Cuban Dissidents. by Rafael Hernandez

Cuban Dissidents: Allies of US Policy or a Hindrance?
By Rafael Hernández, Havana, April 12, 2015
Translator’s note: Rafael Hernández edits Temas, a Cuban journal of social sciences and the
humanities. Books he has authored or edited include: Cuba and the Caribbean and United
States-Cuban Relations in the Nineties, 1989; Looking at Cuba -Essays on Culture and Civil
Society (2003); the History of Havana (2006); and Shall We Play Ball? – Debating U.S.-Cuban
Relations (2011). Hernández has taught at the University of Havana, and at Colombia and
Harvard Universities in the United States.
Try to imagine a US political party calling for conversion to a political, economic, and
social system similar to that of the People’s Republic of China. Let that party or grouping
have no stable or defined leadership, or a coherent ideology other than opposition to the
prevailing order in the United States and embracing the model of the PRC.
And maybe it defines itself as the genuine representative of North American society, yet
stands for no real interest of any one social sector in particular. Let’s further suppose that
the Chinese government, as part of its official foreign policy, granted this grouping
hundreds of millions of yuan in order to promote a so-called project of “peaceful
evolution” toward a model whereby the country builds intimate relations with China.
Finally, imagine that the People’s Republic was located exactly where Canada is today,
with a population 30 times bigger and an economy 233 times stronger than that of the
United States, which, for half a century, in this scenario, has had very bad relations with
this country. And maybe this imaginary Chinese president insisted on being photographed
with the leaders of such a grouping.
How would the US government react? Would it put this group in prison at the
Guantanamo Naval Base, without any right to a trial or to legal protection? Would it
regard the group as a peaceful protest movement because it doesn’t incite armed
rebellion?
Perhaps the U.S. government would limit itself to charging the group with collaborating
with a foreign power, thus exposing the group only to several life sentences. Or might it
be possible to identify the group as a legitimate opposition organization, proposing to
exercise its civil rights as it protests the established order, cultivates free thought, and its
members behave like good citizens?
Would North Americans see the group as defenders of democracy and pluralism, capable
of engaging in dialogue and respecting those who don’t share their ideas? Would they
view members of the group as standard-bearers of freedom of expression, by virtue of
their means of communication that are neither partisan nor dedicated to disowning the
system, but rather to playing a role of providing information that is balanced and
independent of any political tendency?
Would the U.S. government recognize the group's political and intellectual leaders as
capable of leading the country along the road of human development, independence, and
citizen democracy?
If all of the above is taken into consideration in a spirit of equanimity –even if one may
eventually disagree with the Cuban policy towards the dissidents–, it must be appreciated
also that there’s more involved than simple ideological impulsiveness, incompetence in
dealing with dissenters, mental fog, or just plain evil.
Naturally, the explanation does not rest on the assumption that these people themselves
pose a real threat to Cuba’s national security. They are not the problem. Rather, it’s
Washington's policy of giving them support.
We still hear about “bringing democracy and human rights to Cuba”, which means much
more than objecting “the Castros” and “the export of revolution”. Instead, it’s about
transforming the social, economic, and political order of the country in their image and
likeness (“promote our values,” as Obama said on December 17).
Beginning with Brigade 2506 (those Cuban exiles defeated militarily at the Bay of Pigs in
1961) until today, Cubans on the island have regarded Cuban political exiles as a function
of North American policy dealing with the revolution. In that regard, December 17, 2014
showed that it wasn’t the tail wagging the dog, but ultimately the dog doing the deciding.
