Reporte Amuay

Transcripción

Reporte Amuay

~
/'Risk E
'
.
RJf:7
ng,neer'ng
QBE
Risk Improvement Recommendations Update
r
~ Repo rt
~PDVSA
./
Centro de,B.efinaci61lE-<!r.aguana
Estado Falc6n
Venezuela
Recommendations Update Visit Made: March
Prepared on behalf of
s th..gl h
2012
~
QBE
Marine and Energy Syndicate 1036
Plantation Place
30 Fenchurch Street
London
EC3M 3BD
Prepared o n be half Of : e by Roger Gregory
4 Heat h Vil las
Plumstead
London SE18 1PG
Ref.201 21139
,-Risk , .
.
RJf7
rl!llneer'"9
rr
Phone +44 (0)
03 731 1 16
k..
mail roger kb§aol.com_
Contents
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Basic Inform ation
Values llt\d Estimated M aximum Loss
Summary
Company Administrative Strudure Changes
Operational status and Significant Events
Maintenance status and Signitcant Events
Inspection Status and Significant Events
8.
'recrmcasevces
9.
10.
11.
12
12.1 .
12.2.
12.3.
12.4.
12.5.
13.
Safety. Fire Protection & Securi ty
Notable ~cidents
Loss Estimates Update:
Risk Improvement Recom mendations Update
R ecomm enda~ons from 1993 Survey
aeccmmencauces from 2002 Survey
Recommendations from 2005 Survey
R ecomm enda~ons from 2007 Survey
Recommendations from 201 0 Survey .....
Observations
Cgyer Picture: PVAY-5 at Amuay.
3
4
5
7
7
7
9
13
14
15
17
18
22
23
'ZT
30
36
46
..
This report follCM's ',(sits to the PDVSA Centro de Refinacl6n Paraguana , (CRP) made at the request of Underwriters ,
to assess and repat on progress made in complianoe with recom mendations made by Uflderwriters' risk engineers
during thK sulVlly ',(sits in 1993, 2002, 2005, 2007 & 2010. • also contains infonn ation on the reported operational
status of the various units. significant operational events, significant m aintenanoeflO spectioo events , detal s of any
nctable incidents 0( accidents reported to the risk engineers during Ihe survey, and an update to the estimated
maximum loss. Forfurther tadual information on key details of the risk, referenoe should be made to the Risk
Engineering Report from the last full sulVll y carried out on behalf of OBE in Odober 2010
The authO( retains drawings. photographs and other documentation, acquired Vitlilst carrying out the SU lVlly, Yitlich can
be made ava~ abl e should the need ari se. All enquiries should in the first instance be directed to:
The Engineering Manager,
OBE Mame and Energy S~dlcate 1036.
Plantation Plaoe.
30 Fenchurch Street ,
l ondon. EC3M 3BD
Disclaimer
• should be noted that any liabil.y Vitlich
Enginttf'ing may incu- In tort (including but not l im ~ed t o
negligence) arising out of 0( in connedion with this report shall be excluded absolutely.
• is acknowledged that this repat is not intended to identify al hazard s which may exist nor is it intended to be
an exhaustive re',( ew afal possible eventU alities. Any recommendations fO( risk improvement contained in the
repat are purely advisory and the decision and responsibilay fO( implementation rests with the site's
managemefi. Responsibitity fa underwri1ing decisions rests with the underwriter in all cases. No responsibla y
can be taken for the accuracy of any inbrmation that has been provided by the client. (the assured. the broiler a
Ihe underwriter) fO( the purposes of this report.
.#-""
a BE Disclaimer
report hCl$ bu n provided solely to provide infr,"notkm to UndelWritel$ l7bout rllt /odUties referred to in the report
ond rhe projed monogemenr $)Istems in operotion at the fod iitits. for tilt purposes oj rhe UndelWriters' risk
=essmenf. The report gives the opinion oj a BE UndelWriting Limiredin resptd of tilt expawre to the inwred ptr~s, the
quolity of rhe loss conrrol measures in ploce ondmoy olso make recommendarions for ri5k improvemertf.
This
The recom mendotions submitted in rhis report (if ony) ore purely odvisory and ore for rhe purpose of l7ssisting rhe Insured
in risk control ond soft ly ossessm ents. It 1$, howe..er, not irtfended re imply thot no other risks exist or rhor no other
prtcou!ioru need to tit roken. No guoronru is gillen as ro the occurory, viobUity or rompltt:entSS of ony oj tilt
recommendations proVl'ded Ol' os to the rontent of the report.
The report soes IIOt QUOronret,. assume or WOrTOnt in ony woy !hl7t the Ownel$/OptrotOI$ ore in compiionce with ony
k1W$, reguklrions, code$ of procrice or ony orherlegol or Industty requirement or I}llidance opplying to the jocUitits.
QBEUnderwriting limited occepts 110 HobHiry whorsoever for ony erTOl]' or omissions in the report or rhe consequences of
reHonce on the inform ation provided.
PDVSA Centro de RefinaciOn Paraguana
Recommendations Update
01
First Dr.IIl Date 03 ':lI'2
Ref201211 39
o
QBE
Page 2 0f54
~isk
I
Basic Informalion
CLIENT ORGANISATION
COMPANY SURVEY ED
LOCATION
VISIT DATES
VISIT LEAD BY:
A LSO A TTENDED BY
PRINCIPAL COM PANY
PA RT ICIPANTS
caa Marine and Eller S odicate 1036
Petr6leos de Venezuela
Centro de Refinilci6n Paraguam1 (CRP) Amuay and Card6n Refineries
These are ess entially two refineries, operated as a combined system.
Man~menl . maintenance. etc are common to the two.
5 108 Mardl2012
liP-
Rog er Gregory
Engl"••r1n g for aae M arine & Energy Syndicate 1036
David Dalla Costa Ch artis, Madrid, e....c e ,
OmarJ Bravo
C RP Gen eral Ma nager
jesUs Malpica
Te chnical
Rcnald Pella
Seguridad Industrial
Ramal Uzcalegui
Operations Management
Edd ie Miguilene
PDV Main tenance
Elisaul MOllusl ena
Carm elo L6p ez
SMC Management
Process Management Amuay
Ricard o J . Ramirez M.
Process Eng inee r
Manager Operations CardOn
Ruben Bos~n
Zoilo Roo an
I
Maintenance
Luis Heredia
Wlliam Medina
T echnica l
Finances
Operations
Luis auerc
Hector Martinez
Alberto Rod riguez
Pedro Suarez
Felipe Semeoo
Fidel Fuenmay«e
Francisoo Montero
Nelly Rivllfo
Ramon Cosi
Jose V argas
Oscar Salazar
Angel Ouintero
Denis Ruiz
Luis a Lugo
Juan Joe Ram ir ez
Alexes Bra cho a .
Gennan Buslus
rsc
S IHO
GSA Card6n
Operations SMA
Man ager ROI.tine Main tenance A muay
Operations
SI HO
PCE
Te ctlni cal
Maintenan ce
Maintenance
Tectlnical
Industrial Safety
Industrial Safety
PCE Operations
Industrial Safety
Ja~ erGoi~ a
Finan ces
Marilza Vallejo
PDVSA Cap orale Insurance
Coop er Ga y , London
sarah Cl affey
Coop er Ga y , Colombia
Dian a Renfi go
Con tributions were made by othllfs du ring th e presentations on
recanmend ations and the brief site tour.
I
Rog er Gregory
Svndicate 103 6
SU PLEM ENTED BY:
PLANT A DDRESS:
PLANT TY PE A ND CA PA CITY :
LAn TU DE, LONGITUDE,
EL EVA Ti ON & AR EA:
SITE SI TUAnON
PDVSA Centro de Refinaci6n Para gu ana
Recc mmendaacos U pdate
First Draft Date 03 0l11O ' ~
R#1II< En gi neeri ng on behalf ofaBE Marine & Energy
Market Report by Roger Gregory R~ En gi n eerin g on behalf of aBE
Marin e & Ener ov Svndi cate 1036 fran \.lsit dated octcbe- 2010
Punto F-o, POI
uana. Estado Falc6n , Venezuela
Amuay: 63S,()()())op d, 'Nith distillation, lubric ants, hydrotreatment, FCCU ,
HF alk yt a~on , delayed coker and flexi cok llf (FCCU ).
;~~6n: 3OS,OOObopd, with distillation , lubes, h ydrctr eat ment, FCCU, H F
aJ lation , lscmerisetlcn. delayed ecee -.
Amuay: 11"37.8'N, 070 "13.3'W. Elevation 5 10 21lTl am sl Area .. 38llha ,
Card6n : 11"4S'N, 070 "11.S'W, Elevation 5 to 21lTl am sl Area " 420ha
Coastal sites, 14km ap art , on sou th-west comer of Paraguana peninsula ,
on the Gafo de V enezuel a, Ugh! popul atioo , no significan t adjacent
industri al exposures. Ne arest town , Punto Fij o, ap proximately midway
between the two sites.
Re f 201 21139
o
QBE
Page 30f 54
2. Values and Estimated Maximum Loss
IN SUREO VA LUES :
US$x1
Property damage
Comme....s
Card6n: 10 .625.
Nnuay: 11 .829.
From Febl\lary 2010 valuations by Advanced Appraisals
(Brazil) . Increased by 1.5% for 2011 . Includes
equipm ent, construction , and Foundations , Vtry
sign ifican t increases in value s since the 2007 valuation
by the sam e company (Card6n USS 4,843 millions,
Amuay US$ 5,843 millions). The recent valu ations haw
been accompan ied by a detailed site layou t showing th e
location of eacnuen.
Business Interru lion
Boil er & Mach;,ery Damage
Not Covered
AssllfTled included in Property Damape sumsinsured.
Contin ent BI
Not Covered
US$)(10
~isk Loss Estl mMe:
Property damage
Amuay
3 ,356
Comment s
HF Alkylation Iscmerisalion Section DIB column
Overhead Receiver l00tonnes.
Cardon
1,408
61from PO
MB
61 from MB
PDVSA Centro de Refinaci6n Paraguana
01
First Draft Dale 03 /101?
16
Card6n Alkylation 21sornerisalion Section DIB column
Overhead Receiver 100 lomes. Similar estinale results
from 37.1 tonne release In FCC Gas Plant,
Not Covered
Major un-contained rotor fa ilure of one of the three ex"GENEVAPCA" cas turbo-aKemators
Net Covered
Ref 201 211 39
o
QBE
Page 4 0f 54
3. Summary
The main purpose of this vis~ was to obtain information on progress 'Nith respect to the risk improvement
recomm endations mad e d~ng underwriters' risk engineering swveys in 1993, 2002,2005,2007 & 2010. In
we have included details of signi ficant changes or events in management stNcture, in operations, projects,
i1dd~ial .
maintenance and n scecr co. detals of reported inci dents involving leaks. fires. or explosions. and an update of the
estim ated maximum loss based on any reported changes to insured repl acement cost values.
At the comm encement of lhe survey there were 22 O\tstan ding r ecom mendations comprised of a total of 46
uncompl eted action items, and oflhese item s we are able 10 report 16 ( 35%) dosed, 19 (41%) in progress, and 11
(24%) with no progress.
Reference should be mad e to the October 20 10 underwriting report for further details of the risk . only cnang es an d
events of ~ nific;ance in are reeceeee in the descriptive body of the report. In particular, details of values and the
development of the Estim ated M aximum Loss are unchanged, wi th the except ion of a small "indexed" adjustment to
values advised b y the d ient.
Overa l , w e see some positive progress , aRhough we continue to rate this large refine ry complex as "in need of
improvement" as in 2010, A stronger "proa ctive" approach is necessary in our opinion ,
The oven JlI c ompany struct ure for Refining is essentially unchanged. A new M aintenance Org anisation
"Planificati6n y Oirecci6n Ven ezuelan a de Mantenimienlo" has been set up to stre am Wne Ihe planning and execution
of m ajor m ainlenance at the PDVSA fad lltles. Th is is based at Paraguan a.
Prod.lct ion al the time of our visit was SOO.OOObid at Amuay (nam eplate 635.000b/d ). with all un ~s op erating except
the A exicrack er (FC CU ). Alkylation , Depentaniser , rscn et seucn and on e Sulphur Recovery l ra in. There ar e
thr ough put lim~ations on Cru de Un ~ 1 vacuum feed fu rnace. Card6n is operating at 195,OOObJd (namepl ate
305,00llbId), with the largest Crude Un ~ C[). 4 and associat ed vacuum uni t shut down following Ihe February 5"'fire on
C D4, these should re-start very shortly, Sulphur Unit PRA-3 is shut down, Jetty 1 is in rep air ~Howing the Octob er
2010 fi re .
Major m aintenance (turnarounds) has been seen 10 be suffering from delays, typically of one or two years, supported
by "Technical Operation al Evaluations", These large refineri es . wi th a multiplic~y ofun~s have many should give
operat ional nexi bil~y to ta ke un~s ou t for maintenance. It is hoped that the new "PDV Mantellimiento" wi ll reverse the
trend of delays to major mailltella-oce .
ROlIi ne mai ntenance suffered a significant "low" in 2009 , the effeds of'Hhich are still being felt. evidence d by a
m arked increase in the ratio of corrective to preventive m aintenance . The effeds ar e also evident in the maintenance
backlog partiaJlarly for pumps and molors, and in a higher tha n larget proportion of "Em ergen cy" and Urgent" work
orders. Howevef. it is encouraging that these figures are being reported to management. Procurem ent remains a
significant challenge, aRhough proprie tary pump sea ls are avai lable.
There is a continuing effort on the struct ural int egrity pr09"lUTlmll , wi th good evidence of progress, however it is
recogn ised thai the scale oflhe problem on these "aging assets" rem ains a high priorit y. This inclu des the
reroeeocree structur es, steel structures and their passive fireproofing . It is noted that many uni ts yet to be tr eated
are making use of temporary support slnJctures , and thai these are nel fireproofed. I is also noted that the work of
temporary construction and r eplacem ent is carried out as "S IM OPs" (i e. simultaneous structural work on an 2el!rating
uni t).
Inspecti on rem ains org anised as before, but wi th some add~ional own- hire staff. On stre am inspection is by a local
contractor (Inspfalca ) wh o also provide s scaffolding etc. Analysis rem ains b y PDVSA staff. and "S ILCO" is used for
scheduling , recording an d analysis. A ceresco Under Insulation plan has been commenced. prodUCW1g manuats of
CUI prone areas and inspection plans. There have been vertjca~ty and thermog raphic inspections oftJ rnace sta cks.
and this pl"ogra mm e is aactually running ahead of schedule, Off-Process (Outside Battery LimM) pipewon< has now
been included in "S ll CO" . stornge tankS are inspected on "Risk Based " criteria . tan ks prioritised , and inspection s
being carried out on "High" and "Very High" risk tanks first. Typically 26 tan ks per year at Amu ay and 34 per year at
Card6n are to be insp ected -this is intend ed - in lim e - to elimin ate the presen t Sl.lbstantial back-log, PresSl.lre
vessel inspections are said to be fully up-to-date, and included in "S ILCO".
Pipework insp ection records were viewed for the Amuay PVAY"4 v aensn Column Overhead circuit and Bottoms lines.
These w ere easily found , and the inspection re cords were avai lable back to 1986. We were concerned however that
no basel ine insp ection had been carried out following a significant replacement and change of steel alloy. tha t the
m aximum 2 year cyee had not always been kept to, and that fer the evemeae circuit, wher e there was knONn
signific ant thinning of the pipe wal to the extent th at remaining useful ~fe was short and a "sp ecial watch" had been
scecaec . there wa s no attempt to check any of the many "dorm ant" TM L zon es,
First Draft Date 03 0l1~ , ~
Ref 201 21139
o
QBE
Pag e 50f54
Techni c al Services eeitnue to be involved in projects, monitoring of process "exa n sions" etc , an d there is a major
Alarm Management exercise underway. to address the knCMTI problem of alarm "ovel1oad". TNs project . in our
opinion , r equires more formal~y.
Safely (SIHO) continues to aud ~ permits towor1< and to carry out detailed aud its . and repoo improvements il some
areas of compli ance. There has been ina-eased tra ining of issuers and receivers of permits and other topic s including
housekeeping. The "S1SA" datab ase Is used to prog ress recommendations, and although there rem ains a larg e
number of open items, it is reported that thi s has been reducing . There is a "DJ po nt" inspired "manual of lessons from
past events. with "Best Practice" exemplars as well as analyses of ilcidents. Includes process associated events .
PTW. LoTo. etc .
Fire Prot ection : Organisation unchanged, firefighting equipment: now being added to "SA P" mainten ance schedulilg .
