Articles Standard Essential Patents, Trolls, and the Smartphone

Transcripción

Articles
Standard Essential Patents, Trolls, and the
Smartphone Wars: Triangulating the End
Game
Daryl Lim*
ABSTRACT
Few legal issues in recent years have captured the public’s attention
more powerfully than litigation over standard essential patents (“SEPs”).
This Article explains how SEP litigation overlaps with two other major
centers of patent litigation—litigation involving smartphones and patent
assertion entities (“PAEs”). It observes that attempting to pre-empt
patent hold-ups by imposing blanket ex ante disclosure obligations and
royalty caps on standard setting organizations (“SSOs”) is misdirected
and counterproductive. Instead, the solution lies in clear and balanced
rules to determine “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” (FRAND)
*Assistant Professor, The John Marshall Law School. I am grateful to Logan
Breed, Mike Carrier, Jorge Contreras, Tom Cotter, Sean Gates, Llew Gibbons, Allen
Kamp, Josh Sarnoff, Greg Vetter as well as the participants of the AIPLA Computer and
Electronic Summit, the McAndrews, Held & Malloy LLC Comprehensive IP Litigation
Update, the IP Scholars’ Roundtable, the IP on the Edge Conference, and the Faculty
Work in Progress Workshop for their helpful comments and suggestions. I am also
grateful to Dean Ralph Ruebner for the summer research grant awarded in support of this
Article and to Judge Jim Holderman of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois for his encouragement to take this article further. Many thanks also to Susanna
Bagdasarova and her team at the Penn State Law Review, including Beth Robinson,
Alexandra Cumings, and Emma Snyder, for their outstanding work in bringing this
Article to print. All errors and omissions remain my own.
1
2
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 119:1
royalties and injunctive relief. This solution will help parties make more
realistic assessments of their options and help adjudicators resolve SEP
disputes.
Correctly framed, implementers bear the burden of proving the
breach of a FRAND commitment. FRAND royalties should, in the
absence of comparable licenses, focus on apportioning the profits based
on the relative importance of the patented technology in the covered
product. Royalties should be measured at the time the standard is set but
generally should not be discounted for the possibility of invalidity and
non-infringement. Discriminatory licenses can be hard to detect, but
targeted initiatives and improved transparency would make the task
easier. Injunctions should be granted based the wording and intent of the
relevant FRAND commitment, conduct of the parties, and proof that the
technology drove the sales of the component or product on which the
relief is sought. More broadly, courts must understand both the limits
and opportunities of the antitrust and patent laws. While useful in
arresting ex ante misconduct and attempts to elide FRAND commitments
through patent assignments, antitrust is largely irrelevant in addressing
patent hold-ups; patent law has a role in both improving patent quality
and deterring vexatious litigation.
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 3 I.
STANDARDS, SMARTPHONES, AND PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES ............ 8 A. Standard Setting and the FRAND Commitment .............................. 9 B. The Smartphone Wars and Patent Assertion Entities ..................... 14 II.
WHY SSO POLICY REFORM IS NOT THE SOLUTION ................................ 22 A. Four Reasons Why Not................................................................... 22 B. A Better Way .................................................................................. 29 III.
A FRAMEWORK FOR FRAND COMMITMENTS ........................................ 33 A. Who Bears the Burden of Proof?.................................................... 35 B. Royalty Valuation ........................................................................... 37 C. The “Non-Discriminatory” Requirement ....................................... 47 IV.
INJUNCTIONS ........................................................................................... 54 A. Life After eBay ............................................................................... 56 B. The Case for Injunctive Relief........................................................ 59 C. A Framework for Assessing Injunctive Relief ............................... 62 D. The End Game ................................................................................ 70 V.
ANTITRUST AND PATENT SOLUTIONS ...................................................... 72 A. The Role of Antitrust Law .............................................................. 72 B. The Role of Patent Law .................................................................. 81 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 90 2014] STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS, TROLLS, AND THE SMARTPHONE WARS 3
INTRODUCTION
Modern society depends on standards, but we are often oblivious to
them.1 Standards allow us to switch seamlessly as our smartphones and
tablet PCs connect to Wi-Fi over different hot spots.2 Computer
hardware standards like USB ensure that our flash drives work across
different devices that march to a common drumbeat drawn up by
standard setting organizations (“SSOs”).3
Standards also foster
competition between compliant products, driving innovation and
consumer choice.4
However, these benefits come with the risk of hold-ups.5
Implementers invest in making their devices comply with a standard,
which in turn makes it expensive to switch out of a standard. Owners of
patents essential to using the standard—standard essential patents or
“SEPs”—may opportunistically target non-licensed implementers with
patent infringement suits and reinforce their royalty demands with
1. See Jorge L. Contreras, Implementing Procedural Safeguards for the
Development of Bioinformatics Interoperability Standards, 39 N. KY. L. REV. 87, 87
(2012) [hereinafter Contreras, Implementing] (describing Wi-Fi, USB, CD, DVD, PDF
and HTML, which “have become household terms, and thousands of others ensure that a
vast array of products and services connect and communicate seamlessly in a manner that
is largely invisible to the consumer”).
2. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”) established these
standards.
See
IEEE
802.3:
Ethernet,
IEEE
STANDARDS
ASS'N,
http://standards.ieee.org/about/get/802/802.3.html (last visited June 28, 2014).
3. See, e.g., Certain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities &
Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-868, 2014 WL 2965327, at *74 (USITC June 13,
2014) (Final) (Initial Determination on Violation of Section 337 and Recommended
Determination on Remedy and Bond) (“[European Telecommunication Standards
Institute (ETSI)]” is an organization that creates globally applicable standards in the
information and communication technology industry.”).
4. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY
STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY
F/RAND COMMITMENTS 3–4 (2013) [hereinafter POLICY STATEMENT], available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/290994.pdf (describing how “voluntary
consensus standards, whether mechanical, electrical, computer-related, or
communications-related, have incorporated important technical advances that are
fundamental to the interoperability of many of the products on which consumers have
come to rely”).
5. I use “hold-up” to mean a higher rate than what would normally accrue to the
SEP owner. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at
*10 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (“The ability of a holder of an SEP to demand more
than the value of its patented technology and to attempt to capture the value of the
standard itself is referred to as patent ‘hold-up.’”).
4
[Vol. 119:1
injunctions that would expel the implementers’ devices from the
marketplace if they fail to comply.6
When a standard becomes ubiquitous, such as the 4G LTE (LongTerm Evolution) standard, using an alternative standard may not be an
option.7 The market power gained as a result of standardization allows
SEP owners to demand a bounty from locked-in implementers in excess
of the value of their patented technology—as much as 100 times the
adjudicated value of the technology.8 Hold-ups raise prices for
consumers and harm implementers by reducing overall demand for
standard compliant products.9 They also jeopardize the benefits of
collective standard setting as the incentive to participate becomes
diminished.10
SSOs are aware of the risk of hold-ups. They require commitments
from SEP owners to disclose patents “essential” to the standard and to
license their technology on “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory”
(“FRAND”) terms.11 Often, this private ordering works well. SEP
owners realize that they are trading higher per-unit prices for higher sales
6. See Timo Ruikka, "FRAND" Undertakings in Standardization—A Business
Perspective, 43 LES NOUVELLES 188, 192 (2008) (“An implementer faced with the threat
of ceasing its business utilizing the standard is prepared to absorb a higher patent royalty
cost than would have been the case if negotiations were conducted ex ante of
implementer investment.”).
7. See Damien Geradin, Moving Away from High-Level Theories: A Market-Driven
Analysis of FRAND, 59 ANTITRUST BULL. 327, 354 (2014) (describing how the 4G LTE
standard “increases the capacity and speed of wireless data networks, hence allowing
users to use their devices for a larger set of capacity-hungry applications, such as video
calls and mobile TV”).
8. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 2111217, at *65, *100 (holding that, despite
Motorola’s request for a royalty of $3.00–$4.50 per unit, the F/RAND rate was $0.03471
per unit).
9. Id. at *10 (“In addition to harming firms that are forced to pay higher royalties,
hold-up also harms consumers to the extent that those excess costs are passed onto
them.”).
10. See POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 4, at 4 (explaining that “it may induce
prospective implementers to postpone or avoid making commitments to a standardized
technology”); see also Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 2111217, at *11 (“Hold-up by one SEP
holder also harms other firms that hold SEPs relating to the same standard because it
jeopardizes further adoption of the standard and limits the ability of those other holders to
obtain appropriate royalties on their technology.”).
11. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 313 (3d Cir. 2007) (“To
guard against anticompetitive patent hold-up, most [SSOs] require firms supplying
essential technologies for inclusion in a prospective standard to commit to licensing their
technologies on FRAND terms.”). FRAND issues also arise in the context of non-SEP
disputes. They fall outside of the discussion of this Article. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge,
Treating RAND Commitments Neutrally, J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. (forthcoming
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2398579 (arguing
that lock-ins occur both in de facto standards set by SSOs and de jure ones set by
independent private parties and should be treated similarly).
2014] STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS, TROLLS, AND THE SMARTPHONE WARS 5
volumes. They charge just a few cents, and sometimes nothing at all, on
the products that carry their technology.12
If an implementer wishes to use the standard, the SEP owner must
be willing to negotiate a fair and reasonable rate. If the implementer
refuses to pay that rate, the SEP owner can seek damages in an
infringement suit.
When disputes occur, they reveal a stark disparity of views on the
meaning of FRAND obligations.13 Closely convoyed to the issue of
FRAND royalties is whether and when SEP owners should be allowed to
obtain injunctions or exclusion orders against implementers.14
The threat of hold-ups has become significant enough to warrant
recognition by the judicial and executive branches of government and
has elicited Congressional testimony by industry representatives, as well
as a plethora of academic commentary.15 Others, however, have warned
12. See Robert D. Keeler, Why Can't We Be (F)RANDS?: The Effect of Reasonable
and Non-Discriminatory Commitments on Standard-Essential Patent Licensing, 32
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 317, 328 (2013).
13. Jorge Contreras, Guest Post: The February of FRAND, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 6,
2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/03/february-of-frand.html (noting that the
commitment to license a standard essential patent (SEP) on FRAND terms has “led to an
increasing number of litigation claims alleging that one party or another . . . has failed to
comply with its FRAND obligations.”); see RICHARD T. RAPP & LAUREN J. STIROH,
NERA, STANDARD SETTING AND MARKET POWER 9 (2002) (stating that, even though SEP
owners commit to license SEPs on FRAND terms, the “typical SSO patent policy
mandating that a royalty be ‘fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory’ gives little guidance
for royalty determination because ‘reasonable’ can mean different things to a technology
owner and a technology buyer”).
14. Mark. A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX.
L. REV, 1991, 1993 (2007) (“Injunction threats often involve a strong element of holdup
[when] . . . the defendant has already invested heavily to design, manufacture, market,
and sell the product with the allegedly infringing feature.”).
15. See, e.g., In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 2303, 2013 WL
5593609, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013). The court reasoned:
Following that investment, switching to an alternative technology would be
prohibitively expensive, and in any case would take the implementer out of
compliance with the standard. In that situation, the patent holder can demand
excessive royalties far beyond the fair value of its technological contribution to
the standard, merely because the implementer has no choice but to pay.
Id.; see, e.g., DONALD S. CLARK, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THIRD PARTY UNITED
STATES FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S STATEMENT ON THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3 (2012),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/policy/policy-actions/advocacy-filings/2012/06/ftccomment-united-states-international-trade. The statement read:
Hold-up and the threat of hold-up can deter innovation by increasing costs and
uncertainty for other industry participants, including those engaged in inventive
activity. It can also distort investment and harm consumers by breaking the
connection between the value of an invention and its reward – a connection that
is the cornerstone of the patent system. The threat of hold-up may reduce the
value of standard-setting, leading firms to rely less on the standard setting
process and depriving consumers of the substantial procompetitive benefits of
standard setting.
6
[Vol. 119:1
against “alarmist” conclusions of hold-ups and note that ex ante licensing
and cross-licensing make hold-ups rare.16
The Article accepts that both views are plausible. Hold-ups stem
from real FRAND disputes over SEPs, even if few disputes are actually
adjudicated and fewer still result in injunctive relief. For example, a
recent empirical study on operating companies in the smartphone
industry revealed that less than a third of the patents involved in
litigation are related to SEPs.17 The same study also revealed that no
injunctions had been granted to SEPs owned by operating companies.18
This is a significant finding. However, what the study does not reveal is
even more significant.
Id. See generally, e.g., Standard Essential Patent Disputes and Antitrust Law: Hearing
before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of A. Douglas Melamed, Senior
Vice-President & Gen. Counsel, Intel Corp.) [hereinafter Melamed], available at
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/7-30-13MelamedTestimony.pdf; POLICY
STATEMENT, supra note 4; Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses,
Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL’Y AND THE ECON. 119, 120
(2001) (citing the risks to standardization because of a defective FRAND regime); Ashby
Jones & Jessica Vascellaro, Smartphone Patents: The Never-Ending War, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 12, 2012, at B.1.
16. See Geradin, supra note 7, at 334; see, e.g., Joshua D. Wright, SSOs, FRAND,
and Antitrust: Lessons from the Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 21 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 791, 801–802 (2014) (“Despite the amount of attention patent holdup has drawn
from policymakers and academics, there have been relatively few instances of litigated
patent holdup among the thousands of standards adopted.”); Certain Wireless Devices
with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-868, 2014 WL
2965327, at *81 (USITC June 13, 2014) (Final) (Initial Determination on Violation of
Section 337 and Recommended Determination on Remedy and Bond) (“While there may
be a hypothetical risk of holdup, we have evidence that it is not a threat in this case, or in
this industry.”); Letter from Thomas E. Goode, Gen. Counsel, Alliance for Telecomm.
Indus. Solutions, to Donald S. Clark, Sec’y, Fed. Trade Comm’n 1 (June 14, 2011),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/requestcomments-and-announcement-workshop-standard-setting-issues-project-no.p11120400015%C2%A0/00015-60529.pdf (noting it “has not experienced the holdup problem,
nor has any such problem impeded in any way ATIS' standards development efforts”);
AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST., ANSI RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR INFORMATION RE:
FEDERAL AGENCIES’ PARTICIPATION IN STANDARDS AND CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT
ACTIVITIES 12 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/policy/public-comments/comment00006-33 (noting that “for only a relatively small number [of standards] have questions
ever been formally raised regarding the ANSI Patent Policy, including issues relating to
improper ‘hold up’”); Letter from Professor Jay P. Kesan, Univ. of Ill. at UrbanaChampaign, Coll. of Law, to Patrick J. Roach, Fed. Trade Comm. 2 (June 14, 2011),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/requestcomments-and-announcement-workshop-standard-setting-issues-project-no.p11120400022%C2%A0/00022-60546.pdf (finding “there is little or no empirical evidence
indicating that there is a significant problem with patent ‘hold-up’”).
17. Kirti Gupta & Mark Snyder, Smart Phone Litigation and Standard Essential
Patents 4 (Hoover Institution, Working Paper No. 14006, 2014), available at
http://hoohila.stanford.edu/ip2/wp14006.html.
18. Id.
Operating companies make up a diminishing share of the plaintiff
profile, falling sharply from 70 percent to 33 percent between 2010 and
2013,19 with the rise of non-practicing entities (“NPEs”) accounting for
the decrease. Between 65 and 90 percent of all patent cases settle, which
means that the data from the study may grossly underestimate the
severity of the problem as defendants negotiate their settlements under
the threat of patent hold-ups.20 Indeed, courts may have refrained from
granting injunctions on SEPs precisely because of concerns raised about
hold-ups.21
The continuing wave of cases and commentary also indicates that
while substantial progress has been made, the law has yet to provide a
satisfactory framework for resolving these disputes. This Article fills the
gap by offering a framework to understand and resolve SEP disputes
more effectively. As will be seen, many of these disputes have involved
smartphones and some have involved NPEs.
The Article begins by explaining how standard setting works and
why FRAND disputes are particularly prevalent in the smartphone realm.
It also explains the rise of a type of NPE, patent assertion entities
(“PAEs”), and the role they play in smartphone and SEP litigation. In
Part II, the Article observes that conventional wisdom urging blanket
reform of SSO intellectual property (“IP”) policies is misdirected and
counterproductive. The legal and technical characteristics of SSOs make
SSOs an inappropriate venue to prevent hold-ups through mandatory
disclosure obligations and royalty-caps. FRAND disputes are more
similar to disputes that routinely take place in patent litigation over
patent validity. Only a small percentage of bilateral negotiations result in
litigation. Rather than attempt to preempt every contingency with
complex SSO rules, it is more efficient to place the burden of
19. See Fiona M. Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Strategic Patent Acquisitions, 79
ANTITRUST L.J. 463, 465–66 (2014) (stating that from 2010 to 2013, the share of all
patent lawsuits brought by PAEs more than doubled, from 30% to 67%); see also Sara
Jeruss, Robin Feldman, & Tom Ewing, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent
Monetization Entities 9 (Univ. of Cal. Hastings, Research Paper No. 45, 2013), available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2247195 (finding that PAEs filed
58.7% of all patent cases in 2012, up from 24.6% in 2007).
20. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Understanding the
Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, TEX. L. REV. 16 (forthcoming 2015), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2442451; see also Jay Kesan &
Gwendolyn Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the
Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 264 (2006)
(finding that “approximately 80% of patent cases settle”).
21. To put it differently, countries make their decisions based on the possibility that
the risk of nuclear war might manifest itself, thereby giving countries holding those
weapons leverage in negotiations, even if such a war has not occurred. I am grateful to
Jorge Contreras for this insight.
8
[Vol. 119:1
determining rights and liabilities on those most interested—the parties in
dispute. SSOs may then clarify their FRAND obligations based on
guidance from the courts.
In Part III, the Article proceeds to present a framework to navigate
the FRAND inquiry. Under an improved framework, implementers bear
the burden of proving a FRAND breach. Those royalties should, in the
absence of comparable licenses, focus on apportioning the profits based
on the relative importance of the patented technology in product covered
by the standard. Royalties should be measured at the time the standard is
set but generally should not be discounted for the possibility of invalidity
and non-infringement. Discriminatory licenses can be hard to detect, but
that task can be made easier with targeted initiatives to improve
transparency.
Turning to injunctions, Part IV explains why FRAND commitments
should not prevent SEP owners from getting injunctions. Injunctions
should be granted based on the wording and intent of the relevant
FRAND commitment, conduct of the parties, and proof that the
technology drove the sales of the component or product on which the
relief is sought.
Finally, in Part V, the Article completes the discussion by
considering the complementary roles that antitrust laws and patent laws
can play in SEP litigation. It explains why antitrust laws are generally
appropriate in policing anticompetitive conduct taking place before the
standard is set and attempts to elide FRAND obligations through patent
assignments. It also explains why it is unwise to use antitrust laws
afterwards in addressing patent hold-ups. The Article also identifies two
problem areas best targeted by patent law: improving patent quality and
deterring vexatious litigation, with particular reference to nuisance suits
by PAEs.
I.
STANDARDS, SMARTPHONES, AND PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES
Technology standards are set in two main ways. Under one
approach, some companies release a technology that becomes a de facto
standard through market adoption.22 An example of this standard is
Adobe’s Portable Document Format (“.PDF”).23
22. See Anne Layne-Farrar, Moving Past the SEP RAND Obsession: Some Thoughts
on the Economic Implications of Unilateral Commitments and the Complexities of Patent
Licensing, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1093, 1095 (2014) (discussing patent hold-ups in the
context of de facto SEPs).
23. See Nadia Soboleva & Lawrence Wu, Standard Setting: Should There Be a Level
Playing Field for All FRAND Commitments?, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE, Oct. 2013, at
1, 3.
Standards may also be set by a group of companies and institutes, or
SSOs, who collaborate through consortia on sets of technical
specifications or an individual product. For example, the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ETSI”) develops global
standards for information communications technologies (“ICT”), which
include e-commerce, mobile devices, networking, media content and
distribution.24 Another example is the Institute of Electrical and
Electronic Engineers (“IEEE”) that develops standards, including those
for wireless local area networks (“W-LAN” or “Wi-Fi”).25
In recent years, courts have increasingly been called upon to decide
what a FRAND commitment means in the context of SEP litigation.26
FRAND disputes typically arise from a SEP owner suing a vendor or
manufacturer of a standard-compliant product who may or may not be an
SSO member.27 This section explains how standard setting works, and
why SEP litigation has become intertwined with litigation involving
PAEs and smartphones.
A.
Standard Setting and the FRAND Commitment
SSOs are voluntary membership groups. Participants often hold
patents that cover one or more aspects of the standard and meet to
discuss and adopt mutually acceptable standards to ensure
interoperability. SSOs have IP policies that encourage SEP owners to
24. About ETSI, ETSI, http://www.etsi.org/about (last visited July 21, 2014).
Standardized technologies include Global Systems for Mobile Communications (GSM),
Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA), and Long-Term Evolution (LTE)
technologies.
Mobile Communications, ETSI, http://www.etsi.org/technologiesclusters/technologies/mobile (last visited July 21, 2014). ETSI and five other SSOs
develop globally applicable technical specifications for mobile systems, such as 3G (third
generation) and 4G (fourth generation).
See About 3GPP Home, 3GPP,
http://www.3gpp.org/about-3gpp/about-3gpp (last visited July 21, 2014).
25. IEEE at a Glance, IEEE, http://www.ieee.org/about/today/at_a_glance.html (last
visited July 21, 2014).
26. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2012);
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 303 (3d Cir. 2007); In re Innovatio IP
Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 2303, 2013 WL 5593609, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013);
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-cv-178-bbc, 2012 WL 5416941, at *2
(W.D. Wisc. Oct. 29, 2012); Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK,
2012 WL 2571719, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2012); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,
864 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1030 (W.D. Wash. 2012); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Inc., No. 1:11cv-08540, 2012 WL 1959560, at *11 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2012). For a table listing
FRAND litigation, see Jorge Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach To
Standards-Based Patent Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 47, app. 1 (2013).
27. Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and
Other Patent Pledges, 2014 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 20),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2309023 [hereinafter
Contreras, Market Reliance Theory].
10
[Vol. 119:1
disclose patents they consider essential before the standard is adopted.28
Given their heterogeneous membership, and more importantly, the fact
that they serve both technology owners and implementers, SSOs also
have the incentive to stay neutral in disputes.29
SSOs require SEP owners to agree to license their patents on
FRAND terms to SSO members, and sometimes, to outside
implementers.30 Implementers, such as smartphone manufacturers like
Samsung, must obtain permission from all SEP owners in order to use
the relevant standard legally, offering a cash payment, running royalties,
or cross-licensing.31 The FRAND commitment is intended to facilitate
widespread adoption of the technology by protecting implementers
against hold-ups by SEP owners after an industry has adopted a standard.
The FRAND commitment also provides reasonable rewards to those who
invested in the research, development, and commercialization of
technologies used in the standard.32
From the perspective of patentees, the ability to infuse an industrywide standard with patented technology encourages them to risk
developing the costly technology and make their standards available on
FRAND terms.33 Standards greatly multiply the number of potential
28.
See, e.g., AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF
ANSI
PATENT
POLICY
5
(2012),
available
at
http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/Standards%20Activities/American%20Nati
onal%20Standards/Procedures,%20Guides,%20and%20Forms/ANSI%20Patent%20Polic
y%20Guidelines%202012%20final.pdf (noting that early disclosure of patents “is likely
to enhance the efficiency of the process used to finalize and approve standards” and
“permits notice of the patent to the standards developer . . . in a timely manner, provides
participants the greatest opportunity to evaluate the propriety of standardizing the
patented technology, and allows patent holders and prospective licensees ample time to
negotiate the terms and conditions of licenses . . . .”).
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., ETSI RULES OF PROCEDURE, Annex 6: ETSI Intellectual Property
Rights Policy § 6.1 (Mar. 20, 2013) [hereinafter ETSI IPR Policy], available at
http://portal.etsi.org/directives/32_directives_oct_2013r.pdf. Section 6.1 requires:
When an ESSENTIAL IPR relating to a particular STANDARD or
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION is brought to the attention of ETSI, the
Director-General of ETSI shall immediately request the owner to give within
three months an irrevocable undertaking in writing that it is prepared to grant
irrevocable licences on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and
conditions under such IPR . . . .
Id.; see also IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS § 6.1 (Dec. 2012), available at
http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sect6-7.html (requiring the SEP owner
to submit “a “Letter of Assurance” stating “that a license for a compliant implementation
of the standard will be made available to an unrestricted number of applicants on a
worldwide basis without compensation or under reasonable rates, with reasonable terms
and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination”).
31. See Geradin, supra note 7, at 329.
32. See, e.g., POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 4, at 5.
33. See Melamed, supra note 15, at 9. Melamed explained:
THE
2014] STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS, TROLLS, AND THE SMARTPHONE WARS11
customers for both SEP owners and implementers.34 Thus SSOs function
like beekeepers and fruit farmers who provide an environment for insects
and plants to interact, pollinate, and produce a harvest of fruit and
honey.35
Despite the participation of sophisticated patent owners and
implementers, key contractual terms are usually mere guidelines, if
that.36 Most are silent as to disclosure obligations.37 SSO policies also
do not provide guidance on how to identify essential patents or divide
When a standard is widely used, its technologies are widely used; and the SEP
holders thus have vast commercial opportunities to license their patents, which
otherwise might never be used by anyone. Wi-Fi SEP holders, for example,
can collect royalties on billions of Wi-Fi chips, which are used in a variety of
products, including notebook PCs, smartphones, printers, cameras, televisions,
medical devices, home appliances, and a host of others.
Id.
34. Peter Strand, RAND Royalties Refreshed: A Primer for a Modified GeorgiaPacific Patent Royalties Test? (Part I), IPQ (Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, Washington,
D.C.), May 2013, at 2 (“SSOs promote widespread adoption of their standards by
incorporating technology that is attractive and cost-effective for companies adopting their
standard.”).
35. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL
2111217, at *12 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (“[T]o induce the creation of valuable
standards, the RAND commitment must guarantee that holders of valuable intellectual
property will receive reasonable royalties on that property.”); ETSI IPR Policy, supra
note 30, § 3.1. Section 3.1 states:
It is ETSI's objective to create STANDARDS and TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATIONS that are based on solutions which best meet the technical
objectives of the European telecommunications sector, as defined by the
General Assembly. In order to further this objective the ETSI IPR POLICY
seeks to reduce the risk to ETSI, MEMBERS, and others applying ETSI
STANDARDS and TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, that investment in the
preparation, adoption and application of STANDARDS could be wasted as a
result of an ESSENTIAL IPR for a STANDARD or TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATION being unavailable. In achieving this objective, the ETSI IPR
POLICY seeks a balance between the needs of standardization for public use in
the field of telecommunications and the rights of the owners of IPRs.
Id.
36. Currently one SSO, Versa Module Europa bus International Trade Association
(VITA), requires patentees to disclose terms or maximum royalties ex ante or risk
forgoing royalties later. See Disclosure and Licensing of Patents in Standards, VITA,
http://www.vita.com/disclosure/VITA%20Patent%C20Policy%C20section%C2010%20d
raft.pdf (last visited July 4, 2014); see generally Anne Layne-Farrar, Proactive or
Reactive? An Empirical Assessment of IPR Policy Revisions in the Wake of Antitrust
Actions (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). But that requirement is
controversial. Commentators have raised concerns that implementers will tacitly collude
to drive down prices through a group boycott. Michele K. Herman, How the Deal Is
Done Part 1: Negotiating Standards-Related Patent Licenses, 3 LANDSLIDE 35, 38 (2010)
(“While the mere disclosure of license terms to a group of prospective licensees and other
interested parties is unlikely to raise antitrust concerns, the subsequent conduct of those
parties in evaluating, discussing, and making decisions based on the disclosure will likely
raise antitrust concerns.”).
37. See Herman, supra note 36, at 38.
12
[Vol. 119:1
economic rents.38 Some even allow SEP owners to couch FRAND
commitments on their own terms39 or explicitly disclaim responsibility
for identifying SEPs, their validity, or any role in policing compliance
with FRAND obligations.40 Other SSOs like the IEEE allow voluntary
disclosure of terms pre-standardization.41 SSOs are generally small nonprofits, and they are not a party to the FRAND disputes.42
The tendency of SEP owners to over-disclose their patents, thereby
distorting FRAND royalty rates, exacerbates the risk of hold-ups due to
incomplete contracting.43 Definitions of what is “essential” vary among
SSOs. Some SSOs subject more patents to FRAND, while others like
the Bluetooth standard44 subject only a few patents to the standard.45
Studies have shown that only 21 to 27 percent of declared SEPs are
actually essential.46
The tendency towards over-disclosure stems from several factors.
