The conflicts in Libya and Syria and the potential for regional
Transcripción
The conflicts in Libya and Syria and the potential for regional
November 2015 The conflicts in Libya and Syria and the potential for regional destabilisation Edited by: Valeria Ruggiu and Daniele Scalea Contributors: Alexandre Brans, Dario Citati, Diego Del Priore, Roberta La Fortezza, Luca Maiotti and Andrea Sperini Abstract Since 2011 Syria and Libya are the subjects of extreme violent infightings which, far from bringing democracy as many in the West initially hoped, are threatening the very existance of State and society. In addition to the human tragedy in the two countries, destabilization is seemingly spreading to their neighbourhood, as shown by terrorist attacks in Tunisia, armed struggle of Turkish Kurds, Lebanon, Turkey, Tunisia and other countries flooded with refugees, ISIS spreading to Iraq and establishment of a trans-national terrorist network. The very real risk is that the two national hotbeds of tension could destabilize the whole South-Eastern Mediterranean arch, bringing war and terrorism at the gates of Italy and Europe. This Report aims to analyze how the Libyan and Syrian destabilization is affecting the whole region. Keywords: MENA socio-political stability, ISIS, Islamist terrorism Language: Italian About the authors VALERIA RUGGIU Director of the “North Africa and Near East” Programme, IsAG, Rome [email protected] DANIELE SCALEA Director-general, IsAG, Rome [email protected] ALEXANDRE BRANS Collaborator of the “North Africa and Near East” Programme, IsAG, Rome [email protected] DARIO CITATI Director of the “Eurasia” Programme, IsAG, Rome [email protected] DIEGO DEL PRIORE Associate Researcher of the “North Africa and Near East” Programme, IsAG, Rome [email protected] ROBERTA LA FORTEZZA Collaborator of the “North Africa and Near East” Programme, IsAG, Rome [email protected] LUCA MAIOTTI Intern of the “North Africa and Near East” Programme, IsAG, Rome [email protected] ANDREA SPERINI Collaborator of the “Africa and Latin America” Programme, IsAG, Rome [email protected] ISSN: 2281-8553 © Istituto di Alti Studi in Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliarie Istituto di Alti Studi in Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliarie 3 Contents ________________________________________________________________________________ 1. Libya and Syria: will these two “black holes” swallow up the Middle East and the Maghreb? ........... 4 2. Turkey.................................................................................................................................................... 4 2.1 Present situation: Ankara caught in the Syrian web ........................................................................... 4 2.2 Scenarios: Kurdish independence as the new no 1 enemy .................................................................. 5 3. Lebanon ................................................................................................................................................. 6 3.1 Present situation: taking part in the war but keeping it at arm’s length ............................................. 6 3.2. Scenarios: growing internal and external pressures on Lebanese stability ....................................... 7 4. Palestine................................................................................................................................................. 7 4.1 Present situation: the Palestinian factions take sides ......................................................................... 7 4.2 Scenarios: new tenants in the Gaza Strip ............................................................................................ 8 5. Jordan .................................................................................................................................................... 8 5.1 Present situation: a country increasingly worn out by the war in Syria ............................................. 8 5.2 Scenarios: more internal conflict ........................................................................................................ 9 6. Egypt and Tunisia .................................................................................................................................. 10 6.1 Present situation: “secular” dams against the fundamentalist tide .................................................... 10 6.2 Scenarios: new social pacts to defeat terrorism .................................................................................. 11 7. The Caucasus and Central Asia ............................................................................................................. 11 7.1 Present situation: the “foreign fighters” who scare Putin.................................................................. 11 7.2 Scenarios: a resurgence of terrorism on the horizon .......................................................................... 12 8. The European Union.............................................................................................................................. 12 8.1 Situation: a timid Europe confronting terrorism and organised crime ............................................... 12 8.2 Scenarios: new instruments and new awareness to guarantee security .............................................. 