Building Better Teachers in Latin America and the Caribbean: New
Transcripción
Building Better Teachers in Latin America and the Caribbean: New
Building Better Teachers in Latin America and the Caribbean: New Evidence on Strategies for Teacher Quality and Student Learning World Bank regional study 2013 Presentation by Barbara Bruns, World Bank MIDE- UC. Santiago, Chile April 16, 2013 Overview 1. 2. 3. Context Diagnosis – key issues Recommendations 3a. 3b. 3c. 3d. 3e. 4. Recruiting better teachers Grooming teachers better Motivating teachers to perform Managing the politics of teacher reforms Exploiting a “reform window” – 2014-2025 Conclusions 1. Context 1. 2. 3. 4. LAC shows low learning outcomes to GDP and spending… … But some countries show impressive progress. Global research indicates that teacher quality matters: teacher effectiveness varies widely, and has a statistically and educationally significant impact on student learning. LAC’s current demographic transition opens up opportunities in most countries for improving the quality of teachers. 2. Diagnosis 1. The teaching profession in LAC is mired in a “low-level equilibrium”: – Low standards for entry into teacher education and teaching positions – Low quality teacher education – Relatively low pay (adj. for hours, education) – Flat lifetime pay-scales – Pay-scales de-linked from skills and performance 2. 3. Teachers have weak content mastery Teachers have weak teaching and classroom management skills: - Classroom management and teaching skills vary widely. They affect student learning and levels of engagement. 3. Recommendations Major policy reforms to Recruit Groom Motivate teachers differently. 3a. How to improve the recruitment of teachers 1. Raise selectivity of entry into teacher education. - Admission systems [constraint: institutional autonomy] - Incentives to attract strong candidates, e.g. Chile’s BVP. 2. Raise quality of teacher education - Short-term strategies: close down very low-quality institutions, establish national teacher university. - Long-term strategies: quality standards, accreditation systems, competitive funds. - Teaching practice is particularly important. 3. 4. Raise selectivity at exit of teacher education. - Standardized exams at exit. - National teacher standards. Allow alternative certification. 3b. How to improve the grooming of teachers 1. Introduce regular, comprehensive teacher evaluations. - Tests of teacher content mastery; expert observations of classroom practice; student, parent, and peer feedback. 2. Improve quality of in-service training. - Use results of teacher evaluation to target training and maximize impact. - Seek direct control of design and delivery of in-service training. 3. Build culture of shared practice. - Peer observation; whole school development; teacher collaboration. 4. Higher standards and accountability for principals. - Rigorous selection, fixed terms, high quality training and mentoring. - De-selection of consistent poor performers. - Accountability for teacher quality and school performance. 3c. How to improve the motivation of teachers 1. Increase professional rewards - Teacher professionalism is the core driver: autonomy, time for preparation, sharing of practice, promotion stream for master teachers 2. Increase accountability pressure - Strengthen managerial oversight. - Link job tenure to performance: teacher de-selection. 3. Increase financial rewards - Replace the single salary scale and seniority-based promotion with differentiated financial rewards linked to skills and performance. 3 major approaches: - Career path reforms (competency-based promotion and pay): » Decompression of the overall salary scale » Promotions based on competence rather than seniority - “Hybrid” reforms: » Fixed term bonuses for teachers who perform well on tests of skills » Permanent promotions still based on traditional criteria (seniority, formal credentials) - Bonus pay reforms (rewards for prior period results): » School based bonuses » Individual teacher bonuses 3d. How to manage the politics of teachers policy reform 1. Political dynamics of education reform, shaped by: - How the reform affects key stakeholders’ interests - The relative power of key stakeholders - The effectiveness of stakeholders’ political strategies 2. Stakeholder power of teachers unions in LAC stems from multiple sources. - Union density, union fragmentation, relations with political parties, history / capacity for disruptive behavior, and capture of education ministry: comparison. 3. 4. Two core strategies: negotiation, confrontation. Key lessons for politicians and policy makers - Reform momentum is greatest at the start of an administration. - Hard data on education system results is a critical policy tool. - Confrontation strategies can succeed legislatively, but create issues for implementation. - Sequencing reforms can ease adoption and implementation. Classic sequence = 1) student testing; 2) school-based bonus pay; 3) voluntary teacher evaluation; 4) mandatory teacher evaluation. 