First, SEP owners are worried about the risk of antitrust liability if they
38. See Ruikka, supra note 6, at 191 (“Within standards body rules, there is no
authoritative definition of what 'fair and reasonable’ means in actual fact and in concrete
circumstances. Such definition or elaboration is not found in a licensing undertaking, in
the IPR policies or in related SDO documents.”).
39. See Contreras, Implementing, supra note 1, at 89 (noting the lack of clear written
policies and how this “minimalist approach not only invites abuse and opportunistic
behavior, but also leaves aggrieved participants with little legal recourse after abusive
behavior has occurred”).
40. See, e.g., IEEE-SA STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS § 6.2 (Dec. 2012), available at
http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sect6-7.html (disclaiming responsibility
“for determining whether any licensing terms or conditions provided in connection with
submission of a Letter of Assurance, if any, or in any licensing agreements are reasonable
or non-discriminatory”). “The IEEE is not responsible for identifying Essential Patent
Claims for which a license may be required, [or] for conducting inquiries into the legal
validity or scope of those Patent Claims.” Id.
41. Press Release, Karen McCabe, IEEE Standards Ass'n, IEEE Enhances Standards
Patent Policy to Permit Fuller Disclosure on Licensing (Apr. 30, 2007), available at
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20070430006298/en/IEEE-EnhancesStandards-Patent-Policy-Permit-Fuller#.U7msxxYeVuY.
42. Id.
43. See Contreras, Market Reliance Theory, supra note 27, at 60–61.
44. See Fast Facts, BLUETOOTH, http://www.bluetooth.com/Pages/Fast-Facts.aspx
(last visited July 22, 2014) (“Bluetooth technology is the global wireless standard
enabling . . . exchanges of data over short distances using radio transmissions . . . in the
unlicensed industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) band at 2.4 to 2.485 GHz . . . .).
45. BLUETOOTH, BLUETOOTH PATENT/COPYRIGHT LICENSE AGREEMENT § 5(a)–(b)
(2014).
46. See David J. Goodman & Robert A. Myers, 3G Cellular Standards and Patents,
in 2005 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WIRELESS NETWORKS, COMMUNICATIONS AND
MOBILE
COMPUTING
415,
415
(2005),
available
at
http://eeweb.poly.edu/dgoodman/wirelesscom2005.pdf; FAIRFIELD RES. INT’L, ANALYSIS
OF PATENTS DECLARED AS ESSENTIAL TO GSM AS OF JUNE 6, 2007, at 8 (2007), available
at http://frlicense.com/GSM_FINAL.pdf.
attempt to sue on patents not disclosed before the standard was set.47
Second, royalties are based on the number of patents licensed, and SEP
owners may believe that they will obtain better leverage during
negotiations for cross-licensing.48 Third, SEP owners may also want to
display a large patent portfolio as a posture of dominance to its rivals and
shareholders.49
It is tempting to assume that accurate disclosure is important
because the value of standard setting is about picking the best
technology. In reality, just like plugs and sockets in different countries,
the declared standard is one among several functional standards chosen
based on a cost-benefit analysis of factors that may depend only partly on
technological merit.50 Thus, the consensus-based disclosure and FRAND
rules are not the result of arbitrary choice, historical accident, or the
subjugation of one group by another. Rather, consensus-based disclosure
and FRAND rules are the result of conscious choice on the part of most
or all of the SSO’s participants.51
The real value of a standard lies instead in the reduction in design
and implementation costs that consensus brings. For example, wireless
devices need to interact with each other to allow users to communicate
through a variety of different applications. Standards facilitate these
positive network externalities through intra-standard competition while
trading-off inter-platform competition.
The ICT industry stands as a quintessential example of the benefits
of standardization.52 Thousands of FRAND agreements have been
47. The
Federal
Trade
Commission
(FTC)
in
Rambus,
Dell, and Unocal found misrepresentations or intentional concealment to amount to an
unfair method of competition under §5 of the FTC Act. See infra Part V.A.
48. See Contreras, Market Reliance Theory, supra note 27, at 61.
49. See J. Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9(4) J.
COMPETITION
L.
&
ECON.
931,
958
(2013),
available
at
http://idei.fr/doc/conf/sic/seppapers2013/sidakmay2013dec4.pdf (explaining that the
patent holder may believe that the sheer number of its declared-essential patents will
signal to important constituencies the patent holder’s technological prowess). This signal
may, for example, help the patent holder to attract customers, investors, or skilled
workers. Id.
50. Thomas F. Cotter, TIPLJ Session 3: In House Perspectives on FRAND
(Moderated by Professor David Taylor, SMU), COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (Feb.
21, 2014), http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2014/02/tiplj-session-3-inhouse-perspectives.html (“One misconception: standard setting isn't necessarily about
picking the ‘best’ technology. It's more a question of ‘just pick one.’ Think about plugs
and sockets in different countries; one is not necessarily better than another.”).
51. See Roger G. Brooks, Patent "Hold-Up," Standards-Setting Organizations and
the FTC's Campaign Against Innovators, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 435, 454–55 (2011).
52. Geradin, supra note 7, at 330 (describing the evolution from GSM through
WCDMA to LTE with “thousands” of agreements between SEP owners and
implementers).
14
[Vol. 119:1
concluded and billions of standard-compliant devices have been sold.53
However, the ICT industry has also been the area where vocal calls for
reforms of the FRAND regime are heard.54
B.
The Smartphone Wars and Patent Assertion Entities
Where multiple inputs are priced independently, each patent owner
acts independently to maximize profit by taking the full value
represented by all holders of patents needed,55 resulting in royalty
stacking.56 Where standards have many SEPs and products that comply
with those standards, the risk of a hold-up is compounded by the number
of potential SEP owners and can result in cumulative royalty payments
that may undermine the standards.57
Participants in early telecommunications standards shared a
common interest in setting balanced royalty rates because they shared a
common business model.58 To avoid royalty stacking, implementers paid
53. Id.
54. See Shapiro, supra note 15, at 119 (“The need to navigate the patent thicket and
holdup is especially pronounced in industries such as telecommunications and computing
in which formal standard setting is a core part of bringing new technologies to market.”)
(emphasis added); Geradin, supra note 7, at 336 (noting reforms at ETSI to redefine
FRAND “in a manner that is favorable to implementers”).
55. AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE
THEORY OF WEALTH 99–116 (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers
1971) (1838) (describing what is known today as the “Cournot complements” problem);
see also Ronald A. Cass, Patent Litigants, Patent Quality, and Software: Lessons from
the Smartphone Wars, 16 MINN. J.L., SCI. & TECH., (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at
29–30), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2431285 (noting
that “[i]n the patent context, this hold-up risk rises sharply with the number of patents and
patent holders”).
56. See generally Ann Armstrong, Joseph J. Mueller & Timothy D. Syrett, The
Smartphone Royalty Stack: Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components Within
Modern
Smartphones
(Working
Paper,
2014),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2443848 (describing royalty stacking
as a situation where the “cumulative demands of patent holders across the relevant
technology or the device threaten to make it economically unviable to offer the product.”)
57. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 2303, 2013 WL 5593609, at
*9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (noting that royalty-stacking “concern arises because most
standards implicate hundreds, if not thousands of patents, and the cumulative royalty
payments to all standard-essential patent holders can quickly become excessive and
discourage adoption of the standard”).
58. John D. Harkrider, Seeing the Forest through the SEPs, 27 ANTITRUST 22, 25
(2013),
available
at
http://awards.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/seeing_the_forest_through_seps-harkrider.pdf.
Harkrider explains:
If they set a rate on their 3G patents that was too high, that rate would become
precedent for a firm that was trying to charge them a high rate. If they argued
for too low a rate, that rate would become precedent for those who wanted to
pay them that low rate. . . . As a result of this dynamic, most
telecommunication firms charge very similar prices for their portfolio of SEPs.
one royalty that covered every standard applicable to a device.59 These
rates would be what the same participants both paid and received and
would be between two and four percent of the price of the device.60
In the mid-2000s, the entry of Apple, Google, and Microsoft into
the mobile telecommunications space catalyzed the transformation of
simple mobile phones into smartphones, disrupting the royalty
equilibrium.61 This smartphone revolution shook the technology world.
One billion smartphones were sold in 2013 alone—one user for every
seven people on the planet, with revenues of $340 billion.62
As new entrants in the smartphone space, Google, Apple, and
Microsoft did not have network protocol SEP portfolios and could not
cross-license as their predecessors had done.63 To beef up their stockpile
Id.; see also Kai-Uwe Kühn, Justifying Antitrust Intervention in ICT Sector Patent
Disputes: How to Address the Hold-Up Problem, 9 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 100, 105
(2013) (“In the information technology sector such agreements have worked for a long
time and allowed firms to innovate without having regard to potentially infringing patents
of their main competitors.”).
59. See Harkrider, supra note 58, at 25.
60. Eric Stasik, Royalty Rates and Licensing Strategies for Essential Patents on LTE
(4G) Telecommunication Standards, LES NOUVELLES, Sept. 2010, at 114–19, available
at http://www.investorvillage.com/uploads/82827/files/LESI-Royalty-Rates.pdf.
For
example in 2002, a number of telecommunications companies such as Nokia, Siemens,
and Ericsson capped their aggregate royalty burden below 5%. See Press Release, Nokia,
Nokia Advocates Industry-Wide Commitment to 5% Cumulative IPR Royalty for
WCDMA (May 8, 2002), available at http://company.nokia.com/en/news/pressreleases/2002/05/08/nokia-advocates-industry-wide-commitment-to-5-cumulative-iprroyalty-for-wcdma (“Under this proposal no manufacturer should pay more than 5%
royalties covering all essential WCDMA patents from all patent holders.”).
61. See Harkrider, supra note 58, at 25; see also Alison Jones, Standard-Essential
Patents: FRAND Commitments, Injunctions and the Smartphone Wars, 10 EUROPEAN
COMPETITION J. 1, 9 (2014). Jones attributes the litigation to:
(i) the entry into the market of implementers, such as Apple (with iPhone),
Google (with its open source Android operating system) and Microsoft (with
Windows Mobile), which did not have the networks of patents essential to
ETSI standards as their competitors (although Apple and Microsoft, for
example, hold a significant portfolio of design and software patents which are
not standard-essential (non-SEPs)); and (ii) when some of the original players
either sold off their patent portfolios to patent assertion entities (PAEs) and/or
their position in the final product market changed or began to decline.
Id. (citations omitted).
62. Press Release, IDC, Worldwide Smartphone Shipments Top One Billion Units
for the First Time, According to IDC (Jan. 27, 2014), available at
http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS24645514; see also Press Release, HIS,
Combined Smartphone and Tablet Factory Revenue to Exceed Entire Consumer
Electronics Market This Year (Oct. 25, 2013), available at http://press.ihs.com/pressrelease/design-supply-chain-media/combined-smartphone-and-tablet-factory-revenueexceed-entire; Joel Rosenblatt, Samsung Calls One of its Own at $2 Billion Apple Patent
Trial, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 14, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201404-14/samsung-calls-one-of-its-own-at-2-billion-apple-patent-trial.html.
63. Id. (describing how while Apple and Microsoft had 4500 patents and 18,000
patents, “Apple had declared only 23 U.S. patents as essential to ETSI and Microsoft had
16
[Vol. 119:1
of telecommunications patents, Apple and Microsoft, along with other
companies, paid $4.5 billion for 6000 patents from Nortel in 2011, a deal
Wall Street Journal described as “the largest intellectual property
portfolio ever sold.”64
Many of those patents covered core wireless communications
technologies such as LTE and 3G.65 In 2012, Google acquired Motorola
Mobility Inc., which had 17,000 patents, including a significant number
of SEPs, for $12.5 billion.66 A writer for Wired Magazine observed that
“few companies have been loading up on patents as aggressively as
Apple and Google, two companies that had nothing to do with the
smartphone market 10 or 15 years ago[.]”67
Both sets of transactions were approved by the Justice Department
because (1) Motorola Mobility’s litigation history against Apple,
Microsoft, and others made it unlikely that Google’s acquisition would
dampen Motorola Mobility’s aggression; (2) Apple and Microsoft had
pledged publicly not to seek injunctive relief on their SEPs,
acknowledging that this would be contrary to their FRAND
commitments; and (3) Google committed to refrain from seeking
injunctions for disputes involving future revenues and to allow patent
validity challenges.68
declared only one,” but that “Google had an even more significant problem—it lacked a
significant portfolio of both SEPs and non-SEPs”) (citation omitted).
64. Peg Brickley, Nortel $4.5-Billion Patent Sale to Apple, Microsoft, Others
Approved,
WALL
S T.
J.
(July
11,
2011,
3:14
PM
ET),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303812104576440161959082234.
65. See Harkrider, supra note 58, at 26.
66. See Timothy Cornell, Apple, Google, and Motorola as Barometer of
Patent/Antitrust
Tension,
BLOOMBERG
BNA
(June
29,
2012),
http://antitrust.bna.com.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/atrc/7032/split_display.adp?fedfid=271
83589&vname=atrnotallissues&jd=a0d3g8h1e5&split=0. Cornell reports:
Motorola Mobility holds a trove of standard essential patents relating to mobile
devices. The acquisition put in the hands of the market's mobile operating
system leader, Google, a significant portfolio of standard-essential blocking
patents. And those patents have been the source of litigation between Apple
and Motorola Mobility for more than two years.
Motorola Mobility's patent portfolio consists of more than 7,000 patents, most
of which are U.S. patents, but more than 500 of which are EU patents. Of these,
many are standard-essential patents, especially in the areas of LTE, 3G, and 2G
as well as WCDMA-UMTS, GSMGPRS, CDMA, WiFi, WiMAX, MPEG-4
Visual, HDTV, and mobile batteries.
Id.
67. Robert McMillan, How Apple and Microsoft Armed 4,000 Patent Warheads,
WIRED
(May
21,
2012,
6:30
AM),
http://www.wired.com/wiredenterprise/2012/05/rockstar/.
68. Press release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice’s
Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigations of Google Inc.’s Acquisition
of Motorola Mobility Holdings Inc. and the Acquisitions of Certain Patents by Apple
Inc., Microsoft Corp. and Research in Motion Ltd. (Feb. 13, 2012), available at
Each tech company had a different business strategy. Apple
targeted high-end users with its iPhone and sought to keep its operating
system, iOS, a closed technological platform synced to its ecosystem.69
Microsoft banked on licensing its Windows Mobile operating to original
equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”), just as it had done with its
Windows operating system for personal computers.70 Google distributed
its Android operating system for free, banking more on revenue from its
suite of Internet services,71 which it estimated would be worth ten dollars
per Android device per year at the rate of 850,000 new Android devices
activated a day.72 Google’s strategy, however, threatened to significantly
undercut Microsoft and Apple’s revenue models in both the mobile and
desktop space.73 Apple and Microsoft sued OEMs that used Android
devices, such as Samsung, Motorola, and HTC.74 Apple wanted to
eliminate Android; founder Steve Jobs regarded Android as Apple’s
property and was “willing to go thermonuclear war on this.”75 In some
cases, Apple demanded up to ten percent of the price of Android
smartphones as royalties.76
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-at-210.html; see also Microsoft’s
Support
for
Industry
Standards,
MICROSOFT
(Feb.
8,
2012),
http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/legal/intellectualproperty/IPLicensing/ip2.aspx.
Google promised that it would not increase the rate charged for SEPs beyond
Motorola’s published 2.25% of the end device price. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, supra. Google also promised that it would not seek injunctions against willing
licensees. See id. In the end, the DOJ concluded that Google would not have a greater
incentive than Motorola Mobility to use these patents aggressively against Microsoft and
Apple and cleared the transaction. See id.
69. Harkrider, supra note 58, at 25.
70. Id.; see also Malarie Gokey, Chinese Government Reveals List of Patents
Microsoft
holds
over
Android,
DIGITAL TRENDS
(June
16,
2014),
http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/microsoft-android-patents-china/#!bj6yYX
(estimating that Microsoft makes $2 billion annually off simply through royalties
collected on Android devices that use licensed technology, more than its Windows phone
licensing agreements).
72. Seth Weintrub, Schmidt: A Billion Android Devices?, FORTUNE (July 28, 2010,
7:36 PM), http://fortune.com/2010/07/28/schmidt-a-billion-android-devices/; see also
Andy Rubin, Android@Mobile World Congress: It’s All About the Ecosystem., GOOGLE
MOBILE BLOG
(Feb. 27, 2012, 12:43 AM), http://googlemobile.blogspot.com/2012/02/androidmobileworld-congress-its-all.html.
74. See, e.g., Certain Pers. Data & Mobile Commc’ns Devices & Related Software,
Inv. No. 337-TA-710, USITC Pub. 4331 (Dec. 19, 2011) (Final) (Notice of the
Commission’s Final Determination Finding a Violation of Section 337, Issuance of a
Limited Exclusion Order, Termination of Investigation); Harkrider, supra note 58, at 25.
75. Larry Dignan, Steve Jobs: Android a 'Stolen Product', ZDNET (Oct. 11, 2011,
18:17 GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/steve-jobs-android-a-stolen-product/61504.
76. See Chris Ziegler, Apple Asked Samsung to Pay as Much as $30 Per Android
Phone, $40 Per Tablet for Patent Licenses, THE VERGE (Aug. 10, 2008, 9:41 PM),
18
[Vol. 119:1
Apple, Microsoft, Research in Motion (“RIM”), Sony, and Ericsson
formed Rockstar Bidco, later known as Rockstar Consortium
(“Rockstar”), to hold 4000 of the 6000 Nortel patents.77 Rockstar was a
PAE, a species of non-practicing entity whose purpose is to acquire,
aggregate, and assert patent portfolios.78
PAEs, pejoratively known as “patent trolls,” are a modern
byproduct of a post-colonial effort to democratize patent ownership and
facilitate a market for the licensing of technology.79 It is worth noting
that some PAEs perform the laudatory tasks of connecting innovators
and implementing licensees,80 as well as lowering transactions costs.81
Also, the line between PAEs and operating companies may not always be
clear,82 and their continued existence may be more “a symptom of the
success of the high-tech patent economy, [rather] than a sign of its
vulnerabilities.”83
http://www.theverge.com/2012/8/10/3234909/apple-samsung-patent-royalty-rates;
see
also Jessica E. Vascellaro, Apple and Google Expand Their Battle to Mobile Maps,
WALL ST. J., June 5, 2012, at A1.
77. See McMillan, supra note 67.
78. See Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Patent Assertion Entities and
Antitrust: A Competition Cure for a Litigation Disease?, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 501, 501
(2014). Wright and Ginsburg summarize:
In brief, a PAE acquires patents—sometimes a large portfolio of patents—from
research companies, operating companies, or individual inventors and
monetizes those patents by collecting royalties from anyone it finds practicing
one of the patents without a license. The PAE compensates the patentee
through the acquisition price, a share of the royalties, or some combination of
the two.
Id.; see generally David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of NonPracticing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425 (2014).
79. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION
1
(2013),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf; see also David
Kline & Bernard J. Cassidy, Are Non-Practicing Entities The Problem?, IPWATCHDOG
(Apr. 9, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/04/09/myths-of-the-patentwars-are-non-practicing-entities-the-problem/id=48984/ (“Patent licensing, in fact, was
the principal means by which new inventions were commercialized during the decades
before in-house corporate R&D departments emerged in the early 20th century.”).
80. SCOTT W. BURT, MOSAID TECHS. INC., COMMENTS OF MOSAID
TECHNOLOGIES ON PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITIES WORKSHOP 2 (2013), available
at www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/pae/comments/paew-0044.pdf.
81. Erica S. Mintzer & Suzanne Munck, The Joint U.S. Department of Justice and
Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Patent Assertion Entity Activities-"Follow the
Money", 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 423, 429 (2014) (“Other possible efficiencies identified
included lowering transaction costs by assembling bundles of complementary patents and
thereby reducing search, negotiation, and licensing costs. In addition, PAEs may be more
efficient at evaluating patents, negotiating deals, or managing litigation.”).
82. Id. at 426 (“Line drawing can be difficult, and an entity's form is not
determinative.”).
83. Yaniv Heled, Op. Ed., Patent Trolls as Parasites, JURIST (Apr. 28, 2014, 6:00
PM ET), http://jurist.org/forum/2014/04/patent-trolls-as-parasites.php.
At the same time, because PAEs are immune to countersuit and
injunctions, they are more likely to exploit SEPs aggressively. In
addition, PAEs have no incentive to cross-license their patents since they
have no products which might also infringe on their adversaries’
patents.84 In theory, PAEs could offset the negative effect on innovation
if they created value for original innovators, their targeted implementers,
or consumers. However, empirical evidence suggests that only a small
fraction of patent infringers actually copied from the patentees.85
The number of lawsuits brought by NPEs has more than doubled
between 2010 and 2013, with more than 90 percent of those cases
brought by PAEs.86 In the first half of 2013, PAEs sued 70 percent of
defendants.87 About two-thirds of the defendants were in the ICT
sector.88 One of the earliest and most notorious PAE lawsuits was filed
by NTP, Inc. against RIM.89 Under the threat of an injunction, RIM
settled for over $600 million, or 20 times the reasonable royalties
ordered, a sum which commentators note reflected the hold-up value of
shutting down RIM’s Blackberry service rather than the value of NTP’s
technology.90
The entry of Microsoft, Apple, and Google into the smartphone
space and the rise of PAEs are two important reasons for SEP litigation,
but they are not the only ones. Three other features of the smartphone
space fuel its SEP litigation.
84. See Harkrider, supra note 58, at 28 (“[T]he continued transfer of patents
(including SEPs) to patent assertion entities—which are immune to countersuit and
therefore are more likely to use these patents aggressively rather than to negotiate broad
cross-licenses . . . .”); see also Kühn, supra note 58, at 105 (“The relative hold-up values
of these portfolios are apparently much less clear across different previously nonintegrated industries so that cross-licensing solutions become much harder.”).
85. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87
N.C. L. REV. 1422, 1424 (2009) (finding copying established in only 1.76% of the cases
studied).
86. See Morton & Shapiro, supra note 19, at 465–66.
87. See id. at 466.
88. See id at 468.
89. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 420 (2014) (“We believe that the NTP suit is a poster child for the
problem of patent notice failure and harmful patent assertion by NPEs.”); see also NTP,
Inc., WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTP,_Inc. (describing NTP Inc. as a
“patent troll” whose “primary asset is a portfolio of 50 US patents” covering “wireless
email and RF Antenna design”). The court “issued an injunction ordering RIM to cease
and desist infringing the patents. . . . [which] would have shut down the BlackBerry
systems in the US.” Id.
90. Kühn, supra note 58, at 102 (“Note that the market value of a patent in such
circumstances does not reflect the intrinsic increase in value of the product that the patent
generates but instead the value of the potential costs that can be induced through an
injunction.”); see also Cass, supra note 55 (manuscript at 41–42).
20
[Vol. 119:1
First, standards-compliant devices such as smartphones integrate
telecommunications, computing, video, and photographic functions. The
number of potentially relevant patents is vast, estimated to be in the order
of 250,000 patents in a single smartphone.91
The need for
interoperability across various functions requires standardization and
hence, SEPs.92 The large number of standardized products, together with
the tendency to over-disclose patents, leads to patent thickets, increasing
the likelihood of infringement.93
The vast number of patents also increases the risk of royalty
stacking.94 In the context of SEP litigation, the cumulative demands of
owners of patents covering the relevant technology threaten the
economic viability of the products complying with the standard.95 A
recent empirical study estimates that royalty payments make up about a
quarter of the price of a smartphone, almost equal to the cost of the
components.96 Royalty stacking, the study concluded, may thus be
“undermining industry profitability—and, in turn, diminishing incentives
to invest and compete.”97
Second, many of those patents are software patents and generally of
poor quality.98 Ownership is often unclear.99 Unlike real property, there
91. RPX Corporation, Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Sep. 2, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1509432/000119312511240287/ds1.htm.
92. JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., 5 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 19:29.70.
(2d ed. Westlaw).
93. Kühn, supra note 58, at 103–04 (“A modern smart phone contains parts covered
by thousands of patents—most of them uncertain in their scope and validity. Many
potentially relevant patents will not be known to the designer of the new product.”).
94. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 2303, 2013 WL
5593609, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (“Another concern of the RAND obligation is to
prevent ‘royalty stacking.’ This concern arises because most standards implicate
hundreds, if not thousands of patents, and the cumulative royalty payments to all
standard-essential patent holders can quickly become excessive and discourage adoption
of the standard.”); see also id. at *10 (concluding that “the court should consider royalty
stacking as a way of checking the accuracy of a proposed RAND royalty’s
correspondence to the technical value of the patented invention”).
95. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND
COMPETITION
76–84
(2007),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf.
96. Armstrong, Mueller & Syrett, supra note 56, at 2.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
34–35 (2004) (“[T]he PTO has become so overtaxed, and its incentives have become so
skewed towards granting patents, that the tests . . . that are supposed to ensure that the
patent monopoly is granted only to true inventors have become largely non-operative.”).
99. Justin R. Orr, Patent Aggregation: Models, Harms, and the Limited Role of
Antitrust, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 525, 525–26 (2013) (“Although practicing technology
companies like the household names listed above own some of the world’s largest patent
portfolios, large non-practicing entities (‘NPEs’) like Intellectual Ventures, Acacia
is no requirement for recording SEP ownership assignments. Despite the
best efforts of companies to avoid infringement, history has shown that
even the best efforts can be futile.100
Third, ICT companies develop and commercialize devices quickly.
Firms commonly invent technologies claimed by earlier, unpublished
applications.101 This simultaneous invention and ubiquitous infringement
results in 97 percent of suits filed against independent inventors.102 Even
when patents have been published, engineers do not consult them
because knowledge of the patent attracts increased damages for willful
infringement.103 Thus, implementers run a calculated risk of infringing
SEPs if they did not obtain licenses from the patent owners.104
Faced with a seemingly overwhelming risk of infringement, the
need for a clearer picture of FRAND obligations becomes critical. There
are a number of ways one might achieve clarity.
The most
straightforward method is for all SSOs to impose mandatory disclosure
of only patents that are truly “essential” to the standard, as well as any
relevant licensing terms and rates.105 In theory, this method could allow
SSO members to make an informed choice about what they are
committing themselves to, much like restaurant diners expect to know
Technologies, Round Rock Research, and RPX Corporation have become active
purchasers from patent producers as well as at open auction.”).
100. Kühn, supra note 58, at 104. Kühn writes:
With the current innovation cycle in the ICT industry such careful and time
consuming patent search and assessment would not be possible if one would
want to compete with any product in the market. As a result, firms will have to
invest in new products and develop them, knowing that there will likely be
some infringement but that they cannot tell beforehand which part of the
product is likely to infringe a patent and who holds the relevant intellectual
property. This means that hold-up issues (i.e. investment before the negotiation
over a license) are endemic to the ICT industry.
Id.
101. Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2148–49 (2013) (“In a world in which everyone can patent every
little thing, royalty stacking is a fact of life.”).
102. Id. at 2149.
103. Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21 (2008).
104. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 1193.
105. See, e.g., Kai-Uwe Kühn et al., Standard Setting Organizations Can Help Solve
the Standard Essential Patents Licensing Problem, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE, Mar.
2013,
at
1,
3,
available
at
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Free/ScottMortonetalMar13Special.pdf (“SSOs can substantially reduce the problem of hold-up and litigation in
this sector by reforming their IPR policies.”); see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A
Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patent,
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1137–38 (2013) (“This litigation is largely a function of
ambiguities and omissions in the FRAND system used by most SSOs. The effectiveness
of the FRAND commitment has been undermined by these ambiguities and omissions . . .
.”); Ruikka, supra note 6, at 189 (“These gaps should be better addressed by SDOs.”).
22
[Vol. 119:1
what they are ordering and how much they will be charged.106 But, as
will be seen in the next section, that is precisely the wrong thing to do.
II.
WHY SSO POLICY REFORM IS NOT THE SOLUTION
The impulse to fix contractual incompleteness in FRAND
commitments must be held in check; the inquiry should be allowed to
proceed only if there is a reliable indication that the system is somehow
broken.107 Despite numerous changes SSOs have made to their IP
policies, participants generally have no obligation to define FRAND.108
Few SSOs have adopted policies facilitating ex ante disclosure of
licensing terms, leaving parties to define the scope of FRAND poststandardization.109
A.
Four Reasons Why Not
First, as to the disclosure of only “essential” patents, determining
whether a pending application or patent is essential is difficult, even for
patentees themselves.110 Software and telecommunications standards are
106. See Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results
and Analysis of an Empirical Study, 53 JURIMETRICS J. 163, 164 (2013) [hereinafter
Contreras, Technical Standards]; see also Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to
Make a Patent Market, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 257, 259 (2007) (“The only people who
stand to lose from mandatory licensing of licenses are those who are taking advantage of
the current state of ignorance . . . .”).
