Dissertation - Master - 9.15 - 7.55 pm

Transcripción

Fear and Defection: Information Dissemination and the Threat of North Korean Defectors
Jordan Groh (590069)
MSc Migration, Mobility and Development
Submitted: 15 September 2014
This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MSc in the
Migration, Mobility and Development of the School of Oriental and African Studies
(University of London)
Declaration by candidate:
“I undertake that all material presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me,
in whole or in part, by any other persons(s). I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the
published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the work which I
present for examination.”
Signed: Jordan Groh
Date: 15 September 2014
Word Count: 9,964
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Table of Contents:
•
Abstract
5
•
Acknowledgements
6
•
Note on Terminology
7
•
Dissertation
8
1. Introduction
8
2. Methodology
10
Caveats
10
3. Historical Overview
12
o
o
Effects of Famine
12
o
Marketization and Migration as a Response to Famine
12
o
A Rising Number of Defections
13
4. Literature Review
o
Effects of Foreign Information in Poland
16
o
Effects of Foreign Information in the Soviet Union
16
o
Effects of Foreign Information in East Germany and Ukraine
17
o
Effects of Foreign Information in North Korea
18
5. Measuring Foreign Media in North Korea
2
16
19
o
Smuggling Operations Along the Sino-Korea Border
19
o
Balloon Launches
21
o
Contact with Foreign Tourists
22
o
Word-of-Mouth Sources
23
o
Foreign DVDs
24
o
Foreign Radio
25
o
Computer Usage
26
o
Alternative Technologies
27
o
Conflicting Evidence
27
6. The Influence of Defections on Reform
o
High-profile Defections
29
o
Songbun: Class Stratification
30
o
Provincial and City Origins
31
o
Gender
34
o
Occupation
34
o
Education
36
o
Age
36
o
Review of Defection Findings
37
7. A Critique of Current Policy and Practice
39
8. Conclusion
41
o
The North Korean Response to Defections
41
o
Policy Recommendations
42
9. Bibliography
o
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29
Personal Correspondence, Personal Interviews, and Web Sources
43
46
Figures:
Figure 1.0
14
Figure 2.0
32
Tables:
Table 1.0
32
Table 2.0
33
Table 3.0
34
Table 4.0
35
Table 5.0
36
Table 6.0
37
Table 6.1
37
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Abstract:
Does access to foreign-produced information influence a North Korean citizen’s desire to defect?
And, if so, are defections influencing reform in governmental policy or the creation of political dissent?
Access to information may have a long history of influencing defections and influencing reform in various
countries, but in the context of North Korea, it is critical to examine whether the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea’s leadership has a fear of defectors. Looking at the DPRK through the lens of a
hereditary single-party regime which has systematically exploited its citizenry, migration is often a last
resort for victims of persecution. Through this dissertation, I will attempt to assess the role information
and foreign media plays in a North Korean citizen’s decision to defect and whether this should concern
the North Korean government. As an isolated pariah state, the understanding of North Korea’s actions as
a highly effective Machiavellian actor make the drafting of responsible policy more relevant.
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Acknowledgements:
This paper has been a long work in progress and my gratitude extends to many people. First, and
foremost, I would like to thank my wife, Danielle, for all of her suggestions, edits, and thorough
recommendations. Second, I would like to acknowledge friends and former colleagues in South Korea.
Their expertise and inspiration have helped guide the paper to what it has finally become. A big thank
you to Ji Hyeon, Matt, Dan, Ryan, Yerin, Hee Hwa, and Katty. Further, a thank you to every friend who
looked over this paper in its final proofreading stages. Your comments truly helped shape the final draft.
Finally, I would like to extend a specific thank you to the brilliant Christopher Green for his invaluable
advice and expertise on the issue of North Korean defectors.
My dissertation has been funded by the Rotary Foundation of Rotary International. Through its
Global Grant program and the generous funding received, I have had the opportunity to focus scholarly
attention to this critical issue without worry. It has been invaluable.
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Note on terminology:
For the purposes of this paper, a ‘defector’ is a North Korean migrant who has renounced the
North Korean nation-state and has arrived in South Korea. North Korean migrants hiding in or
migrating through China are classified as ‘refugees.’ North Korean migrants temporarily in China with
plans to return to North Korea voluntarily are classified as ‘travelers.’ North Korean ‘refugees’ living in
countries beside China will not be examined.
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Fear and Defection: Information Dissemination and the Threat of North Korean Defectors
by: Jordan Groh Introduction There has been a remarkable increase in the rate of North Koreans defecting from their home
country and resettling in South Korea since the year 2000 (Ministry of Unification 2014). While the South
Korean Ministry of Unification (MOU) records which types of North Koreans are defecting through data
on provincial and city origins, gender, education, job, and age, it has been unclear whether the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) leadership is fearful of defections destabilizing the
nation. I will attempt to assess the role information plays in a North Korean citizen’s decision to defect.
Gauging which types of information produce the most internal change can influence a more thoughtful
foreign policy. By investigating whether information influences defection, I will examine whether
defections are influencing reform in governmental policy or the creation of political dissent.
As an isolated pariah state, the DPRK has made a name for itself as a highly effective
Machiavellian actor that prioritizes the survival of the internal elite. The issue of emigration from North
Korea through defection is important because there is not a clear understanding as to whether defections
are indicative of internal dissent and potential reform. Large financial resources continue to fund
democracy and human rights programs in North Korea each year with limited information regarding
their real effectiveness at influencing reform (State Dept. 2011). I admit to a bias of desiring significant
reform in North Korea and eventual reunification with South Korea, but ineffective programs wasting
limited financial resources should receive a more critical examination.
After years of living in South Korea, listening to the stories of defectors, and campaigning for a
stronger consciousness of North Korean human rights, I grew tired of the low quality of data prevalent
throughout the media regarding North Korea. U.S. Congressman Jay Kim previously spoke of the
DPRK’s former leader, Kim Jong-Il, saying, “I understand he is not a rational individual” (Lerner 2007:
833). Despite the regularity of this sentiment, responsible study of the nation, its leadership, and policies
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reveal carefully crafted decisions produced to the most optimal effect.
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Methodology My research is structured on three principal methods: a secondary data analysis of various types
of foreign media accessed by North Koreans, primary interviews with several prominent academics and
specialists in the field of North Korea, and an analysis of statistical information provided by the MOU
and correlated with the most recent DPRK census. Important insights can be revealed into the strategic
thinking of the DPRK leadership through these methods.
To properly explore these issues, this paper will first briefly consider the historical situation
affecting the North Korean economy, the collapse of its Public Distribution System (PDS), the increase in
self-dependency and marketization of the country, the rise in defections from North Korea, and the return
of control to the North Korean government and its battle over the role of government, the private
marketplace, and state-supported socialism. Second, this paper intends to briefly examine the present
literature available on the role that information dissemination has played in the historical context of
reform in the formerly authoritarian countries of Poland, the Soviet Union, East Germany, Ukraine, and
North Korea. Third, this paper will discuss an analysis of the ways that foreign media enters North Korea
and the effectiveness of those modes of transmission. In the fourth section, I will introduce my crosssectional analysis of who defectors are by examining Songbun (송분) status, provincial and city origin,
gender, occupation, education, and age data. In the fifth section, I will scrutinize the efforts of charities
whose primary focus is influencing reform in North Korea through the funding of defections. Finally, I
will conclude with a discussion of the North Korean government’s likely response to the issue of defection
and how policymakers can effectively influence reform in North Korea.
