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Volume 4, Number 2 Hipatia Press www.hipatiapress.com h Dissonant Have British Jews Fully Assimilated in the UK Labour Market? – Nabil Khattab.………………….………………………….…..…121 Rural Depopulation in China: A Comparative Perspective – Xingan Li…………………………………………………………………………………149 Social Networks and Cognitive Frameworks. The Case #YaMeCansé and the Conflict of Ayotnizapa, México 2014 – Luís César TorresNabel…………………….………................................................................175 The Impact of New Technologies on Leisure Activities in Developed and Emerging Economies – Lynne Ciochetto.………………..…..........194 Book Review: Precariado. Una Carta de Derechos, by Guy Standing – José Taberner Guasp…………………….....……………………………….215 Instructions for authors, subscriptions and further details: http://rimcis.hipatiapress.com Have British Jews Fully Assimilated in the UK Labour Market? Nabil Khattab 1 1) University of Bristol, United Kingdom, and Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel th Date of publication: July 30 , 2015 Edition period: July 2015 – November 2015 To cite this article: Khattab, N. (2015). Have British Jews Fully Assimilated in the UK Labour Market? International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2), 121-148. doi: 10.17583/rimcis.2015.1490 To link this article: http://doi.org/10.17583/rimcis.2015.1490 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE The terms and conditions of use are related to the Open Journal System and to Creative Commons Attribution License (CC-BY). RIMCIS – International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences Vol. 4 No.2 July 2015 pp. 121-148 Have British Jews Fully Assimilated in the UK Labour Market? Nabil Khattab University of Bristol and Hebrew University of Jerusalem Abstract This paper analyses the patterns of occupational attainment and earnings among the Jewish community in Britain using UK Labour Force Survey data (2002-2010). The findings suggest that although British-Jews cannot be distinguished from the majority main stream population of British-White in terms of their overall occupational attainment and earnings, it seems that they have managed to integrate through patterns of self-employment and concentration in the service sector economy, particularly in banking and financial services. It is argued that this selfemployment profile is a Jewish strategy used to minimise dependency on majority group employers and by doing so to helping to escape any religious penalties. Keywords: British Jews, England, UK LFS, labour market, earnings, selfemployment, religious penalty, salariat, Labour Force Survey 2015 Hipatia Press ISSN: 2014-3680 DOI: 10.17583/rimcis.2015.1490 RIMCIS – International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences Vol. 4 No.2 July 2015 pp. 121-148 ¿Se Han Asimilado Plenamente los Judíos Británicos al Mercado Laboral del Reino Unido? Nabil Khattab University of Bristol, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Resumen Este artículo analiza los patrones de logro ocupacional y salarial entre la comunidad judía de Gran Bretanya a partir de los datos de la UK Labour Force Survey (20022010). Los resultados sugieren que, a pesar que no se puede distinguir entre los judíos británicos y la mayoría de blancos británicos por lo que se refiere a su logro ocupacional y salarial, parece que se las han apañado para integrarse a partir de patrones de autoempleo concentrándose en el sector servicios, concretamente en los servicios financieros y bancarios. Se argumenta que este perfil de auto-empleo es una estrategia judía utilizada para minimizar la dependencia respecto de los empleadores pertenecientes al grupo mayoritario y que este hecho les ayuda a escapar a cualquier sanción religiosa. Palabras clave: judíos británicos, Inglaterra, UK LFS, mercado laboral, ganancias, auto-empleo, sanción religiosa, asalariado, Labour Force Survey 2015 Hipatia Press ISSN: 2014-3680 DOI: 10.17583/rimcis.2015.1490 International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) R 123 eligious belief, religious affiliation and attendance have declined in the UK. The decline is most evident in relation to the majority white ethnic group (Crockett & Voas, 2006; Voas & Crockett, 2005), but also in relation to the non-white ethnic minority population, especially when looking at the rates of intergenerational decline (Voas, 2006). However, religious identity for most people in the UK remains important, at least to the extent that they select a particular religious category in the census and the other official surveys whenever the question about religious affiliation is present. Furthermore, evidence from the US, Canada and the UK suggests that religion is significantly related to labour market outcomes (Brown, 2000; Burstein, 2007; Chiswick & Huang, 2008; Khattab, 2009; Khattab & Johnston, 2013; Meng & Sentance, 1984; Model & Lin, 2002; Steen, 1996). These studies have revealed significant labour market differences between various religious groups and denominations. While UK based studies (e.g. Heath & Matrtin, 2013; Khattab & Johnston, 2013) have highlighted the disadvantaged position of Muslims and Sikh, other studies (mainly USbased studies) have focused on the relative advantages of Jews over the majority populations in the US and Canada in terms of education, employment and earnings (Burstein, 2007; Chiswick & Huang, 2008; Meng & Sentance, 1984; Steen, 1996). While Jews in the US have received considerable research attention in the past (Burstein, 2007; Chiswick, 1983; Chiswick, 1985; Chiswick & Huang, 2008; Steinberg, 1977), we know relatively little about how well Jews do in the UK. To the best of our knowledge, not a single study has focused solely on this group, despite their importance and long residence in the UK. This is the first paper to systematically analyse the educational, employment profiles and earnings of British Jews using the Labour Force Survey (LFS) data from 2002-2010. By doing so, this paper expands our knowledge in relation to this specific religious group, but more generally it contributes to the literature on religious differences in the UK labour market and beyond. Most previous studies analysing ethno-religious penalties in the UK labour market have excluded Jews from the analysis (Heath & Martin, 2013; Lindley, 2002; Model & Lin, 2002). However, from the very little that has been published so far in relation to Jews in the UK, there is a sense of considerable educational and employment success (Khattab, 2009; Khattab 124 Khattab – Have Brisish Jews Fully Assimilated? & Johnston, 2013). Yet, the lack of systematic research and data leaves us with speculations on the extent of their success, the factors that explain it and whether Jews in the UK are vulnerable to the hostile attitudes against immigrants and minorities (including White and European groups) throughout the country. This study aims to answer these questions by systematically analysing the educational and economic performance of Jews in the UK and drawing on theories of human capital, cultural distinctiveness and particular strategies, and on theories of group threat and competition. In the next section we will review these theoretical perspectives followed by a discussion of the study context (background). In the fourth section we will discuss our data and methods followed by a presentation of the empirical results. Finally, we discuss these results and provide some conclusions along with implications for further research in this area. Why are Jews Successful? Theoretical Considerations Particular Human Capital General theories of human capital explain between-group differences in the labour market (e.g. employment status and earnings) as a result of their differential educational qualifications and skills (Coleman, 1988; Mincer, 1958). Previous studies on American Jews have pointed out that controlling for human capital between Jews and non-Jews in the US does not explain their between-group differences (Burstein, 2007). A number of researchers have explained the remaining differences (after controlling for human capital) by turning to Jewish particularity, most often the importance that Jews place on education (Chiswick, 1983) and the “Jewish way” of being involved in communal religious organisations (Hartman & Hartman, 1996). However, these studies neither provided any strong empirical support to this unique characteristic of Jews nor explained its source. However, a recent study by Botticini and Eckstein (2007) (see also Botticini & Eckstein, 2005) has provided some explanation on how and where this particular human capital has come from. They argue that following the destruction of the Second Temple, the educational and religious reforms that took place under the new religious leadership International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 125 obligated every male Jewish to read and to teach his sons the Torah (p. 924). This reform created a large number of Jewish males who could read and write, although the majority were farmers, similar to other populations within their areas of residence. With the expansion of urban centres in the Muslim empire during the Seventh and Eighth centuries, Jews began to migrate to these centres as their economic returns there were higher than that in agriculture. Given their initial knowledge in reading and writing, they had an advantage over many other groups which facilitated a rapid move into urban occupations. The high economic return on education within these urban centres (e.g. Baghdad) encouraged these groups to invest even more in education and other related skills as the demand for urban and skilled occupations was rapidly increasing with the Establishment of further new cities, such as Samarra in 836 (p. 939). Thus, Jews as a minority within the Arab and Muslim Empire specialised in urban skilled occupations which helped to generate various forms of capital. These capitals were (and still are to a large extent) highly transferable and Jews have been able to utilise them in every place they have migrated to, including Eastern Europe, Russia and later to the rest of Europe and America. Likewise, these can be key factors in explaining the success of Jews in the west in general and at present times as argued by Botticini and Eckstein (2005). However, these capitals per se are not sufficient to enable Jews (or any other group) to be successful in education and in the labour market without the intervention of other important factors, most notably social networks, residential patterns, minimum or none majority-minority group threat and competition which will be discussed below. Segregation and Social Capital There is a clear tendency amongst Jews, perhaps as with other immigrant groups, to voluntarily live in segregated areas forming areas with high Jewish density. For example, at present, Jews in the UK are one of the most segregated religious groups (Peach, 2006). Their high residential concentration in North London and in the North-West of Britain is remarkably high. The same pattern can also be found in the US (Pagnini & Morgan, 1990), which began with migration of Jews in large numbers from 126 Khattab – Have Brisish Jews Fully Assimilated? Europe (Germany) in the second half of the nineteenth century to America (Bernasconi, 2002). Although there is no research or analysis of how segregation or social networks operate amongst Jews in the UK, an analysis by Portes and Manning (2001) has suggested that segregation and networks amongst Jews were key factors in their economic success. They have argued that “Jewish enclave capitalism depended, for its emergence and development, precisely on those resources made available by a solidaristic ethnic community: protected access to labor and markets, informal source of credit, and business information” (Portes & Manning, 2001, p. 572). The discussion of the Jewish (and Japanese) enclaves has lead them to conclude that there were three prerequisites needed for the emergence of an ethnic enclave economy: the presence of a substantial number of immigrants with business experience acquired in the sending country; the availability of capital; and the availability of labor” (Portes & Manning, 2001, p. 574). There is no reason to suspect that these very same processes are not at play amongst Jews in the UK and therefore it can be argued that their residential segregation and strong social ties (social capital) in conjunction with their initial human and economic capital contributes to their success. Previous studies on minority-majority (racial) inequality and discrimination have also pointed out that some minorities are actually able to minimise or offset the effect of discrimination practiced by dominantmajority groups against them by working within their ethnic economic enclaves (Portes, 1987; Portes & Jensen, 1989) or turning to selfemployment (Abada, Hou & Lu, 2014; Constant & Zimmermann, 2004). Both strategies (working within the ethnic enclave or turning to selfemployment) make workers less dependent on majority-group employers and do not have to compete, not directly at least, with majority-workers, which can significantly reduce the negative impact of discrimination or the sense of threat amongst majority groups. The Lack of Between-Group Competition Previous studies have shown that racial disadvantage (possibly resulting from discrimination) is a major factor accounting for the under-performance of many minority groups in the British labour market, relative to their International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 127 educational qualifications and other resources. Racism by employers and discriminatory practices creates these problems, mostly on the grounds of inter-group physical (phenotype) and cultural differences (Khattab, 2009; Khattab & Johnston, 2013; Meer & Modood, 2009; Modood, 2005). Moreover, studies explaining the disadvantaged positions of BlackAmericans have associated the size and visibility of these groups within local labour markets and the level of discrimination against them (Cohen & Huffman, 2007; Huffman & Cohen, 2004). However, ethnically (in terms of skin colour and visibility), Jews in the UK see themselves and are seen by others (mainstream society) as belonging to the white majority ethnic group. As such, they can access social and economic opportunities similarly to the majority group. In fact, a recent study examined the educational and occupational attainment of various ethnic groups has pointed out that educationally and occupationally Jews do better than Christian-Whites (Khattab, 2009). This in turn suggests that Jews in the UK, unlike most of the other ethno-religious groups, do not face any clear penalties in education or employment. Hence, it is reasonable to hypothesise that Jews in the UK will be educationally and economically more advantaged compared with the majority Christian-White British. Additionally, since Jews have been a minority that has over the centuries specialised in certain urban skilled occupations (Botticini & Eckstein, 2005; Botticini & Eckstein, 2007), they are likely to be found within occupations that require high qualifications and specialisation, where many highly qualified Jews can also work as self-employed. This strategy is very often used by migrants in order to reduce their dependence on majority employers and by doing so they are able to minimise or offset the effect of discrimination (Abada, Hou & Lu, 2014; Constant & Zimmermann, 2004). According to Parker (2004), British Jewish groups choose selfemployment as a form of income generation because of the limited opportunities they have faced in the labour market as well as their skills in self-employment. However, levels of self-employment have decreased among subsequent generations who have widened their opportunities in the labour market. Historically, self-employment has always been a resourceful phenomenon for British Jewish groups across time and place. The majority of male immigrants to London who originally came to the East End of 128 Khattab – Have Brisish Jews Fully Assimilated? London did so to find a better life through employment, while fewer immigrants from Eastern Europe spent their time in religious study. The majority entered the tailoring trade, a seasonal industry with casual employment. The Jewish wife usually helped out in the tailoring workshop, with small direct wages, and tried to balance her role as breadwinner with her role of mother and homemaker (Kershen, 2001). In a study by Waterman and Kosmin (1987) carried out in the 1980s, around a fifth of British Jewish groups (21.9%) classified themselves as self-employed, which was around double compared with the general population (10.8%), although it was also felt that ‘[t]he Jewish community in the United Kingdom is in numerical decline through a combination of forces such as low birth rate, ageing, outmarriage, assimilation and migration’ (ibid, 86). Background The 2011 Census reported 260,000 Jews in the UK (ONS, 2012), where the overwhelming majority of British Jewish groups lived in England (96.7%), 2.5% lived in Scotland and only 0.8% lived in Wales. About 60% of Jewish people live in Greater London. The other 40% are dispersed in other urban areas in the UK such as Manchester, Glasgow, Birmingham, Brighton and Bournemouth (Graham et al., 2007). The Official National Statistics (2005) showed that the Jewish population had a much older structure than the general population in the UK. The median age was 44.3 years compared to 38.1 years for British groups as a whole. Although the size of the Jewish population in Britain as a whole has increased, some studies have pointed out that in terms of faith and belonging to the Jewish religion, there is a tendency for some people to convert and move out of the faith, especially in Scotland (Voas, 2006). The vast majority of Jews in Britain are white, or at least they tend to select the category of White in the census. While orthodox Jews are visible within the public space due to their dress, most secular Jews or those who do not necessarily adhere to Jewish dress code are invisible in the public space. In other words, they are likely to be considered part of the dominant race or majority ethnic group, and as such facilitating their access to social and economic resources. Within particular organisations and institutions, they International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 129 are likely to be treated on an equal basis, unlike African-Caribbean other ethnic minorities, as argued by Edwards (2008). In terms of education, the 2001 UK Census indicated that more than half of British Jewish groups (55.7%) aged 25-54 had higher level qualifications compared with about a quarter (25.6%) of the general population in the same age category. These figures demonstrate a strong relationship between age and educational attainment levels since successive generations have experienced various educational improvements. Since 1960, the Jewish community began to focus on higher education levels because they believed that the more parents became educated the greater the success of their own children in the future. It was a belief that gaining higher educational levels increased the competitive economic advantage of young British Jewish groups and thereby their potential future earnings (Graham, Schmoll & Waterman, 2007). British Jewish groups have consistently focused on the educational attainments of subsequent generations (ONS, 2007). Based on the 2001 Census, full-time employed British Jewish groups accounted for 48.6% of all Jewish people aged 25 over compared to 61.6% of the general population. The 2001 Census also showed that Jewish young people aged 16-24 years were less likely to be economically active (45.1%) than their counterparts from the general population in England and Wales (65%). This is because young Jewish people were more likely to be in education (89.2% were in schools, colleges and universities) compared to 76.2% of the population in England and Wales as a whole. More than twothirds of British Jewish groups (65.9%) aged 25 and above were economically active compared to 66.8% of the general population (ONS, 2001). The above description gives a sense of the