The conflicts in Libya and Syria and the potential for regional

Transcripción

November 2015
The conflicts in Libya and Syria and the
potential for regional destabilisation
Edited by:
Valeria Ruggiu and Daniele Scalea
Contributors:
Alexandre Brans, Dario Citati, Diego Del Priore,
Roberta La Fortezza, Luca Maiotti and Andrea Sperini
Abstract
Since 2011 Syria and Libya are the subjects of extreme violent infightings which, far from bringing
democracy as many in the West initially hoped, are threatening the very existance of State and
society. In addition to the human tragedy in the two countries, destabilization is seemingly
spreading to their neighbourhood, as shown by terrorist attacks in Tunisia, armed struggle of
Turkish Kurds, Lebanon, Turkey, Tunisia and other countries flooded with refugees, ISIS spreading
to Iraq and establishment of a trans-national terrorist network. The very real risk is that the two
national hotbeds of tension could destabilize the whole South-Eastern Mediterranean arch,
bringing war and terrorism at the gates of Italy and Europe. This Report aims to analyze how the
Libyan and Syrian destabilization is affecting the whole region.
Keywords: MENA socio-political stability, ISIS, Islamist terrorism
Language: Italian
About the authors
VALERIA RUGGIU
Director of the “North Africa and Near East” Programme, IsAG, Rome
[email protected]
DANIELE SCALEA
Director-general, IsAG, Rome
[email protected]
ALEXANDRE BRANS
Collaborator of the “North Africa and Near East” Programme, IsAG, Rome
[email protected]
DARIO CITATI
Director of the “Eurasia” Programme, IsAG, Rome
[email protected]
DIEGO DEL PRIORE
Associate Researcher of the “North Africa and Near East” Programme, IsAG, Rome
[email protected]
ROBERTA LA FORTEZZA
Collaborator of the “North Africa and Near East” Programme, IsAG, Rome
[email protected]
LUCA MAIOTTI
Intern of the “North Africa and Near East” Programme, IsAG, Rome
[email protected]
ANDREA SPERINI
Collaborator of the “Africa and Latin America” Programme, IsAG, Rome
[email protected]
ISSN: 2281-8553
© Istituto di Alti Studi in Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliarie
Istituto di Alti Studi in Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliarie
3
Contents
________________________________________________________________________________
1. Libya and Syria: will these two “black holes” swallow up the Middle East and the Maghreb? ........... 4
2. Turkey.................................................................................................................................................... 4
2.1 Present situation: Ankara caught in the Syrian web ........................................................................... 4
2.2 Scenarios: Kurdish independence as the new no 1 enemy .................................................................. 5
3. Lebanon ................................................................................................................................................. 6
3.1 Present situation: taking part in the war but keeping it at arm’s length ............................................. 6
3.2. Scenarios: growing internal and external pressures on Lebanese stability ....................................... 7
4. Palestine................................................................................................................................................. 7
4.1 Present situation: the Palestinian factions take sides ......................................................................... 7
4.2 Scenarios: new tenants in the Gaza Strip ............................................................................................ 8
5. Jordan .................................................................................................................................................... 8
5.1 Present situation: a country increasingly worn out by the war in Syria ............................................. 8
5.2 Scenarios: more internal conflict ........................................................................................................ 9
6. Egypt and Tunisia .................................................................................................................................. 10
6.1 Present situation: “secular” dams against the fundamentalist tide .................................................... 10
6.2 Scenarios: new social pacts to defeat terrorism .................................................................................. 11
7. The Caucasus and Central Asia ............................................................................................................. 11
7.1 Present situation: the “foreign fighters” who scare Putin.................................................................. 11
7.2 Scenarios: a resurgence of terrorism on the horizon .......................................................................... 12
8. The European Union.............................................................................................................................. 12
8.1 Situation: a timid Europe confronting terrorism and organised crime ............................................... 12
8.2 Scenarios: new instruments and new awareness to guarantee security .............................................. 14
www.istituto-geopolitica.eu
www.geopolitica-rivista.org
4
1. Libya and Syria: will these two “black
holes” swallow up the Middle East and the
Maghreb?
In the civil wars in Libya and Syria, which
have now been ongoing since the closing
months of winter 2010/2011, the presence of
the state has been so significantly reduced that
it is difficult – at least in the case of Libya –
to talk about a state. Although the crises have
evolved differently – while in Libya the
regime was overthrown after a few months
and Muammar Gaddafi killed, in Syria Bashar
Assad has remained in power, albeit holding
less national territory – there are clear
similarities between the two situations which
make it possible to consider them together.
The crises in Libya and Syria began during
the Arab uprisings of 2011 (the so-called
“Arab Spring”), but transcended them in
terms of time as there was no rapid
conclusion and regime change (like in
Tunisia), nor short-lived change (like in
Egypt), nor sudden repression (such as in
Bahrain); the crises in these two countries
provoked the quasi total collapse of the State,
without any of the myriad of factions being
able to lay claim to its legacy in terms of
geographical area or political credibility.