107. Wright, supra note 16, at 801 (“[T]he relevant question is not whether SSOs,
contributors, and adopters face tradeoffs in terms of balancing IPR policy completeness
and precision—they certainly do—but whether there is reason to believe the sophisticated
parties get the balance systematically wrong as the result of some market failure.”).
108. See id. (arguing that “[t]he persistence of these terms in competitive markets
over time suggests . . . that this imprecision is a feature and not a bug of the SSO
contracting process”).
109. See RUDI BEKKERS & ANDREW UPDEGROVE, A STUDY OF IPR POLICIES AND
PRACTICES OF A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF STANDARDS SETTING ORGANIZATIONS
WORLDWIDE
102–03
(2012),
available
at
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/pga/cs/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_072197
.pdf. Bekkers and Updegrove assert:
[N]one of the policies attempts to even define what “fair” or “reasonable” fees
are intended to mean in context. Nor do they state that at minimum, such fees
must bear a reasonable relationship to the economic value of the IPR, despite
the fact that this benchmark is stated explicitly by the FTC in its report on
evolving [sic] IP marketplace, as well as in the European Commission's
relevant Guidelines on horizontal cooperation agreements.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Contreras, Market Reliance Theory, supra note 27, at 59
(“As it turns out, very few such licenses are negotiated prior to the adoption of a
standard.”).
110. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 105, at 1155 (“Inventors can keep patent
applications pending in the PTO for years or even decades and can even seek additional
new patents from old applications, and the PTO takes years to issue a patent.”) (citations
omitted).
typically covered by thousands of patents potentially essential for
successful
implementation.111
Patent
claims
covering
telecommunications and software patents use non-standard nomenclature
in their claims, making searches difficult and time consuming. This
nomenclature also makes it difficult for both prospective SEP owners
and implementers to review claims.
Ex ante disclosure or pre-implementation review would almost
certainly omit a significant number of patents. Omissions stem from the
number of patents, the secrecy of the patent application, and the
complexity of the standard.112 In Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Systems, Inc.,113
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas declared that
“[t]here is no way to determine the exact number of standard-essential
patents,” and that neither side attempted to do so.114
Further, few seek out licenses because bilateral negotiations are
costly. When SSO participants are simultaneously involved with more
than a hundred SSOs, each developing multiple standards—a common
occurrence—the cost of negotiation becomes prohibitive.115
For
example, the 4G LTE standard involved more than 30 participants
111. Contreras, supra note 27, at 68 (“But most important is the fact that ex ante
policies, while theoretically capable of promoting efficiency-enhancing benefits, are
insufficient when hundreds or thousands of patents may be essential to the
implementation of a single standard.”).
112. See Brooks, supra note 51, at 456 (“SSOs recognize that it is difficult to identify
all potentially essential patents with respect to complex standards, and impossible to do
so with perfect precision.”); see, e.g., DEANNE E. MAYNARD, SEAN P. GATES, JOHN
THORNE & GAIL F. LEVINE, VERIZON COMMC'NS INC., WRITTEN COMMENTS OF VERIZON
COMMUNICATIONS INC. FOR FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION WORKSHOP ON STANDARDSETTING
ISSUES
4
(2011),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/request-commentsand-announcement-workshop-standard-setting-issues-project-no.p11120400051%C2%A0/00051-80236.pdf (“The number of patents, combined with the secrecy
of patent applications, prevents SSOs or their members from knowing of all potential
patent rights that may cover standardized technologies.”); TIMOTHY SIMCOE, CAN
STANDARD SETTING ORGANIZATIONS ADDRESS PATENT HOLD-UP? COMMENTS FOR THE
FEDERAL
TRADE
COMMISSION
3
(2011),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/request-commentsand-announcement-workshop-standard-setting-issues-project-no.p11120400040%C2%A0/00040-80169.pdf (noting that the difficultly in determining relevant
patents because “a modern laptop or smart-phone will implement hundreds of standards
and infringe thousands of patents”).
113. Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., No. 6:10-CV-473, 2013 WL 4046225 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 6, 2013).
114. Id. at *24.
115. See Jorge Contreras, Rethinking RAND: SDO-Based Approaches to Patent
Licensing Commitments 14–15 (Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law, Working Paper, 2012),
available
at
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1030&context=fac_
works_papers [hereinafter Contreras, Rethinking RAND].
24
[Vol. 119:1
disclosing over 3000 patent families.116 Understanding the full size and
scope of the patent portfolio license needed to avoid infringement in
making and using the standard is even more difficult for implementers.
Because the cost of searching for patents could be prohibitive, the effort
and inconvenience of compliance makes mandatory disclosure of
“essential” patents unattractive.117
Any reputational smear from hold-ups by SEP owners seems to be a
weak deterrent at best. Commentators note that implementers exploited
in an earlier round may find themselves allied with the SEP owner in the
next round.118 As a result, SSOs simply require that disclosures be made
in good faith.119 In turn, implementers assume, before they make
standard-specific investments, that some licensing demands will be made
despite best efforts at evaluating patents potentially relevant to the
standard.120
Second, some have argued for the disclosure of licensing terms and
royalty caps. A recent study involving VITA, an SSO, revealed a
number of interesting findings, most notably, that VITA’s ex ante
licensing disclosure policies achieved overall openness and transparency
without depression of royalty rates or measurable negative effects on the
number of standards produced, duration of time required, or quality of
the standards.121
The depression of royalty rates is significant because SSO
participants include rival technology owners and rival implementers.
The very act of coming together to agree on terms raises the possibility
of antitrust liability for collusion. Sharply defined FRAND licensing
terms suggest coordinated pricing and provide possible proof of a
116. See Brooks, supra note 51, at 457 n.75 (“A ‘patent family’ refers to a set of
patents and applications derived from a single initial application and the specification
contained in that application.”).
117. See Ruikka, supra note 6, at 191 (“Investment prior to obtaining a license may
be viewed as less risky regarding patent costs when the SDO has a track record of
consistently procuring FRAND undertakings.”).
118. See 2 ECKSTROM'S LICENSING IN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC OPERATIONS chap. 8E
app. Y (2012) (noting the limits to reputational arguments against FRAND abuse).
119. Letter from Steve Mills, Pres., Inst. of Elec. & Elecs. Eng’rs (“IEEE”), to Donald
S. Clark, Sec’y, Fed. Trade Comm’n 2 (Aug. 5, 2011) [hereinafter IEEE Comments to
FTC
Report],
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/request-commentsand-announcement-workshop-standard-setting-issues-project-no.p11120400046%C2%A0/00046-80184.pdf (expecting that its members will act in “good faith” to
disclose any known patents that might prove essential), cited in Brooks, supra note 51, at
456–57 n.74.
120. I am grateful to Josh Sarnoff for this insight.
121. See Contreras, Technical Standards, supra note 106, at 208.
buyer’s cartel under antitrust law.122 Such cartels are dangerous because
they may force royalty rates down, under-compensating SEP owners.123
Even if owners and implementers could coordinate without fear of
antitrust enforcement, the sheer heterogeneity of the group would make
the transaction costs formidable.124 SSO participants are therefore
comfortable negotiating under the shadow of a FRAND commitment and
relying on tribunals to adjudicate occasional disputes.125
The study on VITA shows that ex ante license disclosures can work
in some cases, particularly if tailored to suit the needs and limitations of
the relevant industries. For instance, the study noted that “the
technologies on which VITA focuses are not as heavily covered by
patents as technologies in other ICT markets such as wireless
telecommunications, computer networking, and semiconductors.”126
At the same time, the VITA study also candidly acknowledged its
limitations, recognizing that “ex ante policies have not achieved
significant support” among SSOs.127 The study suggests that lack of
support for ex ante policies could be due to a variety of factors, including
122. See Wright, supra note 16, at 796 (“[[F]ear of antitrust liability imposes some
costs, as specificity with respect to prices, marketing, and distribution terms may be
construed as unlawful price fixing.”); see also Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property
Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1964–65 (2002).
Lemley notes:
Virtually no SSO specifies the terms on which licenses must be granted beyond
the vague requirement that they be “reasonable” and ““nondiscriminatory.”
Indeed, some SSOs expressly forbid discussion of such issues when a standard
is under consideration, presumably for fear of antitrust liability. Further,
private licenses are normally confidential. The result is uncertainty over the
cost and scope of patent licenses that may not prove much better than having no
policy at all.
123. Richard J. Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations in Standard-Setting
Organizations, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 855, 856 (2011) (“[J]oint negotiation may create
opportunities for potential licensees to exercise buyer market power, and suppress royalty
terms ex ante, but after rights holders have made irreversible research and development
investments necessary to create and patent technologies that are essential to a standard.”)
(citations omitted). But see id. at 858 (“The tolerance for coordinated conduct by
members of an SSO that may exercise buyer market power should depend on the
likelihood and magnitude of the ex post holdup.”).
124. Kühn, supra note 58, at 109 (“Furthermore, in the standard setting process
different players have systematically different incentives, which appears to be one factor
that has prevented agreements on a sharper definition of FRAND and of a dispute process
over FRAND in standard setting organizations like ETSI.”).
125. See Ruikka, supra note 6, at 191 (“The standards context is one where ex ante
licensing is truly the exception rather than the norm.”).
126. Contreras, Technical Standards, supra note 106, at 208.
127. Id. at 211.
26
[Vol. 119:1
patent owners pursuing a “patent monetization strategy;”128 other
participants fearing compliance costs129 as well as the possibility of
provoking “otherwise passive” SEP owners to seek additional
royalties;130 and the dampening effect of royalty-stacking in SSOs where
multiple owners hold vast numbers of SEPs, as is the case in the
smartphone industry.131 More broadly, the anticompetitive effects from
possible collusions warrant skepticism of such disclosure requirements.
Third, ex ante disclosures will do little for various groups of
implementers; even the window for determining essentiality is extended
to a time following the implementation of the standard.132 Some
implementers may not have participated in the standards-development
process because the adoption of the standard was unexpected.133 For
others, licensing negotiations arise only after the commercialization of
standard-compliant devices and services.134 One reason for these delayed
negotiations, as Professor Doug Lichtman explained, is that “intricate
negotiations over patent validity and patent value would take an
enormous amount of time,” and implementing firms want to “wait for
additional information before they commit to a specific royalty
128. Id.; see also id. at 206 (“[M]aintaining the secrecy of royalty rates (constrained
only by an ill-defined commitment to license on FRAND terms) might enable PatentCentric Developers to extract higher royalties.”).
129. See id. at 207 (“It is easy to make a FRAND commitment with respect to one’s
standards-essential patents. It requires much more work to determine the numerical
royalty rate that one might charge on particular standards-essential patents. In some
cases, making this determination might also require labor-intensive searches of large
corporate patent portfolios.”).
130. See id. at 208 (“[B]y forcing them to identify and place a price tag on their
standards-essential patents, these Product-Centric Developers might be induced to seek
royalties on patents that they otherwise would not have thought to assert.”).
131. See Contreras, Technical Standards, supra note 106, at 208–10; see also id. at
208 (“When multiple patents cover a single standard (patent stacking), the independent
disclosure of maximum royalty rates by individual patent holders becomes less
meaningful.”) (citation omitted).
132. See Ruikka, supra note 6, at 192 (“The total time span between a technical
selection (producing the Essential status of patents) and actual patent license agreements
emerging can easily be from 5 to 10 years.”).
133. See Contreras, Market Reliance Theory, supra note 27, at 59 n.47 (describing the
USB standard, “which was originally developed to improve the connection between
personal computers and stand-alone printers and similar peripheral devices). “At the time
it was developed, very few expected that USB would become a broadly adopted standard
used in a wide range of computer memory and other products.” Id.
134. See Ruikka, supra note 6, at 192. Ruikka notes:
Licensing negotiations are typically lengthy and their commencement may be
substantially deferred beyond standard approval and beyond initial deployment
due to various reasons including unpredictability of market success of the
standard, lack of visibility of which firms become the major implementers of
the standard, the poor quality of information about Essential patents etc.
Id.
structure.”135 Decisions regarding which technologies to incorporate into
the standard are made much earlier than the negotiation of licenses.136
Disclosing SEPs and licensing terms before the standard is set would
therefore be of no help to these groups of implementers.
Fourth, economic theory teaches that incomplete contracts can be
efficient.137 There would be no way to tell how important some patents
are until they are commercialized, imperiling arguments in favor of
royalty caps.138 The costs of complying with SSO policies are significant
factors in participation in SSOs, and those with large patent portfolios are
particularly sensitive.139 To arrest every factual permutation that could
lead to hold-ups would be impractical and, frankly, impossible.140 The
cost of ensuring every SSO contract complete could tax society more
than the cumulative cost of hold-ups. Rather than a being static event,
standards development is a continuous process and evolves over time.141
During this process, new SEPs are revealed, and the relative incremental
values of existing SEPs fluctuate.142 Thus, SSOs leave FRAND
135. See Doug Lichtman, Understanding the RAND Commitment, 47 HOUS. L. REV.
1023, 1028 (2010).
136. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 105, at 1155–56. Lemley and Shapiro
explain:
For an invention to be essential to a technical standard, it presumably must
have been made at the time that standard is adopted. With limited exceptions,
an inventor with an idea essential to a technical standard must file an
application within one year after adoption of the standard or lose rights to the
invention under the statutory bars. Accordingly, we suggest that SSOs specify
that the FRAND commitment applies not only to existing patents and
applications but also—at the very least—to those applications filed within one
year after the SSO adopts the standard.
137. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of
Contractual Relationships, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 444, 447 (1996).
138. Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-in: Rand
Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351, 369 (2007) (“[B]efore the
standard is established, it is unclear which if any of the participants will own standardessential patents.”).
139. See generally Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, A Model of Forum Shopping, 96 AM.
ECON. REV. 1091 (2006) (demonstrating that forum shopping technology contributors
respond to “sponsor friendly,” less rigid, IPR policies, resulting in higher quality
standards).
140. See Miller, supra note 138, at 381 (“No contract can ever fully anticipate, and
make provision for, all possible circumstances and outcomes in a complex relationship.
Indeed, this limiting condition is built into the very fabric of a transaction cost
perspective: a fully detailed contract would be infinitely costly; therefore, no one writes
them.”).
141. See Sidak, supra note 49, at 994 (“Inventors produce patentable innovations on a
recurring basis. Similarly, a standard evolves over time. Patents that are essential to the
standard are revealed over time. As technology changes, the marginal contributions of
different patents to the value of the downstream product also change.”).
142. Id.
28
[Vol. 119:1
negotiations to the parties, who are better situated to reach optimal
negotiated solutions.143 A commentator remarked that “[i]t is folly to
expect, much less insist upon, ex ante negotiation of detailed, tailored
license terms much beyond the royalty-free and RAND options.”144
Indeed, SSO members have stated that transparency compliance
may require them to “completely overhaul” their participation in
SSOs.145 For instance, discussions by technical experts could require the
participation of lawyers, business, and marketing representatives.146 SSO
participants are usually engineers “unschooled in business considerations
and unequipped to address the costs and related competitive implications
of their technical specification-writing exercises.”147 Consumers will
likely bear the costs of including these additional participants, both in
terms of higher product prices and a delayed standardization timeline.148
143. See, e.g., ETSI IPR Policy, supra note 30, § 6.1 (including FRAND commitment
but not defining FRAND terms); AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., GUIDELINES FOR
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANSI PATENT POLICY 7 (2012), available at
http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/Standards%20Activities/American%20Nati
onal%20Standards/Procedures,%20Guides,%20and%20Forms/ANSI%20Patent%20Polic
y%20Guidelines%202012%20final.pdf (“[T]he determination of specific license terms
and conditions, and the evaluation of whether such license terms and conditions are
reasonable and demonstrably free of unfair discrimination . . . should be determined only
by the prospective parties to each license . . . .”).
144. See Miller, supra note 138, at 370.
145. 2 ECKSTROM'S LICENSING IN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC OPERATIONS chap. 8E app.
Y (2012) (“At the Hearings, panelists also noted the potential costs associated with
disclosure requirements, including slowing the adoption of a standard and deterring widespread participation in the SSO.”).
146. FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIV., ANTITRUST DIVISION
ROUNDTABLES: COMPETITION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY IN THE
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 33 (Nov. 6, 2002) [hereinafter ANTITRUST DIVISION
ROUNDTABLES] (Earle Thompson, Intellectual Asset Manager and Senior Counsel at
Texas
Instruments),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/competition-ip-lawpolicy-knowledge-based-economy-hearings/021106ftctrans.pdf (asserting that Texas
Instruments does not have enough “rare breed” licensing attorney/engineers to engage in
ex ante negotiations with all of the standards bodies in which Texas Instruments
participates).
147. Robert A. Skitol, Concerted Buying Power: Its Potential for Addressing the
Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 727, 734 (2004).
148. ANTITRUST DIVISION ROUNDTABLES, supra note 146, at 87. Earle Thompson
asserted:
At some point [ex ante discussions are] either going to add to my cost, which,
by the way, gets passed on to the consumer at some point, or it's going to be we
don't participate in certain groups. To me, it's a major longer term concern and
I'm not sure if the thing that we're trying to fix, which doesn't seem to be a real
problem, is worth presenting another problem down the road.
Id.; see Brooks, supra note 51, at 455 (noting that pressuring SSOs to change their rules
or governmental intervention that trumps those rules “would damage the standards
development and licensing processes to the grave disadvantage of downstream entities,
and ultimately consumers”).
In short, FRAND commitments function as a residual property right
to protect the implementers of standard-specific investments.149 These
commitments help induce implementers to adopt SEP encrusted
standards despite the possibility of hold-ups. In economic terms,
implementers participate because the payoffs for participating are greater
or equal to not participating.
SSO IP policies are diverse, suggesting choice and competitive
forces at work.150 The obligations ultimately reflect the work of
sophisticated parties who are conscious of the need for contractual
flexibility, potential antitrust liability for price-fixing, and costs of
participation. Vague FRAND commitments are thus a feature, rather
than a failing, of the system.151 SSO participants are aware of the risk of
hold-ups but find the cost of preempting every element that could lead to
a hold-up prohibitive.152
B.
A Better Way
A FRAND commitment is not an actual license, but merely a basis
for private negotiations without the intervention of SSOs.153 A more
149. See Paul L. Joskow, Asset Specificity and Vertical Integration, in 1 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 107, 111 (Peter Newman ed., 1998)
(“[W]hen specific investments are involved, ownership of the specific assets allocates the
residual rights of control to the party that makes the specific investment.”).
150. Wright, supra note 16, at 799–800. Wright explains:
For the SSOs with IPR policies, the requirements imposed by those policies
vary significantly. There is also rich variation in SSO rules governing the scope
of disclosure, licensing arrangements, and whether members' ownership of
IPRs within a standard is prohibited. Some SSOs require royalty-free licensing
before incorporating the IP into a standard, while others require “reasonable
and nondiscriminatory licensing.”
Id.
151. See Wright, supra note 16, at 801 (noting that “contractual incompleteness and
ambiguity in SSOs’ IPR policies is an intended and key design feature of SSOs”); see
also Damien Gerardin, Standardization and Technological Innovation: Some Reflections
on Ex Ante Licensing, FRAND, and the Proper Means to Reward Innovators 4–5
(Tilburg Univ., Discussion Paper No. 2006-17, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=909011 (arguing that that any license
terms agreed by parties in bilateral market-driven, arms-length negotiations should, by
definition, be considered reasonable and thereby compliant with RAND commitments).
152. See, e.g., Klein supra note 137, at 447.
153. See Herman, supra note 36, at 35. Herman notes:
It is important to note that a willingness or commitment to offer a license on
RAND terms and conditions is not an actual license. Negotiations in the
market, the primary mechanism intended to establish RAND terms and
conditions, are generally left to individual patentees and implementers, and are
not conducted within or aided by the SSO. Importantly, by committing to offer
a RAND license, a patentee cannot refuse to negotiate in good faith with
implementers of the standard.
Id.
30
[Vol. 119:1
effective way to deal with incomplete FRAND contracting is to place the
burden of resolving the inherent uncertainties in the FRAND
commitment on the parties themselves.154
SSOs can implement
thousands of standards in a wide range of areas, many of which are never
widely adopted. Identifying SEPs and determining the scope of FRAND
obligations during litigation—when obligations are valuable enough to
litigate—is more cost-effective.155
Post-implementation bargaining
allows a diverse group of participants to reach more flexible outcomes.156
The interests of implementers and SEP owners are generally not
aligned and are of equal bargaining power, with large and small entities
on both sides. Hence, the perpetuation of the status quo may indicate
that this is the most efficient arrangement. SSO participants are
comfortable negotiating under the shadow of FRAND, relying on
tribunals to adjudicate disputes when they sporadically arise.157
Cajoling SSOs to straighten out their disclosure rules and focusing
on the precise scope of FRAND obligations may be precisely the wrong
thing to do, particularly in the smartphone industry. The former calcifies
the very suppleness participants need to negotiate custom solutions while
imposing hefty compliance costs on SSO participation.158 The latter fails
to confine the costs of sporadic disputes between financially wellendowed companies to the parties with the greatest interest in the
outcome—the companies themselves. Instead, these initiatives impose a
wide-reaching reform on the vast majority of stakeholders who may
never face a hold-up and must bear the assured compliance cost of well-
154. See Wright, supra note 16, at 798 n.25 (“The additional negotiation costs to
attempt to cover all contingencies are wasteful and inefficient because they involve only
wealth transfers between the parties and because most future events can be
accommodated at lower cost after the relevant information is revealed.”).
155. See Contreras, Rethinking RAND, supra note 115, at 20. Contreras asserts:
Many SDO standards are never widely-adopted or have limited application,
making such a massive investment of resources a highly dubious proposition.
In contrast, relatively little up-front investment is required in SDO-based
standardization: patents are voluntarily declared as essential by patent holders,
and the actual essentiality of such patents is not tested unless and until litigation
ensues.
Id.
156. See Wright, supra note 16, at 800 (“[T]the significant variation we observe in
SSOs’ IPR policies is what one expects to see in competitive contracting process in a
diverse ecosystem of technologies and SSOs.”).
157. See Ruikka, supra note 6, at 191 (“The standards context is one where ex ante
licensing is truly the exception rather than the norm.”).
158. See Wright, supra note 16, at 804–05 (noting feedback from SSO participants
who expressed that “proposals for the federal government to promote a mandatory ex
ante IPR policy are likely to be costly and cumbersome, with little benefit”).
intentioned, but misplaced, efforts.159 That is not to say that SSOs should
simply take a passive role.
One way in which SSOs can make a positive difference is to require
SEP owners and implementers who join the SSO to agree to adjudicate
disputes through a court or arbitrator.160 Such an agreement on dispute
resolution provides parties who want to dispute royalties the flexibility to
attempt a negotiated settlement with a view that failure to achieve it
would mean the certainty of an adjudicated result which fails to take into
account the more nuanced outcomes desired by the parties. An
adjudicated outcome also brings with it the monetary costs of
adjudication.
Competition agencies recognize the value of mandatory
adjudication and have incorporated it as part of their response to alleged
SEP abuses. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) entered into a
consent decree with Google over its subsidiary, Motorola’s, attempt to
obtain injunctions on its FRAND-encumbered patents.161 The order also
contained a provision allowing implementers to seek to have contested
SEPs “resolved through a request for a FRAND [court] determination or
binding arbitration.”162 The decree also precluded Google from seeking
injunctive relief unless implementers refused to accept the adjudicated
result.163
The most developed protocol to date comes from Europe. In April
2014, the European Commission accepted Samsung’s commitment not to
seek injunctions against unauthorized implementers within the European
159. See Bernhard Ganglmair, Luke M. Froeb & Gregory J. Werden, Patent Hold-Up
and Antitrust: How a Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation, 60 J. INDUS. ECON.
249, 250 (2012) (noting that a legal regime allowing for damages for excessive licensing
fees might solve the patent hold-up problem at the cost of retarding innovation and SSO
participation).
160. See Miller, supra note 138, at 392 (suggesting arbitration under the American
Arbitration Association's Supplementary Rules for the Resolution of Patent Disputes);
see also George T. Willingmyre, Patent Policies and Standards Setting: The Issues. What
is Going On? Why should I Care? 33 STANDARDS ENGINEERING (2014). Willingmyre
found:
[T]here is no evidence to date that an arbitration process has actually addressed
a standards related patent dispute. One SDO56 is considering adding text to
state that nothing in its patent policy prohibits parties from pursuing arbitration.
Such an approach encourages dispute resolution through alternatives to
litigation but does not require it.
Id.
(manuscript
at
10),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2435313.
161. See Motorola Mobility LLC, No. C-4410, at 9–10 (F.T.C. July 24, 2013),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07/130724googlemotorolado
.pdf.
162. Id. at 8–9.
163. Id. at 9, 12.
32
[Vol. 119:1
Economic Area for five years if the implementers agreed to a protocol.164
With the oversight of an independent monitoring trustee, parties were to
attempt negotiations for up to 12 months. If they could not agree, one
party could submit the dispute to a court or both parties could submit it to
an arbitrator. Recognizing the fact-specific nature of a determination of
a “willing licensee,” the Commission instead offered implementers a “no
fault” alternative—the protocol’s “safe harbor.”165
The “safe harbor” approach imposes no stain of fault on the
belligerent parties. Further, this approach allows flexibility to reach a
negotiated outcome within a fixed timeframe and shepherds the parties
towards a tribunal that resolves the dispute if the parties fail to do so.
Although this Article disagrees that antitrust law is the appropriate forum
to resolve FRAND disputes,166 it acknowledges that this protocol has
much to commend itself.
Motions to compel arbitration are routinely granted and can
complement injunctive threats while reducing the need for SEP owners
to rely on such threats.167 Where appropriate, courts normally stay
proceedings in favor of arbitration.168 If a SEP owner can show that
implementers are likely to elide royalties, the arbitrator could require
164. Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Accepts Legally
Binding Commitments by Samsung Electronics on Standard Essential Patent Injunctions
(Apr. 29, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-490_en.htm.
165. Memo, European Comm’n, Antitrust Decisions on Standard Essential Patents
(SEPs) – Motorola Mobility and Samsung Electronics – Frequently Asked Questions
(Apr. 29, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14322_en.htm. The European Commission explains:
Whether a company can be considered a "willing licensee" needs to be
determined on a case by case basis taking into account the specific facts.
Today's decisions provide a "safe harbour" for willing licensees who want to
avoid the risk of being the subject of an injunction on the basis of SEPs . . . .
The decisions do not make findings on the willingness of licensees outside this
"safe harbor."
Id.
166. See infra Part V.
167. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1–13, 16 (West Supp. 2014); 9
U.S.C.A. §§ 14–15 (West 2009).
168. See In re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 700 F.3d 109, 116 (2d
Cir. 2012) (“[A] party to a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement is entitled to a stay
of federal court proceedings pending arbitration as well as an order compelling such
arbitration.”) (quoting Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, 341 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2003)); see
generally Jorge L. Contreras & David L. Newman, Developing a Framework for
Arbitrating Standards-Essential Patent Disputes, 2014 J. DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming
2014). At the same time, compelling arbitration has its costs. See Willingmyre, supra
note 160 (manuscript at 10) (“Adding requirements that SEP owners must use arbitration
in resolving license disputes would significantly expand most current SDO patent
policies. Arbitration is difficult to setup and if incorrectly setup can be prejudicial. Also
not all disputes are amenable to being arbitrated.”).
implementers to make payments into escrow or post a bond.169 Some
SSOs, such as ETSI, already have a mediated dispute resolution process.
This process can complement arbitration as alternatives to litigation.170
SSOs can also encourage transparency by partnering with the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to improve the quality of prior
art searches. These complement other initiatives to increase transparency
and detect breaches of the “non-discriminatory” requirement in FRAND,
and are discussed in Part III. Unlike the disclosures and royalty caps
discouraged by this Article, these initiatives retain the benefits of an
inchoate FRAND commitment and shift the focus toward developing a
legal framework for resolving disputes in the two areas they matter
most—refining royalty calculations and clarifying the rules on injunctive
relief. The Article focuses on these issues in the next two sections.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR FRAND COMMITMENTS
FRAND commitments are made in the context of particular IP
policies of a particular SSO and have the characteristics of contractual
relationships.171 In interpreting FRAND commitments, tribunals have
therefore attempted to determine the SSO’s goals in setting the
standard,172 the express terms of the agreements, and other indicia of the
parties’ intentions.173
169.
170.
See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 105, at 1153.
See EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., ETSI GUIDE ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS (IPRS) § 4.3 (2013) (encouraging members who cannot resolve
disputes in a “friendly” manner to consult the organization “in case a friendly mediation
can be offered by other [members] and/or the ETSI Secretariat.”), available at
http://www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-guide-on-ipr.pdf.
171. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 2012).
Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-868, at 110 (June 13, 2014) (Final) (Initial
Determination on Violation of Section 337 and Recommended Determination on Remedy
and Bond) (“The first goal of the policy is that the IPR owner be ‘adequately and fairly
rewarded for the use of their IPRs in the implementation of STANDARDS and
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.’”); cf. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., C101823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *12 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (“A RAND royalty
should be set at a level consistent with the SSOs' goal of promoting widespread adoption
of their standards.”).
173. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc. 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1081–82 (W.D.
Wis. 2012); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-cv-178-bbc, 2012 WL
5416941, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 29, 2012); see also Thomas F. Cotter, The Comparative
Law and Economics of Standard-Essential Patents and FRAND Royalties, TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. (forthcoming). Cotter suggests:
As far as contract law is concerned, the relevant doctrinal questions are whether
a FRAND commitment constitutes a binding contract, if so what it obligates the
patentee and would-be licensee to do, and whether third parties (such as other
SSO members) have a right to seek enforcement of those obligations. The
34
[Vol. 119:1
Although FRAND commitments are not licenses in themselves,
they are more than merely unilateral offers “to engage in bilateral, good
faith negotiations” but rather commitments to grant licenses.174 Both
court decisions and SSO policies also make it clear that FRAND
commitments may continue to bind transferees after they have acquired
their SEPs from predecessors who originally made those commitments,
even though there is no contractual privity.175
Given the chimeric combination of patent and contractual features,
it is perhaps unsurprising that cases are divided on whether the basis for
enforcing FRAND commitments are grounded in contract law or are
merely “rules to guide parties in their interactions with the organization,
other members and third parties.”176 This section presents a framework
to navigate the FRAND inquiry.
answers to these questions depend upon the language of the SSO IPR policies
to which the SEP owner consents, and applicable contract law principles.
Id.
(manuscript
at
4),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2318050&download=yes.
174. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2012 WL 4827743, at *6
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 10, 2012). But see Cotter, supra note 173 (manuscript at 7). Cotter
reports:
Courts in other countries, by contrast, so far have reached very different results.
The German cases, for example, have held that an SEP owner’s FRAND
commitment does not invest third parties with a right to obtain a license, or
constitute a waiver of the right to obtain an injunction. Rather, a FRAND
commitment merely amounts to an invitation for third parties to make offers.
Similarly, in a dispute between Samsung and Apple, a Dutch court last year
concluded that the ETSI IPR Policy did not of its own force create a license
between Samsung and Apple (though it did not state whether Samsung had a
contractual duty to conclude such a contract, or whether the FRAND
commitment is merely an invitation for offers).
Id.
175. See Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d at 884–85 (finding that “Motorola's RAND
declarations to the ITU created a contract enforceable by Microsoft as a third-party
beneficiary”); Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., The Art of
Persuasion: Competition Advocacy at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual
Property
10
(Nov.
8,
2013),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/301596.pdf (“Recent court decisions have
also helpfully recognized that a F/RAND commitment to an SSO is a binding contract
and implementers of the standard are third-party beneficiaries of that commitment.”); see,
e.g., In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp. 2d 903, 923 (N.D. Ill.
2013) (“The longstanding rule in Illinois, and elsewhere, is that ‘the promisee of a thirdparty-beneficiary contract may bring suit for a breach of that contract and recover
damages therefor.’”); id. at 922 (finding that parties to the dispute agreed that the
FRAND commitment bound the successor in title); Rembrandt Data Technologies, LP v.
AOL, LLC, 641 F.3d 1331, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding that a current patent owner
was bound by prior license agreements); IEEE Comments to FTC Report, supra note
119, at 3 n.8 (noting that SSO rules include a requirement that contractually binds
transferees).
Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-868, 2014 WL 2965327, at *75 (USITC June 13,
A.
Who Bears the Burden of Proof?
The remedy for a breach of FRAND commitments is specific
performance of the contract. Because FRAND does not specify a precise
numerical value, the initial determination of a reasonable offer value
rests initially with the SEP owner.177 The implementer then has the
burden of proving that the patentee’s initial offer and attempts to
negotiate were “unfair, unreasonable or discriminatory.”178
In Microsoft v. Motorola,179 the burden was placed on Microsoft,
the implementer, who alleged that Motorola, the SEP owner, breached its
FRAND obligation.180 In Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc.,181 the
court dismissed the implementer’s breach of contract action because the
implementer could not satisfy the “exceptional requirements” of specific
performance when the implementer sought a non-binding court
determination as a starting point for future negotiations.182
In In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation,183 the court
explained that the implementers bore the burden because alleging a
FRAND breach was “like an affirmative defense,”184 thus intermingling
patent law concepts into the inquiry. The court reasoned that the
2014) (Final) (Initial Determination on Violation of Section 337 and Recommended
Determination on Remedy and Bond) (“It is important to note the ETSI Rules of
Procedure is not a contract, but it contains rules to guide the parties in their interactions
with the organization, other members and third parties.”); cf. Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL
2111217, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (acknowledging that FRAND commitments
created enforceable contracts between the SEP owner and SSO, and that also held that the
implementer could enforce these contracts as a third-party beneficiary).
177. See Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 2111217, at *2 (noting that “initial offers do not
have to be on RAND terms so long as a RAND license eventually issues”).
178. Apple, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d at 1081–82; see also Apple, Inc., 2012 WL
5416941, at *4.
179. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *1
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013).
180. Id. But see Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND, 80 ANTITRUST L.J.
(forthcoming
2014)
(manuscript
at
37),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2374983 [hereinafter Contreras, Brief
History]. Contreras advises:
Courts and parties considering this critical issue today would be well-advised to
bear in mind the long history of placing the burden of proof of reasonableness
on the patent holder, as established by courts, the DOJ and private firms over
the course of more than twenty-five years of patent licensing decrees.
Id.
181. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-cv-178-bbc, 2012 WL 5416931
(W.D. Wis. Nov. 2, 2012).
182. Id. at *1–3 (expressing skepticism that specific performance would resolve any
of the litigation if plaintiff “refuses to be bound by the rate determined by the court”).
183. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 956 F. Supp. 2d 925 (N.D. Ill.
2013).
184. Id. at 936.
36
[Vol. 119:1
FRAND obligation was like a license which would limit the defendant’s
liability. “The alternative,” the court stated, “would be to assume in
patent litigation that every potentially standard-essential claim is subject
to [F]RAND until the patent owner demonstrates otherwise, a rule that
would be overly burdensome for patent owners.”185
The International Trade Commission (“ITC”) takes a similar
approach. In In the Matter of Certain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or
4G Capabilities and Components Thereof,186 Administrative Law Judge
Essex made a number of important observations regarding the
obligations of implementers under a FRAND commitment. First, the
implementer had to prove that the patents at issue were SEPs, explaining
that patents initially declared to be essential may not turn out to be so.187
Second, even if the patents were essential, they would only be subject to
FRAND commitments if the implementers met the conditions imposed
upon them as a quid pro quo for using the technology.188 On the facts,
the SSO IP policy required implementers to try to negotiate a license as a
condition precedent to requiring SEP owners to honor their side of the
FRAND bargain and to seek the assistance of the SSO to determine
whether there was a breach of the FRAND commitment.189
The foregoing cases show that the implementer carries the burden
of proving that the various ingredients of a FRAND breach have been
met. Once met, the tribunal must determine the value of the royalty rate.
As seen from the earlier discussion, the FRAND commitment creates a
general obligation for both SEPs and implementers to negotiate without
mandating a specific royalty figure.190
185. Id.
186. Certain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities & Components
Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-868, 2014 WL 2965327 (USITC June 13, 2014) (Final) (Initial
Determination on Violation of Section 337 and Recommended Determination on Remedy
and Bond).
187. Id. at *76 (“Establishing standards involves input from hundreds of companies
over multiple years. It is [therefore] not surprising that some declarations prove to be
mistaken.”). See discussion in Part I on the tendency for SEP owners to over-declare
their patents.
188. Id. at *78.
189. Id. Judge Essex reasoned:
These Respondents chose take the actions that led to the allegation of
infringement rather than follow ETSI policy for obtaining a license. . . . The
ETSI IPR policy requires companies that wish to use the IPR covered by the
agreements to contact the owner of the IP, and take a license. By skipping this
step, the companies that use the IPR in violation of the policy are able to exert a
pressure on the negotiations with the IPR holder to try to make the agreement
in the lower range of FRAND, or perhaps even lower than a reasonable
FRAND rate.
Id.
190. Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Competition in Information Technologies: StandardsEssential Patents, Non-Practicing Entities, and FRAND Bidding 12 (Univ. of Iowa Coll.
B.
Royalty Valuation
Microsoft v. Motorola was the first decision to identify principles
for assessing FRAND royalty rates.191 Motorola had declared to the
International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”) and IEEE that it was
willing to negotiate a license for using its patents embodying video
coding and wireless local network standards on FRAND terms.192
Motorola offered to license its SEPs to Microsoft, who rejected the offer
and sued Motorola for breaching its FRAND commitments; Motorola
countersued Microsoft for patent infringement.193
Judge Robart drew upon the factors in Georgia–Pacific Corp. v.
U.S. Plywood Corp194 to calculate reasonable royalty damages for patent
infringement and modified the factors to take into account Motorola’s
FRAND commitments.195 He found that while the Georgia-Pacific
factors simulated a hypothetical negotiation between the parties at the
time of infringement, the negotiation in a FRAND dispute was between
SSO members when the standards was being promulgated.196 This
conclusion results in a number of implications.
of Law, Research Paper No. 12-32, 2012) (“The FRAND process permits SSOs to select
a standard based upon performance characteristics on the assumption that all of the
standards will be reasonably priced, without worrying too much about exactly what that
price will be.”).
191. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *12
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (holding that (1) the royalty should be “consistent with the
SSOs’ goal of promoting widespread adoption of their standards[,]” (2) the need to
“recognize and seek to mitigate the risk of patent hold-up that RAND commitments are
intended to avoid[,]” (3) “address the risk of royalty stacking by considering the
aggregate royalties that would apply if other SEP holders made royalty demands of the
implementer[,]” (4) guarantee SEP owners “reasonable royalties,” to “include technology
intended to create valuable standards[,]” and (5) limit the royalty to “the economic value
of its patented technology itself, apart from the value associated with incorporation of the
patented technology into the standard”); see also David N. Makous, Compulsory IP
Licensing And Standards-Setting, Standard-Essential Patents and F/RAND, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING STRATEGIES 95, 119 (2014 ed. 2014), available at
2014 WL 1234517 (calling Judge Robart’s principles “[p]erhaps the most serious and
complete evaluation by a United States court”).
192. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 564 F. App'x 586, 587 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(setting out the procedural history of the case and concluding that the Ninth Circuit was
the correct venue to hear the appeal).
193. Id. at 587.
194. Georgia–Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
195. Id. at 1120 (listing the factors, which deal with the type and term of the license,
comparisons with the rates and policies used in other licenses, the costs to the licensor in
granting the license, the benefits to the licensee, expert opinion and the result of a
hypothetical negotiation); Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 2111217, at *3.
196. Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 2111217, at *19 (“[T]he parties to a hypothetical
negotiation under a RAND commitment would consider alternatives that could have been
38
[Vol. 119:1
First, while Georgia-Pacific compared the expected profitability for
the infringer, FRAND rates would be based on the SSO’s evaluation of
alternatives for the patented technology and the goal of promoting
widespread adoption.197 Judge Robart held that the FRAND rate was not
based on the incremental value of the technology compared to
alternatives that could have been written into the standard, but rather the
incremental value of the technology compared with comparable licenses
used in patent pools covering those standards.198 Second, he held that the
relevant time frame within which to judge the value of the SEPs was the
time of adoption rather than the time of infringement.199 Third, Judge
Robart analyzed the relative importance of the standards and SEPs as a
portfolio to the products at issue rather than as a single patent.200
Ultimately, Judge Robart determined upper and lower bounds for a
FRAND royalty range and selected a rate for each standard by looking to
comparable patent pool licenses. He rejected licenses proposed by
Motorola, which were reached during settlement of active or threatened
litigation, included cross-licenses and patents related to SEPs at issue, or
were lump sum rather than a running royalty rate.201 The court
determined that the SEPs were of minimal ex ante value. Judge Robart’s
methodology has been accepted in subsequent cases.202
Judge Robart correctly valuated SEPs as a patent portfolio rather
than as individual patents, as most licensing takes place on a portfolio
basis.203 Portfolio valuation should be used even when only a portion of
written into the standard instead of the patented technology. The focus is on the period
before the standard was adopted and implemented (i.e., ex ante).”).
197. Id. at *20.
198. Even though some adjustment had to be made because “patent pools tend to
produce lower rates than those that could be achieved through bilateral negotiations.” Id.
at *80.
199. Id. at *19.
200. Id. at *3.
201. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 2111217, at *67.
202. See, e.g., Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., No. C-12-03451-RMW,
2014 WL 46997, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2014) (finding that reliance on Microsoft’s
method of calculating FRAND royalties was “not arbitrary”); In re Innovatio IP
Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3,
2013) (“The parties agree that Judge Robart's methodology is appropriate for the court to
use here to set a RAND rate in this case.”).
203. See Ruikka, supra note 6, at 194. Ruikka reasons:
An implementer's investment decision is, after all, not dependent on the cost of
any single license but upon the aggregate cost of all of the licenses put together.
In the presence of up to several hundred Essential patents the cost of a single
license may be almost meaningless for the investment case if it is taken in
isolation.
Id.; Anne Layne-Farrar, Vice President, Compass Lexecon, Roundtable Discussion at the
FTC Workshop: Tools to Prevent Patent “Hold-Up” 203 (June 21, 2011) (transcript
the portfolio is being asserted and reflects the approach that courts have
taken.204 Rather than complicating the analysis, valuing the relevant
patents using the portfolio simplifies the FRAND negotiation and
reduces the need to parse through and calculate the value of individual
patents.205
As discussed in Part II, the value of a patent included in a standard
depends on the patent’s interaction with other patents included in the
standard.
The patents’ complementary nature means that
“eliminat[ing] . . . one particular patent from the standard can[not easily]
be cured by substituting some other patent with identical functionality in
its place.”206 The portfolio approach includes all patents needed for
making, using, or selling products that comply with the standard.
Portfolio valuation also gives implementers and SEP owners more room
to negotiate and reach an agreement closer to their particular needs.207
Where portfolios involve cross-licenses, they can provide a useful
benchmark for discerning the appropriate FRAND royalty.208 To
properly determine the FRAND royalty, the net payment for each side to
the agreement should first be clearly identifiable.209 Licenses resulting
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/tools-preventpatent-hold-ip-rights-standard-setting/transcript.pdf). Layne-Farrar stated:
I think one of the reasons why we've gotten to the place where lots of portfolios
are licensed [as] a package is precisely because it can be so difficult to value
these things. It's not like this patent is clearly on X and this patent is clearly on
Y and we can give the economic value to X and Y and give you a la carte
prices.
Id.
204. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1181 (W.D.
Wash. 2013); Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., No. 6:10-CV-473, 2013 WL 4046225, at
*15 (E.D. Tex. Aug., 6 2013) (taking into account licenses covering the patentee’s entire
802.11 portfolio).
205. See Brooks, supra note 51, at 446.
206. Richard A. Epstein & David J. Kappos, Legal Remedies for Patent Infringement:
From General Principles To FRAND Obligations For Standard Essential Patents, 9
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 69, 77–78 (2013).
207. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 105, at 1151 (describing the difficulty in
determining FRAND based on a patent-by-patent basis and advocating pricing for the
entire SEP portfolio for the standard because it is simpler and matches more closely to
real world practices while giving parties freedom to operate); see generally Microsoft
Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 (determining the
appropriate FRAND royalty rates and ranges for the patent portfolios Microsoft was
seeking to license from Motorola).
208. See, e.g., Sidak, supra note 49, at 1004 (“In short, cross licenses may contain
helpful information, but they should receive heavy weighting in the determination of the
FRAND royalty only when they resemble the negotiation at issue.”).
209. DAVID J. TEECE, PETER C. GRINDLEY & EDWARD F. SHERRY, SDO IP POLICIES IN
DYNAMIC INDUSTRIES 9–10 (2012) (explaining that in cross licenses, “[r]oyalties are
typically determined based on the relative value of each company’s technology portfolio”
and that “[t]he parties will calculate a balancing payment based on the relative values of
the portfolios and each party’s expected volume of sales of licensed products”).
40
[Vol. 119:1
from settlement agreements should be disregarded because their
reliability is compromised by the fact that the royalty figure might be
higher than if it were determined by the court.210
Judge Robart’s decision to use an ex ante approach has proven more
controversial. Commentators have criticized the ex ante approach on
three principal grounds. First, critics note that the ex ante measure would
encourage implementers to hold-out on negotiations because
implementers would only be liable for what they would have paid as
licensees.211 Second, SEP owners would be undercompensated since the
rate would not take into account the cost of the owners’ sunk
investments.212 Third, SEP owners would hesitate to allow their
technology to be incorporated into the standard if they anticipated that
their technology would be better than the one eventually accepted,
allowing them to negotiate for a better price ex post.213 This means that
210. See Sidak, supra note 49, at 1005. Sidak explains:
Unobserved factors could bias the royalty rate upward or downward. Without
additional evidence, it may be impossible to determine reliably which outcome
will be more likely. Indeed, it may even be impossible to determine whether
the net flow of consideration is to the licensor or the licensee. That latter could
be the case if the licensee is the first of multiple defendants to settle and is
being offered ancillary inducements from the licensor to negotiate a high
royalty rate, which the licensor then intends to cite as evidence relevant to the
FRAND royalty rate that the remaining defendants should be ordered to pay.
Id.; see, e.g., Brandeis Univ. v. Keebler Co., No. 1:12-cv-01508, 1:12-cv-01509 1:12-cv01511, 1:12-cv-01513, 2013 WL 5911233, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2013) (Posner, J.)
(noting, in a non-FRAND case, that this licensing strategy motivated the benchmark
royalty proposed by the patent holder’s expert economic witness on damages).
211. Epstein & Kappos, supra note 206, at 78. Epstein and Kappos explain:
If the value of the standard depreciates over time, the price will fall and the
latecomer can reap the rewards of delaying. But by the same token if the
standard increases in value, the holdout has in effect an option to sign on at the
original price, given his credible threat to go without the license if the patent
holder does not acquiesce in the original (lower) price. That free option to the
putative licensee thus reduces the return to parties who set the standard as well
as early good-faith adopters who pay for licensees, so the reward goes to parties
who game the system, and not to those who contribute to its overall long term
value.
Id.
212. Damien Geradin, The Meaning of "Fair and Reasonable" in the Context of
Third-Party Determination of FRAND Terms, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 919, 948 (2014).
Geradin explains:
This unsatisfactory outcome arises because, contrary to the way it is labeled,
the ex ante incremental value rule is not a true ex ante method. It is ex ante
with regard to the adoption of the standard in question and the sunk
investments made by standards implementers, but ex post with regard to the
investments made by the SEP holders.
Id.
213. Anne Layne-Farrar et al., Payments and Participation: The Incentives to Join
Cooperative Standard Setting Efforts 6 (July 29, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1904959.
the ex ante rate may insufficiently incentivize SEP owners to monetize
their patents through participation in SSOs rather than through private
standardization.214
For FRAND to be “fair and reasonable,” the rate must take into
account both the interests of those seeking access to the patented
technology as well as the risks associated with technical failure, noninclusion into the standard, and failure to detect or obtain compensation
from infringers.215 However, the shortcomings of the ex ante approach
may be overstated.
First, implementers who wait until they are detected and
successfully sued will be liable not just for FRAND royalty and possible
attorney fees.216 Further, the fact that they had not sought a license prior
to implementing the standard may weigh against them if FRAND
obligations require them to do otherwise.
Second, SEP owners who complain that they are undercompensated
may find it difficult to explain why they had accepted the rate offered at
the time the standard was implemented, only to find that royalty figure
inconveniently binding after its value had been inflated by network
effects owing to the standardization process. SEP owners had done their
sums, and there is no reason for implementers to bear the burden of a
SEP owner’s “seller’s remorse.”
Third, any technology owner of the “best” technology who
considers refraining from having its technology implemented so that it
might reap higher per unit ex post royalties also loses potentially greater
gains from higher volume sales and network effects. Further, history is
replete with examples of consumers adopting technologically “inferior”
standards such as the QWERTY keyboard and VHS video-recorder.
Consistent with the discussion in Part II, the longevity and success of
these standards show that the benefits of standardization are quite
capable of offsetting what seemed to be suboptimal technology choices
at that time.
214. See Sidak, supra note 49, at 976. (“In effect, the ex ante incremental value
method assumes that the inventor has no outside option for monetizing his patent.”); see
also id. at 983 (noting that a pure ex ante approach “is selective, asymmetric, and
therefore inherently biased; it sets a FRAND rate so as to restore the implementer—but
not the inventor—to the original position. The buyer in the hypothetical negotiation
would still have substitute opportunities, but the inventor would not”).
215. See Brooks, supra note 51, at 440.
216. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Müller and Henke on the European Commission's
Decisions in Samsung and Motorola, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (July 16, 2014),
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2014/07/muller-and-henke-oneuropean.html (“[I]f the defendant is an infringer and ultimately has to pay a FRAND
royalty, it will also have to pay interest . . ., its own attorneys' fees, and at least some
portion of the patentee's attorneys' fees.”).
42
[Vol. 119:1
As a matter of precedent, the ex ante approach has also been cited
with approval by courts and commentators.217 Judge Robart’s concept of
placing the implementer in the position it would have been in at the time
the standard was set also puts it in pari materia with all other
implementers past, present, and future. Having all implementers take
reference from a single point in time provides both greater commercial
certainty and fits more comfortably with notions of a “fair” and “nondiscriminatory” rate.
As Professor Thomas Cotter explained, it is better to trust that
patent law struck the correct balance between incentives and access
rather than believe that creating a special bump in the case of SEP
royalties will translate into greater social benefits through greater
invention or disclosure.218 In other words, the goal is to operationalize a
policy that rewards the patentee for the contribution to the state of the art
without inflating the royalty rate with switching costs the implementer
must incur because it is locked-in by its standard-specific investments.
The discussion has thus far described a framework for determining
FRAND royalties using an approach that values the SEP owner’s patent
at the time the standard was adopted in the context of the portfolio of
other patents within the standard. The third piece of the framework
involves a “top down” approach. In In re Innovatio, Judge Holderman of
the Northern District of Illinois faced the task of setting the FRAND rate
for a portfolio of 19 SEPs covering the Wi-Fi standard.219 Innovatio had
sued a wide variety of defendants—electronics manufacturers, coffee
shops, hotels, restaurants, and other end-users of the standard.220 Unlike
217. See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill.
2012). The court explained:
The proper method of computing a FRAND royalty starts with what the cost to
the licensee would have been of obtaining, just before the patented invention
was declared essential to compliance with the industry standard, a license for
the function performed by the patent. That cost would be a measure of the
value of the patent qua patent.
Id.; see also Cotter, supra note 173 (manuscript at 45). Cotter reasons:
[C]ourts should calculate the royalty based on the amount willing parties would
have negotiated prior to the adoption of the standard, because a large part of a
royalty negotiated after that date will reflect not the inherent value of the
technology itself in comparison with other possible alternatives, but rather the
difficulty of avoiding use of a technology for which ex post there may be no
feasible alternatives.
Id.
218. See Thomas F. Cotter, Reflections on Holdup and Royalty Stacking, Part 1,
COMPARATIVE
PATENT
REMEDIES
(June
11,
2014),
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2014/06/reflections-on-holdup-androyalty.html.
219. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL
5593609, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013).
220. Id at *2.
the Motorola court, the Innovatio court lacked a suitable license to
compare and turned to the “top down” approach, which concentrates on
the profit from sales of products using the standard.221
The court first determined that all the patents asserted were essential
to the standard and therefore FRAND encumbered.222 The court then
held that the FRAND rate should reflect the technical value of the patents
rather than the hold-up value of standardization.223 The court adopted a
“top down” approach to avoiding royalty stacking.224 The “top down”
approach derived the chipmaker’s profit from the average price of a WiFi chip, the smallest component embodying the technology.225
Using this “smallest salable patent-practicing unit” approach
avoided over-compensating the SEP owner for non-infringing
components of the product. The smallest salable unit approach resulted
in a difference of between 0.72 and 3.09 cents per chip compared to
between $5 and $37 per device.226
The profit figure was then multiplied by the fraction of the SEP
owner’s patents over the total number of SEPs covering the standard.227
The total royalty stack allowed other chipmakers to remain in the
business and avoided the need to rely on other licenses since FRAND
licenses are rarely available for comparison. The analysis led the court
to award 9.56 cents per Wi-Fi chip,228 which was consistent with rates
determined in other SEP litigation.229
221. Id. at *37–38.
222. Id. at *2.
223. Id. at *9.
224. Innovatio IP Ventures, 2013 WL 5593609, at *38.
225. Id. at *23 (noting that the court must calculate the FRAND royalty “on the
smallest salable patent-practicing unit”); see also LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta
Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 67–68 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[I]n any case involving multicomponent products, patentees may not calculate damages based on sales of the entire
product, as opposed to the smallest salable patent-practicing unit, without showing that
the demand for the entire product is attributable to the patented feature.”).
226. Innovatio IP Ventures, 2013 WL 5593609, at *40. The EU Competition
Commission in Rambus also favored the view that royalties should be based on the price
of the individually sold chip rather than the price of the end product into which the chip
was incorporated. European Commission Decision of 9.12.2009, Case COMP/38.636—
Rambus; Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Accepts
Commitments from Rambus Lowering Memory Chip Royalty Rates – Frequently Asked
Questions (Dec. 9, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-09544_en.htm?locale=en; see also Grazynarazyna Piesiewicz & Ruben Schellingerhout,
Intellectual Property Rights in Standard Setting from a Competition Law Perspective, 3
COMPETITION POL’Y NEWSL. (European Comm’n, Belgium), no. 3, 2007, at 36.
227. Innovatio IP Ventures, 2013 WL 5593609, at *40.
228. In determining the average price of a Wi-Fi chip, Judge Holderman relied on a
report from a market research company. Id. A hypothetical negotiation through the life
of Innovatio’s patents put the figure at $14.85. Id. at *41. The profit margin was 12.1%
and there were approximately 33,000 802.11 SEPs. Id. at *41, *43. Innovatio’s patents,
“all of moderate to moderate-high importance,” fell in the top 10% of all 802.11 SEPs.
44
[Vol. 119:1
Consistent with the position advocated in Part II.B, Innovatio’s
“top down” approach allows tribunals to reach the initial FRAND
determination with much less information. It also shifts the burden of
determining FRAND to the most interested parties—the SEP owner and
implementer in litigation—rather than to all FRAND participants, to
most of whom FRAND never became an issue.
The court twice recognized that a valuation of the SEP owner’s
contribution to the standard requires both the value of non-infringing
alternatives as well as the cost of lawfully acquiring the use of those
alternatives.230 First, it rejected the argument that when two equally
effective alternatives were possible, the royalty rate would be zero.231
Second, like Judge Robart, Judge Holderman rejected the “bottom up”
approach, which was based on the cost of implementing reasonable
alternatives.232 The court noted that the “bottom-up” approach did not
take into account the cost of implementing the next-best non-infringing
alternatives.233
The “top down” approach may be used to establish a single rate for
all licensees or to derive any number of distinct rates for differently
situated licensees.
The approach is relatively simple and its
methodology is robust.234
Id. at *43. The judge multiplied $14.85 by 12.1% to arrive at an average profit of $1.80
per chip. Id. This represented the profit available for pay royalties and was then
multiplied by 84% to reflect a position in the top 10% of 802.11 SEPs, to obtain$1.51.
Id. He multiplied it by Innovatio’s 19/300 share of the top 10% of 802.11 patents, giving
a FRAND rate of 9.56 cents per Wi-Fi chip. Id.
229. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL
2111217, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (setting a rate of 3.471 cents per unit and a
range of 0.8 to 19.5 cents per unit for Motorola’s SEPs). Judge Holderman’s figure fell
comfortably within the range and was triple the rate of the Motorola patents because
Motorola’s patents “were only of minimal value to the standard” while Innovatio’s
patents were of “moderate to moderate-high importance.” Innovatio IP Ventures, 2013
WL 5593609, at *44.
230. See Sidak, supra note 49, at 988.
231. Innovatio IP Ventures, 2013 WL 5593609, at *37 (noting that “it is implausible
that in the real world, patent holders would accept effectively nothing to license their
technology . . . such a low [rate] . . . would discourage future innovators form investing in
new technology and from contributing their technology to future standards”).
232. Id. at *72; see also Microsoft, 2013 WL 2111217, at *13 (rejecting the
“incremental value” approach, which is based on the theory that a hypothetical licensee
would not pay more for the patents than the amount necessary to adopt an alternative on
the ground that an accurate analysis is too complicated for courts to perform “because
when you take one patent out of a standard and put another one in you may make other
changes, the performance of the standard is multidimensional, different people value
different aspects”).
