A Homage to Louk Hulsman - Societe Internationale de Defense
Transcripción
A Homage to Louk Hulsman - Societe Internationale de Defense
A Homage to Louk Hulsman by ADOLFO CERETTI Associate Professor of Criminology, Faculty of Law, University of Milano-Bicocca, Italy Assistant ISSD Secretary-General 1. Peines perdues. Le système pénal en question (Le Centurion, Paris, 1982), which is undoubtedly Louk Hulsman’s most meaningful and best known work, was written in collaboration with Jacqueline Bernat de Célis and published, as we all know, in 1982, that is just over twenty years ago, though it seems much longer ago. The intellectual fervour, the noblest utopias, the probing questions and the long-term planning that at the time challenged the theoretical foundations, the ideologies and the organisation of the basic systems of social control – criminal law and imprisonment, psychiatry and mental asylums – now seem a thing of the past. More specifically, the crux of the proposal put forward by the abolitionist theory Louk Hulsman was so fond of, which went so far as to hypothesise the suppression of the modern penal system as such – that is to say substantive and procedural rules and prison organisation – would seem, even upon close scrutiny, to have dissolved in the meanders of a labyrinthine set of policies which, clearly showing an absolute disregard for the risk of impinging upon the sensitivity of contemporary human beings, advocate and apply – virtually all over the world – principles and ideologies clearly bearing a conservative and repressive imprint. Some of these – the most popular – go by the name of “zero tolerance”. 2. The opportunity offered by the publication of this issue of the Cahiers de défense sociale, dedicated to Hulsman on the occasion of his 80th birthday, is truly unique. A number of scholars from all over the world have taken up the invitation extended by the Cahiers to think about the 48 acknowledged meaningfulness, value and topicality of some of Hulsman’s theories despite the strong dissent caused by his stand among penal and criminal scholars. As I have already briefly mentioned, the issues intertwining with abolitionist utopias1 are clearly born of the desire and the will to challenge the very foundations of the system of legitimisation underlying modern punitive systems. The intellectual and emotional drive behind such a strong stand for doing away with criminal law could arise only from a very articulate Weltanschauung as part of a “coherent and original” global vision of society and of the criminal issue, as Marc Ancel pointed out in his afterword to Peines perdues. Though clearly not pretending to offer an organic reconstruction of Hulsman’s theories, I wish to recall that the deep sensitivity he displays towards community models, towards the privatisation of conflicts and alternatives to the penal system plunges its roots in a multi-faceted hybrid cultural fabric, which ranges from the Christian tradition to some tenets of anarchical theories. As a matter of fact, as already promptly pointed out when Peines perdues was first released by a scholar as careful and as distinguished as Pio Marconi,2 his suggestions for alternative solutions to the social conflicts born every time a crime is committed, has much in common with the ideas put forward, in the late nineteenth-century, by some humanitarian thinkers (suffice it to think of Dorado Montero) who radically challenged – far ahead of the times – the notion of social defence or, alternatively, tried to push it to the limits, going so far as to wholeheartedly advocate the overthrowing of the system of guarantees and of the modern penal system. Suffice it to think of the community solution for conflicts and crimes advocated by Kropotkin, of the vision of a society (consortium) capable of looking upon diversity as something normal (Stirner), or of the just as abstract belief that arbitration can settle penal disputes (Proudhon). Hulsman, taking his distances from the well-established tradition which – according to him – creates a strong link between the logic of the Catholic Church’s centralised power and the power of law and of penal justice, goes so far as to challenge any form of power enjoined with the task of defining what “is good” and “what is bad”, and to mete sentences on the grounds of 1 2 As a matter of fact Hulsman has always denied the utopian nature of abolitionism, repeatedly claiming in Peines perdues that far from being utopian, the abolitionist perspective is a logical necessity, denoting a realistic attitude, a need for freedom. MARCONI P., (1983), “La strategia abolizionista di Louk Hulsman”, in Dei delitti e delle pene, 2, p. 222. 