14 www.istituto-geopolitica.eu www.geopolitica-rivista.org Istituto di Alti Studi in Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliarie 4 1. Libya and Syria: will these two “black holes” swallow up the Middle East and the Maghreb? In the civil wars in Libya and Syria, which have now been ongoing since the closing months of winter 2010/2011, the presence of the state has been so significantly reduced that it is difficult – at least in the case of Libya – to talk about a state. Although the crises have evolved differently – while in Libya the regime was overthrown after a few months and Muammar Gaddafi killed, in Syria Bashar Assad has remained in power, albeit holding less national territory – there are clear similarities between the two situations which make it possible to consider them together. The crises in Libya and Syria began during the Arab uprisings of 2011 (the so-called “Arab Spring”), but transcended them in terms of time as there was no rapid conclusion and regime change (like in Tunisia), nor short-lived change (like in Egypt), nor sudden repression (such as in Bahrain); the crises in these two countries provoked the quasi total collapse of the State, without any of the myriad of factions being able to lay claim to its legacy in terms of geographical area or political credibility. Libya and Syria have therefore become regional “black holes” which, unlike their astral counterparts, do not simply exert a force of attraction, but propel destabilizing elements outwards. Because of their porous and, by now, almost purely formal, borders, Libya and Syria attract outside interventions while in exchange, they produce international tension, waves of refugees and safe havens for foreign fighters with their radical ideologies and military training. Iraq has already fallen into the Syrian “black hole”. The aim of this report is to assess how the Syrian and Libyan “black holes” are pulling neighbouring countries, and some farther away, towards the same state of chaos, and to identify possible countermeasures to prevent regional destabilisation. www.istituto-geopolitica.eu 2. Turkey 2.1 Present situation: Ankara caught in the Syrian web For historical, geographical and political reasons, Turkey is on the front line of the Syrian conflict. After decades of hostility with the Hafez Assad regime, there was a rapprochement between the two countries in 2004 when the Syrian government, which, in the meantime, had passed to Bashar Assad, quashed the Kurdish uprisings in Quamishli (Turkey had previously accused Syria of providing logistic support to the PKK). However, in 2011 relations deteriorated once again. Recep Erdogan’s Turkish government, which had sympathised with the Arab uprisings earlier that year, offered mediation between Assad and the opposition but in vain. Since then, Turkey has openly supported the rebels who, not surprisingly, have been able to capture large swathes of territory along the Turkish border. In the last two years, the emergence of ISIS, and, opposing them, the Kurdish militias has led Ankara to make the Incirlik airbase available to the anti-ISIS USled coalition, and itself to conduct operations against the PKK. The latter’s renewed activities, their bases in urban areas, their logistic hinterland in the virtually independent Kurdish territories in Syria and their ability to launch guerrilla actions against the Turkish security forces, are the first, but fundamental, negative consequences of the Syrian conflict for Turkey. This was undoubtedly an unexpected setback for Ankara which had been counting on the Baath regime being overthrown, and despite the fact that the conflict has hardened, Turkey has continued to provide logistic support to various rebel groups and has even tolerated the flow of foreign volunteers crossing Turkey. Baathist resilience aside, one of the reasons for the failure of the Turkish strategy lies in the lack of understanding with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States which are hostile to Assad and actively support the rebellion in www.geopolitica-rivista.org Istituto di Alti Studi in Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliarie 5 Syria, but are opposed to the groups close to the Muslim Brotherhood. The discord between Ankara and Riyadh culminated in summer 2013 when Egyptian President Morsi was overthrown – an event supported by the Saudis but not welcomed by the Turks. However, the start of a new and difficult conflict in Yemen and the nuclear agreement with Iran (which is the prelude to the end of Iran’s isolation) convinced Saudi Arabia to put aside many of its reservations and cooperate with Turkey in supporting a wider rebel front. The most immediate result was the creation of the Jaish al-Fatah coalition which, in the Idlib area, combines groups which are considered close to Turkey with others, like Faylaq al-Sham and Liwa alHaqq, which are considered to be in the Saudi orbit. The combined strength of Ankara, Doha and Riyadh’s support for this coalition of Islamist groups has given quick results with a major part of the Idlib Governorate being captured during the first months of this year. The Jaish al-Fatah offensive has however been halted by the Russian military intervention. As well as a stronger PKK, another negative consequence of the Syrian conflict for Turkey has been the significant flow of refugees: Turkey is the country with the highest number. There are approximately two million Syrians in Turkey today but only 15% of them live in the refugee camps close to the border. Many others subsist on hand-outs, or through prostitution and smuggling. Since the beginning of the conflict Turkey has been pursuing an open-door policy and, as a result of the restrictions imposed simultaneously by Lebanon and Jordan, the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey has more than doubled in 2015. 2.2 Scenarios: Kurdish independence as the new no 1 enemy Russia’s intervention has made the already complicated creation, by Turkey, of a 40km deep buffer zone in Syria even more difficult. This buffer zone should cover the Azaz, Al Bab and Jarablus areas and would fulfil a number of objectives: the almost purely www.istituto-geopolitica.eu symbolic objective of protecting both the many Turkmen who live in the area and the emblematic Dabiq site; the economic objective of starting the repatriation of the Syrian refugees who represent a significant burden for the Turkish infrastructure; and the political objective of expelling ISIS from the Turkish border and driving a wedge between the Kurdish areas In Jazira on the one hand and Kobane on the other. It is not surprising that the top Turkish priority is not the struggle with the Baath regime but the creation of a buffer zone: Turkey has suffered a strategic setback and therefore bringing Syria into its sphere of influence becomes secondary compared to the defence its territorial integrity. This territorial integrity is being threatened by the Kurdish independence movement, which, in the Syrian sector, has gained significant international support thanks to the fight against ISIS. The Kurdish PYD is seeking to strengthen its hold in the Aleppo area in order to disrupt the Turkish supply lines