233. Id. at *73; see also Sidak, supra note 49, at 988.
234. RICHARD B. TROXEL & WILLIAM O. KERR, CALCULATING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY DAMAGES § 5:50 (2014 ed. 2014) (“[I]ts results derive from division of the
pool of profits available to producers who exploit the standard's technology. As a result,
A final piece of the framework requires that the royalty rate be
premised on the assumption that the patent was valid and infringed,
unless proven otherwise.235 This approach is supported by law and
should be encouraged as a matter of policy.
As a matter of law, patent law confers to the presumption of validity
to an issued patent.236 In Innovatio, Judge Holderman pointed out that in
reconstructing a hypothetical negotiation under the Georgia-Pacific
framework and prior to an infringement determination, parties do not
know whether the patents asserted are valid or infringed.237 Within the
Georgia-Pacific framework, the hypothetical negotiation assumes that
the asserted patent claims are valid and infringed, since “no hypothetical
negotiation would have taken place if it were otherwise.”238 Hence,
“[t]he patent infringer gets no discount on its licensing fee because of
uncertainty about its liability that has since been cleared up by
litigation.”239
Likewise once the court has found the patent claims “essential,” “it
would be inappropriate to adjust the [F]RAND rate based upon prelitigation uncertainty about the essentiality of a given patent.”240 This is
because “the patent owner cannot leave the hypothetical negotiation on
the ground that it will contest essentiality in court. . . .[and t]he
[F]RAND obligation requires that it grant a license.”241
As a matter of policy, knowing the higher point in the royalty range
either owed or owing at the end of the litigation process will help parties
make a more sober decision on whether to litigate to the end and incur
the additional attorney fees, monetary costs, and work hours diverted
the incremental layers of compensation for patent rights and other inputs should not rise
to a level that destroys the value to a licensed producer of participating in the market.”);
see also id. (“The approach also has the advantage of simplicity.”).
235. See also Cotter, supra note 173 (manuscript at 45) (“As noted above, this
assumption is sensible in infringement cases and therefore should apply whenever an SEP
sues for infringement.”) (citation omitted).
236. 35 U.S.C.A. § 282 (West 2014); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 2238,
2245 (2011).
237. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL
5593609, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013).
238. Id. Judge Holderman reasoned:
At the time of the hypothetical negotiation, the parties in actuality would not
have known whether a given patent is valid or infringed, and the alleged
infringer would have had the option of contesting these issues in court.
Nonetheless, by the time the damages phase of an infringement suit arrives, the
court has determined infringement and validity, thus foreclosing the
hypothetical negotiator from benefiting from any uncertainty as to future court
rulings.
Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
46
[Vol. 119:1
toward the litigation. In Innovatio, Judge Holderman noted that
addressing damages before validity and infringement would aid
settlement of the dispute.242 He also noted that in a breach of contract
case, a discount might be made for the possibility of invalidity and noninfringement as in Microsoft.243
The rationale for Judge Holderman’s discounting may have
stemmed from the notion that patents are probabilistic rights and
allowing patentees to bargain based on the presumptions of validity and
infringement would allow them to “extract far more in expectation than
in a process in which validity and infringement could be determined
instantaneously.”244 Since issues of validity and infringement can only
be determined upon adjudication, discounting means the more the
outcome of settlement bargaining can be tied to the actual final decision
of a court or arbitrator, the more accurately the expected return reflects
the actual social value of the patent.245
However, the Article recommends against discounting the royalty
rate by an arbitrary factor because it will only add further uncertainty
into an already complex determination, an example of pursuit of the
perfect becoming the enemy of the good. As Judge Holderman
acknowledged, “no approach for calculating a [F]RAND rate is [perfect]
in light of the inherent uncertainty in calculating a reasonable royalty.”246
This uncertainty is heightened in SEP litigation because “the court must
reconstruct a hypothetical negotiation under a variety of assumptions and
inferences about the influence of the [F]RAND obligation on
hypothetical parties negotiating at a hypothetical time under hypothetical
circumstances.”247
Where there are comparable license agreements, as was the case in
Microsoft, the adjudicator may choose a lower rate. In the absence of
242. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, 2013 WL 5593609, at *1 (“[P]arties will be better
able to evaluate the potential risks and benefits of expending additional resources in the
litigation.”).
243. Cotter, supra note 1743 (manuscript at 45) (“If a court is trying to estimate the
hypothetical royalty outside this context, however, as in the Microsoft v. Motorola breach
of contract action, it is correct to consider (as Judge Robart did) the probability of validity
and infringement as relevant factors in determining the licensing rate.”) (citation
omitted).
244. Kühn, supra note 58, at 105 (“To understand such biases against potential
infringers, it is important to emphasize that patents in the ICT industry (and others) are
probabilistic by nature.”).
245. See also Cotter, supra note 1743 (manuscript at 45) (“The result, though it
sounds a bit paradoxical, is that a FRAND rate decided pre-patent infringement litigation
should be lower than a FRAND rate involving the same patent decided during the course
of infringement litigation.”).
246. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, 2013 WL 5593609, at *37.
247. Id.
comparable license agreements, the court should first determine
essentiality and then presume validity and infringement, as was the case
in Innovatio. But injecting further arbitrariness in the pursuit of
precision may upend the accuracy of the inquiry in a complex and
dynamic industry.248 Here, one could argue that while an ex ante frame
of reference for calculating royalties may favor the implementer, the
presumption of validity and infringement acts as a counterbalance
favoring the SEP owner. This result helps achieve a measure of fairness
between the parties while giving clarity and certainty as to how FRAND
royalties are to be calculated.
Ultimately however, many implementers in a FRAND royalty
dispute and SSOs may be less concerned about the actual rate charged
and more concerned about how that fee looks when compared to what
others are paying. Professor David Teece and Edward Sherry explain
that while firms would rather not pay royalties, “the cost of the royalties
can be built into the price of the product being sold, just as the cost of the
raw materials and labor needed to make and sell the product is likewise
built into the price.”249
Since implementers compete on price,
“prospective licensees may rationally be far more concerned about the
‘non-discriminatory’ aspect of the [F]RAND requirement than they are
about the ‘reasonable’ aspect.”250 The Article next turns to this issue.
C.
The “Non-Discriminatory” Requirement
The non-discriminatory requirement in FRAND originated from
antitrust decrees that favored open licensing policies.251
The
requirements promoted competition by diluting the concentration of
market power in the hands of SEP owners.252 Put simply, nondiscrimination essentially requires SEP owners to license similarly
situated implementers on the same terms.253 Thus, if a SEP owner offers
one implementer a royalty rate that declines with increasing output, it
must offer a similar declining rate to another similarly situated
248. See Brooks, supra note 51, at 464 (“[C]ourts and regulators are ill-equipped to
set prices for complex IP in ever-shifting markets.”).
249. David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, Standards Setting and Antitrust, 87 MINN.
L. REV. 1913, 1956 n.149 (2003).
250. Id.
251. Contreras, Brief History, supra note 180 (manuscript at 10–11).
252. Id.
253. See Miller, supra note 138, at 355; Roger G. Brooks & Damien Geradin,
Interpreting and Enforcing the Voluntary FRAND Commitment, 9 INT’L J. IT STANDARDS
& STANDARDIZATION RES. 1, 16 (2011) (arguing that “non-discriminatory” allows SEP
owners latitude in adjusting according to the specific situation facing parties).
48
[Vol. 119:1
implementer; however, the rate may ultimately be different from what
the patent owner charges another implementer.254
The scope of that the non-discriminatory requirement depends on
the IP policy in question. In Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc.,255 the
Ninth Circuit found that Motorola had promised to “grant a license to an
unrestricted number of applicants on a worldwide, non-discriminatory
basis and on reasonable terms and conditions to use the patented material
necessary” to practice the standards.256 The court read the contract as
admitting “no limitations as to who or how many applicants could
receive a license (‘unrestricted number of applicants’) or as to which
country’s patents would be included (‘worldwide,’ ‘the patented material
necessary.’)”257 The court concluded, “it is clear that there is a contract,
that it is enforceable by Microsoft, and that it encompasses not just U.S.
patents but also the patents at issue in the German suit.”258
Licensing terms that cover non-price aspects are also part of the
SEP owner’s non-discrimination obligation. As Professor Richard
Gilbert notes, “[t]he value of a license depends on the restrictions that
attach to the use of the licensed property,” such as the fields of use or
geographic areas in which licensed technologies can be used.259 Should a
disagreement arise as to the scope of the “non-discrimination”
requirement, a court or arbitrator can be called upon to adjudicate the
issue within the broader context of the FRAND dispute, as advocated in
Part II. Since FRAND terms are a fallback if private negotiations fail,
calling upon courts and arbitrators should be the exception rather than
the norm.
It is less obvious whether “non-discrimination” also should require
SEP owners to license implementers who are not SSO members at the
same rate as SSO members.260 Some SSOs expressly include non254. Sidak, supra note 49, at 997; see Epstein & Kappos, supra note 206, at 83.
Epstein and Kappos assert:
[T]he gains of a particular device will be dependent at least in part on the extent
it can be resold to downstream users. If parties attach different values to the
device, price discrimination is a perfectly respectable form of behavior by
which to capture those downstream rents so long as there is no horizontal
collusion.
Id.
255. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012).
256. Id. at 876.
257. Id. at 884.
258. Id. at 885.
259. Gilbert, supra note 123, at 877; see also Geradin, supra note 212, at 928 (listing
as examples “volume of licensed products, scope of license (e.g., products, territory,
‘have made’ rights, etc.), exhaustion of patent rights, cross-licenses, other technology
transfer, technical support, possible product purchases, the formation of broader business
relationships and cooperation, and any other business value exchange”).
260. Sidak, supra note 49, at 999.
members as beneficiaries and allow for specific performance as an option
for enforcing a FRAND commitment.261 There may not be express
provisions within SSO IP policies providing for third party beneficiaries.
But there need not be.
FRAND undertakings are encumbrances on the right to exclude.262
Patent rights are treated as a form of personal property under the Patent
Act.263 Like a servitude, the promise of access continues as a burden on
the patent.264 The assignment of SEPs does not alter the rights and
responsibilities under the license. Professors Mark Lemley and Carl
Shapiro explain that
Just as a mendacious patentee can’t whitewash inequitable conduct
by selling the patent to someone who didn’t lie to the patent office, a
patentee that has promised that a patent will not be enforced by
means of an injunction can’t wipe away that commitment by finding
265
a buyer who didn’t make that promise.
Indeed, they warn that SEP owners attempting to do an end-run
around these obligations would face claims under both the antitrust and
patent laws.266 Complications may arise when the SEP owner competes
with the implementer in the downstream product market. In these
circumstances, SEP owners should still be obliged to license rival
implementers on the same terms SEP owners enjoy.267 However, when a
patent portfolio consists of multiple complementary patents, as is often
the case, measuring the incremental value of an individual patent to the
standard is difficult.268 In such situations, it may be impractical to
require absolute precision, and adjudicators should require only that the
261. See, e.g., ESS Tech., Inc. v. PC-TEL, Inc., No. C-99-20292 RMW, 1999 WL
33520483, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 1999).
262. See De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 242 (1927)
(characterizing licenses as a covenant not to sue).
263. 35 U.S.C.A. § 261 (West 2014) (“Subject to the provisions of this title, patents
shall have the attributes of personal property.”).
264. See Miller, supra note 138, at 391.
265. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 105, at 1159 (citation omitted).
266. Id. at 1159 n.81 (suggesting that “[i]mplied license or equitable estoppel
doctrines might limit enforcement of such a patent”, or that “[a]lternatively, the Federal
Trade Commission has shown a willingness to rely on Section 5 of the FTC Act to
prevent fraudulent conveyances like this”).
267. Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory
(RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power, 73 ANTITRUST
L.J. 1, 29 (2005) (arguing that a vertically integrated SEP owner must charge its
downstream rivals the same royalty rate as it charges its own downstream unit at a level
that leaves the SEP owner indifferent between licensing and not licensing those rivals).
268. Anne Layne-Farrar, A. Jorge Padilla & Richard Schmalensee, Pricing Patents
for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments,
74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 693 (2007).
50
[Vol. 119:1
terms are not unjustifiably different, with some allowance for the
implementer’s risk preferences and the value of the patents.269
Successful negotiations create their own problem as licensing terms
tend to be confidential.270 Lack of transparency makes it difficult for
implementers to determine whether a patent owner has complied with its
non-discrimination obligation.271
To facilitate non-discriminatory
licensing, SSOs can require SEP owners to disclose to willing
prospective licensees the terms on preexisting licenses subject to an
appropriate mechanism to protect confidential non-price information.272
Professor Gilbert has suggested that posting licensing terms can avoid
discriminatory outcomes.273 In this regard, an SSO can elect to keep a
record of FRAND commitments it receives and make them available to
willing licensees. However, ETSI is one of the few SSOs who keeps
such a record.274
The ETSI IP database normalizes data with the European Patent
Office’s database, providing transparency with patents and their patent
families.275 It allows users to search by FRAND declaration and by data
instances contained within each declaration. These records will reduce
the universe of potentially infringing and undiscovered patents without
requiring disclosure of specific licensing terms.
The USPTO does not have a similar initiative but should consider
something similar to complement its current initiatives. The USPTO
published a draft rule to ensure patentees “accurately record and
269. See Sidak, supra note 49, at 1000. Sidak explains:
As technology changes, the marginal contributions of different patents to the
value of the downstream product also change. For example, the development
of complementary products may make a touch screen more important to the
commercial value of a smartphone than members of the SSO might have
expected when they adopted the standard.
Id.
270. See Standard Essential Patent Disputes and Antitrust Law, supra note 15, at 12
(“The financial terms of license agreements are seldom publicly disclosed.”).
271. JASON ALBERT, MICROSOFT CORP., COMMENTS OF MICROSOFT CORPORATION ON
THE IMPACT OF PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITIES ON INNOVATION AND COMPETITION
3 (2013), available at www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/pae/comments/paew0042.pdf (“[W]ithout transparency around patent ownership, it is virtually impossible to
assess companies' compliance with patent encumbrances such as commitments to license
standards-essential patents on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms or pledges not to
assert patents against particular products or companies.”).
272. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 105, at 1141–42.
273. Gilbert, supra note 123, at 876.
274. ETSI IPR POLICY, supra note 30 §§ 4.1–4.2.
275. Dirk Weiler, Chairman of ETSI Gen. Assembly & IPR Special Comm.,
Symposium on Management of IP In Standards-Setting Processes: SDO-Patent Office
Cooperation
and
Information-Sharing
(Oct.
4,
2012),
available
at
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/cs/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_0727
20.pdf.
regularly update ownership information” so as to “improv[e] the
quality of patents issued, enhancing competition, facilitating
technology transfer, and making it harder to hide abusive litigation
tactics behind shell companies.”276 Accessible ownership information
could be complemented by a record of patent assignments that would
enable a willing licensee to more easily determine the identities of SEP
owners and the scope of the licenses.277
In general, such initiatives to enhance transparency are a good idea.
It helps expose weak and overbroad patents, making it easier for
licensees to know what they are paying for.278 Transparency allows
potential licensees to identify not only patents that are declared to be
SEPs, but perhaps more importantly, patents that were not declared to be
SEPs (and therefore not subject to FRAND commitments) but through
the evolution of the standardization process later turn out to be SEPs.
Transparency allows licensees to avoid paying multiple times for
licenses hidden in sub-portfolios owned by shell companies.279
Achieving greater transparency in FRAND license data is critical so that
putative negotiating parties are able to detect and be deterred from
opportunistic conduct.
Two other sources of data are worth mentioning. First, court
decisions and arbitral awards provide valuable, objective data points
resulting from consideration after both sides have been given the
opportunity to present their best case.280 Court decisions are public
documents. However, arbitral awards often are not.281 Professor Jorge
Contreras and David Newman advocate requiring SSOs to make records
of the arbitration available to the public, and as in a judicial proceeding,
276. Fact Sheet - Executive Actions: Answering the President’s Call to Strengthen
Our Patent System and Foster Innovation, THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 20, 2014),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/20/fact-sheet-executive-actionsanswering-president-s-call-strengthen-our-p.
277. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 105, at 1158–59.
278. ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., PUBLIC COMMENTS OF THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION REGARDING PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITIES 7 (2013), available at
www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/pae/comments/paew-0064.pdf (quoting Michael
A. Carrier, Patent Assertion Entities: Six Actions the Antitrust Agencies Can Take, CPI
ANTITRUST CHRONICLE (Jan. 2013)).
279. Letter from Steven M. Geiszler, Partner, Dentons US LLP & Garreth A. Sarosi,
Deputy Gen. Counsel, MetroPCS Commc’n, Inc., to William J. Baer, Assistant Att’y
Gen., Antitrust Div. & Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n 5 (Apr. 5,
2013), available at www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/pae/comments/paew-0063.pdf.
280. Contreras & Newman, supra note 168 (manuscript at 17) (arguing that releasing
the results of arbitral awards would “begin to eliminate much of the uncertainty that
currently exists in the market”).
281. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 105, at 1145 (“In any given arbitration, the
standard-essential patent owner and the licensee may well prefer to keep the arbitration
outcome secret.”).
52
[Vol. 119:1
to redact sensitive portions of the record.282 They argue that “[s]uch
improved transparency could help parties negotiate more appropriate
FRAND royalties and make verification of patent holders’ compliance
with the non-discrimination prong of the FRAND requirement easier.”283
Courts may oblige SEP owners to make arbitral awards available to
interested prospective licensees based on FRAND’s “nondiscriminatory” provision.284 More data points will help build a
comprehensive record of what constitutes a FRAND royalty rate, making
the boundaries of what constitutes “reasonableness” clearer to both sides.
Such transparency may eventually reduce the need for duplicative
arbitrations and litigation and allow parties to avoid wasting time and
resources in negotiating bilateral agreements from the start.285
Second, Intellectual Property Exchange International (“IPXI”), the
world’s first financial exchange for licensing and trading IP, promises to
further increase transparency, offering license rights with standard terms
at market-based prices.286 IPXI obtains exclusive patent licenses from
patentees and sublicenses them through the sale of tradable instruments.
Investors, including the Chicago Board Options Exchange, the world’s
largest options exchange, fund the licenses.287 The Chicago Board
Options Exchange includes more than 50 members, including major IP
owners such as Philips, Ford, Hewlett-Packard, Panasonic, Columbia
Technology Ventures, Sony, the Regents of the University of California,
and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.288
282. Contreras & Newman, supra note 168 (manuscript at 17–18) (“Such summaries
could provide only the commercial terms necessary to aid potential licensees in
determining whether the patent holder complied with its non-discrimination obligation,
and the reasons for the arbitrator’s determination.”).
283. Id. (manuscript at 17).
284. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 105, at 1145 n.28 (“Willing licensees also
should have access to the terms on which these same standard-essential patents have been
licensed to others, subject to suitable protections of confidential business information.”).
285. See id. at 1145.
286. See Ian McClure, IPXI to Launch First Offering on Exchange, IPWATCHDOG
(May 29, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/05/29/ipxi-to-launch-first-offeringon-exchange/id=40982/. On IPXI’s request, the Justice Department issued a review letter
which acknowledged the efficiencies IPXI’s business model could generate but stop short
of blessing it. See Letter from William J. Baer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., to
Garrard R. Beeney, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP 1, 6–7 (Mar. 26, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/295151.htm; see also Press Release, IPXI,
IPXI Launches First Offering (June 5, 2013), available at https://www.ipxi.com/newsevents/news/press-releases/105-ipxi-launches-first-offering.html.
287. McClure, supra note 286.
288. Id.; see also Chase Means, IPXI: Creating an Efficient Patent License
Marketplace, TIMELY TECH (Mar. 16, 2013), http://illinoisjltp.com/timelytech/ipxicreating-an-efficient-patent-license-marketplace/. Means claims:
The transparency and efficiency with which IPXI operates will offer corporate
management the opportunity to make better business decisions regarding their
This system of trading promises to provide more complete
information and independent analysis on the value of the technology.289
IPXI will facilitate this goal with market-based pricing and quality
benchmarks for IP which it will create.290 Under this system, patent
experts conduct due diligence to determine if the patents will withstand
validity challenges and then determine whether the patents are something
the market wants.291 The patent experts conduct about 95 percent of the
due diligence a licensee would require.292 Then, implementers, or
anyone with credentials, may look at that analysis.293
In addition to encouraging partnerships between the USPTO and
SSOs, disclosing court and arbitral awards, and using exchanges like the
IPXI, SEP owners can use a patent pooling system. A pooling system
sets a single rate for all SEPs in the pool, which provided a convenient
point of reference for the court in Microsoft in determining the
appropriate FRAND rate. One disadvantage is that patent pools are
costly. Unlike SSOs, which operate on a system of voluntary disclosure
of patents that patent owners subjectively determine to be essential,
patent pool participants engage in a lengthy and costly process of vetting
each patent to ensure that they are not substitutes of one another.294 This
vetting process is necessary to avoid antitrust liability for price-fixing.295
However, the vetting process also limits the viability of patent pools to
discrete standards in well-defined product categories.296
The limits of initiatives to encourage transparency described above
should be acknowledged. Although each initiative aims to provide a
IP. IPXI will offer license rights with standard terms at market-based prices. . .
. IPXI could help remedy some of the larger issues plaguing the United States
patent system. These include patent trolls, the “patent thicket,” and rising costs
of patent litigation.
Id.
289. Means, supra note 288; see also Tom Groenfeldt, New IP Exchange Promises
Transparency
In
Patent
Pricing,
FORBES
(Dec.
6,
2013)
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomgroenfeldt/2013/12/06/new-ip-exchange-promisestransparency-in-patent-pricing/ (“IPXI creates Unit License Right contracts (ULR) for
patents, measuring them by numbered units, kilograms or square feet depending on the
patent. The exchange performs legal analysis of the patent, conducts price discovery and
develops standardized terms. Buyers can purchase licenses as needed.”).
290. See Groenfeldt, supra note 289.
291. See Means, supra note 288.
292. Groenfeldt, supra note 289.
293. See id.
294. See Contreras, supra note 115, at 16 (“When a patent pool relating to a
standardized technology is formed, the parties expend significant resources to ensure that
only SEPs are included in the pool.”).
295. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND
COMPETITION 76–78 (2007).
296. See Contreras, supra note 115, at 20.
54
[Vol. 119:1
greater number of data points for comparison, the highly relationshipspecific nature of licensing agreements means that the points will still be
hard to compare.297 Practical difficulties may also arise in comparing
“hold-up free” licenses covering multiple standards, particularly where
the portfolio covers both SEPs and non-SEPS or where the benchmark
licenses are cross-licenses.298 Nonetheless, as long as those differences
are considered, there is no reason the initiatives should be anything other
than an important step forward.299
A clear and robust framework for FRAND imposes on the
implementer the burden of showing breach of the SEP owner’s
commitments. It provides balanced rules for determining the royalty rate
and for determining whether the rate proposed by the SEP unfairly
discriminates against the implementer. The success of such a framework
will reduce the likelihood that SEP owners seeking to inflate the royalties
they receive through injunctive relief will succeed. Like the FRAND
framework, the framework for injunctive relief has been the source of
much controversy in patent litigation involving SEPs, smartphones, and
PAEs.
IV. INJUNCTIONS
Generally speaking, there are two views on injunctive relief for
SEPs. Those adopting the first view believe that the SEP owner “is, by
definition, willing to license rather than exclude, and benefits from the
widespread adoption of its technology resulting from standardization.”300
SEP owners therefore should not be able to leverage on injunctions in
negotiations.301 High switching costs from standardization and the risk
297. Geradin, supra note 212, at 951–52 (noting that this to be “true whether
comparisons are made between agreements covering different standards (e.g., 2G versus
3G, or Wi-Fi versus 3G), or between agreements covering a similar standard” and
suggesting that “econometric analysis can be used to properly control for differences
between licensing agreements”).
298. Dennis W. Carlton & Allan L. Shampine, Identifying Benchmarks for Applying
Non-Discrimination in FRAND 5 (SSRN, Working Draft, July 3, 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2462234.
299. Id. (noting for example that SEP/non-SEP portfolio licenses may still prove to be
useful benchmarks as long as the licensee had the option to obtain a SEP-only license).
300. Thomas F. Cotter, Lex Machina’s Patent Litigation Damages Report,
COMPARATIVE
PATENT
REMEDIES
(June
30,
2014),
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2014_06_01_archive.html.
301. See, e.g., Michael J. Schallop, The IPR Paradox: Leveraging Intellectual
Property Rights to Encourage Interoperability in the Network Computing Age, 28 AIPLA
Q.J. 195, 227 (2000) (“[FRAND] at a minimum, requires that essential IPR owners not
chill the adoption and proliferation of the . . . standard through the enforcement of their
essential patent rights by enjoining competitors from practicing the standard.”); see also
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 105, at 1140 (“[T]he FRAND commitment is at its base an
agreement not to exercise the full scope of the patentee's rights in exchange for having its
of royalty stacking further militates against the grant of injunctive
relief.302 Proponents of this view point out that, under this framework,
implementers would not be tempted to risk infringement; if a court
should find against the implementer, the implementer would be required
to pay not only the FRAND royalty, but also the penalty of interest and
attorney fees.303
Those adopting the second view are concerned that without
injunctive relief, implementers have little incentive to pay royalties until
sued for patent infringement or hold-out from negotiations.304
Proponents of this view believe that hold-ups are rare and that singling
out SEP owners could harm innovation.305 Those in the second group
technology adopted as an industry standard, likely resulting in increased licensing
opportunities.”).
302. See, e.g., Joseph Kattan, FRAND Wars and Section 2, ANTITRUST MAG.,
Summer 2013 at 18–19. Kattan explains:
This ‘Cournot complements’ problem is aggravated by the ability of an
owner of an insignificant patent that reads on one component of a complex
multi-component product to seek an injunction against the manufacture
and sale of the entire product. As a result, ‘even a very weak patent could
command a high royalty in settlement from defendants afraid of gambling
their entire product on a jury’s decision.’ This can be seen in reported
demands by some SEP-holders for royalties exceeding 2 percent of the
price of a finished product based on a small fraction of the SEPs reading
on just one or two components of the product.
Id.
303. See Cotter, supra note 2168.
304. See MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC'S SUBMISSION IN RESPONSE TO THE COMMISSION'S
REQUEST FOR SUBMISSIONS ON THE PUBLIC INTEREST 15 (2012), available at
http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/234/2013/01/MotorolaMobility-Public-Interest-Comments-337-TA-794.pdf (“Depriving innovators of an
established remedy against an unwilling licensee who may engage in a successful ‘hold
out’ creates a disincentive to participate and contribute in the future.”); see also Lemley
& Shapiro, supra note 105, at 1153. Lemley and Shapiro assert:
A commitment to license on reasonable terms is not a commitment to be
whipsawed by a potential licensee. AnA implementer who agrees to participate
only if it gets a result it likes is no different than a patentee who agrees to
license on reasonable terms only if it gets to decide what is reasonable. Neither
party is acting in good faith.
Id.
305. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Qualcomm Inc. in Support of Reversal at 13–
14, Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., Nos. 2012-1548, 2012-1549 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 20, 2013).
The brief stated:
[T]here is a decided lack of evidence that any ‘hold up’ problem actually exists.
. . . Indeed, no one has identified a single instance in which the adoption or
implementation of a standard has been defeated or delayed as a result of a
patent reading on the standard. Moreover, SSOs have on many occasions told
the FTC that there is no “hold up” problem.
Id. (citations omitted); Complainant Samsung's Initial Submission in Response to
Comm’n Notice of Review at 15, Certain Elec. Devices, Including Wireless Comm’n
Devices, Portable Music & Data Processing Devices, & Tablet Computers, Inv. No. 337TA-794 (USITC Dec. 13, 2012) (“[D]espite a number of recent litigations involving
56
[Vol. 119:1
also point out that SSO policies do not forbid injunctions.306 Solutions
targeted at resolving FRAND disputes post-standardization are
preferable to a blanket withdrawal of the right to injunctive relief.
The discussion that follows explains why SEP owners should be
allowed to show why they deserve injunctions or exclusion orders.
Enjoining implementers should happen rarely, such as when
implementers are unwilling to negotiate or refuse to be bound by an
adjudicated royalty rate, or where they fail to meet a precondition to the
FRAND commitment, such as by failing to seek out the SEP owner prior
to using the standard. The following subsections also outline the dispute
resolution mechanism that can shepherd parties toward an adjudicated
outcome within a fixed time frame.
A.