Many r.ew fire tru cks have been received . and old ones are being refurbished where economic. Fire pumps still do not
comply with annual crrve testing, and recent test s shcm lw<:I of the diesels at Card6n . afthough operating , have
deficiencies. There is a corporate initiative forthe inspection and m aintenance offirefighling and detection apparatus .
(S ICOINE database). lMlen fuMy populated , this will replace the present paper system, which is being operated in
para llel
Security : has been m oved from Operations to the S afety and Protection group. and there are investments in
progress to autanate the access control system , the ilter-s~e canmunications, to Improve perimeter lighting and to
build the National guard a neN "Reaction Centre".
Incidents : DJring 2011 there were 222 incitlent s reported , ilclud ing some 100 fires, many of these being in
contamin ate d pipe trenches . At1hough there is a good procedure for incident ilvestigation , we were disappointed to
not that few had progressed past the stag e of settilg up a study committee, an d only 9 w ere "closed ", wi th
recommendations carri ed out. Specific ilcid ents since ~ 201 0 visit described to us were:
•
11109/2010 Card6n Jetty 1 fire - Burst Kerosene Loading Hose.
•
15/0 312011 Amu ay HDAY-4 86,ooObid Gasoil Hydrotreater Explosion - CUI on Hydroge n line
•
2410512011 Card6n 77 ,OOObld FCC Fumace Explosion - Explosion during re-start following ilstrum ent air
loss.
0610&2011 Amu ay HYA Y-2 9.Smmscf/d Hydroge n Plant (Reform er) Furnace F-SS1 Explosial - "Plugged"
•
tub es, not dried OI.lt, exploded and ruptured a ~acent tubes.
•
06r'01f2012 Cardon Platformer "Incipienf fire - radiant area leak following significant overtemperature.
•
0910112012 Amu ay PVAY 27,300bfd Vacuum Un~ Unsafe Caldition of Furnace F- 100 - Collapsed re fi"actory
and carcase distortial
•
05/0212012 Cardon CDU 4 7O,0Cl0 bId Crude Distillation Unit Fire -faUure of small bore line al atmos . COIOOln
boltans pump suction .
There have been several furnace ilcidents in the past few years . but ther e is no apparent common cause.
PDVSA Centro tie Refina ci6n Paraguana
First Draft Dat e 03 0l1~ , ~
Ref20121139
Pag e 60f54
l!l
QBE
4. Company Administrative Structure Changes
The company structure as applies to refining is essentially unchanged.
There is a new group ' PDV Mant enimiento' , (Planifical i6n y Direcci6n V en ezu elan a de Mantenimi ento) intended 10
have a national scope, 10 address the challenges of m ajor m aintenance in the Oil, Gas and Petrochem icals ad i,,;lies
of PDVSA ilod by extension, others in simH ar fields. (See "Maintenance" below)
A "Strategic geseve' of about 50 engineers representing all discip6nes. (esp ecially electrical and plan t) has been
fOllTl ed , on a two year trainilg cyde , and these are currently wortil'lg "..,der super'>1sion.
There was iI rump of retirem ents in 2010, retirement can be at age 50 , but can extend to 65. and there are typically
OeM' 20 to 25 retirements pre year on an overall staffing level of 4360 (direct hired). This includes the power & steam
g enera~ ion fa c ~ity
' Genevapca" which was absorbed into the company structure, but does not include Ihe marine
operations or the "Bariv en" staff second ed to CRP .
6. Operational Status and Significant Events
Presen t operational status if; as foBows:
Amua~ is running SOOkbld
cuoe rate (desi gn Is 635kbfd). wi th no change to the crude diet.
Units are all operational
'Nith the exeee nce of the Flexicracker (FCCU DCAY). the Al k~latiCW'l un~ (A LAY ) and Depentanser (DPA Y) .
lsomerisation (ISAY) Ugh t Ends Recovery (GLAY) on m aintenance since 21" January, 'Nith a planned oiI~ dat e of
15t!l April . The CW'l1~ changes have been reliabilit~ improvem ents to large rotating m achines. no changes to processes
or tech nologies. Kerosene H~drotreater(H DAY- 1) was shu t down last w eek to decoke the catalyst beds; Sulphur
Recovery 3 (SUA Y-3) is not operating . Crude Distillation Unit PSAY~1 had a tube fa~ure in the F3 V acuum Feed
furnace .liniting caP3cit~ to 55kbld (desigl 63kbl d). Furnace plam ed to be rep lace during Milich 20 12 .
Cardon is ope!1lling at a maximum of 195kbld crude rat e (design is 305kbld), with th e largest distina~on unit CD- 4 shut
down due to the February 5"' 2Q12 release and ire ( see "Incidents" be low), In consequ ence , V acuum un~ AV-2 shut
down. These should re-start during March 2012. The PlatformerlHydrolreater developed a furnace F301 tube leak
an d was shu t down 6"' January, re-sta rted 12"' January. Th e FCCU sull"ered a "steam valve" event 21)" Feb rua ry, and
was shut down for 3-4 days. Alkyl a~on unit 1 had been shut down for more than a year , an d r estarted end of JanuiIrY.
The Feed/Product heat exchanger M 100 1 has an intern al leak , although this is reported not to be affecting production
rate or quality. Sulphur recovery un~ PRA -3 is not op erational . Rep airs to Jetty 1, l'<t1ich suffered a serious fire in
October 2010 (See "Incidents" below) is planned to be completed to allow operation to resume by th e end of Aug ust
2012.
6.
Maintenance Status and Significant Events
The princip al change to the main tenance organisation has been the sep aration of M ajor Maintenan ce to be the
responsibility of a filial group "PDV Ma intenimiento" ( see below) . Operational maintenance remains wi thin the CRP
organisation.
There ar e 8 groups reporting to the manager of maintenance at CRP - Planning & Contracts , WorKshops , Routine
M aintenanc e Card6n . Routine M ar.tenance Amu ay, In strumentation and Control . Special Equipm ent . Materials
(stor es), and Assistance I Management. aeeeteat M aintenance Is tceetee in the Operations Department, 'Nith the
excececn of Electric Motor m aintenance , l'<t1ich has as own workshop in Mainten an ce Dep artme nt.
The 1oIa1 number of workers in the CRP mainten anc e organisation as at January 2012was 1139. We do not have
figures for vacancies.
The ma intenan ce ph ~ osophy Is essentially unchanged, Preventive - calendar or cond~ion based, Corrective for
failures, m aintenance projeds to optimise performance or eliminal e root causes of failures, ail within C RP
m aintenance, and "major m aintenance" now with PDV Maintenimient o.
" PDV Mantenimienlo" , (Planificati6n y Direcci6n veoeeu eteoe de M ain tenimiento) is a sp ecia~st mainten anc e group
head ed by Sr. Jesus Luon go, he ad of Refining G roup . and as such comes und er the overall man ag em ent of CRP.
The decision to form th is group was taken late in 201 0. in response to concerns about delays to and costs of major
m aintena nce to th e PDVSA assets. Presently there is a staff of 134 engine ers iII1d administrat ors, 'Nith a creo tc
increase evenlu aly the hea d coun t to 800 or more. The motivation is to create and preserve expertise in the planning ,
contracting and execution of major maintenance acti>Aties svdl as Tum-Around M ain ten an ce , an d the pro>Asion c r a
stock of necessary toots and accessories (cranes, wel ding sets, scaffolding etc. -i nvestment in this areas staled to be
in the order ofUS$ 25 millions). The grou p is run b y a board level "Junta Directiva", and reporting to this are
departments for Administration . Planning . Operations (i.e . responsible fOf execulion of maj or maintenance worK on
Plant and Equipment. net plant operation ), Technical . (who are responsible for standards , compl iance, engineering
techn ical disciplines), Contracts (10 m anage third part y works), Finances , Services & Logistics.
First Draft Date 03 0l1~m
Ref20121139
o
QBE
Page 70f54
~is*
The scope and timing of maja maintenance activities win remain with the individual refineries and operational groups ,
and hence "PDV Mantenim iento" will act very much as an internal contractor, In tim e ij will have branches at all
PDVSA main sees. Note that "PDV" In the t ~le Is "Planlficati6fl y Direcel6n Yelezuelana" and not -seecrecs de
Venezuela", and lt1 at the long term aim Is for the organisation to be availa ble for other industries in addition the oil , gas
and petrochemicals secta. To putlt1e Major Mainten ance challenge at C RP Into perspective, there are some 83
process lIfl~S in the Card6n - Amuay re fineries , plus offsites and cuutes . and je tties, In a typical yea r, there are about
37 major maintenance interventions (turn -arounds) , and this may rise to a peak of 54 In some years.
The contract awa rd process Is stili essentially as before th ough, with a need to comply with the laws of Venezuel a, and
"Bariven" are still to be used for procurement.
It is understood that "MG3P" software is to be employed for the plarming and managem ent ofturn-arounds, to control
the oil-out to olj-in duration and to keep wilt1ln the maintenance objectives.
Key Maintenance Perlorm ance Indicators are presented annuall y to man agement In a "Rendid 6n de cuentae'. The
foUewing are extracted from recen t "Rendid ones",
Maja mainten ance (Turnaroun ds) costs since 2008 have been:
•
T
Partial Turn arOUnd s
General Turn arounds
Cost (USS Millions)
2008
2
2009
27
12
477.85
388.66
26
2011
12
20 10
12
,
3
432.91
314 .30
The emphasis in 20 11 has been Amu ay, with Sulphur Recovery SUAY-2 & 3, Add Gas Recovery FMAY- l , Sour
Water Tr eatment SWAY-2 & 4, Gasoil H ydrotreater H DAY4 , Reformer HYA Y-1, TSAY, and Jetty 2 at Amuay , plus Sep
Tap 3, S eparator 1, th e CCR Platformer and the Jetty 1 rep airs at Card6n.
The origin al plan for 2011 was staled to be for 2J General Turnar ounds and 2 Partial Turnarounds. The original
budget for 20 11 was reported to be in excess of US$ 1 billion .
ovear. compliance with lt1 e declared turnaround intervals for l he various plants has been variable, wilh plants set at 4
years being run from 2OC6to 20 11. Many of the unils thai were scheduled for turnaroun d In 20 11 have been
postponed Into 2012, wijh subsequ ent me-eases In run length , follewing a "Technical Operalional Eval uation". Thts
evalu ation focuses on operational issues wilt1 the most oritical equipment , mostly concerned with Dynamic rather than
Sl atic aems. A few examples of postponements are given below.
~
.
c."""
c.",.,
""'.
""'.
""'.
'""
CD--:VAV·3
HDT- l
>JAY
OCCAY
HOAY2
Oescl1ptl on
TAM
lnt w s
,,
,,•
Crude ~CU..., Units
GIo soil H rClreat....
JlJ lOtion
Cal Cfll~jg-IOc;k ",
DistiIllltes
rot reat.
Last TAM
~"'"
"" 2007
0" aoos
0''"'"
2007
"~
..
TAM
JunIl2011
J~11
Se 201 1
Postponed
TAM
~2012
J
2012
S. 2011
Ma 2011
Feb 201 2
JIII1 2012
20"
Maja maintenance to the jetties al Am uay has been sig nificantly Ialer than the 8 year interval speci fie d, with Jetty 2
having had ~s turnarounds in 1998 and 2011 . Jetty 4 at careen had ~s last turnaround in 2COD, and has l he next
planned fa Iale 2012. Fa Jetty 2, the last turnar ound was in 2006, and the next will be planned for 2014 to 20 16,
atthougtl ~ Is ha~ng replacemen ts and upg rades to serne of ils fire-fig hting mains and apparatus.
The costs for routine mairt enilnee since 2008 have been :
Typ.
Corrective
Preventive
Mixed
Tot als : US$ MiIliollS
2008
94.298
116.396
13.830
224.526
2009
66.950
49.962
2.105
119.0 17
20 10
97.802
7 1.456
2.470
171.727
2011
193.644
95.551
1.021
290.215
Prior to 2009, l he costs were relativety steady in the ranae US$ 220 to 280 minions.
From this dab, me asured on a cost basis, lt1e proportion of "Corrective" maintenance is clearly increasing , from about
50% up to 2009 to 67% in 2011 . On a work cecer bests.uie proportion is 69% Corrective to 31% Corrective. urs
Instructive to nol e th at the low maintenance spend in 2009 has been fofl~d by a mar1<:ed deleria<ltion In lhe
corrective/Preventive ra tio , The target figures often stated in PDVSA are 20% Corrective to 80% Preventive,
Recommendati oos Update
0l
First Draft Dal e 03 /:;,m
Ref20 121139
o
QOE
Page 80f54
ccmp rence with maintenance programmes and backlog fof the whole of CRP is summarised below:
',,,
CompiOlflOll Pnl"""ti"" PlrnJlS e nd BI"",on Terget >90'lIo
Complie""" Pre.",,1MI Sped... (T\rtXImeenne<Y1 T"'9"1 >9 ~ lwe _ 85%)
Compl" """
Pnl_~""
...iI....."e.... T"'9"l >918%
Compl" noo Pnldlct"e PumJlS To'll<'l >90%
BacId<>sI Pu mJlS in V'i<J<1<shop (Nos)Av..-_
BacId<>sI MOIors ,n Wor\«;hop INos ) AII""'9"
T..-gel <1:l'5
T"'lJ'Il <75
Backlog ExCll&noeo> (NoS)AII""'9" T8l'geI <20
Compl" """ wilIl VVe&l<ly P lein Te rgel >8S'Mo (merHlO.... D8Se<l)
Wlrk Orders by Pm nly( EmOfll8rl<y\Jrgo>rf.4'lol.trle) T"'lJ'Il
<~< 15->80
ComplOl""" Ma rt"".""" Prog , Me;or EQl"pmert ('Mo l 1"'9"1 85'llo
''''
ee
'"
se
""
"se
98.22
96.12
9S 13
ss a
."
'"
'"
M
'"•
3-1lHl1
"'"
'"
'"
"ss
U. -..Isble
~~
9.5-1 5.5-15
s.as.se
"
"
"
Ullll\lalsbl.
""
'"
""
as
83 ,3
""ss
"
sa
ss
asa
"
The principal reasons given for the worsening performance wi th respect to pumps and meters was insuffici ent
resources , difficulties in placing and cont inuing contracts, and the procurement of spare parts . During 2011 . the
contract wo rkforc e accou nted for some 3 m ~lion man-hours of waX , implying an average ecorract workforce in the
order of 1,500 for rouijne maintenance acti\'ities.
Spares procurement lead tim e for National purchases are typicaly average 30 weeks, whereas international
purchases average r:Nef 60 weeks. The operational inventory of spare parts is in the order of USS 45 m W~ ons.
The most criijcal spares In this instance are typicany seals, redudng gears, and bearings. For pump seals, which are
critical to the integrity of conta nment systems. there are technical support and supply contracts with proprietary seal
menutactwere, organise<! throu gh ·Bariven " the P DVSA procurement organisation. The suppH er (John Crane ) has a
base at CRP as a first point of contact , and as a fa B back Bariven will deal with John Cran e USA.
overa r . there is clos er compliance with the routine maloterence programme at CardOn Refinery than at Amuay.
InstNmentatiorl is interesting hONeVer, in that a lower number of "op erational doubts' are being recorded , that is,
wh ere an operator queries the ecrreeeiess of an instrument reading , and the instrument artificer called to check the
instrument finds ' oc fault " in the lnstrcmeot . Operators have been trained to recognise problems, and confidence in
the e seu meres on the part of operators is therefore seen to be growing .
There has been significant w ork on remediaticn of the structure s both at Amuay lind Card On . This has included
repl acement of steel and ferroconcrete structures, and the remed iation of detatched fireproofing On steel structwe s.
TempOl'ili)' supports th at had been tntrc euced as emergency measures have generally been lell in place , and are
redundant, a~hough they are likely to be removed for use elsewhere on the refinei)' . We neee that wh Wst the
temporary structlXes were in place , they were nt1 fireproofed. At care en. work is completed on the Furfural Extraetlon
Un~ , vacwm Distillation 1, Vacuum Dist mation 3, FC CU , and Asphalt BlCM'er, in progress 00 the Propane DeAsphalter 1, and Crude Oistination 3, planned to start October this year on the FCCU Fractionation pump house and
audiary pumphouse , the pipeway bridges . and Jetty 4 in March 2013. Significant ether repairs are planned in 20 12
for the Hydrt1reaters, MEK De-Wa x ooit, croee Distillation 1 and Alkylation 2. At Amuay, wo rk has prog ressed on
PSAY-3 crude Ul'lit. PVAY-3 Vacwm unit , PVAY-5 Vacuum Unit , NFAY-5 Naphtha Fracti onator, PSlFVAY-1
CrudeNaaJum oo ~ , HDAY-4 Kero Hydrt1reater, and waX is planned for the DCAY Flexiaack er.