3e. How to take advantage of the demographic transition 1. Even under ambitious assumptions of schooling expansion, the need for teachers in LAC will decrease over the next 15 years because of the declining size of the school-aged population. - Total stock of teachers will shrink from 7.35 to 6.6 million (constant pupil-toteacher ratio, PTR). - With adjusted PTR it would fall to 5.8 million. 2. This is a common trend in most LAC countries: - Large declines in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Cuba. - Smaller declines in Mexico, Costa Rica. - Colombia, Paraguay, and Central America will need more teachers. 3. This opens up a window of opportunity for improving teacher quality by, inter alia, paying higher salaries to a smaller stock of teachers, de-selecting bad performers, and opening fiscal space to invest in training and evaluation. 4. Conclusions 1. Teacher quality is the binding constraint on LAC education performance today guide - Countries realize this, and region is full of policy experimentation and reforms - Very few reforms are rigorously evaluated, so the evidence to design is weak 2. “Biggest of the big” challenges are: - Improving quality/relevance of pre-service education - Evaluating teacher performance and de-selecting poor performers - Reforming the career path to base promotions and pay on skills and raising pay incentives - Stimulating true professional collaboration among teachers at the school level - Creating a cadre of skilled school managers accountable for grooming teachers and raising school results - Managing the pupil-teacher ratio efficiently to reallocate resources from teacher quantity to teacher and school quality ANNEX 1. Context Context (2): But…impressive progress in some LAC countries Figure 8: Comparative PISA math improvement, 2000-2009 Potential lessons from within the region: Chile, Brazil and Peru among PISA’s “most improved” countries Source: OECD PISA Secretariat, 2010 Context (3): Global research on importance of teachers • Evidence base unequivocal that: – Teacher effectiveness most important in-school determinant of student learning progress – Teacher effectiveness varies widely, even within same grade and school (from 0.5 – 1.5 years of curriculum content over single academic year) – Teacher effectiveness (measured by student learning gains) not predicted by teachers’ formal qualifications, age, or experience – Raising student learning performance depends on school systems’ ability to find and develop more effective teachers Context (4): Demographic transition 2010-2025 Figure 1: Change in the Stock of Teachers Needed with Constant Pupil-to-Teacher Ratios, 2010-2025 Even under ambitious assumptions of schooling expansion • total stock of teachers will shrink from 7.35 to 6.6 million (with constant PTR) • with adjusted PTR would fall to 5.8 million • Large declines in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Ecuador, Peru and Cuba and smaller declines in Mexico and CR • Colombia and Central Amer. will need more teachers Source: Authors’ elaboration with data from (UNESCO, 2011) and (UNESCO, 2009) 2. Diagnosis Diagnosis (1): Teaching profession in LAC mired in “low-level equilibrium” • Low prestige, resulting from: – Low standards for entry into teacher education and teaching positions – Low quality teacher education – Relatively low pay (adj. for hours, education) – Flat lifetime pay-scales – Pay-scales de-linked from skills and performance Teacher pay: Long-term decline in relative salaries Figure 6: Evolution of teacher salaries in Peru 1960-2010 (constant 1999 soles) Figure 20: Long-term decline in returns to university level teacher education in Sweden, 1968-2003 3000 Soles(1999) 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 0 Notes: In periods of high inflation, the data are sensitive to the end month (1987-1990). The data are also sensitive to the deflators used (IPG of GRADE or IPC INEI) Source: Fredriksson and Ockert 2007. Teacher pay: flat salary trajectory Career average salaries for teachers and alternative professions, 10 LAC countries 2010 Career average salaries for teachers and alternative professions, Sweden 2004 Figure 22: Career salary trajectories for teaching and alternative professions, 2004 Source: ibid. Teacher pay: undifferentiated by skills or performance Wage distribution for teachers and non-teachers, Sweden, 2004 Wage distribution for teachers and other occupations, Chile, 2000 and 2010 Diagnosis (2): Teachers have weak content mastery PISA math scores for prospective teachers and engineers, 2006 Teachers have weak content mastery Performance of 6th grade teachers on 6th grade math and reading test, Peru 2006 Below level 2: cannot make basic inferences from a text or apply routine math procedures and strategies. Teachers have weak content mastery Comparative math knowledge of primary and secondary school teachers, TEDS-M study 2008 Primary school teachers 623 586 548 536 518 512 509 501 481 456 441 440 413 345 Singapore Russian… Switzerland Germany Poland Philippines Georgia 0 Source: TEDS-M, 2008. Secondary school teachers 200 400 600 800 Singapore 544 Switzerland 531 Poland 529 Germany 483 United States 468 Norway 461 Philippines 442 Botswana 436 354 Chile 0 200 400 600 Diagnosis (3): Teachers have weak teaching and classroom management skills Average use of instructional time, 2010-2012 Weak classroom management skills affect student learning Colombia 5th grade Math Honduras 3rd grade Language Weak classroom management skills affect student learning Share of class time teacher is “off task” and student learning, Mexico DF 2011 Share of class time teacher is “off task” and student learning, Rio municipality 2011 Teachers’ weak skills leave students unengaged Share of class time students visibly not engaged Share of time teacher keeps entire class engaged Average classroom management is weak, but tremendous variation across schools And within schools…. Variance in instructional time within schools, Colombia 2011 Variance in instructional time within schools, Honduras 2011 High variance within schools and high share of time teachers are off-task and out of the classroom suggests weak accountability for performance 3a. Recommendations: Recruiting better teachers 1. Recruiting better teachers • Raise selectivity of entry to teacher training (difficult in LAC, given heterogeneity of providers and institutional autonomy) – Short term actions: • Close low-quality schools under Ministries’ control (Peru, Ecuador) • Establish National Teacher University (Ecuador UNAE) • Incentives for top students (Chile BVP) – Longer-term strategies: • Raise accreditation standards for tertiary institutions, forcing closure or adaptation (Chile 2013) Need to manage transitional issue: inadequate supply of qualified candidates Raising quality through accreditation Figure 17: Chile - Enrollments in teacher education programs by accreditation status, 2007-2010 (number of full-time students enrolled) 90000 80000 70000 60000 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000 0 2007 2008 Accredited programs 2009 Non-accredited programs Source: Authors’ construction using Ministry of Education enrolment data 2010 Recruiting better teachers • Raise quality of teacher education – esp. increase emphasis on teaching practice – Competitive funding for reform of university teacher education programs (Chile MECESUP, Peru FEC) Compulsory Pre-service teaching practice (# of weeks) in selected LAC countries Compulsory Pre-service teaching practice (# of weeks) in selected LAC countries Recruiting better teachers • Raise selectivity at exit from teacher education – Exit exams – signal relative institutional quality and graduate quality: • Voluntary teacher exit exam (Inicia, Exame Nacional Brasil) • Mandatory teacher exit exam (El Salvador ECAP, Colombia Saber Pro) Need research on how well exams predict teacher effectiveness El Salvador ECAP – Pass rate 2001-2012 Recruiting better teachers • Raise hiring standards for teachers – National teacher standards (Chile MBE) – Hiring tests (Chile Examen Inicial, Brazilian concursos, Peru CPM) • Chile will be first case of mandatory national standard for teachers (?) • Rio municipality’s 2013 concurso: first stage selection based on content mastery, then candidates take a short course in classroom management and candidates’ classroom practice is assessed – first such case in Brazil Recruiting better teachers • Allow alternative certification – Teach For All (Ensena Chile, Peru, Ensina!) – Can staff hard-to-fill positions – Can introduce innovation (training program very different from traditional teacher training, emphasis on mentoring also unique) – Can create stream of future education managers (US experience) – Some LAC evidence of TFAll positive impacts on student learning, self-esteem and aspirations; US evidence -with a broader array of programs -- also positive – RCT of Ensena Chile launched for 2013-2017 3b. Recommendations: Grooming teachers better 2. Grooming teachers better • Introduce regular, comprehensive teacher evaluation – Tests of teacher content mastery – Expert observation of classroom practice (video or live?) using validated instruments – Student, parent and peer feedback – Not recommended to include student test results in LAC teacher evaluations (VA scores not widely available, risk of perverse incentives) – Only Chile has system in place; Peru is developing, Mexico reforming Kane (US) MET study – evidence that content mastery, observed classroom practice and student/parent feedback are