El - Microjuris
NEGOCIAR O LITIGAR…
Lcdo. Jose M. Marxuach Fagot Microjuris 11 de diciembre de 2013 Programa de Educación Con?nua 1 NEGOCIAR O LITIGAR…
2 EL NEGOCIO DEL DEPORTE Y EL
3 EL NEGOCIO DEL DEPORTE Y EL
El negocio del deporte y el entretenimiento.
El Negocio Convencional vs. El Negocio del Deporte.
La Naturaleza de esta Competencia. El Negocio del Deporte: Diferencias Básicas.
Deporte y Entretenimiento: Jurisprudencia.
4 EL NEGOCIO DEL DEPORTE Y EL
• El Negocio del Deporte: busca estabilidad económica a través de la competencia de sus socios-‐compe?dores. vs. • Los Negocios y la Libre Competencia: busca estabilidad económica a través de la competencia para excluir a sus [email protected] del mercado. 5 EL NEGOCIO DEL DEPORTE Y EL
*Ejemplo de Negocios y la Libre Competencia: Los Ra?ngs . 35
6 EL NEGOCIO DEL DEPORTE Y EL
Ra?ngs = Aumento en Anuncios = $$$$$. 80
7 EL NEGOCIO DEL DEPORTE Y EL
• La Naturaleza de esta Competencia en el Negocio Convencional: • Terminar con sus Compe?dores. • Dominar el Mercado. • Contratar Nuevos Talentos. • Aumentar el Valor de su Producto. • Aumentar sus Ganancias. 8 EL NEGOCIO DEL DEPORTE Y EL
El Negocio del Deporte: Diferencias Básicas; 1. Relación Horizontal entre Compe?dores-‐Socios. 2. Administración Central-‐Obliga a los compe?dores y a su vez, trabaja para los compe?dores. • Ejemplos: Los Comisionados o Directores. 3. El balance [email protected]@vo es el elemento mas importante para alcanzar la estabilidad economica. Es decir, “ayudar a sus socios para que tambien sean exitosos”. 9 EL NEGOCIO DEL DEPORTE Y EL
*Nota: Puede aplicar tanto a la Liga Profesional como Amateur/Aﬁcionado 10 EL NEGOCIO DEL DEPORTE Y EL
• Administración Central de la Liga: Comisionado. • Poderes: Surgen de las Reglas de la Corporación o Asociación. • Junta de Directores: Los dueños de equipos u apoderados-‐ implementan la polí?ca o reglas de la Liga. • La negociación de los recursos humanos es individual, aun cuando existen uniones que negocian los términos y condiciones básicas de los atletas; nacen los Agentes. 11 EL NEGOCIO DEL DEPORTE Y EL
• Algunas diferencias: • El modelo económico de competencia. • No necesita un balance compe??vo para su sobrevivencia • Las leyes de monopolio aplican. • La duración de la carrera de los recursos humanos usualmente es mayor. • Existe una mayor variedad de “negocios” que pueden mejorar la posición del recurso humano. • Algunas similitudes: • La necesidad de adquirir el mejor talento. • La necesidad de crear el mejor producto. • La necesidad de anuncios y mercadeo. • Los talentos negocian sus contratos individualmente, independiente de las uniones. 12 DEPORTES Y ENTRETENIMIENTO
13 American Needle v. NFL , 130 S. Ct 2201 (2010). 14 El Antitrust y la Litigación en el
• El Monopolio y el Deporte; • Sherman Act §1 y § 2 (1890), según enmendada. • Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) • Se conﬁrma el precedente establecido en 1921, eximiendo de responsabilidad de las leyes de monopolio a MLB en el “negocio” del béisbol. • “Despite the two references in the Flood case to the reserve system, it appears clear from the en?re opinions in the three baseball cases, as well as from Radovich, that the Supreme Court intended to exempt the business of baseball, not any par?cular facet of that business, from the federal an?trust laws”. 15 El Antitrust y la Litigación en el
• American Needle v. NFL , 130 S. Ct 2201 (2010). • Corpora?on that designed, manufactured, and sold headwear carrying trademarked names and logos of various professional athle?c teams brought an?trust ac?on against unincorporated associa?on of professional football teams, team owners, corpora?on established by associa?on and its member teams to license their trademarks, and compe?tor that had received exclusive licensing agreement for trademarked headwear and apparel. • The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Corpora?on appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, aﬃrmed. Cer?orari was granted. 16 El Antitrust y la Litigación en el
• La controversia se circunscribe al trato que las leyes an?-‐
monopolis?cas (“Sherman Act”), le otorgan a la NFL bajo el ar?culo 1 del Sherman Act, bajo la defensa de “single [email protected]”: • "Every contract, combina;on in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na;ons, is declared to be illegal." • Es decir, el Tribual Supremo Federal estableció que: “The NFL should be considered as 32 individual, independent teams when it came to selling licensed items such as jerseys and caps. The court rejected the league's argument that it should be exempted from an?trust laws because it acts as a single en?ty. • Por lo tanto, la defensa de que las Ligas, como ésta, son una sola en?dad no procede. • Revocado. 17 RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL
18 Doody v. Evans 935 N.E.2d 926 (Ohio Ct.
• A catcher, who was injured when base runner from the opposing team collided with catcher at home plate during organized adult recrea?onal sorball game, brought negligence ac?on against base runner, alleging that runner collided with catcher without asemp?ng to slide or to avoid the collision. • The Court of Common Pleas, Franklin County, entered summary judgment for base runner, and catcher appealed. • The Court of Appeals, held that base runner's viola?on of league's “no-‐collision” rule was not reckless behavior, and therefore runner was not liable for catcher's injuries. 19 Doody v. Evans 935 N.E.2d 926 (Ohio Ct.
• The court applied the [email protected] or sports-‐[email protected] [email protected] to negligence liability, sta?ng that “individuals who engage in sports or recrea?onal ac?vi?es assume the ordinary risks of the [email protected] and cannot recover for any injury unless it can be shown that the other [email protected]’s [email protected] were either reckless or inten?onal[.]” • Applying the standard, the court concluded that the viola?on of the safety rule applies only to a “determina?on of what may be an unreasonable risk, which is only one part of the recklessness analysis. A court must consider whether the speciﬁc conduct was both within the rules and foreseeable.” Thus, Evans’ act must have cons?tuted an unforeseeable viola?on of the league rules in order to be considered tortuous and recoverable. Evans’ act did not rise to that level. According to the court, while Evans may have violated league rules by colliding with Doody, his [email protected] was not unforeseeable. The court concluded that a catcher-‐base runner collision is simply a foreseeable hazard of a baseball or sorball game. • However, the court did make it a point to speciﬁcally state that its holding should not be read to absolutely prevent tort liability in all base path collisions. 20 Stern v. Easter 92 A.D.3d 1250 (N.Y. App.
• Plain?ﬀ commenced this ac?on seeking damages for injuries she sustained when she was struck by a golf ball that was driven by an unknown golfer allegedly from the 18th tee of the Brooklawn Golf Club (Brooklawn), which is owned by defendant Midcourt Builders Corp. (Midcourt). • Defendant Guy H. Easter and his wife are the owners of Midcourt. • At the @me she was struck, [email protected]ﬀ was having coﬀee with a friend at the outdoor [email protected] area of an oﬃce building adjacent to the golf course. • The building was owned by defendants Pemco Proper?es III and PG Associates (Pemco defendants). • Plain?ﬀ asserted causes of ac?on for negligence against Easter, individually and doing business as Brooklawn, and against Midcourt, the Pemco defendants and “John Doe,” the golfer who allegedly struck the ball from the 18th tee. 21 Stern v. Easter 92 A.D.3d 1250 (N.Y. App.