remarkable success of this minority group. In this study I utilise recent data obtained from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) in order to systematically analyse the characteristics of Jewish educational attainment and employment outcomes over a nine-year period (2002-20010). In the next section I discuss the data and methods used here. 130 Khattab – Have Brisish Jews Fully Assimilated? Methods and Data To examine our questions and argument data obtained from the UK Labour Force Survey has been utilised. In order to increase the sample of British Jewish, April-June quarters over a period of nine years (2002-2010) were pooled. The analysis was carried out on a final sample of 395,643 Christian and Jewish men and women aged 19-65. The LFS provides a wide range of information on each respondent, including qualifications, employment patterns, earnings, ethnic and religious backgrounds, place of birth, nationality and migration histories making it an excellent source of data for this study. The possibility of pooling a number of surveys over a number of years makes it viable to study relatively small groups using a sufficiently large sample, as is carried out here. Other ethnic or religious groups other than Jewish groups (compared to Christian groups) were excluded for theoretical and analytical purposes, and in order to keep the comparisons between Jewish groups and the majority group as distinct as possible. In addition, although most of the other groups have been of research interest for some time, the Jewish community in the UK, especially in comparison to Christian groups, has been somewhat neglected. In what follows the variables used in this study are described. Dependent Variables The dependent variable here are occupational class and earnings. In relation to the occupational classes, a five-category version of the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) is used. The original onedigit scale includes nine categories. For the sake of simplifying the final model, and in order to avoid empty cells or cells with low counts, a fivecategory scale as shown in Table 1 below is utilised. Semi-skilled and unskilled manual occupations are used as the reference group. This scheme is preferred and not the NS-SEC class scheme as the interest is in examining the influence of being self-employed on class allocation. Self-employment has been taken into account in constructing the NS-SEC, especially in relation to the petty bourgeoisie class, hence the use of the ISCO-88 scheme. International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 131 Table 1 The occupational categories used for the dependent variable in the study Original scale (9 categories) Re-coded scale (5 categories) Legislators, senior officials and managers Professionals Technicians and associate professionals Managerial, professional and semiprofessional occupations Clerks Low non-manual occupations Service workers and shop and market sales workers Service, shop and market sales workers Skilled agricultural and fishery workers Craft and related trades workers Skilled manual occupations Plant and machine operators and assemblers Elementary occupations Semi-skilled and unskilled manual occupations Regarding the earnings (pay) variable, it has been measured using the ‘gross hourly pay’ variable as it has been derived by the Office of National Statistics. In the regression model I have used the natural logarithm transformation to fit the normal distribution requirement (Oaxaca, 1973). Due to potential auto-correlation of wages within specific occupations, a mixed model (multilevel analysis) will be used with the two-digit occupations (the two-digit British Standard Occupational Classification SOC90/SOC2000) defined as the level-2 (Snijders & Bosker, 2002). All the other individual variables will be used within the fixed effect part of the model. Independent Variables Religion: the variable has been coded into two categories: Christians (reference group) and Jewish groups. This variable does not measure religiosity or the extent to which respondents practice religion but only as a 132 Khattab – Have Brisish Jews Fully Assimilated? category of a self-identified faith affiliation as measured in the LFS. In order to avoid including other minority ethnic groups in the analysis, the Christian and Jewish faith categories have included respondents who have identified themselves as being white British when answering the question on ethnicity. Age: used as a continuous variable. Age squared: was introduced to control for the non-linear relationship between age and earnings. Marital status: coded into three categories; single, divorced or separated and married or living with a partner. The latter group was used as the reference. Sex: Gender is included in the final model as a dummy variable (1 indicates men and 0 indicates women). The 0 category was used as the reference. Year of survey: this variable has been used in order to control for the change in variance within the dependent variable due to period effect. Educational qualifications: These have been re-coded into five categories: high tertiary (academic), low tertiary (post-secondary, but pre-university), high secondary (A-Levels), low secondary and finally people with no qualifications. The last category was used as the reference group. Full-time employment: a dummy variable has been included in order to control for variations within the mode of employment; full-time versus parttime. Public sector: due the differences in wages between private and public sectors, a dummy variable was introduced with private sectors as the reference group. Length of experience within current employer: this is a numeric variable measuring the length of experience in years. Generation: first generation was defined as those who arrived in Britain after the age of six and were not born in the UK. Second generation refers to those people who were born in the UK or arrived before the age of six. Region: due to the London pay allowance, dummy variables for Inner London and Outer London have been included in the model for pay with the rest of the UK as a comparator. Self-employment: This variable has been re-coded into two categories; those who were self-employed (1) and those who were in any of the other employment categories such as employees, unemployed and economically inactive. Controlling for this variable turned out to be highly important. International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 133 Interaction terms: two sets of interaction terms have been defined, one for religion by qualification and the other religion by self-employment. The first interaction term reveals the importance of qualifications amongst Jewish groups, and the second examines the influence of self-employment among Jewish groups. Findings First, descriptive analysis is presented through which Figures 1-5 and Table 2 will be discussed, followed by the multivariate analysis in Tables 3-5, where factors affecting the occupational class position and earnings of Jewish and Christian groups in Britain are discussed. Descriptive Analysis Figure 1 below illustrates the enormous differences between UK Jewish and Christian groups in terms of qualifications, particularly in relation to higher qualifications (high tertiary). Jewish men and women are far more likely than Christian men and women to hold academic degrees. Almost one out of two Jewish men, and just over one out of three Jewish women holds a university degree. However, less than one fifth of Christian men and women can claim such an educational outcome. It appears that the main gender differences amongst Jewish groups are in relation to higher qualifications, whereas differences amongst Christians are in relation to high and low secondary. Compared to Jewish women, Jewish men are over-represented in higher qualifications, and comparable Christian men are over-represented in the category of high secondary. Figure 2 above presents the economic status of men and women within both religions. The only noteworthy finding here is the proportion of selfemployment amongst Jewish men and women. It appears that, compared to Christians, there is a clear tendency among Jewish men and women not to be in employment but instead to be self-employed. Just under a third (29%) of all Jewish men and over tenth (13%) of all Jewish women are self-employed. Furthermore, there is clear tendency amongst Jewish men and women to be concentrated in some economic sectors more than in others, as can be seen in Table 2 below. For example, over a third of Jewish men (36%) and 134 Khattab – Have Brisish Jews Fully Assimilated? about a quarter of Jewish women (23%) are in the banking and finance sectors. The comparable percentages for Christian men and women are 16% and 15% respectively. Figure 1. Educational qualifications for Jewish and Christian men and women aged 19-65, UK LFS 2002-2010 (N=379,883) [%] Figure 2. Economic status for Jewish and Christian men and women aged 19-65, UK LFS 2002-2010 (N=395,643) [%] 135 International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) Table 2 Economic sector for Jewish and Christian men and women aged 19-65, UK LFS 2002-2010 (N=233,287) [%] Jewish men Christian men Jewish women Christian women Manufacturing, construction, agriculture, fishing 14 Distribution, hotels, restaurants 18 Transport, communications 6 Banking & finance 36 Public administration, education, health & other services 26 38 15 10 16 21 7 14 2 23 53 11 19 4 15 52 Figure 3. Proportion of self-employment by economic sector for Jews and Christians aged 19-65, UK LFS 2002-2010 (N=233,287) [%] Furthermore, Jewish men, more so than Christian men, are likely to obtain jobs in education, health and the public administration sectors. Jewish 136 Khattab – Have Brisish Jews Fully Assimilated? women are as likely as Christian women to obtain jobs in this sector. Finally, it is worth highlighting the high concentrations of Christian men in the manufacturing, construction, agriculture and fishing sectors (38%). As shown earlier (in Figure 2 above), Jewish men tend to be selfemployed more than Christians. Figure 3 below shows that this tendency runs across all the five economic sectors in this study, particularly in the banking and finance sectors. Within each sector, the proportion of selfemployed Jewish groups is significantly greater than among Christians. Turning to Figure 4 below, it demonstrates even greater differences between Jewish and Christian groups. Jewish men and women are far more advantaged than their Christian counterparts. It appears that almost four out five Jewish men (81%) and about three out of five Jewish women (61%) are employed within the managerial, professional and semi-professional categories. Figure 4. Occupational classification for Jewish and Christian men and women aged 19-65, UK LFS 2002-2010 (N=342,850) [%] International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 137 Figure 5 presents the mean gross hourly pay for Jews and Christians. It shows that on average, Jewish men have the highest gross hourly pay. Their average pay was about 170% higher than the average pay among their Christian counterparts throughout the period 2002 to 2010 (£22.89 and £13.29 foe Jews and Christian respectively). A similar pattern was also found among women, but the difference between Jewish women and Christian women was slightly lower and stood at £3.37 per hour, which is about 35% more for Jewish women throughout the period under study. In fact, the average earning among Jewish women was similar to that among Christian men (£13.25 and £13.17 among Christian men and Jewish women respectively). The above data show that Jewish have a higher educational attainment, better occupational attainment and higher earnings. The data also show that Jews have different profile, especially in terms of self-employment and concentration within some economic sectors more than in others. It is possible that the higher educational attainment and their self-employment within some economic sectors explain their occupational and pay advantage? The next multivariate analysis helps answer this question. Figure 5. The gross hourly pay Jewish and Christian men and women aged 19-65, UK LFS 2002-2010 (N=78,999) [%] 138 Khattab – Have Brisish Jews Fully Assimilated? Multivariate Analysis Results of the multinomial logistic regression model contrasting the four occupational categories with the category of semi-skilled and unskilled occupations are shown in Table 3. The focus nevertheless is on the first category of managerial, professional and semi-professional occupations. Normatively, this is without doubt the most prestigious and the most desirable category. The coefficients reported in the table are odds-ratios. An odds-ratio of one (1) indicates lack of influence of the factor in question. A coefficient less than one illustrates a negative influence and a greater than one coefficient indicates a positive impact. The first important finding to highlight refers to the main effect of religion, which is hugely significant, suggesting that Jewish groups are about six times more likely to be in the managerial and professional category than Christians. Because religion is part of an interaction term, the main effect of religion refers to those having no qualification or is not self-employed. Men, surprisingly, are less likely than women to be in the first category relative to the reference category of semi-skilled and unskilled occupations. However, looking at the category of service workers, shop and market sales workers, it seems that men are about four and half times more likely to be in this category than women, relative to the reference category. Qualifications (amongst Christians, since it is part of an interaction term with religion) operate in the expected direction. Compared to no qualification, any other level of qualification, especially high tertiary, qualifications increase the chances of being in any occupational category relative to the last category. This influence is notably higher in relation to the first category of managerial and professional occupations. In turning to the impact of qualifications amongst the Jewish group shown at the bottom part of Table 3, it seems that impact of qualification operates in the same way as among the majority group, but with one minor difference. Taking the interaction term into account, it seems that Jews with higher education are 29 times more likely to be in the salariat class, whereas Christians with higher education are about 144 times more likely to be in the salariat relative to people with no qualifications. This difference between the International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 139 Table 3 Multinomial regression (odds-ratios) for occupational class for Jewish and Christian men and women aged 19-65, UK LFS 2002-2010 (the base group is semiskilled and unskilled workers) Variables Age 2nd Generation Marital status, Base: married Single Widowed or Separated Religion, Base: Christians Jews Gender, Base: women Men Qualifications, Base: No qualification High tertiary Low tertiary High secondary Low secondary Employment status, Base: employed, unemployed & inactive Self employed Interaction of religion by qualifications Jews X High tertiary Jews X Low tertiary Jews X High secondary Jews X Low secondary Interaction of religion by self employment Jews X Self-Employed Chi-square (df) Cox and Snell * P<0.05 ** P<0.01 Managerial, professional & semi-pro occupations 1.00** Low nonmanual occupations Skilled manual occupations 1.01** Service workers, shop market sales workers 0.99** 0.47** 0.54** 0.97 0.73** 0.57** 0.79** 0.91** 0.75** 0.79** 0.91** 0.87** 0.92** 6.36** 2.00 0.48 1.00 0.67** 0.11** 4.32** 0.11** 145.24** 35.01** 6.98** 3.92** 14.38** 7.10** 4.51** 4.24** 3.40** 5.02** 4.58** 1.38** 4.83** 4.77** 2.96** 1.94** 0.59** 2.35** 0.20** 0.90** 0.20** 0.16** 0.27** 0.42** 0.54 0.56 0.56 1.06 1.40 0.72 0.47 1.19 0.53 0.54 0.85 1.11 1.70* 2.33* 1.16 2.28* 184,127.64 (96) P<0.001 0.468 0.98** 140 Khattab – Have Brisish Jews Fully Assimilated? groups in relation to the impact of qualifications might be associated with a reduced value due to qualification inflation among Jews. The reduced value of qualifications among Jews can be seen in the exceptionally low (lower than 1) and statistically significant odds ratios for the interaction terms of Jewish group X qualifications (respectively 0.20, 0.16, 0.27 and 0.42 for each qualification in descending order). Since in general the impact of higher qualification on obtaining salariat jobs is still very positive and significant, this reduction in the value of qualification cannot be seen as a disadvantage, at least not a structural disadvantage. Furthermore, the reduced value of qualifications among Jewish groups is balanced by the positive impact of self-employment. Self-employment among Christians (the main effect) is negative for most of the occupational categories, and especially for the category of managerial and professional jobs (0.59). But the impact of self-employment amongst Jewish groups is positive (1.70). That is, being a self-employed Jew increases the odds of obtaining managerial or professional occupation. This suggests that Jewish groups might be using self-employment as a path into the salariat class. In order to scrutinise these results further, predicted probabilities for obtaining a salariat job have been calculated using two regression models in addition to the one presented earlier. The first controls only for the religious background and the second controls for the other individual factors while excluding the religious background. These different models allow the revelation of any differences in the likelihood of obtaining a salariat job that are associated with the religious background (religious penalty or advantage) (Carmichael & Woods, 2000). These probabilities are presented in Table 4 for a typical person defined as someone aged 30 to 35 (male or female), married, with academic degree and lives in inner London. The results in Table 4 show a very large difference between the gross probability (Model 1) and the net probability (Model 3) for both Jewish men and women. The initial difference was about 27% and 18% in favour of a typical Jewish man and woman respectively relative to Christian WhiteBritish typical person. This probability has been sharply dropped to only 2.4% among a Jewish typical person (men and women) suggesting that the initial large difference we have seen is due to individual and human capital differences between the groups. International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 141 Table 4. Gross and net percentage differences of typical^ persons joining the salariat class Ethno-religious background Model 1* Model 2** Model 3*** Men Model 1* Model 2** Model 3*** Women Jewish white-British 27.051 -0.362 2.440 18.789 0.133 2.428 Christian white British 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Source: Labour Force Survey 2002-2010, authors’ calculations Notes: * Ethno-religious background only ** Full model without Ethno-religious background *** Full model with Ethno-religious background ^ Typical person is someone aged 30 to 35 (male or female), married, with academic degree and lives in inner London To examine earnings among the groups, 3 different models are discussed in Table 5. The firs model examines the difference between Jews and the majority group while controlling only for occupations as Level-2. The results of this model show a significant difference between the groups, in that the logged gross hourly pay among Jews is significantly higher than that among Christians. In the second model all other individual factors except for qualifications are included. The results show a sharp drop in the coefficient that is associated with being a Jew from 0.117 to 0.066, but this coefficient is still statistically significant. The third model shows that including qualification has caused the coefficient of Jews to drop further down to only 0.04, a level at which the coefficient also loses its statistical significance suggesting that individual differences and human capital explain the pay difference between Jews and Christians. 