Caveats Because North Korea continues to consider national statistics a State secret, most academic
research relies on qualitative and quantitative data from defector surveys in South Korea and refugee and
traveler surveys in China. Despite a highly discouraging lack of rigorous academic study on the issue of
the effects of foreign media consumption and information dissemination within North Korea, my research
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principally builds upon a small handful of noteworthy publications. Additionally, a very important caveat
to any academic study of this topic is the issue of correlation and causation. As very little can be
definitively proven about the attitudes and opinions of the North Korean leadership, the limitations of a
reliance on defector surveys and traveler surveys can create accidental biases and a statistical
overrepresentation of North Koreans who have a negative sentiment large enough to defect and do not
necessarily correlate to the views of the majority of the population. With these restraints in mind, I hope
to show whether information is influencing defections and whether these defections are indicative of
internal dissent and potential reform.
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Historical Overview To understand the importance of defection from North Korea, it is first important to consider the
historical situation affecting the nation. For the sake of brevity, and at fear of oversimplifying the issue, it is
important to note the complex role of Kim Il-Sung’s Juche (주체) ideology and the ethnic nationalism
affecting the two Koreas. A visiting Japanese Parliamentarian described Kim Il-Sung in diplomatic cables
with caution, stressing, “it is a mistake to think of Kim Il-Sung as a communist. He may be more of a
nationalist” (Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1975). With the DPRK having fallen behind
economically from its southern counterpart in the late 1970s, the decline of Soviet aid through the late
1980s, and the collapse of the PDS for rations-par-everything in the early 1990s, disaster was long
overdue by the time floods and famine struck the country in 1994 (Oberdorfer 2001).
Effects of Famine With famine-conditions striking most severely in the outermost provinces, governmental relief
failing to arrive, and economic recession striking at the core of the PDS, North Korean citizens ushered in
a new era of self-dependency, personal entrepreneurship, and the early stages of the marketization of the
country (Noland et al. 2001: 747). North Korea’s Arduous March would eventually claim between 1 and
3 million victims from a population of approximately 22 million creating lasting effects of citizens fending
for themselves would remain (Noland et al. 2001: 741). Evidence now documents an overwhelming
reliance on the market throughout the country, minimal reliance on the reviving PDS, and an effective
privatization of industrial output, showcasing “a fraying of state control” and a “collapse of the socialist
social contract” (Haggard and Noland 2011: 102; Kim 2011).
Marketization and Migration as a Response to Famine The issue of marketization remains extremely pertinent with regards to the information-defection
nexus as the marketplace is a primary origin of information dissemination in North Korea (Kang and
Park 2011). Despite the illegality of the contents being sold, the black markets, known in North Korea as
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Jangmadang (장마당), have flourished since the years of the Arduous March and now number
approximately three hundred throughout the country (Kang and Park 2011). As Lee Soo-Jung writes,
“marketization is the most important [change in North Korea] as it has become the core of life in the
DPRK” (Kretchun and Kim 2012: 9). As North Korea consistently ranks amongst the bottom of the list of
the most repressive freedom-of-information countries in the world according to Reporters Without
Borders annual World Press Freedom Index, markets have become a critical source for information
dissemination in North Korea (Reporters Sans Frontières 2014: 31). After the famine period of the
Arduous March, the growth of the black market brought a wide variety of media devices now in common
circulation within North Korea (Kretchun and Kim 2012: 12).
Another way North Koreans attempted to mitigate the most severe elements of the famine and
economic crisis was through cross-border migration to China (Schwekendiek 2010: 253). As nearly all
movement within the country requires official government approval and travel permits, cross-border
migration has consistently been viewed by the government of the DPRK as treasonous and betraying the
goals and ideals of Juche ideology (Lankov 2013a: 34-35). During the famine years of the mid-1990s as
many as 300,000 North Koreans were living in China as illegal refugees (Hawk 2003: 56). The illegality of
these North Koreans’ refugee statuses comes not from any lacking of a fear of persecution under the
United Nations’ 1951 Refugee Convention, but from agreements made between China and North Korea
(Schwekendiek 2010: 250). Under agreements, all North Korean refugees caught in China are regarded as
illegal economic migrants and undergo forceful repatriation to North Korea and denial of nonrefoulement principles (ibid).
A Rising Number of Defections While the famine years did not witness waves of refugees and defections to South Korea, they
remain incredibly relevant as they mark the first cracks in North Korea’s repressive system of state control.
While only 641 North Koreans arrived in South Korea as defectors in the 40 years between 1953 and
1993, the year 1994 marks a turning point in the information landscape as the first evidences of North
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Koreans not fully believing the story reported by the North Korea’s official media outlets (MOU 2011;
MOU 2014). As of June 2014, a total of 26,854 North Koreans have defected to South Korea (MOU
2014). Figure 1.0 chronicles the trend in defection by year.
Figure 1.0: (MOU 2014: Personal Translation, Personal Compilation).
DPRK Defections to South Korea by year 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 Though defections have increased dramatically, they only represent a tenth of a single percentage
of the 2014 census estimates of 24,851,627 citizens of the national population (CIA 2014). Regardless,
cross-border migration has presented challenges to the regime by spreading news of the outside world
with consequences too severe to ignore (Kang and Park 2011). The domestic situation during the years of
2005 to 2009 can be summarized as governmental initiatives aimed at cracking down on markets, illegal
cross-border smuggling operations supplying the markets, and defections which had been embarrassing to
the regime (Lankov 2009a: 49). The major setback for governmental initiatives at reviving the PDS came
during the botched 2009 currency reform, with the failure so severe “the local authorities were explicitly
ordered in May 2010 not to intervene with the daily working of markets - as long as politically dangerous
items, like South Korean DVDs, were not on sale” (Lankov 2013a: 130). With the information blockade
crumbling, the government of North Korea has shifted strategy and no longer attempts to propagate that
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the nation is more economically well-off than its South Korean brethren (Kretchun and Kim 2012: 17).
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Literature Review With the previously noted caveats in mind, access to information does have a long history of
influencing change and reform in various countries. Historical comparisons of Poland, the Soviet Union,
East Germany, and Ukraine are relevant due to significant political reform happening in each country
during an era without widespread mobile and computer technologies.1 In these countries, foreign media
played vital roles by getting information into each country and by encouraging reform movements.
Effect of Foreign Information in Poland For Poland, Lech Walesa commented on the influence which radio broadcasts played by
remarking,
“it is difficult to imagine what would have happened if it were not for the Voice of America and
other sources with the help of which the true information squeezed through, which showed a
different point of view, which said that we are not alone and that something is happening in the
country — because our mass media did not do that.” (BBG Watch 2013).
Although the opinions of one man, albeit the trade-union activist and future President of Poland, are
noteworthy, further proof within the Soviet bloc can aid an understanding of the importance of foreign
broadcasting and heterodox information-sources.
Effect of Foreign Information in the Soviet Union Interviews with more than 50,000 Soviet citizens while traveling abroad paint a compelling
picture of the impact of foreign broadcasting in the Soviet Union. Foreign radio broadcasts, with upwards
of 25% of the adult population during the period from 1978 to 1990, “helped to keep the flame of hope
alive” through alternative viewpoints sharing censured news (Parta 2007: 66-67). Listenership to foreign
broadcasting was so widespread that “at the height of the cold War, the USSR had constructed such an
Popular mass citizens’ movements such as the Arab Spring and its reliance on social media do not
appear relevant to information dissemination research into North Korea (Lever 2013; Y. Kim 2014: 2930).
1
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extensive jamming transmitter network that it cost considerably more to jam Western broadcasts than to
broadcast them (ibid: 11).