to the IS and thus to ensure greater territorial continuity in the area it controls in Syria, under the name “Rojava” (Western Kurdistan). At present, and thanks to US mediation, it appears that the PYD has agreed to restrict its activities to the eastern bank of the Euphrates, thus making Turkey’s creation of a buffer zone unnecessary. It is more and more difficult for Turkey to act in this situation, as the increasingly complicated Syrian conflict means that its objectives today are often contradictory. Fighting ISIS means favouring above all the Kurds and Assad, while favouring the IS would bring down the wrath of the international community on Ankara and would bring a hard-to-manage neighbour to its border (ISIS has already launched its first terrorist attacks on Turkish soil). A negotiated settlement to the conflict, which is the most realistic option, would inflict on Ankara the humiliation of negotiating with Assad, whom they have used every possible means in the last few years to overthrow and delegitimise, and it would not save them from the establishment of a self-administered Kurdish entity. Maintaining the status quo would www.geopolitica-rivista.org Istituto di Alti Studi in Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliarie 6 simply ensure the continuation of the destabilising influences which, as stated, are affecting Turkey. The only perfect solution for Turkey would be a victory of the rebel front which it supports, but this is highly unlikely – especially after the Russian intervention, and particularly as Ankara has proved unwilling or unable to intervene militarily in Syria. The most probable options all seem to be disadvantageous for Ankara which, in this situation, will, in all likelihood, continue to concentrate firstly on providing support to Jaysh al-Fatah (mostly logistics, weapons and intelligence, leaving financial support to the Gulf states) in order to withstand the Baathist offensive supported by Russian bombardments; and secondly on the struggle with the PKK, which would then divert Kurdish forces from their expansionist activities in Syria. Ankara would therefore be pursuing a conservative strategy in the hope (unlikely) that Russia will cease to support Assad, or that negotiations could start (more likely). Should Ankara be forced to choose a single strategic priority among the various and contradictory options available, as seems probable, it will certainly elect to suffocate the Kurdish independence movement. Future Turkish behaviour will depend to a great extent on how today’s fluid internal political balances are defined and on how Russian and US relations with the Kurdish PYD develop. A further consequence of the Syrian crisis is that relations with Moscow have been compromised. If, as seems likely, Turkey and Russia do not soon define a shared vision of Syria, it is probable that the Turkish Stream project will be the loser. Syrian-Iraqi instability has for some time put the idea of a gas pipeline from Qatar to Turkey on hold. Together these two factors will sound the death knoll for the Turkish plan to make the Turkish peninsula the main hub of the energy transport network. www.istituto-geopolitica.eu 3. Lebanon 3.1 Present situation: taking part in the war but keeping it at arm’s length Historically, the country with the strongest links to Syria is undoubtedly Lebanon. Despite its multiple links with its chaotic surroundings and the innate fragility of coexistence within its borders, this small state has so far been able to avoid being drawn into a civil war. The Lebanese armed forces, together with the Hezbollah militias, have succeeded in resisting pressure in the northeast of the country, along the border with the Qalamoun region in Syria. Here the ISIS and al-Nusra fighters have attempted to break across the Lebanese border, their aim probably to reach Tripoli and thus obtain a foothold on the Mediterranean coastline. A foothold of this kind would be invaluable for arms and human trafficking and would be a forward Lebanese base from which to fight Hezbollah on its own ground. Despite some jihadi infiltrations, the situation in Lebanon still appears to be stable: unlike Syria and Iraq the country still has a strong state apparatus, while ISIS and other jihadi groups have demonstrated that they infiltrate those areas where state failure enables them to offer themselves as guarantors of law and order. However, internal stability is being threatened not only by terrorist infiltrations and the militias’ incursions, but also by the crisis in the institutions and the economy, and by the Syrian refugee problem. As a result of the incomprehension between the Shi’ite and Sunni coalitions and of the divisions in the Maronite community, Lebanon has been unable to elect a new President since Michel Suleiman’s mandate ended on 25th April 2014. Although the Lebanese President has little power, he is an essential figure as he guarantees that the different religions are represented in Lebanese political life. This institutional void and the political stalemate are reflected in the state apparatus itself and normal activities have been paralysed. The economy seems to have been the worst hit: growth has been very small and fallen well www.geopolitica-rivista.org Istituto di Alti Studi in Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliarie 7 short of expectations, and several financial institutions have been blocked. The lack of a President is also exacerbating the Syrian refugee problem. The earlier problem of managing the Palestinian refugees, which dragged the country into a fifteen-year war, has led Beirut to refuse to build refugee camps: the refugees are therefore dispersed throughout Lebanon (a large number of them in the Bekaa Governorate close to Syria, while a smaller number are to be found in the south of the country which is mainly Shi’ite). Today over a million Syrian refugees live in an area of just over ten thousand square kilometres – the equivalent of a quarter of the Lebanese population; this is the highest population density in the world. The Syrians are almost all Sunni Muslims, which makes the situation for the other two major communities – the Shi’ites and the Christians – even more unstable and delicate. The influx of Syrian refugees has overturned the denominational balance in the Bekka Governorate in particular, favouring the Sunnis over the Shi’ites (previously a relative majority). Since 5th January 2015 new measures have been in place in Lebanon which have dramatically limited, and almost put to a stop to, the flow of refugees from Syria which had previously reached half a million in both 2013 and 2014. 