49 such a separation. His ontological critique to the presumed existence of a natural foundation to the notion of crime moves from his refutation of the very idea that man, in order to govern his passions and destructive impulses, should - in what is by now a markedly lay State – fall back upon a centralised system capable of mortifying the plethora of different meanings and solutions and allow such a system to take decisions resulting in punishments, which actually are nothing but violence, the curtailment of freedom, at times even death. But then “… how can the relational models the system now smothers be allowed to survive outside the institutional sphere?”3 As previously said, the rational solution is to abolish the “penal”, to start by subverting the language it draws from to define reprehensible behaviour and then go on to deconstruct the institutions – law-courts, prisons, etc. – it is embodied in. Crime, Hulsman claims, has no ontological reality and is not the object but the product of criminal policy. Criminalisation is one of the many ways to construct social reality. Moreover, the categories of crime are based on the constructions of the criminal justice system and hardly ever serve the real interests of flesh and blood people, that is to say victims and offenders. For Hulsman, the task is then to study the problematic situations (an expression which replaces – in his view – the identifying expressions such as offence, crime and criminal act) and to identify the contradictions at the heart of the various criminal justice systems. In other words, one is interested no longer in the long-standing issue of the causes of criminality, but rather in the possibility of identifying sufficiently sound criteria on the basis of which to create communicative channels between “reasoning actors”: on the one hand the parties giving in to problematic behaviour, on the other the victims. Only a direct analysis of the real problems, as they exist in the social consortium, can tell us which responses mirror public feelings. What has always been missing, according to him, is a level of interpretation capable of explaining if people’s notion of criminality has any analogy with the notion of criminality applied by the institutions. As Hulsman warned, as long as we fail to shed light on the issue, we will not be able to foresee whether the interventions traditionally adopted have merely repressive effects or some other effect. In the eighties, when inviting the whole scientific community to give the matter some thought, to come up with reasonable answers, he claimed: “when I first thought that the concept of criminality might not be used by people to organise their own direct experience in terms of daily life, but might instead be a response produced by the institutions using this specific language, I immediately 3 50 HULSMAN L., BERNAT DE CÉLIS J., Peines perdues, op.cit., p. 105 decided it might prove interesting to carry out empirical research to check out that hypothesis.”4 Many have engaged in such empirical research, but it cannot be asserted that the findings are in any way conclusive or validate Hulsman’s ideas. As a matter of fact, current findings in the field of penal policies would seem to validate other data and other research-studies, now deemed to be far more meaningful and far more likely to solve the problems afflicting justice. Suffice it to take but one example. In most Western world countries, as of the mid-seventies, the constant rise in crime rates has somehow lent “legitimacy” to the revival of a markedly punitive attitude, which cannot surely be taken for the longed for horizontal solutions to problematic situations. Severe sentences and more frequent recourse to prison terms are – in short – the prevailing paradigm. In the United States, which truly represent a workshop for models of control policies in the penal field which may well be exported to other countries, what now prevails, besides the previously mentioned “zero tolerance” policies, is a number of provisions foreseeing an increased use of imprisonment, Three Strikes and You’re Out and mandatory minimum sentencing laws and parole release restrictions, the revival of chain gangs and corporal punishment, supermax prisons, the multiplication of capital offences and executions, community notification laws and paedophile registers. In short, severe sentences – and the old rhetoric based on “law and order” – are resorted to as marks of authority directed at infusing a new sense of security. Such penalties are also supported by public opinion and above all by the mass-media, who view condemnation and the meeting of sentences as useful tools to relieve tension, by conveying a temporary and rewarding “sense of belonging”, countering the crime and the “feeling of insecurity” it generates. What is left, then, of the advocated change towards broadly organic forms of solidarity – upheld among others also by John Galtung, a thinker Hulsman has always acknowledged he was greatly indebted to? What is left of the proposals for an informal police activity, for the civilisation of justice, for initiatives directed at the victims, and of the calling for a growing reconciliation of juxtaposed interests via solutions based on complementarity? A sensible objective answer to the above questions will provide us with a vivid accurate picture of the situation. Those who have carefully studied the solutions resulting of the offender-victim and reparative justice paradigms are, for instance, aware of how in many countries they are now 4 HULSMAN L., (1983), “Abolire il sistema penale?”, in Dei delitti e delle pene, 2, p. 78. 