparentemente
una referencia al golpe militar de junio de 2009 que derrocó al
ex presidente José Manuel Zelaya (Keinon, 2011). En efecto,
125
Israel fue uno de los primeros cinco países en reconocer al
régimen de facto tras el golpe de Estado. Después de estas
reacciones, iniciales, las autoridades israelíes minimizaron el
masivo reconocimiento a Palestina como algo meramente
“simbólico”. El Viceministro de Exteriores israelí, Danny
Ayalon afirmó “que era muy fácil para los palestinos ganar el
apoyo de países que han tenido poca influencia en el Medio
Oriente”1. En términos generales Tel Aviv atribuyó este giro
diplomático a la “falta de acción” de EE.UU. hacia América
Latina y la “creciente influencia de Irán” en la región.
Quizás uno de los aspectos más interesantes y novedosos en
el proceso de reconocimiento del Estado Palestino ha sido la
irrupción de los grupos evangélicos de orientación cristianosionista que, en el caso de Honduras, han sido los sectores
de la sociedad civil que se han opuesto con más virulencia
al reconocimiento y en general a las aspiraciones nacionales
palestinas. Después de la participación del Canciller Al-Malik
en la Cumbre del SICA, dirigentes evangélicos hondureños
invitaron al embajador israelí, Eliahú López, a un acto de
solidaridad con Israel en el que le manifestaron “el apoyo
total de los más de dos millones quinientos mil hondureños
evangélicos a Israel”2. Más adelante, en ocasión del
establecimiento de relaciones diplomáticas con Palestina
en mayo de 2013, Alberto Solórzano, presidente de la
Confraternidad Evangélica de Honduras (CEH), manifestó
que “la iglesia evangélica se oponía al establecimiento de
relaciones con Palestina”, advirtiendo que se cumplía la
promesa bíblica de que “aquellos que bendijeren a Israel,
serían benditos, y los que lo maldijeren, serían malditos”3.
1
2
3
126
Some sources like CNN, mention that ISIS’ oil sales are rated between $1 million and $2 million per day.
En Evangélicos de Honduras respaldaron a Israel en el conflicto con los palestinos, Agencia Judía de Noticias, 24
agosto 2011
Conclusiones
La diáspora palestina en Honduras y El Salvador
presenta un caso sui generis de progreso y éxito
económico, elementos que en las últimas décadas
están vinculados a un redescubrimiento de la identidad
cultural y una creciente influencia política. El reencuentro
con las aspiraciones nacionales palestinas ha
convergido con una intensa labor de lobby diplomático
llevada a cabo por la ANP en la región y una pérdida de
influencia de los EE.UU. en América Latina, factores que
han posibilitado un cambio significativo en el enfoque
tradicional de estos dos países hacia el conflicto
palestino-israelí y que les ha hecho pasar de ser unos
de los más incondicionales aliados de Israel, a apoyar
decididamente las aspiraciones nacionales del pueblo
palestino, reconocer oficialmente al Estado Palestino y
establecer relaciones diplomáticas.
Aun cuando el impacto de este giro diplomático en
el marco general del conflicto palestino-israelí es
limitado, sí se trata de un cambio significativo para
las relaciones internacionales entre América Latina (y
América Central en particular) y Medio Oriente. Por
un lado, la activa diplomacia palestina en América
Latina ha logrado el reconocimiento de 18 de los
21 países de la región. En el caso de Honduras y El
Salvador, se ha aprovechado el papel de una diáspora
económicamente poderosa y políticamente influyente,
para restar espacios diplomáticos a Israel e incrementar
su creciente aislamiento internacional. Por otro lado,
este giro diplomático es señal de que Latinoamérica
quiere expresar independencia frente a los EE.UU. en
un conflicto que durante décadas quedó enmarcado
dentro de los parámetros de la Guerra Fría y de paso,
aprovechar los crecientes lazos económicos de la
región hacia el Mundo Árabe.
Iglesia evangélica critica establecimiento de relaciones con Palestina, Proceso Digital (2013). Autor anónimo.
127
REFERENCIAS
Amaya, J. (2006). Los árabes y palestinos en Honduras (1900-1950).
Tegucigalpa: Editorial Guaymuras.
---------(2012): Los árabes en Honduras. Reportes del CEMOAN No. 2. Centro
de Estudios de Medio Oriente y África del Norte. Universidad Nacional,
Heredia.
Bahbah, B. & Butler, L. (1986). Israel and Latin America: the military connection.
New York: St. Martin´s Press.
Beit-Hallahmi, B. (1988). Israel Connection. Barcelona: Ediciones B.
Cockburn, A. et al. (1991). Dangerous Liaison. New York: Harper Perennial.
---------(Coordinador) (2004): Democracia, legislación electoral y sistema de
partidos en Honduras. Tegucigalpa: Centro de Documentación de Honduras.
Moya, S. (2013). Los árabes y el poder económico y político en Centroamérica:
los casos de Honduras y El Salvador. En Baltar, E, & Marroni, M. Viejas y nuevas
migraciones forzadas en el sur de México, Centroamérica y el Caribe. México:
Universidad de Quintana Roo.
Norton, R. & Greenberg, M. (1989). The international relations of the Palestine
Liberation Organization. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
Romero, R (2009). Los grupos financieros y el poder político. En Meza, V,
(2009). et. al Honduras: poderes fácticos y sistema de partidos. Tegucigalpa:
Centro de Documentación de Honduras.
Colbert, J. (2011). Honduras y el voto palestino – no sin la abdicación americana.
Heritage
Segovia, A. (2005): Integración real y grupos de poder económico en América
Central. Implicaciones para la democracia y el desarrollo de la región. San
José: Fundación Friedrich Ebert,
Faroohar, M. (2011). Palestinians in Central America: from temporary emigrants
to a permanent diaspora. Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol, XL, (No.3).
Shahak, I. (2007). El Estado de Israel armó las dictaduras en América Latina.
Buenos Aires: Editorial Cannán.
Hasfura, R. (2011). Palestina, ¿un Estado independiente? Revista Usul, (No. 8).
Sharif, R. (1977). Latin America and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Journal of Palestine
Studies, ( 7), pp. 98-122.
Hoffman, B. (1988): The PLO and Israel in Central America: The Geopolitical
Dimension. Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation.
Hunter, J. (1987). Israeli Foreign Policy: South Africa and Central America.
Boston: South End Press.
Torre, M. (2009). El poder de los señores mediáticos de Honduras. En Meza,
V, (2009). et. al Honduras: poderes fácticos y sistema de partidos. Tegucigalpa:
Centro de Documentación de Honduras.
Jamail, M. & Gutiérrez, M. (1986). Israel in Central America: Nicaragua,
Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica. MERIP Middle East Report (No. 140).
Kaufman, E. & Shapira, Y. (1979). Israel-Latin American Relations. New
Brunswick: Transaction Books.
Keinon, H. (2011). J’lem protests Honduran support for PA statehood bid. The
Jerusalem Post.
Khoury, S. (2011). Posición de los cristianos sobre las restricciones a sus
derechos religiosos. Revista Usul, (No. 8).
Mesa, V. et al (2009): Honduras: poderes fácticos y sistema de partidos.
Tegucigalpa: Centro de Documentación de Honduras.
128
129
THE APOCALYPTIC WAR AGAINST
GOG OF MAGOG. MARTIN BUBER
VERSUS MEIR KAHANE
Por: Rico Sneller
Leiden University, the Netherlands
Rico Sneller is Assistant Professor of Philosophical Anthropology and Philosophy of Culture, Institute
for Philosophy, Faculty of the Humanities, Leiden University (Netherlands). He recently published
with two colleagues Wild Beasts of the Philosophical Desert. Philosophers on Telepathy and Other
Exceptional Experiences, Cambridge Publishing 2014. Corresponding Author’s Email: h.w.sneller@
hum.leidenuniv.nl
ABSTRACT
KEYWORDS In this article a confrontation on the classic Gog/Magog motive (end
apocalypticism, Gog and Magog,
Martin Buber, Meir Kahane,
religious extremism
time battle between God and evil) is enacted between two opposite
Jewish thinkers: Martin Buber and Meir Kahane. It shows how and on
what conditions the biblical text can be interpreted so differently. The
article also tries to shed a more general light on the chances and risks
at stake in end-of-time accounts.
Introduction
Apocalyptic end of time speculations and assumptions about
concomitant violence have always existed. One of these speculations
can be identified as the Gog of Magog prophecy in the Hebrew bible
(Ezekiel 38-39). It is referred to in the Greek New Testament in the
Book of Revelation. In the Gog of Magog prophecy, a final battle
between Israel’s God and a Prince of Evil is described, a certain king
Gog of Magog. Gog is finally to be slain on Israel’s plains, after he will
have attempted to destroy Israel.
One can imagine that this sort of prophecies displaying a conclusive
war between God and Evil at the end of times, have attracted variegate
interpretations all throughout history. Some of these interpretations
seem to have legitimized sacred violence, others have strictly
forbidden this, arguing that God alone will fulfill our world’s messianic
destiny. Violence as such, though, had seemed unavoidable to all
interpreters. It was supposed to be an eschatological necessity
anyhow. In this chapter I will confront two radically opposed views of
the Gog prophecy, viz. Martin Buber’s approach in his novel Gog und
Magog. Eine Chronik (1949) (Cf. Martin Buber, 2009, 278f.), and Meir
Kahane’s, in his Or hara’ ayon (The Jewish Idea), a two-volume book
that was published posthumously in 1998.
130
Martin Buber (1878-1965) was a German Jewish author who
had collected many Hasidic tales and traditions among Jews
in pre-War Eastern Europe. By doing so, he has preserved
them for posterity, as most of the Hasidic story-tellers have
been slaughtered by the Nazis. Buber’s general spiritual
orientation was mystical, he sought for connections between
Jewish, Buddhist and Hindu mystical traditions. Peace-minded
as Buber was, he not only paid many efforts to reconcile postWar Germany and the State of Israel, but he also made a hard
case for a mutual recognition of Jews and Palestinians on
Israel’s territory.
Meir Kahane (1932-1990) was a radical American-Israeli rabbi
who created the Jewish Defense League in the US to protect
Jewish interests all over the world, especially in the USSR.
After his emigration to Israel he launched the Kach-party, a
party that promoted the mandatory expulsion of Arabs from
Israeli territory. This party was banned and delegitimized by
the Israeli Supreme Court after a few years. In 1990 Kahane
was killed by an Egyptian activist in New York.
The Gog of Magog prophecy
Let’s have a short look at the prophetic text of Ezekiel itself.
In the Jewish liturgy, the Gog of Magog chapters are publicly
read at the end of the feast week starting with Yom Kippur (Day
of Atonement), followed by Sukkot (Feast of Tabernacles) and
ending with Simhat Torah (Rejoicing of the Torah) on the “eighth
day”. The Tanakh lectionary already indicates the mutually
implicative relation, one could say, between ‘atonement’ on
the one hand, and the inevitable struggle against and the
victory over the forces of Evil, on the other.
I will briefly mention here some elements of Ezekiel 38-39.
Gog of Magog, the Prince of a northern nation, is aiming to
besiege the people of Israel. To do so he will gather many
other peoples and their kings.
(Ch. 38) 8. From many days you [i.e. Gog] will be
remembered; at the end of the years you will come to a land
[whose inhabitants] returned from the sword, gathered from
many peoples, upon the mountains of Israel, which had been
continually laid waste, but it was liberated from the nations,
and they all dwelt securely.
9. And you will ascend; like mist you will come; like a cloud to
cover the earth you will be; you and all your wings and many
peoples with you.
131
10. So said the Lord God: It will come to pass on that day that
words will enter your heart and you will think a thought of evil.
11. And you will say, “I shall ascend upon a land of open cities;
I shall come upon the tranquil, who dwell securely; all of them
living without a wall, and they have no bars or doors.
12. To take spoil and to plunder loot, to return your hand upon
the resettled ruins and to a people gathered from nations,
acquiring livestock and possessions, dwelling on the navel of
the earth.
While the Ezekiel text can be seen as the root text of the Gog of Magog
tradition, its distorted echoes can be found not only in the Revelation
of John in the New Testament (cf. Rieuwerd Buitenwerf, 2007), but also
in the Sibylline Oracles, and the Qur’an (Sura 18, 83-98). The Qur’an
describes how an enigmatic ruler called Dhul Qarnayn is called upon
to liberate a defenseless people from the mischief of Ya’juj and Ma’juj.
The iron wall he builds to protect it hereafter will, however, be removed
at the end of times. Sura 21 speaks about a “prohibition upon [the
people of] a city which We [i.e. Allah] have destroyed that they will
[ever] return, until [the dam of] Gog and Magog has been opened
and thou shall see them, from every higher ground, descending.” A
hadith called Al-Bukhari claims that the city of Jerusalem is referred
to in this Sura.
The people of Israel are living in ignorance about these plans,
they are dwelling without any defense. God himself, however,
will finally slay Gog of Magog and its armies, in order to
sanctify his name among the nations:
Who is this ‘Gog’? Though it is not my aim here to engage in a separate
exegesis of this mysterious text, it is perhaps worth mentioning that
history has shown diverse explanations, varying from king Gyges –
Gugu ¬– of Lydia (historically the most probable exegesis) to Babel,
the Romans, Attila, the Khazars, the Eastern European Jews (sic!),
Napoleon, etc. Any enemy could be filled in, so it seems. The XV
Century Spanish-Portuguese rabbi Abarbanel identifies Gog in his
biblical commentaries with the ‘Ishmaelites’, i.e. the Arabs. Levinas
tends to connect Gog and Magog with Hitler and Stalin.1 Old English
traditions have it that a giant called Goemagog, an original inhabitant
of the Island, was conquered and thrown into the sea. Michael
Drayton (1563-1631) writes in his Poly-Olbion:
(Ch. 38) 21. And I will call the sword against him [i.e. Gog]
upon all My mountains, says the Lord God: every man’s sword
shall be against his brother.
22. And I will judge against him with pestilence and with
blood, and rain bringing floods, and great hailstones, fire, and
brimstone will I rain down upon him and upon his hordes and
upon the many peoples that are with him.
23. And I will reveal Myself in My greatness and in My holiness
and will be recognized in the eyes of many nations, and they
will know that I am the Lord.
Finally, all nations will know that God had exiled his people for
its iniquity and betrayal of God:
Amongst the ragged Cleeves those monstrous giants sought:
Who (of their dreadful kind) t’appal the Trojans brought
Great Gogmagog, an oake that by the roots could teare;
(Ch. 39) 24. According to their defilement and according to
their transgressions I did to them, and I hid My face from them.
25. Therefore, so said the Lord God: Now I shall return to the
captivity of Jacob, and I shall have compassion on the House
of Israel, and I shall be zealous for My Holy Name.
26. And they shall bear their disgrace and all their treachery
that they committed against Me when they dwell on their land
securely with no one frightening them.
27. When I return them from the peoples and gather them from
the lands of their enemies, I shall be sanctified through them
before the eyes of many nations.
28. And they will know that I am the Lord their God when I exile
them to the nations, and I shall gather them to their land, and
I shall no longer leave any of them there.
29. And I shall no longer hide My face from them, for I shall
have poured out My spirit upon the House of Israel,” says the
Lord God.
A few miles south of Cambridge the Gog Magog Downs can be
found, which name can be tracked down to the old tradition. An Irish
tradition even claims that the Irish people are the offspring of a Magog
(Japhet’s son, according to the biblical book of Genesis, 10, 2-3).
Obviously all these explanations are hardly more than folklore.
Unless one reinterpret the concept of the ‘apocalyptic’ itself, but that
would lead us astray here. Explanations of Gog-like prophesies are
always hazardous undertakings (which does not mean that they are
necessarily false). As Buber observes in his commentary to Gog und
Magog, three Hasidic rabbis who speculated on Gog’s identity died
in the same year (see below).
1
132
“La guerre de Gog et Magog, le XXe siècle et son avenir ou sa crainte nucléaire, achèveront-ils notre maturité ou
notre vieillesse de modernes façonnées par les promesses et les philosophies de l’histoire et du progrès et du
messianisme, ou se laisseront-elles se consoler par la bonté invincible, mais désarmée, des justes et des saints,
prétendument meilleure que le « souvenir de la sortie d’Egypte » ?” E. Levinas, 1988, 103.