Life After eBay
Patent law allows SEP owners to prevent unauthorized making,
selling, using, offering to sell, and importing of devices containing its
patented technology through injunctions.307 The Supreme Court in eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC308 required patentees seeking a permanent
injunction to show that they had suffered irreparable injury not
compensable by damages and that hardship and public interest factors
favored them.309 Subsequent courts have held that the thresholds are
similar for preliminary injunctions.310
Foreshadowing hold-ups in SEP litigation, Justice Kennedy in his
concurrence in eBay warned that granting injunctions on whole devices
FRAND-committed patents, there has never been any evidence of ‘patent hold-up’
inhibiting the implementation of standards as far as Samsung is aware.”).
306. See Letter from David Heiner, Vice President & Deputy Gen. Counsel,
Microsoft Corp., to the Fed. Trade Comm’n 3–5 (June 14, 2011), available at
http://www.ftc.gov//os/comments/patentstandardsworkshop/00009-60523.pdf; see also
Wright, supra note 16, at 806–07 (“[N]o SSO appears to uniformly disallow injunctions.
To the contrary, some appear to expressly consider and reject such rules.”).
307. 35 U.S.C.A. § 283 (West 2014) (providing that in cases of patent infringement a
court “may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the
violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable”).
308. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
309. Id. at 391. The Court held that the patentee must show:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law,
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3)
that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a
remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction.
Id.
310. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, AK, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987)
(“The standard for a preliminary injunction is essentially the same as for a permanent
injunction with the exception that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the
merits rather than actual success.”).
for patents covering small component parts would facilitate “undue
leverage in negotiations,” particularly when sought by NPEs.311
Notwithstanding the fact that the Supreme Court explicitly stated that
even NPEs may be granted injunctions if they satisfy the requirements
for an injunction, 77 percent of practicing entities continue to obtain
injunctions; non-practicing entities, however, had a much harder time
post-eBay, with requests for injunctions denied up to 90 percent of the
time.312
In the years following the decision, the ITC offered patentees a
convenient end-run around tighter injunction rules that district courts had
to follow under eBay, despite the Justice Department and FTC urging the
ITC to exercise greater restraint.313 The ITC thus became a venue of
choice for patentees seeking to exclude alleged infringers.314 The ITC
must grant an exclusion order when it finds a patent infringement but has
broad discretion to deny an exclusion order when it would harm the
public interest.315
On behalf of President Obama, the U.S. Trade Representative
(“USTR”) Michael Froman disapproved an exclusion order by the
Commission based on a FRAND encumbered SEP, effectively moving
the analysis of exclusion orders closer to those of post-eBay
injunctions.316 Ambassador Froman’s disapproval was an extraordinarily
rare occurrence.317
311. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that “[a]n
industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling
goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees”). Justice Kennedy reasoned:
For these firms, an injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from
its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to
companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent. When the patented
invention is but a small component of the product the companies seek to
produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage
in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the
infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest.
Id.
312. Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public
Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2012); see also Daryl Lim, Post eBay: A Brave
New World?, 3 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 483, 484–85 (2010).
313. See Morton & Shapiro, supra note 19, at 473 (“The DOJ, the PTO, and the FTC
have all urged the ITC to consider this aspect of consumer welfare. However, the ITC
has not accepted that advice.”) (citation omitted).
314. See Chien & Lemley, supra note 213, at 2 (“In the past five years, both PAEs
and product-producing companies have flocked to this once-obscure trade agency in
search of injunctions or the credible threat of injunctions.”).
315. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337(d)(1) (West 1999). In determining that harm, the ITC must
evaluate its effect on “the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United
States economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United
States, and United States consumers.” Id.
316. See Letter from Michael B.G. Froman, Ambassador, U.S. Trade Rep., to Hon.
Irving A. Williamson, Chairman, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n 3 (Aug. 3, 2013) [hereinafter
58
[Vol. 119:1
The ITC has previously found that public interest trumped exclusion
in three cases.318 Unlike those decisions, Ambassador Froman premised
the disapproval on legal policy considerations and not on a public need to
have those products. In particular, Ambassador Froman was concerned
about “potential harms that can result from owners of [SEPs] who have
made a voluntary commitment to offer to license SEPs on [FRAND]
terms . . . gaining undue leverage and engaging in ‘patent hold-up.’”319
Froman directed the ITC to “examine thoroughly and carefully on its
own initiative the public interest issues . . . when determining whether a
particular remedy is in the public interest” and to make “explicit
findings” as to “the presence or absence of patent hold-up or reverse
hold-up.”320
Professor Cotter observed that “[a]lthough it may be too early to
state with confidence the impact of the disapproval, the decision may
encourage the ITC to deny exclusion orders in other cases involving
SEPs, and thus to discourage patent owners from filing in the ITC to
avoid eBay.”321 Shortly after Ambassador Froman’s disapproval, the
White House issued a statement that the U.S. Intellectual Property
Enforcement Coordinator would be conducting an interagency review to
make the enforcement of exclusion orders issued by the ITC “more
transparent, effective, and efficient.”322
The ITC has since been active with its reform efforts. For example,
on January 9, 2014, the ITC further tightened the requirements for
obtaining an exclusion order.323 Ruling against a PAE that accused
Hewlett-Packard and others of infringing on patents covering flash
Froman
Letter],
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/08032013%20Letter_1.PDF (“Licensing SEPs on
FRAND terms is an important element of the Administration's policy of promoting
innovation and economic progress and reflects the positive linkages between patent rights
and standards setting.”).
317. J. Preston (J.P.) Long & Doris Johnson Hines, Un-FRAND-ly Behavior, 87 PAT.,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 572 (2014) (noting that “[t]his was the first time since
1984—and only the fourth time ever—that the USTR has taken such action” and
describing the veto as “virtually unheard of”).
318. Chien & Lemley, supra note 3142, at 20 (these cases covered “car parts
necessary for improved fuel efficiency, scientific equipment for nuclear physics research,
and hospital burn recovery beds”).
319. See Froman Letter, supra note 316, at 2.
320. See id. at 3; see also Long & Hines, supra note 317 (“[W]hat is unique about the
USTR's recent decision is that, unlike the three previous decisions, the public interest was
premised solely on legal policy considerations and not public necessity for the particular
products.”).
321. Cotter, supra note 173 (manuscript at 11).
322. THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 276.
323. See generally Certain Computer & Computer Peripheral Devices & Components
Thereof & Products Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-841 (USITC Jan. 9, 2014).
memory card readers, the ITC held that the PAEs had failed to show
“substantial investment in exploiting the patent though engineering,
research and development, or licensing.”324 In other words, patentees
must show that there are licensed devices that practice the patent, which
is often difficult for a SEP owner who is a PAE to prove. The holding
signals a departure from the ITC’s earlier standard where licensing alone
could satisfy the requirement, whether or not the licensees actually used
the patents.325 The tightening up of exclusion orders has diminished the
threat of patent hold-ups at the ITC.326
B.
The Case for Injunctive Relief
For FRAND litigation in a post-eBay world, the question arises as
to which of the two views—those warning against hold-ups or those
warning against hold-outs—should prevail. The answer depends on the
facts of the case.
In Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc., the Ninth Circuit found that
implicit in a FRAND commitment is the SEP owner’s waiver of
injunctive relief.327 Since the SEP owner was willing to license its
technology to SSO participants, damages asserted must be sufficient to
compensate for infringement.328 The disgruntled implementer may either
seek to be licensed on FRAND terms on the basis of specific
performance of the SEP’s contractual undertaking to the SSO or elect to
join a class of pre-existing licensees to a license implied in law.329 On
324. Id. at 27.
325. Ryan Davis, 'Patent Troll' Suits Face New Obstacles at ITC, LAW 360 (Feb. 11,
2014, 7:21 PM), available at http://www.law360.com/articles/509094/patent-troll-suitsface-new-obstacles-at-itc.
326. See Sidak, supra note 49, at 1008. Sidak concludes:
President Obama’s veto in August 2013 of the ITC’s exclusion order against
Apple’s infringing products in Investigation 337-TA-794193 lowered the
expected value of an SEP holder’s threat to attempt patent holdup, thereby
reducing the probability that any royalties negotiated in bilateral, voluntary
agreements are subject to holdup.
Id. (citation omitted).
327. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Implicit
in such a sweeping promise is . . . a guarantee that the patent-holder will not take steps to
keep would-be users from using the patented material, such as seeking an injunction, but
will instead proffer licenses consistent with the commitment made.”); see also Cotter,
supra note 173 (manuscript at 9) (“[W]hile eBay counsels against the use of ‘broad
classifications’ and ‘categorical’ rules for or against the entry of injunctive relief, one
might safely conclude that the application of the eBay factors in the typical case
involving an SEP generally would militate against the use of permanent injunctions.”)
(citation omitted).
328. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d at 885 (“[H]owever the RAND rate is to be determined
under the ITU standards, injunctive relief against infringement is arguably a remedy
inconsistent with the licensing commitment.”).
329. See Lemley, supra note 122, at 1925.
60
[Vol. 119:1
the facts, the wording of the SSO’s IP policy warranted the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation, but the idea that the right to injunctive relief is
extinguished every time a SEP is at issue is a step too far.
A per se rule prohibiting injunctive relief for SEPs provides an
alluring simplicity. Judge Robart in Microsoft hinted at this simplicity
when he reasoned that “easily measurable litigation costs to enforce
one’s rights cannot constitute irreparable harm.”330
Despite
acknowledging the lack of price increases or diminishing innovation in
the smartphone space, those concerned about hold-ups maintain that
things could be even better.331 They concede that implementers may
“abuse their lack of susceptibility to injunctions to negotiate a license
that is too low to sustain a healthy rate of innovation,” but nonetheless
prefer to invoke enhanced damages and attorney fees should SEP owners
attempt to use injunctions to hold-up implementers.332
Yet taken to its logical conclusion, this view fails to acknowledge
that, as with injunctions, enhanced damages and attorney fees carry the
same risk of overdeterrence. The question is one of kind, not one of
degree. Since overdeterrence is not easily quantifiable, it boils down to a
matter of judgment of whether an injunction is a more appropriate
remedy than damages in the form of reasonable royalties. Those
appointed for precisely those skills—judges—should be left to weigh the
equities as mandated by Congress, rather than be fettered by artificial
presumptions one way or the other.
In Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co,333 Judge Posner
explained how judges make such decisions when deciding to grant
injunctive relief.334 Consistent with Part II.B’s discussion of placing the
burden on the warring parties, Judge Posner noted that injunctions
“shift[] the burden of determining the cost of the defendant’s conduct
330. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2012 WL 5993202, at *6
n.9 (W.D. Wash. 2012); see also id. at *6. Judge Robart concluded:
Because Microsoft will pay royalties under any license agreement from the
time of infringement within the statute of limitations, this license agreement
will constitute Motorola's remedy for Microsoft's use of Motorola's H.264
standard essential patent portfolio to include the Motorola Asserted Patents.
Accordingly, Motorola cannot demonstrate that it has been irreparably harmed.
Id.
331. Cotter, supra note 2168. Cotter writes:
It seems to me that this is still a social cost, potentially a substantial one in the
case of SEPs, even if at the same time technological progress is, fortunately,
mitigating some portion of that cost. . . . We can[no]t just assume that
conditions are optimal because prices are falling.
Id.
332. Id.
333. Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 966 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1992).
334. Id. at 275.
from the court to the parties.”335 Further, “a premise of our free-market
system, and the lesson of experience here and abroad as well, is that
prices and costs are more accurately determined by the market than by
government.”336
In the context of SEP litigation, if a SEP owner’s damages are
smaller than its gain from preventing the implementer from using the
technology, then “there must be a price for dissolving the injunction that
will make both parties better off.”337 If an injunction is granted, the
parties have the opportunity to decide what that price point is where a
proper construction of the FRAND obligation warrants it.
Judge Posner also noted that a “battle of experts” over damages less
reliably determines the actual cost of entry than negotiations between the
parties over the price at which the incumbent “would feel adequately
compensated for having to face that competition.”338 In other words,
“the effect of upholding the injunction would be to substitute for the
costly processes of forensic fact determination the less costly processes
of private negotiation.”339 Further, while injunctions require continuing
supervision by the court, Judge Posner noted that the same was true for
awarding damages.340
A motion for injunctive relief could be simply a means to bring a
belligerent implementer to the negotiating table.341 After all, hornbook
contract law teaches that a party cannot obtain a court order compelling
specific performance from the offending party if it is unable or unwilling
to perform under the contract itself. Similarly contract law should not
require the SEP owner to grant access if the implementer refuses to
license the technology on an adjudicated FRAND rate.342
FRAND represents a commitment by SEP owners to grant
implementers access to their technology on reasonable and non335. Id.
336. Id. at 275–76.
337. Id. at 275.
338. Walgreen, 966 F.2d at 276.
339. Id. at 275.
340. Id. at 276. Judge Posner explained:
The costs and benefits of the damages remedy are the mirror of those of the
injunctive remedy. The damages remedy avoids the cost of continuing
supervision and third-party effects, and the cost of bilateral monopoly as well.
It imposes costs of its own, however, in the form of diminished accuracy in the
determination of value, on the one hand, and of the parties' expenditures on
preparing and presenting evidence of damages, and the time of the court in
evaluating the evidence, on the other.
Id.
341. See Wright, supra note 16, at 807 (“Although the rate negotiated with the
injunction threat is likely greater than the rate negotiated without the threat of injunction,
it does not follow that the former is above F/RAND.”).
342. 81A C.J.S. Specific Performance § 79 (2014).
62
[Vol. 119:1
discriminatory terms, thereby encouraging implementers to participate.
Implementers compelling a SEP owner to grant a license must show that
the SEP owner acted unreasonably or in a discriminatory fashion.
Injunctions are the corollary of the same general obligation to deal in
good faith.
They serve as a safeguard against opportunistic
implementers, encouraging SEP owners to participate.
The hostility toward injunctions may be in part due to the unproven
assumption that the extracted royalties will be greater than FRAND,
rather than greater than the rate desired by implementers, but still within
a FRAND range.343 If the implementer accuses the SEP owner of
breaching its FRAND promise, the earlier discussion shows that the
implementer must prove that breach. While injunctions should not be
granted to SEP owners seeking to leverage the injunction to hold-up
implementers, they should be granted to allow SEP owners to protect
themselves from a hold-out by implementers.
C.
A Framework for Assessing Injunctive Relief
In Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,344 the Federal Circuit held that there
is no per se denial of injunctions for FRAND-encumbered SEPs.345
Instead, the eBay framework “provides ample strength and flexibility for
addressing the unique aspects of FRAND committed patents and industry
standards in general.”346
As an initial matter, courts should be guided by the wording of the
FRAND commitment itself to determine its nature and scope. FRAND
obligations do not necessarily apply merely because a SEP is at issue.
For example, FRAND obligations may not apply where the patents were
declared to be essential but later found not to be so, or where the
implementer did not meet a condition precedent, or where the claims at
issue were not subject to the FRAND commitment.347
Significantly, the ITC has been less disapproving of negotiating
under the shadow of injunctive relief, noting that SEP owners threatening
exclusion orders are par for the course in negotiations unless SSO IP
343. See Wright, supra note 16, at 808 (noting the importance of the threat of
injunction to the bargaining process and “likely part of the benefit of the bargain
conceived by the contributing member of the SSO at the time it decided to participate in
the standard”).
344. Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., Nos. 2012-1548, 2012-1549, 2014 WL 1646435,
(Fed. Cir. Apr. 25, 2014).
345. Id. at *35.
346. Id.
347. For example, see Certain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities &
Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-868, 2014 WL 2965327 (USITC June 13, 2014)
(Final), where the facts furnished dismissal based on all three grounds.
policies expressly prohibit this behavior.348
In a recent case,
Administrative Law Judge Essex ruled against Nokia and ZTE’s
argument that InterDigital, a PAE, had breached its FRAND obligations
because it failed to seek a license before practicing the standard as
provided for under IEEE’s rules.349
Judge Essex held that Nokia and ZTE took a calculated risk.350 In
doing so, Nokia and ZTE shifted the loss entirely to InterDigital, which,
as a PAE, was particularly vulnerable to hold-outs since it was “not
engaged in manufacturing handsets or any cell phone equipment.”351
Judge Essex explained that while “InterDigital must attempt to make
certain all of its licenses are granted on FRAND terms. . . . [i]f
InterDigital failed and was no longer in business, each respondent would
be able to continue at least as profitably as before, and perhaps more
so.”352 Judge Essex concluded that “holding out meets the interest of the
respondents, but if [InterDigital] should ‘hold up’ the respondents, they
will suffer losses along with the licensee.”353
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Microsoft Corp v. Motorola, Inc.
found that Motorola had made a “sweeping promise” to license without
restrictions as to the number of applications, the patents included, or the
identity of the applicants.354 The court thus reached a conclusion by
implication that “injunctive relief against infringement is arguably a
remedy inconsistent with the licensing commitment.”355 Thus the
FRAND commitment created the presumption that the SEP owner had
agreed to allow access to its technology on “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” terms.
348. Id. at *81 (“There is no guidance as to what can be done in negotiations but that
InterDigital must deal with proposed licensees in good faith. There is nothing in any of
the evidence presented that they cannot use the ITC and an exclusion order to obtain an
FRAND contract with respondents.”).
349. Id. at *74 (finding the patents neither infringed nor essential).
350. Id. at *78.
351. Id. at *80.
352. Certain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities & Components
Thereof, 2014 WL 2965327, at *80.
353. Id.
354. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012). Judge
Berzon reasoned:
This language admits of no limitations as to who or how many applicants could
receive a license (“unrestricted number of applicants”) or as to which country's
patents would be included (“worldwide,” “the patented material necessary”).
Implicit in such a sweeping promise is, at least arguably, a guarantee that the
patent-holder will not take steps to keep would-be users from using the
patented material, such as seeking an injunction, but will instead proffer
licenses consistent with the commitment made.
Id.
355. Id. at 885.
64
[Vol. 119:1
Assuming that the implementer can show that it has satisfied its
own obligations under FRAND and that the claims at issue fall within its
scope, the court should next look to the factual record to examine the
conduct of the parties and determine which side equity should favor.
The fact that a party’s good faith plays a central role in the inquiry
should not be surprising. After all, injunctions are remedies that courts
issue according to the equities of the case.
In the context of FRAND negotiations, injunctions may create holdups and are generally frowned upon unless the SEP owner can show that
the implementer was an “unwilling licensee” attempting to “hold-out”
the SEP owner, in which case an injunction against the implementer is
warranted. Thus, practitioners have advised that “patent owners should
ensure that their pre-suit activities were thorough and in good faith.”356
The Apple-Samsung dispute at the ITC also highlighted the
importance of building a record of good faith.357 In particular, parties
should avoid conduct that may be construed as being unwilling to offer a
license and should be proactive in having IP valuation done early in the
process.
Thus, negotiations will be supported by royalty rates
substantiated by methodologies approved by earlier decisions such as the
“top down” approach discussed in Part III.358 Just as a SEP owner’s
injunction request may be denied when the license offered was not on
FRAND terms,359 an implementer may be vulnerable to an injunction if
the implementer refused to pay a FRAND royalty.360
356. Long & Hines, supra note 317.
357. Froman Letter, supra note 316, at 3 (noting the importance of parties developing
“a comprehensive factual record”).
358. Long & Hines, supra note 317 (“If a patent owner comes to the negotiating table
with royalty rates substantiated by the methodologies endorsed by Judges Robart and
Holderman, that party's offers are far less likely to be controversial during any future
litigations.”); Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., Nos. 2012-1548, 2012-1549, 2014 WL
1646435, at *36 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 25, 2014) (noting that “an injunction may be justified
where an infringer unilaterally refuses a FRAND royalty or unreasonably delays
negotiations to the same effect”).
359. Id.; see also Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., No. 6:10-CV-473, 2013 WL
4046225, at *25 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013) (noting that there was a mutual obligation to
negotiate in good faith and refusing to construe a FRAND rate because the defendant
intended to use that figure as a means of leveraging FRAND as a negotiating tool rather
than agreeing to be bound by it).
360. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2012); see also
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, at *6 n.9
(W.D. Wash., Apr. 25, 2013) (order granting preliminary injunction). The court
reasoned:
The court's prior rulings have made clear that Microsoft, as an implementer of
the H.264 Standard, must accept a RAND license to Motorola's standard
essential patents. Indeed, Microsoft, or any other implementer, is not free to
infringe Motorola's standard essential patents, and were that to occur, this
court's ruling with respect to injunctive relief may be different.
In In the Matter of Google Inc.,361 the FTC indicated that attempting
to obtain injunctions on SEPs would put Google and Motorola in breach
of §5 of the FTC Act.362 At the same time, the FTC acknowledged that if
implementers refused to license the patents, Google and Motorola could
seek an injunction.363 The Justice Department and U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office have also suggested that an implementer could be
deemed “unwilling” where it refused to negotiate; refused, or was
unable, to pay the adjudicated FRAND rate; or when it was not subject to
the jurisdiction of a U.S. court.364
In Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI,365 the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California found that injunctive relief was a
pretext to royalty inflation.366 The patentee had filed an ITC action
against the alleged infringer before offering the alleged infringer a
license to the patent.367 The court found this to be a violation of the SEP
owner’s FRAND commitment.368 At the same time, the court was
prepared to accept that an injunction may be appropriate in cases where
the implementer “outright refuses to accept a [F]RAND license.”369
These decisions establish that although both parties are mutually
obliged to negotiate in good faith, courts frown upon parties concurrently
seeking injunctive relief. When a SEP owner insists, using an injunctive
threat, that implementers waive their right to challenge validity or
infringement of the SEPs, the position is less clear. Abroad, the
Id.
361. Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, Motorola Mobility
LLC and Google Inc., No. 121-0120 (F.T.C. Jan. 3, 2013), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/01/130103googlemotorolaan
alysis.pdf.
362. Id. at 7.
363. Id.; see Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Orders to Aid Public
Comment, Robert Bosch GmbH, No. C-437, at 5 (F.T.C. Nov. 26, 2012), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/04/121126boschanalysis.pdf
(reaching the same conclusion).
364. See, e.g., POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 4, at 7; see also Froman Letter, supra
note 316, at 2 (citing that the joint DOJ/PTO Policy Statement raised concerns that he
“strongly share[d] about the potential harms that can result from owners of standardsessential patents [] who have made a voluntary commitment to offer to license SEPs on . .
. F/RAND [terms], gaining undue leverage and engaging in ‘patent hold-up’”).
365. Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 2d 998 (N.D. Cal.
2013), cert. denied, No. C-12-03451-RMW, 2013 WL 3568314 (N.D. Cal. July 12,
2013), appeal dismissed, 565 F. App'x 602 (9th Cir. 2014).
366. See id. at 1007–08.
367. Id. at 1002.
368. Id. at 1005.
369. Id. at 1007.
66
[Vol. 119:1
European Commission has been willing to find that Motorola Mobility
violated EU competition law by doing so.370
While the wording of the FRAND commitment and the conduct of
the parties are highly relevant to the inquiry of whether to grant an
injunction, eBay provides the framework for the inquiry. A Federal
Circuit decision applying eBay provides a glimpse of the difficulty of
obtaining an injunction for complex technology products based on a
single feature.
In Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,371 Apple sought a
permanent injunction against Samsung for infringing several design and
utility patents.372 The case did not involve SEPs but is instructive on
how injunctive relief in SEP litigation overlays with royalty claims.373
Similar to hold-ups, a central issue in the case was whether, “the patentee
seeks to leverage its patent for competitive gain beyond that which the
inventive contribution and value of the patent warrant.”374
With respect to the irreparable harm factor, the Federal Circuit
required the patentee to show “some causal nexus” between infringement
and harm to the patentee.375 The patentee need not show that the
patented feature was the sole reason consumers bought the accused
infringing devices as long as there is a nexus with consumer demand, for
example, through survey evidence that consumers were willing to pay
more than a nominal premium for the product.376 Commentators have
370. Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission finds that Motorola
Mobility Infringed EU Competition Rules by Misusing Standard Essential Patents (Apr.
29, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-489_en.htm.
According to the European Commission’s press release:
The Commission also found it anticompetitive that Motorola insisted, under the
threat of the enforcement of an injunction, that Apple give up its rights to
challenge the validity or infringement by Apple's mobile devices of Motorola
SEPs. Implementers of standards and ultimately consumers should not have to
pay for invalid or non-infringed patents. Implementers should therefore be able
to ascertain the validity of patents and contest alleged infringements.
Id.
371. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
372. Id. at 1355–56.
373. David Long, Patent Case Alert: Federal Circuit Provides more Guidance on
Injunctive Relief Involving Multi-Component Devices IRIMCD in Apple v. Samsung,
ESSENTIAL
PATENT
BLOG
(Nov.
18,
2013),
http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2013/11/patent-case-alert-federal-circuit-providesmore-guidance-on-injunctive-relief-involving-multi-component-devices-in-apple-vsamsung/ (noting the relevance of the case to SEP litigation analysis).
374. Samsung, 735 F.3d at 1361.
375. Id. at 1360.
376. Id. at 1364. The court illustrated:
There might be a variety of ways to make this required showing, for example,
with evidence that a patented feature is one of several features that cause
consumers to make their purchasing decisions. It might also be shown with
evidence that the inclusion of a patented feature makes a product significantly
noted that “[b]ecause SEPs often cover only a single feature of any
downstream device, the requirement of proving a ‘causal nexus’ may
make injunctions more difficult to obtain in Federal District Court.”377
Consistent with the earlier discussion on FRAND valuation in Part
III, the Federal Circuit accepted that it may be “logical and equitable to”
view the patents as a portfolio or “aggregate” rather than on a “patent-bypatent” basis.378 This approach is appropriate when the patents “all relate
to the same technology or where they combine to make a product
significantly more valuable.” The Federal Circuit was concerned about
preventing “perverse situations” where patentees would be “unable to
obtain an injunction against the infringement of multiple patents
covering different—but when combined, all—aspects of the same
technology, even though the technology as a whole drives demand for
the infringing product.”379
In Motorola, a later case, the Federal Circuit noted that
“[i]nfringement of multiple patents by a single device may strengthen a
patentee’s argument for an injunction by, for example, supporting its
argument that the infringed features drive consumer demand or are
causing irreparable harm.”380 However, the court noted that it is also
appropriate for courts to consider the harm to the public “of an injunction
on a product with many non-infringing features.”381 On the facts,
Motorola had “agreed to add as many market participants as [were]
willing to pay a FRAND royalty,” and “negotiations [with Apple] have
been ongoing.” Under eBay, the lack of irreparable harm to Motorola
controlled, and the court denied Motorola’s request for an injunction.382
With respect to inadequate legal remedies, the Federal Circuit held
that no categorical rule precluded injunctions simply because patentees
were willing to license their patents to some licensees and the
implementer was financially capable of paying any damages that might
be ordered against it.383 On the facts, Apple had been willing to license
more desirable. Conversely, it might be shown with evidence that the absence
of a patented feature would make a product significantly less desirable.
Id.
377. Tony V. Pezzano & Jeffrey M. Telep, Latest Developments on Injunctive Relief
for Infringement of FRAND-Encumbered SEPS—Part I, 26 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J.
14, 19 (2014).
378. Samsung, 735 F.3d at 1365.
379. Id.
380. Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
381. Id.
382. Id. at 1332. But see id. at 1333 (Rader, C.J., dissenting-in-part) (concluding that
because his reading of the record “shows evidence that Apple may have been a hold out,”
the issue should be remanded to allow Motorola to prove Apple's hold out).
383. Samsung, 735 F.3d at 1369.
68
[Vol. 119:1
some patents to Samsung in the past.384 Apple had also been willing to
license the asserted patents to non-rivals as well as to rivals to settle
litigation that excluded “clone” versions of its product.385 However, it
had never offered to license the asserted patents to Samsung, its primary
competitor.386 In reaching its conclusion, the Federal Circuit stressed
that focusing on past licensing practices “without exploring any relevant
differences from the current situation, hints at a categorical rule that . . .
cannot be squared with the principles of equity adopted by Congress.”387
Where the licensing history shows the SEP owner honoring its FRAND
obligations to similar licensees similarly situated to the implementer-insuit, an injunction would likely be inappropriate.388
With respect to the balance of hardships factor, Apple argued that
Samsung would not be harmed because it had designed around Apple’s
patents.389 In contrast, Apple would be harmed by the risk of Samsung’s
continued infringement. Samsung responded that since it no longer sold
the infringing products, Apple would not benefit from an injunction.390
On the other hand, Samsung would be harmed by an injunction because
it would “create fear, doubt and uncertainty in the market as to what
other products Apple might later claim are covered by its sweeping
injunction.”391 The Federal Circuit ruled that the balance of hardships
384. Id. at 1370.
385. Id.
386. Id. The court reasoned:
The district court's exclusive focus on whether Apple's patents are “priceless”
and whether Samsung is “off limits” led it to disregard Apple's evidence that
Samsung's use of these patents is different. Apple points to numerous factors
that the district court failed to consider in determining the relevance of Apple's
past licensing behavior. For example, Apple notes that IBM is not a competitor
in the smartphone market, and that the license was entered into five years
before Apple launched the iPhone. Apple further notes that it entered into the
HTC and Nokia agreements to settle pending litigation. In addition, the Nokia
agreement was a “provisional license” for a limited “standstill” period, and the
HTC agreement excluded HTC products that were “clones” of Apple's
products. Moreover, although the evidence shows that Apple offered Samsung
a license to some of its patents, Apple is adamant that it never offered to license
the asserted patents to Samsung, its primary competitor.