correlated with student learning results Grooming teachers better • Improve quality of in-service training – Use teacher evaluation results to target training programs to identified issues (Pernambuco, MG, Rio state) – Direct control of design and delivery of in-service training • UNAE Ecuador, Minas Gerais Magistra, Rio Casa do Educador High priority to build evidence on effectiveness of new training models – RCTs planned in Brazil (PE and RJ) Grooming teachers better • Build culture of shared practice – Peer observation (Japanese lesson study) – Whole school development planning (Ontario) – Teacher collaboration – explicit time in school week (Finland, Rio’s ginasio carioca experimental) – Most common LAC model (pedagogical coordinators stationed in school or at district office) doesn’t seem to work – lack true expertise and don’t engage enough in classroom observation Grooming teachers better • Higher standards and accountability for school principals – Rigorous selection (Singapore; Minas Gerais, Rio state Brazil) – Fixed terms (Ecuador, Brazil reforms in last few years) – Accountability for teacher quality and school performance (annual performance assessments) – High quality training/mentoring support – De-selection of consistent poor performers 3c. Recommendations: Motivating teachers to perform 3. Motivating teachers Three key sources of motivation: – Professional rewards (mastery and professional growth, recognition, prestige, working conditions) – Accountability pressure (client feedback, managerial oversight, job stability) – Financial rewards (salary differentials, bonus pay, pensions/benefits) All three are under-developed in LAC compared to East Asia and Europe (professional, financial); US/UK (accountability – except for Chile) Motivating teachers: Increase professional rewards • Cross-country research on high-performing education systems (Finland, Singapore, Shanghai, Japan, Cuba, Ontario) points to teacher professionalism as core driver – • Teacher autonomy, time for preparation, sharing of practice, promotion stream for master teachers But no hard impact evidence on reforms/programs to build this culture in systems with low professionalism – – Rio municipality – ginasio carioca experimental (team teaching and substantial time for collective work within and across disciplines and grades) Chile microcentros? Motivating teachers: Increase accountability pressure • Strengthen managerial oversight: – – • School directors accountable for results and trained to observe teachers Comprehensive external assessments of teacher performance Link job tenure to performance (“teacher de-selection”) – – Teachers with poor performance evaluations get remedial support Successive poor evaluations leads to separation from service (Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia – legislation exists but limited implementation) – 2011 Chilean law delegates broader dismissal powers to municipal directors (need research on impact!) US research (Hanushek) estimates large impacts from teacher de-selection, but empirical evidence almost non-existent • Increase client feedback/accountability pressure – – Open schooling market to choice (Chile, Bogota PACES) and alt. cert Build parent/student feedback into teacher performance evaluations and (in Chile) school performance evaluations (SNED) Motivating teachers: Increase financial rewards Reforms to replace the single salary scale and seniority-based promotion with differentiated financial rewards linked to skills and performance. Three major approaches: • Rewards for skills: – Career path reforms (competency-based promotion and pay) • Decompression of the overall salary scale • Promotions based on competence rather than seniority – “Hybrid” reforms • Fixed term bonuses for teachers who perform well on tests of skills • Permanent promotions still based on traditional criteria (seniority, formal credentials) • Rewards for results – Bonus pay (rewards for prior period results) • School based bonuses • Individual teacher bonuses Almost no global research evidence on career path reforms or hybrid reforms; substantial research evidence on bonus pay Motivating teachers/financial rewards: Career path reforms • Career path reforms (promotion based on tests of knowledge/skills) – – – – Colombia 2002 Estatuto de Profesionalizacion Docente (EPD) – mandatory, impact limited by weak implementation Peru 2008 Carrera Publica Magisterial (voluntary) – no eval. Sao Paulo 2009 Prova de Promocao (voluntary) – no eval. Chile 2013 Sistema de Promocion y Desarollo Profesional Docente Municipal • • • Career path reforms (promotion based on comprehensive metrics) – – • Promotions managed nationally based on tests of content mastery and teaching skills Bonus pay managed locally based on comprehensive measures incl. classroom practice Ecuador 2008 Ley de Carrera Docente y Escalofon del