Effect of Foreign Information in East Germany and Ukraine To summarize Rudiger Frank’s lessons on information dissemination and European socialism, he
writes, “we will never know in advance how stable the other side really is.” (2010: 7). For East Germany,
“a massive number of visits, phone calls, letters, parcels, TV and radio transmissions, transiting cars, etc.
led to embarrassment and frustration which accumulated silently and in the end broke out visibly” (ibid:
14). The merit of information promoting reform in the Soviet bloc is further illustrated by a recollection of
a Radio Liberty listener recounting,
“I speak for a circle of Ukrainian intellectuals in Kiev, we feel that all the changes taking place in
the USSR today are in great part due to Western radio broadcasting the truth... If the radio
stopped broadcasting, we would feel betrayed... it would be a disaster” (Parta 2007: 68).
In the historical contexts of the above-mentioned countries, access to information influenced
reform and encouraged internal dialogue and debate about the future path each country would take.
While it can be argued the cases of information dissemination in Poland, East Germany, and Ukraine are
reflective of correlation and not causation, the depth of quantitative research in the traveler surveys of
Soviet citizens strongly points toward radio broadcasting as encouraging reform. Observing the large
quantity of politically moderate listeners, Parta notes “Western radio provided alternative and
supplementary information without which a critical thought process might have been inconceivable. It
was when the ‘moderates’ and the ‘liberals’ found common ground in the perestroika period that change
became possible” (2007: 66). Foreign radio broadcasting became so influential that the Soviet Union
created a system of jamming stations which “cost considerably more to jam [the] Western broadcasts than
to broadcast them (2007: 11).
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Effect of Foreign Information in North Korea Just as foreign radio broadcasting influenced heterodox thought in former Soviet bloc countries,
subtle shifts in public opinion due to exposure with the outside world is well documented in North Korea.
North Korean public opinion has shifted in very unexpected ways similar to American color televisions
and domestic appliances swaying East Germans and Soviet citizens (Castillo 2010: vii-xvii). In the case of
Im Su-Gyong, the famous South Korean student activist whose illegal trip to North Korea in 1989
gripped the nation, the effects of her trip were completely unanticipated (Lankov 2013a: 222-225). Barred
from traveling by the South Korean government, her eventual trip was a major media event in North
Korea (ibid).
With her trip came some of the first revelations that North Korean government propaganda was
not as accurate as claimed. Lankov writes, “according to the official media, South Korean workers were
starving whilst their kids made a miserable living by working in sweatshops, begging, or polishing the
shoes of sadistic American soldiers” (2013a: 223). Her unexpected influence would continue both as “a
trendsetter in the world of North Korean fashion” and through the broadcasted interviews of her parents,
who though “the family members of a political criminal,” North Koreans saw they “were allowed to stay
in their home in the capital city, keep their jobs, and talk freely to journalists” (ibid: 224).
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Measuring Foreign Media in North Korea Having established that foreign sources of information and media can play a direct role in
encouraging diverse public opinion in historical situations, this research will now transition towards
gauging the effects of information access and exposure to foreign media in North Korea. I have compiled
a diverse body of research examining types of foreign media measurably flowing into North Korea and
whether these media devices are influencing the opinions and actions of North Korean citizens and
defectors.
Several types of media are flowing into North Korean in measurable quantities and documented
ways. In this section, I will document the effectiveness of the routes travelled and the types of media
platforms used while gauging their effects at influencing opinions and reform. First, it is important to note
that radios, televisions, computers, DVD players, USB memory devices, etc. have never been illegal in
North Korea, though government-issued radios traditionally have their dials fixed to government stations
and require soldering to remove the restrictions (Lankov 2013a: 103, 225). While devices such as
computers and mobile phones are legal to own, registration of the device at local governmental offices is
required (Boynton 2011). Finally, while it may be legal to own these devices, playing foreign media
content on them is strictly illegal (Bruce 2012: 4). This research will focus on cross-border smuggling
operations, balloon launches, foreign tourists in the DPRK, and word-of-mouth sources as it examines the
routes which information takes entering North Korea. Of the types of media and information platforms
entering North Korea, this research will place its emphasis on DVDs and radio broadcasts with a small
section focused briefly on computers and USB memory devices.2
Smuggling Operations Along the Sino-‐Korean Border While there is a statistical black-hole with concern to accurate numbers of cross-border smuggling
operations between North Korea and China, evidence points to smuggling operations as being the
Though radio broadcasts can be utilized as a route for information entering the country, I will discuss its
impact in the latter section on media platforms used to access information due to market-accessibility.
2
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logistical backbone of North Korea’s recent marketization (Reporters Sans Frontières 2011: 6). Illegal
provincial migration has increased in recent years due to corruption in the lower and middle echelons of
poorly-paid government officials, with much of this provincial typically being seafood-based or seasonal
agricultural-based foods that are cheaper in rural and coastal areas and are smuggled to other provinces
(Lankov 2009b). Though the marketization of North Korea has made luxuries such as car batteries,
electric shavers, and South Korean rice cookers more accessible for average citizens through cross-border
smuggling with China, this research will focus its attention on cross-border smuggling entirely related to
media devices (Park 2009).
Smuggling takes place in many forms ranging from tunnel networks buried beneath the SinoKorean border, bribing of border guards, and attempting to sneak across the porous border (Lankov
2009b; Tiezzi 2014). Though smuggling remains a very dangerous operation, the demand for DVD
players, computers, televisions, DVDs, USB devices, and other media platforms is far greater than the risk
of being caught (Halvorssen and Lloyd 2014). Border guards, when not overlooking contraband due to
bribery, have even been known to keep illicit entertainment devices for their own personal use (Boynton
2011).
Max Fisher describes the commonplace activity that has come to dominate North Korea’s border
region with China through a defector’s experiences, reporting,
“police who caught him at the border would sometimes beat him or sometimes send him to jail, for
sentences that might be a few days or a few months. The money was too good to stop, and other
opportunities too scarce, but Seongmin worried the punishments would get much worse once he
turned 17 and became a legal adult. So he started bribing border guards, first to look the other way
and, later, to help him. The authorities who'd beaten him became his employees. Business boomed”
(2013).
Despite the volume of contraband flowing across the border, governments should be cautious of
funding grants to organizations that profess an ability to get information about the outside world into
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North Korea. Grant funding such as those through the United State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor and its respective call for information access programs targeting North Korea are ripe
for abuse (State Dept. 2014). As Chad O’Carroll, founder of the prominent ‘NK News’ website comments,
“there is nothing to stop a crafty businessman taking a whole load of [USBs and DVDs] and dumping
them in a river once they cross the border. In fact, that would be a more logical thing to do [with grant
funding from the U.S. Government]” (2014b).
Balloon Launches While grants for smuggling operations should be awarded with caution, there are far fewer hurdles
to overcome than with balloon launches. As a whole, statistical data on balloon launches does not exist.
Many prominent organizations, such as Park Sang-Hak’s ‘Fighters for a Free North Korea,’ rely on
balloon launches and typically count evidence of effectiveness on lone defectors who have picked up
information dropped by the balloons (Sulek 2014). With writing on the balloons containing highlypolitical messages such as “the regime must fall,” the balloons are typically thirty feet tall, cylindrical, and
full of “DVDs, USBs, transistor radios, and tens of thousands of leaflets” (Halvorssen and Lloyd 2014).