142 Khattab – Have Brisish Jews Fully Assimilated? Table 5. Mixed (multilevel) linear model for logged gross hourly pay (N= 38,288) Parameter Intercept Religion, base=Christian White-British Jewish White-British Age Age square Male Marital status, base-married Single Separated/divorced Dependent Children Under 10 Region, base=other regions Inner London Outer London Model 1 2.378 Model 2 1.436 Model 3 1.22 0.117** 0.066** 0.036** 0.000 0.146** 0.04 0.036** 0.00 0.134** -0.035** -0.022** 0.033** -0.04** -0.015** 0.031** 0.292** 0.185** 0.261** 0.181** Part-time 0.087** 0.084** Public sector -0.042** -0.023** Length of employment in months Qualification, base=no qualification High tertiary Low tertiary Secondary education Other 0.001** 0.001** 0.374** 0.229** 0.131** 0.049** Year, base=2008-2010 2002-2004 2005-2007 -0.194** -0.091** -0.194** -0.089** -0.183** -0.081** Occupational control at level-2 Residual Level-2 variance Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion (BIC) Yes 0.18 0.12 90351.94 Yes 0.16 0.10 81788.72 Yes 0.16 0.06 74644.03 Discussion and Concluding Thoughts The observations made in this paper are in line with the general view that Jewish groups perform well in education and in the labour market. They are hugely overrepresented in higher education and within managerial, professional and semi-professional occupations, similarly to Jews in the US (Burstein, 2007; Chiswick, 1983; Chiswick, 1985; Chiswick & Huang, 2008; International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 143 Hartman & Hartman, 1996). Their investment in education on the one hand and their concentration in economic sectors such as finance and banking on the other gives support to the argument of Botticini and Eckstein (2007) on how human capital is invested in order to guarantee a high level of economic returns. Additionally, the findings of this study have shown that Jews in the UK are significantly over-represented in the self-employment category within each of the economic sectors that have been analysed here, most notably in finance and banking. Note that historically a large proportion of Jews specialised in the finance sector (e.g. moneylending), especially in Middle Ages Europe (Botticini & Eckstein, 2005, p. 942). Self-employment amongst minorities is often a strategy of survival, especially during economic recessions (Abada, Hou & Lu, 2014; Constant & Zimmermann, 2004), and through which these minorities and immigrants can reduce the risk of unemployment. Other minorities tend to use selfemployment in order to avoid discrimination and increase their economic returns on their qualifications by reducing their dependence on majority employers (Portes & Manning, 2001). Our analysis here suggests that Jews in the UK are not different in this regard. It seems that turning to selfemployment Jews in the UK secure higher economic returns within the economic sectors within which they specialise. Moreover, it minimises the risk of facing penalties (i.e. discrimination) on the grounds of their Jewishness, given the fact that previously they experienced racialisation and some hostility, especially in the early days of Jewish immigration from Russia and Poland (Knepper, 2007). To sum up, British Jews have higher educational achievements, which have translated into occupational and earnings attainment as high as the majority White-British providing an evidence of high assimilation within the UK labour market as in politics and other areas. No doubt their success in education and the labour market is also related to social networks and strong social ties between families, firms and organisations. In the current study we could not examine this hypothesis. Further research is needed in order to examine the extent and ways through which social networks (social capital) is been utilised amongst Jews in the UK. 144 Khattab – Have Brisish Jews Fully Assimilated? 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Email: [email protected] Instructions for authors, subscriptions and further details: http://rimcis.hipatiapress.com Rural Depopulation in China: A Comparative Perspective Xingan Li 1 1) Tallinn University Law School, Estonia th Date of publication: July 30 , 2015 Edition period: July 2015 – November 2015 To cite this article: Li, X. (2015). Rural Depopulation in China: A Comparative Perspective. International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2), 149-174. doi: 10.17583/rimcis.2015.1503 To link this article: http://doi.org/10.17583/rimcis.2015.1503 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE The terms and conditions of use are related to the Open Journal System and to Creative Commons Attribution License (CC-BY). RIMCIS – International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences Vol. 4 No.2 July 2015 pp. 149-174 Rural Depopulation in China: A Comparative Perspective Xingan Li Tallin University Law School Abstract Modernization of Chinese society in recent three decades witnessed significant retreat of primary industry and growth of secondary and tertiary industries. The result of rapid urbanization has been accompanied with rapid rural depopulation, context of which is currently labeled by intertwining of many correlation factors. The purpose of this article is to give a general discourse of depopulation in China from comparative perspective based on literature review, long term experience and observation, and two times of fieldwork in June 2007 and June 2010. Rural depopulation can be perceived as a social problem and as a reason of other social problems, affecting sustainable socio-economic development. In turn, rural depopulation and relevant policy-making are also interplaying, making the issue more irreversible. The situation in countryside China is still in the track towards deterioration and emergent action is required if such a process is to be interfered. Keywords: depopulation, China, rural migration, urbanization, decision-making, law and order 2015 Hipatia Press ISSN: 2014-3680 DOI: 10.17583/rimcis.2015.1503 RIMCIS – International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences Vol. 4 No.2 July 2015 pp. 149-174 La Despoblación Rural en China: Una Perspectiva Comparada Xingan Li Tallin University Law School Resumen La modernización de la sociedad china de las últimas tres décadas ha presenciado un retroceso significativo del primer sector así como un aumento del secundario y el terciario. La acelerada urbanización ha ido acompañada de una rápida despoblación rural, contexto que es actualmente caracterizado por un entrelazamiento de muchos factores correlacionados. El propósito de este artículo es proporcionar un discurso general de la despoblación en China des de una perspectiva comparada, en base a la revisión bibliográfica, la experiencia y observación de muchos años, y dos momentos de trabajo de campo, en junio de 2007 y en junio de 2010. La despoblación rural puede percibirse como un problema social y como la causa de otros problemas sociales, afectando el desarrollo socio-económico sostenible. A su vez, la despoblación rural y el diseño de políticas relevantes también interactúan haciendo de la situación aún más irreversible. El ámbito rural en China aún está en vías de deterioro, por lo que requiere una acción urgente si se quiere intervenir en dicho proceso. Palabras clave: despoblación, China, migraciones rurales, urbanización, toma de decisión, ley y orden 2015 Hipatia Press ISSN: 2014-3680 DOI: 10.17583/rimcis.2015.1503 International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) M 151 igration, whether at the international level or at the state level, has been a focus of sociological research for centuries. While the significance of the agricultural sector in economic development is gradually losing (see Table 1, employment in primary industry), an increasingly great proportion of rural population chooses to emigrate from their native land towards urban areas or abroad. Urbanization has always been accompanied by rural-urban migration. Both urban areas and rural areas can benefit from hosting or donating migrants. Social problem can also occur in both the urban destination communities and the rural donor communities. At least three different attitudes towards the flow of human resources have been taken by individuals or institutions that have interests: being indifferent, for and against, each having sufficient reasons. Table 1. Development of Employment Structure in China during 1990-2010 Total Primary Secondary 1990 100.0 60.1 21.4 1995 100.0 52.2 23.0 2000 100.0 50.0 22.5 2005 100.0 44.8 23.8 2010 100.0 38.1 27.8 Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2010). Tertiary 18.5 24.8 27.5 31.3 34.1 Rural emigration has mostly been inquired in industrialized countries for centuries, by discoursing in the name of depopulation. In developing countries, such as China, rural labor population is also enduring consistent decline in recent decades. However, the impact of emigration on donor communities is an understudied subject (Fan, 2008, p. 117). In recent years, the most unique tendency in these Chinese villages is that the permanent residents are decreasing and aging. Because school age children become fewer and fewer, some primary schools in these villages have been closed or are projected to close. School age children have been transferred to those schools still opening. Old people are left without any cultural activities and entertainment. Cultural facility has not been established yet. The health and caring services are not completely ready for an ageing community. No new improvement has happened for the agricultural production, and farmers cannot get increased income from the 152 Li – Rural Depopulation in China land. Many young farmers choose to work permanently or temporarily in towns and cities, with or without their families accompanying. Some migrated unmarried young farmers even engaged in gang activities in towns and cities and were sentenced to imprisonment. Such a situation was rare in the long history of these villages before. Some official actions have been taken to solve the problem, yet their effects are not evaluated (Yuan, 2009; Liu & Liu, 2010; Wang et al., 2013; Xiang, 2013). Even though the repercussions of rural-urban migration for socioeconomic development have been of long-standing interest to scholars, little literature has explored the consequences of emigration on the rural communities in the destination area of this study. Unique process of such social transformation is freshly demonstrating in rural areas at present. Chinese scholars call these phenomena “empty nest”, not only referring to empty nest families, but also empty nest communities. Recalling that “empty nest families” has traditionally been a research theme in the discipline of psychology, research from the viewpoint of sociology has not been emphatically highlighted. It is an issue that has not been paid much attention. The escalating significance of rural-urban migration leads to a great number of people exposed to new social environments and new lifestyles. An understanding of the reorganization of rural communities associated with rural-urban migration has the potential to influence social policy and the structuring of rural governance through an appreciation of the differential social needs of rural areas relative to traditional communities. In sum, this is a fresh social phenomena and a fresh sociological topic. This article will analyze the phenomena of rural emigration which is typically observed in economies in the premature phases of industrialization. The world will witness the largest population movement in human history. The unprecedented population movements have extremely critical implications to the economic and social stability. The evaluations of the existing policies and comparative analysis on different strategies within a region can serve not only as an assessment of the existing policies but a guideline for future policymaking. This article will be concentrated on the process of migration in China and its medium and long-term impact on migrants, their families, and rural communities, with significant endeavors International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 153 for comparing previous international-wide studies on the same phenomena otherwise in other countries. Besides literature review, the article was based on the author’s long term empirical observation of countryside China, and two times of fieldwork in Hohhot, Inner Mongolia, one in June 2007 and the other in June 2010. The author was born, raised and educated there in his early years, and has still had close connections with local people. Taking such conveniences, the author experienced, observed, or acquired information about the process of depopulation occurred there over years. Much of the writing in this article utilized the author’s direct and indirect knowledge about his changing and defaced homeland. Following this introduction, the second part of the article will turn to context of rural depopulation in China. The third part deals with depopulation as a social problem. The fourth part is revolving around correlation factors of depopulation. The fifth part looks at results of depopulation. The sixth part examines policy-making and its effectiveness. The last part will conclude the article. Context of Rural Depopulation in China The cataract of rural-urban labor migrants occurs in China as it has been undergoing a multi-dimensional change since the introduction of state policy of reform and opening up at the end of 1978. While towns and cities acquired most of the inclined policy and investment, rural areas were basically untouched by the public sector. Economic activities were concentrated in urban areas, where there was not sufficient labor force. Thus economic development provokes crucial structural transformations, such as changes in the demographic structure and the social control system. The socalled surplus rural labor force seeks jobs in urban areas where there are more employment opportunities and higher salary. The central factor of the transformation is that demographic imbalances between rural and urban areas rendered wide-ranging movement of labor force from rural areas to secondary and tertiary industries in urban areas (Williamson, 1998). The decomposition of traditional household registry (hukou) system signifies the loosening of official control over rural-urban migration, which 154 Li – Rural Depopulation in China results in tremendous changes in the labor market in China. Although there is not an exact figure depicting the actual scale of such a human movement, a latest official statistics estimated that approximately 131.81 million people of rural origin working in urban areas of China in 2006 (National Bureau of Statistics of People’s Republic of China, 2008). Table 2 shows some fundamental aspects of such a process. Table 2. Totality and Constituents of Rural Labour Emigrants Totality of rural labour emigrants (million) Constituents of sexes of labour emigrants (%) Male Female Constituents of ages of labour emigrants (%) Younger than 20 years 21-30 years 31-40 years 41-50 years Older than 51 years Constituents of educational background of labour emigrants (%) Illiterate Primary school Junior middle school Senior middle school Colleges and and higher NorthCentral Western eastern areas areas areas National Eastern areas 131.81 38.46 49.18 40.35 3.82 64.0 36.0 65.8 34.2 62.8 37.2 63.1 36.9 70.2 29.8 16.1 36.5 29.5 12.8 5.1 14.2 36.1 27.3 15.4 7.0 17.6 36.6 29.3 11.9 4.6 16.1 36.7 32.2 11.1 3.9 16.7 35.4 25.4 15.3 7.2 1.2 18.7 70.1 8.7 1.3 0.9 15.0 70.9 11.4 1.8 1.1 16.5 73.0 8.4 1.0 1.7 24.9 65.5 6.9 1.0 0.5 20.1 71.8 5.9 1.7 Adapted according to National Bureau of Statistics of People’s Republic of China (2008, Table 3). Rural-urban migration has favorable and unfavorable consequences for origin and target communities alike. The most perceived impacts on rural origins are that rural migrants contribute to poverty reduction through remittance but also leave their rural communities relatively disintegrated and International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 155 undeveloped. The migration of younger generation means loss of society’s interest in maintaining and developing traditional cultural inheritance. The psychological gap between older generation armed with old tradition and younger generation facilitated with new social skills becomes larger and larger. Therefore, for the cultural context in rural areas, the greatest challenge is not change of the tradition; it is the disappearance of the tradition. The most perceived impacts on urban targets are that new comers fulfill the requirements of labor in the process of urbanization but also compete with former urban residents in housing, employment, transport and welfare, and causing other social problems. Urban cultural content was also changed by the influence of large amount of rural labors, which learned to adapt to the new social environment, urban culture, and discipline in new employment. However, with the integration of new rural comers into urban population, urban spiritual existence becomes stronger and stronger. Many previous studies of migration have focused on urban areas, left the rural donor communities generally neglected. This article endeavors to investigate the impacts of rural labor population movement on rural donor communities. Table 2 tells us that in China, young and more educated rural population are moving out of their local rural areas, leaving the countryside to old and more illiterate residents, particularly females. Low comparative income out of the agriculture discourages people from farming, while migration of part of the family members to the towns and cities does not motivate them to invest in constructing their home. As the time passes, they finally move away, or return when they get old, with their children educated and employed in towns and cities. Therefore, urbanization brings about prosperity to towns and cities, while depopulation leads the villages to disappear. In fact, it was estimated that, about 20 Chinese administrative villages are naturally disappearing due to migration, pitifully daily (National Bureau of Statistics of People’s Republic of China, 2010). Depopulation as a Social Problem and as a Reason of Other Social Problems Internationally, even though there is a trend of counterurbanization in some 156 Li – Rural Depopulation in China developed countries (Hodge & Whitby, 1986; Kayondo, n.d.), which means a movement of urban population to rural areas, causing an increase of rural population, many countries, regions, in particular, rural communities in developed (Varouhakis, 2000; Imanishi, 2003; Australian Government Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, 2006; Council of Europe, 2004), transformation (Knappe, 1998; Borodina & Borodina, 2007; Eberhardt, 1994) and developing countries (Kayondo, n.d.; Fan, 2008) are suffering from emigration of labour population, ranging from Western Europe, Africa, Asia, Oceania to America (Varouhakis, 2000; Imanishi, 2003; Australian Government Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, 2006). Particular attention has been paid to the processes of depopulation as well as their range and intensity (Stasiak & Mirowski, 1990; Eberhardt, 1994). Areas of specific environmental patterns, for example, mountainous areas are particularly investigated (Knight, 1994). Falling number of rural population and process of depopulation becomes one of the biggest threats of low standards of living (Borodina & Borodina, 2007). Emigration may well lead to welfare losses (Mann, 2005). The phenomena of rural depopulation have been an intense continuing process (Council of Europe, 1980; Collantes & Pinilla, 2004). It has been considered one of the pessimistic tendencies in social transformation, together with worsening of living conditions for rural population, increasing of mass poverty, growing unemployment, and sharp income differentiation (Borodina & Borodina, 2007). Rural depopulation, land abandonment, and loss of biodiversity usually proceed in a long run but are often irreversible (Westhoek, van den Berg & Bakkes, 2006). The issue of depopulation is primarily treated as economic opportunity and prospects for economic regeneration (Varouhakis, 2000; Stockdale, 