3.2 Scenarios: growing internal and external pressures on Lebanese stability So far, Lebanon has been able to find a balance in the delicate network of regional relations and avoid collapse. However this does not mean that it will be able to withstand the pressures in the future. Short-term, Lebanon will face two significant challenges: continue to prevent fundamentalism and the jihadi phenomenon from crossing its borders, and ensure that the delicate regional situation does not lead to a sudden resumption of the conflict between the different religions inside the country. Although, on one hand, Hezbollah’s active role in the Syrian civil war has countered the threat of a military push by the rebel militias into Lebanon, on the other it has highlighted www.istituto-geopolitica.eu the ideological differences with the Sunni community. The risk of sectarian clashes involving the Syrian refugees (almost all Sunni), perhaps together with the Lebanese Sunnis, is increasingly likely. The various internal factions and foreign powers which are today seeking to overthrow Assad would have reasons to extend the conflict to Lebanon and thus prevent Hezbollah from providing further military support to its Syrian ally. Israel, in particular, is concerned about the weapons, capabilities, experience and competence to undertake new forms of military intervention which the Lebanese Shi’ite militia is acquiring in Syria. The danger of Israeli military action is even more likely now that the Hezbollah militia has become active on the Golan Heights. Lebanon cannot resist indefinitely and the only antidote to renewed instability in the country is to solve the Syrian crisis. On the other hand, the solution could be to apply the Lebanese model of coexistence to Syria, but this is not an undertaking for Beirut (which doesn’t have the necessary forces) and it is up to the so-called “international community” to solve the Syrian problem. In the meantime, Lebanon’s well-being will depend on its society being able to absorb the changes brought about by the factors described above and there must be a collective effort to face the problems caused by the delicate religious balance, the lack of an accurate census and the review of the old National Pact. 4. Palestine 4.1 Present situation: the Palestinian factions take sides Given the significant Palestinian presence in Syria and in the neighbouring countries, the Palestinian movements have all had to take a more or less clear stance on the civil war. When Hamas turned against Assad, who had given shelter to Palestinian leaders, it distanced itself not only from Damascus but also from Iran and Hezbollah. Hamas’ political leader, Khaled Meshaal, reshaped the movement’s foreign policy, at least temporarily, and aligned himself with Saudi www.geopolitica-rivista.org Istituto di Alti Studi in Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliarie 8 Arabia. This change seems to have been dictated by the political wing’s need for financial resources and international legitimacy: in so doing they overcame the opposition of the military, which had Iranian support. Needless to say, ISIS has no sympathy for Hamas (which it accuses of being too close to Iran) nor for Hezbollah (to the point of accusing it of being cryptoShi’ite); in fact, in general, ISIS has never concealed a certain indifference to the Palestinian cause, which it considers a nationalist cause and therefore contrary to the ecumenical spirit of the Caliphate. Yarmouk, the huge Palestinian refugee camp set up south of Damascus in 1948, can be viewed as an extension of Palestine abroad; it was the scene of a battle in the Syrian civil war in April 2015 when ISIS sought to seize control. Yarmouk, which at one time housed one hundred and sixty thousand people, has been largely abandoned: today only eighteen thousand still live in the camp in the midst of a humanitarian crisis. The ISIS attack on Yarmouk led Fatah, in government on the West Bank, to open a new chapter in bilateral relations with the Baathist regime in Damascus and to re-open its offices in the Syrian capital. Now that Hamas has ditched its Alliance with Syria definitively, Fatah clearly hopes to increase its influence over the Palestinian refugees in the country. 4.2 Scenarios: new tenants in the Gaza Strip Although ISIS does not appear to enjoy significant support in the Gaza Strip, the emergence there of Caliphate symbols and the attacks on cars belonging to members of Hamas or Islamic Jihad (whose HQ is still in Damascus) should not be underestimated. The serious humanitarian crisis could encourage the radicalisation of some sectors of the population and support for ISIS. According to UNCTAD, the latest Israeli military operation in Gaza has wiped out what was of left of the middle class. However, ISIS is not the only external actor seeking a foothold in Palestine. After Hamas had aligned itself with Saudi Arabia, and Islamic Jihad had clearly moved closer to www.istituto-geopolitica.eu Riyadh (refusing to condemn the Saudi intervention in Yemen), Iran encouraged the movement to split under the leadership of Hisham Salem. Salem, an Islamic Jihad midranking official, initially set up a charity, Baqiyat al Salihat, and then a veritable movement called Al-Sabirin. This group not only has close political ties to Iran, but has also adopted some typical Shi’ite themes, authors and practices, so much so that its opponents have accused its members of being camouflaged Shi’ites. Al-Sabirin has already succeeded in placing some small groups from Gaza and deserters from Islamic Jihad under its aegis, but is struggling to establish itself because of the strict controls Hamas has imposed on its activities and because of Sunni orthodoxy’s dubious credibility. 