There is widespread skepticism about the effectiveness of these balloons actually getting information
into North Korea. Lankov notes, “the occasional encounter with a short piece of information provided by
a printed text is unlikely to seriously change the worldview of a North Korean (2013a: 227). Christine
Hong argues, “these are Cold War psychological warfare strategies that today are very erroneously
labeled ‘human rights’ efforts,” (Hotham 2014). One anonymous contributor for NK News described
balloon launches as “a total waste of time” and simply “a publicity stunt (Anonymous 2014). While
religious groups such as Seoul USA are taking advantage of patience with the winds, their profession of
using GPS technology is riddled with technical holes. While I consider patience and the utilization of GPS
technology as a ‘best practices’ method for balloon launches, even their public statement only notes usage
of a single GPS transmitter on one solitary balloon (SeoulUSA.org 2014). As launching ten balloons costs
approximately five thousand dollars, relying on speculation and gauging how angrily the North Korean
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government responds remains a wasteful use of resources (Farivar 2014; SeoulUSA.org 2014). With “only
about sixty percent” landing on target, even Park Sang-Hak admits “of those… maybe a quarter make it
into anyone’s hands” (Sulek 2014).
Further, attempts to send USB devices with pre-loaded content into North Korea via balloons
should be approached with caution. Efforts have been made by various groups to send items such as
articles about the world written on the Korean version of Wikipedia on USB devices (Williams 2014b).
Others include a cross-border smuggling attempt by North Korea Intellectual Solidarity to send softwareloaded USB devices with programs such as ‘Window to the Global Village’ which appears as an empty
USB device but opens automatically to the unwary user (Boynton 2011). All of these “surreptitious
distribution techniques” are troubling for the risks they present to unknowing citizens (ibid). Additionally,
I am skeptical of significant numbers of North Koreans actually deciding to share USB-sourced e-books
with politically dangerous contents, like the United Nations’ Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in
the DPRK when understood through the context of North Korean citizens’ hesitance to share even South
Korean dramas via DVD, a much less politically dangerous item (Kirby 2014; Kretchun and Kim 2012:
16).
Contact with Foreign Tourists Understanding source-points of entry for media devices is important, though information also
enters North Korea in low-tech ways. As academic research regarding this issue is limited, this paper’s
discussion of information spread by foreign tourists will remain decidedly brief. Nonetheless, the topic
does warrant further research and could be easily accomplished by interviewing tourists post-trip to North
Korea. O’Carroll provides further evidence that foreign tourists share both domestic and international
news with their tour guides, remarking, “news broke of Gaddafi’s death and we told our guides of it”
(2014b).3 As international hotels, embassies, and foreign businesses increasingly carry satellite television
3
All foreign tourists in North Korea must travel with officially sanctioned tour guides.
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and Internet access, there is great potential for information to spread quickly from foreigners to local
citizens through word-of-mouth.
Sometimes it is impossible to gauge how important these small bits of information are towards
fostering dissent. Defector Joo Sung-Ha comments, “while the people that tourists often meet in North
Korea are elites, don’t also forget that these are the people who are leading the country” (O’Carroll
2014a). Just as contact with foreigners in the Soviet Union influenced heterodox thought, contact with
foreigners and the information they share can greatly influence the minds of North Korean citizens
(Lankov 2009b).
Word-‐of-‐Mouth Sources Gauging the influence of foreign contact affecting alternative viewpoints in North Korea is relevant
due to the overwhelming reliance by North Korean citizens on word-of-mouth sources. No single media
platform in the countries rates as high as word-of-mouth as an important source of information (Kretchun
and Kim 2012: 10). As news filters in, whether it features domestic or international content, North
Koreans spread this information. In one survey, 69% of refugees and travelers in China identified wordof-mouth sources as an important source of information (ibid). In another survey, 81% identified word-ofmouth as their primary source of information (Haggard and Noland 2011: 32). Given the historically
repressive nature of the North Korean government, ideological controls through community surveillance,
and weekly self-criticism sessions, these survey responses are an indication that information is flowing and
that North Koreans are now far less scared of sharing politically dangerous information than before. By
comparison, the following types of media have been as identified as important sources of information:
DVDs (39%), domestic television (38%), South Korean radio (21%), and foreign radio broadcasts (16%)
(ibid). There is strategic value for foreign information getting in and spreading via word-of-mouth sources
as 98% of survey respondents indicated “[having] received information that was not available in the
domestic media in North Korea” (ibid). Regardless of how news and information arrives in North Korea,
it spreads.
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Foreign DVDs In an era of significant upheaval in North Korea, it is important to gauge various media devices
effects on attitudes and opinions.4 Comparing qualitative defectors surveys from recent arrivals in South
Korea during 2013 and 2014 with quantitative surveys conducted during periods as late as 2010, survey
data points to further marketization, massive increases in information dissemination, and a quickly
eroding information blockade by the North Korean government (Lankov 2013a). As the information
cordon erodes, North Koreans have been highly desirous of watching popular South Korean television
dramas and movies (Kang and Park 2011). The rationale is simple: despite having opposing governments,
the dramas and movies are entertainment devices that are easy to watch due to sharing the same language
(ibid). While State supported television in North Korea are produced for the promulgation of Juche
ideology, South Korean dramas and movies are ultimately “commercial products” whose “financial
success relies on the production of dramas that a lot of people want to see” (Lankov 2013b).
How many DVDs are being sold is statistically difficult to determine as rigorous data on DVDs
bought and sold in North Korea’s black markets is impossible to obtain. There does remain useful
evidence buried in various survey data that can illuminate the prevalence, quantities, widespread
availability, and common acceptability of DVDs in North Korea. Of first note, DVDs sell for a relatively
low price of USD $0.50, equivalent to “roughly the same price as a kilo of rice in a public market,” or are
more commonly rented for a lesser amount (Kretchun and Kim 2012: 13; Lee 2014). Second, falling just
behind televisions (used as a stand-alone media device), DVD players are the most accessible media player
with 42% of survey respondents having access (Kretchun and Kim 2012: 11). Finally, by analyzing
qualitative interviews with defectors, it becomes readily apparent “that foreign DVD viewing has come to
be viewed by many North Koreans as normal behavior rather than exceptional or abhorrent” (ibid: 16).
While viewing has become more readily accessible, there remains a mixed fear at sharing foreign DVDs.
4 The first major change is Kim Jong-Un’s hereditary accession following his father’s death in 2011. With
news of purges and executions reminiscent of purges carried out by Kim Il-Sung during the period
between 1956 and 1960, the early years of Kim Jong-Un’s reign have been turbulent (Lankov 2002: 88114). The second major source of change in North Korea is the increased access of foreign sources of
media and media devices.
24
Though North Koreans report readily sharing foreign DVDs with family and trusted friends, many also
feel the need to destroy evidence of their illegal viewings by burning the DVDs when they are done
watching (Kretchun and Kim 2013: 17; Kang and Park 2011).
Defectors frequently describe initial viewings of South Korean dramas and movies with mixed
sentiments. While the material luxuries of television families are deemed as implausible and not
representative of average South Korean families, defectors tend to view skyscrapers and commercial
districts as harder to cinematically fake and thus are more believable (Kang and Park 2011). One defector
described this changing state of disbelief by saying, “as I continued to watch it a couple of more times, I
could realize what I was watching should be all true. And I thought I wanted to go live in South Korea”
(ibid). As evidence suggests, access to foreign sources of information, particularly foreign DVDs providing
entertainment content, is influencing the decision-making process of North Koreans in their desire to
defect. Commenting on the impact of foreign DVD content on his opinions and attitudes, one North
Korean defector remarked, “I fled the North because I came to admire South Korea after watching its
TV dramas and movies,” with another defector adding a similar sentiment, “when you know, you change”
(Kang 2011).