In terms of realpolitik, the main question after 17 of December (17D, as it is called in
Cuba) left behind the option of confronting the dissidents as subversives (putting them in
prison); using them as a bargaining chip when the time comes to negotiate with the
United States (that country always requires things in exchange, for example, in case they
consider returning the Guantanamo base), or applying the full extent of current Cuban
law to them. In all these alternatives, we would end up turning them into victims, or for
some of the Western media, into heroes. The question now is whether or not this
opposition is really contributing to Obama’s policy of December 17. We need to understand that the new policy is already hooked into another logic, that of
dialogue and negotiation. Pressure, ideological confrontation, and coercion are not
excluded, but they come into play differently. The media on the island tirelessly harps on
the idea that the United States has not given up on its objectives. That highlights an
obvious truth for Cubans: they must not trust that powerful neighbor. It remains as
imperialist as ever and has only “changed its methods.” However, if one thoroughly
examines all this about “changed methods,” the new policy harbors large-scale
implications.
In effect, the strategic formulation of 17D is aimed at opening up a highway for
communicating with the heart of the Cuban political system. This new strategy represents
an alternative to a half-century of ineffective brute force.
For example, to influence young people, it’s not so much the hip-hop groups (who
haven’t unleashed revolutions anywhere), but rather government leaders, provincial
Communist Party officials, the armed forces and the state security, the technocrats, and
the scientific, educational, and cultural institutions.
To get in touch with the economy evolving out of Raul Castro’s reforms the main targets
are not just private businessmen who own paladars and food marketing services, but to
the broad layer of managers, heading up the new public sector, anxious to gain efficiency
in production and business methods.
This policy is aimed to reach, [out] not only to artists and filmmakers fashioning
provocative creations, but mainly to the thousands of social communicators and
journalists who work in the government media system. They are more adept with the
internet than what is said, therefore they complain, with reason, about limited access to
broadband and free wifi. They even admire (in known cases) CNN or Discovery channel
as a model.
Will entry onto this information highway be left in the hands of the dissidents, many of
whom are somewhat opposed to the politics of 17D? As for those Cuban-American
congresspersons famous in the United States for their ultra-conservative persuasion, and
who support dissidents on the island: will they be the bridge between Cuban
entrepreneurs on either side of the Florida Straits?
And what about the Ladies in White, who let down the attempted mediation role the
Catholic Church tried to play? It is hard to believe that advisors to the President of the
United States could be so clueless about Cuba's real civil and political society as to take
the delegation of provocateurs that descended on Panama (to attend the Summit of the
Americas) for actual emissaries of dialogue about democracy and freedom in Cuba.
Nevertheless, we must not forget that politics is mostly a strange kind of grand theater.
Marti used to say that, in such a production, the most real thing is what is unseen. A
former US Interests Section Chief, in the intimacy of a report to the State Department,
observed astutely that “there are few if any dissidents who have a political vision that
could be applied to future governance……it is unlikely that they will play any significant
role in whatever government succeeds the Castro brothers.”
This wouldn’t be the first time that these two paths have diverged, that of the North
American government and that of this peculiar Cuban opposition. The Missile Crisis had
hardly cooled down when President John Kennedy accepted the flag of Brigade 2506
members, and promised to return it as soon as they triumphantly entered a “free Havana.”
More than 52 years after President Kennedy’s speech in Miami's Orange Bowl stadium,
almost 300,000 Cuban-Americans, including descendants of those Brigade members,
continue to arrive on the island, although not precisely to the tunes of war. Those average Cubans, embracing their cousins in Havana’s Terminal 2, aren’t up there
on the dissidents’ wagon, nor are they still waving that flag (a current property of the
Kennedy Library), but rather, another kind of banner: one that expresses their peaceful
return to the land where they were born. They are going back to a Havana that is being
revitalized little by little - or to a beach where they will retire, now that they see the
promise of normalization floating over Cuba.