133
Messianic tensions
Ketubbot 111a). These oaths (or vows) have been subject to frequent
debates as to their authoritative (‘halakhic’) status. Anti-Zionists have
at least insisted on their binding character: Jews, so they maintained,
are not allowed to massively settle in the holy land, let alone establish
their own independent Jewish state (cf. Ravietzky 1996, 211-234;
Firestone, 2006, pp. 954-982). By doing so, they would “force the
end”, or bring about a self-willed human redemption, which would be
a grave wrongdoing against God’s plans. Ravietzky quotes the antiZionist Rabbi Kahane-Shapira (1871-1943), who stated:
The explanations of ‘Gog’ in the Jewish tradition can hardly
be dissolved from messianic expectations. Although Ezekiel
itself does not refer to a coming messiah, the text nonetheless
refers to a divine deliverance of the Jewish people from harm
and threat. This deliverance, so the prophecy suggests, can
only take place once the Jews have been brought back to their
land. We will see that this element, the so-called ‘ingathering
of the exiles’, plays a key role in Meir Kahane’s approach of
the text.
Heaven forbid that we walk in the ways of these sinful people, who
strive for natural redemption. The striving is forbidden… The act of
teshuvah (repentance) alone is a legitimate means to hasten the End,
but acts of ingathering [the exiles] and of bringing [Israel to their land]
depend solely upon the hand of God: ‘Unless the Lord builds the
house, its builders labor in vain on it; unless the Lord watches over
the city, the watchman keeps vigil in vain’ [Ps. 127:1].2
The importance of the ingathering of the Jewish exiles was
central to all different forms of Zionism that arose by the end
of the XIX Century. In order to provide a background to the
apocalyptic Gog of Magog prophecy I will first give a brief
overview here of some noteworthy religious Jewish attitudes
towards Zionism. A very good study on this subject on which I
am largely dwelling here has been written by Aviezer Ravietzky,
Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism. (Also
cf. Kriegel, 2000, pp. 153-165) It goes without saying that the
creation of the state of Israel in 1948 was a major, astounding
event that influenced the already extant ideas among the
Diaspora Jews about a future Jewish state.
Post-war rabbis such as Joel Teitelbaum (1887-1979) do not hesitate
to see the creation of the State of Israel as a catastrophe of the same
order as the holocaust. They consequently downgrade any moderate
form of redemption realized by human means (viz. the fallible State of
Israel created in 1948). The only acceptable form, to them, is radical,
full redemption, which can only be realized by God himself. Jewish
visitors of the recent Iranian ‘holocaust conference’ for the most part
come from these circles (e.g. Neturei Karta).
Anti-Zionism: Neturei Karta
Haredi Jewry
Anti-Zionism prior and subsequent to the creation of the State of
Israel (if not the holocaust) clearly makes much of a difference.
However, anti-Zionism has not altogether disappeared and
become extinct after 1948, as the fanatically anti-Zionist
Neturei Karta movement has shown. Anti-Zionist movements
in contemporary Jewry reach back by and large to Hasidic
traditions originating in Eastern Europe. It is self-evident,
though, that anti-Zionist sentiments only resurge at times in
which certain Jewish circles actively promote settlement in the
holy land. Be this as it may, none of the Jewish voices either
promoting or prohibiting such settling had expected the actual
establishment of a truly Jewish state in 1948.
The Lubavitcher Rebbe Rabbi Shalom Dov Baer Schneerson
was one of the main castigators of XIX Century Zionism.
Drawing on the so-called ‘three oaths’ he strictly declined any
human effort to autonomously re-establish an independent
Jewish state, as such would be the sole Messiah’s
responsibility. These three oaths refer to a Talmudic passage
which 1) defends the Jews from “ascending the wall” (i.e. to
massively settle in the holy land), 2) adjures Israel “not to rebel
against the nations of the world”, and 3) adjures these nations
“not to oppress Israel too much” (cf. Babylonian Talmud
134
Radical though the contemporary opposition may seem
between orthodox anti-Zionists (such as Neturei Karta) and
orthodox Zionists (such as mainstream Haredi Jewry), they
share common Hasidic roots. The majority of the orthodox
Jews today have accepted, albeit not always wholeheartedly,
the existence of the State of Israel. However, such acceptance
has only become possible at the price of a neutralization of this
State’s religious significance for them. For just as well as the
Neturei Karta ‘fanatics’, they believe in the sole divine agency
in matters of human redemption. The Jews themselves, they
think, should remain purely passive and just persevere in the
daily observance of the halakhic rules.
Ravietzky distinguishes in fact two Haredi responses to the
reality of the Jewish State of Israel: one of them corresponding
to the aforementioned “religious indifference to the politicalhistorical dimension”, whereas the other is “moved by the
2
A.B. Steinberg, Da‘at ha-rabbanim (Warsaw, 1902), p.39, in: Ravietzky, 18.
135
ways of Providence in current history”. “They share a common
consciousness of exile”, Ravietzky continues, “that does
not allow an effective place for mundane Jewish activity, for
collective national initiative that shapes the course of history.”
(Ravietzky, p.161).
Haredi circles have always taken extremely seriously traditional
notions such as the “birthpangs of the Messiah” or the “footsteps
of the Messiah”, which refer to events generally supposed to
precede divine redemption, and frequently identified with the
Gog of Magog prophecy. The Haredis apply these notions
to the increased suffering and persecution of Jews on the
one hand, and to wide-spread religious transgression on the
other. Shortly before the holocaust Rabbi Elhanan Bunem
Wasserman writes in his Ikveta de-meshiha (Footsteps of the
Messiah): “In our days, which are the footsteps of the Messiah,
in which the heretics are the leaders of the generation, and
do not permit Torah scholars to raise their heads, and wage
open war upon the Torah… [there is] a terrible situation the
likes of which we have not experienced since Israel became
a people.” (Ikveta di-meshihah, pp. 6ff., in Ravietzky, p. 171).
It is striking that similar quotations can be found by post-war
thinkers such as Rabbi Schach. In a harangue addressed to
‘secular’ Jewish leaders he contends: “We see a terrible and
frightening sight. A collective revolt against the kingdom of
heaven. […] According to our own conviction and faith, those
who presume to maintain the state are those who endanger
it”. (Mikhtavim u-ma’amarim, pp. 6, 13, in Ravietzky, 178, 179.)
Religious Zionism: Rav Kook
The contemporary Israeli Settler’s Block, Gush Emunim, overtly
claims loyalty to Rav Kook, both son (Zvi Yehuda, 1881-1981)
and father (Avraham, 1865-1935). Whether this claim is always
justified cannot be answered here. Only their religious Zionism
puts such a tremendous weight upon the ongoing colonization
of the Land that it takes this colonization to be a precondition,
rather than the upshot, of the future redemption. Avraham
Kook draws here upon the Talmudic notion of the athalta dege’ulah, the beginning of redemption. Only collective human
activity, so Kook claims, can bring about this beginning, which
will only be completed by the Messiah. According to Kook,
“Zionism is a heavenly matter”. “The State of Israel is a divine
entity, our holy and exalted state!” (Z.Y. Kook, Le-hilkhot tzibbur
pp. 244, 246, in Ravietzky, 82; also cf. A.I. Kook, 1978)
136
The Kooks continue older traditions dating from the 19th
Century, e.g. those upheld by the ‘Harbingers of Zion’. These
idealistic-minded rabbis saw redemption as closely linked
to settling in the holy land. As opposed to the Kooks, they
did not see this as a process also requiring severe crises
(‘birthpangs’). If one would go further back into history, one
could also think of the Nahmanides (13th Century) or Judah
he-Hasid (1700), who already actively stimulated Jewish
immigration in the Land of Israel.
Religious Zionism differs from the two previously mentioned
approaches (i.e. Neturei Karta and the Haredis) in that it makes
redemption conditional; human agency is required to prepare
for the coming of the Messiah. As opposed to what we will find
in Kahane, however, it also sees a positive role for ‘secular’
or ‘political’ Zionism. As a Hegelian philosopher in disguise,
Kook the Elder would affirm that, “if the secularists represented
the unconscious workings of the Jewish spirit, the religious
Zionists […] would raise this spirit to the level of conscious
choice.” (Ravietzky, p. 122)
Martin Buber and immanent redemption
Let us return to the Gog prophecy more explicitly. Martin
Buber has dedicated the only novel he wrote to this propheticapocalyptic text. Gog und Magog is a ‘chronicle’ (cf. Friedman
2002, 1955, Ch. 18, and HaCohen, in Buber, 2009, pp. 9-35),
a record of discussions between Hasidic zaddikim, roughly
between 1793 and 1815. Hasidism is a XVIII Century Jewish
mystical revival movement, born in Eastern Europe with the
teachings of the Baal Shem Tov, the ‘great teacher’ (magid
gadol) or the Besht (an acrostic). Hasidic communities are
generally centered around a zaddik, a holy rabbi whose
religious and moral injunctions are considered to be binding
for all his followers.
The chronicle’s protagonists are the ‘Seer of Lublin’ (Yaacov
Yitzak), his disciple, ‘the Jew’ (Yehudi, der Jude) of Pžysha
(whose proper name is, as a matter of coincidence, also
Yaakov Yitzak), and some other rabbis. The ‘Seer’ and Yehudi
represent two religious positions that together undoubtedly
make up for Buber’s own inner struggle. (Friedman 2002, Ch.
18 and HaCohen 2009, p. 22f) These two positions do not
just regard the interpretation of the Gog of Magog prophecy
but, more generally, two opposite tendencies within Hasidism
137
as such. Even a third position can be distinguished,
i.e. Rabbi Menachem Mendel’s. Though in the wider
context of the book Menachem Mendel plays a smaller
role, I think his views can be seen as a ‘shadow’ (to use
a Jungian term) of the Seer’s. It can even be defended
that they virtually anticipate to Meir Kahane’s approach,
as we will see. However, these views rely upon the more
basic ones which are held by the Seer of Lublin himself.
Actually, in the wake of Gog und Magog Buber published
another, similar though non-narrative text: Bilder von
Gut und Böse (‘Images of Good and Evil’), in which
especially Yehudi’s views return but now assimilated to
Buber’s own. (Buber 1952)
Moshe Idel does not hesitate to compare the role of the zaddik
to the shaman, who also functions as a vessel to convey divine
influxes. (Idel, 1995, pp. 214, 218, 225; Idel, 2005, pp. 148-150)
In the introduction to Der grosse Magid und seine Nachfolge
Buber writes about the Seer of Lublin:
He was filled with ceaseless waiting for the hour of redemption
and finally initiated and played the chief part in the secret rites
[jener geheimnisvollen Handlung] which he and certain other
zaddikim … performed with the purpose of converting the
Napoleonic wars into the pre-Messianic final battle of Gog and
Magog. The three leaders in this mystic procedure all died in
the course of the following year. They had ‘forced [bedrängt]
the end,’ they died at its coming. The magic, which the Baal
Shem had held in check, broke loose and did its work of
destruction. (Buber, 1927, 395)3
According to Yaakov Yitzhak the Seer of Lublin, ‘Gog’
refers to Napoleon, someone who also comes from the
‘North’ or the ‘Northwest’ (of Israel) and who destroys
many countries. Yaakov Yitzhak ‘the Jew’, however,
internalizes the Gog prophecy, applying it to the socalled yetzer hara, the traditional Hebrew name for the
‘evil inclination’ in the human heart.
As stated previously, the Seer’s position is radicalized by Rabbi
Menachem Mendel, a rigorous rabbi who is very restrained
in matters of exuberant clothing and of giving in to life’s
pleasures. Just as other rabbis, so it is said, he believes in “the
influence of the Zaddikim on the course of events”. Like the
Seer of Lublin, he thinks it is “the duty of the Zaddikim to make
Napoleon into Gog. Yet his meaning and our Rabbi’s meaning
are not identical. He interprets it as praying and taking spiritual
risks that Napoleon may be the universal victor [Beten und
Sich-Einsetzen, dass Napoleon alles besiege].” (Buber, 2009,
p. 205; trans. p. 222) In a discussion with Yehudi, Mendel even
remarks: “God […] is with us, wherever we are and however
we are constituted. But the dawn of His kingdom can arise
only among us, only in Israel, when, and not before there exists
this ‚in‘, this place within us [nicht eher als bis es dieses ‘in’,
diesen Ort gibt].“ (Buber, 2009, p. 213; trans. p. 232) Mendel’s
logic, we could add here, reminds us of some of the Russian
revolutionaries who wanted to await Russia’s becoming an
industrialized nation with a proletariat of its own before starting
the revolution itself. It manifests certain Gnostic traits already
inherent, though less clearly, to the Seer’s views.
More generally speaking, the Seer represents a line in
Hasidism which has a magic, if not theurgist orientation.
The zaddik is taken as a vessel or an intermediary
between God and the religious community. By means of
magical ‘incantations’ he intends to accelerate or hasten
the end. For if Napoleon is indeed the announced ‘Gog’,
as the Seer claims, the final redemption is near.
We have already met with the notion of “hastening the
end” before, in Rabbi Kahane-Shapira. This rabbi had
warned against Zionism, which he saw as a dangerous
hastening of the end of times. A more general caveat
in the Jewish tradition has it that he who “hastens the
end” by eliciting the forces of evil, risks to bring about
unprecedented catastrophes. Had not Maimonides
already emphasized that the future messianic redemption
would come as a natural process, independent of
human interference? However, despite such warnings,
a certain strand in Hasidism still attempted to hasten the
end by magical practices and procedures. This magical
strand has often been neglected in Hasidism research,
due to the ‘romantic’ conception invigorated by thinkers
as Martin Buber himself. The Israeli Kabbala expert
138
The other protagonist in Gog und Magog, Yaakov Yitzak ‘the
Jew’ (Yehudi), however, interprets Gog as the “evil inclination”
within, the yetzer hara. “The Yehudi kept on the other side of
3
The German original lacks the final sentence (“they died at its coming. The magic, which the Baal Shem had held in
check, broke loose and did its work of destruction”), it just reads “Sie hatten das Ende bedrängt; sie verbrannten in
seinem Anhauch.“ Trans. 1948, p. 33.
139
the realm of magic”, Buber writes in his introduction to Der
grosse Magid, “which the Seer and his friends entered at that
time in an attempt to reach the Messianic sphere by affecting
current events; he did not wish to hasten the end [das Ende
bedrängen], but to prepare man for the end.” (Buber, 1927, p.
398; trans. p. 35)
The oral traditions that have inspired Buber’s chronicle relate
that Yehudi was sacred on a perhaps even more profound,
if not an altogether different level. Being the Seer’s disciple,
Yehudi was supposed to have reached spiritual altitudes that
made him even long for physical death. The Seer himself,
so these traditions assert, was not able to understand his
disciple’s views from the latter’s own viewpoints. Yehudi
was inspired by a sense of urgency which made him call for
immediate repentance: ““Turn! [Kehret um]“, he cried to them,
“Turn quickly for the day is near [denn die Zeit ist kurz: ‚time
is short’]. There is not time for new migration of souls [keine
Frist mehr verbleibt für neue Wanderung], redemption is close.“
(Buber 1927, p. 398; trans. p. 373) In more general terms, one
could say that Yehudi, when compared to his master, showed
a tendency towards internalizing faith.4 Doctrine and prayer,
in his teachings, were to fuse into one service. ‘Magic’, then,
would be a mere outward means of living one’s faith, the use
of it as an instrument. To put this in still other terms, extending
the drift of the argument: in the Seer’s eyes even evil can be
used by the zaddik in order to achieve the good, for God will
transform the effects of his actions or ‘manipulations’ into
the opposite. Yehudi, however, contends that such attempts
run the risk of assimilating good to evil. Evil must simply be
endured, just as God himself endures it. Only God can finally
transform evil into good; in man’s hands it will only get worse.