Foreign Radio While DVDs are useful tools for bringing in outside information, they are not particularly useful
for timely news distribution. To overcome the limitation on current and accurate news, North Koreans
turn to foreign radio broadcasts and listenership is regularly around a quarter of the population (Kretchun
and Kim 2012: 20). Though North Korean authorities occasionally jam signals, listeners find ways of
listening to broadcasts through several ways. First, due to the jamming of signals, many foreign
broadcasters routinely change radio frequencies and listeners have become adept at searching for content.
By utilizing the “‘twilight immunity’ effect” during hours when “jamming [is] considerably less effective
than at other times,” listeners further avoid jamming practices. (Parta 2007: 97; Kretchun and Kim 2012:
20). Finally, while jamming does occur, its effects appear limited and listeners report typically having
25
multiple options of broadcast content (Kretchun and Kim 2012: 40).
With organizations such as Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, North Korea Reform Radio,
Radio Free Chosun, and others receiving funding grants and broadcasting into the country, it is necessary
to consider the opinions and attitudes of listeners (Williams 2014a). Numerous defectors point to foreign
radio as a major influence when deciding to defect. For those who cannot afford to buy foreign built
radios, North Korean markets sell crude homemade radios (Ahn 2014). One defector cited his contraband
homemade “radio [as playing a] strong role in motivating [him] to escape North Korea” (ibid). From
evidence available in defector, refugee, and traveler surveys, foreign radio does appear to have a high
correlation with changing attitudes and opinions and decisions to defect. Survey respondents have further
indicated a tendency to share information heard on foreign radio with friends and neighbors and also with
immediate family members, with sharing rates at 44% and 28% respectively (Kretchun and Kim 2012:
41).
Computer Usage Though data remains limited about market penetration rates for computer accessibility, survey
responses reflect 16% of refugees and travelers from North Korea having had access to computers
(Kretchun and Kim 2012: 57). Reports suggest upwards of one hundred thousand privately-owned and
two million government-owned computers are likely to exist in the DPRK. (Lankov 2013a: 103;
Reporters Sans Frontières 2011:7). While data does remain limited, available reports do suggest that
computers are becoming status symbols, especially for the children of Pyongyang’s elites (Lankov: 2013a:
103).
Despite the lack of Internet access throughout the country, computers are valuable information
dissemination tools because of the USB and DVD access available. Given the dangers of information
dissemination through computer access, North Korea has even banned WiFi from embassies, hotels, and
foreign offices in order to curb citizens’ access to an open and uncensored Internet, cited through
evidence of a surge in housing prices near these establishments (Byrne 2014). As the North Korean
26
government has perceived the danger which information dissemination can pose to the country, it has
specifically set up the ‘109 Groups’ and the ‘927 Groups’ as task forces geared specifically to counter the
inflow of information into the country (Daily NK 2014; Gause 2012: 49). While the risk of raids by these
security agencies is worrisome for those using DVD players and radio devices, USB devices are quickly
concealable and showcase great opportunities for distribution information contents of the outside world
through e-books, music, and movie files (Daily NK 2014).
Alternative Technologies While news organizations and activist-related charities have a tendency to present all possible
information dissemination devices with unrealistic usage expectations, the previously mentioned types of
media have been quantifiably documented. The following types of information dissemination methods
appear highly valuable in their potential but have impacted the DPRK in very different ways. Though
mobile phone usage in North Korea continues to rapidly expand, its information dissemination potential
appears presently diminished by widespread governmental eavesdropping (Y. Kim 2014: 31). To aid
mobile communications, Commotion’s mesh-networking algorithm could facilitate information
dissemination as it bypasses traditional mobile phone towers and relay stations and jumps from one
mobile phone to another (Achin 2014.). Another exciting technology with information dissemination
potential in North Korea is software-defined radio, which uses computer components to receive and
broadcast signals (Skatun 2014). Though mesh-networking and software-defined radio each have
significant hurdles to overcome and have likely never entered North Korea, the potential modern
equivalents of the Soviet Samizdat is worthy of further research.
Conflicting Evidence As this review of available literature has shown, the prospects for information dissemination in
North Korea are many and they are rapidly growing. Whether through DVDs, radio, computers, USBs,
or other media devices, defectors are making use of foreign media and it is influencing their decisions to
defect to South Korea in greater numbers. The implications of these defections are not straightforward
27
and evidence is conflicting. Writing favorably towards foreign media consumption, Haggard and Noland
note, “not only is foreign media becoming more widely available but also inhibitions on its consumption
are disappearing” (2011: 112). They find evidence of a clear correlation between “consumption of foreign
media” and “more negative assessments of the regime and its intentions” (ibid). This is problematic as
Kretchun and Kim find evidence of the exact opposite. They document that while access to foreign media
statistically impacts favorable beliefs and attitudes about the outside world, they report on the lack of a
“measurable direct relationship between exposure to outside media and North Koreans’ beliefs and
attitudes about their own regime” (2012: 33-34). They find North Koreans are being convinced of a better
life available outside of North Korea, though this is not inspiring political dissent.
On the differences between the two studies, Stephen Haggard comments, “[they] are not
uncommon; they depend on the samples and the precise questions asked” (Haggard 2014). Nat Kretchun
adds a similar sentiment in his comment, “the results aren’t conflicting as much as they are measuring
somewhat different things based on the way data was collected and analyzed” (Kretchun 2014). With this
in mind, I remain hesitant about supplying firm answers on either side, as further research is necessary.
28
The Influence of Defections on Reform Though research has been conducted into the effects of outside information and the decision to
defect, there is a surprising absence of academic literature on the effects of defection with regard to the
internal thinking and decision making of the North Korean leadership. If information is motivating
defections, are defections influencing reform in governmental policy or the creation of political dissent?
Prior research has failed to look into whether defections influence governmental reform. With millions of
dollars in funding, organizations such as Liberty in North Korea (LiNK), Citizens’ Alliance for North
Korean Human Rights, and People for Successful Corean Reunification (PSCORE) are actively working
to end the humanitarian crisis in North Korea and hope to achieve the goal of Korean reunification
through the funding of defections (LiNK 2014; Citizens’ Alliance 2013; PSCORE 2013). As the stated
goal of these organizations is reform in North Korea, it is important to ask whether their primary method
of influencing reform in North Korea is effective in any measurable way.
Understanding who defectors are has important implications for determining whether they are
influential or not to the DPRK leadership. High-profile North Koreans have left North Korea, but an
analysis of which defectors are influential is necessary before an assessment can be made of the North
Korean government’s likely response. In this section of the report, I will focus my analysis on a
quantitative examination of the 26,854 North Korean defectors living in South Korea. Utilizing data
provided by the MOU and cross-correlating it with data from the most recent 2008 North Korean census,
I believe important insights can instruct the information-defection nexus. Principally, I will examine class,
provincial and city origin, gender, occupation, education, and age data.
High-‐profile Defections Before examining how statistics classify North Korean defectors, it is useful to first examine
governmental response toward both high and low-profile defectors. When examining high-profile
defectors, discussion must first start with the 1997 defection of Hwang Jang-Yop, the driving force behind
the formulation of North Korea’s Juche philosophy (Boynton 2011). Though Kim Jong-Il expressed the
29
sentiment, “cowards, leave if you want to. We will defend the red flag of revolution to the end,” it is
widely believed that the assassination of defector Lee Han-Young, Kim Jong-Il’s nephew was committed
by North Korean agents in retribution for Hwang’s defection (Pollack 1997; Choe 2010b). In 2010, a twoman team posing as North Korean defectors unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Hwang (Choe 2010b).