51 regularly to be found operating side by side with criminal justice, at times making up for its centralising tendency though without substantially changing the overall balance of the system. These paradigms unexpectedly flower in social territories being progressively abandoned by formal order production systems. Conflicts and family and neighbourhood violence, social decay, vandalism, petty criminality in the metropolitan outskirts and racial intolerance produce suffering and large victimization which in its turn raise an equally large demand for the re-affirmation of justice, a demand which all too often remains unanswered. Against this backdrop of political haziness the past twenty years have witnessed the emergence of social dynamics posing as objectives the task of infusing a sense of responsibility in civil society and the re-appropriation of capacities allowing for self-resolution of conflicts. The public display of mediation and of restorative justice paradigms thus goes to place itself in a scenario definitely full of contradictions, where juxtaposing policies intertwine and tend to annul one another. But the spirit animating them and imposing, though marginally, their appeal linked to informality, mildness, simplicity, proximity are first and foremost the outcome of the battles started and fought by Hulsman. 3. Let me now briefly turn my attention to the noteworthy writings that several distinguished scholars offered as gifts on the occasion of Louk Hulsman’s eightieth birthday, when invited to write on the theme of Criminal law between abolitionism and zero tolerance. From Spain, Eduardo Demetrio Crespo presents us with an ideal opening paper. With the skill that only somebody who really has a deep knowledge of the subject, in just a few pages he presents the “philosophical foundations” of abolitionism, its “premises and theoretical bases”. Having outlined the picture, Demetrio Crespo then inscribes in it Hulsman’s doctrine, as evinced from his most original pages. He then moves on to an overview of the main criticisms levelled at abolitionist theories (be this criticism levelled on methodological, anthropological and sociological grounds, or animated by a desire to guarantee civil rights or mete retribution or have it a meta-scientific origin). What emerges as a certainty from all this – possibly thanks to Hulsman’s abolitionism – and what Demetrio Crespo adamantly believes in is the idea that punishment should be regarded as an evil, and that criminal law should move more and more towards minimal intervention solutions. From Italy, a country where the invitation to write something for this occasion has engendered a heartfelt response, Fausto Giunta invites us to consider that the ever mobile boundaries of criminal law are now traced by 52 the notions of “abolitionism” and “zero tolerance” which, it must be acknowledged, do not simply influence or impact on penalty but, though to a different extent, shape its practice and operate through it. Stimulated by this awareness, Giunta thoroughly questions the role criminal law and juridical science should take on in an age in which both find it hard to prove their legitimacy since ours is the age in which the veil that hid the interplay between power and violence has been lifted once and for all. Derridda docet! Francesco Palazzo constructs his convincing contribution by pointing out that, without necessarily embracing radical abolitionist utopias, it is altogether legitimate to question the idea that a monolithic single solution such as that of punishment may prove to be socially adequate to counter every form of criminality. In this specific instance, his attention focuses on the crimes committed by immigrants, a phenomenon which increasingly impinges upon urban security and upholds the “zero tolerance” policies adopted in several countries throughout the world. His line of reasoning is extremely thought-provoking. In his thorough overview of criminal policy in Italy over the past few decades – such policy being judged basically ambiguous and irrational – Alessandro Bernardi points out that if on the one hand the logic of punishment lives on in many fields and is even fuelled by “exemplary” recourse to penal sanctions, it is just as true that more and more people are willing to create a minimum criminal law system and that, following the introduction in the year 2000 of the figure of the Justice of the Peace, the foundations are being laid – albeit on the margins of the legal system – to create more constructive and less repressive mechanisms and solutions: “Be it consciously or unconsciously, therefore, abolitionist ideas tend to catch on in terra hostile, if not doing away with at least modifying criminal law.” Anabela Miranda Rodrigues intervenes from Portugal with an extremely articulate and scathing contribution. One of the issues from which she moves and around which her line of reasoning revolves is that criminal law must, nowadays, come to terms with a growing demand for security, with a growing palpable fear of criminality, with the fact that crime is increasingly over-represented. Moreover, all these