Democracy and economic crisis in Spain: support, dissatisfaction
Transcripción
Democracy and economic crisis in Spain: support, dissatisfaction
Democracy and economic crisis in Spain: support, dissatisfaction, and disaffection* Alberto Sanz, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid ([email protected]), Rosa M. Navarrete, Universität Mannheim and Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES) ([email protected]), and José Ramón Montero Universidad Autónoma de Madrid ([email protected]) * We would like to thank Angie Paula Ariza and Amaya Frades for their help in the data analysis, to the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) for its grant for visiting its extraordinary Banco de Datos, to the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness for its financial support through the research project CSO2013-47071R, and to its principal investigator, Mariano Torcal, for his active involvement in the three-wave panel survey CIUPANEL 2014 which we have used in this paper. Paper presented for delivery at the at the Workshop on What Citizens Want from Democracy: Popular Attitudes to Existing Political Processes and Alternatives Joint Session of Workshops, European Consortium for Political Research Warsaw (Poland), 29th March-2nd April, 2015 2 Abstract This paper examines the impact of economic crisis on some relevant political attitudes towards democracy in Spain, and its consequences in terms of support to established and to new, emerging parties. We have selected three attitudes: democratic legitimacy or support for democracy, political and economic discontent or dissatisfaction with the way democracy works, and political disaffection. Our empirical research strategy included both time-series and cross-section individual-level analyses over representative samples of Spanish citizens. Over a period of thirty years, democratic legitimacy and satisfaction with the performance of democracy, contrary to the mainstream literature in the field, showed to be independent dimensions --the latter being strongly related to the economic conditions and the former depending more on political factors. At the individual level, these attitudes proved to have an impact on the citizens’ disaffection from the political system, as unemployment and opinions on legitimacy, efficacy, and fairness of capitalism also had. Finally, attending to electoral consequences, the paper illustrates how, in moments of economic and political crises, dissatisfaction –but not disaffection-- is directly related to the increasing voting intention enjoyed by Podemos, a populist left-wing new party, and to the probability of a serious disruption of the Spanish party system. 3 This paper explores the consequences of the economic crisis in some attitudes towards democracy in Spain, one of the debtor countries. In Paul Krugman’s (2008) qualified words, the crisis that began with the bankruptcy of the global financial firm Lehman Brothers in 2008 has been “a long, nasty, and brutish economic slump, … the worst recession in a quarter of century”. The Great Recession brought in Spain a number of all-time records in increasing figures for unemployment and public deficit, or in decreasing rates for GDP and capital formation. Though Spain was not officially bailed-out by the European Stability Program, both the incumbent socialist government in 2008 and the conservative government which succeeded it in 2011 introduced a series of drastic austerity measures which included massive lay-offs, salary cuts for public-sector employees, major tax increases, and extensive cuts in every social policy, while at the same time negotiated with the EU generous bail-out provisions for the financial system. The consequences have been devastating. Judged by their self-proclaimed standards, austerity policies have been a spectacular failure: annual deficits in the Spanish state budget increased from 4.5 percent of GDP in 2008 to 10.6 percent in 2012; the standing public debt has soared from 36.3 percent of GDP in 2007 to 84.2 percent in 2012; and unemployment increase from a 8.3 percent in 2003 to a 25.8 percent in 2012. Austerity policies have not only failed to restore the Spanish economy to health, but they have also inflicted horrific social costs on already vulnerable sectors of society –in terms of increasing poverty, producing inequality, and reducing the social-welfare policies and economic growth of the previous three decades. The consequences of austerity policies were also political. In a recently systematic revision of popular reactions to the economic crisis, Nancy Bermeo and Larry M. Bartels (2014) did show to some extent their surprise for the limited range of these reactions. Whereas mainstream literature assumes that economic crises are both dramatic and consequential in terms of citizens’ reactions, Bermeo and Bartels´ findings seem to be more limited. As they (2014: 3, italics in the original) summarize them, “Voters did punish incumbents, as predicted; but contrary to expectations, the cumulative potential of the Great Recession was realized in only a few of the countries we studied… ; in most countries, popular reactions to the Great Recession were surprisingly muted and moderate”. In electoral terms, voters punished incumbents regardless their ideology and on the basis of economic growth much more than unemployment rates (Bartels 2014). And in broader political terms, austerity policies were contested by distinctive levels of protest mobilization in the streets (Kriesi 2014). 4 There are, however, other fields of citizen politics that might have received an impact of the Great Recession and whose consequences are fairly unknown. True, Bermeo and Bartels (2014: 3) emphasized that none of the cases analyzed in their book “suggests an ideological sea change or even significant partisan realignments. Nearly all point instead to impressive continuities with the past”. Yet political attitudes towards democracy were apparently kept apart from their approach, and, for that matter, from those of many other contributions that aim to expand the scope of issues potentially affected by the Great Recession. Besides economic voting and protest mobilization, both political and economic discontent is to be expected as a natural response to the austerity policies implemented by governments. And something similar could be said of dissatisfaction with the way democracy is working or the lack of confidence towards political institutions as the parliament playing a major role in the economic measures against the recession. But, what if discontent, dissatisfaction, and distrust reach historically high levels? Do they make any difference for citizens’ relationships with the political system and more generally with politics? To what extent could they significantly erode the sources of support for democracy in a given country? Is there any chance that a profound disaffection with politics could be reinforced even more by the combination of high levels of dissatisfaction and low doses of democratic support? In this paper we will answer these questions through a discussion of democratic legitimacy, discontent or dissatisfaction with democracy, and political disaffection –three political orientations that are usually taken as the most relevant attitudes for the relationship between citizens and their polity or its political institutions. In the next pages we will try to provide empirical evidence for the relationships between those three political orientations through two research strategies. The first one consists in a longitudinal analysis of the dimensions of satisfaction with democracy in Spain and democratic support among citizens. We have chosen the period 1983-2014. This is justified by the necessity of having a period long enough to include both wealthy moments and crisis periods, as well as governments from different political parties with different parliamentary support. The second research strategy consists in a series of multivariate, cross-section analyses of individual-level survey data gathered in 2014. This design aims at identifying citizens’ profiles related to democratic disaffection, lack of legitimacy, and political disaffection in critical moments for both the 5 political system and the economic fabric. Our focus is on the relationship between out three political orientations, and the extent to which they interrelate with attitudes towards capitalism, on the one hand, and their joint consequences on party competition and the voting choice. We will develop our discussion along five sections. In the following one, we will conceptualize those political attitudes, establish their relations, and include some contextual data spanning over more than thirty years. In the second, we will examine the longitudinal evolution of satisfaction and legitimacy, as well as their statistical association to economic, political, and contextual factors. In the third, we will perform cross-section analyses of satisfaction, legitimacy, and disaffection with survey data undertaken in 2014 as a function of several individual characteristics. In the fourth, we will shortly explore the consequences of those aforementioned attitudinal factors for