2006). Not all areas are able to partake in growth in the long term (Australian Government Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, 2006). Jobs are in the cities and working in an office is more attractive than doing agricultural jobs (Varouhakis, 2000). The concentration of urban population and depopulation in rural areas has resulted in ageing in depopulated areas and lack of social infrastructure systems in urban areas (Imanishi, 2003; Mann, 2005). Because depopulation International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 157 is primarily driven by the out-migration of young and bright adults (Stockdale, 2006), the process of depopulation shaped the characteristic picture of the age structure of donor communities, dominated by the elderly (Skowronek et al., 2005). Usually, the viability of small rural communities becomes a major concern (Australian Government Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, 2006). In China, depopulation of rural areas well means migration of younger generation into urban areas, leaving older generation behind. A few young people there caught the governance power, usually not by democracy nor by knowledge, but by force and by fight. It is not rare that Chinese scholars claimed that majority of the Chinese rural areas were currently controlled by gangs themselves, or by powerful local figures with the help of paid gangs (Yu, 2003). They controlled resources, investment, income, and opportunities. Compared with desolation of arable land, old houses, poverty of old population, and lack of education and healthcare facility, control by gangs was more than destructive. Even worse, those gangs or those who employ gangs were themselves members of the Chinese Communist Party, which is generally more powerful and prestigious but is taken as protective umbrella. Gang governance is not only destroying cultural tradition, but is also extinguishing conscience. This reminds the historical scene of 1940s when many of the rural Chinese areas were under control of local bandits. This also reminds the chaotic situation in some war-tossed countries in today’s world. Their forms of gangs, bandits, or warlords are different, but their contents are similar: causing a lack of democracy, a lack of sense of security, and residents’ wait for migration or disappearance. Correlation Factors of Depopulation In international literature, correlation factors of rural emigration can always be socio-economic (Gawryszewski & Potrykowska, 1988; Anderlik, 2004). Usually, rural emigration has been considered driven by decrease in agricultural employment, lack of employment opportunity outside agriculture, and more economic opportunity in urban areas (Drudy & Wallace, 1971; Douglass, 1971; Varouhakis, 2000; Knappe, 1998; Rao, 158 Li – Rural Depopulation in China 2007). This is often termed push and pull effects: push effects caused by surplus in the agricultural employment, and pull effects created by attraction of urban employment (World Bank, 2006). Some viewpoints directly link the two aspects together, arguing that urbanization draws population from the villages to the point of impeding their social reproduction and inducing their absolute depopulation (Knight, 1994). With the reform of agriculture in China, the traditional mode of labourintensive agriculture changes gradually. Production of grain crops that are more difficult to plant and harvest is substituted by production of commercial crops that are easy to plant and harvest. Commercial crops have lower demand for fertility of land, quality and quantity of labour, and even irrigation. Resulting from changes of market, emigration of surplus labour force becomes evident in rural communities. Rural population declines as a result of emigration (Williams & Griffin, 1978). Thus the influence of the farming system on depopulation processes has been examined (Mann, 2005; MacDonald et al., 2000). Some conclusions suggest that a depressed farm economy, the agricultural adjustments, structural change, break-down of traiditional economic model, or the neglected rural economy and service sector led to rural depopulation (Drudy, 1978; Daniels & Lapping, 1987; MTT Agrifood Research Finland, 2002; Collantes & Pinilla, 2004; Rao, 2007). Furthermore, easing restrictions on farm land ownership will contribute to rural depopulation and the demise of rural communities (Docksteader, 2002). The shortage of opportunities of on-farm employment caused by land-use transformation is the biggest impact (Rural Affairs Coordinator, Sector Performance Policy, New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, n.d.). A high percentage of people are employed outside agriculture (Pak & Brecko, 1998). Particularly, the young labour population migrate for lack of employment (Protsenko, n.d.). The lack of economic development provides few wage employment in rural areas, which are lacking in investment and infrastructure. This in turn discourages labour population to live in villages with low productivity and low incomes (Kayondo, n.d.). In specific cases, no more young people left could emigrate (Vartiainen, 1989). Decreasing population is also linked to lowering household size, in particular, to a reduction in numbers of children and young adults (Spencer, 1997). International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 159 There are several factors driving rural depopulation. These include: (a) technological improvements in agricultural production and transport, (b) economies of scale and scope in agriculture, (c) decreasing returns to agriculture, and (d) the fact that most agricultural products are inferior goods (Australian Government Department of Families, Husing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs. Communities, 2006). Another aspect of the emigration is the attractive wage in urban employment (Imanishi, 2003; Kayondo, n.d.; Varouhakis, 2000). Depopulation has been due largely to the emigration of young people, rather than whole families (Knight, 1994). Young people emigrate from rural areas to seek employment in the urban areas where economic activities are concentrated and income level is higher (Imanishi, 2003). Young people, who are hope of rural communities, are in the center of the issue, but they will always move (Stockdale, 2006). As a result, a depopulated region will be hard to repopulate (Westhoek et al., 2004). In China, the income gap between urban and rural residents developed since 1978 as first decreased in early 1980s, but increased through the last two decades upto three times (see Table 3). It is natural that rural residents seek employment in urban areas. Table 3 Statistics of Urban and Rural Residents in China during 1978-2011 (Unit: China RMB Yuan) Year Disposable Disposable income of urban income of rural residents residents Disposable income of urban residents as times of rural residents 1978 343 134 1979 N/A 161 N/A 1980 478 191 2,503 1981 458 223 2,054 1982 495 270 1,833 1983 526 310 1,697 1984 608 355 1,713 1985 739 398 1,857 2,560 (continued) 160 Li – Rural Depopulation in China Table 4 Statistics of Urban and Rural Residents in China during 1978-2011 (Unit: China RMB Yuan) Year Disposable Disposable income of urban income of rural residents residents Disposable income of urban residents as times of rural residents 1986 900 424 2,123 1987 1002 463 2,164 1988 1181 545 2,167 1989 1376 602 2,286 1990 1510 686 2,201 1991 1701 709 2,399 1992 2027 784 2,585 1993 2577 922 2,795 1994 3496 1221 2,863 1995 4283 1578 2,714 1996 4839 1926 2,512 1997 5160 2090 2,469 1998 5425 2162 2,509 1999 5854 2210 2,649 2000 6280 2253 2,787 2001 6860 2366 2,899 2002 7703 2476 3,111 2003 8472 2622 3,231 2004 9422 2936 3,209 2005 10493 3255 3,224 2006 11759 3587 3,278 2007 13786 4140 3,330 2008 15781 4761 3,315 2009 17175 5153 3,333 2010 19109 5919 3,228 2011 21810 6977 3,126 Source: China Ministry of Civil Affairs (2012). International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 161 However, employment is not the only reason for rural residents to migrate. In China, rural area suffered more from weakening of social control and comparative reduction of welfare. On one hand, during the past three decades, infrastructure in most Chinese cities enjoyed repeated construction: construction, demolition, re-construction, re-demolition, re-re-construction. The waste of tax-payers’ money has been a huge amount, unprecedented in human history. Comparatively, in rural areas, investment in infrastructure constituted only a small and pity part. The rare examples are motorways, schools in big townships, to name some. Motorways do not have substantial affect on improvement of people’s income and living standard. Schools in big townships helped to enhance the primary education for some children, but it also means to worsen the situation of other children by being concentrated in schools at a farther distance from their residence, school nearby were demolished or discarded. So in general, a correct approach did not eve exist in dealiing with the countryside. On the other hand, corruption in rural areas was a factor that was neglected until today. Much of the investment in countryside might be subsequentially embezzled by officials at different layers. “Xiaoguan Jutan” (small official, but arch corrupt; low-level official, but embezzling hundreds of millions of Chinese RBM Yuan) is a popular term prevailing in recent years. By using this term, the authority now began to recognize that lowlevel managers in governements or enterprises could commit economic crimes as serious as central leaders. The reason why rural infrastructure has not been improved, to some extent, was due to embezzlement and misappropriation. Without transparency and democratic decision-making, officials could easily take the money that meant for the poorest villagers for their own private use. If this is the case for building a house for a poor family, such money might be used to build a villa for the official’s parents, for example. In particular cases, mountainous areas and small villages are becoming depopulated very quickly (Knight, 1994; Stasiak, 1992). The most likely explanation is that smaller communities can hardly support their own services (Tyrchniewicz & Ragone, 1995). In one specific case, the arid interfluvial areas have suffered depopulation but the irrigated valleys have enjoyed population growth (Gwynne &Prtiz, 1997). The Chinese cases of 162 Li – Rural Depopulation in China disappearing villages are also extreme phenomena of depopulation, thought to be irreversible. Results and Affects of Depopulation The socioeconomic consequences has been a perpetual toipc revolving around the issue of emigration (Gawryszewski & Potrykowska, 1988; Anderlik, 2004). Traditionally, studies and research attribute many urban social problems to immigrants, who impose pressure on employment, housing, traffic, social infrastructure, sanitaiton, health and medical provisions, criminal prevention, and education in the urban areas (for example, Kayondo, n.d.; Lee et al., 2004; Imanishi 2003). It is generally acknowledged that the migration is beneficial to the individual out-migrant (Stockdale, 2006). Migrants have the opportunities to be employed in secure and responsible positions, and paid more than they could be in the donor community (Stockdale, 2004). Even many rural migrants originating from the least-educated sector, are able to secure lowstatus and low-paid jobs at their destinations (Kasimis et al., 2003). Because of the relative decline of agricultural sector’s importance, income sources from off-farm employment complement or substitute income from agricultural production (Glauben et al., 2006). A number of studies have provided empirical support to the positive impact of remittance on production despite its negative impact on labor availability at farm level (Miluka et al., 2007). Labor emigration benefits local economy in a variety of ways. First, emigrant labors acquire more opportunities for employment. Second, some returning farm labors make investments or startup enterprises in their hometown by using their accumulated capital and human resources, so that the local economic development as well as the pace of poverty alleviation is promoted. Third, the rural emigrant labors directly stimulate the change of farmer’s income structure and income growth in rural areas. Fourth, the labor emigration promotes the human capital (Sheng, 2007). Migrant labourers who have expanded their experiences and increased their human capital through their migration can become a positive force in the local socio-economic development of sending areas (Huang & Zhan, 2005). Through their hard International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 163 work, high savings, low consumption and by reducing the pressure on the land, these tens of millions of rural labourers have helped their family members who had stayed behind by sending a large amount of remittance (Zhao, 1999; Huang & Zhan, 2005). Labour migration has multi-facet, positive and significant influences on agricultural development and agricultural production (Sheng, 2007). Nevertheless, some studies worry that these constructive impacts may be countervailed by potentially unfavourable affects on individual households or local communities, for example diminished household labour supply, weakened human capital and diminished labour efforts by members left behind (Miluka et al., 2007). At national level, rapidly depopulation may induce “ageing recessions”, accompanied by falling demand, collapsing asset values, shrinking corporate profits, deteriorating household and financial institution balance sheets, weakening currencies, and soaring budget pressures (Hewitt, 2002). The donor communities possibly suffer from landscape abandonment, an ageing of the local population, and a decline in rural services and facilities (Stockdale, 2006), particularly transport (Drudy & Wallace, 1971; Imanishi, 2003). Low population density usually entails great negative implications for rural development as a whole (Muilu & Rusanen, 2003; Stockdale, 2004; Stockdale, 2006; Anderlik, 2004; Mann, 2005; Kayondo, n.d.), causing manpower lack and the wage increase, which subsequently reduces the competitiveness of agricultural sector (Lee et al., 2004; Kayondo, n.d.). During period of significant depopulation and the successive ageing of the rural society, the decline of farming output and the abandonment of farmland may occur (Kashiwagi, 2004; Imanishi, 2003; Kayondo, n.d.). Anderlik (2004) identified three critical problems for depopulating areas, besides unhealthy demographic age structures, there have been also a “brain drain” phenomenon and declining commercial activity. As far as new economic activities are concerned, it was found that rural depopulated areas have insufficient infrastructure of e-business (Uesuqi, 2004). Therefore, the World Bank concludes that regardless of considerable rural-urban migration, rural poverty will not be alleviated in near future (World Bank, 2007). Other studies indicate that rural emigration can have impacts on rural financial institutions (Anderlik, 2004), school rolls (Rural Affairs Coordinator, Sector Performance Policy, New Zealand Ministry of 164 Li – Rural Depopulation in China Agriculture and Forestry, n.d.), everyday facilities such as stores (Imanishi, 2003), and public transport systems (Imanishi, 2003). Migration very likely affects the welfare of future generations. For instance, a typical phenomenon in China is that many children of migrants are left behind in home villages, while those who are brought to cities have limited access to local schools and other public facilities. The lack of parental care of migrant children in China can potentially lead to the under-investment in their education, nutrition and health. This in turn has important implications for the income mobility and poverty of future generations. The construction and operation of rural grass-root regime is confronted with challenge from out-migration of native elites. Well-educated students, successful entrepreneurs, and experienced craftspersons usually migrate to cities and towns, and even other rural areas with better environment. Depopulated rural society may become unable to reproduce itself, and increasingly depend on the state intervention in welfare, employment and even marriage brokerage (Knight, 1994). The emigration of a huge proportion of population also has deep implications on stability of marriage and family life, criminal prevention, operation of educational facilities, etc. In depopulated areas, tragic circular reactions have always been identified. For example, in Anderlik (2004), a circular reaction was identified: low population density is insufficient to maintain their critical infrastructure, such as government agencies, roads, schools, and hospitals, while declining infrastructure makes these areas less attractive to live and conduct business and the costs per capita to provide needed services increase. As a result, current residents will leave, environment will worsen, and economy will decline. In Imanish (2003), another circular reaction was identified: scattered facilities over large areas necessitate high levels of car ownership, high levels of car ownership drop the demand of public transport, reduction in transport services makes the distance from residence to stations and bus stops far, or the frequency of services low, this in turn makes it difficult for people to utilise public transport, and finally, cars are necessary for maintaining everyday lives. International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 165 Policy-making and its Effects The impact of changing policies on such trends has frequently been addressed (Drudy & Wallace, 1971; Gawryszewski & Potrykowska, 1988; Imanishi, 2003; Kayondo, n.d.; Irving, 1996; Docksteader, 2002; Worldbank, 2006; Tyrchniewicz & Ragone, 1995; Friends of the Earth Europe, n.d.; Australian Government Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, 2006; Rao, 2007; Commins, 1978; Madureira, 2004; Knight, 1994; Imanishi, 2003). The state may play a part in decelerating population movement, or meliorating its negative impact (Knight, 1994). The practical experience is that the transition from depopulation to repopulation may improve public services, the economy, the quality of community life and planning policies and the environment (Bolton & Chalkley, 1990). Constructive public policies have been taken to reverse demographic behaviours (World Bank, 2006). Besides others, it has been pointed out that the extreme population concentrations shall be economically unnecessary (Commins, 1978). Furthermore, rural regions need public policies that will allow improved mobility while preserve the essence of local communities (Australian Government Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, 2006). Successful measures in certain context, such as (Kayondo, n.d.), specific benefits are provided for farmers to keep them to carry out on-farm work In EU, mountain areas have been given specific compensation for disadvantage (McDonald et al., 2000). However, many schemes fail to alleviate the problems of rural depopulation in Japan (Irving, 1996; Knight, 1994). These policies are only partly effective, while the problem of harmonization between urban and rural areas is left unsolved (Rao, 2007). Docksteader (2002) presents that restrictions placed on farm land ownership has no mitigating effect on rural depopulation and the declining number of farmers. Similarly, governmental protection on smaller communities becomes increasingly difficult under the circumstances where the policy and the economic forces are unbalanced (Tyrchniewicz & Ragone, 1995). In another case, no general evidence for a positive affect of marketing campaigns on in-migration (Niedomysl, 2007). 