5. Jordan 5.1 Present situation: a country increasingly worn out by the war in Syria Syrian refugees in Jordan now account for almost 20% of the population. Three quarters of them live in the border Governorates of Irbid and Al Mafraq or in that of the capital, Amman. Here the arrival of the Syrians has contributed to an increase in the number of foreign residents which, in the last decade, had already been swelled by the arrival of Iraqi refugees. The most delicate situation is however in al-Mafraq, which shares a long desert border with the Islamic State and in which the number of Syrian refugees is over double that of the native population. Zaatari, the first and largest Syrian refugee camp, is now the fourth most highly populated centre in Jordan. There are frequent protests in the Zaatari and Marjib Al Fahud camps. Despite foreign aid, Amman finds it difficult to manage the chronic water and energy shortages, particularly as it already giving shelter to half a million Iraqi refugees. The first months of the conflict highlighted a strange phenomenon: cross-border family and tribal ties meant that both Syrian refugees and rebels enjoyed the support of Jordanian citizens, especially in the town of Deraa close to the border. The support has, however, www.geopolitica-rivista.org Istituto di Alti Studi in Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliarie 9 slowly waned as a result of stricter border controls and a change in attitude amongst the Jordanian population. The excessive and never-ending flow of refugees has weakened tribal loyalties, as many Jordanians felt the burden imposed on their already limited resources. Furthermore, Syrian refugees of Palestinian origin have been subject to a hard line policy and are often denied entry – obviously a result of past traumas. Only 20% of Syrian refugees live in camps where they receive aid from the state or from humanitarian organisations. The others live in towns or villages where they receive aid from relatives or through family ties, in any case beyond direct government control. The main source of income for the refugees, whether they are registered or illegal, is undeclared employment. The huge influx of new, lowcost labour into the labour market has seriously affected poorer Jordanian families, as unskilled workers’ wages have decreased and rents increased. In addition, the energy, water, health and education infrastructure is being sorely tested. The refugees are administered in accordance with the Jordan Response Plan (JRP), which is implemented in coordination with various UN agencies, in order to optimise the use of resources and the flow of international aid. The plan envisages a budget of 2.99 billion dollars, although only 35% has already been funded. 5.2 Scenarios: more internal conflict Officially Jordan implements an open-door policy for refugees, but has increasing doubts. At times the door is closed, partly owing to the state’s financial difficulties and partly as a result of pressure from public opinion which is increasingly opposed to the arrival of new refugees. Jordan is still providing assistance to the rebels in the Deraa area, which could soon be subject to a government offensive supported by the Russian Air Force. Its political importance aside, the loss of Deraa by the rebels could mean a new wave of refugees to Jordan. However, when faced with an operation involving Russia, Amman’s options are very limited. Help could come www.istituto-geopolitica.eu from Israel, as the Deraa area is close to the Israeli border and in no way does Tel Aviv want to see Hezbollah and Iranian military advisors there. The Jordanian military presence along the border with ISIS territory has been strengthened and, up to now, any infiltration attempts have been readily repulsed. There is however concern about the return of Jordanians fighting in Syria and Iraq, who could then join Salafi groups like Ma’an which openly sympathise with ISIS. The vast majority of the population is however still opposed to al-Baghdadi’s plan, particularly after the barbaric execution of alKasasbeh, the Jordanian pilot. That consideration notwithstanding, Jordan has made its anti-terrorism laws stricter and abandoned its de facto moratorium on capital punishment. The repressive measures implemented to counter the terrorist threat, the interruption of the reforms begun in 2011, the economicfinancial difficulties and the trauma of the massive influx of Syrian refugees could all increase political conflict in the country. Yet another fundamental aspect is the need for a better reading of the tribal dynamics which are so important for Jordanian stability, and key to better management of the situation in the Middle East as a whole. Energy is a particularly serious problem for Jordan. The country is 99% dependent on external supplies. Since the preferential channel with Iraq was abandoned in the last decade, the periodic episodes of sabotage to the gas pipelines in Sinai have placed greater stress on the entire system, a situation which has been further worsened by the sudden 20% increase in population. Vis-a-vis ISIS, Jordan is playing, and can play in the future, an increasingly important role as a representative and spokesman for a moderate Islam which is open to dialogue: this is the only solution in fighting the war of hearts and minds at which ISIS propaganda is so adept. www.geopolitica-rivista.org Istituto di Alti Studi in Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliarie 10 6. Egypt and Tunisia 6.1 Present situation: “secular” dams against the fundamentalist tide The endogenous problems that Tunisia is facing in consolidating its new democratic regime have been intensified by the destabilization of Syria and Libya. Domestically, discontent over the new political course and the economic situation has caused great disappointment among the younger generation, who, for a variety of reasons, consider that their expectations have been betrayed. Radical militancy is being reorganised at the political level: fundamentalist and religious-based reactionary groups have returned to the postrevolutionary scene forcefully and are confronting the secular political actors, offering a concrete and structured alternative. The result is a new climate of domestic tension which is influenced by the even more complex regional instability. To the endogenous political violence which re-emerged forcefully in 2013 thanks to Ansar al-Sharia (which initially presented