the electoral support to different parties in moments in which both most parties and the party system is experiencing major changes. The sixth section concludes. Three dimensions of attitudes toward democracy Over the course of the 20th century a large number of democratic regimes have come into existence, but many of them were incapable of surviving over the long term, while others have functioned poorly. From Max Weber to the present day, many scholars have argued that the legitimacy accorded to political institutions by citizens is an important dimension of political systems, particularly in democracies, in which the mass public’s compliance with government policies is not primarily dependent on coercion. And following David Easton’s (1965) classical analysis of political life, it has often been argued that the stability of new democratic systems may depend on the development of widespread mass-level support for regimes, and that even in established democracies a reservoir of popular support may facilitate governance and encourage popular compliance with government decisions irrespective of the policy preferences of individual citizens (see also Gamson 1968). How should popular support for democracy be conceptualized and operationalized in empirical studies? As M. Stephen Weatherford (1992: 149) has argued, the literature on democratic support is characterized by a remarkable gap between the relatively high level of 6 theoretical development in normative political science, on the one hand, and the poverty of the many empirical indicators that have been used in research on this subject, on the other.1 In general, most published studies in this area of research share two characteristics. First, they tend to assume that attitudes towards the political system constitute one single attitudinal domain, including such seemingly distinct orientations as belief in the legitimacy of democracy and satisfaction with the current performance of governmental institutions. Some scholars (e.g., Fuchs 1993: 235-237) have contended that, although it is possible to differentiate at the conceptual level between what Easton referred to diffuse and specific support for the regime,2 it is not possible to operationalize this distinction and examine it empirically. This is, they argue, for a variety of reasons; for instance, because Easton's original conceptualization was too vague and confusing (Kaase 1988), because measurement problems are "insuperable" (Loewenberg 1971), because the distinction is tautological (Craig 1993), or because citizens are simply not capable of distinguishing between them (Muller and Jukam 1977).3 Second, many of these studies assume a close (if not deterministic) relationship between citizens' levels of satisfaction with the performance of political institutions or the economy, and support for the democratic regime per se. This question of whether citizens' attitudes towards their governments and political regimes can be meaningfully separated into such categories as specific and diffuse support, on the one hand, or are largely undifferentiated, on the other, could be regarded as well within the realm of sterile academic debate were it not for the fact that several scholars have asserted that regime support and its 1 Indeed, some assert that legitimacy is a value-laden concept whose very nature precludes analysis using conventional indicators, or whose empirical operationalization is virtually impossible (Schaar 1981; O'Kane 1993). As nicely described by Mishler and Rose (1999: 3), “Specific support... is the temporary and relatively ephemeral acceptance or approval that individuals extend to a political object as a result of its satisfaction of their specific demands.... Diffuse support, in contrast, is conceived as a deeper, more enduring, and more generalized political loyalty resulting from early life political socialization. As such it is conceived as immune to short-term inducements, rewards or performance evaluations." Also see some recent empirical reformulations in Kornberg and Clarke (1992: ch.1), Norris (1999), and Klingemann (1999). 2 3 In our view, this latter claim is patently incorrect. Citizens who have more or less recently experienced a transition from a dictatorship are able to both distinguish between authoritarian and democratic rule, and to separate their evaluations of system performance (satisfaction) from their support for the current democratic regime (legitimacy); see Morlino and Montero (1995), and Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998: ch. 5). 7 stability are highly contingent on popular satisfaction with the performance of governments and, more broadly, democratic institutions (Weatherford 1987: 13; Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995: 342). And given the findings of numerous studies that the level of satisfaction with the performance of democracy is strongly associated with the degree of satisfaction with the current condition of the economy, they assert that the prospects for democratic stability and the very survival of these regimes may hinge on their capacity to solve intractable economic problems (Przeworski 1991: 95). As students of Spanish politics, we are fairly skeptical about the validity of those two characteristics. Spanish democracy, after all, became consolidated at about the same time that the economy was passing through a most severe economic crisis. Despite widespread discontent resulting from the dislocation associated with economic restructuring, and from unemployment rates that exceeded 20 percent, by the 1980s support for democracy in Spain rose to levels comparable to other West European democracies and has remained solid ever since despite continuing Basque terrorism, political scandals, and subsequent economic difficulties –including those derived from the Great Recession. On the basis of these suspicions, in the rest of this paper we undertake a systematic analysis of the nature of the mass public's attitudes towards democratic politics in Spain over a period spanning three decades. Our starting point is that these attitudes could not be regarded as constituting one single dimension. Instead, three distinctly different dimensions could be clearly defined conceptually and measured empirically: these are what we refer to as democratic legitimacy, or diffuse system support (using Easton's [1965] terminology); performance satisfaction, or its antonyms “dissatisfaction” or “discontent”; and a third set of attitudinal orientations that can be regarded as part of a broad syndrome of political disaffection. Regime legitimacy pertains to citizens' beliefs that democratic politics and representative democratic institutions are the most appropriate (indeed, the only acceptable) framework for government. Such beliefs should focus on the political regime in the aggregate, and should be expected to be stable over time and immune from the correspondence between the citizen's partisan preferences and the party of the incumbent government. Democratic legitimacy is a relative concept; no system should be expected to be fully legitimate in the eyes of each and every citizen, and the intensity of positive support for these institutions varies from one person to another. Accordingly, legitimacy may be considered to be “the belief that, in spite of shortcomings and failures, the political 8 institutions are better than any others that might be established” (Linz 1988: 65; 1978a: 16). This definition is also relative insofar as it refers to the belief that a democratic political system is the “least bad” of all forms of government. As famously expressed by Winston Churchill in his speech at the House of Commons, “Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time”. 4 Otherwise said, democratic legitimacy is ultimately based on “the belief that for that particular country at that particular juncture, no other type of regime could assure a more successful pursuit of collective goals” (Linz 1978b: 18). In contrast, satisfaction with the performance of democracy, like Easton's concept of specific support, is based on “peoples’ judgments about the day-to-day actions of political leaders and the operation of governmental institutions and processes” (Kornberg and Clarke 1992: 20). It should thus be expected to fluctuate over time in accord with the government's performance and the condition of the society and economy. And since it is focused on partisan political leaders and the governments they lead, it would not be surprising to find that, other things being equal, citizens supporting the same party as that of the incumbent government would be more positive in their assessments than those who voted for the opposition. Its more commonly used antonyms, political dissatisfaction or, to use still a similar concept, political or economic discontent result from the government’s inability to deal effectively with problems regarded by citizens as important (Dahl 1971: 144). And they can be considered as expressions of displeasure resulting from the belief that the performance of the government or political is falling short of the citizens’ wishes or expectations (Farah, Barnes, and Heunks 1979); or as reflecting a frustration derived from comparing what one has with what one hopes or expects to have (Gamson 1968).5 The third cluster of attitudes that we shall explore in this paper, political disaffection, is conceptually distinct from both democratic legitimacy and political satisfaction, although it is often indiscriminately lumped together with them. Following Giuseppe DiPalma (1970: 4 In Hansard, The Official Report, House of Commons, 5th Series, vol. 444, 11 November 1947. For other enlightening discussions of satisfaction with the performance of democracy and/or democratic institutions, see Anderson and Guillory (1997); Newton and Norris (2000), and Nadeau, et al (2000). 