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Institutionalization, representation and effectiveness in the federal government
advisory councils of Mexico
Dr. Felipe J. Hevia (CIESAS-Golfo). México. [email protected]
XXIInd World Congress of Political Sciences-July 8-12, 2012. Madrid
Abstract
We present the results of a questionnaire given to 81 participants from 27 different
advisory boards of the federal government in Mexico. With this information, these
instances are discussed in three dimensions: their level of institutionalization, their
criteria of representativeness, and the quality of discussion and deliberation they
have. The results show high levels of institutionalization, issues of autonomy for
the selection of participants, and a divided perception of the effectiveness of the
councils and their impact on sectorial policies which are integrated. This leads to
the conclusion that the federal government advisory boards in Mexico have
structural deficiencies, including asymmetry of power, low degree of politicization,
opacity of its operation, and an under-representation of voices of citizens who do
not participate in them. There are also significant gaps in transparency and
accountability, both governmental participants as well as non-governmental
organizations.
Resumen
Con base en los resultados de un cuestionario aplicado a 81 participantes de 27
consejos consultivos diferentes del gobierno federal en México se analizan estas
instancias en tres dimensiones: su nivel de institucionalización; sus criterios de
representatividad; y la calidad de la discusión y deliberación que poseen. Los
resultados muestran altos niveles de institucionalización, problemas de autonomía
para la selección de los participantes, y una percepción dividida sobre la
efectividad de los consejos y su impacto en las políticas sectoriales donde se
integran. Esto permite concluir que estos consejos en México tienen deficiencias
estructurales, que incluyen un desbalance de poder, bajo grado de politización,
opacidad de su funcionamiento, y una sub-representación de voces ciudadanas
que no participan en ellos. También se encuentran vacíos importantes de
transparencia y rendición de cuentas, tanto de los participantes gubernamentales
como también de los no-gubernamentales.
1
Introduction
In Latin America have been developed many participation processes as
participatory budgeting, “direct democracy”, and many participatory devices (Selee
y Peruzzotti 2009; Avritzer 2010; Isunza Vera y Gurza Lavalle 2010; Lissidini,
Welp, y Zovatto 2008). These process have been accomplished with constitutional
and institutionalized changes (Cameron 2010; Hevia 2006). In recent years, many
countries changed their constitutions and participatory laws, and they created a lot
of participatory devices in their administrations (Welp y Serduilt 2009; LARR 2010).
In Mexico, the institutionalized participation has less development. In federal law
there aren’t direct democracy devices (like referendums or popular legislative
consultation), and the different administrative fields the principal devices is
Consultative or Advisory Councils (consejos consultivos) (Hevia y Isunza Vera
2010) as a means to include citizens in the design, implementation and evaluation
of public policy (Poder Ejecutivo Federal 2007).
These consultative councils aim to incorporate the voice of experts and citizen
representatives in advising authorities in public policy decision-making. Compared
to other mechanisms, the councils have some advantages, such as the ability to
rely on “expert” participants and their low operating cost. Nevertheless, they are
disadvantaged by the difficulty of broadly involving the citizenry to sufficiently
incorporate the “broad mosaic of citizen interests, since in order to be dynamic and
manageable, they must be small in size” (Font 2001; Zermeño y Domínguez 2010,
19). The councils are also subject to “over-representation” of previously organized
interests at the expense of the poorer and more vulnerable strata of the population
(Cunill 1991; Cunill 1997).
By choosing to foster consultative councils, the Felipe Calderón government (20062012) maintained the tradition of using these spaces as the privileged mechanism
for participation. This trend had begun in 1982 when the De la Madrid (1982 –
1988) government instituted the National System for Democratic Planning (Sistema
Nacional de Planeación Democrática), which established Democratic Planning
Councils in all states and municipalities (COPLACE and COPLADEMUN,
2
respectively). During President Carlos Salinas Gortari’s six-year term (1989 –
1994), Solidarity Councils and consultative councils for sectorial policies were
created as part of the administration’s signature National Solidarity Program
(Solidaridad), (Cornelius, Craig, and Fox 1994). Subsequently, the government of
Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) implemented consultative councils for a variety of
sectors to represent the “voice” of diverse actors, particularly those with specialized
information in the field, while retaining decision-making within the governmental
sphere. Under President Vicente Fox (2000-2006) these bodies were progressively
more formalized through regulations, laws and, increasingly, in procedural rules,
which also coincided with the growing tendency in states and municipalities to
establish participatory consultative bodies (Isunza Vera and Hevia 2006).