The following passage is taken from a dialogue between
Yehudi and his master, the Seer: “Rabbi”, he said in an almost
failing voice, “what is the nature of this Gog? He can exist in
the outer world only because he exists within us.” He pointed
to his own breast. “The darkness out of which he was hewn
[geschöpft] needed to be taken from nowhere else than our
own slothful and malicious hearts. Our betrayal of God has
made Gog grow so great [so gross gepäppelt].” (Buber 2009,
p. 82; trans. p. 54)
4
140
Redemption, in his view, means a delivery from evil. This
does not come down to the destruction of evil but to the
delivery of evil from itself (“Does not redemption primarily
mean the redeeming of the evil from the evil ones that
make them so [Erlösung der Bösen vom Bösen]?” Buber
2009, p. 132; trans. p. 121) Battling inexorably against
evil should not consist in solidifying the “seven times
walled citadel of their soul” [i.e. of the evil ones] but in
“conquering” it; and it should also consist of “battl[ing]
against ourselves”. “If we were to forget that, if we were
to take the contradiction and, instead of annihilating it,
let it cleave to the very depth of the primordial [bisins
Urfeuer hinein vertieften], would we not in the very midst
of combat against Satan have become his followers?”
(Buber 2009, p. 132; trans. p. 121)
Full redemption, Yehudi claims almost at the end
of the chronicle, will consist of uniting God with his
Shekhina (his “indwelling”). We cannot unite God with
his Shekhina unless we carry it to him. (Buber 2009, p.
212; trans. p. 231) In so far, we could say that in this vein
of thinking, the world’s redemption depends on us, i.e.
on our repentance and acceptance of God’s kingship.
(ib.) It also depends on us in the Seer’s views; however,
whereas Yehudi wants us to fully submit to God, to
prepare divine agency by being passive ourselves, by
being actively passive so to speak, the Seer requires
a far more active effort of man. Yehudi paves ways
for divine agency within the soul, the Seer for it in the
outside world.
Nonetheless, the moment of redemption, according
to Yehudi, cannot be predicted whatsoever: “For this
reason all calculations concerning the end of time are
false and all attempts to calculate it to bring nearer the
coming of the Messiah must fail. In truth all such things
deflect us from the one thing needful, which is this, to
reunite Him and the Shechinah by virtue of our return
to good.” […] Redemption is at the door. It depends
only and alone upon our return to good, our teshuvah.
“(Buber 2009, p. 213; trans. p. 231)
In medieval Jewish mystical traditions this internalization is called kawanna, the art of directing or concentrating one’s
consciousness while praying.
141
The opposition between the extreme positions becomes most
clear in a final discussion between Yehudi and rabbi Mendel:
“”It were well”, cried Rabbi Mendel, “that Jewish blood flow
until one can wade therein up to the knees from Prystyk to
Rymanow, if thereby our exile be brought to an end and our
redemption dawn.“ “But supposing”, said the Yehudi, “that this
fire is nothing but a fire of destruction? God can kindle such
a fire and blow upon it, too, and know what He does. But we?
What gives us the right to wish the evil an increase of power
and lend it such increase, if we may? Who tells us whom we
serve thereby, the Redeemer or the adversary. Who dare be
bold enough to speak today in the words of the prophet: ‘The
word of the Eternal came unto me’?” (Buber 2009, p. 228;
trans. p. 255) The Yehudi replied: “Never will a work of man
have a good issue if we do not think of the souls whom it is
given us to help, and of the life between soul and soul, and of
our life with them and of their lives with each other. We cannot
help the coming of redemption if life does not redeem life.”
(Buber 2009, p. 228f; trans. p. 256)
On the eve of his death, Yehudi is once more seized by a
profound religious ecstasy. He explains to one of his disciples
that, between the final battle with Gog and Magog and the
Messiah’s coming, three hours of “silent horror” (stummen
Grauens) will occur. These hours will be much heavier to bear
than this battle itself. Only (s)he who sustains them will see
the Messiah. But he immediately adds: “But all the conflicts of
Gog and Magog arise out of those evil forces which have not
been overcome in the conflict against the Gogs and Magogs
who dwell in human hearts. And those three mirror what each
one of us must endure after all the conflicts in the solitariness
of his soul”. (Buber 2009, p. 248f; trans. p. 284)5
Meir Kahane and the imminent redemption
“Hasidism”, Moshe Idel writes, “namely, the way to reach
mystical experiences and the possibility of operating on the
material level characteristic of the Besht and of later Hasidic
masters, is immanently redemptive, and not imminently,
as in what are conceived by scholars to be acute forms of
messianism.” (Idel, 1998, p. 219) We have seen in what I have
5
142
Also cf. Martin Buber, 1952. In the preface of this book Buber quotes Yehudi from Gog und Magog (“Rabbi”, sagte
er mit fast versagender Stimme, „was ist es mit diesem Gog? Es kann ich doch da draußen nur geben, weil es ihn
da drinnen gibt.“, p.11)
described above that this rather applies to Yehudi’s than to the
Seer’s and Menachem Mendel’s approaches. For whereas the
latter tended to ‘conjure up’ all Gog’s darkness in Napoleon’s
historical presence such as to “hasten” the end, Yehudi made
a case for inward struggle and self-purification. It should not
surprise that both Buber and Hasidism have been inspiring
many later existential psychologists. (cf. Rotenberg, 2004,
1983; Buber, 1997; Neumann, 1968)
Let us now turn to a 20th Century rabbi who in many
respects seems to be comparable to the Seer of Lublin’s and
Menachem Mendel’s “imminent” redemption. In the following I
will draw on Kahane’s Or hara’ayon / The Jewish Idea, a series
of Biblical and Talmudic commentaries with a view to the
actuality of Israeli politics and the question of Arabic presence
within Israel’s borders. The penultimate chapter of his book
is entitled ‘Gog’. One could say that Kahane’s explanation of
this prophecy more or less belongs to his very last published
words – although this was not intended, obviously (Kahane
was murdered). Anyway, all the chapters of the second volume
of his book deal with the notion of redemption. They betray
a growing eschatological awareness. (Cfr. Sneller, 2011) The
chapter which is entitled ‘Gog’ (Ch. 38) is not even the chapter
that pays most attention to a scriptural exegesis of Ezekiel
38-39; such an exegesis can rather be found in the previous
chapters which have titles such as ‘The Final Redemption’,
‘Atchalta De’Geula (The Beginning of Redemption)’, ‘The Time
of Redemption’, ‘Signs of the Redemption’, and “‘I will hasten
it”’.
Kahane’s main thesis goes as follows: the Jewish people
have a choice. Either they can try to bring divine redemption
“in haste”, to accelerate it (viz. by collectively repenting, by
showing full obedience to Torah, and by completely separating
from the nations of the world, and by purging the land of Israel
from non-Jewish elements), or to do nothing and await for
divine redemption to come “in its time”, i.e. the time determined
by God, which will bring with it “Messianic birth pangs”: war,
violence, huge catastrophes etc. (cf. Kahane, 1998, pp. 844,
866, 969 and passim)
Interestingly, Kahane interprets the Gog prophecy (in which
Gog together with all the nations of the world prepares for a
war against Israel) as something that might or could happen.
It refers to the option of a redemption coming “in its time”, with
143
Messianic birth-pangs. “If redemption comes ‘in its time’, there
will be troubles such as have never been, and only afterward
will come redemption. […] And even ritual observance will not
save Israel from Messianic birthpangs, unless we demonstrate
our faith and trust in G-d through bold deeds without fear of
the nations.”(Ib., p. 839) If Israel does not repent, the suffering
will be longer and redemption will come “in its time”. (Ib., p.
841) “The trouble and grief of Gog and Magog will surpass
all the troubles and holocausts of the past, Heaven help us.”
(Ib., p. 932)
However, the coming of redemption “in its time”, with the
messianic birthpangs, can be avoided. The war against Gog
can be avoided and so, the Ezekielic prophecy need not
necessarily come true. For the other option which Kahane
shows enhances that God will “hasten” redemption. “Israel
will then suffer briefly”, “according to Israel’s merit”. (Ib., pp.
839, 841)
We have encountered the notion of God “hastening” the end
earlier, but then in a negative sense. Anti-Zionists such as Rabbi
Kahane-Shapira had warned against “hastening” the end, for in
their view, this would bring with it giant catastrophes. However,
the terminology may be confusing here. The anti-Zionists
primarily base their admonitions upon a passage from the
Song of Songs (2, 7): “I adjure you, O daughters of Jerusalem,
by the gazelles or by the hinds of the field, that you neither
awaken nor arouse the love while it is desirous.” Kahane, on
the other hand, rather has in mind the following verses from
Isaiah (60, 21-22): “21. And your people, all of them righteous,
shall inherit the land forever, a scion of My planting, the work of
My hands in which I will glory. 22. The smallest shall become
a thousand and the least a mighty nation; I am the Lord, in its
time I will hasten it (be‘itto achishenna)”.
It is precisely the option which Kahane sees as being offered
to the Jewish people which gives his call such an urgent,
apocalyptical bent. The cruel final battle with Gog need not
take place, if the Jewish people but repent and purify their land
from all non-Jewish residents, remnants and remainders.
I will now describe some general elements of Kahane’s Gog
account as they appear mainly from the remarkably lengthy
Chapter on ‘The Beginning of the Redemption’ (Atchalta
De’Geula, Ch. 28).
144
As follows from Ezekiel 38-39, Kahane writes, the war against
Gog will only take place after “the ingathering of the exiles” (i.e.
the creation of the State of Israel). (Ib., p. 849) It belongs to
Ikevot De-Meshicha (“the footsteps of the Messiah”, Messianic
birth-pangs); it is part of Atchalta De’Geula, the ‘beginning of
the Redemption’. (Ib., p. 851) Relative to this, it will not surprise
to see that Kahane does not make much trouble about the
“three oaths”, which had inspired anti-Zionists from all ages.
He claims that the nations have not kept their part of the deal,
i.e. of not subjugating Israel too much. (Ib., Ch. 26 ‚The Three
Oaths‘) As they have done far worse, so Kahane claims, the
Jewish people are fully entitled to accept the land of Israel as
God’s gift, moreover, to interpret it as a sign of the coming
end. One could say that, out of the abovementioned Jewish
orthodox groups, Kahane’s position most resembles the
religious Zionists’ pretending to safeguard the heritage of
Rabbi Kook. The main difference, though, lies in Kahane’s alldetermining emphasis upon the need to ‘purge’ the land from
non-Jewish traces.
“The Reign of Gog”, Kahane continues, “constitutes the end
of this world as we know it and symbolizes the pinnacle of
blasphemous pride.” (Ib., p. 851) “Through Gog’s war on the
People of Israel, G-d will begin his punishment and revenge
against all the rest of the nations who profaned his name and
that of Israel.” (Ib., p. 846) If Gog repents, Kahane remarks,
if it “is accepting the yoke of Heaven and submitting to G-d,
and subjugates himself to G-d and Israel, thereby bringing the
world the great and final Kiddush Hashem, G-d will certainly let
him repent in this way. Yet, as long as he does not do this, as
long as he and the world continue in arrogant Chilul Hashem,
G-d will set the time for His revenge and, then, will entice him
into receiving his punishment.” (Ib., p. 853)
It may surprise here, in light of the rest of his theology, that
Kahane leaves open the possibility that Gog repents at all.
Nonetheless, it is not altogether clear what particular chance
is offered to Gog, in Kahane’s eyes. It is highly unlikely that
Kahane is aiming at the classical Origenist doctrine of an
apokatasasis pantoon (according to which God would finally
redeem each and every creature, even the wicked). “G-d will
certainly let him repent in this way” is a very vague and reticent
formula in this respect. Even so, what is sure is that Israel
will be alone with nobody to rely on except God. But “Israel’s
isolation”, so Kahane continues in italics, “is an immutable
145
precondition for final redemption.” (Ib., p. 991) Concretely,
Israel should purge the land of “the false religion called Islam”
and of “idolatrous churches and cults which are to be ‘shunned
totally’ (Deut. 7:26), which arrogantly seek to influence the holy
Jewish People to abandon the true faith.” (Ib., pp. 908, 997)
This ‘purging’ is an act which is similar to divine Creation as
recorded in Genesis, for Creation also rested upon an act
of separation and division (viz. between light and dark, or
between sea and land, etc.).
Almost at the last page, Kahane affirmatively refers to the
book of Numbers 25, 1-18. Here we find a narrative in which a
man called Pinchas zealously kills another Israelite man who
neglects God’s prohibition to “yoke” with foreign idolaters:
“Who shall rise up like Pinchas and, spear in hand, execute
zealous judgment against the alien culture and abominable
concepts which have destroyed the uniqueness, holiness
and separateness of the chosen, supreme people?” (Ib.,
p. 996) I mention this reference to the (not so well-known)
Pinchas story because in his book The Secular Outlook, the
Dutch legal philosopher Paul Cliteur extensively dwells on
it. Cliteur takes the Pinchas story to be paradigmatic for the
risks of both organized and unorganized religion. It should be
noted, though, that the adopted stance in Cliteur’s rejection of
religious influence is the state’s, and the perspective taken is
the raison d’état.6
Buber versus Kahane
Let us take stock of what have hitherto seen.
First, Kahane, by repeating Ezekiel’s prophecy and actualizing
it, claims for himself prophetical vision (‘the end-time is near’).
Buber’s account, on the other hand, is a narrative. Although
Buber’s sympathy clearly lies with Yehudi’s existential account,
at least some weight is given to other positions simply by
rendering them at some length. One could say that the
chronicle’s narrative character makes its ‘argument’ far more
cautious. But even if we would fully identify Buber’s position
with Yehudi’s, we must realize that Buber seems to make any
actualization of the prophecy dependent on man’s repentance
and his or her preparation for God’s coming. This complicates
6
146
Cliteur, 2010, 105-108 and passim. Cf. “It is clear that this attitude and the whole worldview connected with it is hard
to reconcile with modern freedom of religion, freedom of worship, freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, free
inquiry and other fundamental rights ingrained in the concept of liberal democracy.” (107)
any prophecy, in Buber, as it cannot be predicted in principle.
(Buber, 2009, p. 213; trans., p. 231)
Next, both Buber and Kahane put apocalyptic weight on
Jewish repentance. In Buber, repentance implies a personal
activity, in Kahane it also entails a (violent) collective purging
of the land of Israel from alien residents.
Thirdly, in Buber, God’s kingdom will not come without
repentance; in Kahane, it will come anyhow, albeit “in its time”,
with a lot of suffering and violence, and a final war with Gog.
Fourthly, Buber takes into account a psychological or existential
level, which makes his ‘argument’ in my view stronger than
Kahane’s: fighting evil, so Buber’s suggestion goes, may
ultimately contribute to this very evil itself.
Fifthly, in Kahane, repentance requires separation and
elimination of evil, or (sic!) foreign elements (mark the equation
of ‘evil’ and ‘foreign’). This procedure is given a religious
dimension (God’s creation also rests upon a separation etc).
Finally, in Buber, repentance requires an assumption of the ‘evil’,
the ‘alien’ or the ‘foreign’. They must all be “seized by the drive
of the soul” (vom Schwung der Seele ergriffen) and brought
to a full decision. (Buber, 1952, p. 93) If we would apply this
Buberian precept to Israeli-Palestinian peace process (which
is not impossible, as Buber himself was very concerned with
this process during his lifetime): Israelis should persevere in
trying to entice Palestinians to a common decision for peace.
Conclusive remarks
So we have two extremely opposed approaches of the Gog
end-time prophecy. Buber (supposed we can identify his
position with Yehudi’s) internalizes Gog by equating it to the
jezer hara or the evil inclination each human is endowed with.
By doing so, he de-historicizes the prophecy, or at least, he
brings predicted violent apocalyptic scenarios more or less
within human reach. A similar approach we find, as a matter
of fact, in Franz Rosenzweig’s Stern der Erlösung: “Eternity,
that is to say, must be hastened [beschleunigt], it must always
be capable of coming as early as “today”; only through it is
it eternity. If there is no such force, no such prayer that can
hasten the coming of the Kingdom, then it does not come
147
eternally, but—eternally does not come.” (Rosenzweig, 1990,
1921, p. 321; trans., p. 306)
Kahane also brings them within human reach, but to a certain
degree only. Final redemption will come at any rate, preferably
“in haste” (if the Jews but repent), otherwise it will come “in its
time”, unpredictably and beyond human interference. The last
option, so we have seen, enhances a final battle with Gog,
accompanied by a huge suffering.