5 9 30), we regard political disaffection as a certain estrangement of members of the polity from its core political institutions. This syndrome is characterized by a number of specific symptoms including disinterest in politics, political inefficacy, cynicism and distrust, the belief that political elites do not care about the welfare of their citizens, and a general sense of detachment from the political system and/or its most relevant institutions. While this syndrome shares with the dissatisfaction dimension a negative attitude towards politics, it is different in one important respect: political dissatisfaction may be regarded as the result of a discrepancy between generally positive expectations regarding the political system, on the one hand, and a negative evaluation of the way it is currently functioning, on the other; in contrast, political disaffection is a reflection of a fundamentally distrusting and suspicious vision of political life. And unlike dissatisfaction (which should be expected to ebb and flow in accord with current assessments of the performance of incumbents or democratic institutions), attitudes of disaffection are likely to have been fixed at some stage of the socialization process, and should subsequently be more resistant to change. In addition, while dissatisfaction can be charged with a partisan component (with supporters of opposition parties generally more critical of the performance of the government and dissatisfied with its policy outputs than those who identify with the incumbent party), disaffection is more farreaching and indiscriminate in its objects of negativity (Torcal and Montero 2006). In earlier empirical studies of Spain (Montero, Gunther, and Torcal 1997; Gunther, Montero, and Torcal 2007), we found strong evidence that these three dimensions are empirically distinct. Analyzing survey data in several different ways, we concluded that the abstract conceptual distinctions described above are clearly reflected in Spanish citizens’ responses to the relevant questionnaire items over three decades. Table 1 and Figure 1 present two indicators that reflect basic perceptions of democratic legitimacy. 6 In both cases, democracy was overwhelmingly endorsed by citizens from the very beginning, and has remained constant thereafter: between two thirds and more than three quarters of those interviewed agreed with the statement affirming the superiority of democracy over any other political system. The high level of support for democracy in 1978 probably reflects a honeymoon effect, but from 1982 onwards a very high level of democratic legitimacy is fully These items were, for Table 1, the agreement with the statement that “Democracy is the best form of government for a country like ours”, and, for Figure 1, the choosing by respondents one option among the followings: “Democracy is preferable to any other form of government; Under some circumstances an authoritarian regime, a dictatorship, is preferable to a democratic system; [and] For people like me, one regime is the same as another”. 6 10 apparent. Figure 1 reveals the same pattern, strengthened now by evidence of the low levels of support for non-democratic alternatives. The outgoing authoritarian elites played a positive and constructive role in the transition to a democratic regime, as did prominent political elites and organizations during the transition period: both did have a major impact on the political attitudes of their respective sets of followers. The results was that the divide between the new democracy vs. the old dictatorship did not emerge as a cleavage separating supporters of one party from another, and a broad interparty consensus in support of democracy emerged. Indeed, ever since by the 1980s, levels of support for democracy in Spain are indistinguishable from those of other West European countries (Montero, Gunther, and Torcal 1997: 129). [Table 1 and Figure 1] In contrast to the underlying continuity seen in these indicators of democratic legitimacy, evaluations of the performance of the political system and its governing elites have oscillated considerably over time. There are several different measures of performance, and all were strikingly parallel to one another in their evolution over time regardless of the wording of the questionnaire item. Whether the face content of the by now classical survey item focused on satisfaction with “the way democracy is functioning in Spain”, or on a assessment of the political or economic situation of the country, all measures of satisfaction were quite positive at the time the new democracy was coming into existence around 1977 (Figures 2 and 3). They all fell to a very low level in 1981 (which coincided with the depths of Spain's political and economic crises, particularly evident in the high unemployment levels) (Figure 4); they all rose to a peak around 1990 following nearly a decade of stable government and strong economic growth, and declined again as a series of scandals beset the incumbent Socialist government and the economy slid into recession in 1992 and 1993; they all then rose as the economy recovered in the mid 1990s and went down once again after 2008 with the arrival of the Great Recession. On the other hand, those measures on the performance of the economy almost perfectly co-varied with the assessment of the political conditions. As would be expected, dissatisfaction with the economic situation was strongest precisely at the worst moments of the three recessions. But evaluations of the political conditions followed exactly the same pattern. This convergence is particularly evident in the consequences of the austerity policies implemented firstly by a socialist government in 2008 and above all by the conservative government since 2011. Levels of dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy and the negative assessments of both the economic and political situations did reach extraordinarily, 11 unprecedented high levels. In 2014, and for the first time in the last four decades, around 90 percent of Spaniards showed their discontent towards the economic and the political situation, and 85 percent reported its dissatisfaction with the working of democracy. The sharp contrast between the stability over time of attitudes pertaining to democratic legitimacy, on the one hand, and the considerable fluctuation of satisfaction with the performance of the economy or the incumbent government, on the other, provided prima facie evidence of the distinctiveness of these attitudinal dimensions. [Figures 2, 3, and 4] Attitudes falling within the disaffection syndrome were also quite stable over this same time period. In this section we will examine only two indicators of disaffection in Spain: psychological involvement in politics and confidence in political institutions. Among the different specific indicators of psychological involvement, the usual indicators are levels of political interest (defined by the degree to which politics arouse a citizen’s curiosity) (Van Deth 1990: 281 ff.) and frequency of political discussion (symbolized by the behavioral expression of interest which crystallizes in informal political participation) (Topf 1995). Both indicators provide a basic picture of attitudes of affection, perceptions of proximity, and positive sentiments towards politics. In both cases, the Spanish data suggest the existence of clear disaffection. As can be seen in Figures 5 and 6, levels of political interest and frequency of political discussion have been extremely low despite the enormous political and institutional changes witnessed over the last almost four decades. The final indicator is confidence in political institutions, and more particularly in the Parliament. It follows similar patterns (Figure 7): its level is also low, and has been decreasing even more during the Great Recession. In short, the Spaniards’ levels of disaffection appear high. Their estrangement from politics (expressed in low involvement and a basic distrust of political institutions) is reinforced by other relevant attitudinal features, as their scant sense of both internal and external political efficacy. These symptoms have remained stable over the last decades. Unlike the indicators of dissatisfaction, measures of disaffection have not fluctuated in parallel with the gigantic changes affecting social, economic, or political conditions of the new democracy. Clearly, democratic legitimacy, political discontent, and political disaffection are conceptually and empirically distinct from each other. [Figures 5, 6, and 