• Following discovery, the Pemco defendants, as well as Easter and Midcourt, moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against them. Supreme Court granted the mo?on of the Pemco defendants and granted only that part of the mo?on of defendants Easter and Midcourt. • We conclude that the court should have granted the mo?on of Easter and Midcourt in its [email protected], and we therefore modify the order accordingly. 22 Court of Arbitration for Sport
23 Armstrong v. World Curling Federation CAS
• James Armstrong, a Canadian curler, appealed the WCF’s decision that found him guilty of a doping oﬀense. Armstrong submised to an out-‐of-‐ compe??on doping test in December 2011 and tested [email protected] for Tamoxifen, a prohibited substance. • As a result, the WCF suspended Armstrong for eighteen months. • Armstrong appealed to CAS, seeking to overturn the WCF’s decision and to reduce his suspension. • Armstrong contended that he mistakenly took one of his deceased wife’s [email protected] (the Tamoxifen) in place of his own prescribed medica?on (ASA 81mg), which was similar in size, shape, and color to the Tamoxifen. Armstrong argued that the WCF erred when it suspended him for eighteen months because he did not intend to take the banned substance and it did not enhance his performance. 24 Armstrong v. World Curling Federation CAS
• The WCF contended that Armstrong did not meet the World An?-‐Doping Agency (WADA) Code’s Ar?cle 10.5 standards because he could not [email protected] how the banned substance entered his body and, therefore, did not qualify for a reduced suspension. • The CAS panel concluded that Armstrong did bear a certain amount of fault for mixing his medica?on containers with his wife’s; therefore, he was not en?tled to a complete elimina?on of sanc?on. • The panel also concluded that [email protected] 10.5 of the WADA Code applied because Armstrong established that the Tamoxifen entered his system when he accidently took one of his wife’s pills. The panel found that Armstrong did not take the Tamoxifen to enhance his performance because he took the medica?on by accident and provided expert tes?mony showing that taking Tamoxifen would be dangerous for him due to an exis?ng medical condi?on. • The panel [email protected] concluded that Armstrong commised the doping oﬀense through no signiﬁcant fault or negligence of his own and reduced his suspension to six months. 25 CBS Corp. v. FCC 663 F.3d 122 (3d Cir.
26 CBS Corp. v. FCC 663 F.3d 122 (3d Cir.2011)
• The pe??oner television broadcas?ng company sought review of orders of the respondent Federal Communica?ons Commission (FCC) imposing a monetary forfeiture under 47 U.S.C.S. § 503(b) for the broadcast of indecent material in viola?on of 18 U.S.C.S. § 1464 and 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999. • The sanc?ons stemmed from the pe??oner’s live broadcast of a Super Bowl Halrime Show, which resulted in the exposure of a bare female breast on camera, an act that lasted nine-‐sixteenths of one second. • The pe??oner transmised the image over public airwaves, resul?ng in puni?ve ac?on by the FCC. The pe??oner challenged the FCC orders on cons?tu?onal, statutory, and public policy grounds. 27 CBS Corp. v. FCC 663 F.3d 122 (3d Cir.2011)
• At the ?me of the incident, the FCC’s policy was to exempt ﬂee?ng or isolated material from the scope of ac?onable indecency. However, the FCC sanc?oned the pe??oner under its new policy, which was implemented a^er the Super Bowl incident. • The court noted that the FCC, like any agency, could change its policies without judicial second-‐guessing; however, it could not change a well-‐established course of ac?on without supplying no?ce of and a reasoned explana?on for its policy departure. Because the FCC failed to sa?sfy this requirement, its new policy was arbitrary and capricious as applied to the pe??oner. Therefore, the court vacated the FCC’s orders. 28 LOS AGENTES
29 Harmon v. Gordon 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
• The plain?ﬀ sued the defendant for breach of contact. • (Gordon) was drared by the Chicago Bulls in 2004 and signed a three-‐year contract with the op?on to extend for a fourth year. • Larry Harmon (Harmon) and Gordon entered into a consul?ng agreement arer Gordon was drared, the term of which was to cover the [email protected] of Gordon’s playing career. Gordon terminated the contract arer his third year with the Chicago Bulls. • Arer Harmon sued Gordon for breach of contract, both par?es moved for summary judgment. Harmon argued that the contract was valid to extend for the en?rety of Gordon’s playing career, whereas Gordon argued it could extend only for the length of his ini?al contract. 30 Harmon v. Gordon 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
• The court found that the contract must have a term that was deﬁnite and certain, which Harmon’s interpreta?on would not provide. Gordon also argued that he was en?tled to terminate the contract for dissa?sfac?on in services. • The court found that Gordon was en?tled to terminate his contract arer his playing contract with the Chicago Bulls expired, which he did, and therefore, the court granted Gordon summary judgment and accordingly denied Harmon’s mo?on for summary judgment 31 El derecho de la imagen: ¿quién es su
32 Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No.
(9th Cir. Jul. 31, 2013)
• In Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 09-‐56675 (9th Cir. Jul. 31, 2013), the Court held that Electronic Arts’ unpaid use of NFL great Jim Brown’s likeness in its Madden NFL franchise was not explicitly misleading about Brown’s endorsement or aﬃ[email protected] with the game, and thus Brown’s Lanham Act claim could not surmount the First Amendment’s protec?ons of freedom of expression. • Therefore, the Ninth Circuit made it more diﬃcult for public ﬁgures and athletes to proﬁt from their likeness appearing in video games. 33 Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No.