Another interesting element is that Kahane only addresses the
Jewish people, whereas Buber is at least ambiguous here. Of
course, the Gog und Magog chronicle contains discussions
between Jewish rabbis, but the reminiscences of these dialogues
in Buber’s Bilder von Gut und Böse, especially of Yehudi’s
views, suggest the possibility that these views apply just as
well to mankind as such. Buber’s mystical, existentializing and
psychologizing approach enabled him to enlarge his scope. One
may remind Buber’s famous conversations with Carl Rogers,
the famous psychotherapist, on therapeutic dialogues.7 While
the non-Jewish reader of Kahane will all to easily find himself
in the position of ‘Gog’, (s)he will be more able to positively
acknowledge the Buberian struggle with an inward ‘Gog’.
One could emphasize here a certain incommensurability
between both Jewish thinkers. While Buber has assembled
pre-War materials from Hasidic traditions, Kahane is a postholocaust author whose main drives are the concrete possibility
that peoples of the world can unite and be relatively successful
in eradicating millions of Jews. He is aware that the terrifying
phenomenon of historical anti-Semitism can lead to much
more than ‘limited’ pogroms; much worse, that not even the
recent holocaust, nor the creation of the State of Israel, have
not been enough to put an end to persecution of Jews once
and for all. Against Buber, Kahane would probably argue that a
generalization or a psychologization of Jewish morality runs the
risk of neglecting a profound ‘exteriority’ inherent to the Jewish
people. The Jewish people have a special, world historical role
to play in history that cannot be fully ‘mastered’ philosophically,
psychologically, not even mystically.
7
148
Buber, 1997. Cf. “there is not as we generally think eh in the soul of a man good and evil opposed. There are –eh,
there is again and again in different manners a polarity, and the poles are not good and evil, but rather [4.2] yes and
no, rather eh acceptance and eh refusal. […] And we can strength-, we can strengthen, we can help him strengthen,
the one positive […] pole. […] And even, perhaps, we can strengthen the force of direction in him because this
polarity is very oft, uh often directionless. It is a chaotic eh state. We could bring in a cosmic note into it. Eh, we can
help put order, eh, put a shape into this. Eh, because I think the good, or what we may call the good, is always only
direction. […] Not a substance.” Op. cit., 84f.
Kahane’s arguments here are as strong as the historical
evidence of the Jewish people is. They lack, however,
philosophical or psychological evidence. Buber’s insights, on
the other hand, rest upon the latter. This does only give them a
harder time than Kahane if one would take empirical or rational
consciousness as a sole basis for normativity. However, it is
essential for Buber that this be avoided, as such a form of
consciousness (which is so dominant in today’s ‘scientific’
worldviews) may itself be subservient to an inner ‘Gog’. If this
is the case, an inner ‘purification’ and ‘struggle’ are the only
condition upon which Buber’s argument can be ‘tested’.
Is it relevant that Buber’s materials are pre-holocaust based and
that they have been collected prior to the establishment of the
State of Israel? I don’t think so. Not only did Buber first publish
his Hasidic tales in ‘Israel’ in 1941, after having escaped NaziGermany; not only did he publish the German original a few
years later. He even proceeded to give their subject matter a
more ‘doctrinal’ form in his Bilder von Gut und Böse published
in 1952. Moreover, his post-war efforts to reconcile Israel with
Germany, and his laboring for a peaceful coexistence between
Jewish and Arab Israelis testify to the weight his approach of
Gog had for him, despite the holocaust.
In this article I have tried to present two extreme interpretations
of one and the same apocalyptic end-time prophecy. Such
prophecies also exist in other religious traditions, in which they
receive equally opposite interpretations. It is my hypothesis
that an explanation of these oppositions is not altogether
unfamiliar to the one proposed in this article. For I think that,
just as the metaphysical basis of end-time war may be said to
lay within the human mind, the metaphysical basis of inner war
of the human mind can be said to lay outside; they mutually
presuppose each other. Furthermore, should one wish to
speculate on the identity of an end-time Prince of Evil, of any
such Prince, it would be my claim that the truth value of these
speculations is to be experienced in the defeat of ‘apocalyptic’
enemies (i.e. “enemies that tend to destroy defenseless
people”); it cannot be ‘rationally’ argued for. Finally, the
previous claim entails another hypothesis (which I cannot
elaborate here), according to which the ‘apocalyptic’ may be
a repetitive structure, the apocalyptic end-time war repeating
itself time and again, probably with increasing intensity and on
an increasing scale.
149
REFERENCES
Buber, M. (1927). Die chassidischen Bücher. Berlin: Schocken
Verlag. Trans. (1991, 1947) Tales of the Hasidim, The Early
Masters. New York: Schocken Books.
– –. (1952). Bilder von Gut und Böse. Köln/Olten: Jakob
Hegner.
– –. (1997). The Martin Buber-Carl Rogers Dialogue: A New
Transcript with Commentary. New York: SUNY.
– –. (2009). Werkausgabe 19. Gog und Magog. Eine Chronik.
Herausgegeben, eingeleitet und kommentiert von Ran
HaCohen. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 278f. Trans.
For the Sake of Heaven, by Ludwig Lewisohn, New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1953 (1945). First published in the Hebrew
newspaper Davar between 10 January and 24 October 1941,
first Hebrew book publication in 1943 (Jerusalem 1943),
first German publication in 1949 (Heidelberg, L. Schneider),
several reprints.
Buitenwerf, R. (2007). The Gog and Magog Tradition in
Revelation 20:8. In Henk Jan de Jonge and Johannes Tromp
(ed.) The Book of Ezekiel and its Influence. London: Ashgate.
Cliteur, P. (2010). The Secular Outlook. In Defense of Moral and
Political Secularism. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Firestone, R. (2006). Holy War in Modern Judaism? “Mitzvah
War” and the Problem of the “Three Vows”. In Journal of the
American Academy of Religion. 74 (4), 954-982.
Friedman, M. S. (2002, 1955). Martin Buber: The Life of
Dialogue. New York: Routledge.
Idel, M. (1995). Hasidism. Between Ecstasy and Magic. Albany:
SUNY Press.
– –. (1998). Messianic Mystics. New Haven/London: Yale
University Press.
150
– –. (2005). On Shamanism in the Carpathian Mountains.
In Ascensions on High in Jewish Mysticism: Pillars, Lines,
Ladders. Budapest/New York: Central European University
Press. 148-150.
Kahane, M. (1998). Or hara’ayon / The Jewish Idea, vol. II, trans.
from the Hebrew by Raphael Blumberg. Jerusalem: Institute
for the Writings of Rabbi Meir Kahane (Hebrew edition: 1992).
Kook, A. I. (1978). The Lights of Penitence, the Moral Principles,
Lights of Holiness, Essays, Letters, and Poems. New York:
Ramsey & Toronto: Paulist Press.
Kriegel, M. (2000). Orthodoxie (Ultra-). In Élie Barnavi, Saul
Friedländer (ed.), Les Juifs et le XXe siècle. Dictionnaire
critique. Paris: Calmann-Lévy.
Levinas, E. (1988). A l’heure des nations. Paris: Minuit.
Neumann, E. (1968). Mystical Man. In Joseph Campbell (ed.),
The Mystic Vision. Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Ravietzky, A. (1996). Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish
Religious Radicalism Trans. by Michael Swirsky and Jonathan
Chipman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Original
Hebrew edition Jerusalem 1993.
Rosenzweig, F. (1990, 1921). Der Stern der Erlösung. Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp. Trans. (2005) The Star of Redemptioni, by Barbara
E. Galli. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.
Rotenberg, M. (2004, 1983). Hasidic Psychology. Making
Space for Others. New Brunswick and London: Transaction
Publishers.
Sneller, R. (2011). Apocalypticism: source or impediment of
terrorism? In Mahmoud Masaeli (ed.) Terrorism in Theory and
Practice: An Interfaith Perspective. Ottawa: Nortia Press.
151
ABDULLAH ÖCALAN’S
THE ROAD MAP:
Abdullah Öcalan is the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK).1 A former practitioner of terrorism,2 Öcalan reflected on his
organization’s changing fortunes after his arrest by the Turkish state.
He continued a dramatic turn, which began in the 1990s, from the
lionized leader of the PKK to an intellectual who largely eschews
the violence of his past. The transition is remarkable, as Öcalan
was enemy number one in Turkey from 1984, the year he began the
PKK’s violent uprising, until his spectacular kidnapping in Nairobi and
subsequent arrest by Turkish authorities in 1999. Öcalan currently
resides in the Turkish prison of Imrali, where he penned his threevolume Prison Writings (Öcalan, 2007, 2011, 2012).
FROM THE ARMED STRUGGLE
TO A GRAMSCI OF OUR TIMES?
Por: Dr. Tamir Bar-On
ITESM, Campus Querétaro, México
For almost 15 years Öcalan has languished in a Turkish
prison as the only inmate guarded by 1500 Turkish soldiers.
Abdullah Öcalan is a solitary figure, sitting in a remote Turkish
prison off the Sea of Marmara. He thus had lots of time to
re-think the strategies of the struggle for Kurdish rights and
independence. He also reflected on other key issues: the
violent guerrilla and terrorist tactics and strategies of his
Marxist-inspired PKK (including suicide bombings, the
brutal killings of “collaborators” within his own ranks, and
indiscriminate killings of civilians),3 the nature of the Turkish
state and its ideological foundations, the divisions and feudal
structures of the Kurds, the history of civilization, and new
models to resolve the Kurdish question and the problems of
Dr. Tamir Bar-On is a Full Professor and Researcher in the Department of
International Relations and Humanities at the Monterrey Institute of Technology
and Higher Education (Tec de Monterrey), Campus Querétaro, Mexico. He is a
member of the SNI – Sistema Nacional de Investigadores – Mexico’s National
System for Researchers. He is the author of Where Have All The Fascists Gone?
(Ashgate, 2007), Rethinking the French New Right: Alternatives to modernity
(Routledge, 2013), and The World through Soccer: The Cultural Impact of
a Global Sport (Rowman and Littlefield, 2014). Bar-On received his Ph.D. in
political science from McGill University (Montreal, Canada) in 2000, while he
attained his M.A. and B.A. in political science from York University (Toronto,
Canada) in 1991 and 1990 respectively.
ABSTRACT
KEYWORDS This paper analyzes Abdullah Öcalan’s The Road
Abdullah Öcalan; Antonio
Gramsci; democratic autonomy;
communism; civil society;
intellectuals.
Map from a Gramscian perspective. The Road
Map cements the transition of the PKK leader from
the armed struggle towards the importance of key
ideas in civil society and “democratic autonomy,”
which began in the early 1990s. Furthermore,
The Road Map proposes a non-violent resolution
of the Kurdish “problem” in Turkey, which could
have ramifications for Kurds throughout the Middle
East and other ethnic problems in the region. Yet,
the radical solutions advanced in The Road Map
challenge both the Turkish state and the PKK’s
former communist and nationalist ideology.
1
2
3
152
In 2002, the PKK changed its name to KADEK (Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress) and insisted that the
PKK fulfilled its historic mission. In 2003, the PKK changed its name again to KONGRA-GEL (Kurdistan Peoples’ Congress). Despite the name changes, the leading members of the PKK remain the same and the PKK/KONGRA-GEL is
headed by Abdullah Öcalan. The Turkish state views the name changes as legitimisation schemes designed to win
international favour, while it points out the PKK could boast 5,000 fighters in 2006. See Republic of Turkey Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, “PKK/KONGRA-GEL,” http://www.mfa.gov.tr/pkk_kongra-gel.en.mfa, accessed October 24, 2013.
My definition of terrorism is the following: “The use of violence against civilians or other non-combatants, or wanton disregard for their lives, in pursuing political objectives.” This definition applies to state and non-state actors
alike. For the aforementioned definition of terrorism, see Tamir Bar-On and Howard Goldstein, “Fighting Violence:
A Critique of the War On Terrorism,” International Politics 42 (2005), p. 239.Using this definition, the PKK and the
Turkish state have at times committed acts of terrorism. For a full list of PKK terrorist attacks on non-combatants
(civilians), see the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.
aspx?expanded=no&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&success=yes&country=209&ob=GTDID&od=desc&
page=110&count=20. Using the database in question and my definition, not all the PKK’s actions can be deemed
terrorism, especially when they target police or military targets. The Global Terrorism Database disagrees and lists all
PKK actions again civilians and soldiers (or police) as acts of terrorism.
For a list of these attacks, type in PKK in the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database: http://www.start.
umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?expanded=no&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&success=yes&country=
209&ob=GTDID&od=desc&page=110&count=20.
153
humanity at large. “The PKK launched most of its attacks on
Turkish security forces, but also attacked other Turkish sites
at home and abroad, as well as Kurdish civilians who would
not cooperate with the group,” wrote Greg Bruno (2007) of the
Council of Foreign Relations.
Robert Pape (2003, p. 361) has pointed out that in the 1980s and
1990s the use of the tactic of suicide terrorism rose worldwide
“largely because terrorists have learned that it pays.” Despite
their secular credentials, Öcalan’s PKK engaged in suicide
terrorism. Yet, suicide terrorism was not central to the PKK’s
operations. The PKK’s campaign of suicide attacks began on
30 June 1995 and ended on 5 July 1999. About two-thirds of
the attacks --eleven of its fourteen attacks--were undertaken
by women and led to less than 20 deaths (Kurth Cronin, 2003,
p. 17). Rather the PKK had a preference for guerrilla warfare, a
form of irregular warfare in which a small group of combatants
such as armed civilians or irregulars use military tactics such
as ambushes, raids, and, hit-and-run tactics, as well as great
mobility to fight a larger, traditional military. In 1984, the PKK
guerrilla warfare operations began and included a raid on a
police station in Skirt on 17 August, which was followed by an
attack that killed three of General Kenan Even’s Presidential
Guards in Yüksekova, and an ambush which killed 8 Turkish
soldiers in Çukurca. Despite the PKK’s guerrilla warfare tactics,
it did not mean that terrorist attacks were not committed
against civilians as the primary targets. Although the majority
of PKK activities are focused on village guards, police, and
military posts, they have employed suicide bombing tactics on
tourist sites and commercial centers in Western Turkish cities,
especially during the tourism season. In addition, the PKK
has engaged in non-suicide terrorist attacks against civilians,
including in Istanbul on December 25, 1991 (11 deaths and
20 injuries) and a suspected PKK attack on July 27, 2008 (17
deaths and 154 injuries).
Suicide terrorists use the “strategic logic” of suicide terrorism
because it can extract political concessions such as the
expulsion of “occupying forces” from one’s territory or limited
autonomy. Suicide terrorists sought to get Israeli forces to
leave Lebanon in the 1980s and quit the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank in the 1990s, while they pressured the Sri Lankan
government to create an independent Tamil state from 1990
onwards. Yet, Pape (2003, p. 361) insists on the failure of the
PKK once it adopted the tactic of suicide terrorism: “In all but
154
the case of Turkey, the terrorist political cause made more
gains after the resort to suicide operations than it had before.”
That is, the tactic of suicide bombing did not yield concrete
gains such as autonomy or independence for the Kurds, while
ironically Öcalan’s capture by the Turkish state has set the
stage for a historic resolution of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict.
For a man that lived by the gun, Öcalan devotes very few
pages to violence in his three-volume Prison Writings. Öcalan’s
novelty is his historical approach to the Kurds and more
broadly Middle Eastern civilizations. This paper advances a
Gramscian interpretation of Öcalan based on his numerous
writings after his capture by the Turkish state, but argues that
the PKK leader has moved to a more radical “democratic
autonomy” position superseding the former Italian Communist
leader. I especially focus on Öcalan’s The Road Map because
it set the stage for historic negotiations between Öcalan and
the Turkish state in order to resolve the long-standing TurkishKurdish conflict.
Born in Ales, Sardinia (Italy) in 1891, Antonio Gramsci, was a
political theorist and former leader of the Italian Communist
Party. A hero for Marxists in Italy and around the world for his
resistance to the Fascist rule of Benito Mussolini, Gramsci wrote
his own prison writings while in jail and died in a governmentcontrolled clinic in Rome in 1937 (Gramsci, 1971, 1992, 1996,
2007). I utilize Antonio Gramsci to help us understand culturalcivilizational sea changes that allow political space for new
ideological syntheses (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 445; 506-507).