166 Li – Rural Depopulation in China Many suggestions have been posed against depopulation through raising of citizen civil awareness and education (Tyrchniewicz & Ragone, 1995), organic agriculture and other environmentally friendly farming systems (Friends of the Earth Europe, n.d.), balancing planning between the city and the countryside, reinforce regional macro-leading, quicken relevant legislations, and promote the independence of the rural regions (Rao, 2007), land consolidation (Miranda et al., 2006), improving farm productivity through easier mechanization and reduced transport costs (Miranda et al., 2006), promoting rural municipalities to attract new residents: An evaluation of the effects (Niedomysl, 2007), and drawing experiences from other countries (Kashiwagi, 2004). Transformation of economic structure and improvement of communitiy functions become increasingly important for rural development (Pak & Brecko, 1998). Unfortunately, in China, preferential policies are always delayed in introduction. For example, construction of infrastructure in rural areas, particularly, medical care, education, and cultrual and sports facilities, have far been lagging behind those in towns and cities. On the contrary, rural education has been ruined resolutely through forcibly implementing failing policies, such as merger of primary schools. Before, there were always schools in big villages. But according to such policies, average distance between pupils’ home and schools are usually beyond walking distance. Pupils have to live in the school during weekdays. However, accomodation and foods, with expenses beyond their families’ ability to pay, are in inferior quality. Children’s health and welfare cannot be guaranteed. Due to various reasons, families with school-year children prefer to move to towns and cities, where they can easily get temporary employment with a salary easily more than possible income from cultivating crops and farming poultry and livestock. In a word, current policies does not privide sufficient support for residents in rural area to continue their work and family life. Rural areas are losing sufficient attractiveness for further development by local people. Presumbly, it is part of the results of the failure of policies. Conclusions Rural depopulation is a common process occurring during the modernization International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 167 of many countries. The changed faces of rural areas can never be reversed to their original image before. The irreversible development is erasing the longlasting rural memory that was accumulated in history. Of course, such development has its both merits and drawbacks. Depopulation became a fact before the world, around which the same thing has happened and is still happening. China is repeating such a process at a larger scale due to its traditional dependence on agriculture in at least last two thousand years. Presently, modernization of Chinese society witnessed significant retreat of agriculture in rural areas and growth of industry and services in urban areas. Agricultural resources became insignificant in many families’ economic life, and in turn their investment on agricultural activities is gradually diminishing. Hence the majority of rural labor migrated to big cities, as if the only economic life existing only in urban area. The reasons why rural residents are moving to urban areas cannot be identified as only economic. But economic pursuance is the most powerful driving force for such a large scale of population flow. Some other factors also contributed substantially, such as unequal allocation of resources and income. In fact, backward, biased and weak rural policies contributed to the resolute desolation of the rural area. Missing of positive state intervention leads to lack of investment, lack of construction, lack of education facilities, lack of cultural and entertainment facilities, even lack of sense of security, made rural areas uninhabitable. For example, many schools were simply forcibly closed without any further investment and renovation. Other schools were reserved but only sparsely distributed. Students from their seven years of age have to travel several kilometers everyday to and from schools. Many of them were discouraged by the fact that the employment expectation of university students was dim. Many teenagers ended up with discontinuation of schooling. Others have to move to towns and cities to study. But household register system imposed other limits on their migration, and their study in other places was not officially guaranteed. 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Email: [email protected] Instructions for authors, subscriptions and further details: http://rimcis.hipatiapress.com Social Networks and Cognitive Frameworks. The Case #YaMeCansé and the Conflict of Ayotnizapa, México 2014 Luís César Torres-Nabel 1 1) Universidad Pedagógica Nacional, México th Date of publication: July 30 , 2015 Edition period: July 2015 – November 2015 To cite this article: Torres-Nabel, L.C. (2015). Social Networks and Cognitive Frameworks. The Case #YaMeCansé and the Conflict of Ayotnizapa, México 2014. International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2), 175-193. doi: 10.17583/rimcis.2015.1570 To link this article: http://doi.org/10.17583/rimcis.2015.1570 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE The terms and conditions of use are related to the Open Journal System and to Creative Commons Attribution License (CC-BY). RIMCIS – International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences Vol. 4 No.2 July 2015 pp. 175-193 Social Networks and Cognitive Frameworks. The Case #YaMeCansé and the Conflict of Ayotnizapa, México 2014 Luís César Torres-Nabel Universidad Pedagógica Nacional Abstract This paper analyzes the cognitive frameworks underlying political behavior on social networks. To this end the phenomenon occurred in the Mexican tweetosphere after the conflict of 43 student teachers missing in southern Mexico, namely the case of the hashtag #YaMeCansé, the longest (35 days) in the history of the social networks in Mexico. The analysis results account for a socio-cognitive predisposition users to increase this type of trends that arise every day in social network applications. Keywords: social networks, cognitive frameworks, Twitter, collective action, Ayotnizapa 2015 Hipatia Press ISSN: 2014-3680 DOI: 10.17583/rimcis.2015.1570 RIMCIS – International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences Vol. 4 No.2 July 2015 pp. 175-193 Redes Sociales y Marcos Cognitivos. El Caso #YaMeCansé y el Conflicto de Ayotnizapa, México 2014 Luís César Torres-Nabel Universidad Pedagógica Nacional Resumen El artículo analiza los marcos cognitivos que subyacen al comportamiento político en las redes sociales. Para tal efecto se estudia el fenómeno ocurrido en la twitósfera mexicana tras el conflicto de 43 estudiantes normalistas desaparecidos en el sur de México, a saber el caso del hashtag #YaMeCansé, mismo que es el más extenso (35 días) en la historia de las redes sociales en México. Los resultados del análisis dan cuenta de una predisposición socio-cognitiva en los usuarios para incrementar este tipo de tendencias que se suscitan cotidianamente en las aplicaciones de red social. Palabras clave: redes sociales, marcos cognitivos, Twitter, acción colectiva, Ayotnizapa 2015 Hipatia Press ISSN: 2014-3680 DOI: 10.17583/rimcis.2015.1570 International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) E 177 l artículo plantea el análisis de los “marcos cognitivos” que constituyen el mecanismo que explica el comportamiento de los activistas políticos y de la sociedad en general ante acontecimientos que movilizan las emociones de los mismos y que los llevan de la observación a la acción. El análisis se circunscribe a lo ocurrido en entornos virtuales, principalmente en la construcción de tendencias en las principales plataformas de red social que operan en internet, en específico en twitter (Tw). Se analiza el caso derivado del hashtag (Ht) #YaMeCansé cuya popularidad se mantuvo durante por más de un mes en los trending topics (Tt) de la comunidad de twitter en México. Dicho Ht surge como protesta en contra de las autoridades mexicanas por la desaparición de 43 estudiantes universitarios de la Escuela Normal Rural de Ayotzinapa en el estado de Guerrero, en septiembre de 2014. Tras el análisis se producen algunas hipótesis del orden teórico acerca de los mecanismos que operan en la movilización ciudadana mediante las redes sociales de internet, que parece estar muy lejos de ser autónoma y racional, apostando entonces por entender que las emociones juegan un papel preponderante en el comportamiento político de los internautas. De los Marcos Cognitivos en lo Político Los “marcos cognitivos” son estructuras predispuestas y condicionadas evolutivamente en la especie humana para producir cohesión social, y excluir creencias y juicios contrarios a los que establece el status quo de una comunidad. Estos marcos cognitivos, para su evolución y diseminación social, tienen que estar nutridos y hospedados en al menos dos sujetos que posibiliten su implantación y adherencia en las mentes de otros. El mecanismo que opera en la activación de los marcos cognitivos se da cuando vivimos una experiencia y cuando vemos a otro viendo esa narración, entonces se moviliza una parte de la estructura neuronal del cerebro, a saber las “neuronas espejo”. Según Castells (2010) mediante el mecanismo de las neuronas espejo se representa la acción de otros sujetos y se activan los procesos de imitación y 178 Torres-Nabel – Social Networks and Cognitive Frameworks empatía que permiten comprender los estados emocionales de otros individuos. Las neuronas espejo activan patrones neuronales que asocian imágenes, frases ó sonidos con emociones tales como el miedo y la euforia, mismas que ayudan a construir las respuestas, facilitan la transición de la observación a la acción y de esta al proceso de abstracción, la cual a su vez introduce la expresión simbólica, origen de la comunicación mediante lenguaje (Damasio, 2005). En la misma línea este lenguaje mediador activa las respuestas a los diversos estímulos externos emanados de la narración del otro, dichas respuestas se conocen como conductas. Según Reynolds (1973) “las características de la conducta están determinados por las condiciones del contexto, por los eventos que preceden o acompañan a la conducta, por los Eventos Socialmente Competentes (ESC). Por su parte, los patrones de conductas que se configuran a partir de su ocurrencia histórica de denomina comportamiento. A su vez, en relación con lo político este se refiere a una atribución individuo-social basada en el antagonismo que existe intrínsecamente en las relaciones humanas. Este se manifiesta como la diversidad en las relacione sociales que pueden estar orientadas al orden o al conflicto y que a su vez coexisten en los intercambios continuos que hay en toda sociedad (Canneti, 1960; Mouffe, 1993); el intercambio es un acto cotidiano sobre cualquier cosa, tales como el intercambio físico-biológico (gases, desechos, fluidos, bacterias, virus) económico (dinero, mercancías, trabajo) psicológico-comunicacional (gestos, gritos, palabras, sonidos, imágenes, símbolos, ideas, ofensas, halagos, emociones) normativo (reglas, leyes, derechos, obligaciones, sanciones), etc. En síntesis el comportamiento político está configurado por intercambios cotidianos basados en el orden y el conflicto. Ahora bien, el comportamiento político está condicionado por dos sistemas emocionales: a) el sistema de predisposiciones que induce al entusiasmo y organiza el comportamiento para conseguir los objetivos del sujeto entusiasta en un entorno dado y b) el sistema de vigilancia cuando se experimenta miedo o ansiedad por la presencia de ESC (Castells, 2010). El primero de ellos implica la voluntad de elección, interés o intención del individuo es el juicio inicial del que parte el individuo para la acción International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 179 colectiva. Este juicio está construido por los marcos cognitivos las neuronas espejo (conceptos explicados líneas arriba) del individuo pre-programados a partir del contexto y su historia individual, tanto interior como exterior. A su vez esta historia se basa en distorsiones de información, fallas de origen (las cuales se remontan a la historia inicial de la especie humana) en el aparato cognitivo, también denominados “sesgos cognitivos” juicios inexactos, interpretaciones ilógicas al recordar su historia, emociones, así como los resultados que ha obtenido en su participación previa en acciones colectivas (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). El segundo sistema de condicionamiento del comportamiento político implica mecanismos biológico-evolutivos muy primitivos que han estado en el comportamiento humanos desde su aparición en la tierra. Dichos mecanismos implican la agresión, el ataque preventivo en colectivos que se contagian mutuamente de dichas conductas como respuesta emociones tan básicas en cualquier ser vivo como el miedo. Al final pareciera que es relativamente fácil provocar emociones en cualquier ser humano sin embargo ¿por qué ciertos Eventos Socialmente Competentes activan estos sistemas emocionales y otros no? ¿cuál es la variable que produce que estas emociones se contagien en cascada y en grandes grupos y otros ESC no lo logren? Entre los estudiosos de los fenómenos sociales hay una teoría que justamente menciona que no todo agravio social produce movilizaciones, independientemente de que este implique una buena fuente de emociones fuertes como el miedo o la ira. Al respecto dicen estos teóricos (McAdam et al, 1999) que la acción colectiva implica costos y recursos y que una buena parte del motor de esta viene de grupos externos no necesariamente ofendidos pero si interesados en utilizar este agravio para sus fines. De tal manera que una de las claves para contestar a las preguntas planteadas es saber los recursos con los que cuentan los sujetos agraviados tanto al interior pero sobretodo al exterior de su grupo, en ese sentido la clave puede estar en el análisis de las redes sociales como mecanismo evolutivo y social de cualquier grupo humano para satisfacer sus necesidades de intercambio. A continuación se presenta un mapa conceptual (Figura 1) a manera de síntesis visual de lo expuesto hasta ahora. 180 Torres-Nabel – Social Networks and Cognitive Frameworks Figura 1. Mapa conceptual: Marcos cognitivos, política y redes sociales Sobre las Estructuras Sociales de Red La interdependencia de los actores en un determinado grupo humano, genera necesariamente una estructura relacional o red, según la cual los individuos pueden diferenciarse por su adscripción a grupos o por sus papeles socialmente diferentes (Merton, 1949) En ese sentido una red es un conducto para la propagación de información o el ejercicio de la influencia, y el lugar de un individuo en el patrón general de relaciones determina la información a la que tiene acceso o, en consecuencia, quien se halla en posición de influir (Watts, 2006). Por su parte una red social es un entramado de relaciones (vínculos) directas entre sujetos que actúa como mecanismo para intercambiar bienes y servicios, para imponer obligaciones y otorgar los derechos correspondientes a sus miembros (también llamados nodos) (Boissevain & Mitchell, 1973). Las redes se basan en el intercambio y difusión de información, así como de las respuestas humanas a todo ello. A partir de estas se tejen las claves de la innovación constante, pero también de la cooperación y la competencia (McNeill & McNeill, 2010). International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 181 Por su parte una estructura enuncia las relaciones sintáctico-semánticas de un sistema. El campo de la estructura corresponde a los procesos de transición de información. Solo hay transmisión de información si hay regularidades en la misma, hay tendencias de organización. La determinación de la estructura es el procedimiento para comprender las regularidades de una serie informacional de aconteceres (Verón, 1995). Según Giddens (1995) una estructura consiste en algún diseño de relaciones sociales o de fenómenos sociales, una intersección de presencia y de ausencia. Estructura denota entonces las propiedades por las que se vuelve posible que las prácticas sociales discerniblemente similares existen a lo largo de segmentos variables de tiempo y de espacio y que presten a estos una forma sistémica. Es un orden virtual de relaciones transformativas que denotan reglas y recursos y que implican: formas de dominación y poder, reglas que implican procedimientos metódicos. Estructura: reglas y recursos, o conjuntos de relaciones de transformación que se organizan como propiedades de sistemas sociales. Existen diferentes tipos de estructuras como reglas de codificación inmanentes a los sistemas de relaciones sociales: a) estructuras vividas, bajo la forma de normas que determinan la conducta de los individuos, como el intercambio matrimonial; b) estructuras actuadas, como las reglas de sistemas de comportamiento ritual, donde las significaciones se despliegan en secuencias temporales e conducta simbólica; c) estructuras concebidas, los sistemas de significación contenidos en “textos” o mensajes circulantes en la sociedad y objetivamente diferenciales de la conducta (Lévi-Strauss, 1979). En suma las estructuras de red son la configuración más utilizada por los grupos humanos para abrirse paso frete a otros grupos, pero también de los individuos a interactuar como puentes entre diferentes colectivos. En ese sentido la clave que ensambla los elementos neuro-político-sociales con las redes es el sentido de las mismas a la hora de programar determinada acción colectiva, recurriendo a recursos, alianzas y conflictos para obtener determinados resultados, entre ellos el salir avante de un agravio. Al respecto cabría preguntarse ¿si existe una predisposición de ciertos fenómenos sociales o como mencionábamos líneas arriba de Eventos Socialmente Competentes para configurar alianzas políticas? 182 Torres-Nabel – Social Networks and Cognitive Frameworks Sobre la Predisposición de las Tendencias en las Redes Sociales La exposición reiterada de un sujeto a una situación de aprendizaje, determina la formación en el organismo de una “predisposición” (Verón, 1995). La predisposición hacia cierto tipo de conductas colectivas, que devienen en el tejido de las redes sociales se basan en el mecanismo del temor a la desaprobación más que en el altruismo, así como en el miedo al castigo por enunciar opiniones desviadas a la tendencia (Elster, 2010). La predisposición de los actores de una red social a intercambiar información y a diseminarla está programada por los actores que poseen ventajas informativas que les provee su trabajo o sus relaciones. Por tanto, las redes poseen usuarios que actúan como programadores los cuales tienen la capacidad de construir redes y de programar/reprogramar las mismas a partir de los objetivos que les asignen. Los programadores tienen la capacidad de conectar diferentes redes y asegurar su cooperación compartiendo objetivos y combinando recursos (Castells, 2010) . El poder es la capacidad relacional que permite a un actor social influir de forma asimétrica en las decisiones de otros actores sociales de modo que se favorezcan la voluntad, los intereses y los valores del actor que tiene poder (Castells, 2010). En la misma línea podemos incluir el concepto de influencia como punto nodal entre la predisposición y el poder, entendiendo a esta como la capacidad que tiene cualquier individuo de echar a andar sus recursos (dada su posición en la red social) para intercambiar favores, información, acceso, etc. y con esto hacerse de más recursos para tal o cual fin y/o salir avante de algún agravio contra su persona o colectivo. En este sentido, y con los elementos hasta aquí mencionados podemos establecer un análisis de Eventos Socialmente Competentes muy concretos para determinar si existe predisposición en su ejecución y devenir ó son meros sucesos al azar que surgen del continuo intercambio social, en síntesis si es posible encontrar patrones y tendencias en estos ESC. International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 183 De la Predisposición a la Insurrección Tendenciosa: El Caso #YaMeCansé y el Conflicto de Ayotzinapa en México, 2014 El contexto La noche del 7 de septiembre de 2014 el Procurador General de la República en México Jesús Murillo Karam terminaba una extensa conferencia de prensa donde detalló el secuestro, ejecución y calcinación de 43 jóvenes estudiantes de la Escuela Normal Rural de Ayotzinapa por parte de la delincuencia organizada, hechos transcurridos entre el 26 y 27 de septiembre de 2014 en el estado de Guerrero, México. La frase final del procurador mexicano fue “ya me cansé” mencionada a uno de sus asistentes y como excusa para terminar la conferencia de prensa; minutos más tarde aparecía el Ht #YaMeCansé en las tendencias nacionales y posteriormente globales de la red social twitter. La etiqueta #YaMeCansé ha sido la tendencia más extensa en la historia de las redes sociales en México con 35 días en los Tt del país y con un total de 3´446,966 menciones (Figura 2.). De esos 35 días, el Ht lideró las tendencias en Tw durante 27 días, para a partir del 3 de diciembre comenzar a descender y finalmente desaparecer por acción directa de la empresa Twitter, Inc., al parecer por considéralo no genuino en cuanto a su derivación de opinión pública lo que creció a partir del uso de “bots” programados para inflar la tendencia, cuestión que fue detectada por los programadores de Tw que rápidamente quitaron el Ht de los Tt. Por su parte la inmensa cantidad de usuarios que si habían hecho crecer la tendencia desde el 7 de noviembre y que además habían hecho de esta su grito de lucha contra el Estado, crearon una gran cantidad de Ht emulando el #YaMeCansé (#YaMeCansé2 …YaMeCansé100. Figura 1) sustituyendo uno a uno de acuerdo a como crecían y se diluían en la opinión de los tuiteros. 