itself as a preaching and social assistance movement and stood as a Salafi opposition, but was subsequently banned by the authorities), one must add terrorism channelled from outside the country. More than three thousand Tunisians have joined the fight in Syria and Iraq and many others continue to head for Libya, where they aim to create a bridgehead for the Caliphate in North Africa. Libya’s porous borders mean that Tunisia is also exposed to the problem of “returning jihadists”: the recent terrorist attacks on the Bardo Museum and Sousse, the aim of which was to disrupt the tourist economy, point towards a strategy of longterm terrorism, undoubtedly influenced by the operational and emotional thrust of ISIS. Terrorism in Tunisia bears an interesting and almost exclusively generational hallmark, which is the result of complex social and, at times, identity-based, dynamics, which have been ignored. In this context, this can be attributed, to a great extent, to postrevolutionary frustration and a transition www.istituto-geopolitica.eu process which has been unable to improve living conditions for the younger generation in the short term, or give them hope for the future. The jihadist groups have succeeded in seizing the discontent and channelling it into a common project, in order to transform rage and disappointment into concrete complicity and support for the Caliphate. Since the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak, and the complex internal political events which followed, Egypt, the cradle of modern fundamentalism, is witnessing the reemergence of terrorism. Here too, the feeling that the “Arab Spring” had not run its course has been a contributory factor in redefining societal logic and awakening the dormant but unresolved ideological differences between secularism and fundamentalism. Postrevolutionary confusion facilitated the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood as a political alternative, and enabled the jihadist groups to reorganise. The outlawing of the Muslim Brotherhood and the advent of the Syrian crisis have helped strengthen smaller but radical groups who are restating their political agenda as a global “holy war”, at times even joining the Islamic State – as was the case with Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, which later became Wilayat Sinai. This traditionally pro-Al Qaeda group was already operational in the Sinai and was behind a new ideological “structuring” operation, uniting those who had split from the smaller groups such as Ajnad Misr and Ansar al-Sharia. Today Wilayat Sinai has a significant military and organisational capability which enables it to control a large stretch of the Sinai. At the same time, by conniving with local officers and leaders, it is able to exercise considerable influence on the local population. The Egyptian government not only has to deal with ISIS in Sinai, but also with various Jihadi groups operating around Cairo and in the Nile delta, and above all there is the problem of those who have taken up positions in the Western desert, on the border with Libya. The latter pose further serious problems for the Egyptian security apparatus, as they constitute a tangible link between www.geopolitica-rivista.org Istituto di Alti Studi in Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliarie 11 Libyan instability and the growing domestic uncertainty. The picture that emerges is one of an apparently strong, but internally vulnerable, country which will have to confront a number of exogenous, destabilising factors over a considerable period of time. In geographical terms, Egypt is today the most subject to negative Libyan and Syrian influences. It is not surprising then that Cairo provides military support to the Tobruk faction in Libya and favours the Russian intervention against ISIS in Syria. 6.2 Scenarios: new social pacts to defeat terrorism ISIS views Egypt above all as a possible step on the road to consolidating its Caliphate provinces in Libya and Sinai and ensuring geographical continuity. By adopting a more moderate position in order to maintain its political manoeuvrability – which many would like to see removed – Al Nour has cleared the way for even more radical Salafi groups. After a long period of peaceful cohabitation with the Mubarak regime, the Muslim Brotherhood itself, following the arrests and exiles which decimated the former leadership, is now in the hands of intransigent, younger leaders who favour a return to the armed struggle. Egypt and Tunisia, with their still solid state systems, do, in fact, constitute an obstacle able to halt the advance of ISIS and, in more general terms, of a fundamentalist political system, as they offer a more secular alternative. The clash will not be purely ideological or military, however, but also social and economic. Social discontent has been the greatest facilitator of the Jihadist advance: the high abstention rate among young Egyptians during the recent parliamentary elections is a wake-up call. Cairo and Tunis are therefore facing two common challenges: to guarantee economic growth and wealth redistribution, and regain full control of their border areas which are a hotbed of terrorist activity. However the terrorists have demonstrated their ability to strike the tourism industry in both countries, www.istituto-geopolitica.eu thus worsening the socio-economic situation. External aid will, in all likelihood, be decisive. If provided by the West, it could contribute to toning down certain antiterrorism measures which can be instrumentalised at the domestic political level and thus further radicalise the opposition. In general terms, Egypt and Tunisia must combine their military and security activities with a comprehensive plan to resolve internal divisions and avoid fomenting a climate of discrimination and violence. New social pacts and economic development are the pre-conditions for victory over terrorism. 