Another high-profile defector is Park Sang-Hak, known for his balloon-launch activity and the 2011
assassination attempt to kill him with a poison-tipped needle (Choe 2011b). Additionally, Hwang HyeRang, Kang Chol-Hwan, Lee Soon-Ok, Jang Jin-Sung, and Shin Dong-Hyuk are all vocal critics of the
North Korean government, but their defections have not publicly been known to have assassination
attempts placed on their lives.
While high-profile defections generate significant quantities of media attention, the sporadic and
limited nature of these high-profile defectors has not caused any significant change in governmental policy
(M. Kim 2014).5 And while many of the limited numbers of defections between 1953 and 1993 were high
profile, defections since this period have categorically not been high profile (Lankov 2006: 108). Lowprofile defectors such as Kang Chol-Hwan and Shin Dong-Hyuk have gained prominence for their vocal
criticism of the government despite not having been politically important prior to their defections.
Additionally, with substantial usage of defector testimonies, efforts by the United Nations’ Commission of
Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK have generated widespread international criticism against the
North Korean government (UN COI 2014). Nonetheless, despite intense international pressure, no
significant reforms have been made in light of these critical findings.
Songbun: Class Stratification Understanding the impact of defections can most easily be determined through an analysis of
each defector’s Songbun classification. As a system of class stratification, Songbun categorizes each citizen
first into three main categories of political loyalty: core (핵심 계층) wavering (동요 계층), and hostile
I define a high-profile defector as a North Korean citizen with influence either in government or the
military. Further, defectors with advanced knowledge of the inner-workings of governmental programs or
personalities of the elite are considered high profile.
5
30
(적대 계층) (Collins 2012: 1). Structured as a way to classify loyalty, class status is marked at birth,
followed throughout each citizen’s life, and instructs all educational opportunities, vocational assignments,
and housing placements (ibid: 18-19).
One significant caveat exists in my quantitative study of defectors. Songbun data is not published
by the North Korean government (Demick 2010: 28; Hunter 1999: 3, 6). Though exact statistics of
percentile groups comprising each of the three groups is not available, the sizes of the classes in the
national population have been quantified and estimated as follows: core (30%), wavering (40%), and
hostile (30%) (Hunter 1999: 4-5). Running contrary to numerous international declarations, most notably
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Songbun influences all life prospects through a system of
“heredity-based class and socio-political rank” (Collins 2012: 1-2). Though Songbun data would greatly
simplify an understanding of the importance of the 26,854 defectors now living in South Korea, important
connections can be inferred upon without Songbun data. Provincial and city origin, gender, occupation,
education, and age data can all instruct an educated assessment of the impact these defections are causing.
Provincial and City Origins First, as the North Korean government uses housing assignments as a way to reward the most
politically loyal citizens, understanding where defectors lived in North Korea is a useful starting point
(Collins 2012: 75-77). Further, only the most politically loyal are officially allowed to live in Pyongyang,
with members of the hostile class generally marked for a life in rural farming collectives or factory work
(ibid: 53, 76). Table 1.0 models this trend and showcases where defectors originated in North Korea.
Figure 2.0 further visualizes these numbers. Compiling data provided by the MOU, figure 2.0 and tables
1.0 through 6.1 all utilize defector data updated to February 2014 of 26,368 defectors living in South
Korea. For table 1.0, highly striking are the numbers of defections taking place from three provinces.
North Hamgyeong Province alone, along the Sino-Korean border, has been responsible for 64.31% of all
defections. Also along the Sino-Korean border, Ryanggang Province has seen 11.61% of all defections.
Finally, South Hamgyeong Province, the only province not along the Sino-Korean border to break above
31
a miniscule four percentage points, has seen 9.05% of defections. Though it is readily acknowledged that
provincial and city data cannot instruct perfectly upon how the government of North Korea is reacting to
defectors, it is apparent that for 84.97% of defectors to originate from border provinces with limited
influence in the government, the likely North Korean governmental reaction is not to fear (Nelan and
FlorCruzl 1997). As an inverse to these numbers, only 1.96% of defectors have originated from
Pyongyang.
Table 1.0: (MOU 2014: Personal Translation, Personal Compilation).
Origins
Kangwon,Province
Nampo,Special,City
Ryanggang,Province
Jagang,Province
South,Pyeongan,Province
North,Pyeongan,Province
Pyongyang,Directly,Governed,City
South,Hamgyeong,Province
North,Hamgyeong,Province
South,Hwanghae,Province
North,Hwanghae,Province
Kaeseong,Special,City
Other
Total
Total,Defectors,from,
Province,or,Special,City
512
124
3,061
173
922
708
517
2,385
16,958
407
369
69
163
26,368
Percent
1.94%
0.47%
11.61%
0.66%
3.50%
2.69%
1.96%
9.05%
64.31%
1.54%
1.40%
0.26%
0.62%
100.00%
Figure 2.0: Heat map visualization of North Korean defections by province or special city (MOU 2014:
Personal Translation, Personal Compilation, Personal Illustration).
32
Correlating these numbers with the 2008 North Korean census can show where defections are
occurring relative to the size of the provincial or city population.6 To quantity this using Table 2.0, a
simple ratio measures that while 9.97% of the North Korean population lives in North Hamgyeong, it’s
64.71% of defectors provide it with a ratio of 6.49.7 8 Ryangang Province has a high ratio of 3.79.
Pyongang, by comparison has even fewer defectors than its already low number of 1.97% first suggested.
Despite having 13.94% of the nation’s population, Pyongyang’s ratio is only 0.14. This number suggests
that the core class of North Koreans living in Pyongyang are not defecting in great enough quantities for
the North Korean government to worry about. Pyongyang’s ratio of 0.14 comes only second lowest in the
country after Jagang Province’s 0.12 ratio.
Table 2.0: (MOU 2014: Personal Translation, Personal Compilation; Central Bureau of Statistics, DPRK
2009).9
Ratio+of+
Percent+of+
Percentage+of+
General+
Proportion+ Defectors+
Defectors+from+ Total+Defectors+
Origins
Population+ of+National+ Total+from+
this+province+/+ to+Percentage+of+
(2008)
Population Province
city
National+
Population
Kangwon+Province
1,477,582
6.33%
512
1.95%
0.31
Nampo+Special+City
366,815
1.57%
124
0.47%
0.30
Ryanggang+Province
719,269
3.08%
3,061
11.68%
3.79
Jagang+Province
1,299,830
5.57%
173
0.66%
0.12
South+Pyeongan+Province*+excluding+Nampo+ 3,684,881
15.78%
922
3.52%
0.22
North+Pyeongan+Province
2,728,662
11.69%
708
2.70%
0.23
Pyongyang+Directly+Governed+City
3,255,288
13.94%
517
1.97%
0.14
South+Hamgyeong+Province
3,066,013
13.13%
2,385
9.10%
0.69
North+Hamgyeong+Province
2,327,362
9.97%
16,958
64.71%
6.49
South+Hwanghae+Province
2,310,485
9.90%
407
1.55%
0.16
North+Hwanghae+Province*+excluding+
1,805,232
7.73%
369
1.41%
0.18
Kaeseong+Special+City
Kaeseong+Special+City
308,440
1.32%
69
0.26%
0.20
Total
23,349,859 100.00%
26,205
100.00%
n/a
I have removed the MOU’s “other” category for provincial origin from these statistics. As such, the
following percentages and ratios reflect this updated number.
6
7
The ratio is as follows:
(!"#$% !"#"$%&'() !"#$ !"#$%&'( !" !"#$ ÷ !"#$% !"#$%&"' !"#"$%&'())
(!"#$%&'%() !" !"#$ !"#$%&'(") ÷!"#$%&"' !"#$%&'(")) .
8 For a perfect ratio of 1.00, a hypothetical province with 10% of the national population would have 10%
of total defections.