184 Torres-Nabel – Social Networks and Cognitive Frameworks Figura 2. Histórico tendencia #YaMeCansé, conflicto Ayotzinapa, México Fuente: http://topsy.com/ El análisis El Ht #YaMeCansé alcanzó los 3´446,966 menciones en twitter durante 35 días. A partir de este número de menciones se calcula que hay por lo menos 19,696 usuarios detrás del mismo. De ese universo se extrajeron los 27 usuarios más importantes a partir de los siguientes aspectos: a) no. retuits en sus participaciones más importantes, b) no. de usuarios considerados como influyentes por la página de de tendencias en twitter TOPSY, c) no. de seguidores; todo esto de los tuits generados en los 27 días en que el HT fue tendencia genuina (Tabla 1). Posteriormente se procedió a calcular la influencia de estos 27 usuarios a partir de la formula desarrollada por Torres-Nabel (2015a) de dividir el no. de retuiteadores influyentes entre el número de seguidores totales a su vez multiplicado por el número de retuits del mensaje original, y finalmente divididos entre el rango mínimo de seguidores de un actor para considerarse influyente: 1000. En este análisis encontramos que solo 7 (25%) de los 27 usuarios más retuiteados tiene algún grado de influencia en la red general del hashtag y que de esos 7 actores uno es el que lleva la capacidad de influencia mayor con el 100% de los usuarios que participaron en la red de International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 185 la etiqueta #YaMeCansé. Lo que quiere decir que los 19, 696 involucrados en la tendencia retuitearon en promedio 4 veces (3.97) el mensaje original emitido por el actor estadounidense RobSchneider (Tabla 1). Tabla 1. Actores con mayor influencia en el Ht #YaMeCansé (N=27: 07.nov. – 03.dic. 2014) RobSchneider Tipo de actor social Figura pública verne Periodista 769 20400 5 0.2 epigmenioibarra Periodista 1801 217000 20 0.2 PelonGomis Figura pública 4300 1870000 58 0.1 ponchohd Figura pública 2837 1310000 50 0.1 sopitas Periodista Tuitero independiente Periodista 3094 1860000 44 0.1 28 1031 2 0.1 1300 2333000 73 0.0 910 320000 12 0.0 19 2378 4 0.0 2504 5720000 58 0.0 7 725 2 0.0 19 2107 2 0.0 681 770000 14 0.0 3 407 1 0.0 7 1015 1 0.0 DavidMalborn Figura pública Tuitero independiente Figura pública Tuitero independiente Tuitero independiente Periodista Tuitero independiente Tuitero independiente Periodista 3 578 1 0.0 christopheruck Figura pública 535 983000 7 0.0 CNNMex Periodista 389 1860000 14 0.0 padaguan Periodista 4 6638 2 0.0 Actor marcokennedy Milenio LuisGerardoM edelamm DulceMaria jmeloso spatargo Pajaropolitico tavo_andrade Lorelo Retweets Seguidores #YaMeCansé 78256 322000 Influyentes (rtw) 796 Influencia 193.5 (sigue) 186 Torres-Nabel – Social Networks and Cognitive Frameworks Actor BBCWorld Tipo de actor social Periodista Retweets Seguidores #YaMeCansé 125 9090000 Influyentes (rtw) 10 Influencia 0.0 MARCHAPARRO Figura pública 102 5221000 5 0.0 PedroFerriz Periodista 39 1870000 2 0.0 EncinasN Periodista 43 6758 0 0.0 LaNegriNoeli Periodista Tuitero independiente Tuitero independiente 4 1528 0 0.0 4 1155 0 0.0 3 1321 0 0.0 aleskahadaverde Thorcho Fuente: elaboración propia Otros hallazgos apuntan sobre la influencia que parecen tener actores populares de las redes sociales en las ciberprotestas, que contraria a la idea de que en las redes sociales la horizontalidad reina entre los actores, existen usuarios dada su posición y recursos dentro y fuera de la red poseen ventajas sobre los otros y programan el incremento de ciertas tenencias de opinión. En el gráfico 1 encontramos que el 74% de los usuarios influyentes en el Tt #YaMeCansé son actores famosos, periodistas 45% y figuras públicas principalmente de la farándula 29%. El gráfico 2 expone el comparativo entre la cantidad de retuits que reciben los diferentes tipos de autores, y donde los tuiteros independientes parecen estar en casi total nulidad en los procesos internos de la red general de la tendencia analizada #YaMeCansé. International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) Gráfico 1. Proporción de los actores importantes en el HT #YaMeCansé Fuente: elaboración propia Gráfico 2. Comparativo de número de retuits entre los actores importantes en el HT #YaMeCansé Fuente: elaboración propia 187 188 Torres-Nabel – Social Networks and Cognitive Frameworks Finalmente en un análisis temporal sobre la influencia de los tipos de actores de la tendencia del #YaMeCansé encontramos (gráfico 3) que en la mayor cresta (alcanzando los 800 mil retuits) de la tendencia ocurrida hacia el 20 de noviembre (festejo de la Revolución Mexicana) los usuarios más influyentes son las figuras públicas, de donde entresacamos al mencionado actor estadounidense RobSchneider y la popular actriz y cantante mexicana DulceMaría. Gráfico 3. Histórico de retuits del #YaMeCansé. (7.nov-12.dic/2014) Fuente: elaboración propia La discusión Los resultados del análisis del Ht #YaMeCansé parecen seguir confirmando la hipótesis que plantea Castells (2010) en torno a que en las redes sociales hay actores que programan la tendencia de la opinión, y que a su vez enmarcan los temas importantes entre los usuarios. Así mismo en sendos análisis (Torres-Nabel, 2014, 2015a, 2015b) se comprueba que la opinión pública en las redes sociales de México la opinión de los miembros de la International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 189 farándula y de los periodistas sigue teniendo la mayor influencia entre los usuarios mexicanos que parecen elegir la reproducción de las opiniones a producir las propias. En ese sentido la explicación científico-social parece acercarse a buscar en planos más profundos en la conducta de los usuarios de las redes sociales, a saber en los marcos que rigen su conducta y percepción. Líneas arriba se mencionaba que los marcos cognitivos pueden ser entendidos como estructuras predispuestas y condicionadas para producir cohesión social y excluir creencias y juicios contrarios a los que establece el status quo de un determinado grupo. En ese sentido estos marcos producen también adherencia a tendencias previamente programadas por actores influyentes y populares. La duda entonces es saber que elementos sirven como “anclajes” que son utilizados por los programadores para desencadenar el interés inicial del usuario común y posteriormente hacerlo que se adhiera a la tendencia. Una de las primeras hipótesis es la del mecanismo de las neuronas espejo que representa la acción de otros sujetos y activa los procesos de imitación y empatía que permiten comprender los estados emocionales de otros individuos. Las neuronas espejo activan patrones neuronales que asocian imágenes, frases ó sonidos con emociones tales como el miedo y la euforia, mismas que ayudan a construir las respuestas, facilitan la transición de la observación a la acción y de esta al proceso de abstracción, a su vez la abstracción introduce la expresión simbólica, origen de la comunicación mediante lenguaje (Castells, 2010). En ese sentido cabría preguntarse si en ciertos fenómenos como el de los estudiantes normalistas de Ayotzinapa no implicaba per se un detonante infalible para que una buena parte de la opinión pública se adhiriera primeramente al estado emocional de agravio para después provocar una conducta de repliegue sobre la percepción de conciencia tribal de ser pertenecientes al mismo grupo social, parientes de pueblo o tribu como lo describía hace varias décadas Max Weber (1922). En dado caso, podemos introducir la hipótesis del acontecimiento prediseñado como estrategia para movilizar adeptos ideológicos, pero también para enfocar grupos subversivos y actores sociales interesados en transacciones muy especificas. Huelga decir que a nueve meses de los 190 Torres-Nabel – Social Networks and Cognitive Frameworks acontecimientos no hay evidencias suficientes para comprobar ninguna de las dos aristas de dicha hipótesis. En suma, parece ser que los procesos suscitados en las redes sociales parecen estar mediados por el orden de lo psicosocial, donde diversos sesgos cognitivos constituyan los marcos mediante los cuales los usuarios regulan su conducta y eligen sus batallas virtuales. Pero también programados por actores políticos muy definidos con ganancias muy específicas. Conclusión. El Estudio de las Redes Sociales: Dos Nuevas Rutas de Investigación a Futuro El devenir de los estudios sobre la conducta política de los usuarios en aplicaciones de red social e Internet parece orientarse a dos líneas amplias de investigación: a) el análisis de grandes cantidades de datos con el fin de identificar patrones denominado como análisis de big data; b) el análisis de diversos mecanismos cognitivos que parecen operar en la conducta de los usuarios y en la inter-conducta de los mismos. Al respecto del análisis de big data ya hay suficientes elementos para comenzar a buscar patrones en comportamientos políticos cíclicos como los procesos electorales, tal y como lo ha estado haciendo en recientes fechas (2014-2015) la empresa Google poniendo al publico análisis sobre una gran cantidad de datos que surgen de las campañas, a tal caso que por ejemplo en las elecciones intermedias en México ya predecían ganadores días antes de las campañas, que al final resultaron efectivos. En la misma línea existen análisis iniciales sobre las posibilidades de hallazgos y explicaciones sobre el comportamiento electoral a partir de las tendencias en redes sociales usando herramientas de análisis de red social como TOPSY. En el camino de las neurociencias y el comportamiento político, el panorama es mucho más complejo pero igualmente esperanzador para darnos explicaciones sobre determinados patrones de comportamiento regido por las emociones y más por estos sistemas emocionales que predisponen a los individuos a responder de una forma casi programada. Al respecto es importante dar seguimiento a diversos estudios al respecto las metáforas de la vida cotidiana que permiten estructurar nuestro lenguaje (Lakoff, 2007) y las redes neuronales que operan como marcos reguladores de nuestra conducta política (Damasio, 2005). International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 191 Al final parece inevitable que estos dos campos se unan analizando grandes cantidades de datos sociales pero también neuro-cognitivos para ampliar el espectro del sentido de los patrones políticos. En ese punto el gran laboratorio que son las aplicaciones de red social y en general la gran cantidad de aplicaciones digitales que cubre la vida social en estos días, pueden darnos mapas más precisos de cómo operamos socialmente y cómo podemos incluso cambiar para el beneficio de la humanidad, o por el contrario saber con claridad por quien y como estamos siendo conducidos. Notas 1 Un compilado amplio de notas periodísticas la respecto del conflicto de Ayotzinapa puede consultarse en http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Desaparici%C3%B3n_forzada_en_Iguala_de_2014 2 Una hipótesis de las causas de suprimir la etiqueta #YaMeCansé: http://www.sopitas.com/site/413590-por-que-ya-no-aparece-yamecanse-como-tt-en-twitter/ 3 A partir del calculo que los usuarios emiten en promedio 5 mensajes diarios (Torres-Nabel, 2009) (hay quien pone 200 pero hay quienes ponen uno por semana ó por mes). 4 https://plus.google.com/+GooglePolitics/posts 5 _http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2015/06/02/actualidad/1433269914_517028.ht ml?id_externo_rsoc=FB_CM 6 http://topsy.com/ Referencias Boissevain, J., & Mitchell, J.C. (Eds.) (1973). Networks analysis: studies in a human interaction. Mounton: The Hague Canetti, E. (1960). Masa y poder. Madrid: Alianza-Muchnik Castells, M. (2010). Comunicación y Poder. Madrid: Alianza Editorial Damasio, A. (2005). En busca de Spinoza, neurobiología de la emoción y los sentimientos. Barcelona: Debate Elster, J. (2010). La explicación del comportamiento social. Más tuercas y tornillos para las ciencias sociales. Barcelona: Gedisa Giddens, A. (1995). La Constitución de la sociedad. Bases para la teoría de la estructuración. Argentina, Buenos Aires: Amorrortu Lakoff, G. (2007). No pienses en un elefante: lenguaje y debate político. Madrid: Editorial complutense 192 Torres-Nabel – Social Networks and Cognitive Frameworks Lévi-Satrauss, C. (1979). Antropología estructural. México: Siglo XXI McAdam D., McCarthy J., & Zald, M. (1999). Movimientos sociales: perspectivas comparadas. Madrid: Itsmo McNeill, J., & McNeill, W. (2010). Las redes humanas. Una historia global del Mundo. Barcelona: Crítica Merton, R. (1949). Teoría y estructura sociales. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica Mouffe, Ch. (1993). El retorno de lo político. Comunidad, ciudadanía y pluralismo, democracia radical. Barcelona: Paidós Reynolds, G. (1973). Compendio de condicionamiento operante. México: Ed. Ciencia de la Conducta Torres-Nabel, L. C. (2009). Ciberprotestas y consecuencias políticas: reflexiones sobre el caso de Internet Necesario en México. Razón y palabra, 70. Consultado desde: http://www.razonypalabra.org.mx/TORRES_REVISADO.pdf Torres-Nabel, L.C. (2014). El poder de las redes sociales: la “mano invisible” del framing noticioso. El caso de #LadyProfeco. Icono 14. Revista de Comunicación y Tecnologías Emergentes, 12(2), 318-337. doi: 10.7195/ri14.v12i2.625 Torres-Nabel, L.C. (2015a). Redes sociales, popularidad e influencia social. El caso de la ciberprotesta contra la Ley de Telecomunicaciones en México, 2014. Revista Mediterránea de Comunicación, 6(1), 177-185. doi: 10.14198/MEDCOM2015.6.1.10 Torres-Nabel, L.C. (2015b). ¿Quién programa las redes sociales en internet? El caso de twitter en el movimiento #YoSoy132 en México. Revista Internacional de Sociología, 73(2). Doi: 10.3989/2013.05.29 Tversky, A., & Kahneman D. (1974). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Science, New Series, 185(4157), 1124-1131 Verón, E. (1995). Conducta, estructura y comunicación. Escritos teóricos 1959-1973. Buenos Aires: Amorrortu Watts, D. (2006). Seis grados de separación. La ciencia de las redes en la era del acceso. Barcelona: Paidós. Weber, M. (1922). Economía y Sociedad. Madrid: Fondo de Cultura Económica International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2) 193 Luís César Torres-Nabel es Profesor Titular de la Universidad Pedagógica Nacional Contact Address: Universidad Pedagógica Nacional, Unidad Guadalajara. Av. Plan de San Luis 1696 Col Chapultepec Country C. P. 44620 Guadalajara, Jalisco, México. Email: [email protected] Instructions for authors, subscriptions and further details: http://rimcis.hipatiapress.com The Impact of New Technologies on Leisure Activities in Developed and Emerging Economies Lynne Ciochetto1 1) Massey University, New Zealand th Date of publication: July 30 , 2015 Edition period: July 2015 - November 2015 To cite this article: Ciochetto, L. (2015). The Impact of New Technologies on Leisure Activities in Developed and Emerging Economies. International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2), 194-214. doi: 10.17583/rimcis.2015.1565 To link this article: http://doi.org/10.17583/rimcis.2015.1565 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE The terms and conditions of use are related to the Open Journal System and to Creative Commons Attribution License (CC-BY). RIMCIS – International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences Vol. 4 No.2 March 2015 pp. 194-214 The Impact of New Technologies on Leisure Activities in Developed and Emerging Economies Lynne Ciochetto Massey University Abstract This paper is a cross-cultural exploration of the impact of the widespread adoption of digital technologies on contemporary leisure activities. In the last two decades there has been an exponential increase in worldwide computer use, followed by a similar expansion in mobile phone usage. There are a number of factors caused this increase: technological advances in functionality, the migration of computer use from work to the home environment, increased accessibility of data through the increased capacity of search engines and the rapid growth in popularity of social media websites after 2004. The exponential growth of mobile phone use followed a similar but more rapid trajectory and the user base expanded in emerging economies when 3G mobile phone technologies provided internet access. There has been a major shift in the way people communicate particularly the exponential increase in the use of social networking sites such as Facebook, MySpace, Bebo, Skype and Baibu. Sites such as iTunes and YouTube have changed the way music and video are accessed, listened to and used. Changing patterns of technology use have had a major impact on the way people conduct their lives and have impacted significantly on leisure activities in both developed and emerging economies: the types of activities and the way those activities are pursued in both at home and when people travel. Keywords: leisure, mobile technologies, social media 2015 Hipatia Press ISSN: 2014-3680 DOI: 10.17583/rimcis.2015.1565 RIMCIS – International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences Vol. 4 No.2 March 2015 pp. 194-214 El Impacto de las Nuevas Tecnologías en el Ocio en las Economías Desarrolladas y Emergentes Lynne Ciochetto Massey University Resumen Recurriendo al Foro Social Mundial como un estudio de caso ejemplar, este artículo muestra como la emergencia de una forma de visión cosmopolita (transversalismo) se puede explicar en términos de experiencias de los activistas, a partir de la complejidad y las contradicciones en sus redes. El artículo cuestiona la idea que la transnacionalización de las redes de solidaridad y las interconexiones pueden estimular de forma sencilla el aumento del cosmopolitismo entre los activistas de la justicia global. Las experiencias de los activistas de disonancias entre sus ideales, la complejidad de las relaciones de poder y las incertidumbres estructurales en sus redes de justicia global puede proporcionarles una base de pensamiento y deliberación auto-reflexiva, y de esta manera estimular las agendas a adaptar las diferencias. El respaldo a las medidas de adaptación que aparecen al manejarse con tales disonancias cognitivo-prácticas aparece como un nuevo modo de cosmopolitismo, acuñado aquí como ‘transversalismo’. El artículo propone un nuevo marco conceptual y un modelo analítico para investigar la complejidad de este proceso de forma más inclusiva y sistemática. Palabras clave: ocio, tecnologías móbiles, medios sociales 2015 Hipatia Press ISSN: 2014-3680 DOI: 10.17583/rimcis.2015.1565 196 Ciochetto – New Technologies and Leisure P rior to the industrial revolution the pursuit of leisure activities was the prerogative of the elite and wealthy. The contemporary concept of leisure as ‘time spent not working’ is a product of social and economic changes in the 19th century associated with the industrial revolution in Europe and North America (Roberts, 