~~~
Translated by Tom Whitney (Edited by Walter Lippmann of Cuba News)
Source: http://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20150412/54429850268/disidenciacubana-fuera-de-juego.html#ixzz3Xd4EHN63 also -- https://lapupilainsomne.wordpress.com/2015/04/12/la-politica-de-eeuu-cuba-y-ladisidencia-aliada-o-impedimenta/
La disidencia cubana, en fuera de juego
Por Rafael Hernández | La Habana , 12/04/2015
Imaginemos a un partido en EE.UU. que promoviera el cambio hacia un sistema político,
económico y social similar al de la República Popular China. Que ese partido, o
conglomerado de grupos, careciera de un liderazgo estable o definido, de una ideología
coherente, salvo oponerse al orden prevaleciente en EE.UU. y abrazar el modelo de la
RPCh; y que se autodefiniera como la genuina representación de la sociedad
norteamericana, aunque no expresara el interés real de ningún sector social en particular.
Supongamos que el gobierno chino, como parte de su presupuesto oficial, le otorgara a
ese conglomerado cientos de millones de yuanes, para fomentar lo que aquel llamaría un
proyecto de “evolución pacífica” hacia un modelo de país que conllevara una relación
íntima con China. Finalmente, pongamos por caso que la República Popular estuviera
donde hoy queda Canadá, con una población 30 veces mayor y una economía 233 veces
más potente que los EE.UU., tuviera medio siglo de muy malas relaciones con este país,
y que su presidente insistiera en retratarse con los líderes de tal conglomerado.
¿Cómo reaccionaría el gobierno de EE.UU.? ¿Recluiría a este grupo en la base naval de
Guantánamo, sin derecho a juicio o protección legal? ¿Lo consideraría un movimiento
pacífico, por el hecho de no incitar a una rebelión armada? ¿Quizás se limitaría a
presentarle cargos por colaborar con una potencia extranjera, exponiéndolo solo a varias
cadenas perpetuas? ¿O sería posible que lo identificara como oposición legítima,
dedicada a ejercer sus derechos civiles, a disentir del orden establecido, a cultivar el
librepensamiento y a comportarse como buenos ciudadanos? ¿Aparecerían ante los
norteamericanos como defensores de la democracia y el pluralismo, capaces de practicar
el diálogo y el respeto hacia los que no comparten sus ideas? ¿O abanderados de la
libertad de expresión, mediante medios de difusión no partidistas ni consagrados a negar
el sistema, sino a jugar un rol informativo balanceado e independiente de ninguna
corriente política? ¿Reconocería entre ellos a líderes políticos e intelectuales, capaces de
conducir al país por el camino del desarrollo humano, la independencia, y la democracia
ciudadana?
Si se aprecia serenamente todo lo anterior, se apreciará que, incluso sino se aprueba la
reacción cubana ante los disidentes, esta no se reduce a simple impulso ideológico,
ineptitud para lidiar con el disentimiento, cerrazón mental o pura maldad. Tampoco se
podría explicar, naturalmente, por la magnitud de amenaza real que estos representan por
sí mismos para la seguridad nacional cubana. El problema no son ellos, sino la política
norteamericana que los auspicia, enunciada aún hoy como “traer la democracia y los
derechos humanos a Cuba”, y dirigida no a objetivos puntuales, a “los Castros” o la
“exportación de la revolución”, sino a transformar el orden social, económico y político
del país a su imagen y semejanza (“promote our values”, dijo Obama el 17D).
Desde la Brigada 2506 hasta hoy, el exilio político cubano se ha percibido en la isla como
una función de la política norteamericana frente a la revolución. El 17D demostró que, en
esa función, no es la cola la que mueve al perro, sino, en última instancia, el perro el que
decide. En términos de realpolitik, la pregunta post-17D va más allá de aplicarle a la
disidencia los medios con que se enfrenta la subversión (o sea, ponerlos presos); o de
hacerlo para poder contar con una pieza de cambio a la hora de negociar con EE.UU.
(quien exige cosas a cambio siempre, por ejemplo, devolver la base de Guantánamo); o
de aplicarles todo el peso de la ley cubana actual, lo que termina convirtiéndolos en
víctimas, y mediante cierta prensa continental, en héroes. La pregunta ahora es si esta
disidencia le resulta realmente funcional a la política inaugurada por Obama el 17D.