Libya and Syria have therefore become
regional “black holes” which, unlike their
astral counterparts, do not simply exert a
force of attraction, but propel destabilizing
elements outwards. Because of their porous
and, by now, almost purely formal, borders,
Libya and Syria attract outside interventions
while in exchange, they produce international
tension, waves of refugees and safe havens for
foreign fighters with their radical ideologies
and military training. Iraq has already fallen
into the Syrian “black hole”.
The aim of this report is to assess how the
Syrian and Libyan “black holes” are pulling
neighbouring countries, and some farther
away, towards the same state of chaos, and to
identify possible countermeasures to prevent
regional destabilisation.
2. Turkey
2.1 Present situation: Ankara caught in the
Syrian web
For historical, geographical and political
reasons, Turkey is on the front line of the
Syrian conflict. After decades of hostility with
the Hafez Assad regime, there was a
rapprochement between the two countries in
2004 when the Syrian government, which, in
the meantime, had passed to Bashar Assad,
quashed the Kurdish uprisings in Quamishli
(Turkey had previously accused Syria of
providing logistic support to the PKK).
However, in 2011 relations deteriorated once
again. Recep Erdogan’s Turkish government,
which had sympathised with the Arab
uprisings earlier that year, offered mediation
between Assad and the opposition but in vain.
Since then, Turkey has openly supported the
rebels who, not surprisingly, have been able
to capture large swathes of territory along the
Turkish border. In the last two years, the
emergence of ISIS, and, opposing them, the
Kurdish militias has led Ankara to make the
Incirlik airbase available to the anti-ISIS USled coalition, and itself to conduct operations
against the PKK. The latter’s renewed
activities, their bases in urban areas, their
logistic hinterland in the virtually independent
Kurdish territories in Syria and their ability to
launch guerrilla actions against the Turkish
security forces, are the first, but fundamental,
negative consequences of the Syrian conflict
for Turkey.
This was undoubtedly an unexpected
setback for Ankara which had been counting
on the Baath regime being overthrown, and
despite the fact that the conflict has hardened,
Turkey has continued to provide logistic
support to various rebel groups and has even
tolerated the flow of foreign volunteers
crossing Turkey.
Baathist resilience aside, one of the reasons
for the failure of the Turkish strategy lies in
the lack of understanding with Saudi Arabia
and other Gulf States which are hostile to
Assad and actively support the rebellion in
5
Syria, but are opposed to the groups close to
the Muslim Brotherhood. The discord
between Ankara and Riyadh culminated in
summer 2013 when Egyptian President Morsi
was overthrown – an event supported by the
Saudis but not welcomed by the Turks.
However, the start of a new and difficult
conflict in Yemen and the nuclear agreement
with Iran (which is the prelude to the end of
Iran’s isolation) convinced Saudi Arabia to
put aside many of its reservations and
cooperate with Turkey in supporting a wider
rebel front. The most immediate result was
the creation of the Jaish al-Fatah coalition
which, in the Idlib area, combines groups
which are considered close to Turkey with
others, like Faylaq al-Sham and Liwa alHaqq, which are considered to be in the Saudi
orbit. The combined strength of Ankara, Doha
and Riyadh’s support for this coalition of
Islamist groups has given quick results with a
major part of the Idlib Governorate being
captured during the first months of this year.
The Jaish al-Fatah offensive has however
been halted by the Russian military
intervention.
As well as a stronger PKK, another
negative consequence of the Syrian conflict
for Turkey has been the significant flow of
refugees: Turkey is the country with the
highest number. There are approximately two
million Syrians in Turkey today but only 15%
of them live in the refugee camps close to the
border. Many others subsist on hand-outs, or
through prostitution and smuggling. Since the
beginning of the conflict Turkey has been
pursuing an open-door policy and, as a result
of the restrictions imposed simultaneously by
Lebanon and Jordan, the number of Syrian
refugees in Turkey has more than doubled in
2015.
2.2 Scenarios: Kurdish independence as the
new no 1 enemy
Russia’s intervention has made the already
complicated creation, by Turkey, of a 40km
deep buffer zone in Syria even more difficult.
This buffer zone should cover the Azaz, Al
Bab and Jarablus areas and would fulfil a
number of objectives: the almost purely
symbolic objective of protecting both the
many Turkmen who live in the area and the
emblematic Dabiq site;
the economic
objective of starting the repatriation of the
Syrian refugees who represent a significant
burden for the Turkish infrastructure; and the
political objective of expelling ISIS from the
Turkish border and driving a wedge between
the Kurdish areas In Jazira on the one hand
and Kobane on the other. It is not surprising
that the top Turkish priority is not the struggle
with the Baath regime but the creation of a
buffer zone: Turkey has suffered a strategic
setback and therefore bringing Syria into its
sphere of influence becomes secondary
compared to the defence its territorial
integrity. This territorial integrity is being
threatened by the Kurdish independence
movement, which, in the Syrian sector, has
gained significant international support thanks
to the fight against ISIS. The Kurdish PYD is
seeking to strengthen its hold in the Aleppo
area in order to disrupt the Turkish supply
lines to the IS and thus to ensure greater
territorial continuity in the area it controls in
Syria, under the name “Rojava” (Western
Kurdistan). At present, and thanks to US
mediation, it appears that the PYD has agreed
to restrict its activities to the eastern bank of
the Euphrates, thus making Turkey’s creation
of a buffer zone unnecessary.