We ncte hCM'ever that much of this waX Is carried cot as a "SIMO PS' actMty
7. Inspection Status and Significant Events
There is no change to the organisation of Inspection . Establishment staffing is 46, and there are 40 in post . A
"strategic Reserve" of 5 has been recru ited an d shoold commence her e SOOn, plus a further 2 as Corrosion and
Materials specia ~sts, The Stl1lltegic Reserve is sourced from nl!'W graduates, or people recru~ed from recognise<!
contractors,
The Inspection schedu ~ng and analysis tool used is "SILCO' and cxrrll1llctor-s (Inspfalca) carry out th e field u~rasonic
measurements, the contract includes the measurements and the scaffold ing reqlired to do access the measurement
points . The contract Is on a 2 year cycle , due to expire May this year, and CRP is in the pr ocess of negoijat ing the
nl!'W contract wh ich (hopefull y) wil be in place before the expiry of the old ecneee. Analysis of the readings is carried
out by PDVSA staff.
PDVSA Centro <Ie Refinaci6n Paraguana
Reccmmendae cos Update
Ref20121139
o
QBE
Page 90f54
ACorrosion Under Insulation (CUI) plan was commenced inOctober 2011. The aimis to produce aCUI Manual
specsk to each un ~ onthe refinery , and there are 5 phases tothe wort:
1. Technical Concepts (refereoce codes: API 571 ,NACE International, Shell DEP 30.46.00.31 Y PDVSA PI-D2-
09-04)
2. Idenlificalioo and classificalion of thermicaltt insulated lines
3. Development of lecmetrc Drawings of H ~ h Consequence lines ~unc lion of pressure, temperature and
malerial contained)
4, Data Collection
5, Consolidationof information and identification of inspection facil ~ies .
The plan is to complete all the manuals by the endof May 2013, To date,progress achieved is 14%against a pla nof
27%. The manuals specific to the Furfural Extraction andMEK Dewax unjs (lUbricants) are reported to be complete,
and a planhas been developedand executed (clamps added) for the three Hydrolreaters followingthe March2011
HDAY-4 incident (see "Nolable Incidents" below)
(Note, the HDAY4CUI incident was inMarch201 1).
There has been a programme of Visual, "verticality" and thermographic inspections of thechimneys of thevarious
furnaces and fired heaters onthe refinery. There are approximatett 35 furnaces at Card6n and 50 at Amuay.
Inspectionscoverthe carcase ofthe chimneys and lheir dueling, refractory linings where rtlled, painting, guys and
other external supports, and produce comprehensive tabular database reports. (example below) The plan ,phased
over two years commenced November 201 1, and is running signirlCantly ahead of schedule currently (40%versus
15%planned).
OPO...
R ES~TAOO DE INSPECCKlN YlSUALDE
'lAM Dl!TWlOGW\lsO!CilJf'IW WI~
Mom Dl! 1lW<viEs ElIt'10 2Q12
CIIW£AS
' 00Il1 ~ 'lUllI'U 0(0&1' IliCllltl
_.
- ..... - ..-. .. - -_.
--- .-- .. - - _.
_
.
.
_.- - - . ....-- -- ---_.'...__.. _....F~- r---:-__....._......_...
-
1- 1-1- '-
1- 1
~
' •- ••
w
•
,
• •
••
"
...:0...".: ,•
•
La< .,::,:- -::
. ,...,., fIlSlII. ' IDDIlIl
~-:.:.";"': F -·- -
··0ISl1NlD&S
. _ - ~._
...
,
...._.-
_'--~
..,
__
r.
•.
.'- - " ,"
.. _
••
.,. ~
._
.. _ _ .._ n
Outside Battery Limit Pipework between unrts and storage wi1hin the Amuay and Card6n sjes, and servingthe
;ellies have been indudedin the "SILCCW schedufing, recording and analysis tool. It is reported that all lines have
now beenincluded. The lines between the refineries are surveyed by Security for interference or incursion.
Low PressureStorage Tanksare inspected on a"Risk Based"
approach. There are 6 phases:
• External evaluation,
Visual inspectionand historical review
• Repairs database
Actualisalion and development of existingdatabase, creation
of dynamic tables
• Failure Consequence Analysis
Based on characteristics of storage, material stored, safely
and operational factors
• Failure Probability Analysis
Corrosion & Operational History, location & design.
PDVSA centro de Refinaci6n Paraguana
RecommendationsUpdate
First Draft Date 03 0l/;.:u12
Ref20121139
••
•
•"
iil-- - - - - -
-.••
~~"
••
•
·
"
Page 100f54
o
QBE
R;ttisk
•
•
Analyse Risk Lewl
failure probab~ity and consequ ence considered . 5 x 5 ma trix , risks classified in 5 grades from "Very Low" to V ery
High
Develop maintenance plans for next 15 yearsSee table above.
The Risk Basis eetem ees the priority of tanks to be addressed , and initially the maJority"";l be the ' High" and 'Very
High" risk: lanks. There is no apparent equivalence to the -250 lanks overdu e for inspectionhnaintenanee reported In
2010. Th ere remains t10wevef significant operational presswe on the availabll~y of these tanks for inspeetion and
maintenar.ce, and only time will tel if this initiative succeeds. A similar ph~osophy is appFied to the pressure storage
spheres and bullets.
There is reported to have been 100% comp~ar.ce with Press.... e V essel lnspeclion s (drums. exchangers,
columnskowers and reectcrsj, with a lotal of 1719 at Amuay and 1353 at Card6n inspected in 2011 . These are also
scheduled and recorded using the ' SILCQIU software .
As a sample, we requested to see the inspection records of the Amuay PVAY-4 Vacuum Dis(illation Unit T-151 column
Bcttoms line, Ihrough 10 the bottoms pumps. W e w er e informed thalln 2OO71his had been changed from carbon s eer
to 5% Cr Low Agoy carbon steel during a rout ine planned tum-around . No base-l ine wall thickness measurements had
been taken . First measurement was in March 2011 , and at that time 2 measurement points (multiple TMLs) were
rece-d ed. Reason given was thai it was a cosily exercise, and because an al oy s(eel had been used, the inspeclions
were not necessary. Inspedions at2 year intervals are reported to be required forthis duty, and this has not been
complied with. Next turn arou nd is in 2013.
A second j ne requested was Ihe overhead j ne for the same vessel. This is a negative pressure line , and is fitted with
S(iffening hoops and support clamps. Initially there were aboul20 inspection poirts . but these had been reduced to 5
based on operational and corrosion experience. The other points. presen~y -frecuce ' in ' SILCO!>' do however have
some hiS(oric re adings, and could be readivated . Poirt 8, an elbON, had been measured in 1988, 88, 91, 93 , 95, 98 ,
2000, 01 , 04, 08 an d twice in 20 11. The graph presented shows little loss in wall thickness up to 1998, then a
significant loss in the period 1998 to 2000 . bllowed by a continued slow reduction . The remai ning ~fe for the fiYe
poirts measured varied from a maximum of 15 years, to a minimum of 1.8 years (for Point 8). and M's iI1speetion
interval has been reduced to 8 months. We would queS(ion whelherlh is finding should have justified the reac tivation
of 'inadive' inspection points on this circu~? (See illustration s below) These and other lines are due for replacement
in tile 2013 tum-afDund .
I
Ref20121139
Page 11 of 54
~
QBE
LINEA I} E CA BECE RA I} E VACIO (TOPE
I} E LA T- ' SI )
ULTIMA INS PECCI ON
D
"' -
--,""". MID : 1).111
ULTI MA INSP ECCI O N
Es p. Mn: 0 .234
Esp, Holll: 0.U5
Esp. Rot: O.I2S
•
V.U '" -vce util ' (Usefl-i Life)
PQVSA centro de Refinaci6n Parag..aana
RecomrnendiltlOn5 UfX1ate
First Draft Date 03 001," '1
Ref 20121139
Page 12 of 54
:.
~;sk
8, Technical Services
Technical Services continue to monitor processes, process variables' deviations and excurs ions, feedstoc k changes in
quality etc, consultation on maintenance planning. There Is a major project on the Lubricants units, involving an
exp ansion and add ing emergency isolation va lves etc. The drawings used for t he expansio n are still the ' Marave n"
drawings from 1994, styled as "for detailed desig n". However, engineers wal k the plant and confirm that the rerevant
parts 01 the plant are realistically represented on the drawings. Tech nic al are invo t.-ed in the "HazO p" and "Whal lf
studies and the "Diadem PHAPRO' format is used for these.
Process Variables are mon~ored to initiate action or analys is when significant deviations in temperature, pressure ,
composition, pH, Chlorine, iron content etc. take place. Fuel gas Is analysed by a gas chromatograph, and me Lean
Am ine specttcauon is 100ppm tota l Su lphu r. There is presently no problem With amine supply. Any shortfa ll is said to
be co untered by recocucns in rate. There has been a change in the supply of Natural gas lor the reformer and
turtcaltematcrs, and afthough this was not carried out under the manage ment of change regime , an equivalent
procedure is said to have been used .
There has been an Alarm Management
exercise , so lar on crude unit C D-4 In
acco rdance With EEM UA 191-1999 al'ld
ANSIIlSA 18 .2-2009. Honeywell Event
Analys is is being used. The
casercetens. In ascending order of
&rEB.l e r M U\18\TE ,"5 a n SIM '8 \1 B.lTE
criticality are:
' Predictive" (avera9B :56 , maximum
•
:560 ala rms per hour),:
"Robust" (average :560, max imum
•
:5600 alarms per hour),
"St able" (average :560, maximum
•
~
"
:56000 alarms per hour),
"Reaewe" (average :5 600, maximum
•
<
:56000 alarms per hour)
•
"Ove rloaded", which is anywhere
more than "Reactive". (see diagram
Irom EEMUA 191, j'4 edition).
Oth er criteria in the gllidance include the
number and durat ion ct -sreveo- and
E~\ IUA191R<~~' ~
"Standing" alarms, and the "Top 10 Load
Percentage ".
Using these criteria , it has been recognised that most systems are "Overloaded' according to the EEMUA defi nitions ,
and have been so since 2008. SOme action to rationalise the alarm systems has taken place , btlt not to the EEMUA
philosophy , and with no specific budget To a Iar9B extent the success of the present initiativ e depends on the
accuracy 01 the P&IDs, afthough the software In the Honeywell systems can be used to del lne the alarm loops lor
analys is. 11 is instructive to note that the alarm management study was initiated. At least in part, as a response to the
May 201 1 careen Fluidised Catalytic Cracker lurnace explosion.
In our opinion , the Alarm Management Programme requi res to be formalised and adequately funded .
Alarm System Performance
.'
",
......
-,-
,-
.........
-
There is a plan to Instali lwo " Polyduetos" (multi- product batehlng pipel ines) 10"0 and 16"0 to supply progduets to the
Sajo Grande distribution centre nea r Marac aibo.
PDVSA centro de Rel inaciOn Paraguana
Reco mmendations Update
First Draft Date 03 OO'))l2
Re12012/139
Page 13 015 4
~
QBE
9. Safely, Fire Proleclion & Securily
The organisation for the Industrial SafetylHealthiEnviroomenl (SlHO). Seoority (PCP) and Fire Intervention has had a
smal l change, with Securty being moved in from Operations. Overall staff establishment for SlHO and pcp is 83, and
a further 15 posts await approwl. Safety has an estabhhrn ent of 17, 3 vacancies being Qmenlly fi ~ed by contractors,
and additional safety analysts plu s oocupalional hygierdsb are being recueee (part otthe 15 above). The Firefighters
have an eslabtishm enl of 64, with vacancies for 2 supelVisoo; and 32 tremen.
Safely
The ' SISA" database for recommendations arising from audits. investigations or safety reports by others (includi ng the
InSU"ers' recomm endations) continues in use. In an, since its inception in 2004, there have been som e 4,600 entries.
roughly evenly distributed between Amuay & Cardlrl. On the database , these are recorded as ·CU· (completed) , "EP'
<in progress). "CA" (cancell ed), "SF" (long term ),"NA" (Pending Response) or "SS' (selected for audij of comp letion ).
There are reported to tie 621 of these In categories other than "Completed", and the num ber remaining to be
completed is said
to be on a reducing trend .
There continue to be single top ic aud~s on the units and audits of Pennijs-to-wOl1< . The aim is to have 3 or 4 audits
per area per year - and wi th the increased num ber of Safety Analysts, this should become achi~ble. Detail audits
can take between 1 and 4 days. depending on the complexity of the area under study. Fi particular. considering au dits
of Permits-to-Work . which are in our opinion vital to management of safety on the refin eries , the results show som e
improvement in th e period since 2009, especial y in work execution and dosure of the permits, although there has
been a deteriorafion in performance on permit issLing. The areas re qLirin g and receiving allention in 20 11 have been
the risk identification. Safety Analyses (ART), traini ng and authorisation of issuers , executors and receivers of permits.
houseke eping, demarcation of work areas and closure issues. These concerns are being addressed by formal
training, toolbox meetings , poster campaigns etc.
There is also a manual of lessons teamed from past events, This initiative started last year. "Dupont" materi als were
purchased, includin g DVDs, on process , chemical hazards, driving, welding e1 c, permit-to-work, LDTD , and shCM's
examples of "Best Practices", and where these are no t necessaril y properly applied.
Fir e Prot ecl ion
The organisation of the fire irltervention forces is essentially unch anged . A pl;ron ed tom the fireprotection group is in
the Maintenance departm ent to progress the addition of firefighting systems into SAP. This includes the fixed
prot ection system s located on the units and on storage (monitors. hydrants deluges, foam systems and the like).
Detection system s for gas and fire remain by extern al contractors and are not included on SAP because they are
maintained on contract by external companies.
24 new capital fire trucks have been received since 2004, and som e 26 "old" trucks are retained and are, or are to be
refurbished. The new trucks all have 3 ,ooOusgpm pump s and 200Jsg foam tan ks , and are fully compatible wi th the
5"0 Storch connectors used on the hydrants in the "high risk" area s of the site.
Fire Pum p testing has not been carri ed out annually (2009 to 2012 Card 6n Diesels , Eleclric pumps tested in 2011).
Tests are prOlr-lmm ed th rou gh SAP, so it is unclear wh y they qre na schedul ed in accorda nce wi th the N FPA
requirements. The results for Card6n showed the elecbi cal pumps to be satisfactory, but the diesels to need attention,
one of them being 18% belCM' the curve , and another suffering from a pressure re~ef valve passing at low pump flCM'
(high pressure), although this did not affect the performance at high flows. where the pressure is somewhat lower and
does not open the relief valve. There are recommendations to remedy pump 22, recalibra te the re~ef valve on Pump
23, and to replace pump 21. The Amu ay pump s had also been tested . but we did not review the results.
A new system "SICOINE" (Sistema para el Control de las osoecctcoes de Equipos Contra Incendio) was brou ght into
use last year. This Is a corporate initiative, and wh en fuHy populated wil indude all FIRE detection and praection
app aratus. So far it is populated only by extingLishers, bre athing appara tus sets. and fire trucks . For the firefighting
veh icles, there is a status "li ck 1st", The old pap er system remains in use however. but is being migrated to SICOIN E.
Sec u rity (PCP)
Security hilS an establishment of 159 to ccver the tw o re fineries. th e marine facil ities and the pipelines between the
refineries. They can cal on support from the arm ed servces (National Guard) and arm ed cont ractors . The sites are
w ei provided with acc ess control and intrud er detection , wi th an outer cordon plus an inner III'VeI providi ng access to
the opera ting units and marine fa cilities. Access control has a database forvali dation of entry through the "badge
control led" access points. The security systems are in the process of being autom ated (CECON system ), wh ich
should be compl eted by 20 13. Improved communicafions (fibre-optic) between the tw o sites should be completed this
year, imprC/\/ed perim etrallighting , and a new "Reaction Centre' for the National Guard. This represents a planned
investment of U S$ 48millioos.
PDVSA Centro de Refinaci6n Para guana
Ref 20121139
Page 14 0f54
Recommendations U pdate
o
QBE
10. Notable Incidents
Incidents are recorded on the "Meridium" database. These are broken OOwn l.7f area and by ty pe: Operational,
Incident, Accidert, vehcuer, Electrical Failure, Fire, Spill, teak Emission or Other , a nd classified t:>,' risk as loW,
rrecnm , or High.