Es necesario entender que esa política se monta ya sobre otra lógica, la del diálogo y la
negociación, que no excluye la presión, la confrontación ideológica o la coacción, pero
articulándolas de manera distinta. La prensa en la isla repite sin descanso que EE.UU. no
ha renunciado a sus objetivos, remachándoles a los cubanos una verdad obvia: no deben
confiarse de ese poderoso vecino, que sigue tan imperialista como siempre, y solo ha
“cambiado los medios”. Ahora bien, si se examina detenidamente esto de “los medios”
cambiados, la nueva política contiene implicaciones de mayor escala.
En efecto, como alternativa a medio siglo de fuerza bruta ineficaz, la formulación
estratégica del 17D se dirige a abrir una carretera que comunique con el corazón del
sistema político cubano. De influir, por ejemplo, sobre los jóvenes, no tanto los grupos de
hip hop (que en ninguna parte han desatado revoluciones), sino el liderazgo de los
gobiernos y direcciones provinciales del Partido Comunista, las fuerzas armadas y la
seguridad, la tecnocracia y las instituciones científicas, educativas, culturales. De
comunicarse con la economía naciente de las reformas de Raúl Castro, no solo empleados
de paladares y agromercados, sino la ancha capa de empresarios al mando del nuevo
sector público, ansiosos de conseguir la eficiencia en la producción y los negocios. De
alcanzar no solo a artistas y cineastas que hacen obras provocadoras, sino a los miles de
comunicadores sociales y periodistas que trabajan en los medios gubernamentales, más
diestros en internet de lo que se dice, quienes se quejan con razón por el poco acceso a la
banda ancha y el free wifi, y hasta admiran (en casos connotados) a la CNN como
modelo.
¿Se encuentra la entrada a esta carretera en manos de los disidentes, más bien opuestos en
muchos casos a la política del 17D? ¿Son los socios de los congresistas cubanoamericanos, famosos en EE.UU. por su catadura ultraconservadora, y padrinos de la
disidencia en la isla, el puente entre los emprendedores cubanos de ambas orillas? ¿O las
damas que dejan colgada de la brocha de la mediación a la propia iglesia católica? Por
muy despistados que estén sobre la real sociedad civil y política cubanas, resulta increíble
que los asesores del presidente de EE.UU. consideren emisarios viables para el diálogo
sobre democracia y libertad en Cuba a la delegación de provocadores que descendió
sobre Panamá en el entorno de la Cumbre de las Américas.
No hay que olvidar, sin embargo, que la política, en buena medida, es un extraño gran
teatro. Solía decir Martí que en esa puesta en escena, lo más real es lo que no se ve. No
en balde un antiguo jefe de la Sección de Intereses, en la intimidad de un informe al
Departamento de Estado, comentaba que “there are few if any dissidents who have a
political vision that could be applied to future governance... it is unlikely that they will
play any significant role in whatever government succeeds the Castro brothers.”
No sería esta la primera vez que sus caminos, el del gobierno norteamericano y esta
peculiar oposición cubana, se bifurcan. Todavía caliente la Crisis de los Misiles,
Jacqueline Kennedy recibiría la bandera de la Brigada 2506, prometiéndole que se la
devolvería cuando entraran triunfalmente en una “free Havana”. Más de 52 años después
del discurso de Jacqueline en el estadio Orange Bowl, los descendientes de aquellos
brigadistas, junto a otros cubano-americanos estimados en 300 mil el año pasado, siguen
llegando a la isla--aunque no precisamente en son de guerra. Esos cubanos comunes, que
se abrazan con sus primos en la Terminal 2 de La Habana, no montan en el furgón de los
disidentes ni enarbolan hoy aquella bandera (guardada por los Kennedy en un almacén),
sino la del retorno al país natal, a La Habana que renace poco a poco, y a una playa para
el retiro, que la promesa de la normalización ha hecho flotar sobre Cuba.