It is more and more difficult for Turkey to
act in this situation, as the increasingly
complicated Syrian conflict means that its
objectives today are often contradictory.
Fighting ISIS means favouring above all the
Kurds and Assad, while favouring the IS
would bring down the wrath of the
international community on Ankara and
would bring a hard-to-manage neighbour to
its border (ISIS has already launched its first
terrorist attacks on Turkish soil). A negotiated
settlement to the conflict, which is the most
realistic option, would inflict on Ankara the
humiliation of negotiating with Assad, whom
they have used every possible means in the
last few years to overthrow and delegitimise,
and it would not save them from the
establishment of a self-administered Kurdish
entity. Maintaining the status quo would
6
simply ensure the continuation of the
destabilising influences which, as stated, are
affecting Turkey. The only perfect solution
for Turkey would be a victory of the rebel
front which it supports, but this is highly
unlikely – especially after the Russian
intervention, and particularly as Ankara has
proved unwilling or unable to intervene
militarily in Syria.
The most probable options all seem to be
disadvantageous for Ankara which, in this
situation, will, in all likelihood, continue to
concentrate firstly on providing support to
Jaysh al-Fatah (mostly logistics, weapons and
intelligence, leaving financial support to the
Gulf states) in order to withstand the Baathist
offensive
supported
by
Russian
bombardments; and secondly on the struggle
with the PKK, which would then divert
Kurdish forces from their expansionist
activities in Syria. Ankara would therefore be
pursuing a conservative strategy in the hope
(unlikely) that Russia will cease to support
Assad, or that negotiations could start (more
likely). Should Ankara be forced to choose a
single strategic priority among the various
and contradictory options available, as seems
probable, it will certainly elect to suffocate
the Kurdish independence movement. Future
Turkish behaviour will depend to a great
extent on how today’s fluid internal political
balances are defined and on how Russian and
US relations with the Kurdish PYD develop.
A further consequence of the Syrian crisis
is that relations with Moscow have been
compromised. If, as seems likely, Turkey and
Russia do not soon define a shared vision of
Syria, it is probable that the Turkish Stream
project will be the loser. Syrian-Iraqi
instability has for some time put the idea of a
gas pipeline from Qatar to Turkey on hold.
Together these two factors will sound the
death knoll for the Turkish plan to make the
Turkish peninsula the main hub of the energy
transport network.
3. Lebanon
3.1 Present situation: taking part in the war
but keeping it at arm’s length
Historically, the country with the strongest
links to Syria is undoubtedly Lebanon.
Despite its multiple links with its chaotic
surroundings and the innate fragility of
coexistence within its borders, this small state
has so far been able to avoid being drawn into
a civil war. The Lebanese armed forces,
together with the Hezbollah militias, have
succeeded in resisting pressure in the northeast of the country, along the border with the
Qalamoun region in Syria. Here the ISIS and
al-Nusra fighters have attempted to break
across the Lebanese border, their aim
probably to reach Tripoli and thus obtain a
foothold on the Mediterranean coastline. A
foothold of this kind would be invaluable for
arms and human trafficking and would be a
forward Lebanese base from which to fight
Hezbollah on its own ground. Despite some
jihadi infiltrations, the situation in Lebanon
still appears to be stable: unlike Syria and Iraq
the country still has a strong state apparatus,
while ISIS and other jihadi groups have
demonstrated that they infiltrate those areas
where state failure enables them to offer
themselves as guarantors of law and order.
However, internal stability is being
threatened not only by terrorist infiltrations
and the militias’ incursions, but also by the
crisis in the institutions and the economy, and
by the Syrian refugee problem. As a result of
the incomprehension between the Shi’ite and
Sunni coalitions and of the divisions in the
Maronite community, Lebanon has been
unable to elect a new President since Michel
Suleiman’s mandate ended on 25th April
2014. Although the Lebanese President has
little power, he is an essential figure as he
guarantees that the different religions are
represented in Lebanese political life. This
institutional void and the political stalemate
are reflected in the state apparatus itself and
normal activities have been paralysed. The
economy seems to have been the worst hit:
growth has been very small and fallen well
7
short of expectations, and several financial
institutions have been blocked.
The lack of a President is also exacerbating
the Syrian refugee problem. The earlier
problem of managing the Palestinian
refugees, which dragged the country into a
fifteen-year war, has led Beirut to refuse to
build refugee camps: the refugees are
therefore dispersed throughout Lebanon (a
large number of them in the Bekaa
Governorate close to Syria, while a smaller
number are to be found in the south of the
country which is mainly Shi’ite). Today over
a million Syrian refugees live in an area of
just over ten thousand square kilometres – the
equivalent of a quarter of the Lebanese
population; this is the highest population
density in the world. The Syrians are almost
all Sunni Muslims, which makes the situation
for the other two major communities – the
Shi’ites and the Christians – even more
unstable and delicate. The influx of Syrian
refugees has overturned the denominational
balance in the Bekka Governorate in
particular, favouring the Sunnis over the
Shi’ites (previously a relative majority). Since
5th January 2015 new measures have been in
place in Lebanon which have dramatically
limited, and almost put to a stop to, the flow
of refugees from Syria which had previously
reached half a million in both 2013 and 2014.