387. Id. at 1370 (citation omitted).
388. Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1331–1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(finding that a history of licensing the asserted patent to rivals and honoring FRAND
obligations “to as many market participants as are willing to pay a FRAND royalty”
suggest that damages would likely be sufficient, and that “a patentee subject to FRAND
commitments may have difficulty establishing irreparable harm”).
389. Samsung, 735 F.3d at 1371.
390. Id. at 1371.
391. Id. (quoting Corrected Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 45, Apple Inc. v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., 735 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (No. 2013-1129)).
factor was neutral,392 which suggests that courts will likely take a narrow
view of the parties’ hardships flowing from risks of further infringement
and injunctions.
With respect to the public interest factor, the Federal Circuit defined
the concern as “not that a large number of products would be enjoined,
but rather that entire products would be enjoined based on ‘limited noncore features’” and “that an injunction [may] depriv[e] the public of
access to a large number of non-infringing features.”393 The court ruled
that the public’s interest in enforcing patent rights was “outweighed by
other considerations” in this case, such as “removing phones from the
market when the infringing components constitute such limited parts of
complex, multi-featured products.”394 This view is consistent with the
view taken by the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, the antitrust
agencies, and the U.S. Trade Representative on SEPs as described in Part
IV.B.
In sum, Apple demonstrates that it will be difficult to obtain an
injunction covering multicomponent standards-compliant devices like
smartphones based on the eBay decision. To obtain an injunction, SEP
owners will first need to show a causal nexus between consumer demand
and the patent portfolio at issue, a possibly higher and different kind of
bar than legal or technical “essentiality.” The public interest factor and
“inadequate remedies at law” factor are weighted in favor of access to
the SEP owners’ FRAND-encumbered technology. The balance of
hardships factor determination will likely be fact specific.
Rather than making sweeping proclamations for or against
injunctions, the better view is that parties understand that bilateral
negotiations are not conducted under the shadow of an injunction but
with the understanding that an adjudicated FRAND rate helps determine
whether an implementer is unreasonably holding out and should be
enjoined as a step toward reaching a negotiated solution.395 At the same
time, FRAND also assumes that SEP owners have generally waived
rights to an injunction in exchange for increased licensing opportunities
392. Id.
393. Samsung, 735 F.3d at 1372–73.
394. Id. at 1372.
395. See, e.g., James Ratliff & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Use and Threat of
Injunctions in the RAND Context, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 9 (2013). Ratliff &
Rubinfeld explains:
[T]he existence of that threat does not lead to holdup as feared by those who
propose that a RAND pledge implies (or should embody) a waiver of seeking
injunctive relief. If RAND terms are reached by negotiation, the negotiation is
not conducted in the shadow of an injunctive threat but rather in the shadow of
knowledge that the court will impose a set of terms if the parties do not reach
agreement themselves.
Id.
70
[Vol. 119:1
by having its technology adopted within the standard.396 Because each
case is decided on its own merits, later implementers that are sued are not
stuck with the first implementer’s failure to put on a good case at trial.
D.
The End Game
SEP owners realize that obtaining injunctive relief for FRANDencumbered patents is an uphill task. SEP owners also realize that courts
will demand rigorous proof of a nexus between the patented invention
and the implementers’ sales, as well as any alleged uncooperativeness in
reaching a negotiated compromise. On the other side, implementers
realize that they will be vulnerable to injunctions and exclusion orders if
they are perceived as being “unwilling” licensees. Both sides understand
that courts are increasingly intolerant of hold-ups and hold-outs. That
realization has accelerated the onset of the end of the smartphone wars.
SEP litigation in the smartphone industry will end with settlements
for all ongoing litigation regarding global patent cross-licensing for all
SEPs.397 Recent months have seen a significant cessation of hostilities.
In a joint statement, Apple and Google announced that they agreed to
dismiss all the current lawsuits existing directly between them.398 More
recently, Apple and Samsung agreed to end all patent-related disputes
outside of the United States.399 A number of other major players such as
Motorola Mobility, Nokia, Microsoft, and HTC have also reached a
truce.400
396. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 105, at 1140.
397. See Rachel Swan, Preliminary Ruling Invalidating Key Apple Patent Could
Reshape Smartphone War, DAILY JOURNAL (Dec. 24, 2012), http://news.jmls.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2013/01/Lim-Dec.24.pdf.
398. Dan Levine, Apple, Google Settle Smartphone Patent Litigation, REUTERS (May
16, 2014, 7:43 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/16/us-apple-googlesettlement-idUSBREA4F0S020140516.
399. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Apple and Samsung Drop All Non-US Lawsuits, (Aug. 5,
2014, 11:55 PM EDT), http://fortune.com/2014/08/05/apple-and-samsung-drop-all-nonu-s-lawsuits/.
400. Simon Johnson, Samsung to Pay Ericsson $650 Million Plus Rroyalties to End
Patent
Spat,
REUTERS
(Jan.
27,
2014,
7:51
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/27/us-ericsson-samsung-patentsidUSBREA0Q0A120140127; see Press Release, Ericsson, Ericsson and Samsung Reach
Agreement
on
Licensing
Terms
(Jan.
27,
2014),
available
at
http://www.ericsson.com/news/1757163 (announcing that Samsung would pay Ericsson
$650 million together with ongoing royalties in settlements covering GSM, UMTS, LTE
standards for networks and handsets based FRAND commitments); id. (reporting that
Samsung also entered into a cross-license agreement with Google and Nokia recently);
Nick Gray, HTC Settles Patent Dispute with Nokia, Signs Cross-licensing Agreement,
ANDROID AND ME (Feb. 7, 2014, 5:43 PM), http://androidandme.com/2014/02/news/htcsettles-patent-dispute-with-nokia-signs-cross-licensing-agreement/ (reporting that Nokia
and HTC have agreed to cross-license their patents); Microsoft’s Support for Industry
Standards,
MICROSOFT
(Feb.
8,
2012),
Like its European counterpart, the U.S. Justice Department closed
its antitrust investigation into Samsung’s use of SEPs to obtain exclusion
orders at the ITC against Apple. It explained that with Ambassador
Froman’s disapproval of the ITC’s exclusion order against Apple, further
investigation was unnecessary.401
Patent wars, particularly those involving SEPs, are lengthy and
expensive. As parties battle over claims of infringements of one
generation of devices, technology has moved the market ahead.402
Apple, which entered the war in pursuit of an ideological vendetta
against its rival Google, realized that its arsenal of patents was not as
solid as its founder Steve Jobs might have envisioned.403 In the end, the
reality of Digital Darwinism rather than the wisdom of the courts may
close this memorable chapter of patent history.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that such technological
evolution renders the FRAND debate moot. The slew of settlements
represents a transition into the end game phase; the game itself is not
over. Each party retains a vested interest in maintaining its leverage over
http://www.microsoft.com/about/legal/en/us/IntellectualProperty/iplicensing/ip2.aspx
(announcing that Microsoft would not seek an injunction for SEPs); Brandon Russell,
Apple and Motorola Mobility Agree to Throw Out Patent Lawsuit, TECHNOBUFFALO
(May 16, 2014), http://www.technobuffalo.com/2014/05/16/apple-and-motorolamobility-agree-to-throw-out-patent-lawsuit/; Joe Weisenthal, Apple and HTC Reach
Patent Deal — All Lawsuits Dropped, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 10, 2012, 10:17 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/apple-and-htc-reach-patent-deal--all-lawsuits-dropped2012-11 (reporting that Motorola Mobility and HTC have also agreed to settle their
disputes with Apple, agreeing to cross-license each other’s mobile industry patents).
401. Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division on Its Decision to
Close Its Investigation of Samsung’s Use of Its Standards-Essential Patents (Feb. 7,
2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/February/14-at-129.html.
402. Lori Zimmer, Are We Headed for a Smartwatch War?, (Mar. 27, 2013),
ECOUTERRE.COM, http://www.ecouterre.com/are-we-on-the-verge-of-a-smartwatch-war/;
see also Jon Phillips, How Samsung Can Still Win the Looming Smartwatch Wars in an
Android
Wear
World,
TECHHIVE
(Mar.
19,
2014,
3:00
AM),
http://www.techhive.com/article/2109544/how-samsung-can-still-win-the-loomingsmartwatch-wars-in-an-android-wear-world.html (“[T]he fact of the matter is Samsung is
the dominant player in smartphones, and where smartphones go, smartwatches follow.”).
403. Florian Mueller, Apple and Samsung Drop All Non-U.S. Patent Suits Against
Each
Other,
Keep
Suing
in
U.S.,
(Aug.
6,
2014)
http://www.fosspatents.com/2014/08/apple-and-samsung-drop-all-non-us.html. Mueller
argues:
[I]f Apple has now recognized that it can't gain leverage over its fiercest rival
anywhere else, it will have to come up with something else than the
thermonuclear patent war envisioned by Steve Jobs if it wants to stop Android
from further marginalizing iOS outside the U.S.
Even in the U.S., Apple's ability to regain market share through patent litigation
is very doubtful. Its U.S. patents so far haven't been strong enough either.
Id.
72
[Vol. 119:1
its opponent. Each victory on FRAND royalties or injunctions adds a
chip that can be used at the bargaining table in future negotiations.
V.
ANTITRUST AND PATENT SOLUTIONS
The final section completes the discussion by considering the
complementary roles that the antitrust laws and patent laws can play. It
explains why antitrust laws are generally more appropriate in policing
anticompetitive conduct taking place before the standard is set, and why
it is unwise to use these laws to resolve disputes afterwards. This section
also explains why patent law is up to that task. Recent court decisions
promise better quality patents and fairer play in litigation, but more can
be done. The equitable defense of patent misuse has been a largely
untapped tool which offers a useful way of targeting vexatious litigation.
A.
The Role of Antitrust Law
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization and
attempted monopolization.404 Antitrust plaintiffs must prove that the
defendant has power in the relevant market and willfully sought,
acquired, or maintained that power unlawfully.405 The FTC may also
bring these claims under § 5 of the FTC Act as an unfair method of
competition or as a deceptive act or practice.406
Thus far, antitrust law has intervened in three categories of conduct
where patents cover standards. First, antitrust law condemns conduct
that results in implementers becoming locked-in through the SEP
owner’s deception. Cases involving owner deception could be due to the
owner concealing a SEP at the point the standard was adopted, or when
the owner lies about its willingness to license on FRAND terms.407 Such
404. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West Supp. 2014).
405. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (requiring
proof of “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as
a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident”).
406. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (West Supp. 2014); see Contreras, Market Reliance Theory,
supra note 27 (manuscript at 35) (“While monopolization and attempted monopolization
are actionable under Section 5, Section 5 also encompasses conduct beyond
monopolization.”); see also Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright, Federalism,
Substantive Preemption, and Limits on Antitrust: An Application to Patent Holdup, 5 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 469, 495 (2009) (noting that the FTC may prefer Section 5 due
to the difficulty of meeting more stringent Section 2 liability standards or a desire to
achieve a broad reading of Section 5).
407. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 76–77 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(finding Microsoft liable for deceiving Java developers to adopt Windows-specific
software development tools); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 304 (3d
Cir. 2007); Rambus Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 522 F.3d 456, 464–66 (D.C. Cir. 2008);
Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, 616–18 (1996), available at
violations may be brought under § 2 of the Sherman Act, which
condemns the acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power.408 It is
important to note that claims of deception relate to conduct taking place
before the standard was set and are wholly distinct from claims where the
dispute focuses on the scope of FRAND commitment after the standard
was adopted.409 No party in a FRAND dispute has been accused of the
sort of bait-and-switch410 or “patent ambush” attempted in earlier
cases.411
Second, both the assignor and assignee of a patent may be guilty of
collusion if the assignment was undertaken to allow the assignee to elide
FRAND obligations previously undertaken by the assignor. In Visio,
Inc. v. Funai Elec. Co.,412 the assignor and assignee conspired to charge
royalty rates in excess of the FRAND obligations and split the profits.413
The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California found this
relationship to be sufficient to provide for an antitrust claim against the
assignor.414 In light of Visio, patentees who sell their standard-essential
patents should exercise caution in situations where they continue to be
involved with the new patent owner on issues involving royalty rates.
SEP owners tempted to push the envelope would do well to realize
that antitrust agencies take a dim view of using transfers as a means of
circumventing the FRAND commitment. In Negotiated Data Solutions
LLC,415 the FTC entered into a consent decree with Negotiated Data
Solutions, preventing it from enforcing SEPs until it had offered to
license them on terms set by the FTC.416 N-Data had obtained the
http://www.ftc.gov/os/decisions/vol121.htm (resolving the complaint by consent order
and finding liability for lying that it had no IP relevant to the standard and suing after
adoption of standard); see also Elhauge, supra note 11, at 18 (“Such monopoly power is
not obtained through competition on the merits because it is obtained by breaching a
commitment that had persuaded firms to give up their competitive options.”); Jeffery M.
Cross, Standard Setting And Antitrust: SSOs, SEPs, F/RAND and Patent Holdup,
ANTITRUST LAW DAILY (Mar. 14, 2014) (on file with author).
408. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 595–96, 605
n.32 (1985).
409. Contreras, Market Reliance Theory, supra note 27 (manuscript at 33–34) (noting
that such conduct “is generally viewed as deserving sanction . . . [but] does not appear to
be common, or even the focus of most litigation over FRAND commitments today”).
410. Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, No. C-4234, 2008 WL 4407246 (F.T.C. Sep.
22, 2008).
411. Rambus Inc., 522 F.3d at 459.
412. Visio, Inc. v. Funai Elec. Co., No. CV 09-0174 AHM (RCx), 2010 WL 7762624
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2010).
413. Id. at *2.
414. Id. at *6.
415. Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, No. C-4234, 2008 WL 4407246 (F.T.C. Sep.
22, 2008).
416. See David Balto, A Dozen Times to Call Your Antitrust Lawyer, 5 LANDSLIDE 42
(2012).
74
[Vol. 119:1
patents knowing they were FRAND encumbered and exploited switching
costs to charge higher royalties.
Third, the FTC invoked § 5 of the FTC Act to limit a SEP owner’s
ability to seek injunctions as an “unfair method of competition.”417 In In
the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc.,418 the FTC
launched its own investigation into Google/Motorola Mobility’s conduct
with regard to SEPs shortly after the Justice Department approved
Google’s acquisition of Motorola Mobility.419 The FTC alleged that
seeking injunctive relief violated § 5. The FTC entered a consent order
where the parties committed not to seek injunctive relief subject to some
exceptions.420
In In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH,421 the FTC entered a
consent order requiring the SEP owner to license some patents on a
royalty-free basis, license others on FRAND terms, and refrain from
seeking injunctive relief on any of them.422 The FTC explained that the
threat of injunctions could “cause substantial harm to U.S. competition,
consumers, and innovation” because royalties would “reflect the
investments firms make to develop and implement the standard, rather
than the economic value of the technology itself,” harming “incentives to
develop standard-compliant products” and leading “to excessive royalties
that can be passed along to consumers in the form of higher prices.”423
417. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a), (n) (West Supp. 2014); Complaint at 1, Union Oil Co.
of Cal., No. 9305, 2003 WL 1190102 (F.T.C. Mar. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Unocal
Complaint],
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2003/03/030304unocaladmincmplt
.pdf, resolved by consent order, 140140 F.T.C 123, 125–26 (2005) (finding liability for
misrepresenting that proposed standards were nonproprietary); see also Elhauge, supra
note 11, at 20. Elhauge asserts:
[A]pplied to RAND breaches, the FTC Act does not change the essential
structure of the inquiry, but simply lowers the monopoly power requirement to
a market power requirement. This lowered power requirement is consistent
with the fact that the FTC Act creates lower overdeterrence concerns because it
is enforceable only by a financially-disinterested, politically accountable FTC
that is limited to seeking prospective remedies.
Id.
418. See Motorola Mobility LLC, No. C-4410, 2013 WL 3944149 (F.T.C. July 23,
2013).
419. Id. at *5.
420. Id. at *5–6.
421. See Robert Bosch GmbH, No. C-4377, 2013 WL 1911293 (F.T.C. Apr. 24,
2013).
422. Id. at *9, *11–12.
423. Statement of the Fed. Trade Comm’n, Robert Bosch GmbH, No. 121-0081, at 1–
2,
(F.T.C.
Apr.
24,
2013),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/04/121126boschcommission
statement.pdf.
This threat would amount to an “unfair method of competition,” under §
5 of the FTC Act.424
In her dissent, Commissioner Ohlhausen indicated her skepticism
that § 5 was an appropriate avenue for redress without the FTC first
“fully articulating its views on what constitutes an unfair method of
competition, including the general parameters of unfair conduct and
where Section 5 overlaps and does not overlap with the antitrust laws,
and how the Commission will exercise its enforcement discretion under
Section 5.”425 Otherwise, she warned, “the Commission runs a serious
risk of failure in the courts and a possible hostile legislative reaction,
both of which have accompanied previous FTC attempts to use Section 5
more expansively.”426
Professor Contreras has cautioned against relying on § 5 for two
reasons:
[First r]elying on such an uncertain and judicially untested standard
as the principal mechanism for enforcing patent pledges could make
the enforcement of such pledges less predictable and thus lessen their
value as market-wide assurances. Second, even if the parameters of
Section 5 were clarified to cover breaches of patent pledges with
greater reliability, an action under Section 5 can only be brought by
the FTC in its enforcement capacity, and not by private litigants.
Thus, such actions depend on the enforcement priorities and
resources of the FTC and as such cannot provide a reliable means for
427
enforcing patent pledges across the board.
Employing antitrust law to address ex ante misconduct and attempts
to elide FRAND commitments are fairly uncontroversial. However, the
Article agrees that employing § 5 of the FTC Act to address breaches of
424. Id. at 2–3.
425. See Statement of Comm’r Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Robert Bosch GmbH, No.
121-0081,
at
1
(F.T.C.
Nov.
26,
2012),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/statementcommissioner-maureen-ohlhausen/121126boschohlhausenstatement.pdf. Commissioner
Ohlhausen argues:
Even if all of the SEP-related allegations in the complaint were proved . . . I
would not view such conduct as violating Section 5 of the FTC Act. Simply
seeking injunctive relief on a patent subject to a fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (“FRAND”) license, without more, even if seeking such relief
could be construed as a breach of a licensing commitment, should not be
deemed either an unfair method of competition or an unfair act or practice
under Section 5.
Id.
426. Id. at 3–4.
427. Contreras, Market Reliance Theory, supra note 27 (manuscript at 38) (citation
omitted).
76
[Vol. 119:1
FRAND commitments is problematic for the reasons articulated by
Professor Contreras.
What about § 2 of the Sherman Act? Some commentators have
suggested that antitrust liability could hinge on two theories. First, one
might posit that patent owners obtain power over price because of the
high switching costs involved. In the familiar narrative, patent owners
threaten injunctions and obtain “hold-up” royalties. The problem
confronting this theory is that antitrust law does not regulate prices.428
One U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has unequivocally required evidence
of anticompetitive effects, even when the patent owner obtained higher
prices through deception.429
Second, one might also posit that by refusing to grant access to
SEPs at a FRAND rate, SEP owners are denying rivals and downstream
implementers access to a resource they need to compete.430 Such a
refusal could also provide the basis for invoking the essential facilities
doctrine, which mandates access to “a facility that cannot reasonably be
duplicated and to which access is necessary if one wishes to compete.”431
The theory of liability rests on the SEP owner’s leveraging of exclusive
428. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP. 540 U.S.
398, 407–10 (2004); see also Cotter, supra note 173 (manuscript at 40). Cotter advises:
I am concerned . . . [with] . . . the difficulties of requiring courts or antitrust
enforcers to determine what a fair return is, in the manner of public utility
regulators. The inherent subjectivity of the task, along with risks of erroneous
decisions (that then may have precedential value, with potentially wide-ranging
effect, in future cases) and of bending competition law to protect competitors
instead of the competitive process, all seem to me to counsel against deploying
doctrines such as essential facilities or abuse of dominant position in all but the
most extreme cases.
Id.; c.f. Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of
Objections to Motorola Mobility on Potential Misuse of Mobile Phone Standard-Essential
Patents (May 6, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13406_en.htm (finding that it was an abuse of a dominant position under EU competition
law to exclude a willing licensee from the market or negotiate under an injunctive threat,
which could lead to “[anticompetitive] licensing terms that the licensee of the SEP would
not have accepted absent [the seeking of the injunction]”).
429. Rambus Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 522 F.3d 456, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding
insufficient evidence that the patent owner unlawfully monopolized the relevant
markets).
430. See, e.g., Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak, 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.
1997).
431. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 539 (7th Cir. 1986); see Krista S.
Jacobsen, Intellectual Property in Standards: Does Antitrust Law Impose A Duty to
Disclose (Even If the Standards-Setting Organization Does Not)?, 26 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 459, 485 (2010) (“When a standard incorporates a
patented invention as an essential component of the standard, the patent becomes, in
effect, an essential facility because one wishing to implement the standard cannot do so
without having access to the patented invention.”); see also Daryl Lim, Patent Misuse
and Antitrust: Rebirth or False Dawn?, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299.
rights in the technology market for standards compliant products.432
When designing around the patented standard or developing a new
standard is “expensive and unreasonable,” “the essential facilities
doctrine appears to be a well-suited remedy[.]”433
Some commentators have warned that greater forays by antitrust
law could erode SEP owner confidence and willingness to participate in
SSOs, resulting in an overall decline in innovation.434 Others, while
more optimistic that patent owners’ enthusiasm may continue unabated,
caution against the risk of condemning the innocents.435 Despite the
arguments of a few commentators,436 both the Federal and D.C. Circuits
have exonerated SEP owners of antitrust violations because the SSO
disclosure policy did not specify with sufficient particularity what
patents needed to be disclosed.437 As a general matter, antitrust law
frowns upon the notion that rivals have a duty to assist each other in the
absence of predatory behavior.438 Where the issue is access to patented
technology, courts have been even more reluctant to grant what would
432. Jacobsen, supra note 431, at 484–85.
433. Jacobsen, supra note 431, at 485–86. In its latest Draft Rules on the Prohibition
of Abuses of Intellectual Property Rights for the Purpose of Eliminating or Restricting
Competition, China is exploring making FRAND violations a breach of competition law.
See Koren Wong-Ervin, FRAND Ambush?, LAW360 (July 9, 2014, 10:29 AM ET),
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/key-speeches-presentations/wong-ervin__frand_ambush_-_july_2014.pdf (“In contrast with the approach taken in the United
States and Europe, recent developments in China suggest that patent holders may be
required to license SEPs on FRAND terms even in the absence of a voluntary
commitment to do so.”).
434. Teece & Sherry, supra note 249, at 1986. But see George S. Cary et al., The
Case for Antitrust Law to Police the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 77
ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 923–24 (2011) (arguing that there is little evidence supporting this
view).
435. Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 406, at 486.
436. See Skitol, supra note 147, at 728–29 (arguing that vague FRAND promises are
a “tool for misuse” and that SSOs should thus be held to have violated the antitrust laws
when they fail “to require, or at least affirmatively encourage, ‘ex ante’ disclosure of
intended license terms prior to voting [to adopt a standard], with a related mechanism for
collective negotiation of the license agreement”).
437. Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1102 (Fed. Cir.
2003). The court reasoned:
A policy that does not define clearly what, when, how, and to whom the
members must disclose does not provide a firm basis for the disclosure duty
necessary for a fraud verdict. Without a clear policy, members form vaguely
defined expectations as to what they believe the policy requires——whether
the policy in fact so requires or not.
Id.
438. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP. 540 U.S. 398,
411–16 (2004) (warning that forced sharing may reduce incentives to innovate; that
courts are ill-equipped to regulate price and output; and that it may encourage collusion
between rivals).
78
[Vol. 119:1
amount to a compulsory license as long as the patentee can offer some
legitimate justification for the refusal.439
With respect to SEPs, it is difficult to substantiate the facial claim
that the SEP owner is a monopolist when there are hundreds of standards
covering the 250,000 patents in a smartphone, and only between 21
percent and 27 percent of patents declared essential really are essential.
Implementers must show that the patents were indeed relevant to
practicing the standard.
But even if market power is shown, pinning an antitrust violation on
a SEP owner who refuses to license at rates it believes to be too low or
who seeks an injunction to facilitate the negotiation is inherently
problematic.440
While SSOs in theory bear a responsibility for
constraining the market power of SEP owners, given the heterogeneity of
participants, it is unrealistic to expect SSOs to straightjacket participants
into boilerplate terms. The endemic inability of SSOs to define FRAND
places any theory pinning blame on SEP owners for simply refusing to
license on shaky ground.
Equally, a patent owner’s access to the courts is a right jealously
guarded, as Apple discovered when it attempted to prevent Motorola
Mobility from enforcing its patents.441 The District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin found that there was no evidence of
antitrust injury resulting from Motorola’s license demand.442 Neither
could Apple prove that Motorola engaged in sham litigation.443 Instead,
Apple was required to show that Motorola had contractually violated its
439. See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 &
n.64, 1188 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986) (allowing access where cooperation is
“indispensable to effective competition”)). But see Cotter, supra note 173 (manuscript at
22) (“That condition seems unlikely to be present in the SEP context, because the market
for the patented technology is not, ex post, competitive.”). Courts have also allowed
access where the justification was a “pretext.” See, e.g., Image Technical Servs. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218–20 (9th Cir. 1997). But see Cotter, supra note
173 (manuscript at 22) (“[T]he pretext rationale seems unlikely to be applicable as long
as the litigation is not a sham and (unlike in Image Technical) the assertion of patent
infringement is not a mere afterthought.”).
440. Cotter, supra note 173 (manuscript at 21) (noting that “an SEP owner’s refusal to
license on terms that the user believes to be FRAND may not be so unreasonable as to
constitute a practical refusal to deal. After all, the typical SEP owner is probably not
seeking exclusion, but rather licensing fees.”) (citation omitted).
441. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1075–79 (W.D.
Wis. 2012) (finding Apple’s antitrust claims based on abuse of the standard setting
process and refusal to license on FRAND terms barred by Noerr-Pennington immunity).
442. Id. at 1076 (finding that Apple refused to pay the 2.25% royalty that Motorola
demanded and continued to make and sell its products without release relays, increased
costs, or customer loss).
443. Id. at 1077.
commitment not to enforce its SEPs without first offering a license on
FRAND terms.444
SEP owners may be guilty of illegal tying if implementers are
forced to take SEPs with non-SEPs.445 However, given the murky
boundaries within the hodgepodge of SEPs and non-SEPs, implementers
may find it difficult to prove that a patent was not essential.
Accordingly, antitrust law should not be used unless there is clear
evidence of anticompetitive harm.
Consistent with the tenor of the earlier discussion in Part II, antitrust
laws should not interfere with SSO policies because this could “reduce
clarity of [SSO] rules thereby making participation in SSOs more risky
and reducing the willingness of firms with valuable IP to participate,”
leading to a decrease in innovation.446 With the threshold of antitrust
intervention set to protecting competition rather than competitors,
disgruntled implementers face an uphill task to successfully mount an
antitrust challenge against SEP owners, even if they were willing and
able to amass the considerable amount of evidence required to prove the
other elements of an antitrust violation.447
Finally, it may be argued that PAEs attempting to extract the
nuisance value of suits against rivals should be sanctioned under § 2,
particularly when they assert SEPs.448 However, the Supreme Court has
also warned against using antitrust law to “provide remedies for various
‘competitive practices thought to be offensive to proper standards of
business morality.’”449
Employing antitrust law to address alleged patent abuses by PAEs is
also problematic. Even a circuit judge known for his antitrust expertise
and two FTC Commissioners have expressed skepticism about the
appropriateness of antitrust remedies for PAE litigation. Judge Ginsburg
and Commissioner Wright have warned that targeting PAEs with
antitrust law because they have a greater propensity to engage in patent
hold-ups “departs from standard analysis.”450 They warn that “there are
444. Id. at 1078.
445. See generally, e.g., Alden F. Abbott & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Analysis of
Tying Arrangements and Exclusive Dealing, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS: ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 183 (Keith N. Hylton ed., 2d ed. 2010).
446. Teece & Sherry, supra note 249, at 1986.
447. Kühn, supra note 58, at 112 (“An antitrust proceeding tends to be far too long
and the informational problems so severe that determining FRAND seems outside the
scope of antitrust authorities.”).