During 2011, - 100 fires were reported to reve ccccrec . Of these -60 we!"e said to be in o il cortaminaled
"Trincheros' (pipe trenches) , There wa s a total of 222 incidents reported (including these fires). Of these 9 were said
to be 'completed (fully investigated and recorrsrercatcns carried out, and included on the SISA database), 11 had
been "d ivulged" (The Irwestqetc n complete and t he relevant people informed}, 20 were being investigated, and 173
were at the ' Comite" stage, i.e. a learn had been allocated. Rewrrmendations, where made, are progressed through
the ' SISA' databa se.
Incidents described to us dlxing this visit are:
111091'2010 Card 6n J etty 1 fi re
Aviation Kerosene Jet A1 was being loaded via roses to a tanker. The roses had been installed in 2007, and had not
been been inspected, although it is understood that some had been repaceo, A hose failed by' a combination of
fatigue and accu maaton of tension/compression in cUlVature, this resulted in a cut to the vuceraeeuco reyers. There
were two loading PUfTllS started simultaneously, and the resu~ing pressure surge is thought to have cor1ributed to the
cause of release. The resu~ing fire caused severe damage to the structure of the jetty, and it rema ins out of service.
The regular strong wind is understood to have made the fire more intense. (See photographs below),
Action item from the irddenl is the institution of Annual or 6 monthly inspection of loading hoses. Hoses are
extensively used at both Card6n and Am.Jay , for a variety of products including LPGs.
The Jetty 1 refurbishment features a reduced number of hose connections. (More Photos in ' Observations' below)
«Shows extent of
repairs to jetty substructure.
And replacement of topworks, hose g<lntries
etc>
We commented that there was no obvious marking on the hoses to indica te that they had valid recenltests, shinking
in terms of stencilled obvious tag numbers and COIOlK codes, rather in the manner used for lifting apparatus in many
coo-nee. Following the meetings, we were given details of a stamped idenlifier on one flange of the rose, and were
shown a test certificate whch incidentally was rot dated.. This is not in our opinion ' obvious·. IdenliflCation or testing
assurance.
1510312011 , Amuay HDA Y-4 86,000 bJd Gasoi l Hydrolfeater - explosion
Operation was reported to be normal. The overhead line to the recycle gas compresso r fa iled (700psig@1 10"F} The
reeaee, mostly of I¥drogen i:lnd methane ignited and exploded, Release mecharisrn was extemi:ll corrosion, under
insUlation. There had been more ra infall than in the past, and a heat tracing line was leaking, causing condensate to
be tra pped inside the insuli:llion.
Because of the loWer rainfall in the past, this line had not been identified as a candidate for CUI, and the Shell DEP
had not therefore been fully applied,
Mer the event, the CUI plan has been formalised, and similar symptoms have been discovered on the same circuit of
two other Hydrolreaters HDAY-2 (Distillates) and HDAY-3 (Gasoil). Clamps have been added where required, and the
CUI pran extended to i:l1I l.rits.
This, in our opinion, is a reactive response to the problem, (See above · Inspection·)
POVSA Centro de Refinaci60 Paraguana
Recom mendations update
First Draft Da te 03 00/20"
Ref20 121139
Page 15 0f 54
l!l
QBE
2410512011 Cardon n
,ooo bid FCC Furnace Explosion
Loss 01 Instrument air to a fuel gas varve was Klenlified as the Root Cause, restored flow generated a Mmmable
mixture in the combustion chamber, whk:h ignited and exploded, Supplementary causes were alarm Oooding - 350
alarms in 50 minutes (Ihat's an average ot1 every 9 seconds), and the Re-Start procedure was out ot dale.
Alarm rationalisation for the whole of Centro de Refinaci6n Paraguana was recorrrrerced
0610812011 Amuay HYAY2 9.5mmscfld Hydrogen Plant (Reformer) Furnace F-851 Explosi on
Doring a start-up after repairs to the furnace, there was an overpressure of tubes that had been "plugged', due 10
steam condensate being sealed into lhe tubes, and there being no mechanism whereby the trapped steam pressure
colJd escape (The furnace temperature is - 1800°Fj The subsequent explosion ruptured other nearby reformer tubes,
which escalated the incident to a tumace fire which pullhe uM out of action temporarily.
Investigation revealed thai no management of change was carried 011 wRh respect to the plugging of the tubes. As a
pre-emptive measure, at least one nroe thai was not actually leaking was plugged, hence the overpressure and
explosion. Proper drying of the tubes prior to plugging has been recommended. we suggested that holes should be
drilled Inlo tubes to be plugged, to remove any possibility of ccessotsenco
06101120 12 Cardon Platformer " Incipient" fire
Radiant Area Header leak and small (incipient) fire. In October 2011 there had been an over-tereperanee (850"C vs
design 640"q on 5 tubes, operating temperature was lowered and thermography increased to daily and cleaning
frequency increa sed, Remaining lire (creep lire of lubes) assessed as very short, and visual rospecncos increased to 9
per day plus 2 thermographic inspections each day. leak was esccvered at visual inspection"
09/0112012 Amua.y P.-VAY 27,3OObJd Vacuum UniUJnsafe Condition of Furnace F"1 00
Deformation discovered on carcase of F-100 rcrrece. Low thk:kness of refractory noted on lower area of furnace,
weight of upper refractory had crushed lower refractory, ShI1 down and repaired,
050'0212012 Cardon CDU4 70,000 bid Crude Distillation Unit Fire.
«Column aoncrre Pumps
suction line small bore
drainage connection failed.
Subsequent fire caused
significanl damage 10 unit,
Remains out of action,
Emergency tsctaton veves
being Installed as part of
repa irs - ir installed sooner
woud have reduced the
consequences. Note
damage to t.Odel'Slde 01
second level floor
One of the new EIVs
AS shown on the "redline" P&ID Note
date of "redline",
we asked specirlcally to review the rcmace Inciderts that have recently occurred,
and Rwas concluded that there was no significanl comrron causal factor -OIX
initial concem that this lXII"ortunate r!XI of incidents may have been connected with
operating heaters and fun-aces beyond the usefu life of their tubes has not been
borne out bt experience.
Recom mendations Update
First Draft Date 03 00/20"
Ref20 12/139
.
,,
,
-_un_ , ,
...
_~ n
n.
~~
,,
__ ,u_
~
u_
_
n
..
n
•
11 . Loss Estimates Update:
The Estimated Maximum Loss. (EMl ) br insurance purposes. can be defined as th e largest loss anticipated (rom the
most severe ecce-renee possible to a location, causing widespread dam age th at renders fi re protection ilnd
emergency shut down procedures iloperatiw, or the systems cceate without any changes in the final oulcane of the
loss. Only passive physical features sum as spacing , fireproofing , diking, and topography are effective in 'im~ing the
loss.
At this sile, the mechanism whim has been identified as the worst incident is "Vapour Clou d Explosion and Fire
FoIll7Ning", re sulting from an uncontroll ed rel ease of namrn able volati le hydrocarbons foam process system
containment, subsequent Ignition , and combustion In the process unjts . Overpressures tom the initial explosion are
assumed 10have disabled systems intended to prevent further release or to extinguish fires/eooI structures.
We do not consid er the probabmly oflhe incident - ~ is sufficient to say thal whatever design, construction , inspection,
maintenance, operation or protection measures are t aken , the capacity for the WOfSl event remains, and th at there will
exist the possibil~y of many pctentlallesser loss producing Incidents.
Val ues
The properties al CRP were revalued by Advanced Appraisals (Braz il) in Februa ry 2010. The total replacement cost
values for the two sites as of thai dale were dedared to be:
S"'
Plant &
~
CW
"
Eq~ment
US$ 9,691B-llion
US$ 8.4606i llion
COnsb\ldlon
Fom oatlons
US$ 825 Millon
US$ 859 Millon
US$ 1.137 B-lIion
US$ t.149 Billion
2006 Replaeement
as New Value
US$ 5.902 Billion
US$ 4.843 Billion
2010 Replacement
IllS New Value
US$11 .654 Bilion
US$ 10,468 amen
The 2010 valu ation represents a vel)' large increase in the repl acement cost value forthe see. Underwriters are
advised to re'View the valuation ~ainst their conception of relative values for refineries of broadly simi lar scale and
complex~y worldwide .
Full delail of the val uallon WilS given in Appendix AS of lh e 2010 und erwriting report . These were prlMded in Exc el
Wor1csneets, and reference the contents of each block In some detail. It has been possible to sum the contents of
each block , and it is these block total values that have been used in the EML calculation
T he 20 11 values are merely indexed tom the 2010 values by 1.5% acro ss the beard.
Site
A",::=¥.:=
21111 Replacement as
New value
US$ 11 .829 BilUons
US$ 111.625 Billions
We have therefore chosen to not re-run the EML calculations , and have innated the resulting estimated maxinum loss
by the same factor. For further details please refer to the 20 10 underwriting report.
...
Estimated Maxlmun
LM'
US$ 3,356 millions
US$ 1,408 millions
First Dr.In Dat e 03 0l1~ , ?
Ref20121139
Page 17 of 54
~
QBE
12. Risk Improvement Recommendations Update
There are on reccer reccemen cancos made ltJri ng Risk Engineering SUrveys cA ttle Centro de RefinadOll Paraguana
made dlling 1993. 2002. 2005, 2007 & 2010 . These were included in the 2010 underwriting repet in bolh Englistl
and Spanish. Progess on completion of these reccrnmend ations has been reviewed, ba sed on reports and evidence
made available by CRP management and ccseveecos made in the field by the two surveyors (Mr Roger Gregory.
representing QBE. and Mr David Dalla Costa. representing Chartis~ Only reccmmendations thai had not been
repeteo as dosed falowing past surveys reports lYe eocessee In this report Overall, at the cornmencernent of the
survey there were 22 outstandin g reccmmendations conpdsed of II total d 49 uncompleted action items. end of these
items we are able to report 16( 33%) dosed, 19(45%) in progress. and 11 (22%) with no progress (See Pie Chart
below)
'" prollf• • • . 22. ~%
PDVSA centro de Refinad On Peraguane
Flrst Draft Date 03 04f201~
Ref 20 12/139
Page 18of54
~
QBE
R~isk
....
SUrrnlary of Recommendation Respons es
••f
05.1993
08.2002
10.2002
SIJfeet
Card6n Remery: Independent High
Level Alarms (Pressunsed
staao e\
CRP; P&lD memaandum
(prE!\fioU5ly part of 05.1990 Techn ical
Information in Control
Rooms)
CRP: Housekeeping improvements
~
In Progress
In Slow Progress
(Long Term
Project)
In Progress
c coueucue Effort
COrrnlent
E2 Sphere implemented, during present
TAM
E1 s enere olanned for later th is V<!Iar
In Progress. Project progressing .
Examples of newly "actualised" P& IDs
were sha.vn to us, although those we saw
in control roan s w ere not "As Buift", not
authorised , some from 1997 (Maraven)
issue drawings , and not "Autoplan" CAD
issues , Few "RedHn e" chang es recorded .
It is unclear wh ether thes e are the
"Master" P&I Ds, or whether the conc ept of
"Master" P&ID s exist s.
Amuay housekeeping falls far short of
expectations orl un~s we visited . PSAY-4,
PVAY-4.
Card on housekeep ing wa s generally
12.2002
02.2005
CRP: Inspection program coverage of
offsit e oicewor1l.
Wafer Flanges I Long Bot Flang es
Closed
In Progress
Physical
N.
Pro~tSS (4
06,2005
,,"
Pressurized LPG Storag e at Card6n
Refinerv
Emergency lsolatiorl Valves (EIVs):
Operation from the Contrd Bunker
In Progress
0 1.2007
In-process fixed gas detection
installation , plus maintenance and
operat or training on existing systems
In Progress but
No Physical
Progress
08.2007
EIVs Operabil ity
Closed
09.2007
LPG Sphere best practice for
Sa m p ~ng I Water draw-off
In Progress
11.2005
In Progress
much I~~t,er than befor~ ~n the un~s
visited . FCC, PG2 . CD4
Offsites Pipe systems on the refinery Now
included in olanned orooramme
Protection Jackets national supplier
identified. Note these are not the usual
"Stainless Steel Sleeves" most usually
used fa' this eurc cs e,
E2 Sphere i mPI~m~:ed , during present
TAM E1 Sohere annedlaterthis vear
New EIVs at CD-4 have facil ~y to operate
from external safe locati on panel and from
the control bunker. Not presently
operable from control bunker (See Also
Rec2007.11\.
No add l~onal detectDrS installed since
2009 upgrade of PG2 system . This has
not operated successfully. Cards on
order via Bariven , stil not received.
Original card s were damaged by incorrect
grounding system. This issue said to
have been solved fa' the Gas Detection
System on this unit, although problem
understood st~1 to exist on other units.
(See also 05 2010 re Bypassing during
electrical storms\.
Closed:
Proottest ing regim e now established.
inclUding testing at planned shutdowns
and other opportuni~es. Comprehensive
Check~st now used for each valve.
(example seen), No "Partial Stroke
'resen " facilit has been instal ed,
Card on Spheres reported to comp ly after
aud~ .
Amuay S 207 sphere being treated during
TAM . other spheres follow at their TAM3 in 2012 and another 3 in 2013 .
Recommendati ons Update
Ref20 121139
Page 19 0f 54
~
QBE
11.2007
Improved provision of EIVs
In Progress
(Slow)
328 valves origfnally identified. Scope
now reduced to 21, using PDVSA 1997
criteri a of 25m3 inventory . Another ~2O
will be needed. Scope now includes
ovemeae drum sour water dr.I'N valves.
5 valves installed at CD-4. Had this.been
implemented $99!?6f, !htt oonseguences
of tm Ftlbnarr 2012 CD4 fire would have
been sianif!£sntly ,-,duoed,
Legacy issues Cardon EIVs are fall-sete
pneumatic, th ose at Amuay are electrical
drive.
12.2007
Floating Roof Tanks - Housekeepn g &
Gfounding
In Progress
14.2007
Management of 'Safety Critical ' valves
01 .20 10
Priority A
Fire-Safe/Fire Protected EIVs.
Protection of Cables & General Cable
Fireproofing
No Progress
2, No Progress
3, No Progress
No Progress
5: No Proaress
1 Closed
Schedule estabhhed starting January
201 2, with checklist and register, however
frequency is only one check pel" year. This
we consi del" to be low for a task consistin g
a visu al cheel< ,
Still an inconsistent approach
San e valves seen controlled using cable
ties, however many others seen not to be
controll ed.
"
,.
2 n Progress
3 Closed
02.2010
Priority A
ATS (Assessm ent of Safe WOrk).
consider process hazard s
03.2010
Priorit y A
Unconl.roled Bypasses
04.201 0
Priority B
05.20 10
Priority A
to
Tank A7-2 Bund Contamination
Long Duratioo Bypasses (e .g. For
Electrical Storm T tveats)
Closed
1 Closed
the four zooes identified by us in 2010 in
HDAY4arerepaired . DKAY andALAY
bei done durin resent TAM
Sane mOdification of ATS , to include
some considerations of process risk5.
But see Site Observation
The "block" on C35 1 governor did not
disable the protection, .....t1i ch is
independent.
Blue Book appears to be properly used
and authorised .
3C_
1: Closed
Regular audit earned out on rotating
maeun ev orotection.
Cause found and eliminated.
2: Closed
Conlamin ation remCNed
3: In Progress
2 other blocks of l aoks identified with
similar svmotoms. Planned to be treated.
Cause identified as grOl6lding of the
protection system (Clean /Dny Earth
system), Varistors on order or being
installed.
Still some recent "Blue Book" entries of
long dosation bypasses for "Atmospheric
Cond~ia15" or "Rainstorms", even on units
where it has not been a problem,
Mitigation measures rem ain vagu e "monitor the process " etc.
1: In Progress
3: In Progress
First Draft Date 03 0l/~ , ~
Gap Analysis can pleted and fireproofing
plan prepared
ImprOYem ents to power cable fireproofin g
made on HDAY-4 (by PDV Maintenance)
2 C_
2: In Progress
,,'"
Ref 201211 39
Page 20 of 54
o
QBE
~isk
00.2010
Priority A
Control of Hazardou s Energy during
Maintenance: Positive Isolation,
Defin~ions, Identification , Tagg ing , etc,
07.20 10
Priority B
Register of Firefighting Equipment
08.20 10
Priority A
Sphere Deluge Detci encies
09.2010
Priority A
EIV Local Button Location , Label~ng ,
Integrity and Lamp Function.
10.2010
Priority
Anomalous Piping T hldmess
Mea surement Readings in ' SILC O"
PDVSA Cen tro de Refinaci6n Parag uana
No Progress on
any of the 6
points,
In Progress
"2, In Progress
1: Closed
2: Closed
3: In PrCKlfess
Closed
In Progress
although not
much apparent
Ref2012/139
FUll LOTO Is not in practice. Dupont
Training "Best Practice" taught , but not
prad iced. The PDVSA Norm also cah
for full LOTO.