9 As MOU statistics provide for defectors originating specifically from Nampo Special City and Kaeseong
Special City, I have examined North Korean census data for each city and respectively subtracted its
population from South Pyeongan Province and North Hwanghae Province statistics.
33
Gender Moving past origins data, the gender of the 26,368 defectors can further instruct an
understanding of what the North Korean government’s likely reactions will be. In patriarchal Confucian
North Korean society, women are expected to work in official government jobs only until they marry and
thereafter expected to work as stay-at-home housewives (Kim 2013). With this in mind, women do not
traditionally occupy positions of power within the governmental administrations and decision-making
bodies of North Korea’s power structure. As such, table 3.0 shows that 69.68% of all defectors of women.
Gender
Defectors,
Male,from,
Province
Defectors,
Female,
from,
Province
Kangwon,Province
Nampo,Special,City
Ryanggang,Province
Jagang,Province
South,Pyeongan,Province
North,Pyeongan,Province
Pyongyang,Directly,Governed,City
South,Hamgyeong,Province
North,Hamgyeong,Province
South,Hwanghae,Province
North,Hwanghae,Province
Kaeseong,Special,City
Other
Total
206
59
917
61
399
334
309
719
4,465
249
154
44
78
7,994
306
65
2,144
112
523
374
208
1,666
12,493
158
215
25
85
18,374
Percent,of, Percent,of,
defectors, defectors,
from,this,
from,this,
province,
province,
alone,who, alone,who,
are,male are,female
40.23%
47.58%
29.96%
35.26%
43.28%
47.18%
59.77%
30.15%
26.33%
61.18%
41.73%
63.77%
47.85%
30.32%
59.77%
52.42%
70.04%
64.74%
56.72%
52.82%
40.23%
69.85%
73.67%
38.82%
58.27%
36.23%
52.15%
69.68%
Occupation Knowing that most defectors have thus far been described principally as rural women, examining
their occupations in North Korea can further instruct upon their likely importance to the DPRK
leadership. Through an examination of table 4.0, it is evident that 79.77% of male defectors are laborers
34
or unemployed dependents. For male defectors, only three categories are particularly important to this
study of potentially important defectors. With 4.00% of male defectors having been in “administrative”
jobs, 7.57% in military positions, and 2.34% in “professional” jobs, this relatively low number is difficult
to objectively determine their importance to the regime. MOU statistics are complicated, for while some
categories are straightforward, other categories such as “administrative” are not descriptive in terms of
whom these defectors are. For example, a minimally important secretary could theoretically be classified
in the same way as members of the top leadership. Nonetheless, while it can be said that these low
numbers, comprising all male administrative, military, and professional jobs make up a miniscule 4.21%
of total defectors regardless of gender, the likely importance to the regime is quite possibly much lower
given the nature of military conscription in North Korea (Lankov 2013a: 206).
What jobs actually make up the “administrative,” “soldier” and “professional” positions may be
documented in further detail by MOU, though it remains unpublished and inaccessible. Despite these
questions, it can be summarized with two statistics. First, the total number of defectors classified as either
“laborer” or “unemployed dependents” is 86.09%. Second, in the unlikely assumption that every male
and female defector in the “administrative,” “soldier,” and “professional” categories are deemed
influential to the North Korean leadership, this still only represents 6.25% of all defections.
Employment
Male
Female
Total
Administrative
Soldier
Laborer
Unemployed1
dependents
Service1Sector
Arts,1Sports
Professional
NonKtarget1
(children,1etc.)
Other
Total
320
605
3421
100
92
6,530
420
697
9,951
Percent1of1
Male1
defectors
4.00%
7.57%
42.79%
2956
9,793
12,749
36.98%
53.30%
48.35%
69
66
187
970
151
345
1,039
217
532
0.86%
0.83%
2.34%
5.28%
0.82%
1.88%
3.94%
0.82%
2.02%
289
254
543
3.62%
1.38%
2.06%
81
7994
139
18,374
220
26,368
1.01%
100.00%
0.76%
100.00%
0.83%
100.00%
35
Percent1of1
Female1
defectors
0.54%
0.50%
35.54%
Percent1of1
Total1
Defectors
1.59%
2.64%
37.74%
Education Adding to this research’s broad understanding of who is influential to the North Korean
government, an analysis of MOU data examining education data through table 5.0 will further provide
clarity.10 From these totals, it can be shown that 83.30% of all defectors arrived in South Korea with a
middle school education level or less.11 12 As the top universities are reserved for students with a ‘core’
classification, the 6.98% of defectors who attended university show that very few defectors were important
enough to the North Korean government to be sent to university (Collins 2012: 71-76). Those attending
technical colleges or trade schools may have been deemed important enough to teach a skill or craft, but
those attending this type of school are unlikely to have been influential within government (ibid).
Education
Preschool
Kindergarten
People's2
School
Middle2
School
Technical2
College
University
Uneducated
Other
Total
Male
382
116
Female
360
116
Total
742
269
Percent2of2Total
2.81%
1.02%
705
1,065
1,770
6.71%
4,861
13,535
18,396
69.77%
677
1,762
2,439
9.25%
885
343
25
7,994
955
445
99
18,374
1,840
788
124
26,368
6.98%
2.99%
0.47%
100.00%
Age Finally, age statistics in table 6.0 document whom the North Korean government would likely
I have found a discrepancy error in Table 5.0 between the total number of male, female, and total
defectors. The error appears to be in the Female Kindergarten tally and can be corroborated by a
summation of ‘total male’, a summation of ‘total total’, and a summation of ‘total kindergarten.’
Despite determining the nature of this discrepancy, I have chosen to utilize only the combined male and
female totals.
11 North Korea’s school system is modeled differently than most Western schools. Students’ primary
education is limited to four years. Middle school lasts for just six years. From this age, students are
conscripted into the military or enter a university or technical college.
12 I have ignored adding the 0.47% “other” figure.
10
36
determine as the most instrumental agents of reform. As the most influential members of North Korean
society, government, and military are likely older men, I am intentionally separating the entirety of
MOU’s age statistics into two categories: first, males between the ages of thirty and older and second,
females of all ages plus males of the age between zero and twenty-nine. Through this, it can be shown in
table 6.1 that 14.28% of all defectors arriving in South Korea have been males and aged thirty or above.
85.72% of defectors have been males under the age of thirty or females of any age. While this
representation is by no means perfect, it is a useful step for gauging the importance of defectors in a field
with very little statistical data available. I split males at the age of thirty as I find it unlikely for youth and
children to represent a significant threat to the North Korean leadership in terms of revolutionary
capabilities. Further, males aged twenty to twenty-nine are likely either to still be in military conscription
with little power or working in entry-level career positions (Choe 2011a; Collins 2012: 53-59).
Table 6.0: (MOU 2014: Personal Translation, Personal Compilation).13
Age
Male
Female
Total
0-9
10-19
20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60+
total
577
1,483
2,169
1,905
1,135
418
307
7,994
575
1,746
5,170
5,985
3,114
935
849
18,374
1,152
3,229
7,339
7,890
4,249
1,353
1,156
26,368
Percent of males Percent of females
Percent total
who are this age who are this age who are this age
7.22%
3.13%
4.37%
18.55%
9.50%
12.25%
27.13%
28.14%
27.83%
23.83%
32.57%
29.92%
14.20%
16.95%
16.11%
5.23%
5.09%
5.13%
3.84%
4.62%
4.38%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
Males&30+
3,765
Males&0*29& Males&30+&as&
&&females percent&of&total
22,603
14.28%
Males&0*29&&&females&
as&percent&of&total
85.72%
Review of Defection Findings As this research has shown, it is categorically unlikely that defections from North Korea are taking
place by influential governmental officials. As most of these defectors are young women from rural
As South Korean society and MOU data perceives a child age one as a child having just been born, all
MOU age statistics should subtract one year to be correlated with Western ages.