7. The Caucasus and Central Asia 7.1 Present situation: the “foreign fighters” who scare Putin Although they are only a small minority amongst the myriad of jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq, the presence of fighters from the Muslim regions of the Russian Western Caucasus (Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia) and from the most Islamised areas of Central Asia (especially Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirghistan) is a situation which has existed since the birth of the Islamic State: the figure of the young Georgian-Chechen guerrilla Omar al-Shishani, born Tarkhan Batirasvili, who led the ISIS assault on Kobane in September 2014 is proof. Murad Moargosvili, another Caucasian who has been in the sights of the Russian security services for some time, is now the leader of the Junud al-Sham group in Syria. It is also worth mentioning that the radicalisation process which Giuliano Delnevo, the Italian jihadist volunteer who died in Syria in 2014, underwent, was carried out through direct contacts with Chechen groups. Although they are less striking in terms of “celebrities”, the jihadists from Central Asia are present in large numbers. At the beginning of this year, the International Crisis Group put the number of Central Asian guerrillas fighting for ISIS between 2012 and 2014 at between 2000 and 4000. The main source of recruitment is the Islamic Movement of www.geopolitica-rivista.org Istituto di Alti Studi in Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliarie 12 Uzbekistan. This radical Sunni organisation was involved in the cruel Tajik civil war (1992-1997) and, since the beginning of this century, has threatened to set up an Islamic State straddling the border between these two Central Asian countries. The area most susceptible to ISIS successes is, unsurprisingly, the North Caucasus where the self-proclaimed Caucasus Emirate was set up in 2007. This organisation has been responsible for the bloodiest terrorist attacks in Russia in recent years (the Moscow Underground in 2010, Domodedevo Airport the following year, and booby-trapped cars in Volvograd in 2013). In southern Dagestan, the Salafi faction Shariat Jamaat, led by Rustam Asildarov, has aligned itself with the Islamic State under the name Vilayat Qawqaz. The attitude of the present Emir, Abu Mohammed, is more cautious vis-avis ISIS, and he is rightly concerned that a rapprochement with al-Baghdadi could alienate the support which the Muslim cause in the Caucasus still enjoys in some Western milieus. One of the reasons for the Russian Federation’s military intervention in Syria is clearly to hamper the transit of fundamentalists from the Caucasus and Central Asia to Syria and Iraq where they undergo training, make alliances and acquire useful means to destabilise their homeland. 7.2 Scenarios: a resurgence of terrorism on the horizon The possibility that ISIS could take root in the Caucasus or, above all, in Central Asia seems fairly unlikely for several reasons: the vast array of Islamist groups on the regional stage; their preference for the struggle against local regimes, and relative indifference to what is occurring elsewhere; and their fear of alienating the support they have in the West. Furthermore, the State’s hold over these regions is solid and prevents the radical movements from seizing control of territory, as has happened in Syria and Iraq. Russia and China have presented themselves as guarantors of the established order in the www.istituto-geopolitica.eu framework of the Anti-terrorism Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Nevertheless, the experience gained by the volunteers in Syria and Iraq could, once they return home, upgrade the quality of the armed struggle of the Islamist groups already established in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The decline in terrorist activities in these areas in the last few years is due, in no small part, to the departure of many militants for Syria. Since the beginning of the Russian bombing campaign, some have been returning to the Russian Federation: the possibility of reprisals in the coming months is very high and is the reason for the feverish investigations being carried out by the Russian security forces. 8. The European Union 8.1 Situation: a timid Europe confronting terrorism and organised crime The crises in Libya and Syria – for which the West is not devoid of responsibility – have dramatically highlighted what Europe has been only too willing to forget in the last few decades: that Europe is closely linked to the North African/Near Eastern theatre and that some countries, like Italy and Greece, surrounded by the Mediterranean, are, in many respects, actually part of it. The wave of immigrants in these two countries and towards Northern Europe, and the resurgence of Islamic terrorism in France are two striking and very serious consequences of this historical and geographical reality which has been neglected for so long. A previous IsAG report (No.45) covered in detail the Mediterranean challenges for Italy (most of them common to other European countries), ranging from migration to terrorism. Here, the intention is simply to note how the EU has proved to be extremely timid in the fight against terrorism and, in general, against the actors behind destabilisation. The often passive attitude to the immigration emergency, even when it is solely a question of the essential human aspect and of their reception, does not take into account – or underestimates – the www.geopolitica-rivista.org Istituto di Alti Studi in Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliarie 13 criminality with which today’s flow of migrants is associated. Human trafficking is only one of the many forms of illicit trafficking which, since the revolution and its subsequent chaos, have been centred on Libya: arms and drug trafficking, together with trafficking in oil and human beings are the main activities from which dozens of criminal groups are making a fortune. They share the ability to exercise strong and exclusive territorial control, which enables them to manage and develop a wide variety of illicit trafficking: a situation made possible by the collapse of the Libyan state. At the heart of the illicit economic system is arms trafficking, which began when the former Libyan army’s arsenals were looted. Weapons were often exchanged for drugs arriving from the south-west across the Sahel. The result is thus a supply chain of illicit trafficking which originates in Sub-Saharan Africa and, after crossing the 4000 km of porous borders, reaches the hub in Libya. To the south-west, the