7] Time series analysis, 1983-2014 12 Research design, data and hypotheses Longitudinal or time series analysis allows us to determine if the evolution of a specific dependent variable is associated to the changes shown by a set of independent variables. Given the continuous quantitative nature of our dependent variables, our time series models have been formed using ordinary least squares. This method allows also a qualitative interpretation of the model residuals7. Residuals express the variations in the studied phenomena that escape from the theory implicit in the models. That is, atypical residuals peaks point towards the existence of an exceptional event. Figures 8, 9, and 10 reflect the evolution of our dependent variables along the period between 1983 and 2014. Data was obtained from the Spanish Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS).8 Following Leonardo Morlino and Marco Tarchi (2006), we have measured dissatisfaction with the percentage of those “not at all satisfied” with how democracy works. Figure 8 shows that, starting from a baseline around 8 percent, levels of dissatisfaction rose up to 16 per cent during the political and economic crises of the early 1990s, and up to 36 per cent in 2013. On the other hand, our second dependent variable has been operationalized through the measurement of the percentage of those choosing the item “in some circumstances, an authoritarian regime, a dictatorship, can be preferable to a democratic system” against “democracy is preferable to any other form of government” or “people like me doesn’t care about one or another regime”. As shown in Figure 9, the eventual support to an authoritarian regime starts from values close to 12 percent in the 1980s, descends to 5 percent at the end of the 1990s and has grown slightly since then, regaining the level of 8 percent in 2014. Its total variation range was 11 points. Figure 10 shows the covariation of both series. Results show the autonomy of legitimacy vis-à-vis the fluctuation of dissatisfaction (with a correlation of .14, and a significance of .44): our first hypothesis (as stated in Table 2) is greatly falsified. [Figures 8, 9, and 10] 7 Residuals are computed as the difference between the observed (real) values of the dependent variable and the predicted (or fitted) values by the model, at every time point. 8 Data on legitimacy for 2014 come from the third way of the CIUPANEL survey, directed by Mariano Torcal and funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiviness (CSO201347071-R). 13 [Table 2] Regarding the measurement of our independent and control variables, we have chosen, in all but one case, objective indicators. By doing so the exogenous nature of the independent variables is guaranteed. Economic growth and unemployment have been measured using the GDP increase and the unemployment series provided by Euromonitor; the size of the public sector has been measured also with the increase of the public spending provided by Euromonitor. Unfortunately, “objective” data based on expert assessments on levels of corruption in Spain are available only since 1990, and consequently we had to use survey data. More specifically, corruption in Spain has been operationalized by the yearly average of the percentage of respondents who considered “corruption” among the three main problems in Spain in the CIS quarterly barometer. Control variables are dichotomous, and take into account the ruling party (which takes the value 1 for the Partido Socialista Obrero Español [PSOE] and 0 for the conservative Partido Popular [PP]) and the election year (which takes the value 1 for the years in which general elections were held and 0 in all other cases). As mentioned above, Table 2 summarizes our hypotheses. The first predicts that low levels of satisfaction with democracy are related to a decrease of its legitimacy. The second (H2.1) considers the existence of a direct relationship between unemployment and GDP growth and the satisfaction of democracy. The third (H3.1) raises a relationship between the public spending implemented by the various governments and the levels of satisfaction with democracy. The fourth (H4.1) is oriented towards contextual factors and proposes an inverse relationship between levels of corruption and satisfaction with democracy. Similarly, hypothesis H2.2, H3.2 and H4.2 considered identical relations, but now taking democratic legitimacy as the dependent variable. Results In order to test the aforementioned hypothesis we have estimated several time-series analyses. 14 On Dissatisfaction. Figure 11 shows the evolution of three series: The actual levels of dissatisfaction, the predicted (or fitted) values of dissatisfaction from our regression model, and the residuals (or the differences between the two previous series). As already mentioned, analysis of these residues can be useful to identify “atypical” oscillations.9 In the case of dissatisfaction, both the R2 coefficient and the figure of observed and predicted values confirm the good fit of the data to the model proposed for dissatisfaction. [Figure 11] Table 3 shows the regression coefficients for dissatisfaction, in which economic factors are relevant. Discontent significantly grows whenever unemployment or GDP decrease. Both findings confirm hypothesis H2.1. In contrast, annual variations in public spending growth are unrelated to dissatisfaction levels, falsifying hypothesis H3.1 Among contextual factors, dissatisfaction increases significantly when corruption is perceived as one of the main problems of Spain, which confirms H4.1. But it was not so with the other control variables. Neither the color of the party in government nor the celebration of elections in a given year appear to be associated with variations in the levels of discontent . [Table 3] On the preferences for an authoritarian regime. According to models 2, 3, and 5 in Table 4, higher unemployment increases are associated with increases in the preferences for an eventual authoritarian regime. This is not the case for GDP growth. This mixed evidence weakens the relevance of the economic context pointed in H2.2. Attending to the factors related to public policy, an increase in the public spending is significantly related to an increase in the support to an authoritarian regime. This –counterintuitive- result contradicts H3.2. In the same line, the relationships between corruption and legitimacy is also direct but not robust across different model specifications, and the same is true for the fact of being governed by PSOE. These mixed results call for a more detailed analysis of legitimacy within the PP and PSOE voters. [Table 4] 9 Peaks in the residual series indicate specific moments in which levels of dissatisfaction (later, legitimacy) are not adequately predicted by the factors considered in the model. Usually these peaks in the residuals coincide with specific moments with exceptional circumstances. 15 On the preferences over an authoritarian regime within the PSOE and PP voters. During the transition to democracy, levels of democratic support were unevenly distributed among voters (and also among leaders) for the main political parties. This support was quite high among left-wing voters for Partido Comunista de España (PCE) and PSOE, and decreased for Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) centrists and, specially, for the very conservative voters of Alianza Popular (AP) (Linz et al. 1981; Morlino and Montero 1995; Gunther and Montero 2001). After 1985, party electorates still hold distinctive patterns (Figure 12). Preferences for an authoritarian regime were low and constant for PSOE voters (with an average of 5, and a standard deviation of 1.5), and much higher and particularly more volatile for PP supporters (average, 17, standard deviation, 10). [Figure 12] How to explain these differences? Results for PP voters can be found in Models 5 and 6 of Table 4. For them, economic factors seem to play again a role. Unemployment shows a direct and significant relationship with support to an authoritarian regime, while GDP growth is not statistically significant; both variables, however, point in the same direction. Public expenditure shows a remarkable and robust relationship: the higher the public spending, the greater the conservative voters’ support to an eventual authoritarian regime. Contextual factors are interesting. Holding of elections and corruption levels show inconsistent or null relationships. But, when the PSOE is in government, then a strong and significant increase in support to authoritarian regime occurs, increasing by an average of 8 percentage points. Figure 13 shows the observed and predicted values of legitimacy of democracy among PP voters. The model fit is remarkable, capturing correctly 70 per cent of the variation of the support to authoritarian regimes among the PP voters. [Figure 13] It seems that, following Anderson et al. (2005), conservative voters would condition their support for democracy to their electoral fortunes and to the economic policies at play. Their attitudes towards democracy seem to reflect a remarkable instrumental component. They support democracy when AP and later PP, their parties, are in the government and public spending is low; and they question democracy if spending increases or PP have to stay in the opposition. 