3.2 Scenarios: growing internal and external
pressures on Lebanese stability
So far, Lebanon has been able to find a
balance in the delicate network of regional
relations and avoid collapse. However this
does not mean that it will be able to withstand
the pressures in the future. Short-term,
Lebanon will face two significant challenges:
continue to prevent fundamentalism and the
jihadi phenomenon from crossing its borders,
and ensure that the delicate regional situation
does not lead to a sudden resumption of the
conflict between the different religions inside
the country.
Although, on one hand, Hezbollah’s active
role in the Syrian civil war has countered the
threat of a military push by the rebel militias
into Lebanon, on the other it has highlighted
the ideological differences with the Sunni
community. The risk of sectarian clashes
involving the Syrian refugees (almost all
Sunni), perhaps together with the Lebanese
Sunnis, is increasingly likely. The various
internal factions and foreign powers which are
today seeking to overthrow Assad would have
reasons to extend the conflict to Lebanon and
thus prevent Hezbollah from providing further
military support to its Syrian ally. Israel, in
particular, is concerned about the weapons,
capabilities, experience and competence to
undertake new forms of military intervention
which the Lebanese Shi’ite militia is
acquiring in Syria. The danger of Israeli
military action is even more likely now that
the Hezbollah militia has become active on
the Golan Heights.
Lebanon cannot resist indefinitely and the
only antidote to renewed instability in the
country is to solve the Syrian crisis. On the
other hand, the solution could be to apply the
Lebanese model of coexistence to Syria, but
this is not an undertaking for Beirut (which
doesn’t have the necessary forces) and it is up
to the so-called “international community” to
solve the Syrian problem. In the meantime,
Lebanon’s well-being will depend on its
society being able to absorb the changes
brought about by the factors described above
and there must be a collective effort to face
the problems caused by the delicate religious
balance, the lack of an accurate census and
the review of the old National Pact.
4.
Palestine
4.1 Present situation: the Palestinian factions
take sides
Given the significant Palestinian presence
in Syria and in the neighbouring countries, the
Palestinian movements have all had to take a
more or less clear stance on the civil war.
When Hamas turned against Assad, who had
given shelter to Palestinian leaders, it
distanced itself not only from Damascus but
also from Iran and Hezbollah. Hamas’
political leader, Khaled Meshaal, reshaped the
movement’s foreign policy, at least
temporarily, and aligned himself with Saudi
8
Arabia. This change seems to have been
dictated by the political wing’s need for
financial
resources
and
international
legitimacy: in so doing they overcame the
opposition of the military, which had Iranian
support. Needless to say, ISIS has no
sympathy for Hamas (which it accuses of
being too close to Iran) nor for Hezbollah (to
the point of accusing it of being cryptoShi’ite); in fact, in general, ISIS has never
concealed a certain indifference to the
Palestinian cause, which it considers a
nationalist cause and therefore contrary to the
ecumenical spirit of the Caliphate.
Yarmouk, the huge Palestinian refugee
camp set up south of Damascus in 1948, can
be viewed as an extension of Palestine
abroad; it was the scene of a battle in the
Syrian civil war in April 2015 when ISIS
sought to seize control. Yarmouk, which at
one time housed one hundred and sixty
thousand people, has been largely abandoned:
today only eighteen thousand still live in the
camp in the midst of a humanitarian crisis.
The ISIS attack on Yarmouk led Fatah, in
government on the West Bank, to open a new
chapter in bilateral relations with the Baathist
regime in Damascus and to re-open its offices
in the Syrian capital. Now that Hamas has
ditched its Alliance with Syria definitively,
Fatah clearly hopes to increase its influence
over the Palestinian refugees in the country.
4.2 Scenarios: new tenants in the Gaza Strip
Although ISIS does not appear to enjoy
significant support in the Gaza Strip, the
emergence there of Caliphate symbols and the
attacks on cars belonging to members of
Hamas or Islamic Jihad (whose HQ is still in
Damascus) should not be underestimated. The
serious humanitarian crisis could encourage
the radicalisation of some sectors of the
population and support for ISIS. According to
UNCTAD, the latest Israeli military operation
in Gaza has wiped out what was of left of the
middle class.
However, ISIS is not the only external
actor seeking a foothold in Palestine. After
Hamas had aligned itself with Saudi Arabia,
and Islamic Jihad had clearly moved closer to
Riyadh (refusing to condemn the Saudi
intervention in Yemen), Iran encouraged the
movement to split under the leadership of
Hisham Salem. Salem, an Islamic Jihad midranking official, initially set up a charity,
Baqiyat al Salihat, and then a veritable
movement called Al-Sabirin. This group not
only has close political ties to Iran, but has
also adopted some typical Shi’ite themes,
authors and practices, so much so that its
opponents have accused its members of being
camouflaged Shi’ites. Al-Sabirin has already
succeeded in placing some small groups from
Gaza and deserters from Islamic Jihad under
its aegis, but is struggling to establish itself
because of the strict controls Hamas has
imposed on its activities and because of Sunni
orthodoxy’s dubious credibility.
5.