Magisterio – mandatory, includes peer, parent and student feedback – no eval. Peru 2012 Ley de Reforma Magisterial - mandatory, includes classroom observation and parent/student feedback – no eval. Career path reforms (promotion based on comprehensive metrics including student test scores) – Mexico 1992 CM – inconsistent implementation, limited impact Table 5.1 Career Path Reforms in Latin America RESULTS TOTAL COST COUNTRY (EVAL. DATE) A. TYPE DESIGN AND COVERAGE PERFORMANCE MEASURE AWARD PROCESS PREDICTABILITY MONITORING SALARY SCALE AND TYPE OF AND SUPPORT DISTRIBUTION INCREASE Tests developed and administered by ICFES, graded by National University. Branch 1 (secondary school degree) Levels A-D: 127204% of base (1A) salary Branch 2 (bachelor’s degree, no specialization) Levels A-D: 126-230% of base salary Branch 2 (bachelor’s degree with specialization) 137%,-256% of base salary Branch 3 (masters’ degree) Levels A-D: 211-357% of base salary Branch 3 (doctorate) Levels A-D: 279%-475% of base salary Level 1: 50% increase over base salary Until 115% 2011,base flat increase Level: of $1250 forbase 10 years. Level 3=130% Level From4=150% 2012, base larger Level 5=200% base rewards, proportional EVAL. METHOD AND PERIOD Promotion based on teacher content mastery Colombia – Estatuto de Profesionalizacion Docente (2002) Ome (2012) Peru – Carrera Indiv Indiv National. Voluntary for teachers in service; mandatory for new entrants National, D.Public “Hybrid” career incentives voluntary for Magisterial Chile – AEP Indiv National (2008, revised in teachers in Asignacion de (all 2012) service; mandatory Excelencia schools) for new Pedagogica (2002) Voluntary entrants Eisenberg, (2008) Manzi et al, (2008) Chile-AVDI Asignacion Variable por Desempeno Individual (2004) Eisenberg, (2008) Manzi et al, (2008) Indiv National (municipal schools only) Voluntary Tests of content mastery, pedagogy and behavioral competencies. Tests of content mastery and Tests of pedagogy content mastery, a videotaped class and portfolio of work Tests of content mastery and pedagogy (for teachers rated outstanding or competent on comprehensive national teacher evalation system) Threshold score of 80% required for promotion, but promotions contingent on budget available (those with highest scores given priority.) Test implemented yearly since 2010. Teachers achieving Teachers threshold score scoring above passed to second stage evaluation threshold on by local comprehensive committees (for performance specific schoolmeasure level CPM receive award positions) 68,000 applicants from 2009-2011, Only 20%24,966 of of which applicants were incorprated into system achieve award Teachers scoring in top 3 categories (outstanding, competent or sufficient) 15% of teachers ( 85% of teachers who take the test earn some bonus, but these represented only 25% of all municipal teachers in 2011) 45,773 teachers took test in 2011; 19% achieved threshold score for promotion. Unsuccessful candidates may retake test following year. annually; as of 2012, only 4% of all teachers had ever achieved award Unsuccessful candidates may retake test following year to salary Avg reward xx of annual salary Maximum award 25% of annual salary; avg. 711% of annual salary Base pay increase Panel regression analysis (2004-2011) Must stay 3 years in grade Base pay increase Base pay increase Must stay 3for years Level 1; 10 years. 5From years L2012, 2; 6 years L 3; pay 6 years L 4 US$xx million Soles 38.7 million (from 2009-2011) NA RDD. increase for 4 years Base pay increase for four years Positive effects on 5th and 9th grade math and 9th grade Spanish, but no effects observed at 11th grade RDD Higher test scores for student s exposed to larger number of AEP teachers Higher test scores for students exposed to larger number of AVDI teachers • Motivating teachers/financial rewards: “Hybrid reforms” Reward for skills overlaid on traditional promotion system – Chile 2002 AEP • voluntary, rewards content knowledge and classroom practice, 10 year bonus, all public and subsidized schools, limited take-up • From 2012, 4 year bonus, larger size – Chile 2004 AVDI • Voluntary, rewards content knowledge and classroom practice, 4 year bonus, only municipal teachers, limited take-up Research (Eisenberg, Manzi, Bravo et al.) confirms positive correlation between teacher certification and student results, but low uptake has limited system-wide impact – Rio state 2013 Teacher certification program • Voluntary, rewards content knowledge and (at top level) also classroom practice, 5 year bonus, large salary increments (Level 3 doubles annual salary); must advance, re-accredit or drop down w/in 5 years No research evidence to guide design choices and no evidence of overall impact on incentives to enter (or remain in) teaching Motivating teachers/financial rewards: Bonus pay • Bonus based on student