Tuareg control the caravans bringing cocaine and migrants from Nigeria, to the south-east the Tabu control the convoys transporting migrants and methamphetamines from the Horn of Africa. In the hinterland and in the urban areas, the dynamics of supremacy have changed: it used to be traditional management by the tribes, but it is now corruption and violence. Arms smuggling follows two main routes: the Sahel route (criminal gangs in Mali, Algeria and Nigeria) and the Syrian route (through Egypt). The latter has been declining as a result of the establishment of an IS outpost in Libya itself. Trafficking in oil moves east, either overland through Egypt or by sea. Drug trafficking, in particular, is flourishing: the value of the cocaine which transits the Maghreb each year is estimated at about 3-4 billion dollars. The groups which control drug trafficking (and its distribution on growing domestic markets) are linked to transnational organised crime. The final case in point is human trafficking: migrants who arrive in Libya from the South are often kidnapped and used as slaves until their families pay a ransom. Recent evidence www.istituto-geopolitica.eu shows that organisations involved in organ trafficking are also becoming more widespread in Libya. The arrival of migrants on the European shores is simply a by-product of these criminal circuits. However, the challenges this poses for the EU transcend those of epic proportions associated with social integration. Without being excessively alarmist or criminalizing the Muslim migrants, it must be said that the present influx of migrants has an impact on terrorism. Recent history offers numerous examples of the link, albeit marginal, between refugees and militancy: for example, the role of the Palestinian refugees in the creation of armed anti-Zionist groups or of the Taliban, who emerged from among the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The danger lies not so much in the fact that terrorist infiltrators might be concealed amongst the refugees, but rather in the huge number of poor people who, on coming into contact with the European world, might be radicalised by local extremist groups. Another indication of EU “timidity” concerns the legal battle against terrorism: this is such a sensitive subject that excesses – in one direction or another – (for example the cases of extraordinary rendition a few years ago) are hard to avoid. Today, the legal weapons that the EU can use to fight terrorism have been blunted by the attitude of the European courts (the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice) which, according to the jurist Paola Bargiacchi, are “replacing the traditional approach to the security paradigm with one centred on the individual by extending the reach of the human rights dimension”. The European courts have ruled that even in an emergency or war, an individual’s rights are irrevocable: this is the case even when the individual constitutes a threat to public safety. The Courts have therefore blocked the expulsion, repatriation or extradition of immigrants accused of, or sentenced for terrorist activities. In determining whether, in the country to which an individual is to be repatriated/extradited, he is “safe” from degrading treatment, the burden of proof is on www.geopolitica-rivista.org Istituto di Alti Studi in Geopolitica e Scienze Ausiliarie 14 the State issuing the decree, not on the individual challenging it. The European Courts have ruled that not even the EU countries are, a priori, “safe, in humanitarian terms” and have blocked for example the expulsion of illegal immigrants to Greece and even to Italy. Although this line of conduct by the European Courts guarantees full compliance with human rights, it blunts the weapons, and particularly the preventive weapons, used, in a transparent fashion and within the rule of law, in the fight against terrorism. 8.2 Scenarios: new instruments and new awareness to guarantee security With reference to the constraints imposed by the European Courts on the expulsion of immigrants suspected of terrorist activities, the jurist, Paola Bargiacchi, has proposed that they be overcome by drawing up agreements with third-party non-EU states which would oblige them to comply with European human rights standards – a situation which would be monitored by international organisations and NGOs. European states cannot allow individuals suspected of terrorist activities to roam freely on their territory. Proof of this are the attacks in France in the last few years: the perpetrators have normally been individuals who have already been identified by the security services and are known to be close to terrorist groups, but whom the security services themselves cannot monitor effectively because of the many details on which they must concentrate. However, rather than identifying and dealing with aspiring or real terrorists, the priority is to prevent them from becoming terrorists in the first place. If the authorities could effectively sabotage the road that leads to radicalisation and hence to terrorism, this, more than anything, would ensure victory in the fight against terrorism. In the framework of this analysis, the focus of our interest is the very real risk that the many refugees and migrants coming from (or through) Syria and Libya may provide the terrorist groups with fresh manpower, though maybe only in the medium/long term (in Europe, the typical www.istituto-geopolitica.eu terrorist is a second-generation Muslim immigrant and is more radical than his parents). Consequently we need new awareness: the migrant crisis is not only a humanitarian problem. Once the migrants have been saved from dangerous journeys by sea, once they have been settled in expressly designated structures and their credentials for obtaining political asylum or subsidiary protection monitored, then the new and delicate phase will begin: integration. The migrant crisis, as stated above, is not simply a humanitarian problem, but also – and above all – a social problem. If the new arrivals are not integrated into our societies, we will potentially be handing them, and their children, over to the extremists: from the riots in the banlieues to the Charlie Hebdo massacre, we know what that means. www.geopolitica-rivista.org