2006, p.32). The combination of political emancipation and the expansion of the franchise, the reduction of both the working day and the length of the working week, along with rising standards of living, enabled greater numbers of people to engage in other activities, including leisure activities. The way leisure is defined is highly ‘context-dependent’, especially in Western industrialized societies where leisure is influenced by the wider economy, the way work is organized, the political system and the decline of community in the 20 th century (Roberts, 2006, p.2). There was a further expansion of this leisure time, accompanied by rising standards of living, in the second half of the 20th century. What people did with leisure time was influenced by technological changes in the media and the entertainment sectors. During the 19th century the mechanization of print expanded the production of newspapers, books and magazines. A rise in literacy levels meant reading in the home increased. In the 20th century there was an evolution in new forms of media–cinema, radio and television and a merging of some aspects of those media. The expansion of cinema at the turn of the century was part of the transition to increasingly visual forms of communication. In the 1920s radio became more widespread, and in the next decade sound and image merged in films. The introduction of radio increased the amount of entertainment available in the home in the 1920s, a trend that intensified with the rapid uptake of television in the 1960s. During the 1990s the migration of the computer from work to personal use also had an impact on leisure. A decade later mobile phones and tablets made media more available for personal use. In contemporary emerging societies a rapid social transition, similar to that which occurred in Western industrialized societies in the 19th and 20th centuries, took place from the 1970s. Today, with the globalization of the media and technology, it is possible for these groups to leapfrog stages of technological development and engage with the latest media technologies International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(1) 197 available. These technological changes are completely revolutionizing how people spend their leisure time in all societies. Time Because leisure has social and economic implications, it became an important area of research in the 20th century, and of interest to governments. Leisure is an important economic activity. In Britain leisure accounted for between 25% and 38% of consumer spending and is an important form of employment (Roberts, 2006, p. 5-6). The OECD report measuring leisure has identified three key criteria for defining leisure: time, activities and states of mind. The economic determinants of leisure focus on ‘residual time not spent in paid work’. Leisure is also defined in terms of the allocation of time in the adult life cycle, and time-use studies are used to document activities when people are in work and away from work (2009, p.20). Trends in all OECD countries from 1970-2005 indicated that, contrary to general perceptions, time spent working was not increasing except for certain groups (OECD, 2009, p.22). The greatest reduction in work hours in recent decades occurred in the 1970s (Roberts, 2006, pp.46–47). Average hours in paid work in OECD countries were 1595 hours a year, though averages differed considerably between countries. The reduction in work hours has not translated into an increase in leisure hours (OECD, 2009, p. 25). The OECD study used four criteria for defining time: 1. leisure (using the ‘narrow’ definition –low levels’ of personal care– 45% of time) (OECD, 2009, p. 27) 2. paid work 3. unpaid work 4. personal care (including sleep) and 5. ‘other’. Gender, age, social class, race/ethnicity and employment status are all important influences on the time available for leisure and how people engage with technology in their leisure. Older age groups have more leisure time once taking care of young children ceases, and in almost all countries men have more leisure time than women, whether using a ‘broad’ definition (factors in a high level of personal care) or the narrow definition (OECD, 2009, p. 27). Employed married women with dependent children have the least time for leisure. Those with lower incomes may have to work longer hours or have more than one job which may decrease leisure time (Freysinger & Kelly, 2000, p. 154). 198 Ciochetto – New Technologies and Leisure Roberts (2006, p.40), citing Gershuny’s survey (2000) of 35 time budget studies in 20 countries, concluded that convergence in leisure activities was taking place between countries, classes and gender. Roberts also included age groups. Hours of work do vary from country to country, even between economically advanced countries. The UK 2000 Time Use Survey found that leisure activities took up 22% of people’s time–which translates into five hours and 17 minutes a day–and of that figure watching television accounted for 10% and social life and entertainment for 6%, sport was 1%, hobbies and games 1% and ‘other’ 4% (Roberts, 2006, p.11). The OECD data for 2006 revealed that in the UK 23.4% of the day (five hours 14 minutes) was leisure time, while in the US that number was 21.7% (five hours five minutes) (2009). Expenditure According to Roberts, since the 1970s leisure has become more commoditized (2006, p. 49). The pace of spending on leisure activities has increased dramatically since the 1970s in Britain (citing the Family Expenditure Survey Great Britain 1974-2000/1 and 2002/3 and the General Household Survey 2006, Table 1.5, 2006, p.17). Out-of-home eating and drinking dominated leisure spending in 2002/3, followed by tourism and media (2006, p.18). Increasingly, what we do with our leisure time is defined by ‘buying, possessing and displaying’ purchased products (Freysinger & Kelly, 2000, p. 278), and this clearly applies to expenditure on new technologies. Though use of media may not dominate leisure spending it is increasingly coming to dominate use of leisure time. User Profiles: Technology The nature of technological changes has also influenced what people do with that technology, often in unanticipated ways. People tend to spend most of their leisure time at home, and use of mass media came to dominate leisure activities with the advent of television which first brought moving images into the home in the 1950s. For the next decades families watched television together. Watching television has been the most common form of leisure International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(1) 199 activity since the 1960s. British people have watched over 20 hours of television per week since the 1970s (Roberts, 2006, p. 18). The introduction of satellite communications, the expansion of satellite television and an increase in the number of channels in 1990s began to fracture television audiences. As multiple niche audiences evolved, the number of household television sets increased. Unfortunately the OECD data is not useful in identifying specific technology use in leisure time, as television and radio are grouped together, while ‘other’ activities include computer games, recreational internet use, telephone conversations as well as activities like walking pets and doing arts and crafts (OECD, 2009, p. 35). According to Neilsen, fragmentation of the media in recent years has happened across all formats. The explosion of platforms and formats has provided more content than ever before but the idea of television viewing has been reconfigured as video programming, defined as ‘any type of content, such as TV, cable shows, professional video or user-generated content, that is watched on your TV, PC, mobile phone, tablet or e-reader’. The Nielsen Global Digital Landscape Survey found 55% of 30,000 respondents worldwide saying that video programming was an important part of their lives (Nielsen, 2015). Computers At the same period that satellite communications changed the television sector there was an increase in the use of computers for leisure activities. The expansion of computer use, as well as the migration of computers from work to the home was based on decades of research and development. The silicon chip was invented by by Jack Kirby in 1959, and by the 1970s led to the development of the personal computer. Satellite communication networks had already made computers an essential part of the business and financial sectors when computers began a migration from the workplace to education and entertainment. The first personal use of computers in the 1980s was the playing of offline games. These early games required quite a high level of technical knowledge and were relatively clumsy and difficult to use. The first wave of personal users tended to be young males. Email communication and information searching attracted a wider audience of 200 Ciochetto – New Technologies and Leisure personal users in the next decade. A number of changes in the 1990s widened the appeal of computers by increasing the range of capabilities. Information searching improved when Microsoft launched Internet Explorer and popularized the World Wide Web in 1996. In 1999 Google expanded search capacities and Napster enabled database access. Sharing music via the internet became possible and music piracy went global. As 99% of music exchanged this way is not paid for, the music industry was changed forever. Control was wrenched from traditional owners of the media (British Broadcasting Company, 2010). In 2004 the social networking site Facebook was set up and by 2010 it had logged its 500 millionth active user. A quarter of the people with an active account had logged into the site in the in the previous 30 days (Fletcher, 2010). The first video was posted in 2005 on YouTube, and its user base has also expanded exponentially. Trends in online activities have also evolved including ‘blogging’, the setting up of personal web posts. This trend became ‘mainstream’ when major media organizations started establishing blogs. An estimated 60–80% of blogs started by people were abandoned within a month (Worldwatch, 2009, p. 32). Further modifications such as wireless accessibility and the introduction of the laptop meant that computers could be more portable. The introduction of the iPad computer tablet in 2010–a cheaper, more basic computer with internet access–was instantly a great success and changed the computer user profile again. By 2012 tablets were being used as playmate, teacher and child minder (Nielsen, 2012), in much the same way television was used after it became widespread in the 1960s. Mobile phones In the same decade that computer usage increased–the 1990s–the mobile phone became a common accessory. Phone prices went down as competition increased and production levels went up. The GfK Roper Report, ‘Worldwide Study 2006’, which surveyed only the top 75% of income earners in countries, found 71% of participants used a mobile phone (Salles, 2006). Uptake of mobile phones has been very rapid in emerging economies. The percentage of mobile phone ownership can easily rise over 100% when International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(1) 201 people have multiple SIM cards or multiple phones. Brazilians have recently embraced the mobile phone, and uptake has been rapid. In 2007 ownership levels were at 133 million phones, over 70% of the population (Meirelles, 2009), and three years later numbers had reached 202.9 million, 99.7% of the population (CIA, 2012a). Levels of mobile phone ownership are even higher in Russia, reaching 238 million (164% of the population) in 2010 (CIA, 2012e), an increase from 5.1% in 2001). By 2010 numbers of mobile phones in India had reached 752 million–64% of the population (CIA, 2012c). Within 10 years of mobile phones being introduced into China in 1987, China had the most mobile phone users in the world. In 2010 there were 859 million mobile phones (64% ownership) (CIA, 2012b). In the same year US ownership was 279 million (90%) (CIA, 2012g) and UK ownership was 80.8 million (128%) (CIA, 2012f). As mobile phones do not have internet access, in many countries mobile phone ownership was supplanted by smartphones when they became available. Smartphones The most significant innovation in mobile phone technology was the launch of the ‘smartphone’ in 2006, offering texting, talking plus ‘advanced data’, which led to a media convergence with the internet, television, email, voice and text all delivered in one device. The internet was no longer tied to computers. The smartphone, because it is much cheaper than a computer and transportable, will enable millions of people to leapfrog landline and computer technologies and access the internet with wireless handheld devices. One of the attractions of smartphones for young people is the ‘anywhere anytime access’. Smartphone uptake has been rapid. The 24.1 million sold in China from January to June 2010 exceeded sales for all of 2009 (WARC, 2010c). The smartphone has tended to intensify patterns that were established with computer use earlier in the decade. Smartphone ownership levels are, however, still much smaller than those of mobile phones. 202 Ciochetto – New Technologies and Leisure User profiles With each change in technology and with the introduction of each new media device different user profiles are generated. User profiles tend to vary with age and gender, and different age groups show preferences for certain products and services and those profiles evolve over time. Different societies exhibit different cultural preferences, and in all societies men and women have different patterns of using technology in their leisure time. Computer User Profiles In the 1990s the number of internet users was still a small percentage of the total population in most countries and email communication was one of the first popular activities for personal computer users. Before 1995 British computer ownership levels were higher than the United States; then the United States overtook Britain. Ownership levels were about 25% in 1995 (Schmitt & Wadsworth, 2002). Not until the late 1990s in the UK did the number of homes with computers begin to rise steeply, and by 2004 over 50% were connected to the web (Roberts, 2006, pp. 38-39). By then two thirds of young people were experienced internet users (Russell & Drew, 2001, and Russell & Stafford, 2002 cited in Roberts, 2006, pp.38–39). According to the TGI 1999/2000 survey, the rate of usage in Britain, France, Germany and Spain averaged 14.4% with Britain having the highest level of users at 23% and the others varying between 7.6% and 14.4%. By 2001 levels in these four countries had reached 19.5% (Ware & de Montigny, 2001). At the end of the decade, in 2009, internet user numbers had reached 51.4 million (83%) in the UK (CIA, 2012f) and 245 million (80%) in the US (CIA, 2012fg). Computer uptake in key emerging economies has been uneven and ownership levels began expanding in the last decade, a few years after expansion in industrialized countries. In Latin America, user levels in a 1999/2000 survey were 12.5%, increasing to 19.6% by 2001. Five percent of the users in Latin America were men (Ware & de Montigny, 2001). In Brazil personal computer ownership grew to 76 million (38%) in 2009 (CIA, 2012a). In Russia internet users expanded to 40.8 million (29%) in 2009 International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(1) 203 (CIA, 2012e), the same level as in China in 2009 389 million – or 29% (CIA 2012b). In India by 2009 the number of internet users was 61 million, 5.5% of the population (CIA, 2012c). Children A recent study of children’s use of the internet–for leisure or learning–in the OECD countries found the key influences to be family, cultural values and socio-economic status. One of the important social changes that occurred in the 1990s in these countries was the growth of a ‘wired generation’ of children (also known as ‘digital natives’) who had computers at school and in their homes, and who grew up with the internet, mobile phones and video games. In 21 of the 30 OECD countries over 86% of children over 15 used a computer at home, and in five countries the level was over 95%. It was easy for children to use computers for play or entertainment as the internet complemented and extended activities they were already engaged with (2008). Since then children have been engaging with computers from a very early age. A decade ago computer use by children aged six months to six years in the United States was increasing (Calvert, Ridout, Woolard, Barr & Strouse, 2004 cited in OECD, 2008). On average children start learning to use computers on their parent’s laps, sometimes as young as two and a half years, but had moved to independent use within a year. There is a strong trend towards universal use amongst OECD teenagers. There is also evidence of a gender gap in the use of technology. Boys use computers and the internet more than girls; they have wider computer experience and spend more time online. Girls seem to use computers for communicating, word processing, text messaging, email and blogging more than boys (Lenhart, 2007, OECD, 2007 cited in OECD, 2008). Research into the effects of new technology on children builds on existing research into effects of television on children. There is evidence of positive benefits for the development of cognitive skills, but the effects on other aspects like critical thinking and creativity have not been researched. Time spent on digital technologies adds to time devoted to other media and reduces time interacting with families and friends, but there is an increase in 204 Ciochetto – New Technologies and Leisure virtual communication, less supervised by adults. There is no conclusive evidence through longitudinal studies of effects on educational performance (OECD, 2008). One of the major effects of increasing use of technologies for leisure is the displacement of other activities, especially the physical activities of young people and children. Smartphone Uptake Smartphone ownership has rapidly increased in recent years. In December 2010 media research company Nielsen published a report on mobile phone behavior in 10 countries. In Europe 47% of mobile phone users aged 15-24 – henceforth ‘youth’–owned a smartphone (as a percentage of mobile phone owners), and the group over 25 averaged 31% ownership. In the USA the overall average was 28% and the youth average was 33%. In all the countries surveyed smartphone ownership by males exceeded that of females, except in the United States where 55% of owners aged 15-24 were female. In the US overall, 55% of users were male (Nielsen, 2010). By 2012 most young adults in the United States had a smartphone, according to the New York Times (cited in Nielsen, 2012). A 2011 UK survey by Ofcom–the independent regulator and competition authority for the communications industry–found that by 2011 27% of adults in the UK and 47% of teenagers owned a smartphone and that most of those smartphones had been purchased in the last year (2011). User Activities Mobile Phones: Texting and Talking (MSM) Texting and making calls remain the main uses of mobile phones, even on smartphones. Women tend to use messaging more in most markets except India. In the UK and US women use messaging 10% more than men do. In the US, where plans were much cheaper, at first texting (TMS) was less popular than making calls, but this trend has changed in recent years. The same Nielsen study found in the late 2000s that mobile phones and texting had become an obsession with young people. Their main conclusion was International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(1) 205 that this generation of young people around the world is more immersed in mobile technology than any previous generation, though the same would have been said about computers a decade earlier. Nielsen’s analysis of American mobile phone usage data in April-June 2010 also found that US teens’ main reason for getting a mobile phone had changed between 2008 and 2010, from safety to texting. American teenagers aged 13-17 years were the highest users of mobile phones, averaging 3339 sent and received messages in a month, more than six every hour they are awake–and this was an 8% increase from the