learning results only – Andhra Pradesh, India (group and individual) – 5 yr program • Individual bonus much larger impact – Mexico (ALI) – (group, incl. students; individual; students) 3 yr • Individual bonus no impact; student bonus strong impact; group bonus huge impact and cheating – Chicago Heights, Ill. – “loss aversion” (group and individual) – 1 yr • Individual and group bonuses at end of year no impact; bonuses granted at beginning of year, large impact • Bonus based on student learning and pass rates – Pernambuco, Brazil – (group bonus) – ongoing since 2008 • Significant increase in pass rates, some increase in learning; no evidence of cheating; smaller schools improved most; disadvantaged students improved most Motivating teachers/fin. rewards: Bonus pay, ctd • Bonus based on student learning results and other (nonstudent) performance measures – Chile SNED – tournament • Overall positive impacts on student learning (Contreas and Rau, 2012) • Heterogeneous impacts across schools (bonus exerts strongest effects on schools with 65% chance of winning, and limited incentive effects on schools that consistently win and never win) • No evidence that SNED “signal” affects schools’ subsequent enrollments, tuition and student SES (Mizala and Urquiola, 2007) Conclusions: – Global evidence that bonus pay can improve student learning results, esp. in developing country contexts – Impacts highly sensitive to incentive design (group/indiv; bonus size, ambitiousness of targets) – Heterogeneous impacts on different types of schools 3d. Recommendations: Managing the politics of teachers policy reform 4. Managing the Politics of Teacher Reforms Political dynamics of education reform shaped by: – How the reform affects key stakeholders’ interests – The relative power of key stakeholders – The effectiveness of stakeholders’ political strategies Managing the Politics: Education policies through the lens of teachers’ interests • Reforms perceived as threats to teachers’ benefits: – Loss of job tenure – Reduction/loss of other benefits (pensions, higher retirement age) • Reforms perceived as threats to teachers’ working conditions: – Curriculum reform – Student testing – Teacher evaluation systems • Reforms perceived as threats to union structure and power – – – – – Decentralization School choice Higher standards at entry Alternative certification Individual pay based on skills or performance • Reforms aligned with unions’ interests – Higher spending – Bonus pay for school results – Lower pupil-teacher ratio Managing the Politics: Stakeholder power of teachers’ unions in LAC • • • • • Union density Union fragmentation Relations with political parties History/capacity for disruptive behavior Capture of education ministry Country Teacher’s Union(s) Union Density Fragmentation Relation with Political Parties Disruptive Behavior Capture of Education Ministry Argentina Confederación de Trabajadores de la Educación de la República Argentina (CTERA) is the most important, but there are several other state organizations which do not belong to CTERA 50.8% (234,000) High fragmentation (effective coordination through CTERA) Diverse strategies and alliances (EJEMPLOS CONCRETOS) High (varies by province) No at the national level, but some state unions have participated in the Disciplinary Boards and in the School councils Brazil Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Educação (CNTE) is the most important, but there are several other municipal and state organizations which do not belong to CNTE 44.2% (925,229) High fragmentation (partial coordination through CNTE) Closer to the Workers Party (PT) Intermediate (varies by municipality and by state) Intermediate (some positions by former leaders of the CNTE) Chile Colegio de Profesores 53.3% (71,982) Monopoly of representation Not formally but supported the presidential candidates of the left coalition, Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia Low levels of disruptive behavior No Colombia Federación Colombiana de Educadores (FECODE) 81.6% (Pulido 2007) Monopoly of representation Although not formally linked to any of the major political parties, FECODE has recently allied with Polo Democrático Intermediate (disruptive behavior has weakened during the last years) No Costa Rica Asociación Nacional de Educadores (ANDE), Asociación de Profesores de Segunda Enseñanza (APSE), Colegio de Licenciados y Profesores en Letras, Ciencias y Artes (COLYPRO), Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Educación Costarricense (SEC). ANDE and APSE are the main unions, for primary and secondary education, respectively. 