Following Gramsci, I use Öcalan’s writings to stress the role
of intellectuals in history. Intellectual ideas play a key role in
shaping history and moulding consensus among the people
in civil society in favour of or against a reigning ideological
framework. An intellectual is a person whose profession is
centred on the production and dissemination of ideas. Antonio
Gramsci (1971, pp. 131-133) distinguished between “organic”
and “traditional” intellectuals, with the former wedded to a
particular social class (bourgeoisie or proletariat) and the latter
connected to the older socio-economic order and “hegemonic
project.” Öcalan is neither an agent of the bourgeoisie and not
the proletariat in the dogmatic Marxist sense because he has
criticized the one party dogmatism of Communist states and the
PKK’s narrow-minded socialism of the past. So, for example,
in Prison Writings I, Öcalan (2007, pp. 234-236) stated that
socialist and national liberation movements “made excessive
155
use of violence”; the Communist One-party state was a “tool
for the strict implementation of a totalitarian understanding of
government”; the “dictatorship of the proletariat” slogan was
“largely motivated by propaganda purposes”; and there can
be “no socialism without democracy.”
Öcalan’s theoretical influences are diverse. Democratic
theory, ecological anarchist Murray Bookchin, Immanuel
Wallerstein, the New Left, feminist theory, Marx, and Hegel
influence Öcalan’s thought. So, for example, Öcalan’s focus
in recent years on democratic-confederalism and democraticautonomy beyond the state is influenced by the ecological
anarchist Murray Bookchin (Akkaya and Jongerden, 2013).
His goal is a new civilizational model in which “democratic
civilization” will be merely one component of a still emerging
global, civilizational synthesis. Öcalan favours “contemporary
democracy” and federalist principles, while longing for a new
historical synthesis of world civilizations (2007, pp. 255-256). A
new “democracy of the people,” argues Öcalan (2007, p.237),
will fail in the Middle East if it is not “superior” to Western
democracy. This bold assertion reinforces the Hegelian idea
that history unfolds towards universal, civilizational progress
and that “contemporary democracy” is for now the highest
expression of this progress. If a new civilizational synthesis
emerges, sustains Öcalan, it will need to build on the real
historical progress made as a consequence of the emergence
of “democratic civilization”: individualism, the rule of law, rule
by the people, secularism, and women’s rights.
Whether in his days as a practitioner of the armed struggle
or in his jail cell, Abdullah Öcalan is a unique figure that the
world knows little about. The same cannot be said about
Menachem Begin and Yasser Arafat, two prominent Middle
Eastern leaders that used the armed struggle to “liberate” their
peoples. Moreover, while Öcalan is an indisputable voice of
conscience of the Kurdish people, why is the Kurdish question
relegated to a secondary international status compared to,
say, the Palestinian, Tibetan, Basque, Kosovar, and even
Quebecois national questions? In an epoch that Zbigniew
Brzezinski (2007, pp.205-208) has dubbed an “anti-imperial
age” (that is, an era of “global geopolitical awakening” and
de-colonization where it is no longer acceptable to rule over
other peoples because of the principles of national selfdetermination and sovereignty), it appears rather strange that
the Kurds have been left off the list of nations deserving a state.
156
According to an expert on the Kurds, David Romano (2008,
pp. 346), “the Kurds are often described as ‘the world’s largest
stateless nation,’” and about half of the 28 million Kurds in the
Middle East come from within the territory controlled by Turkey.
Another prominent specialist on the Kurds, Michael Gunter
(2000, pp. 849), points out that Kurds comprise as much as
20 per cent of the total population in Turkey and that Öcalan’s
capture “signalled a whole new beginning in the attempt to
solve Turkey’s continuing Kurdish problem.” The tragedy of the
Kurds has been a history of brutal state repression, as well as
practical complications in seeking cultural rights or statehood
from four sovereign states: Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria.
Linking Gramsci and Öcalan
As highlighted above, the aim of this paper is to analyze
Abdullah Öcalan’s Prison Writings III: The Road Map to
Negotiations (The Road Map) from a Gramscian perspective.
I use Gramsci’s writings in prison, his example, and his
theoretical insights in order to explain the transformation of
Öcalan’s thinking. In addition, I suggest that The Road Map’s
contents offer the Kurds, Turks, and other peoples in the Middle
East a way out of the blind alleys of authoritarianism, uncritical
nationalism, and statist assimilationism. The Turkish state and
PKK have a historic opportunity offered by The Road Map and
could seize the moment in order to radically change TurkishKurdish relations. Should this historical moment be seized, the
fate of the Kurds beyond Turkey might also be transformed. In
addition, The Road Map offers us a model for the resolution of
long-standing ethnic conflicts in the region, although no two
conflicts can be solved similarly. In Prison Writings I, Öcalan
(2007, pp. 296-297) argues that we have reached a historic
moment in which we can “attempt a solution of the Kurdish
question by democratic and peaceful means,” while insisting
that the Kurds will be “a fundamental power of peace and
democracy” for the entire Middle East.
Moreover, I argue that The Road Map is a text linked to a
Gramscian metapolitical vocation. “Metapolitical vocation”
here implies the following: (1) intellectuals rejecting direct
and activist parliamentary or extra-parliamentary political
interventions and focusing their energies on changing hearts
and minds and the “conquest” of civil society; (2) a fixation
on what Robert Nozick (1974 in Zaibert, 2004, p. 113) argued
was the “the fundamental question of political philosophy,
157
one that precedes questions about how the state should be
organized”; and (3) a sophisticated form of politics that is
not a flight from politics, but a continuation of “war” through
“non-violent” means (Bar-On, 2013, p.3). In order to distance
himself from fascist or Bolshevik strategies of a “frontal assault
on the state,” Öcalan advanced Gramsci’s notion of a “war of
position,” or the centrality of a politics of ideological struggle
(Bar-On, 2013, p. 3).
Gramsci (1971, p. 481) pointed out that political struggle is
“enormously more complex” than war because it includes
both elements of consensus and force. Furthermore, Gramsci
(1971, pp. 479-480) insisted that “the greater the mass of the
apolitical, the greater the part played by illegal forces has to
be,” or conversely “the greater the politically organised and
educated forces, the more it is necessary to ‘cover’ the legal
State.” Gramsci (1971, p. 481) pointed out that there were
“three forms of war”: war of movement, war of position, and
underground warfare. He explains that Gandhi’s passive
resistance is “a war of position, which at certain moments
becomes a war of movement, and at others underground
warfare.” (Gramsci, 1971, p.481) He also underscores that
boycotts fall under the ambit of war of position, strikes are
a type of war of movement, and the secret preparation of
weapons and combat troops are considered underground
warfare (Gramsci, 1971, p. 481).
Öcalan’s understanding of the “war of position” has indeed
changed since his capture by the Turkish state. We should
remember that a number of terrorist groups from the PLO
to IRA and ETA have “increasingly renounced violence and
maximalist goals in light of the end of the Cold War, the demise
of the Marxist–Leninist Soviet Union, and cycles of terrorist
violence that have reinforced the power of states.” (Bar-On,
2009, p.257) Öcalan’s call for the global spread of democratic
civilization, scathing criticisms of narrow nationalism and
dogmatic Marxism, and rejection of the utilization of violence
should be viewed in the context of these global changes.
Öcalan’s “conversion” process should be analyzed with
respect to external forces (that is, the armed struggle that
did not work and did not allow the Kurds to attain full cultural
autonomy or independence) combined with internal reflections
precipitated by his prison experiences (Bar-On, 2009, p. 258).
What Öcalan shares with the Hegelian and Marxist perspectives
is that history progressively unfolds towards more rational and
158
higher spiritual, socio-economic, or political frameworks on a
universal scale (Bar-On, 2009, p. 258).
Like Gramsci, Öcalan posits a less dogmatic view of history in
which there is no “end of history” (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 3-18)
and political struggles remain perpetually open and subject
to constant movement and change. He is also, like Gramsci,
a proponent of the importance of the conquest of civil society
because this is where revolutionary activity should be directed
in the contemporary world. For Öcalan, civil society “comprises
the tool of democratic possibilities - that opens the door to
developments hitherto impossible.” (Öcalan, 2007, p. 227) It
is through the terrain of culture, including the media, Internet,
education system and popular consciousness, which Öcalan
hopes to lead the Kurdish people to their “promised land” of
liberation in a manner that was impossible through the armed
struggle.
Öcalan’s ceasefire call from Imrali Prison in the spring of 2013
continued his faith in the possibilities of radical change through
civil society and the “war of position.” In the historic ceasefire
call, Öcalan stated: “We have a new era starting upon us. A door
is opening from a process of armed resistance to a process of
democratic politics.” (21 March, 2013) He emphasized that a
“new mentality” is emerging based on the trinity of democratic
rights, freedoms, and equality. Öcalan reiterated his rejection
of violence in the ceasefire announcement: “We have come
to a point where we say ‘let the arms silence, opinions and
politics speak’.” (21 March, 2013)
Yet, like Gramsci, for Öcalan the option of armed force is
not completely taken off the table. Military and police targets
were attacked regularly by the PKK in 2012. The use of PKK
armed force will depend on whether the Turkish state fulfills its
commitment to the Kurds in terms of the agreed upon road
map, respects individual rights such as free expression and
equality, and guarantees Kurdish collective rights, including
legal, linguistic, educational, and broadcasting rights. Turkey’s
desire to join the European Union (EU) led it to change many
of its laws, including Öcalan’s death penalty, as well as its laws
on political parties, the press, and association (Alexander et
al., 2008, pp. xvii). Yet, in a move that was seen as directed
at the PKK and its terrorist camps in Iraq, in 2007 the Turkish
Parliament revised the Law to Fight Terrorism, “essentially
broadening crimes punishable as terrorism offenses.”
159
(Alexander et al., 2008, p. xxii) In October 2007, the PKK
announced a unilateral ceasefire, while it simultaneously
engaged in terrorist attacks against Turkey from its bases in
Northern Iraq. These PKK attacks led to Turkish air strikes
against Kurdish targets in Iraq.
Öcalan (2008) argues that independence is not a necessary
precondition for respecting Kurdish cultural and linguistic
rights: “Equal rights within a democratic Turkey” is the slogan.
As Öcalan (2008: 39) wrote, “I offer the Turkish society a
simple solution. We demand a democratic nation. We are
not opposed to the unitary state and republic. We accept
the republic, its unitary structure and laicism [secularism].
However, we believe that it must be redefined as a democratic
state respecting peoples, cultures and rights.” Recall that
Gramsci’s “war of position” contained non-violent elements
such as boycotts, while the use of force could also be an
option through “underground warfare.”
Analysis of Prison Writings III: The Road Map
In this section, I comprehensively analyze Öcalan’s Prison
Writings III: The Road Map to Negotiations. I argue that The Road
Map is wedded to a Gramscian metapolitical vocation, but that
the contents of the document are more radical proposals than
the ideas of the former leader of the Italian Communist Party. As
Öcalan (2007, 2011, 2012) has pointed out in his three-volume
Prison Writings, the Kurds have faced a double historical
tragedy: 1) the legacy of nationalist and statist assimilation
at the hands of the Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi, and Syrian states;
and 2) the continued failure to solve the Kurdish question in
a way that would grant the Kurds independence, autonomy,
confederalism, or equal civil, political, and cultural rights within
the four main nation-states inhabited by the Kurds. The legacy
of nationalist and statist assimilation even threatened the
Kurds with extinction in Turkey in the early 20th century and
more recently in Iraq. In her A Problem from Hell, Samantha
Power (2003) examines the major genocides of the 20th
century, including the little-known Anfal campaign launched by
the Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein from 1986-9, which
it is estimated killed about 180,000 Kurds.4 The grotesque
pictures of chemical gas attacks against defenceless women
4
160
and children in Halabja shocked the international community,
but few in the West called for action against the brutal Ba’athist
regime at a time when the West worried about the spread of
another Iranian-style Islamist theocracy in the Middle East in
the context of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). In Turkey, the Kurds
as well as Turks also paid a heavy price. From 1984-1999,
the period of the PKK’s insurgency, there were 31,000-37,000
dead (the majority Kurdish), 3,000 villages destroyed, and
about 3,000,000 people internally displaced (Gunter, 2000,
p.849; 2007, pp. 166-167).
In reading The Road Map, one gets the distinctive sense that
the Kurds and Turkey are on the precipice of a historic solution
to the Kurdish question in Turkey. As Öcalan (2012, p. 14)
writes in the Foreword to The Road Map, the spirit of optimism
even permeated the Turkish state, with Turkish President
Abdullah Gül stating the following in respect of the Kurdish
question in 2009: “It shall be resolved – there is no other way.”
The guerrilla war between the Turkish state and PKK has killed
many innocent people. Yet, peace is indeed made between
former enemies. Who would have imagined the Oslo Accords
between Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader
Yasser Arafat and former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin?
Who would have dreamed of secret negotiations between the
Turkish state and Abdullah Öcalan? For many Turks, Abdullah
Öcalan is a terrorist and war criminal; a man that ordered
gruesome suicide bombing attacks against Turkish civilians
and soldiers; a traitor to the Turkish nation. For many Kurds,
on the other hand, the Turkish state aims at the extermination
of the Kurds and Abdullah Öcalan is a hero for fighting for the
Kurdish cause.
The Road Map is a unique historical document. It tells the
story of the secret dialogue process between Abdullah Öcalan
and the Turkish state. These negotiations began in 2009, but
were broken off in mid-2011. The Road Map’s proposals for
the resolution of the conflict have little to do with the Marxism
or nationalism of the PKK’s past. These solutions certainly
do not threaten the nationalist, secular, and Islamist-oriented
government of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
in the same way as an independent Kurdish state. Yet, the
question remains: Is Turkey prepared to cede to Öcalan’s Road
180,000 deaths is the figure given by Iraqi prosecutors for civilians killed during the Anfal campaign. See Omar Sinan,
“Iraq to hang ‘Chemical Ali’,” Associated Press (June 25, 2007), Tampa Bay Times, available online at: http://www.
sptimes.com/2007/06/25/Worldandnation/Iraq_to_hang__Chemica.shtml, Accessed May 29, 2012.
161
Map proposals for a “democratic nation” and a “common
homeland” for Kurds? Are these more moderate proposals,
which reject the armed struggle, Marxism, and call for equal
political, civic, and cultural rights for Kurds within Turkey, still
too frightening for the Turkish state? Are these proposals also
troubling for the other states in the region with a “Kurdish
problem”? Are they threatening for the major powers?
The Road Map is split up into six sections: Introduction,
Concepts, Theoretical Framework and Principles, The Problem
of Democracy and the Solution of a Democratic Constitution in
Turkey, the Kurdish Question and the Prospects for its Solution,
Action Plan, and Conclusion. The book also contains useful
Editorial Notes by the International Initiative, the Colognebased organization responsible for the publication of The
Road Map. Finally, the Preface to The Road Map is written
by Immanuel Wallerstein (b. 1930), a world-renowned world
systems theorist who combines the insights of Marxism/neoMarxism, the French historian Fernand Braudel (1902-85), and
dependency theory.