16 Citizens and democracy In the early 2000s, several cross-section analyses examining the basic perceptions of democracy in Spain reached the conclusion that satisfaction with democracy, legitimacy, and disaffection were rather independent among them (Montero, Sanz, and Navarrete forthcoming). But the political and economic situation has profoundly changed in 2014. As we already know, political and economic discontent as well as dissatisfaction with the way democracy works were all-time record for the whole democratic period. Can we expect any correlative changes in the attitudes towards democracy of Spanish citizens? Paying attention to some significant changes in the political context –as for instance the entry of two new parties into the party system and the punishment afflicted to the two major parties--, it is clear that Spanish democracy is now confronting different challenges. The slogan “No nos representan” –that can be translated as “They do not represent us”-- summarizes the feeling of those electors who are switching their preferences to new political entrepreneurs and their corresponding parties who are taking advantage of the sustained economic recession and the political discontent. Criticisms against Spanish democracy have come hand by hand with less disaffection. For instance, the percentage of those who never or almost never discuss politics has been dramatically reduced. Changes like this call for an assessment of the determinants of political attitudes towards democracy amid the Great Recession. To do so, we will test how satisfaction with democracy, democratic legitimacy and political disaffection interrelate, and how political, social, and economic factors affect these three attitudinal dimensions. We will use data from the CIUPanel, and more particularly from its third wave, undertaken in December 2014 and with a sample of 2,563 respondents. By then, Podemos (We Can), a left-wing, populist new party, has made a surprising entry at the European Elections with eight MEPs and became unexpectedly soon the very first party in vote intention, leaving behind the conservatives of PP and the socialists of PSOE.10 Does the emergence of this new party mean a change in the relations between democratic discontent, legitimacy and disaffection? How does this affect attitudes towards democracy? Is there any change in the role played by democracy concerning vote choice? Our expectations are summarized in Table 5. We expect the three dimensions of attitudes towards democracy to show certain level of autonomy. Concerning the impact of 10 According with the CIS Barometer, survey 3050, January 2015, http://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/ES/1_encuestas/estudios/ver.jsp?estudio=14141. accessible at 17 economic factors on these attitudes, we also expect them to have a higher effect on the most unstable attitudes, i.e., on satisfaction with democracy, compared to the effect on the other two (H2). We assume that political participation (conventional or unconventional) would have a distinctive role to each dimension. Those who participate more actively would be more satisfied with democracy (H3), would prefer democracy over other regimes (H4), and would be less disaffected towards politics (H5). As the consequences of the economic crisis are affecting citizens with different social profiles, we expect younger citizens to be more discontent with democracy (H6), significantly indifferent to the political regime (H7), and more disaffected than critical (H8). Finally, those who voted for the incumbent government would feel better represented and would be significantly satisfied with democracy (H9); they would also think that democracy is the best political system (H10) and would be less disaffected and less critical towards democracy (H11). By testing these hypotheses we will be in condition to define citizens’ individual profiles in the context of an economic crisis that has contributed to a serious disruption of the Spanish party system. [Table 5 ] For testing these hypotheses we have estimated three different models for each of our dependent variables. For satisfactions with democracy, measured for 2014 as a dichotomous variable in which 0 means dissatisfied and 1 is satisfied with democracy, we ran binomial logistic regressions. In the case of legitimacy, we ran multinomial regressions since our dependent variable had three categories: democracy is best (used as reference category), sometimes an authoritarian regime, indifferent to regimes. The third dependent variable, disaffection, was computed as a continuous one, so in this case we ran lineal regression models. Disaffection is measured as the interaction of political interest and confidence towards political institutions. In its turn, confidence is the resulting variable of a principal component analysis of the variables measuring confidence in the Spanish Parliament, in Spanish politicians and in Spanish political parties. The definition of disaffection used here follows the typology of citizens described in José Ramón Montero, Alberto Sanz, and Rosa M. Navarrete (forthcoming). According to their typology, citizens can be classified based on their political interest and confidence in political institutions. The label of cives is defined as those who combine high levels of both interest and confidence; on the opposite side, the disaffected are those with low interest and low confidence. The other two combinations refer 18 to critical (high interest and low confidence) and deferent citizens (high confidence and low interest). In tis section, we will solely focus on critical and disaffected attitudes. Satisfaction with democracy Models of satisfaction with democracy can be found in Table 6. The first remarkable result is that satisfaction seems to be independent from legitimacy, and to some extent related to disaffection: the more disaffected or the more critical citizens may be, the more chances they have to be dissatisfied with how democracy works. On the economic side, poor evaluations of the national economy are related to political discontent. Unconventional participation –but not turnout- is also related to dissatisfaction with democracy. Regarding other sociodemographic an attitudinal factors, age and education level are not associated to higher or lower levels of dissatisfaction as neither is left-right ideology. Finally, a higher degree of religiosity is associated to greater chances of being satisfied with democratic performance in Spain. [Table 6] Legitimacy As anticipated by the results in the time-series analyses, support for authoritarian regimes is independent from satisfaction with democracy and from political disaffection (Table 7). All other factors constant, the profile of those supporting an authoritarian regime is that of a person with low social trust, older than those supporting democracy, with low propensity to participate in demonstrations, with a relative more conservative ideology, higher chances to vote for PP and maintaining a positive evaluation of the economic situation in Spain. Given the low variability of legitimacy across Spanish citizens, the model fit for legitimacy is clearly the lower of the three attitudes considered in this section. [Table 7] Disaffection The results for disaffection can be found in Table 8. The probability of being a critical or disaffected citizen in Spain is inversely related to both satisfaction with democracy and democratic legitimacy. And the economy also plays a role: the better the 19 assessment on the economy, the higher the probability of being critical or disaffected. On the other hand, it is remarkable that being unemployed –and to some extent alienated from the labor market-- is associated also with higher probability of being disaffected from the political sphere, but not to hold critical attitudes. Religiosity, a conservative ideology, social trust, age, and unconventional participation are inversely related to both dimensions, while conventional participation is inversely related only for that of disaffection. [Table 8] Citizens, democracy, and the economic system To what extent political legitimacy is linked to beliefs in the legitimacy of the economic system? There is not much information about the connections between these two fields, and the literature is remarkably scarce.11 Obviously, the Spanish case after the Great Recession is particularly interesting since, given its longstanding consequences in terms of unemployment, inequality, impoverishment, and drastic reductions in welfare policies, the failure of the political system could be directly connected by citizens to an extremely negative performance of the economic system. Can we therefore expect an impact of perceptions on the economic system on attitudes towards democracy? In this section we analyze whether attitudes towards capitalism are affecting those towards democracy. Also, we will check whether assessments on the economic system have an impact on citizens’ political discontent, democratic legitimacy, and disaffection. The relevance of this analysis lays on their apparent interdependency. We have repeated our analysis by using the same dependent variables that were discussed in the previous section, and adding three more independent variables: capitalist legitimacy12, capitalist efficacy,13 and 11 Juan J. Linz has been one of the few in analyzing with survey data those relationships; see his chapter, “Legitimacy of Democracy and the Socioeconomic System”, in Mattei Dogan, ed., Comparing Pluralist Democracies: Strains on Legitimacy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 65-113. 