phenomena take place in an increasingly globalised world where criminality – above all organised criminality – uses the logic and the potential of globalisation to its own advantage. As a result, the appeal in favour of the rights of those who commit offences and of re-socialising approaches appear to be more and more anachronistic, while actuarial policies and demands for incapacitation keep on gaining ground. What can be done, then, to control chaos? Is the 53 idea of an European criminal law the final answer? What are the truly viable political-criminal options? How is it possible to find a balance between demands for solidarity, the respect of individual dignity and security? A vigorous attack on “law and order” and “zero tolerance” policies has been launched by Massimo Pavarini, according to whom they are part of a short-sighted approach foreseeing old solutions to new problems. There failing to be an adequate culture, in a society like ours characterised by high crime rates, widespread risks tend to be met with insistent recourse to penalties. And it is not the crisis of politics as such that brings about this growing recourse to criminal law as an answer to the social demand for penalties, but rather the fact that we are now witnessing a re-qualification of politics, of the desire to create counter-powers there where none was previously found. From South America, and more specifically from Venezuela, Alì Lasser, in his pages rife with learned quotations (from Don Quixote to Dante Alighieri, to Dostoyevski), takes up another issue which is particularly important to Hulsman and the abolitionists: that of solidarity. Lasser’s considerations all revolve around and move from the question, already posed in Peines perdues: “Why solidarity, which is inborn and present in man, fails to work in criminal law?” Basing himself on the relevant criminal legislation and having regard also to the specific Argentine situation, Carlos Julio Lascano sets out to answer the following questions: a) given the social State model and the rule of law, would a “modernisation of the penal system” based on a zero tolerance criterion be acceptable or would it once more bring about an authoritarian penal system? b) To what extent may one deem reasonable some of the rules born of the “zero tolerance” model, the model as such being one of the specific manifestations of modern penal law? The issue from which Pedro R. David (Argentina) moves was instead postulated by Jacqueline Bernat de Célis, who in a paper written in 1985, insisted that the abolitionist stand is undeniably “opposed to” the penal system and altogether in favour of a society having no penal system, but that it also implies a “positive”, pragmatic approach to social problems and the solutions to be adopted, which must all be “reinvented”. Yet, in the light of these words, David wonders to what extent the system of penal justice has really lost ground. Many of the answers David comes up with may also be found in a meaningful book titled Globalización, Prevención 54 del Delito y Justicia Penal, which has recently been translated also into Italian (Giuffrè, Milan, 2001). Constantin Vouyoucas (Greece) has painstakingly and brilliantly suceeded in coming up with an analytical interpretation of the notions of de-criminalisation and alternatives to trials and sentences, such as diversion (to quote but one), moving from the perusal of the reports drawn up by the Council of Europe and the writings of the best thinkers on the subject (as, by way of example, Marc Ancel). A totally different approach is the one chosen instead by Gabrio Forti and Vincenzo Ruggiero. Forti submits the first findings of a very important research-study he has engaged in with a group of collaborators of his, on the way in which the mass-media, and above all television, select, choose and interpret crime news, contributing – by doing so – in shaping our mental perception of crime. It comes as no surprise that in Italy television news coverage gives such ample coverage to the description of the criminal event, all the more so if it is a violent event, devoting far less attention to the human elements of the event and to the offenders and victims. As Hulsman writes, “medias select events which are a-typical, present them in a stereotypical fashion, contrast them against a backcloth of normality which is over-typical”. The approach chosen by Vincenzo Ruggiero, a professor of sociology in London, is instead markedly … literary. He dwells on the description, depiction and notion of prisons and the miserable conditions associated with them, as emerging from the works of Victor Hugo and Octave Mirbeau. A quotation will suffice to understand why Hulsman will surely appreciate these pages. Hugo as a matter of fact writes that prisons are not in nature, but “man never ceases to pervert his own nature through the tragic pride of condemning his brother”. And what about Mirbeau, who goes so far as to hold that punishment reassures and regenerates the righteousness of the law abiding community, on the one hand, and metes out in legally sanitised fashions, on the other hand, our desire to inflict pain? 55