(9th Cir. Jul. 31, 2013)
• Professional Football Hall of Famer James “Jim” Brown is frequently referred to as one of the greatest football players of all ?me, gaining notoriety from his ?me as a running back for the Cleveland Browns. Arer nine seasons, he re?red in 1965. • Electronic Arts (“EA”) makes and sells the popular Madden NFL franchise of football video games. Every year, a new edi?on of Madden NFL is released with updated rosters of every NFL team, as well as historical and all-‐?me teams 34 Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No.
(9th Cir. Jul. 31, 2013)
• Lanham Act Protects Against Misleading Use of a Public Figure’s Likeness: • Sec?on 43 of the Lanham Act provides a civil cause of [email protected] against a person who uses a trademark, trade dress, or public ﬁgure’s likeness (among other marks) in a way that is likely to cause confusion as to the “aﬃlia?on, connec?on, or associa?on of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial ac?vi?es by another person(.)” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). The purpose of § 43 is to limit consumer confusion about aﬃlia?ons and endorsements. 35 Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No.
(9th Cir. Jul. 31, 2013)
• “Brown needs to prove that EA explicitly misled consumers about Brown’s endorsement of the game, not that EA used Brown’s likeness in the game.” The Court concluded that “nothing in EA’s promo?on suggests that the ﬁry NFL players who are members of the All Madden, All Millennium team endorse EA’s game.” 36 Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No.
(9th Cir. Jul. 31, 2013)
• The Court’s discussion in Brown demonstrates the diﬃculty that public ﬁgures may have when relying on a § 43 Lanham Act claim to sue for an unauthorized use of their likeness, especially when the use has ar?s?c relevance to the work. • Nevertheless, in Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 11-‐3750 (3d Cir. May 21, 2013), the Court sided with a former athlete against EA in his claim that one of EA’s games violated his state right of publicity. 37 Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No.
(3d Cir. May 21, 2013)
38 Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 11-3750
(3d Cir. May 21, 2013)
• The Third Circuit held that a college football player’s inclusion in a popular football video game violated his right to publicity. • Ryan Hart was a quarterback for Rutgers University from 2002 to 2005. In 2005, as star?ng quarterback, he led the team to its ﬁrst bowl game since 1978. • Electronic Arts (“EA”) produces several popular video game franchises, including NCAA Football, which is updated and released on a yearly basis. EA included Hart in NCAA Football each year from 2004 un?l 2006 without permission. 39 Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 11-3750
(3d Cir. May 21, 2013)
• Hart sued EA in state court, alleging a viola?on of his right of publicity. The case was removed to the District Court of New Jersey, where EA ﬁled for a mo?on to dismiss, or in the alterna?ve, summary judgment. • EA conceded for purposes of the mo?on that it had violated Hart’s right of publicity, but that NCAA Football was protected under the First Amendment. The district court agreed with EA and granted summary judgment in its favor. 40 Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 11-3750
(3d Cir. May 21, 2013)
• A^er [email protected] the [email protected] Use Test, (not the Rodgers Test) the Court asked “whether (Hart’s) iden?ty is suﬃciently transformed in NCAA Football.” • The Court deﬁned “iden?ty” to include Hart’s likeness and biographical informa?on. • The Court ﬁrst examined the game’s digital representa?on of Hart. It found that the avatar in the game matched Hart’s real-‐life persona down to his hair style and accessories worn during his college football career. The game also included Hart’s biographical and career sta?s?cs. 41 Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 11-3750
(3d Cir. May 21, 2013)
• The Court next looked at the context in which Hart’s representa?on appeared, thus examining how Hart was “incorporated into and transformed by” the game. • The Court found that the game was not [email protected], as Hart, in the game, “does what the actual Ryan Hart did while at Rutgers: he plays college football, in digital recrea?ons of college football stadiums, ﬁlled with all the trappings of college football games.” 42 Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., No. 11-3750