Annua l Plan local , blJ: work entered into
SAPwhen required .
Early Days : "SICOIN E" inventory and
checkl ists etc . Ar e yet to be fully
populated with all systems and apparatus .
Only extin guishers, breathing apparatus,
fire veh icles so far included.
See 07 .2010 above
At Amuay,nl!\¥ molorised valve panels
have been installed in some units,
installation con tinues in tum-aroond s
At Card6n , Pinars identified by Yel low
Paint, with push-button s labelled by
stenocil.
AKhough it was explained to us that the
problem arises only where there are small
differences in readings. ~ is important that
the princip al of assu ming that the previous
reading was "correct" is not satisfactory.
(symptom - apparent increase in wan
thickness l
Page 21 of 54
G
QBE
12.1. Recommendations from 1993 SUlVey
05.1993 Cardon Refi nery: Indep endent Hi ltl Level Alarms (Press uri sed Storage )
05.1993 Afarmas Independlentes PO' alto nlvel
An independent high-level a1ann is recommended as a back-up to lhe
which Is already relayed to lhe control room .
exis~ng
high level alarm on the gauging system
2005 Status: Open / Ab/eda
This recommendation is completed for all spheres, except ED-111nd ED-02. Installation of the independed ~ level
IIlarm n Eo-1 and Eo-2 wilJ be installed n 2006 during the shutdown of the LPG unit that wi/occur allhe same time d
1118 CCU.
Apr~2007
AIG recorrrnendBnon (o flrNll-up vi sit: No physical progress. The SlIme explanation WIIS provided liS in
2005 bU lhis t.me with a planned shutdown of the LPG storage for August 2007 which will agan coincicJe with a CCU
shlJldoNn. No Progress I SIn progreso.
Nov.-2007 status: No progress I Sin progreso. Once again delayed, this time to a January 2008 combinad LPG I
CCU shl1down .
2009 Status: Good p rogress (to be installed Q4 2009) I Detailed engineeringdone
October 2010 Status: No Fu rther Progres s since 2009. Reported in April 2009 "to be instaUed in Q4 2009"
Marr;h 2012 Status: In Prog ress :
E2 Sphere implemented, dl¥ing present TAM, E1 Sphere planned for later this year
Reccmmendaecos Update
First
-
Dr.s Dal e 03
.
I'$J ' ~
Ref20121139
Page 22 of 54
o
QBE
08.2002 C RP: P&lO m emorandum (was 199Q.05 Techn icallnfonnation in Control Rooms)
08.2002 Actua/~acl6n de los PIDs (ya efllUIl8 f8comendaci6n 05.1990)
The CRP practice is to have P&ID documents updated every six months. During the period in-between this regular
upd ate P&IDs can be modified YJith a red pen to indicate any changes. A P&ID cont aining the red pen man<-ups is
comprehensively veri fied as representing existing process equipment before being made available for use. The m aster
copies of P&ID documents are retained in the respective process area control rooms and the plant section heads have
been designated as the persons responsible for ensum g their aCaJracy.
From a review of P&IDs in a number of control rooms the fonowing concerns were raised:
.,F A large number of P&IDs do not contain an authorizing sign ature. Therefa e, it is not clear if the P&ID docum ents
have been reviewed to confirm technical aocuracy and authorized fa use.
.,F There is r.o indication on the P&IDs when red pen mark-ups wer e made and who authorized their addition to the
master copies and Iher use.
.,F Some "Como ConstnJdion " (As-Built), som e "A.P. ConslnJoci6n" (Approved for Construdon) & "Original"
document versions were present.
Therefore, it is recom mend ed that only "As-buil " P&ID 's be used which should possess authorisation signatures from
the CRP approval engineer. Ftnhennore. similar authorisaton signatures should also aocompany any red pen mar1(ups.
2005 Status : Open. The renewal eX P&1Ds was !,farted in 2000 txA laterinlerrupted ~ 2002 because eX the strike. At
the r.me eX the survey 78 P&1D were revitN/ed and approved at Catdon (40 in Conversbn, 28 ~ Deep COrIversion,
etc.). The rest of P&1Ds at CRPwill be updated in /he pB riod 2006-2007.
AIG recommendBtlon fo llow-up vi sit: In Progress I En progreso
CRP's anSWef is that some637 PlDsoul of a total eX -1200 dnJwings were updatedwlh the NoVlluser I ALtocad
platbfm during 2000-2006. In ~ CRP opted for new sonwares from Bertley which have "in1e1ligent" ifiegration
applications: these ateAlJIoPIant as df8Wing softwate and Projectwise as document visualization tool. The new
applications 8f8 being used on a pi/ol projed for actualizing the PlDs of the HDAY-3 plant. The project is planned for
completion in Q3 2007 and witl be foJowed by a 4-yeer ptOfJmm to actualiza to "as built"conditions 1 ~ eX CRP's
PlDs. CRP estimates complelion of this ffICO/'TImendarion for 2012,
Apr~2001
No v.-200 7 stiltus: In (slow) Progress I En (lema) progreso
During OUf visit eXthe cortrol rooms at both tefineries, we obs8fVed fhat some sets eX PID 's were kel1 on flICks and in
large fofmat (AO}. HoNever, thete were marty missing PIDS; wlJ6n available, most drawings referring to a given unit
and kart rogflth6r we te out eX sequence; the sequence was usualfy incomplele; drawings were uncontrolledc0pi8s
and were missing teVision da tes forexampla as a result eX arty Process Sa fety Management action; some copies were
also fXXJras dates could nd be tead etc. _A t Cardon, PlDs eX rhe Gas Plad PG-2 date bad<. to Apnl2002. At Amuay,
PlDs d the light ends plad DCA Y and GLA Y showed Oct-1999 and Feb-2OO2 dates.
DiSCUSSions wlh the engineering depaffment conflf1Tled that inilitJlives on PlDs actuajzation a'" essentitJly contained
within the pi/a project described in the Apr,2007 status. All PlDs (20 off} for Amuay hydrodasulfuriza/ion HDAY-3 have
noN been ufXJated using the Badley's AlJIopl8d application . These PlDs were being circulated for approval by a/l
disciplines before to be officially authorized and issued to end users like Operations teams. It was stated that these
upd8f.ed PlDs would be aVlliiabie in the conlrol room by Dec-2OO7 (note that the pilot project was initiated in May2(071) and/hal f6Plicaticn eXttis exercise had staffed on Cardon's DCU whichcoufis approx. 86 PIDs, Amuay
HDAY-4, which is a twin unit ofHDAY-3, Is andh6r ""1'1 candidate pla d for the dnJwings actualization.
The Bngitlooring department is aware that progress is slow and that the amount eX work lalt is considBnJble. 7he targBI
of updating CRP's ci'ra1200 PlDs by 2!J12 appears uflf88li!,fic wlh the clJtTlNt lavelof txJman teSOUi"Ces andthe
engitlooring depaffmed explained that it was looking for more support from managemefi. AI. the Wfll~1JP meeting, the
SUf't'ley tNm reminded CRP manaf}fll'Tl&d dthe impoltlJnce eXthe PlDs actlJlJlization andcalledforCRP managament
to comml more fJiUJOUfC8 to this task ,
2009 Status: In progress (long t",",jab)
Status October 2010 In Progress (Long Term Project) Autop/an P&lDs slowly progressIn9, P&1Ds in codrol rooms,
some widence eX "redlines" on dfllW!ngs, Of oth6r updatas, (e.g. on 1994 "Detailed enginee illg " issue drawing at
Cardon Lubricants unil- actua/ised in 2007 wlhout comment
Reccmmendaecos Update
Frst Draft Date 03 0l1~ , ~
Ref20121139
Page 23 of 54
o
QBE
March 2012 Sta tus; In (Slow) Progres s:
'rne so called "Master" copies of the P&IDs are ke pt as stick files in the control bunkers . "AetualiSation" is said to be
carried out, as part of me HazOp process. and Itlis involves "walking me lines". About 80 are being done per year.
and mese are not being put into ttle control buildings until ttle HazOps are done. In our opinion. ltlis is not logical- ttle
"Master" drawings sttould be available for operational purposes. we noted few red line changes on the drawings we
reviewed in th e control buildings, and some of those we saw were confused , witlltlle change "Clouds" not referenced
to ttle euthonsetlcn or management of change number. There were also some changes ltl at had been added very
recently , for changes made in 2010, and tile new EIVs reennes had been added during our visit. (See below)
". ,
-=->e.rlle< Moe •
No ,efe'ence .
seV'er.lli~e lllis
on ,1111 dr.wlng
,-
,•
,
.. ... ..-.
.....
~.;;
"New" Moe ,
p,operly
•
'
.-.-<
Id.."intd,
(lOIIl<lO$l03112
.,i
I
,\
•
I\
,•
.,
0..-
H
•
-
.
.
,
,
\ •
-
_. J..•
I"
,
l-
/'
•
Wi,..
.-
~~
" " ...-
•••
- -'
-
Tile condition of some "master" drawings on slick-files was questionable (left), altttougtl we nave been shewn
' ec uansec' drawings, property approved (centre and rigtlt).
.!'.PJI.I!_
First Draft Date 03()4/Kl'2
Ref 20121139
Page 24 of 54
~
QBE
10.2002 CRP: Housekeeping Improvements
10.2002 Mejora$ de orden y IImpieza
Genera lly, process areas are kept clean and free of debris. However, three specific areas that could be improved are:
.,/ Debris stored in vessel skirts found in a number of process cous.
.,/ Explosion proof boxes oomaining electrical circuits were loose, thus oompromising protection against hydrocarbon
vapour ingress.
-/ The offsite pipe trench on the Cardon site cortained a significant quantity of oil and water covering the lower part
of pipelines located in the trench. There were also planks of wood (scaffold boards). riggers gloves, spare bolts,
etc.
Therefore, it is recommended that these housekeeping situations be rectified as soon as possible. Furthermore,
verification that these areas rerrejn clear in the future, their inspection should be incorporated into s~e safety
walkabouts.
200:5 Status: Open. No Progress I Ablerta. Sin fJI09reso.
Despite me extensive audit of process areas, the site tour has confirmed In few occasions that debris, trash and tools
are stored in ooIumn skirts (Lube Plant and CD3 at Cardal, Isomerization and DCA Y ( T2501) in Amuay). Similarly
explosiaJ proof boxes oonIainirY,J el6ctrical circlAls were found loose. At the aoeeon pr6S6fltalion, it was
recommended to CRP to includB these topics in their check list dlXin:J the operation safely walk or HSE audit,
Apr.-2ooT AIG recommendation follow-up visit: No Progres$ / Sin progru o
DtxlrY,J the site leu, sane debris am tools wwe foun:j in ooIumn skirts and explosion boxes contairin:J electric
eqlApment were tara not properly bolted.
Nov,-2007 $talU$: No Progre$$ I Sin progreso
Housekeepin:J standard in many cI/he visited process lIYts at both refineries was stili inadequa /eam many
anomalies, often ee same as in previous visits. were wed: accumulations cJ debris from maintenance activities,
piping insulatiaJ fallin:J apart, below average f!osf:Idiscipiine, some OCCllfflflCeS of missing capslplugs for example on
the drains fuel gas lines to heatefSlfurnaces, pumps full cJsludge for example at Cardon FCCU am Amuay Crude
(Xlit 5, HouSf;lkeepin:J in /hesf;l two units was disappa'ntin:J while credit sholJd be given to the much better and
<KJequate tlous6J<eeping observed in Amuay light end recovery (Xlit (GLA \') and Amuay Fle:x.icracker area (DCA \').
Hc:NVeVer in DCAY, a blatantoccur~ of inadequate boItirfJ was observed on /he!Y.l:l electrical boxes Z406/Z407
(each box was onlyciosed with 2 bolls when 24 are normaliy req/ired).
a
Status 2009: In progress (improvements seen on integrity issues. but P5-J, VAC-4 still gives cause toC<JnCf:Jm)
Status October 2010 In Progress Some improvement seer on integriry issues. PDA1 & 2, Coker. Pipeways,
t'I:1rNeNer, rubbish seen in vessel skirts in CON Cake..-, PSAY 5 coIalJn drain, numerous missirfJ plugs in ISA Y, missirfJ
bolts on electrical boxes, conduit CCNfWj missing, iuminaires without glass or guard etc.)
March 2012 Status : In ProgreS$: continuous effort remains necessary.
Still below standard at AmJay, but much improved on cerccn Example below from Amuay.
PDVSA cenro de Refinaci6n Paraguana
Recorrmendations Update
First Draft Date 03 "'201l
Ref 20121139
Page 25 of 54
o
Q8E
122002 CRP: Inspection pr ogram coverag e of offsite pipework
12.2002 Incorporacl6n de las llneas off-site aI programa de ItrSpecclon
eve- the past few years , th ere have been a numbel" of losses originating from off-de pipework that WilS nol sufticienlly
ecveree by iIIl Tispection progl"illTl . Accordingly, the indusion of off-site pipewor1< in any corrosion monitoring progl"ill11
stlould be implement ed as seen as possible. From dtscrsstcns with CRP inspection special ists they are considering
wh ether to indJde the monitoring of off-site pipework into their advanced SILCO program .
Thel"efore. it is reccm mended tha t the introdUdion of off-de pipework Wl to the SILCO progl"illTl shoold be implem ented
at the eer test possible time.
2005 Status: Open I Abletta
Only 10% oflhe tctelworlf has been carried auf so far, CRP have lisled all Amuay's df-site pipe worl( (a l the jetty and
at the process units) that netld to be pan of a corrosion monitoring program; this list still need to be dtlve/optKlfor
Cardon. Once bolh lists will be available, CRP will stan worldn} on the isometrics and on the setting of an Inspection
frequency, AI/these scI;"lies will be slJb.corlracled. Completion ~ llle system Is expected by December 2006.
Apr.-2007 AIG recommendation follow-up vis it: In Progress I En progreso
Off-site pf)eworlffor 7 erees at Cardon have now also been identified Wl addijion to the pipin g systems already
selected at Amuay. CRP estim ates the ov erall progress at 31% and the 2008 as the ccm pletlon year.
No v.-2oo7 status : In Progress I En progreso
For Cardon: physical conditioneveva!iofJ, isometrics, fepeirorcJers and inclusion In SILeO have been csrriedou for
the piping systems b6tween plaTts, bdween plans and stOf1lge and b6twoon stontges. "This worl< is pending for the
lines connecting the stontge areas lind lhe jetties. CRP 's own estimll te of progress is 90%.
For Amuay: Lines had already been identified es per previo us status reports, blJ e RP opfed fora recheck dtlle
available information to p roceed later on with lhe incvsion of information ino SI LeO. eRP's own estimale of progress
at Amuay is 26%.
Note that CRP has reviewed 10 2009 the completion )l'98ron this recommendation.
S tatus 2009: Cl osed (Jetties dispatch lines lire still pending txA 10 be compltIt""nd 20(9)
Status October 2010 Re-Opened Jetties dispatch line inspections ere sfi. pendiflf1 despite commitment 10 complete
by end of 2009
Ma rc h 2012 Status: Closed
There are 59 manuals for Ine Wlspedion of all lines on site, with procedures and inspection points. Outside Batt ery
Lim~ Unes and Jetty nnes are done.
Ref 20121139
Page 26 of 54
o
QBE
02.2005 Wafer R anges I Long Bolt Flang es
02.2005 Bridas de tj)owafer l bridas CM es,»fT890S largos
DUlTlll the \!lsit of the process areas al CRP it was noticed that both refineries make an extensive use ofwaferflanges
l loog bolt flanges. The long bolts will be receive direct flame contact if there is a fire in lhe area; the direct flame
contact causes the bolts to eKPal"ld ~idly and lengthen, allowing both gaskets to leak product. The leaking material
lhen adds fuel to the fire and if under pressure il causes a large spraying fire that resoll s in much more damage. It is
recommended the following :
•
•
•
•
Identify Loog Boll Flanges
Assess Fire hazard from the contained material and location hazards.
To ~mil the problem offast fai~ng Long Bolt Range valves they should be replace wi th normal flange valves, bul
th e hazard can be reduced by wrapping th e loog bolts with a fi re resistant mateeat and lhen enclosing th e entire
assembly with a stainless steel covering . In addition CRP should progress~y remove Long Bo~ Flange when in
Flammable liquids or LPG servce.