Jordan
5.1 Present situation: a country increasingly
worn out by the war in Syria
Syrian refugees in Jordan now account for
almost 20% of the population. Three quarters
of them live in the border Governorates of
Irbid and Al Mafraq or in that of the capital,
Amman. Here the arrival of the Syrians has
contributed to an increase in the number of
foreign residents which, in the last decade,
had already been swelled by the arrival of
Iraqi refugees. The most delicate situation is
however in al-Mafraq, which shares a long
desert border with the Islamic State and in
which the number of Syrian refugees is over
double that of the native population. Zaatari,
the first and largest Syrian refugee camp, is
now the fourth most highly populated centre
in Jordan. There are frequent protests in the
Zaatari and Marjib Al Fahud camps. Despite
foreign aid, Amman finds it difficult to
manage the chronic water and energy
shortages, particularly as it already giving
shelter to half a million Iraqi refugees.
The first months of the conflict highlighted
a strange phenomenon: cross-border family
and tribal ties meant that both Syrian refugees
and rebels enjoyed the support of Jordanian
citizens, especially in the town of Deraa close
to the border. The support has, however,
9
slowly waned as a result of stricter border
controls and a change in attitude amongst the
Jordanian population. The excessive and
never-ending flow of refugees has weakened
tribal loyalties, as many Jordanians felt the
burden imposed on their already limited
resources. Furthermore, Syrian refugees of
Palestinian origin have been subject to a hard
line policy and are often denied entry –
obviously a result of past traumas.
Only 20% of Syrian refugees live in camps
where they receive aid from the state or from
humanitarian organisations. The others live in
towns or villages where they receive aid from
relatives or through family ties, in any case
beyond direct government control. The main
source of income for the refugees, whether
they are registered or illegal, is undeclared
employment. The huge influx of new, lowcost labour into the labour market has
seriously affected poorer Jordanian families,
as unskilled workers’ wages have decreased
and rents increased. In addition, the energy,
water, health and education infrastructure is
being sorely tested.
The refugees are administered in
accordance with the Jordan Response Plan
(JRP), which is implemented in coordination
with various UN agencies, in order to
optimise the use of resources and the flow of
international aid. The plan envisages a budget
of 2.99 billion dollars, although only 35% has
already been funded.
5.2 Scenarios: more internal conflict
Officially Jordan implements an open-door
policy for refugees, but has increasing doubts.
At times the door is closed, partly owing to
the state’s financial difficulties and partly as a
result of pressure from public opinion which
is increasingly opposed to the arrival of new
refugees. Jordan is still providing assistance
to the rebels in the Deraa area, which could
soon be subject to a government offensive
supported by the Russian Air Force. Its
political importance aside, the loss of Deraa
by the rebels could mean a new wave of
refugees to Jordan. However, when faced with
an operation involving Russia, Amman’s
options are very limited. Help could come
from Israel, as the Deraa area is close to the
Israeli border and in no way does Tel Aviv
want to see Hezbollah and Iranian military
advisors there. The Jordanian military
presence along the border with ISIS territory
has been strengthened and, up to now, any
infiltration attempts have been readily
repulsed. There is however concern about the
return of Jordanians fighting in Syria and
Iraq, who could then join Salafi groups like
Ma’an which openly sympathise with ISIS.
The vast majority of the population is
however still opposed to al-Baghdadi’s plan,
particularly after the barbaric execution of alKasasbeh, the Jordanian pilot. That
consideration notwithstanding, Jordan has
made its anti-terrorism laws stricter and
abandoned its de facto moratorium on capital
punishment.
The repressive measures implemented to
counter the terrorist threat, the interruption of
the reforms begun in 2011, the economicfinancial difficulties and the trauma of the
massive influx of Syrian refugees could all
increase political conflict in the country. Yet
another fundamental aspect is the need for a
better reading of the tribal dynamics which
are so important for Jordanian stability, and
key to better management of the situation in
the Middle East as a whole.
Energy is a particularly serious problem
for Jordan. The country is 99% dependent on
external supplies. Since the preferential
channel with Iraq was abandoned in the last
decade, the periodic episodes of sabotage to
the gas pipelines in Sinai have placed greater
stress on the entire system, a situation which
has been further worsened by the sudden 20%
increase in population. Vis-a-vis ISIS, Jordan
is playing, and can play in the future, an
increasingly important role as a representative
and spokesman for a moderate Islam which is
open to dialogue: this is the only solution in
fighting the war of hearts and minds at which
ISIS propaganda is so adept.
10
6.
Egypt and Tunisia
6.1 Present situation: “secular” dams
against the fundamentalist tide
The endogenous problems that Tunisia is
facing in consolidating its new democratic
regime have been intensified by the
destabilization of Syria and Libya.
Domestically, discontent over the new
political course and the economic situation
has caused great disappointment among the
younger generation, who, for a variety of
reasons, consider that their expectations have
been betrayed. Radical militancy is being
reorganised
at
the
political
level:
fundamentalist
and
religious-based
reactionary groups have returned to the postrevolutionary scene forcefully and are
confronting the secular political actors,
offering a concrete and structured alternative.
The result is a new climate of domestic
tension which is influenced by the even more
complex regional instability.