(3d Cir. May 21, 2013)
• Another issue was whether the interac?ve features of the game, namely a user’s ability to alter a player’s appearance, suﬃciently transformed Hart’s likeness into EA’s own expression. • The Court found that in this case, the game’s interac?vity did not suﬃciently transform Hart’s likeness. • The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded back to the district court. 43 Keller v. Electronic Arts USCA, Ninth
July 31, 2013
44 Keller v. Electronic Arts USCA, Ninth
July 31, 2013
• Plain?ﬀ, a former star?ng quarterback for Arizona State University and the University of Nebraska, brought a puta?ve class ac?on (along with other former college football players) against Electronic Arts (EA), alleging that its use of his likeness in the NCAA Football series of video games violated his right of publicity under California statutory and common law. • EA ﬁled a mo?on to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public par?cipa?on under California’s an?-‐SLAPP statute. The district court denied EA’s mo?on and EA appealed. 45 Keller v. Electronic Arts USCA, Ninth
July 31, 2013
• The three-‐judge panel split 2-‐1 as to EA’s aﬃrma?ve transforma?ve use defense, with the majority rejec?ng EA’s conten?on that the video game was suﬃciently transforma?ve as to endow EA with First Amendment immunity as a maser of law. • The panel noted that the defense is “a balancing test between the First Amendment and the right of publicity based on whether the work in ques?on adds signiﬁcant crea?ve elements so as to be transformed into something more than a mere celebrity likeness or imita?on.” 46 Keller v. Electronic Arts USCA, Ninth
July 31, 2013
• The panel majority concluded that Keller’s challenge most closely resembled the facts of No Doubt v. Ac;vision Publishing, Inc., in which the California Court of Appeal addressed the use of “avatars” in the Band Hero video game. • There, the video game developer licensed the likeness of band members from the band No Doubt but allegedly exceeded the license’s scope by, among other things, allowing game users to manipulate various elements of the avatars’ voices. • The California appellate court concluded that the developer’s use was not transforma?ve, as a maser of law, because the video game characters were “literal [email protected] of the band members” doing “the same [email protected] by which the band achieved and maintains its fame.” 47 Keller v. Electronic Arts USCA, Ninth
July 31, 2013
• The panel majority concluded that EA’s use of Keller’s likeness was not transforma?ve: “EA was alleged to have replicated Keller’s physical characteris?cs in NCAA Football, just as the members of No Doubt are realis?cally portrayed in Band Hero. Here, as in Band Hero, users manipulate the characters in the performance of the same ac?vity for which they are known in real life—playing football in this case and performing in a rock band in Band Hero.” • The panel majority also looked to the Third Circuit’s decision in Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., a “materially [email protected]” challenge to EA’s use of players’ likenesses in the NCAA Football game, in which the Third Circuit relied substan?ally on the No Doubt decision in concluding that EA’s use was not transforma?ve for purposes of defea?ng a challenge under New Jersey’s right-‐of-‐privacy law. 48 Keller v. Electronic Arts USCA, Ninth
July 31, 2013
• EA urged the court to adopt a broader First Amendment defense, borrowed from the Second Circuit’s decision in Rogers v. Grimaldi, but the panel majority declined to apply the Rogers balancing test in the right-‐of-‐
privacy context. • Although the Ninth Circuit had endorsed the Rogers test in Lanham Act cases, and most recently the very same day in Brown v. Electronic Arts the panel majority dis?nguished between the nature of those challenges. “As the history and development of the Rogers test makes clear, it was designed to protect consumers from the risk of consumer confusion—the hallmark element of a Lanham Act claim.” • The right of publicity “does not primarily seek to prevent consumer confusion”… “protects the celebrity, not the consumer.” 49 Electronic Arts Settles Athletes’ Suit, Cancels
September 27, 2013.