100% (membership est. 140,000-200,000) Calcular union density (porcentaje) Fragmentation by education level Relationship with political parties reflects short-term common issues, and there is no formal systematic alliance across issues or time with any political party Low levels (approximately 47 protests during 1998-2007. Violent episodes in 1995 against changes in teachers’ pensions, and 2003-2004 for demand of higher wages) Some high-ranking union and association members are recruited by the national legislative and executive branches to perform legislative or bureaucratic activities (EJEMPLOS CONCRETOS) Ecuador Unión Nacional de Educadores (UNE). Minor competition from Frente Unionista de los Trabajadores de Educación del Ecuador (FUTE). Regional organizations orbita round UNE Monopoly of representation Union leadership is not organically part of the government, but identifies publicly with the left-wing Movimiento Popular Democrático (MPD) Intermediate-High. Protests, strikes; 62 during 1998-2007. Protests occur at least once a year according to some observers (SOURCE?) Union’s influence over the teachers’ careers. Tense relationship with President Correa because of policies to curb UNE’s influence on education system (Education minister highly criticized by UNE) Sources: 79% - 90% for UNE during 1990s, 79% this decade Managing the politics: 4 recent cases of two core strategies • Negotiation – Negotiated reform with sequencing: Chile (19902013) – Negotiated reform in a context of institutional capture: Mexico (1992-2012) ….. Giving way to confrontation (2012 - ) • Confrontation – Teacher reform in the face of union oppostition: Peru (2007-2012) – Garcia and Humala govts – Teacher reform in the face of union opposition: Ecuador (2007-2013) – Correa Managing the politics of teacher policy reforms Conclusions: • Political leaders can build effective pro-reform alliances of business leaders and civil society through communications campaigns • Reform momentum is greatest at the start of an administration • Hard data on education system results is a crucial political tool (particularly internationally benchmarked such as PISA) • Confrontation strategies can succeed legislatively, but create issues for implementation • Sequencing reforms can ease adoption and improve implementation: classic sequence is 1) student testing to create a platform for performance-based reforms; 2) school-based bonus pay (more palatable to unions than individual pay differentiation), 3) voluntary program of teacher evaluation with individual bonuses, 4) teacher evaluation made mandatory, after union members perceive benefits and valuable implementation experience is gained. • Incorporating parent and student feedback into teacher and school director performance evaluations increases the robustness of the assessment, but poses political challenges, given asymmetric power at local level, particularly in rural and disadvantaged communities. 3e. Recommendations: Exploiting a “reform window”, 2010 - 2025 5. Exploiting a reform window – 2014-2025 Constant pupil-teacher ratios Country Adjusted pupil-to-teacher ratios Teachers needed in 2025 with respect to circa 2010 PTR circa 2010, preschool education PTR circa 2010, primary education PTR circa 2010, secondary education Teachers needed in 2025 with respect to circa 2010, with adjusted PTR (20:1 in pre-school and secondary; 25:1 in primary) Argentina -1% 19 16 12 -34% Brazil -24% 18 21 15 -37% Chile -8% 12 24 23 -19% Colombia 2% 27 28 26 27% Costa Rica -8% 14 18 15 -33% Cuba -26% 14 9 9 -67% Dominican Republic 25% 24 25 28 43% Ecuador -13% 12 18 11 -47% El Salvador -5% 23 30 24 14% Guatemala 57% 23 28 15 48% Honduras 34% 28 32 11 19% Mexico -8% 25 28 18 -5% Nicaragua 8% 21 30 31 36% Panama 19% 18 23 15 0% Paraguay 44% 26 28 12 21% Peru -4% 19 20 18 -18% Uruguay -23% 25 14 13 -45% Source: Authors’ projections with data from UNESCO 2011 and UNESCO 2009. Assumes 100% NER in primary education and 90% GER in secondary and pre-school (ages 4-6) for all countries. 5. Exploiting a reform window – 2014-2025 Table 6: Adjustments in teacher salaries 2010 – 2025 made possible by demographics, assuming constant spending on teacher salaries as share of GDP, with constant and adjusted PTRs Average salaries circa 2010 Average teacher salaries in 2025, with constant PTR Average teacher salaries in 2025, with adjusted PTR Country Teachers Professionals Percentage change Teachers Percentage change Teachers Brazil 76 90 24% 82 37% 85 Chile 78 90 8% 79 19% 82 Costa Rica 83 87 8% 83 33% 89 Honduras 88 88 -34% 78 -19% 82 Mexico 85 88 8% 88 5% 85 Nicaragua 71 91 -8% 68 -36% 60 Panama 81 90 -19% 70 0% 81 Peru 70 90 4% 72 18% 75 El Salvador 86 90 5% 89 -14% 84 Uruguay 69 92 23% 76 45% 81 Source: Authors’ calculations. Salaries are expressed as the percentile in the income distribution of the mean salary in the country in 2010. Figure 1: Change in the Stock of Teachers Needed with Constant Pupil-to-Teacher Ratios, 2010-2025 Source: Authors’ elaboration with data from (UNESCO, 2011) and (UNESCO, 2009)
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