Given the government’s interest in creating consultative councils, and the fact that
some of them have endured, it is surprising how little attention they have received
as a subject of study. With some thematic exceptions – like the consultative
councils for sustainable rural development – there are few panoramic studies of
these bodies that analyze their continued existence or their potential contributions
to building democracy in Mexico.1
We present the results of a questionnaire given to 81 participants from 27 different
advisory boards of the federal government in Mexico. With this information, these
instances are discussed in three dimensions: their level of institutionalization, their
criteria of representativeness, and the quality of discussion and deliberation they
have. The results show high levels of institutionalization, issues of autonomy for
the selection of participants, and a divided perception of the effectiveness of the
councils and their impact on sectorial policies which are integrated.
1
Some of these exceptions are rural development (Cartagena 2005; Fox 2007)
and planning councils (Flores 2005).
3
Method
In first place, we build a questionnaire with three dimensions: institutionalization,
representativeness, and “quality of deliberation”, or effectiveness.
Then the questionnaire was applied to a representative sample of 163 consultative
councils previously identified in federal laws and “operation rules” of main social
programs (Hevia, Vergara-Lope, y Ávila 2011) in December of 2008 and January
of 2009.
In the absence of response of this sample, the questionnaire was administered to
an intentional and unrepresentative sample of counselors, both governmental and
nongovernmental. 350 questionnaires was delivered in many councils but only 81
counselors of 47 different consultative councils answered the questionnaire, 70%
of them nongovernmental counselors (see appendix 1).
The questionnaire was applied in a telephone interview and by-self application via
email,
and
we
have
few
qualitative
interviews
with
governmental
and
nongovernmental counselors. Responses were analyzed using SPSS.
Results
The results are presented in three sections: institutionalization, representativeness,
and effectiveness.
Institutionalization
The first dimension looks the knowledge of counselors about the degree of
institutional level, specifically measure the degree of knowledge about legal basis,
functions and powers of their consultative council.
In general terms, may be noted high levels of institutionalization. Most agencies
have a legal basis, rules, roles, and responsibilities well established, mainly for
consultation, and a calendar of meetings to be held, despite having no budget.
4
According to those interviewed, 94% of instances there is a legal mandate for its
creation, much of general law, federal or organic, and only 3.7% did not know
whether or not there was legal mandate.
The second indicator was related to the existence of internal rules to regulate the
operation of the council. 81.4% of counselors responded that if there was an
internal regulation, although a surprising 18.5% did not know whether or not
regulation. Finally, 13.5% said that the instance involving no regulation. In this
sense, the perceptions of members on progress of the internal regulations of the
council show that only 60% said that this internal rule was applied.
Table 1. Perceptions of counselors on progress of the internal regulations
No.
%
Not applicable
18
24
Partially applied
12
16
Applied
45
60
Total
75
100
Perceptions about the quality of these regulations are also generally high. As
shown in the table below, 61.7% of respondents claim that the powers of the
council itself are well specified, while only three respondents stated that the terms
were poorly specified. 29.6%, on the other hand, claimed that these powers are
“more or less” specified.
Table 2. Frequency specify of the powers of the council
Non specified
Poorly specified
More or less specified
Well specified
Total
N
4
3
24
50
81
%
4.94
3.70
29.63
61.73
100
%ac.
4.94
8.64
38.27
100.00
5
The functions of the councils, according to respondents, are mainly of consultation,
followed by decision and planning functions.