To the endogenous political violence
which re-emerged forcefully in 2013 thanks
to Ansar al-Sharia (which initially presented
itself as a preaching and social assistance
movement and stood as a Salafi opposition,
but was subsequently banned by the
authorities), one must add terrorism
channelled from outside the country. More
than three thousand Tunisians have joined the
fight in Syria and Iraq and many others
continue to head for Libya, where they aim to
create a bridgehead for the Caliphate in North
Africa. Libya’s porous borders mean that
Tunisia is also exposed to the problem of
“returning jihadists”: the recent terrorist
attacks on the Bardo Museum and Sousse, the
aim of which was to disrupt the tourist
economy, point towards a strategy of longterm terrorism, undoubtedly influenced by the
operational and emotional thrust of ISIS.
Terrorism in Tunisia bears an interesting
and almost exclusively generational hallmark,
which is the result of complex social and, at
times, identity-based, dynamics, which have
been ignored. In this context, this can be
attributed, to a great extent, to postrevolutionary frustration and a transition
process which has been unable to improve
living conditions for the younger generation
in the short term, or give them hope for the
future. The jihadist groups have succeeded in
seizing the discontent and channelling it into a
common project, in order to transform rage
and disappointment into concrete complicity
and support for the Caliphate.
Since the overthrow of President Hosni
Mubarak, and the complex internal political
events which followed, Egypt, the cradle of
modern fundamentalism, is witnessing the reemergence of terrorism. Here too, the feeling
that the “Arab Spring” had not run its course
has been a contributory factor in redefining
societal logic and awakening the dormant but
unresolved ideological differences between
secularism and fundamentalism. Postrevolutionary confusion facilitated the
emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood as a
political alternative, and enabled the jihadist
groups to reorganise. The outlawing of the
Muslim Brotherhood and the advent of the
Syrian crisis have helped strengthen smaller
but radical groups who are restating their
political agenda as a global “holy war”, at
times even joining the Islamic State – as was
the case with Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, which
later became Wilayat Sinai. This traditionally
pro-Al Qaeda group was already operational
in the Sinai and was behind a new ideological
“structuring” operation, uniting those who
had split from the smaller groups such as
Ajnad Misr and Ansar al-Sharia. Today
Wilayat Sinai has a significant military and
organisational capability which enables it to
control a large stretch of the Sinai. At the
same time, by conniving with local officers
and leaders, it is able to exercise considerable
influence on the local population. The
Egyptian government not only has to deal
with ISIS in Sinai, but also with various
Jihadi groups operating around Cairo and in
the Nile delta, and above all there is the
problem of those who have taken up positions
in the Western desert, on the border with
Libya. The latter pose further serious
problems for the Egyptian security apparatus,
as they constitute a tangible link between
11
Libyan instability and the growing domestic
uncertainty.
The picture that emerges is one of an
apparently strong, but internally vulnerable,
country which will have to confront a number
of exogenous, destabilising factors over a
considerable period of time. In geographical
terms, Egypt is today the most subject to
negative Libyan and Syrian influences. It is
not surprising then that Cairo provides
military support to the Tobruk faction in
Libya and favours the Russian intervention
against ISIS in Syria.
6.2 Scenarios: new social pacts to defeat
terrorism
ISIS views Egypt above all as a possible
step on the road to consolidating its Caliphate
provinces in Libya and Sinai and ensuring
geographical continuity. By adopting a more
moderate position in order to maintain its
political manoeuvrability – which many
would like to see removed – Al Nour has
cleared the way for even more radical Salafi
groups. After a long period of peaceful
cohabitation with the Mubarak regime, the
Muslim Brotherhood itself, following the
arrests and exiles which decimated the former
leadership, is now in the hands of
intransigent, younger leaders who favour a
return to the armed struggle.
Egypt and Tunisia, with their still solid
state systems, do, in fact, constitute an
obstacle able to halt the advance of ISIS and,
in more general terms, of a fundamentalist
political system, as they offer a more secular
alternative. The clash will not be purely
ideological or military, however, but also
social and economic. Social discontent has
been the greatest facilitator of the Jihadist
advance: the high abstention rate among
young Egyptians during the recent
parliamentary elections is a wake-up call.
Cairo and Tunis are therefore facing two
common challenges: to guarantee economic
growth and wealth redistribution, and regain
full control of their border areas which are a
hotbed of terrorist activity. However the
terrorists have demonstrated their ability to
strike the tourism industry in both countries,
thus worsening the socio-economic situation.
External aid will, in all likelihood, be
decisive. If provided by the West, it could
contribute to toning down certain antiterrorism
measures
which
can
be
instrumentalised at the domestic political
level and thus further radicalise the
opposition. In general terms, Egypt and
Tunisia must combine their military and
security activities with a comprehensive plan
to resolve internal divisions and avoid
fomenting a climate of discrimination and
violence. New social pacts and economic
development are the pre-conditions for
victory over terrorism.
7.