The Editorial Notes penned by the International Initiative
notes that Öcalan’s harsh Imrali Island prison conditions
(for example, Öcalan cannot write or receive letters; he can
neither make phone calls, nor receive visits, save from his
lawyer and siblings) have earned the prison “the nickname
‘the European Guantanamo.’” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 5) We are
also told that a Turkish state delegation “assured Öcalan that
Prime Minister Erdoğan agreed with ‘95 percent of the Road
Map.’” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 7) After the June 2011 parliamentary
elections, the Erdoğan -led Justice and Development Party
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP) won its third term, while the
PKK was preparing its disarmament and Öcalan drafted short
protocols on the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and the creation of a democratic constitution
(Öcalan, 2012, p. 7). The Turkish government gave no written
or verbal responses to Öcalan’s measures, thus leading the
PKK leader to withdraw from the talks in July 2011 (Öcalan,
2012, p. 7). The Turkish state re-started their military operations
against Kurdish areas (including claims of the use of chemical
weapons) leading to the loss of more civilian lives, while mass
arrests targeted Kurdish political parties, writers, academics,
and the press. In addition, Öcalan’s isolation increased
as 36 of Öcalan’s lawyers were arrested, while none of his
lawyers could visit him (Öcalan, 2012, p. 7). As a result, the
162
International Initiative writes sardonically about Öcalan’s
prison conditions: “Strictly speaking, no one knows if
he is still alive.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 8) Nonetheless, the
Editorial Notes end on a more hopeful note, suggesting
that although “Islamo-nationalism will become an
intrinsic part of Turkish society,” Öcalan “embodies the
voice of reason”; “the Road Map is still valid”; and they
insist that “it is the only non-military solution that has
been proposed by anyone.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 8)
Wallerstein’s Preface is a good starting point for
Öcalan’s The Road Map. The Preface introduces us to
the main theoretical concerns of The Road Map, which
are broader than the Kurdish question. A scholar of the
capitalist world-economy with its roots in 16th century
Europe and the emergence of a modern world-system,
Wallerstein sees four contradictions in such a system:
1) the search for state sovereignty; 2) the desire of all
states to become nations; 3) the demands that states are
democratic; and 4) the ways that capitalism maintains
its equilibrium in order to survive (Wallerstein in Öcalan,
2012, p.10). Like Karl Marx, Karl Kautsky (1854-1938),
and Öcalan, Wallerstein is convinced that “political
action will affect the worldwide struggle about what kind
of system will replace the now doomed capitalist worldsystem.” (Wallerstein in Öcalan, 2012, p. 13) Yet, before
that capitalist world-system falls, Wallerstein insists that
the solution to the Kurdish question in Turkey will depend
on the powerful drive of the Turkish state to reinforce its
sovereignty both from within and outwards; the desire
of many in Turkey in the state and civil society to reassert a dogmatic Jacobinism that does not recognize
national or ethnic pluralism; and the way worldwide
struggles will affect the Kurdish drive for democratic
rights and autonomy. In this respect, it is possible
that the financial crisis of 2008-9, Occupy Wall Street,
the Indignados (Indignants) movement in Spain and
Portugal, popular anti-government protests in Greece,
and the Arab Spring all have the potential to impact on
the Kurdish struggle. Indeed, Öcalan’s solutions for the
resolution of the Kurdish question echo the concerns of
the aforementioned protesters in terms of the desire for
direct rather than representative democracy, criticism
of the disproportionate power of money in the political
process, and the more radical demand to democratize
163
society by going “beyond earlier modernist political
projects” and thus end the division between rulers and
ruled (Gill, 2008, p.245). Whereas Gramsci and Öcalan
once saw the Communist Party as a key agent in the
counter-hegemonic struggle, today Öcalan is a prophet
of a more radical, popular democracy that challenges
both states and dogmatic leftist elites. Öcalan is a
proponent of “democratic autonomy,” which is a form
of democracy that takes citizens in civil society as its
starting point; moves beyond elections as central to
democracy; and challenges representatives as the key
agents of the democratic process (e.g., party leaders,
politicians, state officials, etc.).
As a supporter of “democratic autonomy,” Öcalan
opines that civil society (including minorities, cultural
groups, religious communities, etc.) and direct forms
of democracy replace “representative” political elites
as the main agents of democracy and social change.
As Öcalan (2008,p. 32) wrote in War and Peace in
Kurdistan in 2008 in respect of “democratic autonomy,”
“the agents of this kind of self-government are not statebased authorities,” but the sovereign people seeking to
attain democratic self-governance in all aspects of their
lives. This position echoes a long-standing democratic
tradition, which argues that there are “different roads
towards democracy”; democracy does not entail
merely formal elections; and direct democracy is more
representative and fair compared to “elitist” forms of
representative democracy (Rosanvallon, 2008).
Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya and Joost Jongerden (2012)
confirm the “radical democracy” orientation of Öcalan,
which they argue led to a profound ideological
transformation of the PKK in the 2000s. These authors
argue that the project for radical democracy is based
on the conception of “politics beyond the state, political
organisation beyond the party, and political subjectivity
beyond class.” As a result, this conception of politics
can conceivably undermine the centralist tradition in the
Turkish political system, as well as challenge the statist
and dogmatic class perspective of the Left in Turkey.
Whereas in the past the goal of the PKK was a “national
liberation struggle” with the aim of an independent
164
Kurdish state in Turkey, its aim today is a project of “radical
democracy.” Radical democracy, argue Akkaya and
Jongerden (2013), connotes the concept of democracy
beyond nation and state. In addition, radical democracy
can be developed along three dimensions: the democratic
republic (of Turkey), democratic-confederalism (linking the
Kurds in Turkey with Kurds in the rest of the Middle East),
and democratic-autonomy (Both Kurdish and non-Kurdish
communities promoting a democratic civil society beyond
the state) (Akkaya and Jongerden, 2013). In his attempts to
supersede a sterile and dogmatic Marxism, Öcalan sought to
think of democratic practices outside the state, the PKK (the
movement or party), and a narrow class focus (Akkaya and
Jongerden, 2013). This “radical democracy” not only attempts
to struggle against existing political institutions and Old Left
thinking, but offers an alternative to the neo-liberal project
where market civilization increasingly supplants democracy.
The project of “radical democracy” is not only changing the
PKK, but also influencing radical, leftist social and political
movements, from the “liberation movements” of Latin America
to the anti-globalization demonstrations in North America and
Europe (Akkaya and Jongerden, 2013).
Cengiz Gunes (2012, pp. 463-464) points out that the PKK has
played a role in the democratization processes in Turkey. The
PKK’s ceasefire announcement in 1999, asserts Gunes (2012,
p. 463), “brought about a significant reduction in the political
violence in the region. The occasional eruption of violence in
the past decade has neither been continuous nor as severe as
past violence.” Although political violence has not disappeared
between the PKK and Turkish state, the democratic opening
has been important in limiting violence between the two
entities. “The success of any democratic initiative to end
the conflict rests on Turkey’s ability to generate a national
consensus to recognize and accommodate Kurdish national
demands and rights, such as education in Kurdish language,
the constitutional recognition of Kurdish identity, and the
extension of broadcast rights,” writes Gunes (2012, p. 468).
He also points out that a Truth and Reconciliation commission
might be necessary once the violence has stopped in order to
deal with Turkish violence against Kurds, including extrajudicial
murders during the 1990s of an estimated 17,500 people, as
well as the violence of the 1980 coup d’état and the 1938
Dersim uprising (2012, p. 468).
165
The Introduction to The Road Map makes it clear that
democracy and democratization are not merely Western, but
universal tendencies “intrinsic to all beings” and societies
(Öcalan, 2012, p. 15). Yet, in contrast to the universal drive for
democracy, Turkey has been plagued by “severe nationalism”
and “a bureaucratic oligarchic dictatorship” dating back to the
Constitutional period in the Ottoman Empire from 1908-1922
(Öcalan, 2012, p. 16). Öcalan makes the claim that in Turkey
“for a century an oligarchic autocracy has nested within the
state.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 17) He insists that the Ergenekon
trials will “determine the fate of Turkish democracy.”5 (Öcalan,
2012, p. 17) The Ergenekon represents a state within a state,
or what Öcalan calls “a clandestine, kemalist, ultranationalist
organization in Turkey with ties to the military, security forces,
politicians, and media.” (Öcalan, 2012 p. 17) This state
within a state, argues Öcalan, used coups and other political
maneuvers in order to undermine human rights, Kurdish
rights, and the struggles of “oppressed classes.” For Öcalan
(2012, p. 17), the aim of the state within the state has been to
crush democracy and more ruthlessly “to eradicate everything
related to being Kurdish and to Kurdistan.”
Historically, the Kurds were viewed by the Turks as “Mountain
Turks.” (Gunter, 2000, p. 854) Kurdish communal identity
was completely negated or denigrated, while nationalist
assimilation was in general the rule in Turkey from the 1920s to
the 1990s. The PKK was a product of the harsh assimilationist
policies of the Turkish state. As Ertan Efegil (2011, pp. 27-28)
argues, these policies can be traced back to the founder of the
Turkish state, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) who pursued a policy
of “cultural unity” in the 1920s, which led to the emergence
of Kurdish uprisings; the branding of the Kurds as “ethnic
separatists”; and largely military measures to suppress these
rebellions. This position continued until 1992 when Turkish
President Turgut Özal criticized this assimilationist policy
5
166
The Ergenekon trials are being conducted by the Istanbul Heavy Penal Court 13, which accepted a 2,455 page
indictment against 86 defendants in the first case against alleged members of the clandestine organization Ergenekon (which it is claimed sought to overthrow the existing government and install an authoritarian state) on 28
July 2008 and 14 more indictments were prepared until February 2011. More indictments were added to the initial
lists, including more controversially numerous journalists. By April 2011, over 500 people were in custody and almost
300 formally charged with membership of what prosecutors dubbed “the Ergenekon terrorist organization,” which
they claimed had been responsible for virtually every act of political violence, as well as controlled all militant group
in Turkey over the last 30 years. Critics of the ruling AKP government say that that they are using the Ergenekon trials
as a pretext to undermine democracy, press freedoms, and the rule of law. Many Turkish intellectuals want the trials
to continue in order to determine the degree of state involvement, including key politicians, security, and military officials, in subverting Turkish democracy. See Gareth Jenkins, “THE FADING MASQUERADE: ERGENEKON AND THE
POLITICS OF JUSTICE IN TURKEY,” Turkey Analyst, Vol. 4, No. 7 (4 April 2011).
pursued by state elites; described the growing issue as the
Kurdish “question”; and called for the improvement of the
conditions of Kurds in Turkey (Efegil, 2011, p. 28). The opening
to the Kurds was continued in August 2005 in a speech in
Diyarbakır, in which Prime Minister Erdoğan argued in favour
of more democratic rights for the Kurdish people.
Yet, the hopes for democratization in Turkey have been recently
assisted by key powers such as the United States of America
(USA) and the EU, which see their interests threatened and are
“now more receptive to democratic solutions.” (Öcalan, 2012,
p. 18) Öcalan’s perspective has been corroborated by Cuma
Çiçek who argues that “the new geopolitical conditions,” as well
as the regional aspirations of the neo-liberal, pro-Islamist AKP,
facilitates “the ending of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey” and the
re-building of relations between Iraqi and Turkish Kurds (Çiçek,
2011, p. 15). Nonetheless, Öcalan argues that Turkey will need
to shake off the shackles of the Ergenekon and adopt a new
civilian constitution that guarantees fundamental rights (for
example, the freedoms of expression and association), while
safeguarding “the democratic, social, secular, and juridical
attributes of the Republic.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 18) Öcalan is
adamant that such a constitution would help find solutions for
all of Turkish society and would not lead to Kurdish secession
since Kurdish individual and social rights will be guaranteed.
In Part II, Öcalan outlines his key concepts, theoretical
frameworks, and principles, which presumably would allow for
the democratization of Turkey and the Middle East at large.
Öcalan (2012, p. 19) is adamant that “constitutional solutions”
are required in Turkey in order to solve the Kurdish question.
He also notes that while the notion of Kurdistan “still inspires
fear,” it was recognized by both the Seljuks and Ottomans
(Öcalan, 2012, p. 19). Any Turkish attempts to deny the use of
the words Kurd or Kurdistan would only lead to an impasse,
insists the PKK leader.
Like Gramsci in another age, Öcalan has left the world of
dogmatic Marxism. He argues that democratization is not
merely “the dictatorship of the proletariat” or class war, but the
protection of free speech and free association for all individuals,
irrespective of their class position, culture, language, ethnicity,
or faith (Öcalan, 2012, p. 20). Moreover, while he insists that
the Kurdish problem can be resolved within the context of a
Turkish, secular republic, Öcalan rejects the idea that it can
167
be definitively decided through the project of the nationstate (Öcalan, 2012, p. 20). For Öcalan, a nation-state
represents homogenization, assimilation, and at its worst
the spectre of genocide. Öcalan (2012, p. 21) insists
that Turkey could even become a “nation of nations.”
He is adamant that the collective rights of Kurds or Turks
must be balanced with a respect for individual rights.
In Part II, Öcalan (2012, p. 28-35) outlines ten principles
for a more democratic political system in Turkey: 1) the
democratic nation principle, 2) a common homeland
principle, 3) democratic republic principle, 4) democratic
constitution principle, 5) democratic solution principle,
6) the union of individual and collective rights and
freedoms principle, 7) ideological independence and
freedom principle, 8) the principle of historicity and
present, 9) morality and conscience principle, and 10)
the principle of self-defense in democracies.
A democratic nation connotes “open cultural identities
and flexible nationalities;” it is not constructed forcefully
by rulers; and respects both citizens and civil society
(Öcalan, 2012, p. 28). This sounds rather similar to
the state-sanctioned multiculturalism in Canada. Yet,
Öcalan is interested in going beyond representative
democracy as it relates to the state and towards the
flowering of democratic activism at the lowest levels of
civil society.
A common homeland would negate the “fascist” notion
of a “uniform citizenry,” while it would be “multilingual,
multinational, and multireligious.” (Öcalan, 2012, p.28)
This position is obviously designed to undermine the
near religious veneration of Turkish and Tukishness
within the modern, secular Turkish republic.
Öcalan’s (2012, p. 29) ideal state is a republic that is
not a nation-state, but rather a democratic state. The
democratic republic cannot be tied to an ethnicity,
argues Öcalan. Turkishness, Kurdishness, and Islam
would be respected in civil society, but could not be part
of the constitutional parameters of the state (Öcalan,
2012, p.29).
168
A democratic constitution would protect civil society from the
assimilationist tendencies of the state, as well as from “the
enormous concentration of power in the state.” (Öcalan, 2012,
p. 29) Here Öcalan focuses on the power of the people and
society against the hegemonic power of the state. He reiterates
the importance of the notion of “democratic autonomy.”
The democratic solution principle will attempt to democratize
civil society, while civil society will not aim to topple the state
(Öcalan, 2012, p. 30). The democratic solution springs from
the forces of civil society rather than state-driven engineering.
It seeks to protect civil society; constitutionally safeguard
democratic institutions; and would not negate the existence of
the state. Öcalan’s focus on civil society as the key motor for
historical change echoes Gramsci, but also Rosanvallon and
other proponents of more direct forms of democracy.
No political solution will work, argues Öcalan, without the
appropriate balance between collective rights (state, civil
society, Kurds, etc.) and individual rights. In a Gramscian tone,
Öcalan (2012, p. 31) argues that the “ideological hegemony”
of what he calls “capitalist modernity” and “positivism” must
be superseded. In this respect, civil society can play a key
role in undermining the prevailing pro-statist and pro-capitalist
ideological hegemony.
The principle of historicity and the present refers to the notion
that “capitalist modernity tries to destroy human memory
and presents the present as if it were eternal or, rather, the
end of time.” (Öcalan, 2012, p.33) Consequently, democratic
solutions will take into consideration present society and the
history of past experiences.
The morality and conscience principle entails the importance
of religion and morality in democratic decision-making.
Abstract reason and administrative solutions will merely
aggravate problems, or at worst lead to genocides (Öcalan,
2012, pp. 33-34). Here Öcalan indirectly pays homage to The
Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) written by Theodor Adorno
and Max Horkheimer (2002). Modernity was a dialectical
process consisting of both cultural advances and barbarism,
argued Adorno and Horkheimer. For Horkheimer and Adorno,
the modern Enlightenment’s attempts to counter myth with
reason led to the “mythology” of a modern world dominated by
excessive faith in “instrumental reason.” From this perspective,
169
the horrors of the Holocaust can be interpreted as merely
a continuation of the project of modernity with its extreme,
utopian faith in “instrumental reason” and technological
progress. For Öcalan, “capitalist modernity” also entails
contradictory progressive and barbaric processes in which
the Kurds’ conservatism and feudalism can be superseded
and yet new structures of domination are imposed through the
universal spread of capitalism.
Finally, the principle of self-defense in democracies means
challenging capitalist modernity, industrialism, “the monopolist
oppression and exploitation of the nation-state,” and the
“war” against the environment (Öcalan, 2012, p.34-35). In the
future, free individuals will need to resist capitalism and the
state by living in “self-defense units” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 35).
Presumably these “self-defense units” would be led by civil
society organizations rather than the PKK, which Öcalan has
criticized for the armed struggle, dogmatism, and socialist
principles blind to historical realities (for example, the fall of
the Communist Soviet Union).
Despite the Turkish government’s greater openness towards
the Kurdish issue, there has not been “any considerably
positive development towards a solution of the Kurdish issue.”
(Çiçek, 2011, p.15) In 2009 and 2010, the Turkish state arrested
1,500 Kurdish politicians, including mayors, vice presidents,
former MPs, and directors of the central and local branches of
the Democratic Society Party (DTP). The Constitutional Court
also banned the DTP for alleged ties to terrorist organizations
and for questioning the “indivisible integrity” of the state. There
were also arrests of members of the Union of Communities
in Kurdistan (KCK), a PKK “self-defense unit,” as well as
prosecution of children aged between thirteen and eighteen
in adult courts under the Counterterrorism Law for throwing
stones at members of the police force. Some children have
been sentenced to imprisonment for several years (Çiçek,
2011, p.16).