year before. Teen girls sent and received more messages than boys, 4050 compared to 2539 messages per month. Young adults (18-24) sent 1630 texts per month, less than three an hour. Though teens preferred texting to phoning, they still averaged 646 minutes talking on the phone per month. The level of phone call use peaks at age 24. The over 55 group is the only sector that talks less than 646 minutes, the average for teens (2010). Online activity: Computers and Smartphones As marketers are keen to make use of new technology to target consumers, a new market research field has emerged–MROC–market research into online communities. More data has recently become available about behavior and patterns of use. Patterns of behavior online and on mobile phones vary among different cultures and among age groups in those cultures. Older age groups are seen as a key demographic because they often have more time and disposable income. Data on patterns of technology use often blur the distinctions between cellphones and smartphones. In the GfK Roper Report Worldwide Study 2006, texting, emailing and web browsing were all increasing rapidly (Salles, 2006). One of the most noticeable trends in the last decade has been people’s simultaneous use of multiple media. The introduction of computers and the web has not reduced exposure to other media, and in fact increases overall time spent with media (National Centre for Educational Statistics, 2004 cited in OECD, 2008). Multiple simultaneous uses of media raises questions about levels of engagement with any one form of media. Daily time spent online has increased in most societies in the last decade, and part of that growth is due to the increasing 206 Ciochetto – New Technologies and Leisure use of smartphones to access the internet. A British study by Ofcom found (though it is too soon to know if these patterns are temporary or permanent), that patterns of behaviour of smartphone users differ from patterns of earlier mobile phone users. In Britain 37% of smartphone users admitted they were ‘almost addicted’ to their phones and used them at restaurants, while eating and in the bedroom and bathroom. Users are also making more calls and sending more messages. There appeared to be a trend that smartphone use among young people meant they were watching less television (23%) and reading fewer books (5%) (2011). Internet Searching and Games Computer games were some of the first attractions of computers in leisure time and are especially popular in Asian countries. China is one of the leading nations in the emerging world in technology uptake. Research in China by Analysys International found access to the internet by smartphone growing rapidly: 205 million people at the end of 2009 logged onto the web with wireless handsets, rising to 214 million in the first half of 2010. A CTR survey of 1000 mobile internet users in 10 cities found that the major reason for use was the demand for ‘anytime anywhere’ content (WARC, 2010c). The most popular uses of the internet in China in 2013 were instant messaging and searching (GO-Globe, 2013). Smartphone Activities The highest percentage of young people (15-24) in the world who use ‘advanced data’ (beyond text and voice) were in China (70%) and the US (83%). Average adult usage was 47% in China and 51% in the US (Nielsen, 2010). The behavior of users of mobile phones has evolved rapidly since smartphones came on the market. One of the unforeseen parallel developments that accompanied the smartphone was the exponential growth of applications that could be downloaded to add specific functionality, for both computers and smartphones. There are currently around 400,000 applications (apps) available from Apple, 37% of them free. An international study by Oracle Communications of 3000 mobile phone users (acknowledged as slightly skewed towards younger men), found 69% used a International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(1) 207 smartphone, and 47% of the people using smartphones used more mobile data services than they did a year ago. Key activities were that they were used as MP3 players, GPS navigation and as replacements for digital cameras. Seventy-five percent of those aged 19-34 (Gen Y) had downloaded free apps versus 41% of those 47-65 (baby boomers). Sixteen percent of interviewees had a tablet and 41% planned to get one soon. Sixty-eight percent said the apps they most liked to use on phones were games, while other preferences were: social networking 67%, music 64%, banking 55% and video 51% (WARC, 2011). Social Networking The immense popularity and uptake of social networking since it first appeared in 2004 has been a major surprise to the sector. Also not predicted was that Facebook would outdo its competitors in Western markets. The profile of these Facebook users has also evolved rapidly. By 2010 28% of Facebook users were over 34, and this group was the fastest growing (Fletcher, 2010). The use of social networks in older age groups in the United States has almost doubled in 2011 to 42% (over 47% in the agegroup 50-64 and 26% in the over 64 age-group), according to PEW Internet (cited by Willems, 2012). This group is searching for products and information that fits a functional need rather than emotional needs, while the younger age group, 16-24 years, is mainly interested in social interaction with their peers. They also have shorter attention spans (segmented attention) so they like cool new tools and working on multiple tasks (Willems, 2012). E-commerce and E-banking E-commerce has expanded as people become more familiar and comfortable with using technology. Patterns of online shopping vary considerably between countries, and e-commerce is more common in high-income countries where credit card ownership is more widespread and among young adults and the older age groups who have credit cards. The mass uptake of smartphones is predicted to change consumer behaviour as more people shop 208 Ciochetto – New Technologies and Leisure online (WARC, 2010d). The growth in advertising on mobile phones has accompanied the expansion of the numbers of smartphone users, as it did with expansion of computer ownership. Security of data continues to be an issue for some groups. There are marked differences in e-commerce uptake between emerging economies, for example India and China. Only a small number of Indian internet users shop online (WARC, 2009) while a third of those interviewed for a McKinsey survey of the Chinese internet population had purchased products online. The groups in China quickest to show interest in purchasing or who actually purchased products tended to be younger, better educated and wealthier. One of the main uses of the internet was to check out products before purchasing (WARC, 2010b). The percentage of the population who use credit cards is low in China (estimated at two million on internetworldstats.com/asia/cn, 2012), though according to WARC the rate of e-commerce purchasing is 28% in China, the highest of the BRICs (WARC, 2010a). Credit card users in India were estimated at 18.3 million in 2009-10, a minute percentage of the total population of 1.1 billion (Phalghunan, 2010). Customers in both India and China are concerned about security and fraud, which is cited as a key reason e-commerce was a relatively small sector in China (Nanjing Marketing Group, 2012). Electronic banking has been expanding in high-income countries as people became more confident about the security of their data. In emerging economies electronic banking is still fairly small scale. Thirty-two percent of internet users in India used internet banking according to IAMAI (Internet World Stats, 2012). Smartphones phones have also offered e-banking opportunities to people in countries where infrastructure is poor and there are no landlines. In Kenya, where the population is estimated to be 41 million in July 2012, there were 24.9 million mobile phones in 2010 (CIA, 2012d). As banking services are poor or non-existent in many areas of Kenya, the ability to access services such as mobile banking is a very important. In Kenya these banking is done by mobile phones, not smartphones. Mobile banking is especially beneficial to migrant workers who want to send money home to their families. International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(1) 209 Pornography One of the areas of computer use that tends to be ‘under the radar’, but obviously an important for leisure activity–and work time, is using the internet to access pornography. An estimated 42.7% of internet users viewed pornography in 2006 and there were 68 million daily pornography search engine requests, 25% of the total requests. Forty million American internet users frequently visit pornography websites. In the United States in 2006 internet porn sales ($2.84 billion) were worth less than video sales and rentals, which were valued at $3.62 billion (Ropelato, 2006). Travel Most expenditure on leisure occurs away from the home. Out-of-home eating and drinking dominated leisure spending in Britain 2002-3, followed by tourism and media (Roberts, 2006, p.18). Leisure activities have become more polarized as inequality in society increases and trends in growing inequality and growing affluence for certain sectors are reflected in the way people travel. Travel in the form of a holiday is usually people’s largest leisure expenditure. Approximately 60% of the British population has at least one holiday a year away from home (Roberts, 2006, p.19). As the better off became more affluent they began taking more holidays and travelled further. As travel prices became more competitive in the 1990s people also travelled more. Innovations in technology have also changed the way people travel at every stage of the process. People are using computers and smartphones to research and access leisure information and to plan their travel. In the UK research has shown that the internet plays a greater role in planning than booking. Booking a full holiday on a mobile device is still too complicated (TravelSupermarket Travel Trends Tracker, cited by TravelMole, February 2012 in NewMedia Trend Watch UK, 2012). Technology is used at most stages of the travel process as the sector becomes increasingly accessible to those working outside the travel sector. The internet is used to search for airline tickets, last minute bookings, bargains, insurance, and hotel accommodation and to find information about destinations. Once at 210 Ciochetto – New Technologies and Leisure destinations GPS maps can be used to navigate round cities. Airports are beginning to provide information in the form of apps for airport maps. Ticket confirmations and reminders are sent to cellphones and computers. Effects of Changing Patterns of Leisure In the last two decades patterns of leisure activities have changed dramatically with the expansion of the use of computers, mobile phones and smartphones. While time spent using technology has increased, communication may have increased, but there has been a decline in interpersonal interaction. In some countries this decline in personal interaction has created new social problems including increased social isolation and ‘internet addiction’. In Korea– one of the ‘most wired’ nations– clinics have been established to deal with the growth of internet addiction. Numbers reached more than a million in 2007, but after the government established counseling programmes the number declined to 938,000 in 2009 (Sang-Hun, 2010). In countries where children and young people are spending more time using technology there is a decline in physical activity that is contributing, along with changes in diet, to a rise in child obesity, especially in industrialized countries. For adults the fact that technology now enables 24-hour availability means the boundaries between work and leisure or personal time are being eroded. Conclusion The migration of computer technology to personal use in the home in the last two decades has had a major impact on what people do in their leisure time. The expansion of the internet and the increasing leisure options available– games, www, searching, social networking and e-commerce –first impacted on people’s leisure, modifying former patterns of behavior rather than introducing completely new tasks. The other complementary technology was the mobile phone which stimulated an expansion in interpersonal communication, much the way email did in the late 1980s/early 1990s. Texting has become almost an obsession among young people. With the advent of the smartphone, services previously accessed by computer could International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(1) 211 now be accessed anywhere at anytime. The multiple technological options available means technology has migrated into most aspects of daily life. As technology use is sedentary, other types of activities, especially physical activities, have been displaced especially among the young. Among older users there has been an erosion of the differentiation between work and leisure. Technological changes and convergences are still occurring, so it is too soon to say whether patterns of leisure will evolve and change further, or whether current behavior patterns are here to stay. Will there be a reaction and rejection to this invasion of technology in daily life, and a rejection in favour of simpler pleasures? However, the popularity of social networking reinforces the fact that interpersonal communication remains people’s main source of pleasure and enrichment in daily life. References British Broadcasting Company (BBC). (2010). The Virtual Revolution. Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00n4j0r CIA (2012a). World Factbook Brazil. Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/br.html CIA (2012b). World Factbook China. Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ch.html CIA (2012c). World Factbook India. Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/in.html CIA (2012d). World Factbook Kenya. Retrieved from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ke.html CIA (2012e). World Factbook Russia. 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Retrieved from: www.worldwatch.org Lynne Ciochetto is Associate Professor in the School of Design, College of Creative Arts, Massey University Contact Address: Massey University. College of Creative Arts. PO Box 756, Wellington, 6140, New Zealand. Email: [email protected] Instructions for authors, subscriptions and further details: http://rimcis.hipatiapress.com Precariado. Una Carta de Derechos José Taberner Guasp1 1) Universidad de Córdoba. España th Date of publication: July 30 , 2015 Edition period: July 2015 - November 2015 To cite this article: Taberner, J. (2015). Precariado. Una Carta de Derechos [Review of the book]. International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(2), 215-217. doi: 10.17583/rimcis.2015.1644 To link this article: http://doi.org/10.17583/rimcis.2015.1644 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE The terms and conditions of use are related to the Open Journal System and to Creative Commons Attribution License (CC-BY). RIMCIS – International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences Vol. 4 No.2 July 2015 pp. 215-217 Review Standing, G. (2014). Precariado. Una Carta de Derechos. Barcelona: Ed. Capitán Swing. ISBN: 978-849428791 Grande fue el interés que suscitó el anterior estudio de Standing (2011), The Precariat. The New Dangerous Class. Tanto por constituirse en referencia para debatir hipótesis acerca de cambios recientes en la estructura social, como por lanzar una llamada a la acción para reconducirlos. En aquella primera obra (2011) nos presenta al precariado como una clase en formación, que califica –no muy convincentemente- de peligrosa. En esta segunda (2014), rápidamente traducida al castellano, reafirma su crecimiento numérico como clase en sí; y subraya mucho más cómo se constituye progresivamente en clase para sí, con conciencia de condición colectiva necesitada de organización. De ahí su incipiente peligrosidad para el sistema, que esta vez justifica mejor. Dos tercios del libro recogen, en veintinueve artículos, el desarrollo de su carta al precariado para abolirse como clase, para transformar la sociedad; para crear las condiciones de una vida y un trabajo dignos, o –como dice Standing- de una “buena sociedad”, sin precariedades indignas. Las relaciones de producción y de distribución de esta nueva clase en sí se caracterizan por el acceso incierto al trabajo, a la vivienda, a los servicios y recursos públicos; por la carencia de siete seguridades por las que la clase obrera luchó, reivindicadas por la OIT. La inestabilidad errática y el sueldo bajo, aun mediando sobrecualificación, se constituyen en norma. La identidad profesional se desvanece. En relación con el Estado el precario o precaria se va convirtiendo en denizen, en residente, al irse vaciando de contenido sus derechos sociales y 2015 Hipatia Press ISSN: 2014 - 3680 DOI: 10.17583/rimcis.2015.1644 216 Taberner – Precariado. Una Carta de Derechos [Book Review] menguando de iure y de facto los derechos cívicos. Esta es una de las tesis centrales del texto. Otra de las tesis es que en esta economía de mercado global sería inútil frenar la inestabilidad laboral en cualquier país por separado y que las condiciones laborales industriales forjadas en grandes fábricas y oficinas ya no volverán. Pero hay futuro para el precariado si éste -superado el periodo de reconocimiento de sí mismo- se alía con otras clases: profitécnicos concienciados, clase obrera residual y salariado inferior, reinventando una nueva carta de derechos. Siempre que sean capaces de objetivarla socialmente frente a la ubicua plutocracia, la facción dominante de la clase alta. Si esa transformación no se produce, seguirán predominando las cuatro “a”: anomie, anxiety, alienation y anger. Cinco principios regulativos de justicia social, de la seguridad básica como derecho universal, propone Standing en su Carta: Una norma o cambio es socialmente justo sólo si mejora la seguridad de los grupos más inseguros. No discriminar negativamente en derechos sociales a ninguna minoría. Derecho al trabajo digno, no a cualquier trabajo, ni sólo al remunerado mercantilmente. Las seguridades son derechos comunes, no mero objeto de asistencialidad o caridad. El principio de sostenibilidad ecológica preside también esta carta para la reorganización económica y social justa. Tres luchas afronta ahora el precariado para avanzar en derechos. La del reconocimiento de sí sin avergonzarse, lucha por la representación (“no nos representan” clamaba el 15M), y por último la lucha por la redistribución de recursos: seguridad, tiempo, espacio, educación, bienes y servicios comunes… Esto último requiere según Standing, bajo los mencionados principios, redefinir el trabajo como actividad productiva y reproductiva, regular la flexibilidad del trabajo impuesta por el nuevo modo de desarrollo global informacional, reconstruir las comunidades e identidades ocupacionales y la política de inmigración de forma no clasista, así como promover la libertad y la reinserción en el tejido asociativo disuelto por el individualismo. Eliminar los mecanismos sociales que atrapan en la pobreza, revitalizar los bienes y servicios comunes -incluyendo fondos de capital común-, recuperar la democracia deliberativa frente a la dictadura del capital International and Multidisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, 4(1) 217 financiero global son algunos de los pormenores que se desarrollan en esta obra. Para todo ello se sitúa como condición el avance hacia una renta básica universal; el propio Standing la promueve desde la Basic Income Earth Network, cofundada por él. Buen análisis y bien planificada llamada a la transformación social, merecedores de atención. Se echa de menos que Standing no plantee siquiera abordar la cuestión de la incapacidad del modo de producción capitalista para afrontar un nuevo modo de desarrollo socialmente equitativo, ecológicamente sostenible. Referencias Standing, G. (2011), The Precariat. The New Dangerous Class. London: Bloomsbury Academic Standing, G. (2014). Precariado. Una Carta de Derechos. Barcelona: Ed. Capitán Swing José Taberner Guasp, Universidad de Córdoba [email protected]