The Caucasus and Central Asia
7.1 Present situation: the “foreign fighters”
who scare Putin
Although they are only a small minority
amongst the myriad of jihadist groups in Syria
and Iraq, the presence of fighters from the
Muslim regions of the Russian Western
Caucasus (Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia)
and from the most Islamised areas of Central
Asia (especially Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and
Kirghistan) is a situation which has existed
since the birth of the Islamic State: the figure
of the young Georgian-Chechen guerrilla
Omar al-Shishani, born Tarkhan Batirasvili,
who led the ISIS assault on Kobane in
September 2014 is proof. Murad Moargosvili,
another Caucasian who has been in the sights
of the Russian security services for some
time, is now the leader of the Junud al-Sham
group in Syria. It is also worth mentioning
that the radicalisation process which Giuliano
Delnevo, the Italian jihadist volunteer who
died in Syria in 2014, underwent, was carried
out through direct contacts with Chechen
groups.
Although they are less striking in terms of
“celebrities”, the jihadists from Central Asia
are present in large numbers. At the beginning
of this year, the International Crisis Group put
the number of Central Asian guerrillas
fighting for ISIS between 2012 and 2014 at
between 2000 and 4000. The main source of
recruitment is the Islamic Movement of
12
Uzbekistan. This radical Sunni organisation
was involved in the cruel Tajik civil war
(1992-1997) and, since the beginning of this
century, has threatened to set up an Islamic
State straddling the border between these two
Central Asian countries.
The area most susceptible to ISIS
successes is, unsurprisingly, the North
Caucasus where the self-proclaimed Caucasus
Emirate was set up in 2007. This organisation
has been responsible for the bloodiest terrorist
attacks in Russia in recent years (the Moscow
Underground in 2010, Domodedevo Airport
the following year, and booby-trapped cars in
Volvograd in 2013). In southern Dagestan,
the Salafi faction Shariat Jamaat, led by
Rustam Asildarov, has aligned itself with the
Islamic State under the name Vilayat Qawqaz.
The attitude of the present Emir, Abu
Mohammed, is more cautious vis-avis ISIS,
and he is rightly concerned that a
rapprochement with al-Baghdadi could
alienate the support which the Muslim cause
in the Caucasus still enjoys in some Western
milieus.
One of the reasons for the Russian
Federation’s military intervention in Syria is
clearly to
hamper
the
transit
of
fundamentalists from the Caucasus and
Central Asia to Syria and Iraq where they
undergo training, make alliances and acquire
useful means to destabilise their homeland.
7.2 Scenarios: a resurgence of terrorism on
the horizon
The possibility that ISIS could take root in
the Caucasus or, above all, in Central Asia
seems fairly unlikely for several reasons: the
vast array of Islamist groups on the regional
stage; their preference for the struggle against
local regimes, and relative indifference to
what is occurring elsewhere; and their fear of
alienating the support they have in the West.
Furthermore, the State’s hold over these
regions is solid and prevents the radical
movements from seizing control of territory,
as has happened in Syria and Iraq. Russia and
China have presented themselves as
guarantors of the established order in the
framework of the Anti-terrorism Structure of
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
Nevertheless, the experience gained by the
volunteers in Syria and Iraq could, once they
return home, upgrade the quality of the armed
struggle of the Islamist groups already
established in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
The decline in terrorist activities in these
areas in the last few years is due, in no small
part, to the departure of many militants for
Syria. Since the beginning of the Russian
bombing campaign, some have been returning
to the Russian Federation: the possibility of
reprisals in the coming months is very high
and is the reason for the feverish
investigations being carried out by the
Russian security forces.
8.
The European Union
8.1 Situation: a timid Europe confronting
terrorism and organised crime
The crises in Libya and Syria – for which
the West is not devoid of responsibility –
have dramatically highlighted what Europe
has been only too willing to forget in the last
few decades: that Europe is closely linked to
the North African/Near Eastern theatre and
that some countries, like Italy and Greece,
surrounded by the Mediterranean, are, in
many respects, actually part of it. The wave of
immigrants in these two countries and
towards Northern Europe, and the resurgence
of Islamic terrorism in France are two striking
and very serious consequences of this
historical and geographical reality which has
been neglected for so long.
A previous IsAG report (No.45) covered in
detail the Mediterranean challenges for Italy
(most of them common to other European
countries), ranging from migration to
terrorism. Here, the intention is simply to note
how the EU has proved to be extremely timid
in the fight against terrorism and, in general,
against the actors behind destabilisation.
The often passive attitude to the
immigration emergency, even when it is
solely a question of the essential human
aspect and of their reception, does not take
into account – or underestimates – the
13
criminality with which today’s flow of
migrants is associated. Human trafficking is
only one of the many forms of illicit
trafficking which, since the revolution and its
subsequent chaos, have been centred on
Libya: arms and drug trafficking, together
with trafficking in oil and human beings are
the main activities from which dozens of
criminal groups are making a fortune. They
share the ability to exercise strong and
exclusive territorial control, which enables
them to manage and develop a wide variety of
illicit trafficking: a situation made possible by
the collapse of the Libyan state.
At the heart of the illicit economic system
is arms trafficking, which began when the
former Libyan army’s arsenals were looted.
Weapons were often exchanged for drugs
arriving from the south-west across the Sahel.
The result is thus a supply chain of illicit
trafficking which originates in Sub-Saharan
Africa and, after crossing the 4000 km of
porous borders, reaches the hub in Libya. To
the south-west, the Tuareg control the
caravans bringing cocaine and migrants from
Nigeria, to the south-east the Tabu control the
convoys
transporting
migrants
and
methamphetamines from the Horn of Africa.