12 Capitalist legitimacy is a dichotomous variable, in which respondents were asked whether they agree or not with the statement that “the capitalist economy of free initiative is the best economic system for our country”. Respondents answered if they agreed with the statement that “the capitalist economy of free initiative allows citizens of this country to solve their problems”. 13 20 capitalist fairness.14 We have estimated two models. One model includes those attitudes towards democracy that are not acting as dependent variable and the three variables related to the economic system; the second model includes these two groups of independent variables, the assessment of economy –a variable that has confirmed to have a relevant effect on democratic discontent and disaffection--, and left-right ideology, which has been statistically significant in the previous analyses of the three political attitudinal dimensions. In Table 9, attitudes towards capitalism have a significant impact on satisfaction with democracy. Legitimacy, efficacy, and fairness of the capitalist system have a positive effect, what leads us to consider there that citizens seem to perceive political and economic systems as if they were the two sides of the same coin. Comparing the two models, the main difference is the decrease on the goodness of fit of the second model. Ideology and assessment of the economic situation made no contribution to the understanding of satisfaction with democracy when controlling by attitudes towards the capitalist system. Because the fairness of the capitalist system has five categories and rising one level on the perceived fairness of capitalism increases satisfaction with democracy more than half a point, this is clearly the factor with a higher impact. In short, maintaining all other variables constant, those who consider capitalism as a very fair system will add more than 2 points on satisfaction with democracy than those who consider capitalism as very unfair. In what respects to democratic attitudes, results are comparable to those obtained in the previous section with the preference for political regimes as non significant, and disaffection with a negative significant effect. [Table 9] Results for democratic legitimacy shown in Table 10 are quite different. They highlight the autonomy of political discontent vis-à-vis preferences for political regimes. On the contrary, disaffection is a factor tied to indifference towards political regimes. Here, assessment of economy and ideology play a relevant role, especially for those who sometimes would prefer an authoritarian regime over a democratic one: the more to the right, the more authoritarian or indifferent towards regimes. Also, positive assessments of economy are related to the eventual preference of an authoritarian regime over a democratic one. [Table 10] 14 Respondents had to answer whether they considered the economic system to be very unfair, rather unfair, nor unfair neither fair, rather fair, and very fair. 21 Finally, critical and disaffected citizens are affected by perceptions over the efficacy and fairness of the economic system (Table 11). As it could be expected, those who answered that capitalism can solve citizens’ problems tend to be less disaffected or critical, as is the case of those who believe on the fairness of the economic system. The legitimacy of capitalism, however, has no effect on disaffection. Adjustment of models improves slightly when including assessment of economy and ideology. These variables are also significant and work similarly to the case of legitimacy: the more to the right and the more optimist an assessment of the economy, the less disaffected or critical. Concerning attitudes towards democracy, when compared the models of the previous section to these, the impact of satisfaction with democracy, support to an eventual authoritarian regime, and indifference towards regimes decrease when attitudes towards capitalism are included in the model. It has to be highlighted that the coefficients for “sometimes authoritarian” and “indifferent towards regimes” increase when ideology and assessment of the economy are included in the model; they change from 0.722 to 0.895 in the case of the critical citizens, and from 0.560 to 0.711 for the disaffected ones. Thus, attitudes towards capitalism may push the effect of legitimacy on disaffection. [Table 11] In our previous longitudinal analysis we observed that attitudes towards democracy work in a distinctive manner to PSOE and PP voters. In this section we discussed the extent to which attitudes towards the existing economic system affects democracy. The European financial crisis has open a major debate about the way the economic system is interfering with the sovereignty of the countries and how economic powers are winning the battle to the political ones. This discussion is much more intense in countries that had to confront a bailout or had to implement austerity, unpopular measures that, in some cases, directly come from Brussels. This is the case of Spain. In the next section we analyze to what extent attitudes towards democracy and capitalism play a role on the voting choice. Democracy, the economic system, and the voting choice The decrease on the support for the two major parties in Spain was not just an expression of protest of those more affected by economic constraints, but also a challenge to the existing political and economic systems. Is voting intention affected by citizens’ assessments over the democratic and economic systems? Can we point at some profiles of those voting for each of 22 the three most important national parties if attitudes towards democracy and capitalism are include into the models? We conducted an exploratory analysis of vote in late 2014 to answer these questions. We ran linear regressions with the probability to vote for each of four parties selected (PP, PSOE, Izquierda Unida [IU, a coalition between PCE and some minor left-wing parties], and Podemos) as dependent variables15. We did run three models. The first one includes only attitudes towards democracy; perceptions over the economic system are included in the second model, and, finally, age and ideology are added in the third model. This way we can trace the profiles of those who have a major sympathy or a higher propensity to vote to these parties. [Table 12] The results are included in Table 12. The PP is clearly the party with the highest variance explained by our models; this means that our models are better equipped at predicting the vote for this party. These models have a worse performance when the dependent variable is any of the other three parties, perhaps because their potential voters belong all to the left and therefore have pretty similar attitudes towards the political system and towards capitalism. Looking more carefully, results for Podemos antagonize with those for PP. Those with a higher propensity to vote for PP are the most satisfied with democracy, the only ones who show a significant preference for an eventual authoritarian regime, and a strong support for capitalism. On the other hand, those who sympathize with Podemos are the most discontented with democracy and the most critical against capitalism. They are also the youngest and more leftists. Podemos is the only party in which disaffection has no effect, while on the other three parties the impact of disaffection is remarkably negative. Instead, this short analysis does not seem to satisfactorily explain voting for the PSOE. The party is supported by individuals with a similar profile to that of Podemos sympathizers. Alas, the third model, the one with a better adjustment, explains only 18 percent of the probability of voting for PSOE, while the percentage of variance predicted in the case of the PP is higher than 51 percent, and 26 percent in the case of Podemos. [Table 12] 15 The probability of voting for each party goes from 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (very likely). 