Update PDVSA engineering standard in order to ensure thaI every Of!Ni process unt wi l not have Long Bolt
Flang e Joint installed any more,
2005 Cflem Comment: CRPwillCCl1duct a gap analysis across the site qy Febtvary 2006, and will propose an aclion
pJan in on:l8rlo upgrade all wafer flanges existing in the complex. By March 2006 it is expected tha! all wafer valves
are icmrtified. By Septembttr roOl5 CRP will revise PDVSA Engineering standard in adf!1r 10 avoid !m l1iliza!ion of
wafer valves in new projects. AccounlabJe: Mail1.enance.
Apr.-2007 A IG recommendillJon follow-up visit: No Progress I Sin progreso
NoCCtlCfllte improvement on the pJaris, hence the given "no progress" status. CRP stated ht:1weverlha! I plans 10
idenlifylhe numbefof inappropri8le arrangements in 31 units panned for ma"'enance shl1dc1io1n in 2007 and 10 fit
tfltJSfJ valvt1s with thermal isol8liorl.ln sutRiflqUfmt main tum arounds, and where t«hnictJlly possibltJ, the valws will be
replaced by normal flanged systems. The.scc:pe of war#( for18 unls planned for tumarounds in 2008 is als:J being
any long boled flanges identified in these units. CRP als:J agrees to
defined and wil/contempl8le the replacement
no longer specify wafer type of valves for flammable liquids or LPG service. No inkxm8liotJ provided on whelher
PDVSA Engineering Siandards have been formally revised ornoI.
a
Nov,-2oo7 s tatus: No Progres s I Sin progreso
Many iong boltedf/anges were observed across !he units and none was observed wlh a rreprcx:ting protection, hence
tm 8/tributed "no Pf04ress" status. CRP stated 10 stiN btt in the identification phase (apparenlly 700 Jon;J boled flanges
were listed along with diameters and ratings d8la j . CRP st8ted Ihallhe collected information was being reviewed by Is
Engineering Department (GI/-IP and GII-IC) which will issue the technical specirlC8tions required for Ihe provision
fireproofing blankets.
For the units scheduled fortumaround in 2008, CRp ·s exp/anafiotJ is as per/he Apri/2007 sf8lus repotf.. CRP also
stared that the relevant PD VSA Engineering S!aooard(s) wastwere under review (no specirlCS provided).
a
2009 Status: In Progress InvenloTy done, risk. ma/rix topriorlizedlhe ones to prriect, standard is written & being
culated, memo for new projects. But no acliotJ 00 site + unaware of t/me scale
October 2010 Status: No Progress since 2009
March 2012 Status: I" Progress
Nothing physic al yet, blA local manufacturer of fire resistant jackets has been identifi ed. These are not the suggested
stanless steel band typ e, allhou gh if conscientiously replaced aIIer acc ess need s. are believed to be adeq uate.
First Draft Dal e 03 0l1~ , ~
Ref20121139
Page 27 of 54
o
QBE
06.2005 Pressu ri zed Storage at Cardon Refine ry
06.2005 Afmacenarriento de GPL en fa refiners eMdon
During the next CCU shutdown, C RP is planning to install ROV on spheres E-01 and E-02. It is recom mended to
install the ViIItves as closest to the bottom of the sph ere and not at the current location that is outside the bund area. In
addt ion the valve should be of fail close type and remotely operated from the control room .
It is also recommended 10 upd ate PDVSA engineering standard with the above recommendation and develop a pla"l to
upgrade all other spheres with the above recommendation.
2005 Client Comment: A recommendation wi' be issued in order to in stall ROVs in both spheres during tm CCU
turnaround that wiN occur in Man::h 2007. CRP wiN mvise, by February 2006, tm PDVSA Engineering Standard in
orr;Jer/o incllJde the change of the location for lm ROVs.
Apr.-2007 AIG recommemJatJon fo llow-up visit: In Progress I En prog~so
CRP's engineftrirq department (GII-IC) issuedthe technical recommendation during 2006 for/ he installing tm ROVs
as reoommend8d. This will happen at tm LPG shutdown fION rescheduled for August 2007. The f8Visionofthe
cotTeSpondirq PDVSA standard is still intend«J as is the modfication of any of CRP's LPG sk:>nJge that woufd not be
comply wth the updated standard (ac:caurlabilty to GNJ. A first meeAirq wth INTEVEPin March 2007 is foreseen as
a start#1g point.
Nov.-2007 status: In Prog~ss l En prog~so
The vaNes instaJlafion is now planned at lhe same time as the January 2008 CCU shudown.
For tm romaining poirls, l he only p rogress staled by CRP is the setting up d a l eam 10 revi$8 the corporlJte standard
which will be lhen be used in the e1abonJlion d CRp ·s LPG s1ot"111ge modificat ion program.
200 9 Status: Good Progress
on an
& E02 Spheres, EIVs operable from the bunker to be installed in October
2009
Oc tober 2010 Status: No Progress since 2009
Marc h 2012 Status: In Progress
E2 Sphere implemented, dUling present TAM, E1 Sphere planned for laterthis year
Recommendations U pdate
Ref 20121139
Page 28 of 54
o
QBE
11.2005 Emergency Is ol ati on Valves (E1Vs )
11.2005 V<itvulas de bloqueo de emerger1C/a (EfVs)
CRP has already filled a high numb~ of EIV's across the site. In add ~i on to the actuation device installed on th e field
(push button); it is normal pradice in the industry to hilVe val ve s isolating large inventories remctely operaled ecm Ih e
control room ; therefore. is recom mended to instal a aduat ion device in the conlrol room for al Erv isolating critical
Inventory and crilic al t1owtl, In order to ensure a prompt response.
The current PDVSA standard ind udes adualion d8\Aces in the control room only for com pressors but n for critical
inventories. II is also recommended 10 upd ate the PDVSA engineering standard.
2005 Cflerrt Commerrt: In reference to the PDVSA's standard on Ell/; CRP wi/! evaluate the recommendation.
Time Frame: Sap. 200lS
Apr.-lOOT A IG r ecommemJatJon (ollow-up visit: In Progress I En prog~so
Remde opet'8tbn (from the control room) ~ existitJ;1 EIVs currerllyfitedwith actuation device located inthe f/6kfwiH
be installed in Cardon FCC utliles pat! ~thec8p8cifyexpensiotlendlumeround carried 0iJ in HrIy 2008. Forthese
EIVs, engineering and procurement are 100% are camp/sed.
For the remaining urns, CRP states that the improvemeti is inctJded in/he normal ools lumeround scheduiewith an
estimated completion yeara 2012. No details were provided.
No v.-2ooT status: In Progress I En prog~so
Same sluatioo as in Apr. 200T for Carden FCC a1"88 with a camp1elioo dale estimated for May 2008.
Plans for 200811150 inc ~s carrying 0iJ the EIVs modification on Carden atm. CD-4 unit (5 EIVs - tags 40-HS V001l213l4I5) and CBrdon VItCtlunJ AV·2 unl (3 EIVs - tegs 6O-HSV.oo1/2/J) dJring the corresponding plant turnaround
scheduled for Q3-2008.
CRP stated th81 a leam has been set up to revise the con'8sponding corportlte standard.
VIV consider that the lInnounced EIVs modifICations on ClIrdon FCC and distillalion 1I1"88S should first mlllerilllized
lind be witnessed by inSVrer3, end that CRP sfDukJ provide the program a actions for the remaining EIV reItofltitJ;1
worli., before to consider closing this recommendaOOn and tracking sepsrBIefy the progress for exs mp1e in the project
section athe undttrwriting repotI.
2009 Status: In progress (GAP Malysis done, priorifisstion being done)
October 2010 S tatus: In Progress Total a 3J6 valves identif"1ed as needing oontrol room edUlltion. No physical
progress so far.
Marc h 2012 Status: In Progress
New EIVs al CD-4 have fa cil~y to operate from extemal safe Iocalion panel and from the control bunker. Not presenlly
operable from conlrol bunker (See Also Rec 2007 .11).
Reccmmendae cos Update
First Draft Dal e 03 0l1~ , ~
Ref20 121139
Page 29 of 54
o
QBE
01.2007In-pro c llSs fi xed gas d e(ecti on i nstall i.'ll io n, plus maint enance and o perator training on existi ng
systems
le-prccess flam mabl e gas detectioo is either absent a- very l im~ed in most units at both refineries. Furthermore, when
installed, numerous gas eeteetces were found to be no looger operatioo al. There are numerous case studies in the
indllStry , an exa mple of which is the Phililps 66, Pasadena, USA , 1989 explosion . illustrating that early leak I gas
detection is ess ential to the initiatio n of rapid remedial actloo.
The fol lowing improvements should be implemented :
1) Strategically insta l ftammable gas detectors . alarm ing in the oontrol room. in those process unts with significant
inventory of ligt1 t hydroca rbons (particularty LPG holdup s In process vessels such as reflux, feed and surge drums ,
collnl ns etc), and speci fically around those items <:A equipment handling Wght hydrocarbons. For impl ementing an
etredive ga s detection ceeraje . identify and risk assess the probable leak sou rces which oould lead to the formation
offlammable gas clouds. e .g. high pressure equipment I joints. oompressor seals , pu mps handling flammable
liquidslvapours with an Op . temperature higher than the ir lash points, ma nifolds where many control valves are
grouped with multiple flanged com ectio ns, letdown valve etc.•.The recommendation is appWcable as a first priority to
process unas not already filled with gas sensors , but shOOd als o be consi dered foc LPG storage for Yotlich the
provision of gas detection has already be th e subject of other recommen datia'ls. Ar ea detecti a'l (tine-of sight devi ces)
as well as pa nt detectors shou ld be considered,
2) The operational status of gas detectors provided in unit 96 Reformer & HOT area at Cardon Is acce ssible 00 a plant
mimic display In the main Ca'ltrol room. During the visit , it w as observed thai this display showed 5 gas sensors in a
"fault" mode and 2 others in "alarm" mod e out of a total of 10 installed detectors, l.e. at least 50% of lhe gas detection
ecverase wa s not eosw ee. The following defi ciencie s were also noted about the panel operator in charge:
I n ab~ity
to provid e any explanat ioo about thi s faulty and alarm mode sauatloo and Its dlIratioo
Issue not recorded in any of the operator logbook
Lack of knowledge about the functi on and field com ponents oflh e gas detectioo system
No particular remedial action had been taken to respond to the gas alarm
On tJrther investigation, maintenance also indicated that discrepancies may exist between the gas detectors shown on
the control room displays and the coes actually installed w~hin the units. The extent of such discrepancies is not
known by maintenance, oor Is it knO'M"l by operational staff .
It is therefore recomm ended to:
a) Audit other un~s filled with gas detection , at both refineries, to identify potential similar shortfalls and app ly
the improvements llsted below.
b) Inspect, prcce and maintain existing gas detection system
c) Ensure that control room displays accurately reflect field instrumentati on
d) Regularly train operators on gas detection system and the required actions to take on the recei pt of a gas
alarm (all possible alann scen arios snould be ecneeeree such as alarm tom a single detector, from
multiple detectors, pre- alarm only, higher alarm levels etc... )
2009 Status: In Progress overall
1) Prqed of only half way through the concept stage, hence very liffleJprogress
2) Mairtain & l raining of Closed
Seen functiona l on DeS in CR + Cps instn.Jclion isSl.NiKi.
October 2010 Status: In Slow Progress
1) Prc:fed of Units priottised 80cading to DoN/AIChernE rating. Upgrade done on Cardon PG2,
~ever not properly functioning. No specifics/ion yeI for other unls, Concept oriy. No prr:ject timeline established.
March 2012 Status: In Progress - No Physical Progress
1) No additional deIectots installed since 2009 LpgnJrJe cf PG2 system. T1lis has net operated
.successfully. Cards an Older viii Bariven, still not received. Onginalcards were SIlk/ to have been
d8maged by incorrect grounding system connection. T1lis issue said to h8ve been solved for the Gas
Delection System on this unit, aI/hough problem understood stil/to exist another unls. (See ezse 05
2010 IU Bypassing dun'ng electrical Storms).
PDVSA Cen tro de Refinaci6n Parag uana
Recommendati ons U pdate
Ref20121139
Page 30 of 54
~
QBE
08.2007 EIV s Operability
Picture 5 here below sh0W5 the emergency Isolattce valve (EIV) . HCV-432. installed in the suction ofa hydrocarbon
pump . at Cardon's gas plarlt PG2. A s it Carl be seen , the alTilllgement is such that the EIV actu ator arld remaining
valve assembly is horizoot al, but the actuator, which is sizeable , is not supported and because of ~s weight ~ appears
to put a lot of stress 00 the valve stem , v.tlich could impede the proper functlooing of the EIV v.t1en required . Pictures 6
a & b are close -.iewt:; of the stern and actuatoc and dearty sh0W5 significal"ll rusting and degraded physical conditioos ,
which adds further doubts OIl the EIV operabilly. The main concern from the survey team is that the EIV could be
stuck open in case a demand 6-om the process ccccrs. Ttis example also raises the issue of EIV prool' testi ng. Also.
during the -.isl of the Instaltatiorls, l was observed that many EIVs, nomatly fitted with fireproofing blan kets . had the
fireproofing protectiorl not property in place oc remOYed followi ng fa" example mao teiance wa1<: 00 the EIV . This was
observed wlhin the process units but also in the LPG pressure storage spheres at Amuay.
It is recommended to:
1) PrO'o'ide adequate support to HCV-432 actuatoc at Cardoo 's gas plant PG2 arld carry out any requred main ten ance
and testll'lQ to ensure the valve opera.bil~y on deman d.
2) Audit the installatioos to idel"llify other sizeable EIVs lacking adequate supports and/or in
physical COI"lditiorls . as HCV-4 32 , and provide the remedial solutions as in point 1.
sim~ ar
unsatisfactory
3) Re-.iew and strengthen CRP ' s EIVs ma intenance and prooftesting pM osophy to reduce the occu rrence c:i
dangerous valve stuck fa~lXe conditions, as in HCV-432 case.
For example:
o where spare EIVs are inst alled , for example where they are fitted to pairs of "spared" pumps, test them
betweentlXTlarounds and not only at tumaround
o consider implementing partial valve stro\(e testing, to ensure that the valves remain operable , without the
need fa" Stll.tting down the process .
4) Identify EIVs where fireproofing protection (blankets, jackets etc .. .) has been renccee and not adequately put back,
and restore it wh ere needed. Also, mak e the r einstal lation of these fireproofing items a reqlirement in the a cceptan ce
step of work permit activities and ra ise awareness about this poin t of personnel involved in those activities
(contractors. plant operators etc.).
2009 StaWs: In progress, overall
1) Carcim 'sPG2vallll9 o7ExpirBd
2J VelVe support & Operabillyeudits 7 Done, sekJ noimprov8l716rrts to support needed
3J Meirt&ntlnce & proof testing improvement 7 No progress
October 2010 Status: In P rogress
3J In ProgreS$: Mali1tMance proof testing Improvement: Spered ElVs stili tested oriy at TAM .
No l1IO\I8mert tONards Partial stroke Testing. Electric actuated VIIlves not l ested al TAM.
Spll d responsibilly for valve (mechanicaQ and Actual<r (InsfllJments)
Memo (0711CV10) clarlying procedure, simple check.sheet produo8d, Intention to use as pert of pre.start
checks alter TAM end other shu/.downs.
COili/leTlt: Make as mandatcxy pre..starl requirement
4) Closed: Flre.proofjacl<.ets seen lo be improved 00 site, following memo. HcNIever Inconsistencies still
f'xist. rm,re am however e llJdriaJl cabieslcondvits that am not tim protected. (See New RtIC 2010.01'
s:
March 201 2 Status: Clo sed
3J CIos«J: Prodtes1ing regim e f1CTW established, including testing at planned shc.tdCN/nS and dh&r
opportunlies. Comprehensive Checkist
Testing" facilly has been installed.
nc>N
used foreech VII/va. (exempie SfHfn). No 'Psrtial stroke
Ref20121139
Page 3 1 of 54
~
QBE
09.2007 LP G Sphere best pr actice fo r Sam plin g I WlIIler draw-off
t eakape wren taking a sample or drawing wat er from LPG slora ge ,ln parti cular the failure 10 Isolate bllowing such
opefalion , has been recognised as one of the major LPG release cau se leading to accident. When \listIng the LPG
sphere area ill Amuay, f was observed on sphere 209 that the willer drain line consists of a first Yo tum valw and a
second globe valve wh ich are separated by only 1 foot . Thi s separation distance is considered to be Insufficient and
lhe valves could freeze In lhe Ollen position fonewing sampling Of water draw-off ccerencoe. It w as also observed that
lhe samp~ng point lennlnilles directly undemealh the spheres , wh ich Is not lhe preferred layout. (Such a design was
a key factor In lhe Feyzin LPG sphere "BLEVE" In France. 4 th JiII"1uary 1966, see
"http ://www.hse.gov.ukfcomahtsraglechfcasefel/l in66.htm")
It is recommended that :
1) the doubl e val ve isolation on the LPG sphere 209 at Amuay water drain line be modffied to Introdu ce ill least
1m between the valves. Ncte that INs Is also valid on any sample point.