• Electronic Arts Inc. (EA) agreed to pay $40 million to segle a lawsuit by former college athletes over use of their images in video games, arer it canceled its college football ?tle for next year because of legal issues. • On October, 25th, 2013 the NCAA ﬁled a pe??on asking the U.S. Supreme Court to review the decision of the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Keller v. Electronic Arts Inc…………………… 50 El derecho de la propia imagen en Puerto
51 Nueva Ley de Derecho de la Imagen
• Ar}culo 4. – • El propietario del derecho a la propia imagen que encuentre que el mismo ha sido violentado tendrá disponible el remedio de interdicto, así como una acción en daños y perjuicios. • El tribunal, en su discreción, podrá ﬁjar la cuan}a de los daños en una can?dad que no exceda tres (3) veces la ganancia del demandado y/o la pérdida del demandante cuando determine que la violación fue intencional o de mala fe. 52 Nueva Ley de Derecho de la Imagen
• En la alterna?va, el demandante podrá optar por solicitarle al tribunal, daños estatutarios. Los daños estatutarios podrán ﬁjarse en una cuan}a no menor de $750 ni mayor de $20,000 por violación, según el tribunal lo considere justo. En un caso en el cual el tribunal determine que la violación fue intencional o debido a una negligencia crasa, el tribunal, en su discreción, podrá aumentar la cuan}a de daños estatutarios a una suma no mayor de $100,000 por violación. • Cada violación bajo estos daños estatutarios será equivalente al acto de la u?lización ilegal de la imagen del reclamante en un trabajo, independiente del número de copias que se hagan del trabajo en cues?ón en un momento dado. 53 Nueva Ley de Derecho de la Imagen
• Ar}culo 5. – Transmisibilidad • Los derechos bajo esta Ley son derechos discernibles de propiedad libremente transferibles en todo o en parte a cualquier persona o en?dad con personalidad jurídica a través de una transferencia escrita, incluyendo pero no limitándose a un contrato ﬁrmado entre las partes, poderes, licencias, donaciones y testamentos, o mediante sucesión intestada. 54 Nueva Ley de Derecho de la Imagen
• Ar}culo 6. – Extensión • El derecho a la propia imagen se extenderá hasta 25 años después de la muerte de la persona, independientemente de si se u?lizó para propósitos comerciales durante su vida. • Ar}culo 7. – Prescripción • Toda acción o procedimiento que se lleve a cabo para hacer cumplir cualquier disposición de esta Ley deberá iniciarse no más tarde de un (1) año a par?r de la fecha en que la persona afectada adquirió o debió haber adquirido conocimiento del surgimiento de los hechos que dan pie a la causa de acción que sirve de base para dicha acción o procedimiento. 55 DEFENSAS DEL DERECHO DE
Defensas: • Cuando se u?lice la imagen de una persona en cualquier medio como parte de un reportaje no?cioso, expresión polí?ca, transmisión de evento depor?vo o ar}s?co, o una presentación que tenga un interés público legí?mo, y en donde no sea u?lizada con propósitos comerciales o publicitarios. 56 DEFENSAS DEL DERECHO DE PUBLICIDAD
• Cuando se u?lice la imagen de una persona como parte de una sá?ra o parodia, en donde el propósito principal del uso de la imagen no sea uno comercial o publicitario. • Cuando se u?lice la imagen con propósitos de crí?ca o comentario, académicos o inves?ga?vos, siempre que dicha u?lización no cons?tuya una explotación encubierta de la imagen protegida. 57 DEFENSAS DEL DERECHO DE
• Cuando se u?lice la imagen de una persona accesoria. • EJEMPLO: Bonilla Medina v. Par;do Nuevo Progresista, 140 D.P.R. 294 (1996). 58 DEFENSAS DEL DERECHO DE PUBLICIDAD
• Ar}culo 10. – Inmunidad Limitada • Los dueños o empleados de cualquier medio, incluyendo pero sin limitarse a, periódicos, revistas, vallas publicitarias, internet y estaciones de radio o televisión, en el que aparezca la imagen de una persona en violación de esta Ley, no será responsable excepto en el caso que se establezca que tenían conocimiento de que el uso de esa imagen se hizo sin la autorización requerida por esta Ley. 59 NEGOCIAR O LITIGAR…
60 NEGOCIAR O LITIGAR…
En el negocio del deporte y el entretenimiento;
¨ Factores a considerar:
¿Por qué este @po de negociación es tan complicada? ¨
El increíble caso del Béisbol de Doble AA. El increíble caso de MaQ Harrington. 61 El Injunction y el Negocio del Deporte y el
62 Philadelphia Ball Club, LTD v. Lajoie 51 A. 973
• Napoleon “Nap” Lajoie was regarded as one of the best second baseman in the game and a member of the Philadelphia Phillies. • In 1901, while s?ll under contract with the Phillies, Nap Lajoie made a deal to play with the Philadelphia Athle?cs, a cross-‐town rival at the ?me. • The s?pula?ons under Lajoie’s contract stated that he was not allowed to sign and play for any other club during the term of his contract with the Phillies. • However, the contract gave the Philadelphia Phillies an op?on to discharge a defendant on 10 days’ [email protected] • The plain?ﬀ, Philadelphia Ball Club, LTD. (Philadelphia Phillies), sought an [email protected] on Lajoie. 63 Philadelphia Ball Club, LTD v. Lajoie 51 A. 973 (Pa.