23 Conclusion We began this paper by asking the impact of the Great Recession on political attitudes towards democracy in Spain. In order to answer this question we have firstly discussed the concepts of support for democracy or democratic legitimacy, political and economic discontent or dissatisfaction with the way democracy works, and political disaffection. Tough these three attitudes belong to a broader field that houses many political orientations towards political systems, at the same time are quite different concepts that, once correctly operationalized, measure different attitudes. Thus, contrary to mainstream literature in the field, our analysis has shown that they differ both conceptually and empirically. Among them, dissatisfaction with democracy is the one showing larger variability in recent Spanish democratic history. In contrast, legitimacy and disaffection were characterized by their great stability over the past three decades. When we explored through longitudinal, time-series analyses the impact of political and economic changes on dissatisfaction and preferences for an authoritarian regime, each one responded in an idiosyncratic way. On one hand, dissatisfaction proved to be sensitive to the deterioration of the economic situation; on the other, support for democracy appeared linked to political factors. More specifically, the eventual support for an authoritarian regime is more prevalent among PP voters than on those who vote for the PSOE. Additionally, it seems that to some extent conservative voters condition their support for democracy to the economic policies implemented and also to the electoral fortune of their party: in the moments when PSOE is in government they increase their support for authoritarian regimes in an average of 8 percentage points. On the second part of our paper we have paid attention to cross-section survey data gathered in late 2014, in a moment combining huge levels of dissatisfaction and disaffection with the first signs of a serious party system change after the entry of new parties at the occasion of the elections to the European Parliament held in May 2014. Current political situation cannot be understood without looking carefully to what led citizens to distrust the two major parties. 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Evolution of democratic legitimacy in Spain, 1979-2013 (in percentages) 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 2013 2012 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1998 1997 1996 1995 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1980 1979* 0 Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government In some circumstances a non-democratic form of government is preferable For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non democratic regime Sources: Banco de Datos del Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) and Data for those surveys with asterisks. 29 Figure 2. Dissatisfaction with democracy and negative assessments of the economic situation, 1983-2014 (in percentages) 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 0 Somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with democracy Assessment of the economic situation as bad or very bad Source: Banco de Datos, CIS. 30 Figure 3. Dissatisfaction with democracy and negative assessments of the political situation, 1983-2014 (in percentages) 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 0 Somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with democracy Assessment of the political situation as bad or very bad Source: Banco de Datos, CIS. 31 Figure 4. GDP growth (in percentage points) and unemployment (in percentages) in Spain, 1983-2014 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 1985 1990 1995 GDP growth Sources: Eurostat and Euromonitor. 2000 2005 Unemployment 2010 32 Figure 5. Interest in politics (many and a lot), 1983-1911 (in percentages) 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 Source: Banco de Datos, CIS. Oct-11 Jan-08 Jan-06 Oct-04 Mar-02 Feb-94 Apr-93 Jun-91 May-90 May-89 Jan-89 Dec-86 May-86 Feb-86 Mar-85 May-83 0 33 Figure 6. Political discussion in Spain, 2006-2014 (in percentages) 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 2006 (Jun) 2007 (Jul) 2009 (May) 2010 (Jul) 2013 (Feb) Everyday 3-4 days per week 1-2 days per week less than 1-2 days per week Never Source: Banco de Datos, CIS. 2014 (Feb) 34 Figure 7. Confidence in the Parliament (0-10), 1994-2014 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1994 (nov) 1995 (dic) 1996 (Nov) (0-3) Source: Banco de Datos, CIS. 1996 (Dec) 1998 (Dec) (7-10) 2003 (Feb) 2010 (Nov) 2011 (Feb) Don't Know/No opinion 2013 (Apr) 2014 (Apr) 35 Figure 8. Dissatisfaction (“not at all satisfied”) with the way democracy works, 1983-2014 (in percentages) 40 35 30 Mean: 10,2 S.D.: 7,7 Min: 4 Max: 36,5 Range: 32,5 25 20 15 10 5 0 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Not at all satiesfied on how democracy works (%) Source: Banco de Datos, CIS. 36 Figure 9. Support to an eventual authoritarian regime, 1983-2014 (in percentages) 16 Mean: 8,1 S.D.: 2,6 Min.: 4 Max. : 15 Range: 11 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Sources: Banco de Datos, CIS, and CIUPANEL for 2014. 2010 37 Figure 10. Dissatisfaction with the way democracy works and support to an eventual authoritarian regime, 1983-2014 (in percentages) 40 35 Correlation : 0,14 P. Value : 0,44 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Not at all satisfied with how democracy works (%) Support for an eventual authoritarian regime (%) Source: CIS, and CIUPANEL for legitimacy in 2014. 38 Figure 11. Evolution of dissatisfaction with democracy in Spain, 1983-2014 40 R2: 0,85 30 20 8 10 4 0 0 -4 -8 -12 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Residual Not at all satisfied with democracy (%) Model 2 Predicted values 39 Figure 12. Dissatisfaction with the way democracy works and support to an eventual authoritarian regime, 1983-2014 (in percentages) 50 40 30 20 10 0 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Support for an eventual authoritarian regime (% within PP voters) Support for an eventual authoritarian regime (% within PSOE voters) Sources: Banco de Datos, CIS, and CIUPANEL for 2014. 40 Figure 13. Support for an eventual authoritarian regimes in Spain among PP voters, 19832014 50 R2: 0,71 40 20 30 15 20 10 10 5 0 0 -5 -10 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Residual Support to an eventual authoritarian regime (%) Model 5 predicted values 41 Year % N 1978 1980 1981 1982 1983 1988 1993 1994 77 69 81 74 73 87 79 82 5.898 3.132 1.703 5.463 5.481 4.548 1.448 2.491 Includes answer to the question on whether "Democracy is the best form of government for a country like ours" Sources: For 1978-1993, DATA, and Bano de Datois, CIS, for 1994. 42 Table 2. Time series analysis: variables, operationalization, and hypotheses Dependent variables Independent variables and control variables Economic context Satisfaction Legitimacy H 2.1 H 2.2 H 3.1 H3.2 H 4.1 H 4.2 - - - - Unemployment rate Gross Domestic Product (growth) Political factors Public expenditure (growth) Contextual factors Corruption perception (% considering corruption among most important problems in Spain) Party in government (0 PP, 1 PSOE) Election year (0 No, 1 Yes) 43 Table 3. Time series analysis: dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in Spain, 1983-2013a Variables Constant Model 1 2.937 (2.539) Model 2 10.391 *** (1.584) Economic factors Unemployment rate (t+1) .404 ** (0.148) -1.100 *** (0.280) GDP growth Political factors -.232 (0.159) .0164 (0.140) Corruption .36 *** (0.112) .555 *** (0.065) PSOE in government -.590 (1.685) -1.497 (1.468) Election year -1.425 (1.502) -1.092 (1.345) Public expenditure growth Contextual factors ^2 Number of observations a .724 31 .853 32 Entries are least-squares regression coefficients. Standard errors in parenthesis *p<0.1; **p<0.05; *** p< 0.01. Sources: CIS, Eurostat and Euromonitor. 44 Table 4. Time series analysis: preferences for an eventual authoritarian regime in Spain, Entire sample Variables Constant Model 1 .181 (1.209) Model 2 4.351 (1.014) - PSOE voters Model 3 Model 4 1.350 (.841) 3.287 (.600) PP voters Model 5 -11.690 (-4.273) Model 6 1.290 (3.493) Economic factors Unemployment rate .288 *** (.068) .120 ** -.047 -.021 (.179) GDP growth .967 *** -.242 -.088 (.106) .346 (.618) Political factors .243 *** (.066) .260 *** (.089) .065 (.046) -.832 (.053) Corruption .023 (.039) .117 *** (.041) .016 (.027) .053) * (.025) PSOE in government 1.447 ** (.707) 1.706 ** (.940) .629 (.492) .638 (.556) -.428 (.666) .691 32 -.216 (.861) .481 32 -.072 (.463) .404 32 -.005 (.509) .477 32 Public expenditure growth .841 *** (.235) .840 ** (0.309) Contextual factors Election year ^2 Number of observations a .063 -.138 .391 ** (0.144) 6.667 ** (2.500) 8.065 ** (3.237) 1.278 -2.355 .707 32 Entries are least-squares regression coefficients (standard errors in parenthesis). * p< 0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p< 0.01 Sources: CIS, Eurostat, Euromonitor, and CIUPANEL. 