448. Mark S. Popofsky & Michael D. Laufert, Antitrust Attacks on Patent Assertion
Entities, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 445, 456–457 (2014).
449. NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 137 (1998) (citation omitted)
(quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 78 (1996)).
450. Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 78, at 508; see also id. 508–09. Wright and
Ginsburg explain:
80
[Vol. 119:1
many reasons for which a research firm’s costs may increase, and its rate
of innovation commensurately decrease, but that does not make every
increase in the cost of inputs ‘anticompetitive’ in any sense known to
antitrust law or economics.”451
Writing separately, Commissioner Wright expressed concern that
“[t]he risk of imposing antitrust remedies in pure contract disputes can
have harmful effects in terms of dampening incentives to participate in
standard-setting bodies and to commercialize innovation.”452 Instead,
antitrust law should focus on “cases of true anticompetitive price fixing
or deceptive manipulation of standards.”453
Ultimately, PAE litigation is a patent law problem, as
Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen pointed out—one of “adequately
defin[ing] strong patents in terms of their nonobviousness, novelty, or
other characteristics, which may not necessarily be a competition law
problem.”454 Antitrust doctrines are not crafted to govern contractual
disputes between parties or govern SSO policies. Contract law and
patent law provide better tools to do this.455 Treble damages and the risk
This rationale entails a misguided departure from the conventional role of
antitrust, which is to protect consumers from conduct or transactions that would
evade one particular constraint upon firm behavior, viz., that of competition.
The alternative view envisions an entirely novel and much broader role for
antitrust, that is, to police transactions or conduct that alter the incentives of
marketplace participants by relaxing constraints unrelated to competition—
which could equally well extend, for example, to the transfer of assets to a firm
with less reputational capital, less able management, or different litigation
incentives, any of which might be thought to foretell a decrease in consumer
welfare.
Id.
451. Id.
452. Wright, supra note 16, at 809.
453. Id.
454. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at George
Washington University Law School: Recent Developments in Intellectual Property and
Antitrust Laws in the United States 11 (June 17, 2013), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/recent-developmentsintellectual-property-and-antitrust-laws-unitedstates/130617intellectualpropertyantitrust.pdf.
455. Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis after Kodak, 3
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 62 (1993). For example, Klein argues:
Antitrust law should not be used to prevent transactors from voluntarily making
specific investments and writing contracts by which they knowingly put
themselves in a position where they may face a ‘hold-up’ in the future . . .
[C]ontract law inherently recognizes the pervasiveness of transactor-specific
investments and generally deals with ‘hold-up’ problems in a subtle way, not
by attempting to eliminate every perceived ‘hold-up’ that may arise.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright, The Limits of
Antitrust and Patent Holdup: A Reply to Cary et al., 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 505, 510–11
(2012) (“Because multiple damages are not required to generate optimal deterrence,
remedies for breach of contract, or preventing the enforcement of the patent through
of private litigation flowing from antitrust enforcement could easily
cause more harm than good.456
The best thing antitrust agencies can do on the SEP issue is not
enforce the law but instead be its advocate. The U.S. Justice Department
has recognized this fact. Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the
Antitrust Division Renata Hesse noted in a speech that “[b]y working
with SSOs on the front end, we hope to minimize the potential for
anticompetitive conduct in this context and reduce the need for
investigations and enforcement actions.”457 In particular, she described
the Justice Department’s advocacy work with the ITU, ETSI, and ANSI
in crafting IP policies that encourage negotiated settlements without the
need to resort to injunctions and exclusion orders.458
B.
The Role of Patent Law
Where SEP owners attempt to overreach beyond their rights, a
prudent triage points first toward patent law. To the extent that
injunctions cause hold-ups, the discussion in Part IV has shown how the
eBay framework allows courts to deny injunctions without engaging in
costly and complex inquiries into market definition, market power, or
anticompetitive effects.459 Part III has also shown that courts can reach a
FRAND royalty determination in a relatively simple, just, and accurate
way.
Where there is bad faith litigation, such as those brought by PAEs,
courts have a number of devices at their disposal. The Supreme Court, in
Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management460 and Octane Fitness LLC
v. Icon Health & Fitness Inc.,461 has given district courts greater
estoppel, waiver, or other equitable doctrines, can serve to optimally deter undesirable
patent holdup if they impose approximately single damages.”).
456. Wright, supra note 16, at 809. Wright asserts:
In the absence of robust empirical evidence to suggest that SSOs’ adaptation of
their IPR policies over time have been inadequate in minimizing the probability
of holdup, there is little reason to bring to bear the blunt weaponry of antitrust
rules and remedies to micromanage the competitive process in the name of
improving SSO contracts.
Id.
457. See Hesse, supra note 175, at 5–6
458. Id.
459. See Cotter, supra note 173 (manuscript at 41) (“Replacing a right to injunctive
relief with a right to an ongoing royalty, in appropriate cases, is yet another example of
trying to solve an intellectual property problem with the use of intellectual property tools,
without all the cumbersome machinery—and risk of overextension—inherent to the
competition law approach.”); see also id. (manuscript at 34) (“In addition, I see no reason
why courts could not take into account an infringement defendant’s (mis)behavior in
deciding whether an injunction is appropriate in a given case.”).
460. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).
461. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
82
[Vol. 119:1
discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees in cases of abusive litigation and
has made such an award harder to overturn on appeal.462 In Alice Corp v.
CLS Bank,463 the Court further addressed the concern over abusive patent
litigation by imposing heighted requirements to obtain a patent for
software and business methods. The Court ruled that finding a way to
implement an abstract idea through a computer application, a type of
claim commonly asserted by PAEs, was not patent eligible subject
matter.464
But more can be done.
Recently some PAEs have engaged in “patent privateering,” where
operating companies monetize their patents by selling or licensing the
patents to third parties who assert them and split the bounty.465 One such
privateer is Rockstar.466 Several cable operators have sued Rockstar for
breaching FRAND obligations that Nortel, its predecessor in title,
undertook. The complaint accused Rockstar of achieving patent holdups through (1) refusing to identify the patent sought to enforce and
instead broadly accusing implementers of infringing the portfolio as a
whole; (2) requiring all potential licensees to sign non-disclosure
agreements as a precondition to license negotiations; (3) refusing to
identify licensed patents to avoid patent exhaustion challenges and
thereby extract multiple royalties; and (4) transferring SEPs to third
parties to avoid FRAND obligations.467
PAEs have also targeted end users such as retailers using Wi-Fi
equipment instead of implementers who make the equipment. Earlier in
2011, one PAE, Innovatio, sent more than 8000 letters to hotels, coffee
462.
463.
464.
Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1748–49; Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756.
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
Tony Mauro, Patent Ruling’s Effect of ‘Trolls’ Debated, THE NAT’L LAW
JOURNAL
(June
19,
2014),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/supremecourtbrief/id=1202660127710/PatentRulings-Effect-on-Trolls-Debated.
465. Armstrong, Mueller & Syrett, supra note 96, at 11 (“MobileMediaIdeas, LLC is
exemplary of this trend. MobileMedia is owned by Sony, Nokia, and an MPEG LA
subsidiary and holds more than 300 patents. MobileMedia won an infringement verdict
against Apple and settled litigation with HTC with a license.”).
466. Joe Mullin, Patent War Goes Nuclear: Microsoft, Apple-Owned “Rockstar”
Sues Google, ARSTECHNICA (Oct 31, 2013, 11:10 PM EDT), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2013/10/patent-war-goes-nuclear-microsoft-apple-owned-rockstar-sues-google/
(“The Rockstar Consortium may be the ultimate example of patent ‘privateering’—when
big companies hand off their patents to small shell companies to do the dirty work of
suing their competitors. Essentially, it's patent trolling gone corporate.”).
467. Complaint, Charter Commc’ns, Inc., v. Rockstar Consortium US LP (D. Del.
Jan. 17, 2014) (No. 1:14-cv-00055-UNA); see David W. Long, Rockstar Sued by Cable
Operators for Breaching Standard Setting Obligations, ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG (Jan.
21,
2014),
http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2014/01/rockstar-sued-by-cableoperators-for-breaching-standard-setting-obligations/.
shops, and restaurants who used technology by Cisco and Motorola,
alleging patent infringement.468
Such defendants are particularly
vulnerable because they have limited access to legal advice on patent
validity and infringement, as well as costs related to designing around the
asserted patents and settling the lawsuits against them.469 Smaller
companies pay relatively more to PAEs in connection with assertions
that do not go to court.470 Nationwide, defendants quelled by the cost of
litigation submit and have paid $29 billion defending against such
suits.471 Once defendants are corralled into settlement, PAEs impose
strict non-disclosure obligations to prevent comparison of settlement
terms.472 PAEs can use non-disclosure obligations to maintain obscurity
and make for difficult FRAND determinations.
Some PAEs shroud their suits under different corporate aliases to
inflate the number of antagonists letter recipients must face.473 The
468. See Ashby Jones, Cisco's Patent Counterattack Fails, WALL ST. J., (Feb 6, 2013)
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324906004578288370005621206
(dismissing Cisco’s claims that Innovatio's tactics were "misleading, fraudulent and
unlawful," effectively amounting to an extortion scheme and therefore violated federal
antiracketeering laws.) The court found that Innovatio’s actions were protected by a First
Amendment principle that allowed it to the courts. See id. “Congress and the federal
courts have largely failed to stem a wave of patent lawsuits that has roiled the technology
industry.” Id.; see also discussion in Part II.B, supra.
469. See Morton & Shapiro, supra note 19, at 469.
470. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 89, at 422–23. Bessen and Meurer explain:
Only about 5% goes to independent inventors and roughly half of that goes to
large firms. If one adds the R&D spending of some of the NPE companies, that
share rises to 20%. Nevertheless, most of the out-of-pocket costs—roughly
70%—go to socially wasteful legal fees or to the NPEs' operating expenses.
Id.
471. Id. at 389. Bessen and Meurer further explain:
Not much of this payment goes to inventors or innovators; rather, most of the
payment is dissipated by transfers to the NPEs' owners, investors, and
personnel, and to the lawyers representing both the NPEs and the defendants.
Most importantly, the direct costs from NPE disputes are borne by firms
because they chose to innovate and thereby exposed themselves to the largely
unavoidable risk of an NPE lawsuit. Unfortunately, this tax on innovation for
defendant firms is not counterbalanced by significant transfers from NPEs to
other inventors or innovators. Hence, patent assertion by NPEs constitutes a
tax on innovation.
Id. at 416–17. But see Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 78, at 438–39 (arguing that most of
what defendants pay is merely a transfer to “meritorious” patent owners, noting that
defendants' payments to outside counsel are less than one-quarter of the total direct cost).
472. See Morton & Shapiro, supra note 19, at 470.
473. See Morton & Shapiro supra note 19, at 464 n.1. Morton and Shapiro illustrate:
PAEs[] are known to engage in many complex transactions, including
transactions involving shell companies, that appear designed to make it difficult
to track certain PAE activities. For example, rights are licensed to some and
sold to others, a portfolio is divided up among funds held by different shell
companies but controlled by the same entity, or one party controls the patents
but has a contract calling for it to share royalties with another party. We do not
84
[Vol. 119:1
labyrinth of shell companies makes it difficult to determine patent
ownership and whether implementers had already licensed the
technology.474 For example, patent attorney Steve Moore recently
observed in a study that a substantially similar demand letter claiming
infringement of the same patents was sent under the letterhead of eight
different companies.475 This “fog of war” also makes it difficult for
defendants to form a joint defense group.476
Intellectual Ventures (“IV”) is a mass aggregator which holds as
many as 80,000 patents.477 It buys and asserts thousands of patents,
making it difficult for defendants to identify and challenge weak
patents.478 As with hold-ups, PAEs can drive up royalty rates by making
patent litigation unattractive to defendants.
In 2013, IV sued Capital One for patent infringement, creating 2000
shell companies to ring-fence Capital One with a portfolio of 3500
patents.479 The suit cut off any viable option of designing around the
focus on these distinctions below, but rather subsume the beneficiaries of the
PAE’s activities into the role of “owner.”
Id.
474. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 101, at 2153.
475. See Steve Moore, Identifying the Real Patent Extortionists: A Review of the
Extortionist Demand Letter, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 9, 2013, 8:00 AM),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/04/09/identifying-the-real-patent-extortionists-areview-demand-letters/id=48955/; see also Jason M. Schwent, Patent Troll Roll Call:
The Threatening Letter-Writer, THOMAS COLBURN LLP (Mar. 17, 2014),
http://www.thompsoncoburn.com/news-and-information/patent-billy-goat-blog/blog/1403-17/patent-troll-roll-call-the-threatening-letter-writer.aspx. Schwent asserts:
[I]n egregious cases, the asserted patents may already be subject to
administrative review for being invalid. But the PAE will never share that
information. Instead, the PAE bets that with enough pressure, the accused
infringer will pay the licensing fee. The PAE also anticipates that even if one
accused infringer resists, by sending the letter to hundreds and hundreds of
accused infringers, the PAE will have enough success to turn a tidy profit.
Id.
476. Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 1, 3–5 (2012).
477. See, e.g., Jeff John Roberts, How Chicago Is Beating Silicon Valley at the Patent
Game, GIGAOM (Mar. 25, 2012, 11:05 PM PDT), http://gigaom.com/2012/03/25/419how-chicago-is-beating-silicon-valley-at-the-patent-game/ (referring to Intellectual
Ventures as “super-troll”).
478. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 101, at 2153. Lemley and Melamed explain:
A common complaint about trolls, especially about aggressive pioneers like
Intellectual Ventures, is that they aggregate large numbers of patents and that
the aggregation of large numbers of patents in the hands of a single entity
overwhelms alleged infringers by giving them little choice but to pay for a
license for the bundle of patents even if they think the individual patents at
issue are invalid or not infringed.
Id.
479. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 1:13-CV-00740 AJT,
2013 WL 6682981, at *1 (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2013); see also Popofsky & Laufert, supra
note 448, at 449. Popofsky and Laufert explain:
minefield of patents.480 The case is instructive for SEP litigation because
it illustrates the same concerns as post-standardization hold-ups
discussed in the Article.481
Capital One counterclaimed for monopolization, attempted
monopolization, and unlawful asset acquisition under antitrust laws.482 It
also invoked the equitable defense of patent misuse based on
impermissible collection of royalties from invalid patents.483 Echoing the
discussion on hold-ups, Capital One alleged that through vexatious
litigation, IV forced it and other U.S. commercial banks to license vast
patent portfolios with doubtful validity and enforceability.484
IV’s conduct had the alleged effect of (1) eliminating the economic
incentive of coerced defendants to challenge validity of the myriad
patents asserted; (2) reducing the incentive of companies to innovate,
PAEs frequently assert patents in waves . . . . The PAE may disclose only a
certain number of patents to a potential enforcement target. The PAE,
according to this parable, then threatens the enforcement target: If you do not
take a broad license (including to undisclosed patents), we will sue you not
only on this initial wave, but, if we lose, sue you again on yet another set of
patents.
Id.
480. Intellectual Ventures I, 2013 WL 6682981, at *2. Capital One alleged:
Overall, [Intellectual Ventures (“IV”)] “knows or should reasonably know that
many if not most of the 3,500 patents in its financial services patent portfolio
are irrelevant, invalid, not infringed, and/or unenforceable,” and “due to their
probable invalidity, and the risk of countersuit to those who might enforce
them, such patents provide their owners with no market power.” Nevertheless,
“the possible irrelevance, invalidity, and unenforceability of the patents in
[IV]'s financial services portfolio is not an impediment to [IV's] strategy
because, unlike a bona fide portfolio licensing, [IV]'s business model is not
based on the licensing of valuable patent rights, rather on the threat of asserting
thousands of patents in a never-ending series of costly and disruptive patent
infringement lawsuits—pummeling its victims into submission.” These threats
of litigation are made more credible because IV “is not itself subject to such
infringement allegations from members of the financial services industry whom
it attacks.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Amend. Answer & Counterclaims, Intellectual Ventures I,
2013 WL 6682981).
481. Id. Capital One further alleged:
By this [ex post] stage, companies have sunk large investments (many of them
long length, fixed capital assets, often without any significant alternative use)
into their product lines, meaning they can no longer cheaply abandon their
chosen product designs.” For these reasons, “[e]x post, makers and buyers of
technological products, are to a significant degree, locked-in, which makes
them attractive targets for [IV]'s litigation scheme for extracting
supracompetitive licensing fees through coercion and deception.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Amend. Answer & Counterclaims, Intellectual Ventures I,
2013 WL 6682981).
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. Id.
86
[Vol. 119:1
since any revenues they earn will make them targets for PAEs; and (3)
consistently charging royalties “reflecting the ‘hold-up’ value of the
patents rather than their economic worth,” increasing prices to
consumers.485
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found
that IV did not monopolize the ex post market for commercial banking
services technology, as it did not recognize this as a relevant antitrust
market.486 The court held that even if the ex post market were an
accepted relevant market, Capital One did not show that IV had market
power because it could not provide examples of other licenses that IV
charged other defendants or that by charging those prices, IV extended
its market power beyond what was permissible under patent law.487 IV’s
illegal extension of power highlights the problem caused by lack of
transparency, as discussed in Part III.C.
The court found that Capital One’s attempted monopolization claim
hinged on the same elements as actual monopolization and thus rejected
the claim.488 The court also rejected Capital One’s allegation that IV’s
accumulation of patents enabled its litigation threats.489 It reasoned that
§ 7 of the Clayton Act applied to pre-merger conduct and did not reach
allegations of post-merger abuse.490
Finally, the court rejected Capital One’s patent misuse defense.
Capital One alleged that IV engaged in misuse by “attempting to enforce,
in the aggregate, patents that individually or in limited numbers, would
not likely be asserted or licensed.”491 The court refused to expand the
categories of misuse beyond the narrow confines mandated by Federal
Circuit jurisprudence, even in the face of “ulterior or bad motives.”492 In
short, the court refused to find the hold-up by IV to constitute patent
misuse.
Capital One highlights the difficulty of antitrust law in regulating
post-standardization misconduct. The lack of transparency makes it
difficult for implementers like Capital One to show that the royalties
demanded by IV were inconsistent with those it charged other
implementers. Accordingly, antitrust plaintiffs face an uphill battle to
show wrongful monopolization.
Claims based on attempted
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
Intellectual Ventures I, 2013 WL 6682981, at *5–8.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *9.
Intellectual Ventures I, 2013 WL 6682981, at *9–10.
Id. at *10.
Id.
monopolization and unlawful acquisitions of assets will fail for the
reasons articulated by the Capital One court.
However, the court’s reasoning on the patent misuse issue is
suspect. The sort of “cornering to hold-up” tactic that IV displayed is
precisely the type of conduct which patent misuse should arrest. Patent
misuse finds its origins in the equitable doctrine of unclean hands,
whereby a court of equity will not lend its support to enforcement of a
patent that has been misused.493 A judge finding patent misuse has the
discretion to withhold damages or injunctive reliefeven if the patents
themselves have not yet been enforced.494 The patents in question are
rendered unenforceable until the effects of the misuse have been
purged.495 Purging requires patentees to show that they have completely
abandoned the misconduct and that their “baleful effects” have
dissipated.496
Examples of patent misuse including tying, package licensing, and
horizontal price-fixing or territorial allocations under the guise of sham
patent licenses.497 But the categories of patent misuse are not closed.
493. U.S. Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957). The
Court reasoned:
It is now, of course, familiar law that the courts will not aid a patent owner who
has misused his patents to recover any of their emoluments accruing during the
period of misuse or thereafter until the effects of such misuse have been
dissipated, or "purged" as the conventional saying goes. The rule is an
extension of the equitable doctrine of “unclean hands” to the patent field.
Id. (citations omitted); see generally, DARYL LIM, PATENT MISUSE AND ANTITRUST:
EMPIRICAL, DOCTRINAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES (2013); Daryl Lim, Misconduct in
Standard Setting: The Case for Patent Misuse, 51 IDEA 559 (2011); Greg R. Vetter,
Open Source Licensing and Scattering Opportunism in Software Standards, 48 B.C. L.
REV. 225, 232–33 (2007) (“Unless some defense such as unclean hands is available, this
chills development of the standard or makes it more expensive to implement.”).
494. See, e.g., United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 458 (1922).
495. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942).
496. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 124 F. Supp. 573, 594–95 (D.D.C. 1954)
(“This rule is applicable where the owner of patent rights seeks to extend those rights
beyond the limits of his patent monopoly.”). What amounts to a successful dissipation
depends on the nature and extent of the misuse. Cancellation of an offending licensing
clause may be sufficient. Where the conduct involves a price-fixing conspiracy, the
violation is presumed to continue until some affirmative act of termination or withdrawal
is shown. See United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 573 (2d Cir.
1961). Where the misuse consists of “extensive and aggravated misconduct over several
years,” which “substantially rigidified the price structure of an entire market and
suppressed competition over a wide area, affirmative action may be essential to
effectively dispel the consequences of the unlawful conduct.” See Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal,
Inc., 306 F. Supp. 541, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
497. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 105
(1969) (regarding coercion of licensees to pay royalties on unpatented and patented
products); Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co. 329 U.S. 637, 641
(1947) (holding grantback clauses to be judged under the rule of reason); United States v.
88
[Vol. 119:1
Patent misuse or misuse-like concepts have been invoked in both
pre- and post-standardization cases. In Openwave Systems, Inc. v. 724
Solutions (US) Inc.,498 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California recognized that failure to disclose relevant SEPs in breach of
SSO IP policies could render the patent unenforceable as a form of patent
misuse.499 In Fujitsu v. Tellabs,500 the court ordered Fujitsu to “show
cause why the [SEP in suit] should not be held by the court in the
exercise of the court’s equitable powers to be unenforceable.”501 The
jury had found that the Fujitsu willfully breached its FRAND license by
suing Tellabs for infringement and seeking an injunction and damages
rather than offering Tellabs a license on FRAND terms.502
In Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co.,503 Chief Justice Stone wrote for
a unanimous court and framed the question as “whether a court of equity
[would] lend its aid to protect the patent monopoly when [the patentee]
[was] using it as the effective means of restraining competition . . . .”504
Significantly, the Supreme Court found it “unnecessary to decide
whether [the patentee] ha[d] violated the Clayton act, for [it] conclude[d]
that in any event the maintenance of the present suit . . . [was] contrary to
public policy . . . .”505 Chief Justice Stone explained that:
The grant to the inventor of the special privilege of a patent
monopoly carries a public policy adopted by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, ‘to promote the Progress of Science and the
U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 389–90 (1948) (holding patentees were not entitled to
use licenses to control pricing of the end products).
498. Openwave Sys., Inc. v. 724 Solutions (US) Inc., No. C 09-3511 RS, 2010 WL
890249 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
499. Id. at *1–2. Judge Seeborg noted:
[While] patent misuse may not be the most appropriate label or framework that
should be applied to an alleged breach of a duty to disclose to an SSO. . . .
[T]he scope of an unenforceability remedy must be ‘fashioned to give a fair,
just, and equitable response reflective of the offending conduct.’ Notably, in
reaching this conclusion, the [Federal Circuit] even analogized to the
limitations on the scope of the remedy in patent misuse cases. Thus . . . patent
misuse concepts could be at least relevant in evaluating the appropriate scope
of any remedy to be imposed.
Id. (emphasis added).
500. Fujitsu Ltd. v. Tellabs Operations, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
501. Order to Fujitsu Limited to Show Cause Why the ‘737 Patent Should not be Held
Unenforceable as to Tellabs, No. 09 C 4530 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2014); see David Long &
Stephen R. Freeland, Fujitsu Breached RAND Obligation and Must Show Cause Why
Patent not Unenforceable against Tellabs (Fujitsu v. Tellabs), ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG
(July 24, 2014), http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/?s=tellabs.
502. Long & Freeland, supra note 501.
503. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
504. Id. at 490.
505. Id. at 494. The Clayton Act is an antitrust statute. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 12–19, 21–
22, 25–26 (West Supp. 2014); 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 20, 23–24, 27 (West 2009).
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors, the
exclusive Right . . .’ But the public policy which includes inventions
within the granted monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced
506
in the invention.
To fulfill this mandate, Congress empowers patentees to exclude
others, earn royalties, and set the terms of access for those benefitting
from the use of patented technologies.507 A limited monopoly rewards
innovators who take risks and invest in the innovation and
commercialization of their inventions, incentivizing them to disclose,
develop, and market inventions that may not have been realized
otherwise.508
At the same time, the law’s desire to keep patentees acting justly
toward others while gaining a fair reward for their investment is at the
heart of the equitable doctrine of misuse. The need to do justice allows
courts to look beyond the form of a misuse to its effects. It serves as an
insurance policy against unanticipated roguish behavior from patentees.
The ingenuity of patentees to devise ways of abusing their patent rights is
matched only by the potential malleability of patent misuse.
Unlike antitrust law, patent misuse was specifically conceived to
take into account anticompetitive conduct that runs counter to patent
policy. Allowing SEP owners to secure rewards beyond their true value
through meritless claims that penalize patent challenges harms
innovation. So does the hold-up of implementers after the standard has
been implemented.
Of course, patent misuse should be applied only in exceptional
circumstances. These include circumstances where patentees engage in
vexatious litigation or refusals to license without any cognizable procompetitive or pro-innovation justification. One possible scenario may
be where entry into the downstream market for goods and services
offered under the standard is choked off by the refusal to deal in the
upstream market for the technology, stunting the development of new
products and services compliant with that standard that are not offered by
the SEP owner or its licensees. This sort of obstructive behavior is
particularly repugnant when the hold-ups involve PAEs. By definition,
PAEs do not offer the very goods or services of which they seek to
506. Morton, 314 U.S. at 492.
507. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 283–285 (West 2014) (providing for patent infringement
remedies such as injunctions and damages).
508. Kevin J. Arquit, Patent Abuse and the Antitrust Laws, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 739,
740 (1991) (“An often-neglected point, though critical, is that a patent monopoly does not
invariably translate into a monopoly in what an antitrust lawyer would describe as a
relevant market.”).
90
[Vol. 119:1
deprive consumers when they enjoin defendants who are manufacturers
or service providers.509
Putting it differently, two rights lie at the core of the patent misuse
inquiry. The first is the patent owner’s right to have a risk-adjusted
return on its investment, an inquiry guided by the scope of the FRAND
commitment. The second right is the interest of all entities at every level
of the value chain who have relied on that FRAND commitment in
supporting the implementation of the standardized technology.
Defendants facing a potential patent hold-up may be able to show an
actual or constructive reneging of the FRAND commitment in bad faith,
such as where SEP owners refuse to have the decision adjudicated or
where it hinders implementers from offering a new product for which
there is unmet consumer demand. In these circumstances, courts can
draw upon the policy lever of patent misuse to stem the misconduct and
shepherd parties back to the bargaining table with a more realistic view
of the scope of their rights.
CONCLUSION
The patent wars involving SEPs, trolls, and smartphones stem from
companies having different economic incentives. Companies whose
products rely on standardized technologies seek to cut costs to increase
their profits but reduce the royalties they must pay to companies
profiting from royalties by licensing those technologies.510
While patent hold-ups are a real and present problem, they do not
stem from a systemic failure of SSO IP policies, arbitrary choice, or
historic accident. Consensus-based disclosure and FRAND rules are the
result of conscious choice on the part of SSO constituents. Rather than
509. Compared with antitrust law, European competition law has been more willing
to condemn refusals to license IP rights, and has required IP owners to grant access. See,
e.g., Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Comm’n of the European Cmtys, 2007 E.C.R. II3601, ¶ 5 (holding that “in the public interest in maintaining effective competition on the
market, to encroach upon the exclusive right of the holder of the intellectual property
right by requiring him to grant licences to third parties seeking to enter or remain on the
market”); AstraZeneca AB v. European Comm’n, No. C-457/10 P, ECLI:EU:2012:770, ¶
112
(European
Ct.
of
Justice,
Dec.
6,
2012),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=131490&pageIndex=0
&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=157403 (requiring an anticompetitive effect on the market, although “such an effect does not necessarily have to be
concrete, and it is sufficient to demonstrate that there is a potential anti-competitive
effect”).
510. Joseph Schuman, Inside Intel’s Intellectually Dubious Patent Study,
IPWATCHDOG (July 23, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/07/23/insideintels-intellectually-dubious-patent-study/id=50511/ (“[P]olicy conflicts over standard
essential patents (SEPs) tend to pit implementing companies against inventing-andlicensing companies, one business model against another.”).
derail SSO policies, the real solution lies in shifting the focus postimplementation and refining the framework for determining FRAND
royalties and injunctive relief to reach clear and balanced outcomes while
understanding both the potential and the limits of the antitrust and patent
laws in the debate.

Articles Standard Essential Patents, Trolls, and the Smartphone

Transcripción

Documentos relacionados

Benjamin N. Cardozo: New York Giant