2) the sampling point on the LPG sphere 209 at Amuay be relocated away from the shadow of lhe vessel.
Samples coul d lOr example be taken of the wa ter drain line. Note that water draw-olf lines should terminate al
least 3m (lot) cul side of lhe shadow of lile l ank.
3) an audit Is carried cut 10 check whether similar configurations exist elsewhere . at Amuay and Cardon . and a
programme of improvem ents be deveiOlled.
Refer 10 API standard 2510 "Design and ConslnJctl on of LPG installalions" for best pract ices on LPG sample points .
2009 Statvs: In progress
GAP analysis done, EIVs in waler dfllin lines wi' be insalled, etc.
Octobe r 2010 Status: #1, 10, #3 Overall, No Further progress
S,:X1eTfl 209 sample point remains underthe vesse l tc:p valve was open. Sphere 208 sample pairt in bad stsre sc
sample taken from gauge connect.bn, top valve open. Distance bBtwfJfIn sample valves does net complywlh PDVSA
1.5m criterion No progress on implementation 0If other spheres.
October 2010 Status: : #1, 1#2, #3 Overall, No Further progress
S,:X1ere 209 sample point rema ins under the VElSse( tc:p valve was open. Sphere 208 sample pairt in bad srerese
sample taken from gauge connection, top valve open. Distance bBtwfJfIn sample valves does net complywlh PDVSA
1.5m criterion. No progress on implementation on other spheres.
March 201 2 Status: In Progress
Cardon Spheres reported to comply affer audl .
AnlUay S 207 sphere being treated during TAM. Othe r spheres follow at their TAM - 3 in 2012 and andher' 3 in 20 13.
PDVSA Centro de Refinaci6n Parag uana
First Dr.IIl Dal e 03 0l1~ , ~
Ref2012f139
Page 32 of 54
l!l
QBE
11.2007 Improved provision of ElVs
A number of emergency isolation valves are already installed across the cons at Amuay and Cardon, however it was
observed that there are still sigrificant LPG inventories which are connected to pumps and for which the isolation is
manual between the vessel and the pump in case of an emergency at the pI.'Tlp e.g, seal failure. The gas plants at
Amuay and cerocn are our principal concerns although other plant areas may also be invo/lJed. Furthermore, the
inventory tty-eshold defining the vessels that should be protected by EIVs is now becoming more and more stringent in
the industry.
It is recommended to:
1} Audit the lX'lits to identify all the inventories, connected to pumps with only manual isolation between the pump
and the vessel, and with normal liquid levels over 5 m3 of LPG type rreterle l or 10m' of other hydrocarbons
Op. at temperature above, at or close to their f1ashpoint or auto-ignition tempera ture, For the systems meeting
those criteria, install EIVs in the discharge lines of the vessels to the pumps. These velves should be installed
as close as possible to the vesse l or drum and be capable of being actuated from witl1in the appropriate
control room (see recc nerence uce 05.11) and from a safe location within the process units, It is reminded too
that the valves, actuator and cabling should have a fi re raUng of 20 minutes,
Implement the insta ltation of EIVs not only in me main suction line of qualifying
~drocarOOn inventories as described in point 1 but also in other lines which in case of
a pump seal tenere or other release situation, would be likely to release hydrocarbons,
even where the normal now is of water. Particular examples seen include the sour
water line from the water boots or bottom of LPG vessels such as 02601, 02502 etc...
at the GLAY gas plant at Amuay. The current design on these vessels is indeed such
that remote isolation is provided on the main suction line but not on the sour water
lines (see picture 7).
Picture 7: EN s on main line but not on the secondary line - Vessel tag unknown! plant GLA Y Anway, but this
Is to Illus trate the point made In the recommendation
2009 S tatus: In progress
GAP analysis cbne, EI VS in
water drain lines will be ins/ailed, etc.
October 2010 Status: Little Progress since 2009
GAP analysis was cbne before 2009 visif. including agreemenf thai qualifying wafer boot draw would also have EI vs
328 valves identified. Requirements passed /0 Instrumentation for design, but no decisions on types (EJec or
Pneumatic). 1 spool inserted on CON FCC.
March 2012 Status: In Progress, although slow
328 vafves originally identified. Scope now reduced to 21, usirg POVSA 1997 criteria of 25m3 inventory. Another-20
will be needed. Scope now includes ocerneeo drum sour water draw valves. 5 valves installed at CD-4, Had thiS
Deen implemented sooner the conseQuences of the February 2012 CD4 fire would have been sianiOcanltv reduced
(See pictures belgw) Legacy issues _ Cardon EIVs are fa il· safe pneumatic, those at Amuay are electrical drive.
•••
,,
,,
,,
,,
- J,
,- ----_. --------
---~-- - ~ - - .
-
:
!
~;T
Ref20 12/139
Page 330f 54
l!l
QBE
12.2007 Floati ng Roof Tanks· Housekeeping & Grounding
The following anomalies were observed when visijing crude storage tanks 106 and 164 at Amuay:
Excessive vegetation growing out of control in tanks bunds (see picture 8 a).
Roof seals excessively conta rrinated with oil, which could be a contributing factor to hydrocarbon ignition and rim
fires for exerrcre in case of a nearby lightning strikes (see picture 8 b).
Some electrical shunt sections normally ensuring the electrical continuity between the floating roof and the tank
shell were broken, hence increasing again potential secondary lightning effects s\X:h as bound charge and
secondary arc (see picture 8 b).
Tafi(s grounding at the tank bottom not easily klertffi<lble because of excessive vege!<ltion and, in some cases.
missing. (This is recognised by PDVSA, in that the Exxon design does not specify electrical grounding of !tie
tanks, but the Shell design does. PDVSA expressed an intention to grolXld all tanks.)
It is recommended to speciliCi:l11y address the type of ercrraues highlighted on tank 106 and 164 and by extension
establish a programme to improve housekeeping and electrical grounding standards on all CRP's floating tank storage
f<l cilities, l.e. est<lblish <I bund veget<ltion cortrol progr<lrmle, lT1CIint<lin roof seals in <I cean condition, ensure eoequete
electrical continuity between floa ting roof se als and tank shell as well as ecequate tank grounding.
2009 Status : In progress
Need mae proactivity in repating seal conditions. shunts etc.
OCtober 2010 Status: In progress
Reported checklist in use, and archived. (Checklist not seen)
Tank seen (A7, 2), Lagomar 5 Light Crooa, holes in weather seal, gaps
between wall and sea l, root seal nooxa. (Soo proto)
March 2012 Status: In Progress
SChedule established starting January 2012, w~h checklist and register; however frequency is only one check per
year. This we consider to be low for a task consisting of only a visual check.
POVSA Centro de Refinaci6n Paraguana
Ref20 121139
Page 34 of 54
l!l
QBE
14.2007 Mana gement of 'Safety Critica l ' valves
'Safely Cr itical' valves include alilhose valves reql.lred to be in the open or closed posjuon for safety reasons.
Examples include, but are not limiled to, any valves in a pressu re re lief path, any valves in the firewater or other fire
protective system and any valves associated wrth the ESDIEDP system (eg. isolation and bypass valves).
It is
recorrsreroec that these valves (Ire:
1) Identified in the field (e.g. pairted and tagged with lXli Q.lE! reference number}
2}
Identified on the P&ID (eg. Safety Critical Valve Open (SCVO) or Safely Critical Valve Closed (SCVC)
de sigflCltion)
3} Locked or car-sealed in the required 'safe' position, as indicated on the PID
4) Usted on a register held in the Contro l Room and any operation irwolving closir19 ' SCVO" desigflClted valves
or opening designated ·scvc· valves to be corecsec using the cerme-tc-wcrk system or the safely interlock
bypassing procedure as appropriate.
5) Periodically checked to ensure they (Ire in the correct 'safe' pos ition
2009 Status : some progress. (Net all valves identified in our opinioo)
October 2010 Status: Some progress. Most valves Si:l6fl controlied using cable lies, however sene seen ~
oxwonea
March 2012 Sta tu s: No Progres s - i f anything, some regression
Still an iooonsisteni approach
Some valves seen COfJtrdled using cable ties. however many ethers seen
First Draft Dale 03 00/20"
Ref20 12/139
net to be COfJtlOlled.
Page 35 of 54
l!l
Q8E
01.201 0
Fire-SafeiFire Prot ected ElVs , Protectio n of Cables, & General Cable Fireproofing
Pri ority A
There are many electrical ly driven Emel"gency Isolation Valves (EIVs) at CRP. These require a
reliable source of electrical enel"gy and signal to operate. For this reason . where they are located In a
fire zone , they are generally to a fire-safe design (actuator and valve body). or are filted with fire
insula tion jackets. Similarly, cabl es run thrOOJ gh a fire zon e, are generally protected fl"om fire using a
j acket or coating .
During our site \Ois~ many cases were seen where the protection to the cables and thei r conduits was
lncomplete. Most prevalent was failure to protect the lIexibl e conduh carrying the cables fl"0Il1 the
rigid conduit 10 the actuator body. a~hOOJgh cases also wllfe seen where the condu~ was not
prctecled . In such cases the cable could be expected to fail rapidly if exposed to fire.
We also noted cases of highly significant electrical andlor instrument cable trays (e .g . in HDAY-4)
wIlich were protected by a proprietary fire resistant jacket, which had degraded in the ambient
conditions to the extent that ~ was essentially non-existent.
We Recommend:
,
That a gap analysis be carri ed ouI to determinewllere cables serving electrically ltiven EIVs are
within a fire z one.
2
That cabl es found to require prot ection be fitt ed with protective jacketslcoatings.
3
That the condition of tire protection to imporlant instrumenl and electrical cable trays be assessed and
prompt replacements made wIlere necessary.
Cl ient Comm ent :
None
reeevee
Status March 2012:
Clo sed: Gap Analysis has b86rI completed. 11lere is a ' Fireproofing Plan " covering passive protection to
stflJdUf9S and cables.
2) In Progress: Electrlcaf driven actuators are generally ' K-Mass'!>' protected. Cables are being treBled by a
contractor during tum-arounds. HDA v- 4 said to ee eomp/8/ed. DCA Y and ALA ¥ will falloN during TAM.
3) Closed: tha four zones KJen/irled by us in 2010 in HDAY 4 are repaired. DKAY and ALA Y being done during
present TAM
1)
Ref20121139
Page 36 of 54
o
QBE
02201 0
" ATS" (Asses sment of Safe Work used in Permit-to-Work) to c onsid er Proc es s Hazards
Pri ority A
The ' Identilcacion de Riesgos' and associated 'AdieslramientolCertificaci6n Requierd o en Pract icas
de Trabajo Seguro' are job safety analysis used In conjunction with the Perm ~-to-Wor1< to Infonn all
staff and workers of the hazards which may be associated with the work to be undertaken and the
appropriate procedures and crctec uve measures. Thi s concentrates solely on risks to the workers ,
specificall y at the sije of the work itself. and does net consi der broader process hazards. potenijal
damage to equipment, or hazards that may be introdu ced remo te from the work site. Althou gh in
many cases this will also protect th e process, this is not always the case, and significant losses in the
past have resulted from failure to recognise process hazards.
We Recommend:
That a mUlti-disciplinary team should study generically the proce ss hazards that may be introduced In
the preparation and execution of the work , and subsequen t return to sevtee of thllllquipmen t and
systems involved.
The study should consider the consequences of intended actions, unintended ad ions and omissions
in the work . to the immediate process. to ether con nected systems or ap paratus and to the
surrounding environment. It is suggest ed that a Wlal If?" formal of study woul d be suitable, with th e
targ et of including such hazards on the ATS check( st.
Cli ent Comment;
None received
Marc h 2012 Status: Closed
Some modmcation of A TS, to include some considerations of process risks
However we not !hat items such 8s ' Lifti/1li1 Plans' for use ofcranes etc. are applied rat herQeneric811y and
coosidermostly weigftlbalaTlCfl and security d slinging issues. On these there is fIOlIppilmnt coosidttnJtiorl of
thecoosequences of cJropped load on spparatus and pipeworlc. over which the lilt is to l ak.e place. (EXlImp le seen
on Amuay Jetty 2)
Recc mmendaecos U pdate
First Draft Date 03 0l11O ' ~
Ref 20121139
Page 37 of 54
l!l
QBE
03.2010
Uncon trolled Bypasses
Priority A
On the HDAY-4 unit at Amuay, the hydrogen recycle compressor (C-351) steam turbine governor was
seen to have an improvised ptfyslcal block placed to impede action of the governor On investigation,
it was learned that ttlis, and a block to motion of the steam inlet veve to the tul'tline, had been used to
prevent the compressor tripping w ring recurrent repairs of the hydraulic cortrolline on the governor
system. This effectively disabled the over-speed trip. (See photos below).
At the time of the visit, the phy'sical block had been left in situ, bU the t¥pass was not recorded in the
9tpass Register, and as far as we could make out was implemented wrtholA arlf approval. Also, the
Permit-To-INorX (PTW) documenting the last repair during which such unorthodox bypass was applied
coco not be found and staff recognized that, in the end, no PTW had been issued.
We Recommend:
1
To consciertiously rectify in the field the above described anomaly.
2
That no protective system bypass of any kind should be permitted wntou the appropriate
assessment and approval, recording a the reason for the t¥pass, its time of application, li me of
removals etc, as required by the bypass regster book and bypass ccmor procedure. This must apply
to software, key switch, hand-switch, jumper wiring, physical blocks, valve movements, wedges, or
any other means whereby a system in whole or part is disabled.
3
That regular site audits be carried out to identify and correct any deviations from proper
implemertation of the bypass procedure and that perscore r involved in such audits must be briefed on
what to loo k out for in discovering weurcnseo or wccrvenc re rbypassing activity.
Client Comment:
None Received
Marc h 201 2 statu s:
1) Closed: The "block' on C351 goyernot', although highly irregular practice, aa ra disable Itle protection.
which is irdepenclant.
2) Closed: Blve Book (recording and aulhcx'ising of bypasses am their feffloyal) appears 10 be properly osea
am aIJItlorisecJ.
3) Closed: ReglJlar audit is carried ()(J/ on rotating machinery protection.
Recom mendations update
Ref20 121139
Page 38 of 54
l!l
QBE
04.2010
Cardo n tank A7·2 Bund Contamination
Prio rity B
During the survey it was noted that there was considerable co ntamination In tank A7-2 (Cardon) with
crude 041 and water, originating from the tank water draw.
The reason given for ths was associated wlth the piping system to the oily drain. It is appa rent that
the sltuatioo has persisted for a considerable time.
This cooseues a s ignificant fire risk, noting that crude 011 pipeworx and the fKiatlrg roof seal pipewo r'P<
runs aoove grol.fid in the cont<lm inaled area.
The above situation Is reminiscent of reoorrme ndatlon 13,2007 (spill in ArmJay crude tank 164 b..Jnd
and nearby ground plpeway) .
During the visit, we also noted various pipe trenches h~1y conta rrinated w~h oily mixtures, however
in this case, there is an orgoing see wide prograrrme to remedy this type of contamination.
We Ree:: om men d :
1
Urgent attention be given to the elimination of the cause of the contamination In tank A7·2 btIld,
2
The contamination be prorflllly removed.
3
Audit the pl<lnts to identify simila r tratarces elsewhere <l nd diligently remedy them
Client Comment:
None Received
1. Closed: The cause of this specific oonIaminalion - obstruction of a drain line - has been eliminated
2. Closed: Oeconlaminathn is completed. Photographs sho.vn to the stIVeyo-s
3.
In Progress: 2 other blceks of laMS (A5 a'ld A6. disriliates, net crIXiB oil or black product) identified with
similar symptoms, Planned to be treated, funds alicea/ed, .
POVSA Centro de Reflnaci60 Paraguana
Ref20 12/139
Page 390f 54
l!l
QBE
05.2010
L.ong Duration Bypasses of Protective Systems because of " Electr ical Storms"
Prior ity A
The practice of bfpassing fired heater and other protection systems do.xirg (threatened) electri cal
sto rm activity should be ceased - typically 18 hours, or l4J to 345h (see extract fro m one of the con trol
room "Blue BooK" below, used to record the overrides) , Persistence of this undesirable practice,
already noted at previous surveys, justifies the cresere recommendation,
Management of Change is also said to be not aopacebe, a nd mi~ gation bf merely "rmnitoring
constantly operational variables" OIIef such a period is cortrary to good practice, particularly with the
staffing levels available, The conseq uent unavailability of the protective systems would certainly not
comply with the required Safety Integrity Level.