13
37
provinces with minimal education and are either officially unemployed or work as simple laborers,
defections are unlikely to create a groundswell of sudden change in North Korea. While the execution of
Jang Song-Thaek, the second-highest official in the country and uncle to Kim Jong-Un, could have
hypothetically provoked another military general to commit a coup d’état rather than face arrest and
execution, defections from North Korea do not hold this same level of influence (Choe 2010a). Highprofile defectors are rare and have been largely minimized through government decisions to have officials
travel in pairs accountable to another (Schwekendiek 2010: 251).
38
Critique on Current Policy and Practice As mentioned previously, organizations such as LiNK, Citizens’ Alliance, and PSCORE are
actively seeking reform in North Korea through defections. As millions of dollars in grant funding are
available internationally for democracy and human rights programs targeting North Korea, effective
policy must realize the lack of impact which defectors are having in North Korea (State Dept. 2011).14 For
LiNK, their primary and stated goal is “ending the crisis” in North Korea (LiNK 2012: 4). With an
operating budget of nearly 1.5 million dollars, LiNK believes it can influence reform in North Korea by
operating in two ways. First, they attempt to do this through “awareness” by visiting American universities,
high schools, and churches. Second, they attempt to do this through “refugee rescues” (LiNK 2014).
Though my research has instructed toward the negligible likelihood that North Korean defectors
are high-profile government officials, LiNK attempts to reconcile this through a media campaign focused
on utilizing language about “bottom-up changes” being influenced by North Korean defectors (LiNK
2014). Sokeel Park, LiNK’s Director of Research and Strategy, finds merit in examining the role of
remittances toward the marketization of North. Speaking in an interview on the approximately 10-15
million dollars being remitted every year by North Korean defectors, Park comments,
“certain factors… multiply the effect of that money which is going in… This $15 million going into
the grassroots economy is nothing in terms of international finance, but in terms of the grassroots
marketization and speeding up the private business activities, it is more significant than we might
think. Because this money is going back into certain locations, that is actually better than it just
being spread randomly across the country. $15 million across the whole country wouldn’t be that
significant, but it’s going into… border towns in the northeast and bigger cities where the changes
are already happening the fastest” (Park 2014).
Though LiNK’s media campaign is designed well, the remittances argument is unconvincing as
$9.5 million was distributed during fiscal years 2008-2011 (State Dept. 2011). Program grants up to
$350,000 per organization were available during fiscal year 2014 (State Dept. 2014).
14
39
remittances are not a new phenomenon and have been taking place in large quantities since at least the
1960s from the ethnically Korean Chosen Soren community in Japan (Kang and Rigoulot 2005). While
some sources estimate Chosen Soren funds to North Korea may have once been as high as 850 million
dollars annually, by the 1990s, these funds were still as high as near 100 million dollars (Eberstadt 1996:
523-524). While Park anecdotally argues that remittances fund the marketization of the country, there is
little statistical evidence of what defector remittances are being used for (Park 2014). Though the
marketization of North Korea is quickly changing daily life in North Korea, I remain unconvinced that
defector remittances are playing an influential role.
An additional challenge for organizations seeking to promote “refugee rescues” is both financial
and ethical (LiNK 2014; Citizens’ Alliance 2013; PSCORE 2013). Prior to the hereditary accession of
Kim Jong-Un, funding a North Korea’s defection cost approximately 2,000 - 2,500 dollars to bribe border
guards and insure safe transit through China before arriving in South Korea (Lankov 2013a: 93). With the
recent security situation along the Sino-Korean border, funding defections has spiked upwards toward
9,000 dollars (Lankov 2014). Further, there are conflicting moral considerations to examine when falling
behind the convenient logic of ‘North Korea is bad. A life in South Korea must be a more desirable
alternative.’ Unfortunately, many of these defectors go on to live marginally better lives in South Korea as
they become ostracized for their cultural and linguistic differences (Lankov 2006). Defectors frequently
risk their lives attempting to escape North Korea and through China only to find themselves in relative
poverty with difficulty keeping pace with their hyper-competitive South Korean peers (ibid). While their
human security may be higher in South Korea, the high price of funding defections warrants examining
whether the funds should be used for alternative programs aimed at influencing change in North Korea.
40
Conclusion The North Korean Response to Defections When examining whether the DPRK leadership should fear defectors, it is useful to first examine
its current response. In the era of the Kim Jong-Un administration, the North Korean government has
placed its priorities on three issues. Varying in importance at different times, the government has placed
priorities toward improving economic performance, clamping down on cross-border movement, and
controlling the spread of foreign media (Buckley and Park 2012; Kang 2014). However, I argue that while
clamping down on cross-border movement is restricting the flow of defections, these security actions have
more to do with the marketization of the country. Another recent phenomenon relates to a small number
of re-defections and subsequent press conferences the government of North Korea has held (O’Carroll
2013). Stressing the dangers of life in South Korea, these press conferences are useful for the North
Korean government to minimize defections, though I do not believe these press conferences confirm that
the North Korean government should fear defectors. Though publications such as the United Nations’
Commission of Inquiry have generated significant foreign condemnation regarding human rights and the
treatment of prisoners in labor camps and concentration-style camps, I am highly skeptical the report has
spread within the country (Kirby 2014).
Defectors are an annoyance to the government of North Korea rather than an outright threat.
Despite the large number of defections, they remain a miniscule fraction of the national population. While
security clampdowns along the Sino-Korean border and efforts to control the spread of foreign media
have become common during the reign of Kim Jong-Un, they are indicative of a threat larger than the
defection issue. The biggest challenge facing the DPRK leadership is the inflow of information and the
erosion of North Korea’s information barricade. As Lankov frequently stresses, as North Koreans
increasingly hear about the economic prosperity of South Korea, who they are ethnically related to, they
will increasingly grow tired of state-supported socialism and will eventually seek complete reunification on
the Korean peninsula (2013a).
41
Foreign information inspiring negative opinions of the North Korean government is an area that
deserves further research and attention, despite conflicting evidence. The collapse of the Soviet Union and
the rise of the Arab Spring give cause to remember the speed at which governments collapse. Haggard
and Noland conclude their study noting “loyalty to the regime may be in shorter supply than is thought”
(2011: 117). The information cordon in North Korea is unraveling and only time will tell how citizens
react to news of the outside world.
Policy Recommendations As my admitted bias is for the eventual reunification of the Korean peninsula, the results of my
findings offer the following advice: First, I advise that policymakers and donors immediately distribute
funding away from programs pursuing the defections of low-profile North Koreans. Once defectors arrive
in South Korea, I do recommend a continuation of social-welfare assistance from the MOU. Second, as
the continued marketization of North Korea and the lessening of social reliance on the PDS should
become a top priority, policymakers seeking reform in North Korea should actively fund programs that
encourage information dissemination in North Korea. This will be especially useful for market-based
information aiding North Korean entrepreneurs to make timely decisions regarding the pricing of
commonly sold goods and products. Third, increased funding towards relatively inexpensive shortwave
radio broadcasts should take prevalence. It may be very useful to bleed the North Korean State budget
while encouraging private reliance on the markets. Policy is capable of influencing reform in North Korea
through information dissemination initiatives, but limited financial funding must be prioritized towards
programs which are measurably impacting change in the DPRK.
42
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Dissertation - Master - 9.15 - 7.55 pm

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