2.046 2.965 .532 32 45 Table 5. Analysis for 2014 operationalization and hypotheses Dependent variables Independent variables and control variables Attitudes toward democracy Satisfaction with democracy Legitimacy Disaffection Economic context Unemployed Assessment of economic situation Political participation Vote Volunteer labor Political contact Participation in boycotts Participation in demonstrations Sociodemographic Age University Religiosity Ideological and political Party identity Right-left ideology Social trust Voted for PP Satisfaction Legitimacy Disaffection H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 H9 H10 H11 46 Table 6. Satisfaction with democracy in Spain, 2014a Variables Sometimes authoritarian Indifferent towards regimes Disaffection Critical Assessment of economy Unemployed Age University Religion Turnout Voluntary work Contact with politicians Boycott Demonstrations Ideology Social trust Voted for PP Constant Model 1 Model 2 0.003 (0.201) -1.046*** (0.349) -0.246*** (0.039) -0.222*** (0.033) 0.350*** (0.059) -0.236 (0.180) -0.001 (0.005) -0.054 (0.142) 0.236*** (0.046) 0.384** (0.171) -1.048*** (0.264) 0.692*** (0.168) -0.465*** (0.145) -0.264 (0.164) 0.118*** (0.036) 0.048* (0.029) 0.185 (0.194) -1.854*** -3.594*** (0.072) (0.347) Model 3 -0.238 (0.261) -0.880** (0.440) -0.217*** (0.053) -0.210*** (0.044) 0.180*** (0.066) -0.121 (0.194) -0.008 (0.005) -0.028 (0.154) 0.224*** (0.051) 0.243 (0.185) -1.041*** (0.284) 0.654*** (0.188) -0.228 (0.157) -0.442** (0.177) 0.061 (0.040) -0.030 (0.032) 0.066 (0.216) -2.447*** (0.384) Observations 2.562 1.833 1.833 Nagelkerke Ps. R2 0.192 0.143 0.258 a Entries are logistic regression coefficients. (Standard errors in parentheses). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: CIUPANEL, third wave, 2014. 47 Table 7. Legitimacy of democracy in Spain 2014a Variables Sat. democracy Disaffection Critical Economic eval. Unemployed Age University Religion Turnout Voluntary work Contact politicians Boycott Demonstrations Ideology Social trust Voted for PP Constant Observations Nagelkerke Ps. R2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Authoritari Indifferen Authoritari Indifferen Authoritari Indifferen an t an t an t 0.094 (0.195) 0.032 (0.046) -0.000 (0.042) -0.861*** (0.331) 0.265*** (0.048) -0.056 (0.049) -0.240 -0.904** (0.258) (0.431) 0.081 0.217*** (0.063) (0.073) 0.062 -0.047 (0.056) (0.069) 0.158** -0.152 0.244*** -0.039 (0.079) (0.102) (0.082) (0.105) 0.133 0.101 0.092 -0.015 (0.216) (0.254) (0.217) (0.260) -0.015** -0.003 -0.014** -0.001 (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) -0.135 -0.403 -0.157 -0.369 (0.191) (0.247) (0.193) (0.250) 0.021 0.141* 0.056 0.186** (0.066) (0.078) (0.067) (0.078) -0.342 -1.071*** -0.286 -0.935*** (0.230) (0.260) (0.232) (0.264) -0.053 0.070 -0.099 0.027 (0.316) (0.365) (0.318) (0.369) 0.186 -0.483 0.234 -0.440 (0.232) (0.335) (0.235) (0.339) 0.081 -0.483** -0.034 -0.525** (0.186) (0.240) (0.191) (0.245) -0.585** -0.189 -0.550** -0.129 (0.239) (0.260) (0.240) (0.262) 0.123*** -0.014 0.149*** 0.021 (0.046) (0.056) (0.047) (0.057) -0.139*** -0.118*** -0.112*** -0.090** (0.038) (0.044) (0.038) (0.045) 0.662** 0.643* 0.727*** 0.719* (0.271) (0.365) (0.270) (0.367) -2.261*** -2.500*** -1.905*** -1.210** -2.441*** -1.969*** (0.080) (0.095) (0.425) (0.483) (0.453) (0.528) 2.562 0.0254 2.562 0.0254 a 1.833 0.0787 1.833 0.0787 1.833 0.0992 1.833 0.0992 Entries are multinomial logistic regression coefficients. (Standard errors in parentheses). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 Source: CIUPANEL, third wave, 2014. 48 Table 8. Political disaffection in Spain, 2014a Model 1 Variables Critical Satisfaction with democracy -2.885*** Sometimes Authoritarian Indifferent towards regimes (0.130) 0.138 (0.175) 0.727*** (0.190) Disaffected 0.318*** (0.060) 0.480*** (0.055) -0.543*** (0.056) 0.258* (0.149) -0.015*** (0.004) 0.004 (0.129) -0.174*** (0.047) -0.364** (0.144) 0.283 (0.182) -0.369** (0.157) 0.662*** (0.125) -0.287** (0.140) -0.137*** (0.032) -0.202*** (0.025) -0.351* (0.195) 3.643*** (0.293) 2.562 0.171 2.562 0.163 1.833 0.199 Unemployed Age University Religion Turnout Voluntary work Contact with politicians Boycott Demonstrations Ideology Social trust Voted for PP Observations R2 Critical a Critical Disaffected -0.428*** (0.047) 0.360*** (0.125) -0.013*** (0.004) 0.012 (0.108) -0.135*** (0.039) -0.491*** (0.121) 0.056 (0.153) -0.101 (0.131) 0.384*** (0.105) -0.282** (0.117) -0.144*** (0.027) -0.150*** (0.021) -0.147 (0.164) 3.366*** (0.245) -2.276*** (0.156) 0.605*** (0.208) 0.447* (0.249) -0.432*** (0.053) 0.190 (0.141) -0.015*** (0.004) -0.012 (0.121) -0.091** (0.045) -0.229* (0.137) 0.066 (0.172) -0.165 (0.148) 0.551*** (0.119) -0.320** (0.132) -0.111*** (0.031) -0.182*** (0.024) -0.256 (0.185) 3.326*** (0.279) -1.795*** (0.131) 0.546*** (0.175) 0.796*** (0.209) -0.337*** (0.045) 0.304** (0.118) -0.013*** (0.003) 0.007 (0.102) -0.073* (0.037) -0.359*** (0.115) -0.116 (0.145) 0.067 (0.125) 0.306*** (0.100) -0.303*** (0.111) -0.124*** (0.026) -0.131*** (0.020) -0.086 (0.155) 3.044*** (0.235) 1.833 0.191 1.833 0.291 1.833 0.280 Entries are OLS regression coefficients. (Standard errors in parentheses). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: CIUPANEL, third wave, 2014. Model 3 Disaffected -2.456*** (0.119) 0.168 (0.161) 1.142*** (0.175) Assessment of economy Constant Model 2 49 Table 9. Satisfaction with democracy in Spain, 2014a Variables Model 4 Model 5 Sometimes authoritarian −0.363 (0.297) −0.441 (0.301) Indifferent towards regimes −0.748 (0.478) −0.753 (0.474) Critical −0.150*** −0.151*** (0.044) (0.045) Disaffection −0.267*** −0.255*** (0.058) (0.058) Assessment of economy 0.051 (0.073) Ideology 0.050 (0.036) Capitalist legitimacy 0.566*** (0.196) 0.519*** (0.198) Capitalist efficacy 0.719*** (0.200) 0.657*** (0.204) Capitalist fairness 0.511*** (0.097) 0.461*** (0.104) Constant −2.866*** −3.093*** (0.150) (0.209) Observations 1.652 1.652 Log Likelihood −566.785 −565.318 Akaike Inf. Crit. 1.149.570 1.150.637 a Entries are logistic regression coefficients. (Standard errors in parentheses). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: CIUPANEL, third wave, 2014. 50 Table 10. Legitimacy of democracy in Spain, 2014a Model 4 Model 5 Variables Authoritarian Indifferent Authoritarian Indifferent Satisfaction with democracy −0.215 (0.282) −0.639 (0.467) −0.319 (0.287) −0.716 (0.470) Critical 0.074 (0.059) −0.085 (0.071) 0.095 (0.060) −0.076 (0.072) 0.073 0.265*** (0.082) 0.094 0.268*** (0.082) Disaffection (0.071) Assesment of economy Ideology Capitalist legitimacy Capitalist efficacy Capitalist fairness Constant Akaike Inf. Crit. (0.071) 0.254*** (0.089) 0.015 (0.113) 0.234*** (0.043) 0.190*** (0.052) 0.237 (0.252) 0.064 (0.313) −0.049 (0.257) −0.113 (0.319) 0.702*** (0.263) −0.497 0.439 (0.412) (0.270) −0.689* (0.418) 0.170 (0.122) 0.046 (0.159) −0.028 (0.135) −0.039 (0.168) −2.856*** (0.165) 1,531.177 −2.862*** (0.187) 1,531.177 −4.107*** (0.285) 1,486.421 −3.501*** (0.314) 1,486.421 a Entries are multinomial logistic regression coefficients. (Standard errors in parentheses). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: CIUPANEL, third wave, 2014. 51 Table 11. Political disaffection in Spain, 2014a Model 4 Variables Critical Disaffected Model 5 Critical Disaffected Satisfaction with democracy −2.231*** (0.175) −1.754*** (0.142) −2.120*** (0.174) −1.663*** (0.142) Sometimes authoritarian 0.722*** (0.230) 0.560*** (0.187) 0.895*** (0.230) 0.711*** (0.187) 0.464* (0.280) 0.764*** (0.228) 0.533* (0.278) 0.834*** (0.226) Assesment of economy −0.316*** (0.059) −0.224*** (0.048) Ideology −0.069** (0.029) −0.074*** (0.023) 0.160 (0.138) Indifferent towards regimes Capitalist legitimacy 0.164 0.028 (0.169) (0.138) 0.320* (0.170) Capitalist efficacy −0.713*** (0.190) −0.424*** (0.155) −0.580*** (0.190) −0.305** (0.155) Capitalist fairness −0.867*** (0.083) −0.659*** (0.067) −0.688*** (0.087) −0.518*** (0.071) Constant 1.046*** (0.095) 0.986*** (0.078) 1.716*** (0.145) 1.528*** (0.118) 1,652 0.250 1,652 0.234 1,652 0.234 1,652 0.250 Observations R2 a Entries are OLS regression coefficients. (Standard errors in parentheses). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: CIUPANEL, third wave, 2014. 52 Table 12. Probability of voting for different parties (PTV) in Spain, 2014a Model 1 PP PSOE Satisfaction democracy 1.873*** -0.121 (0.181) (0.206) Sometimes authoritarian 1.834*** -0.793*** -0.845*** -0.729** Variables Indifferent (regimes) Disaffection Podemos -1.625*** -2.106*** (0.224) (0.270) IU Podemos 0.834*** 0.441** (0.153) (0.206) (0.208) (0.252) 0.774*** -0.129 0.166 0.399 -0.662*** -0.873*** (0.291) (0.351) (0.194) (0.260) (0.263) (0.318) 0.197 -0.665** -0.650* -0.391 -0.197 -0.361 -0.215 0.008 (0.289) (0.329) (0.357) (0.431) (0.235) (0.315) (0.319) (0.385) -0.133** 0.020 (0.058) (0.070) -0.050 0.114** (0.047) (0.057) -0.202*** -0.158** (0.054) -0.197*** -0.195*** (0.043) Capitalist legitimacy Capitalist efficacy Capitalist fairness Age -0.110*** -0.205*** -0.228*** (0.038) 1.137*** 2.556*** 2.978*** 4.517*** (0.051) (0.052) -0.120*** -0.231*** -0.121*** -0.105* (0.063) 0.010 (0.031) (0.042) (0.042) (0.051) 0.124 -0.045 -0.406** -0.439* (0.143) (0.191) (0.194) (0.234) 1.107*** -0.381* -0.343 -0.836*** (0.161) (0.216) (0.219) (0.264) 0.270*** -0.102 (0.072) (0.097) (0.098) (0.119) 0.003 0.011** -0.002 -0.021*** (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 0.529*** Ideology Observations R2 PSOE (0.268) (0.038) Constant PP (0.235) (0.047) Critical IU Model 2 -0.379*** -0.641*** -0.362*** -0.538*** -0.548*** (0.024) (0.032) (0.033) (0.039) -1.348*** 3.458*** 5.465*** 8.266*** (0.075) (0.086) (0.093) (0.112) (0.197) (0.264) (0.268) (0.324) 1,652 0.258 1,652 0.091 1,652 0.041 1,652 0.068 1,652 0.517 1,652 0.180 1,652 0.247 1,652 0.264 a Entries are OLS regression coefficients. (Standard errors in parentheses). *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Source: CIUPANEL, third wave, 2014.