We Rec ommen d :
1
The root cause of the instability during electrical storms should be sought and remedied, rather than
merely masking the symptoms by disabling the protective systems. (We suspect tha t the source of
the problem lies in electrical equipolen~ al grounding syste m).
2
"Managemert of Change" for irrportant issues such as isolation of protection should always be
considered, including when r-cuveteo by concems Olle r electrical storms,
3
M it iga~on
measures should be clearly detailed, and realistically ac hievable, statirg a lternative
protective rreaso es in place, o r the parameters that must be rmnitored dlXing the outage of the
protective system.
Client Comment:
None Received
March 2012 Status:
1. In Progre ss: Cause has been identified to be the grOl.l lding of the protective system - improper segregation
of the "Dirty" high current 9afth and the "Ciaan" retef8nC6 earth. (this was our initial suspicion in 2010) Of
1387 · Varistors", 144 were found to be fauffy and replacem6flts are Q'1 order or being installed.
2.
In Progre ss: Stiil some recent "Blue Book · entries of long d ilation bypasses for "Atmospheric Conditions · or
"Rainstorms·, even Q'1 units
wnere it has not bElen a problem ,
3. In Progre ss: Mitigation meeswes remain vaglJe - "monitor the process" ao.
Ref20 12/139
Page 40 0f 54
l!l
QBE
Control of Hazardous Energy during Maintenance: Positive isolation, Defi nitions,
identification, Tagging, etc.
06.2010
Prior ity A
Several 'terre of plart were seen isolated for maintenance purposes. It was noted that:
•
•
•
•
•
•
811ndinglsolation schedules and diagrams were not systematically used
Valves were generally tagged blA not physically locked.
Electrical Isolations were tagged b\..( not physically locked
Spades, blinds and blind flanges were not tagged.
Terminal flanges were secured I:7i less than half the flange ocee.
Spades were secured between flanges I:7i about half the flange bolls.
• on a specific rercuer maintenance job, it was not clear whether Spades had been inserted between
flanges, or whether there was merely a spacer ring in place - there is lrdeeo no system of identification
of spades versus spacer rings.
(We are aware that this topic is underreview by me Corporate multi diSfi;plinary commilfae on Industrial Sa/afy. and
thai a "Draft" procedure 51-5-28 was issued in January 2010)
We Recommend:
The use of blindinglsolation schedules and diagrams on all but the most sirrple of isolation tasks, for
all sources of energy and lubrication etc.
2
In addition to tagging, locking of all valves used for isolation. Fulllock·Ol1Ilag-oul is industry best
practice.
3
In addition to tagging, locking of all electrical breakers used for isolation. Fulllock-oUltag-oul is
industry best practice.
4
Tags to be attached to each and fNery blind, spade, spectacle plate or other means of isolation, cross
referenced to the permit to work.
5
To establish a site standard for pos~ive identification of "Spades" and "Spacers", A corrvnon
corventcn is to use a robust "T" shaped lifting lug, with a hole otaeo if it is a spacer, and no hole
drilled if ~ is a spade. The shape of the spade or spacer lab should be unique and standardized
throughootthe site. The appropriate scheduelrating should also be stamped on the lug.
6
Where isolation spades, spectacle blinds, spacers etc are Inserted between flanges, or terminal blind
flanges are used, they should be secured using all the bolts, lightened In the correct order, to the
correct torque Stricter acceptance criteria should be adopted so as to ensure shortcomings like poor
bolting practice no longer persists. In short, process isolations should have the same integrity as the
system In wtWch they are located.
Client Corrment:
1
None Received
March 2012 Status: No Progress on all six points.
FUll LOTO is not in practice, Dupoot Training "Best Practice" has been taught, but is not practiced. The PDVSA
Norm also calls for full LOTO
Pu~
Breaker ...uh
tailS onlv
Dischargeplat e used instead 01
bind flange
Ref20 12/139
same pump -valves
not taQlled
or locked.
Page 41 of 54
l!l
QBE
07.2010 Register of Firefighting
E~ipmenl
Priority B
The Fire rntevenuco Team keeps an annual "Plan de Trabajo" (work plan) in which is contain ed the
schedule for firefighting exercises and preventive maintenan ce and testing of the various fixed , mobile
and portable fire intervention resources. Th is appears to be a comprehensive and well formatted
document, which if properly appli ed , would give th e firefighters and management valuable and rapid
informabon on the status at any time oflhe fire response capabHly and oflhe cornp~ance with the
plamed testing programme . It is hCM'evef only a "paper" plan. and is not incorporated into the "SAP"
maintenance planning system . Also. many entries for past scheduled acthAties were noted to have
been left blank in the work plan docum ent , thus suggesting tnatthe schedul e was not being followed
completely. Specific examples were the "Programma de Simulaao Ario 201r:1', which listed monthly
fire exercises. only the March 2010 exercise (Jetty #1) had been recorded , storage tanks bi-monthly
protection testing , none recorded since May 2010, MTBEfTAME deluges and monitors, tn-monthly,
only recorded in January and July 2010. ~ may be that the work is being done, and not recorded .
We Recommend:
1
The annual "Plan de Trabaj o" should be incorporated into the maintenance planning system .
2
Compliance with the plan shoi.lld be made a Key Performance Indicator for the Fire Intervenbon
department and the work plan document should be maintained up-to-date .
Cliel'll Commer"ll :
None Received
Marc h 2012 Status:
a local sand-8lone $praadsh8etkegiser, bl1 worll is enterfJd tao SAP when
1.
In Progess : Annual Pl8n is
required,
2,
In p rogress : Eart; Days: "S1COINE" i1veriory and checklists etc. Are yet /0 be fully popu/81edwilh a/l
sysems and app8f7ltus. Only extinguishers, bre8thing appanItus, fife vehicles so far included. Needs to
expand /0 capture all fixsd and mobile sysems d detection and protection
Recommendabons Update
Ref20121139
Page 42 of 54
l!l
QBE
Sphere Del uge
08.2010
Priority A
During the survey we requested a test of the deluge on Sphere 210
at Amuay, which has a single lop deluge water distributor. During
the demonstration, the ' Sombrero Chino" (Chinaman's hat) water
distributor at the top of the sphere detached, leading to a vertical
fountain of water mostly missing the sphere. (see photo rigtt)
A test of the deluge on Spheres E-01 & E-02 at Card6n revealed
some blocked nozzles and some nozzles not properly pointing at
the sphere, a~hoU!1J the overall cover of deluge water appeared to
be adequate. (see photo below)
These are the only deluges for which we requested demonstrations, and defects were noted in each
case (a"hough rather minor in the Cardon test case).
We Recommend:
1
That the "Sombreros Chino' of sphere 21 0 be promplly repa ired and that the attachment arrangement
for the "Sombreros Chinos' on other spheres at Amuay be inspected and any necessary rereoar
measures be taken.
2
That the cause of the blockage to the deluge nozzles at ceroco be determined, and remedied,
3
That the preventive maintenance prograrrvne for the sphere deluges be reviewed to ensure that
proper eneoecn is given to the fo..oction of the systems.
Client Comment:
None Received
March 2012 Statua :
1. Closed: 'S Sanbrero Chino" has been replacedby a SupeflOf dssign. am other spheres also treated where
-"."
2. Closed: Ttle dehlJe nozzles are reported to have been cleaned. scale flushed form the Jines, am regulatly
tested. Any remediation is entered into "SAP.
3. In Progress: A paper plan fOf deluge lests and routine maintenance exists since 2011 . being migrated to
"SIC/ONE" See 07.2010 above..
POVSA Centro de Refinaci60 Para guana
Ref2012/139
Page 43 0f 54
l!l
QBE
09.2010
EN Button L.ocation, L.abelllng, Integrity and L.amps
Priority A
Emergency Isolation veves are operated in some cases from the control bunker and locally by handswitches on the units, and in others solely from pushbuttons with indica tor rerros on the l,I"Iits These
pushbutlons and lamps are located around concrete colurms , potentially in positions at risk from plant
incidents. They are poorly labelled and not at all "otNious", There are also issues of integrity such as
damage to indicator li ~t, missing indicator Ii ~t bJlbs etc.
In our opinion these critica l protection devices might be difficult to locate in an emergency, and once
loca ted, the appropriate pushbutton might not be immediately apparent (see pIlolographs below)
,• .
•
I '. ,
."
We Recommend :
1
The safe location 01 EIV pushbUton stations be reviewed in the context of riSk from process incidents.
2
The EIV pushbutton stations be clearly designated, by means 01 conspicuous colouring r::l the
concrete column on which they are located.
3
That each individual EIV pushbutton module be clearly identified by tag number and the equipment
served by the EIV.
4
That all EIV pust'bullons be reguarty tested and maintained in optimal operable conditions.
C lient Conwnent:
None Received
March 2012 Status: CIO$d: All 4 parts,
AI Cardon, pillalS idefllified by Ya/Iow Paint, with push-but/ens labelled by
stencil.
»»>
AI Amuay, new motorisad valve panels have boon installed in some units,
installation continlJeS in tum-arounds. (below)
Rrst Draft Date 03 00/ >0"
Ref20 121139
Page 44 0f 54
l!l
Q8E
10.2010
Anomalous Pip ing Thi ckness MeasU"ement Readings in " SILCO"
Pri ority B
"SILCO' is PDVSA proprietary ilspection data managem ent so1lware used for eeercsen m onitoring
and predictive inspection scheduling.
It was nded that ilthe "SILCO" database, there were man y instances where there had been no
recorded change in the recorded p",ing wall thickn ess for two or three measurement cycles. It was
explained that w here a reading greater tha n the previous record was obtained , the previous value was
retained, rather than recording the measuremenl taken . This is desp~e ' SILCO" automatically issuing
a recomm endation to check the reading whenever a readi ng larger than the previous recor ded valu e
for the sam e measur ement is input.
The cause of lh e higher reading could be cat bratlon error, operator error, non-repeal able
measu rement points, recording error , or the (In our opinion more ~kel y) possi bi~t y that the previous
readilg had in fact been erroneously made and record ed as a lower than actual value.
The consequence of such Instances Is that the rate of carosion is either net possible to calculat e, or if
calculated, might be lower than actual, leadil g to p oten~aly unsafe errors in the estimation of
remainilg life.
We Recommend :
That whenever an anomalous wal thickness readi ng is observed, whether it be larg er than the
previous value, or nd in accordance with the existing Trend: of change in the wall thickness, the
measurement be checked by repea~ng the measurement using the same measurem ent instrument
and a second measurement inslnJment that has been check calibrated. T his shwd preferably be
done by a senior ilspeclor.
Client Com ment:
None received
Marc h 2012 Status: I,., Progress, although not tfflch apparent
Although I was axplained to us tha! the probl8m arises only where there are small differe~ in readings, I
Is importart to realise that the principal d assl#7lirlg that the previotJs reading was #COf'I'l'd " is net
satisflJdory. (symptom - applIrert IfJCffNlSfJ I,., wall thicknltss}
Recc mmendaecos U pdate
First Draft Dat e 03 0l1~ , ~
Ref 2012/1 39
Page 45 of 54
o
QBE
13. Observations
The following observations were meoe to the MarlClgement of Centro de RelirlClciOn P,uagU<lna, ffiCli ~ during the
close-out meeting. It was not our purpose to rrake new recommendations, anhough CRP rrerecerreot were
encolXaged to act on these observations,
Unsafe Conditions
at A m uay J etty 3.
We noted an instance of a (heavy) rose bearirg on a small bore relief line (1)- on LPG dLty. (see below), This line
serves both a therma l relief valve and a Nitrogen Purge point. It is also noted that thrs LPG line uses no hoist, and that
there is an lX1suppClrted srmll radil.l5 bend, which must act as a signifICant stress raiser (2)
Two LPG leaks were also noted on the same system, one on the Nrtrogen Purge Point, and one on a valve packi ng
(see below ,
First Draft Da te 03 00/20"
Stru ctura l Inte grity Pro g ramme - good evidence of progress, but a long way to go,
These pictures from Am uay PS/PVAY1
A<:t M ' IIl..... l!Je<:utl d l "
,1".11_
$Qpon.. E.lrUCI\It.lo. Tompor. lo.
' P- , ,,lNCIU' "'" Rewnplozadol l R _
'~11ing I Pinlur.
,Fi ep OOl" 1I
The ' sooc t e Temporal' was installed to allow ope ration to continue until the structure was renov ated. Note that it was
not fireproofed, hence the structu re was not etrectivel y protected ag ainst failure during a fire. The re novated structure
restores the necessary fire-proofing. Note also that the repairs (tempora ry and renovations) were carried out as
' SIMOPS' - i e. on the run.
Pla nt a PStPvay-1
Ac,lYId. _
......_
!jOCUlI" ' ' ' '
Soponoo EIIN<lUrII.. T_ _
•
'_ _'*'9 I Pmn
R... ' 10. " 4 1 _......
·F·"", oo611
............. " . .
~I<_
,
..
d••
•
I
I
I
"
PDVSA Ce ntro de Refinaci6n Paraguana
First
oaa Date 03 01/ 2012
Ref2012/139
"I
"
Pa{le 47 of 54
~
QBE
Much still to be oone, especially at Amua.y
Structural Fireproofing on lhe structure of PSAY4, advanced degradation of
structural fireproofing - to say nothing of lhe probable condition of the
steelworlc it encases,
New StructlXal
Fireproofing on scccots to
feed to almospheric
ool~
PVAY-4 v acccrn Unit, Compromised structural fire protection and temporary
support in place pending repairs 10
structure.
v acoom Bottoms Line - pipe hanger
from unprotected beam, bolt on sccoct
clamp nol secure, no cercrceem. and
as ye~ no EIV on column bottom.
PV AY·4 Corrosion under
msuaucn There is a programme
10 remedy this,
Recom mendalions Update
Ref20 12/139
Page 48 0f 54
l!l
QBE
Card 6n C04 Fire Repairs
Highly congested and confined area of pumps, re-eers exposed l:¥
concrete spalling on underside of upper (exchanger) deck, not clear
when (if) these are to be repaired.
New pipe supports - not fireproofed
Emergency Isolation Valve added to base of column.
Recommendations update
First Draft Da te 03 00/ >0"
Ref20 121139
Pa ge 49 of 54
l!l
QBE
Jetties
A mu ay J etties: Compact, Congested, incident on one likely to affect neighbour, in addition to the vessel on the
adjacent berth,
Hose handling Gantry - LPG hose (nearest) has not been
supported l::¥ rotst, LPG line has motorised vatve , locally
operate d.
Relatively narrow jetty, ships close together.
Ref 2012/1
Mari fold valves for most products are manual,
Adjacent jelly 4 has creesen Arms rathe r than hoses. Recently
upgraded.
The re are 2 clamps on the Kerosene line, to be elim inated at next TAM
in 2013
Many clamps
on fire-water line, being replaced now (see new P'pes)
Ref20 12/139
Page 51 of 54
l!l
QBE
Card 6n Jetties: \Nell separated, ships berth both sides, wider access ways and jetty heads than at Amuay.
r - - - - - - -"""----,
hoses
Mix of
for white
products and articulated
arms for LPG
Complex manifold, some motorised varves, most manual.
Emergency Isolation valve,
failsa fe, (air 10 open, spring to
c lose) some confusion ebcu
tag ~, fireproof cover not
replaced , actuation f rom local
switch only.
Ref20 12/139
Page 520f 54
l!l
QBE
Foam sokncn rnamolds and air ventcns rounder-deck foam curtian
Remote operated steerable elevated foamlwater «crecr.
Hose
w~h spl~
outer vulcanised layer,
and rose to replace it (see test dale
00-
Ref20 12/139
Page 530f 54
l!l
Q8E
Rflf'lsk
Under-dede structure
e~lensively
repecec
Terrp;wary 5I.... o;.-. . t s '" ljed 10 original steel stru::tln, restW1l on
new ccocrete sU>stNctU"e whle corICl"ete repaced.
Slbstarnal sections of
Upper Hose Handling Structure replaced.
FOVSA Centro de RefinaciOn Pal1l gJlln&
First Draft Date ro "" 2OU
Ref20121139

Reporte Amuay

Transcripción

Documentos relacionados

Presentación de PowerPoint - GMA Proyectos Siglo XXI CA

Garage Commercial for Sale in Miraflores

Corporate Design and Communications Corporate Identity Design

La Movida - Fort Lewis College

RV offers a wide range of valves designing and