In the hinterland and in the urban areas, the
dynamics of supremacy have changed: it used
to be traditional management by the tribes,
but it is now corruption and violence.
Arms smuggling follows two main routes:
the Sahel route (criminal gangs in Mali,
Algeria and Nigeria) and the Syrian route
(through Egypt). The latter has been declining
as a result of the establishment of an IS
outpost in Libya itself. Trafficking in oil
moves east, either overland through Egypt or
by sea. Drug trafficking, in particular, is
flourishing: the value of the cocaine which
transits the Maghreb each year is estimated at
about 3-4 billion dollars. The groups which
control drug trafficking (and its distribution
on growing domestic markets) are linked to
transnational organised crime. The final case
in point is human trafficking: migrants who
arrive in Libya from the South are often
kidnapped and used as slaves until their
families pay a ransom. Recent evidence
shows that organisations involved in organ
trafficking are also becoming more
widespread in Libya.
The arrival of migrants on the European
shores is simply a by-product of these
criminal circuits. However, the challenges this
poses for the EU transcend those of epic
proportions associated with social integration.
Without being excessively alarmist or
criminalizing the Muslim migrants, it must be
said that the present influx of migrants has an
impact on terrorism. Recent history offers
numerous examples of the link, albeit
marginal, between refugees and militancy: for
example, the role of the Palestinian refugees
in the creation of armed anti-Zionist groups or
of the Taliban, who emerged from among the
Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The danger lies
not so much in the fact that terrorist
infiltrators might be concealed amongst the
refugees, but rather in the huge number of
poor people who, on coming into contact with
the European world, might be radicalised by
local extremist groups.
Another indication of EU “timidity”
concerns the legal battle against terrorism:
this is such a sensitive subject that excesses –
in one direction or another – (for example the
cases of extraordinary rendition a few years
ago) are hard to avoid. Today, the legal
weapons that the EU can use to fight
terrorism have been blunted by the attitude of
the European courts (the European Court of
Human Rights and the European Court of
Justice) which, according to the jurist Paola
Bargiacchi, are “replacing the traditional
approach to the security paradigm with one
centred on the individual by extending the
reach of the human rights dimension”. The
European courts have ruled that even in an
emergency or war, an individual’s rights are
irrevocable: this is the case even when the
individual constitutes a threat to public safety.
The Courts have therefore blocked the
expulsion, repatriation or extradition of
immigrants accused of, or sentenced for
terrorist activities. In determining whether, in
the country to which an individual is to be
repatriated/extradited, he is “safe” from
degrading treatment, the burden of proof is on
14
the State issuing the decree, not on the
individual challenging it. The European
Courts have ruled that not even the EU
countries are, a priori, “safe, in humanitarian
terms” and have blocked for example the
expulsion of illegal immigrants to Greece and
even to Italy. Although this line of conduct by
the European Courts guarantees full
compliance with human rights, it blunts the
weapons, and particularly the preventive
weapons, used, in a transparent fashion and
within the rule of law, in the fight against
terrorism.
8.2 Scenarios: new instruments and new
awareness to guarantee security
With reference to the constraints imposed
by the European Courts on the expulsion of
immigrants suspected of terrorist activities,
the jurist, Paola Bargiacchi, has proposed that
they be overcome by drawing up agreements
with third-party non-EU states which would
oblige them to comply with European human
rights standards – a situation which would be
monitored by international organisations and
NGOs. European states cannot allow
individuals suspected of terrorist activities to
roam freely on their territory. Proof of this are
the attacks in France in the last few years: the
perpetrators have normally been individuals
who have already been identified by the
security services and are known to be close to
terrorist groups, but whom the security
services
themselves
cannot
monitor
effectively because of the many details on
which they must concentrate.
However, rather than identifying and
dealing with aspiring or real terrorists, the
priority is to prevent them from becoming
terrorists in the first place. If the authorities
could effectively sabotage the road that leads
to radicalisation and hence to terrorism, this,
more than anything, would ensure victory in
the fight against terrorism. In the framework
of this analysis, the focus of our interest is the
very real risk that the many refugees and
migrants coming from (or through) Syria and
Libya may provide the terrorist groups with
fresh manpower, though maybe only in the
medium/long term (in Europe, the typical
terrorist is a second-generation Muslim
immigrant and is more radical than his
parents). Consequently we need new
awareness: the migrant crisis is not only a
humanitarian problem. Once the migrants
have been saved from dangerous journeys by
sea, once they have been settled in expressly
designated structures and their credentials for
obtaining political asylum or subsidiary
protection monitored, then the new and
delicate phase will begin: integration. The
migrant crisis, as stated above, is not simply a
humanitarian problem, but also – and above
all – a social problem. If the new arrivals are
not integrated into our societies, we will
potentially be handing them, and their
children, over to the extremists: from the riots
in the banlieues to the Charlie Hebdo
massacre, we know what that means.

The conflicts in Libya and Syria and the potential for regional

Transcripción

Documentos relacionados

Statement by the World Federation of Public Health Associations

Immigrants and Emigrants

Syrian Economy

Regime - Iranian Posture UPDATE

los kurdos en Siria