• Uniqueness of an Athlete-‐ Athletes are extremely hard to replace. Every athlete is diﬀerent and their value to the club cannot be measured in a ﬁnite manner. Each player possesses unique skill and character that has its own value to their club. • The court concluded that the defendant’s unique character and skill renders him of peculiar value that cannot be replaced through the open market. 64 Garcia v. World Wide Enter. Co., 132 D.P.R. 378 (1992)
• Los requisitos del [email protected]: • La naturaleza del daño que pueda sufrir el pe?cionario de denegarse el recurso • Si tales daños son o no irreparables • Si existe la probabilidad de que la causa se torne académica de no concederse el injunc?on • Se considera el impacto sobre el interés público, dicha solicitud. • Finalmente si el Tribunal determina que procede el Injunc?on, se puede impedir la prestación de servicios a terceros. 65 Garcia v. World Wide Enter. Co., 132 D.P.R. 378 (1992)
• Los tribunales están impedidos de ordenar el cumplimiento especíﬁco de un contrato cuando éste exige la prestación de servicios personales. “Por tratarse de una ac?vidad personalísima…no cabe decretarse el cumplimiento forzoso en forma especíﬁca, por lo que la ejecución de la obligación ?ene que resolverse en daños y perjuicios.” • Esta limitación, sin embargo, no se ex?ende a la obligación contractual que impone al deudor el deber de no realizar algo que, a no ser por el contrato, podría libremente hacer. 66 Garcia v. World Wide Enter. Co., 132 D.P.R. 378 (1992)
• Contra tal recurso un demandado puede oponer todas la defensas que le otorgan los principios en equidad. • Entre tales defensas encontramos: • (1) consen?miento (acquiescence); • (2) consciencia impura (unclean hands); • (3) incuria (laches); • (4) impedimento (estoppel). 67 CARACTERÍSTICAS DE ESTE TIPO DE
68 1. The presence of agents.
• In recent decades, the rise of players’ unions, collec?ve bargaining, and growing revenue streams from adver?sing and broadcast fees gave players more leverage than ever before—and created a greater need for experts to nego?ate athletes’ increasingly lucra?ve and complex contracts. • Agents can add value by matching players with the right teams and insula?ng them from subpar oﬀers and hard-‐bargaining tac?cs. • But because sports agents typically have rela?onships with many diﬀerent teams and players, and earn a por?on of their clients’ salaries (typically 4% to 10%), they face signiﬁcant conﬂicts of interest. Win-‐Win or Hardball? Learn Top Strategies from Sports Contract [email protected]@on,[email protected]@on Special Report #1, p.1-‐9. 69 2. Lack of alternatives.
• U.S. team-‐sports leagues, including MLB, the Na?onal Football League, and the Na?onal Basketball Associa?on, players enter the system through a drar that requires them to nego?ate with one par?cular team. For most junior players, holding out for a beser deal means si€ng out the season—not an appealing career op?on. • Only when athletes have served their team for a set number of years are they eligible to become free agents and nego?ate with other teams. • Note: Other countries. Win-‐Win or Hardball? Learn Top Strategies from Sports Contract [email protected]@on,[email protected]@on Special Report #1, p.1-‐9. 70 3. No zone of agreement.