Part 3 deals with the problem of democracy and the solution
of a democratic constitution. Öcalan argues that modern,
representative democracies, including the EU, are advances
in human history, but “the monopolist state maintains its
domination from the top.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 36) Individual
freedoms have been paradoxically reduced in the era of
modernity due to the trinity of capitalism, industrialism, and
170
the monopoly of state-led bureaucratic power. This is why
Öcalan insists that new freedoms can be gained through the
“democratic autonomy” of civil society voices.
Turkey’s democracy problem stems from the adoption of Islam,
insists Öcalan. On the one hand, the military and religious
aristocracy received privileges from the monopoly of state
power. On the other hand, the poor in cities and villages were
excluded from state power. While Sunni Islam became the
official ideology of the ruling classes, very few in civil society
could resist against the ideological hegemony of Sunnism.
The modern Turkish state combined the ideological power
of older historical civilizations (for example, Islam), as well
as capitalist modernity. For Öcalan, the Turkish state thus
became “capitalist, fascist, and bourgeois.” (Öcalan, 2012,
p. 39) Moreover, he insists that the Committee of Union and
Progress became the prototype of the Italian Fascist Party
and German National Socialist Party. Brutal class wars and
genocides against Armenians and Kurds were the stock-intrade of the Turkish state. Öcalan provides no evidence for
how the Turkish state was the prototype for Fascist and Nazi
regimes. Moreover, while the Turkish state has historically
been monopolist and authoritarian, Öcalan’s claim that the
Turkish state became fascist begs the question when? For if
Fascism in its regime form was created in Italy in 1919, when
did Fascism make its appearance in Turkey? And it begs a
few other questions: Is Turkey still a Fascist state? Or, is it
merely a semi-authoritarian state? Or, is it a democracy? How
do historians of Fascism classify the Turkish state both in the
early 20th century and more recently? Does Öcalan have a
tendency common to Marxist (or former Marxist) scholars
to see all capitalist and modernist regimes as fascist, thus
obscuring real differences between fascists and non-fascists,
as well as totalitarians and authoritarians? (Payne, 1995)
Turkey’s democracy problem was histotrically aggravated by
Mustafa Kemal and the foundation of a Turkish Republic, as well
as the Jacobin tendency of the Turkish state. Öcalan argues
that Jacobinism advanced the interests of the bourgeoisie, but
was a popular movement that had dictatorial tendencies and
made its mark in diverse regimes from modern Turkey to the
French Revolution, and even the Bolshevik Soviet Union and
Nazi Germany.
171
Despite the authoritarian nature of the Turkish state, Öcalan
cites missed opportunities in respect of the Kurdish problem.
He argues that both Mustafa Kemal and the Grand National
Assembly of Turkey accepted Kurdish autonomy in 1924 and
1922 respectively. He points out that the British Empire played
a key role in undermining Kurdish autonomy in conjunction with
the Turkish state. The British sought to exclude Kurd, Socialist,
and Islamist representation in the new Turkish Republic under
Mustafa Kemal, while Kemal was a realist that accepted
the new bargain. From 1950 to 2007, Turkey was under the
sphere of influence of the USA and Gladio.6 Is Öcalan trying
to win favour with his Turkish interlocutors by stating that
foreign powers rather than Turkey are principally to blame for
the historical oppression of the Kurds? In addition, does not
Öcalan overstate the powers of foreign forces in undermining
the autonomy and self-governance desires of the Kurds?
When the Communist Soviet Union fell, Öcalan argues
that “there was a plan to use it [Turkey] as a model for the
modernization of the Islamic tradition.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 51)
It is true that an Islamist party, The Justice and Development
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP), has governed Turkey
since 2002 and it maintains a secular, republican tradition
with expansive ties to the West. The PKK’s struggle is not for
socialism or independence, insists Öcalan, but with the antidemocratic tendencies of the Jacobin, Turkish Republic. In
addition, the PKK leader points out that Mustafa Kemal sought
to counter the Italian Fascist inspiration of the Republican
Peoples’ Party. Is this not again an attempt to win Turkish
favour from Turks that consider Mustafa Kemal the Turkish
hero of the 20th century? When he was captured by Turkish
authorities, Öcalan surprisingly stated the following: “I really
love Turkey and the Turkish people. My mother was Turkish.
Sincerely, I will do all I can to be of service.” (In Gunter, 2000,
p. 852) Öcalan’s various writings insisted on maintaining
the unity, independence, and territorial integrity of Turkey. As
far back as 1993 when he declared a unilateral ceasefire,
Öcalan’s position evolved from outright separation of the
Kurds towards a rejection of separation and a focus on the
historical “brotherhood” between Kurds and Turks.
6
172
Gladio is an Italian codename for a clandestine North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation in Italy and numerous other European countries (including Turkey) after World War Two. Gladio’s aim was to prevent a Communist
takeover of Western and Southern Europe, while making contingency plans in the event of Communists coming to
power in the region. The Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) role in Gladio is disputed, but Öcalan is adamant in
respect of the CIA’s involvement in Gladio operations in Turkey.
Yet, Öcalan argues that the Turkish state must be situated
within the context of larger hegemonic powers: the imperatives
of the British Empire from 1925 to 1945, the USA from 1945
to 2010, and global capitalist structures (for example, the
IMF and World Bank) in conjunction with NATO’s Gladio,
which Öcalan dubs “the real ruler” of Turkey (Öcalan, 2012,
p. 55). As a result of the assimilationist, Jacobin tendencies
of the Turkish state and the influence of external hegemonic
powers, Turkey “annihilated” members of the Communist Party
in the Cold War period (Öcalan, 2012, p. 55). Islamists were
also targeted with arrests and deportations, but an Islamist
modernization process led to the creation of the Erbakan
movement in 1969 and eventual participation in government
under Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan (1926-2011) in 199697. Erdoğan’s government cemented Turkey as a model for
a secular Islamism in the Middle East. It was assumed that
the Kurdish question was “terminated” after the rebellion
period from 1920 to 1938, but the PKK began the process
of highlighting the existence of the Kurds through violent and
later more non-violent methods from 1980 to 2010 (Öcalan,
2012, pp. 56-57).
In section four, Öcalan highlights the key questions surrounding
the Turkish problem and the prospects for resolving the Turkish
question. Öcalan once thought that a state was the answer
to the woes of the Kurds, but now opines that “the state is
the greatest source of troubles.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 63) Again,
this position should be viewed in light of Öcalan’s rejection
of representative democracy and support for “democratic
autonomy” from the bottom-up. In short, the assimilationist
state denied the existence of the Kurds, while cultural
protection was sought through the preservation of Kurdish
lifeways, their focus on agriculture and animal husbandry, and
the “shelter” of the mountains (Öcalan, 2012, p. 64). In short,
Kurdish culture was maintained outside of the state in civil
society. He insists that Kurds want to overcome the periods of
near “cultural genocide” at the hands of the Turkish state, while
becoming a “strategic friend” or “partner” of the Turks (Öcalan,
2012, pp. 68-69).
Öcalan maintains that he has learned from the Turkish state and
his incarceration. For Öcalan, the armed struggle is identified
as “a fight for truth.” (Öcalan, 2012, p.78) Did not Gramsci
also learn from prison through his writings and the re-thinking
of strategies in order to defeat capitalism? The “truth” that the
173
armed struggle revealed is not that the Kurds need a state (as this
state may replicate the assimilationist Turkish state), but rather
“the existence of the Kurds.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 78) The PKK is
today more concerned with finding democratic solutions within
Turkey rather than the armed struggle, attaining a nation-state,
or socialism. In this respect, Öcalan has superseded Gramsci’s
attachment to the Italian Communist Party. Yet, questions
remain about Öcalan’s authoritarian personality and the sexual
repression associated with the organization. For example,
Romano points out that in the 1990s “while a Kurdish National
Assembly would have helped to develop Kurdish autonomous
institutions and the legitimacy of Kurdish group demands,
Öcalan soured on the idea as soon as it became clear that such
institutions would not remain under his full control.” (Romano,
2008, p. 347; Marcus, 2007) The “democratic autonomy” and
civil society-based solutions Öcalan proposes in The Road Map
would undermine the power of the Turkish state, PKK, and all socalled “democratic” representatives of the Kurds.
Three main solutions have been proposed for the Kurdish
question: national assimilation (or annihilation), a Kurdish
federalist nation-state that encompasses Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and
Iran, and a democratic nation solution. Öcalan calls for the latter
option within the context of the ten principles highlighted earlier.
The name Öcalan gives for the “democratic autonomy” solution is
KCK. The KCK stands for the Union of Communities in Kurdistan
(Komo Civaken Kurdistan), an umbrella of democratic Kurdish
organizations in civil society. As pointed out earlier, arrests of
KCK members intensified in 2009 and 2010. It is the KCK that
will supposedly replace the PKK once the armed struggle is no
longer necessary. It is in this crucial section that Öcalan insists
unambiguously that the democratic solution means that he
accepts “the institutions and present borders of the Republic
of Turkey as legitimate.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 93) He also rejects
a unitary, federal, or confederal Turkey. Instead, he argues that
“the democratic, equal, and free aspects of Republic of Turkey’s
citizenship be not just defined in the constitution and regulations
but institutionally implemented.” (Öcalan, 2012, p. 93) The
solution must respect both individual and collective cultural
rights, but also involve the entire society rather than a top-down,
state-centric approach. Moreover, the Kurds should have their
place within the “People” or “Nation” of Turkey constitutionally
defined (Öcalan, 2012, p.94).
174
As part of the KCK solution, Öcalan points out that the army
must be used for external threats alone rather than against the
Kurds. Moreover, the KCK can be expanded to include other
cultural communities in Turkey from Armenians and Assyrians
to Turkomans, while a flexible confederation can include Turkey,
Syria, and Iraq. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey must
take a leading role in the KCK solution.
Section five outlines the action plan for implementing Öcalan’s
Kurdish solution. It is interesting that Öcalan comes out
against the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq because
its aim is “in controlling Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Turkey.” (Öcalan,
2012, p. 102) In the first phase, Öcalan is prepared to reign
in his PKK fighters in order to attain a democratic solution.
In the second phase, A Truth and Reconciliation Commission
should be conducted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
In a third phase, Öcalan (2012, p. 104) argues that a resort to
arms will not be necessary, Kurds can return from exile, and
ex-PKK fighters and refugees can attain full citizenship status
in the context of the KCK. Öcalan insists that the USA, EU, and
United Nations can all assist in the transition to a democratic
solution.
Yet, Öcalan (2012, p. 104) points out that if there is a Truth
and Reconciliation Commission, he should be released. Will
Turks who view Öcalan with suspicion because of his previous
support for the armed struggle, suicide bombings, Kurdish
nationalism, and Marxism, be ready to make such a leap of
faith?
In the Conclusion, Öcalan (2012, p. 107) declares that should
the current AKP government solve the Kurdish question,
“Turkey has a chance to be a model” for the entire Middle
East. Kurds and Palestinians, as well as other minorities in the
Middle East from Copts in Egypt to Assyrians in Iraq, rightfully
ask where is their Arab Spring? Those hitherto neglected
groups insist that democratization processes must also grant
them equal status politically. Öcalan (2012, p. 108) argues
that a window of opportunity has been opened to solve the
Kurdish problem as Turkish Gladio operations linked to NATO,
the USA, Israel, and EU ended in 2007. Should this window be
left open, the secret negotiations begun between the Turkish
state and Öcalan will lead the Kurds away from a history of
occupation, assimilation, colonialism, and invasion towards
democracy, equality, and freedom.
175
Concluding thoughts
This paper analyzed Abdullah Öcalan’s The Road Map from a
Gramscian perspective. I argued that The Road Map is infused
with numerous influences from “democratic autonomy” and
feminism to Immanuel Wallerstein and Hegel. Yet, a Gramscian
reading of The Road Map allows us to see how changes in
mentalities and civil society are preludes to revolutionary
political change. Gramsci stressed the role of hegemonic and
counter-hegemonic ideas in civil society rather than merely
the repressive apparatus of the state in the maintenance of
liberal, capitalist democracies. Öcalan is convinced that for
the first time in history the Kurdish-Turkish conflict can be
solved through discussions and without arms. This position
strengthened as a result of Öcalan’s incarceration in 1999,
but it has its genesis in Öcalan’s turn towards “democratic
autonomy” in the early 1990s. His claim is that “democratic
civilization” is spreading worldwide and this will assist the
Kurds in their struggle for their rights.
What is remarkable about Öcalan’s Road Map is that he has
presented the Turkish state a framework for the resolution of
the “Kurdish problem.” For all his defense of the Palestinians,
Prime Minister Erdoğan has not similarly defended the Kurds
within his own country and could miss a historic opportunity
by not taking Öcalan’s proposals seriously. The Turkish state
continues to deny the existence of the Armenian genocide.
This too does not bode well for the recognition of cultural and
minority rights by the Turkish state. The Turkish state’s recent
failure to seriously support the Kurds in Kobani (Syria) against
the genocidal Islamic State (IS) further provokes KurdishTurkish tensions. Öcalan, on the other hand, comes off as a
peacemaker. This is a remarkable transition for a man that once
lived by the gun; a man that for a period of time valorized the
deadly tactic of suicide bombing; a man that engaged in the
armed struggle and executed “traitors” within his own ranks.
Imrali prison is a bitter pill for Öcalan to swallow, but it has
perhaps transformed the lionized PKK leader into a veritable
Gramsci of our times.
176
Öcalan’s ceasefire call in the spring of 2013 further cemented
his evolution from the armed struggle towards non-violence
and the importance of “democratic autonomy”. Öcalan has
been championing a Middle Eastern “renaissance” away
from statism and authoritarianism long before the Arab Spring
began in Tunisia in December 2010. Öcalan’s The Road Map
offers hope for Kurds, Turks, and all “subaltern” forces in the
Middle East. Öcalan is a new breed of organic intellectuals
of “subaltern forces helping to organize workers, peasants
and indigenous peoples,” as well as other hitherto neglected
groups in civil society from women and Kurds in the Middle
East (Gill, 2008, p. 182). Öcalan represents a larger wave of
movements in the new millennium, which Gramsci scholar
Stephen Gill has called “the post-modern Prince”. “a set of
progressive political forces in movement.” (Gill, 2008, p.
182) These movements, including an array of indigenous
movements in Latin America, Occupy Wall Street, and some
elements in the Arab Spring, are proposing more innovative
forms of political agency, which question the division between
rulers and ruled (Gill, 2008, p. 237-248). While Öcalan’s
attention to the importance of civil society echoes Gramsci, his
proposals in The Road Map for a more plural, inclusive, and
flexible form of politics that rejects neo-liberal globalization,
statist nationalism, and the Communist Party transforms
the ideas of the Italian Communist hero. This transformation
contradicts the picture Marcus (2007, p. 181) paints of Öcalan:
A self-absorbed, flawed, and ruthless leader, determined to
eliminate any activity “that would remove the Kurdish fight
out of his direct control.” Despite his incarceration, Öcalan
has “singlehandedly shaped the Kurdish issue within the
Turkish republic.” (Kiel, 2011, p. 1) Yet, his radical democratic
proposals for the resolution of the Kurdish “problem,” if
implemented, will lead to the loss of real power for Öcalan,
the PKK, and leaders and states throughout the Middle East.
In his embrace of “democratic autonomy” from the bottom-up
and rejection of the dogmatism of the party or state, Öcalan is
perhaps more revolutionary than Gramsci.
177
REFERENCES
Adorno, T. W. and Horkheimer, M. (2002). Dialectic of
Enlightenment. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press
.
Akkaya, A.H. and Jongerden, J.P. (2013). Confederalism
and autonomy in Turkey: The Kurdistan Workers’ Party and
the Reinvention of Democracy. In The Kurdish Question in
Turkey: New Perspectives on Violence, Representation and
Reconciliation, 186-204. Gunes, C. and Zeydanlioğlu, W.
London: Routledge.
--------------------------------------. Akkaya, A.H. and Jongerden, J.