• In nego?a?ons outside the realm of sports, par?es typically see value in nego?a?ng with each other only if a zone of possible agreement, or ZOPA, exists. • Agents and sports teams oren begin their nego?a?ons miles apart. Instead of dealing in the ZOPA. • Prepara?on/Homework. Win-‐Win or Hardball? Learn Top Strategies from Sports Contract [email protected]@on,[email protected]@on Special Report #1, p.1-‐9. 71 4. Otras características:
• Estar concientes de la ventana de opotunidades. • La naturaleza del deporte o el entretenimiento. • Prepararse lo mejor posible, siempre conciente de que es lo major para su cliente. • Tener Plan “B”, y explicarselo de antemano al cliente. 72 El increíble caso de Matt Harrington
• In 2000, 18-‐year-‐old Mas Harrington was widely considered the most promising pitcher in the Major League Baseball (MLB) drar. The Colorado Rockies chose him as their seventh pick and then sweetened the pot arer Harrington, his parents, and his agent, Tommy Tanzer, rejected the team’s ﬁrst oﬀer. On behalf of his client, Tanzer turned down the Rockies’ ﬁnal oﬀer of $4 million over two years, though it was a typical oﬀer for a seventh-‐pick player. • Arer a disappoin?ng season in the independent leagues, Harrington entered the 2001 MLB drar, where the San Diego Padres made him the 58th overall selec?on. On the advice of his new agent, Scos Boras, Harrington rejected an oﬀer of $1.25 mil lion over four years and a $300,000 signing bonus. • In 2002, following another lackluster season in the independent leagues, Harrington did poorly in the MLB drar and turned down less than $100,000 from the Tampa Bay Devil Rays. Win-‐Win or Hardball? Learn Top Strategies from Sports Contract [email protected]@on,[email protected]@on Special Report #1, p.1-‐9. 73 El increíble caso de Matt Harrington
• In 2003, the Cincinna? Reds drared Harrington in the 24th round and oﬀered him lisle more than the opportunity to play; again talks fell through. • In 2004, the New York Yankees drared Harrington in the 36th round but passed on making him an oﬀer. • Arer failing to receive any oﬀer in the 2005 drar, Harrington became a free agent. • In 2006, he received a minor-‐league contract from the Chicago Cubs, but he was released before the 2007 season began. • He con?nues to play for independent-‐league teams, earning about $1,000 per month. • His string of botched nego?a?ons ensured that his career ended before it could even begin. Win-‐Win or Hardball? Learn Top Strategies from Sports Contract [email protected]@on,[email protected]@on Special Report #1, p.1-‐9. 74 El increíble caso de Matt Harrington
• Error No. 1: Viewing [email protected]@on as a ﬁxed pie • Nego?ators oren falsely assume that their interests are directly opposed to those of their counterparts. The prevalence of compe??on in our society, ranging from sports to university admissions to corporate promo?on systems, can lead us to view many other situa?ons as win-‐lose. • [email protected]: Share [email protected]: • The simplest way to break through the ﬁxed-‐ pie mindset in a nego?a?on is to disclose informa?on to your counterpart. In par?cular, try to provide informa?on that could lead to wise tradeoﬀs. Win-‐Win or Hardball? Learn Top Strategies from Sports Contract [email protected]@on,[email protected]@on Special Report #1, p.1-‐9. 75 El increíble caso de Matt Harrington
• Error No. 2: Anchoring on the ﬁrst oﬀer • Harrington and his family fell vic?m to another common cogni?ve bias: they were overly aﬀected by the ﬁrst number that entered the nego?a?on. • [email protected]: Reject anchors. • Unprepared [email protected] are far more likely to fall into traps, such as inappropriate anchors, than their prepared counterparts. When you come to the table unprepared, you put yourself at a dis?nct disadvantage. Set concrete goals for the nego?a?on in advance so you won’t be swayed by others’ inﬂuence tac?cs. • Don’t allow other [email protected] to force you to give an answer right away. Instead, schedule breaks between [email protected]@ng sessions that give you @me to think and evaluate. Win-‐Win or Hardball? Learn Top Strategies from Sports Contract [email protected]@on,[email protected]@on Special Report #1, p.1-‐9. 76 El caso de la Federación de Béisbol
Aficionado de Puerto Rico
77 Meléndez v. Federación de Béisbol
NO. 05-1040 (PG)
• Plain;ﬀs are all baseball players, who following their turns at professional ball in the States, were denied reinstatement in the Federación de Beisbol Aﬁcionado de Puerto Rico, and the opportunity to play in its local AA tournament, which begins next week on February 13, 2005. Arer the collapse of reinstatement nego?a?ons, plain?ﬀs ﬁled the present ac?on on January 14, 2005. 78 Meléndez v. Federación de Béisbol
Aficionado NO. 05-1040 (PG)
• Although the Federa?on is allegedly an amateur organiza?on, because its players are paid a salary as per the complaint, and because it is not clear that AA baseball is purely an amateur gig, the exemp?on for pro-‐ball may well be applicable. • Having already determined that there is no subject maser jurisdic?on under the Sherman Act, however, the Court declines to decide whether the exemp?on applies. 79 El caso de la Federación de Béisbol
Aficionado de P. R.
• Calendario luego de 8 meses de negociaciones, sin resultados. • 26 de Enero de 2005 – Injunc?on Trib. Federal. • No jurisdicción falta requisito de comercio interestatal. • 4 de Febrero de 2005 – Injunc?on TPI. • 17 de Marzo de 2005 – Mandamus. • 20 de Abril de 2005 – Vista y acuerdo. • Jugadores profesionales: Comenzaron en la temporada 2006. 80 MUCHAS GRACIAS POR TODO.