(2012). Reassembling the Political: The PKK and the project of
Radical Democracy. European Journal of Turkish Studies, 14.
Alexander, Y., Brenner, E. H., and Tutuncuoglu Krause, S.
(2008). Turkey: Terrorism, civil rights and the European Union.
New York: Routledge.
Bar-On, T. (2013). Rethinking the French New Right: Alternatives
to modernity. Abingdon, England: Routledge.
-------------- (2009). Understanding Political Conversion and
Mimetic Rivalry. Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions,
10(3), 241-264.
Bruno, G. (October 17, 2007). Inside the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK). Council on Foreign Relations. 19 October.
Retrieved on 3 March 2014, from: http://www.cfr.org/turkey/
inside-kurdistan-workers-party-pkk/p14576..
Brzezinski, Z. (2007). Second Chance: Three Presidents and
the Crisis of American Superpower. New York: Basic Books.
Çiçek, C. (2011). Elimination or Integration of Pro-Kurdish
Politics: Limits of the AKP’s Democratic Initiative. Turkish
Studies, 12(1), 15-26.
Efegil, E. (2011). Analysis of the AKP Government’s Policy
Toward the Kurdish Issue. Turkish Studies, 12(1), 27-40.
Fukuyama, F. (1989). The End of History? National Interest, 16,
3-18.
178
Gill, S. (2008). Power and Resistance in the New World Order
(second edition). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Global Terrorism Database. University of Maryland. Retrieved
on 3 March 2014, from: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/
Results.aspx?expanded=no&casualties_type=&casualties_
max=&success=yes&country=209&ob=GTDID&od=desc&
page=110&count=20, accessed.
Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks.
New York: International Publishers.
--------------. (1992/1996/2007). Prison Notebooks, volumes
1-3. New York: Columbia University Press.
Gunes, C. (2012). Unblocking the Impasse in Turkey’s Kurdish
Question. Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice 24(4),
462-469.
Gunter, M. (2007). Review of Prison Writings: The Roots of
Civilisation, by Abdullah Öcalan. Middle East Policy, 14, 166167.
-------------. (2000). The Continuing Kurdish Problem in Turkey
after Öcalan’s Capture. Third World Quarterly, 21(5), 849-869.
Jenkins, G. (2011). The fading masquerade: Ergenekon and
the politics of justice in turkey. Turkey Analyst, 4(7) (4 April).
Kiel, S. L. (2011). Understanding the Power of Insurgent
Leadership: A Case Study of Abdullah Öcalan and the PKK.
Master’s thesis. Washington: Georgetown University.
Kurth Cronin, A. (August 28, 2003). Terrorists and Suicide
Attacks. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress.
Accessed on 3 March, 2014, from: http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/
RL32058.pdf..
Marcus, A. (2007). Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish
Fight for Independence. New York: New York University Press.
Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic
Books.
179
Öcalan, A. (22 March, 2013). EuroNews, Full transcript of
Abdullah Öcalan’s ceasefire call. Accessed on 17 October,
2013, from: http://www.euronews.com/2013/03/22/web-fulltranscript-of-abdullah-ocalans-ceasefire-call-kurdish-pkk.
-------------- (2012). Prison Writings III: The Road Map to
Negotiations. Cologne, Germany: International Initiative.
------------. (2011). Prison Writings II: The PKK and the Kurdish
Question in the 21st Century (trans. Klaus Happel). Ann Arbor,
Michigan: Pluto Press/Transmedia Publishing.
-------------. (2008). War and Peace in Kurdistan: Perspectives
for a political solution of the Kurdish question. Cologne:
International Initiative.
-------------. (2007). Prison Writings: The Roots of Civilisation
(trans. Klaus Happel). Ann Arbor, Michigan: Pluto Press.
Pape, R. A. (2003). The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.
American Political Science Review, 97(3), 343-361.
Power, S. (2003). A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of
Genocide. New York: Basic Books.
Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2006). “PKK/
KONGRA-GEL”. Accessed on 24 October, 2013, from: http://
www.mfa.gov.tr/pkk_kongra-gel.en.mfa.
Romano, D. (2008). Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish
Fight for Independence by Aliza Marcus – Review. Middle East
Journal, 62(2), 346-347.
Rosanvallon, P. (2009). “Las nuevas vías de la democracia,”
Cuadernos del CENDES, 26(72) (septiembre-diciembre), 147161.
Sinan, O. (2007). Iraq to hang ‘Chemical Ali’. Associated Press
(25 June), Tampa Bay Times. Accessed on 29 May, 2013,
from:
http://www.sptimes.com/2007/06/25/Worldandnation/
Iraq_to_hang__Chemica.shtml, Accessed 29 May, 2013.
AMOR Y HUMOR
PARA RUSIA Y
DESDE RUSIA
Por: Imelda Ibañez Guzmán
Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales UNAM, México
Maestra en Estudios en Relaciones Internacionales por la Facultad de Ciencias
Políticas y Sociales de la UNAM. Ha sido profesora invitada para impartir la
clase de Rusia y las Relaciones Internacionales en la Facultad de Ciencias
Políticas y Sociales. Ha participado en diversos encuentros académicos
organizados por el Seminario de Geopolítica de la misma facultad así como
por el departamento de Derecho y Relaciones Internacionales del ITESM-CEM.
Su área de estudio es la Rusia postsoviética vista desde el enfoque de la
escuela geopolítica rusa. Sus líneas de trabajo son la seguridad euroatlántica,
la relación Estados Unidos-Rusia y Unión Europea-Rusia. imelda_25_05@
yahoo.com.mx
ABSTRACT
KEYWORDS A Moscú sin Kaláshnikov, escrita por Daniel Utrilla
Moscú, Rusia, humor, cultura,
periodismo
Vizmanos, es una apreciación distinta acerca de la
historia de Rusia. Una lectura que muestra a través
del trabajo periodístico los diferentes momentos
por los que ha pasado el autor en la búsqueda
del misticismo que encierra el alma rusa. Al mismo
tiempo es la historia de la nación que ha resurgido
en la región euroasiática desde inicios del siglo
XXI.
A Moscow sin Kaláshnikov, written by Daniel Utrilla
Vizmanos is assessed differently about the history
of Russia. A reading that shows through journalism
different moments that the author has gone in
search of mysticism enclosing the Russian soul.
At the same time it is the history of the nation that
has emerged in the Eurasian region during the first
decade of the XXI century.
Zaibert, L. (2004). Toward Meta-Politics. Quarterly Journal of
Austrian Economics, 7(4), 113-128.
180
181
A Moscú sin Kaláshnikov
de Daniel Utrilla Vizmanos
«Mi destino son las letras»
León Tolstói
Rusia y su pueblo son especiales, misteriosos e intrigantes,
tanto por su forma de ser como por su historia. Paisajes
nevados, héroes, pasión, valentía, personajes que buscan el
sentido del mundo en el destino, son tópicos inagotables en
la literatura rusa, estos temas ocupan miles de páginas en
relatos, novelas, cuentos y poesía. Para conocer a Rusia es
preciso explorar el entramado de su alma.
Daniel Utrilla ha evocado a los grandes autores rusos para
contar su historia que inicia desde la tierna infancia en
Alcorcon, España. La curiosidad de aquel niño por saber qué
se encontraba allende la cortina de hierro fue la semilla de
una vocación que lo llevaría tiempo después a descubrir el
idioma de Tosltói y Navokov, a cubrir el proceso electoral en
el que Vladimir Putin ganó la presidencia en el año 2000, con
tal fortuna que durante el verano de ese año recibió el cargo
de corresponsal para Rusia. Así, Utrilla despegó de España
para aterrizar en la Rusia que transformaría Putin. Desde ese
momento, sus vivencias se balancearon entre el oficio del
periodista y el amor por la tierra de zares: “Yo aún no podía
creer que sería testigo directo de noticias, de transformaciones
de calado mundial y de tragedias que han marcado la entrada
en el siglo XXI de Rusia” (Utrilla, 2013, p. 90)
A Moscú sin Kaláshnikov logra inquietar al lector desde el
índice, es un viaje de recuerdos y al mismo tiempo es un
singular itinerario para conocer desde otra forma la capital rusa:
Moscú. El lector va descubriendo y entrelazando personajes,
lugares históricos y actuales como Tolstoi, Rasputín, Lenin,
Gagarin, Navokov, héroes de guerra, nostálgicos de la URSS,
‘emvodkadas’, Tula, la estética soviética, la belleza de la mujer
moscovita, Putin, etcétera que han dado vida a la historia rusa
y que son descritos de una manera muy amena y divertida.
Así, mientras Daniel va delineando cada una de sus anécdotas
a lo largo de la obra, logra que el lector no pueda ocultar una
sonrisa y por supuesto la risa.
Es así como en la lectura, el humor desempeña un papel
importante, el choque cultural que se presenta para un
occidental al descubrir a los habitantes de Moscú, sus
costumbres y tradiciones, debe verse con humor. De este
modo, el autor tomó como un desafío presentar al país más
grande del mundo desde una forma amable y explicar que
existen dos Rusias, la real y la imaginaria en un paisaje donde
la temperatura suele rondar hasta -25°
Creo que he encontrado la clave del misterio: conciliar la
Rusia imaginaria y la Rusia real. Para mí las dos son igual de
importantes, y cuando falla la segunda, me voy unos días a
Yásnaia Poliana, la finca de Tolstoi que es uno de los pocos
lugares donde ambas Rusias coinciden y se funden en el
espacio y el tiempo con la nieve como elemento aglutinador.
(Utrilla, 2013, p. 325)
También es una lectura acerca del oficio del periodismo.
Daniel relata cómo es que en medio de su amplia oficina de
17 millones de km2 y con vistas a Eurasia, vivió el fin de la era
dorada del periodismo, del reporterismo de primera mano,
aquel oficio que lo llevó a descubrir el país de los extremos,
el lugar que donde menos se espera salta lo imposible y así
lo real y lo ficticio en personajes tan variados se unen para
provocar sorpresas en la mirada de un extranjero, como
le ocurrió al escritor y periodista Gabriel García Márquez
cuando llegó a Moscú en 1957 y cuyo legado en el autor es
mencionado también a lo largo de esta historia.
Editado por Libros del K.O., A Moscú sin Kaláshnikov. Una
Crónica sentimental de la Rusia de Putin envuelta en papel
de periódico, es una invitación tanto para quienes nos hemos
dedicado a estudiar la inmensidad de Rusia en el orden
internacional, así como para quienes quieran tener una noción
para recorrerla y descubrirla a través de paisajes literarios,
históricos y geográficos desde otra forma: la no occidental; es
un saludo al pueblo ruso, muestra de una pasión tan grande
del mismo tamaño o quizá mayor de la nación que asomó en
el horizonte europeo del siglo XVIII.
Utrilla, D. (2013). A Moscú sin Kaláshnikov. Una crónica
sentimental de la Rusia de Putin envuelta en papel de
periódico. Madrid, España: Libros del K.O.
182
183
RESEÑA DEL LIBRO:
THE WORLD THROUGH SOCCER: THE
CULTURAL IMPACT OF A GLOBAL SPORT,
DEL AUTOR TAMIR BAR-ON
Por: Mary Carmen Peloche Barrera
ITESM, Campus Puebla, México
Maestría en Gestión Pública Aplicada por el Tecnológico de Monterrey (2012). Licenciatura en
Relaciones Internacionales por el Tecnológico de Monterrey Campus Puebla (2010). Profesora de
tiempo completo del Departamento de Relaciones Internacionales y Ciencia Política de la Escuela
de Derecho y Diplomacia del Tecnológico de Monterrey Campus Puebla. Profesora de Ciudadanía
y Democracia de la Universidad Virtual del Tecnológico de Monterrey. Asesora Académica del
Modelo de Naciones Unidas de la Universidad de Harvard.
KEYWORDS Imagine poder analizar la historia de los siglos
Fútbol, Soccer, Política, Historia,
Deporte, Identidad, Ideología.
XIX, XX y lo que va del XXI a través del fútbol.
Las dictaduras militares en América Latina, la
época imperialista británica, el fascismo en Italia y
España, la Alemania de Hitler, la Unión Soviética
de Stalin, entre otros; son momentos históricos
radiografiados por Tamir Bar-On en su más reciente
obra The World Through Soccer: The Cultural
Impact of a Global Sport (El Mundo a través del
Soccer: El Impacto Cultural de un Deporte Global).
Tamir Bar-On nació en Beersheba, Israel pero
emigró con su familia a Toronto, Canadá desde
muy joven. Es doctor en Ciencias Políticas por la
Universidad de McGill de Toronto y actualmente
es profesor del Departamento de Relaciones
Internacionales del Tecnológico de Monterrey en
Querétaro, México. Bar-On es también autor de los
libros Where Have all Fascist Gone? (¿A dónde se
han ido todos los fascistas?) así como Rethinking
The French New Right: Alternatives to Modernity
(Repensando la Nueva Derecha Francesa:
Alternativas hacia la Modernidad), publicados en
2007 y 2013, respectivamente.
A través de once capítulos, Tamir Bar-On nos
muestra la influencia que el fútbol soccer tiene
como forjador de identidades nacionales; como
herramienta para el control ideológico y/o político;
como catalizador para la transformación social;
184
como parte ya inherente de nuestras creencias y fe, así como
promotor de liderazgos. Además, explica certeramente la relación
intrínseca que el fútbol soccer tiene con la ética, con las artes, con
la mercadotecnia y con la política. Cada capítulo representa una
lección a aprender a través de lo que el cronista deportivo Luis
Omar Tapia llama el deporte más hermoso del mundo. Para cada
una de las lecciones, Bar-On ha elegido con escrutinio una lista de
futbolistas que ayudan a ejemplificarlas, como los contemporáneos
Cristiano Ronaldo (Portugal), Xavi (España) y Neymar Jr. (Brasil);
otros ya retirados como Hugo Sánchez (México), Franz Beckenbauer
(Alemania) y Elías Figueroa (Chile); y otros ya fallecidos como José
Leandro Andrade (Uruguay) e Igor Netto (URSS).
La bibliografía revisada por el autor para su investigación es rica
en libros, artículos (tanto impresos como en línea), páginas web,
videos, entrevistas, blogs, noticias, entre otras. ¡El total de fuentes
consultadas y citadas suma 480! Lo que se traduce en una obra
adecuadamente referenciada. Así por ejemplo, Bar-On se apoya en
autores como Eduardo Galeano, Carlos Monsiváis, Albert Camus
y Juan Villoro para introducir interpretaciones maravillosas sobre
lo que para muchos significa el fútbol. Otros autores como Joseph
Nye, George Orwell y Martin Heidegger salen a relucir en el análisis
del mundo que el autor realiza a partir del soccer. Finalmente, se
vale de entrevistas y experiencias propias de futbolistas como Clint
Dempsey (E.E.U.U.), Pelé (Brasil) y Jorge Valdano (Argentina).
La manera en la que el autor presenta cada una de las once
lecciones es fascinante, ya que existe una perfecta relación entre el
tema, el futbolista elegido y la argumentación. Para los amantes del
fútbol, The World Through Soccer nos ofrece conocer historias nunca
antes imaginadas relacionadas con este deporte, ya sea de manera
directa (jugadores, clubes y selecciones nacionales) o indirecta
(contextos políticos, sociales, económicos, culturales, nacionales e
internacionales). Para quienes no gustan de este deporte, el libro
representa una oportunidad interesante de estudiar el mundo desde
otra visión. Es así que en cada capítulo nos sumergimos en un nuevo
aprendizaje.
Si bien se han escrito con anterioridad libros que relacionan el fútbol
con la política internacional, ninguno ofrece tantos enfoques o líneas
de análisis como lo hace Bar-On en su más reciente obra. The World
Through Soccer, tiene el potencial para convertirse en un referente
obligado en la bibliografía del fútbol. Un libro exquisito, entretenido y
proveedor de historias fantásticas.
Bar-On, T. (2014). The World Through Soccer: The Cultural
Impact of a Global Sport.
(1ra Edición). Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
185
¿Te interesa escribir en nuestras páginas?
Consulta la convocatoria de publicación en:
http://retosinternacionales.campusqueretaro.net/convocatoria-2/
Colabora con nosotros y sé parte de Retos
Internacionales.
EL CONFLICTO
PALESTINO-ISRAELI:
SOLUCIONES Y
DERIVAS