Figure 1. Main function
Función principal del consejo o instancia
Porcentaje
40%
35.8%
30%
20%
9.9%
10%
6.2%
11.1%
11.1%
12.3%
9.9%
3.7%
No sabe/No
responde
Otra
Organo máximo
de decisión
Planeación
Evaluación y/o
vigilancia
Dictaminación de
proyectos
Operación de
programas
Consulta/Asesoría
a la entidad
0%
Regarding the institutional operating mechanism of these instances, we used three
main indicators: ability to convene meetings, scheduling previous session, and if
there is budget to operate.
Only 37% of cases the members may convene meeting, while the remaining 58%
are government actors who call for the sessions. As discussed in the conclusions,
this indicator also affects the autonomy of these instances.
In terms of planning sessions, 72% of members said that there is a preliminary
schedule of sessions. One interesting thing to note here is that, in general,
sessions that were scheduled were indeed carried out and that, in addition to
regular sessions are also special sessions. On average, scheduled in 2008, 4.97
sessions (SD=3.6 max.21), which took place on average 4.65 (SD=4.0). That is to
say, there are five sessions in a year on average.
We also sought to correlate programs with sessions conducted. The result is that
there is a high correlation between the sessions that were planned and were
carried out (r=0-87, p< 0.01). These sessions, which are maintained in accordance
with the schedules, they also have goods levels or participation by “owners”
6
(titulares) 93% of the members who should be attending the sessions regularly
(often or always).
Finally, in regard to the budget of these institutions, 22% of participants did not
know if it was allocated a budget to the councils to which he/she belonged.
Remaining 78%, the vast majority (94%) said they did not have any budget to carry
out its actions.
Representativeness
In this dimension, it is concluded that non-state actors, among them especially Civil
Society Organizations (CSOs), have significant levels of participation, however, the
counselors consider that they are underrepresented sectors of society, academics,
and business. The explanation for this perception seems to be in the selections
mechanism of members, which, in most cases, are officials of government
institutions that invite or appoint the members of CSOs.
First, we sought to establish the composition of the Councils. Of those interviewed,
only 68% claimed to know the number of members of the instance. According to
them, councils have an average of 13.44 members (SD=16.6; Min=8; Max. 104).
Also, reported high attendance at meetings, reaching 81%.
Secondly, it sought to establish the specific weight of non-governmental actors in
these instances. In this regard, we found that approximately 64.4% of counselors
who make up the instances are non-governmental actors. I.e., there is more
representation of non-governmental than governmental actors. This situation can
be explained because 14.8% of sample participates in Councils with nongovernmental actors only.
Within non-governmental actors, CSOs have more participation than Academics
and business organizations. That is, stakeholders from CSOs have an important
presence in these instances.
7
Figure 2. Types of non-government actors
Representantes no gubernamentales
Repres entantes de
OSC, 43%
Académ icos y
expertos , 28%
Repres entantes de
organizaciones
productivas y
em pres as privadas ,
28%
However, when asked if they are adequately represented non-governmental
sectors, the majority, 60%, think they are partially represented, and 7% say they
are not represented.
Table 3. In his/her opinion, non-governmental representatives are…
Unrepresented
Partially represented
Fully represented
Total
No.
6
49
26
81
%
7.41
60.49
32.10
100
%ac.
7.41
67.90
100.00
This reflects the limits of the integration mechanisms of the councils. First, 33%
believe that are not clear criteria for the selection of members of instances. As the
following table shows, only 38% of counselors were selected through public call. In
the other hand, 62% of counselors were selected by invitation or appointment of
government offices.
8
Table 4. Criteria for selection of members
Designation
Invitation of
officies
Public Call
Total
No.
14
%
17.72
%ac
17.72
35
30
79
44.30
37.97
100.00
62.03
100.00
goverment
This indicator of reduced autonomy adds the low capacity of the members have to
elect the President or top authority of these instances. Only 17% report that there
are no clear criteria for the designation of the president of the instance, and 61&
feel that the designation is made by the governmental office.
Finally, we asked for the renewal periods. On average the renewal of counselors is
conducted every 1.99 years (SD=1.2 Max 4), but is important to say that 22% of
counselors did not know or did not respond for this indicator.
Effectiveness
Most respondents feel that councils do not fulfill their duties and have little impact
in sectorial policy making, in spite of its high degree of institutionalization. Also the
interviewed considered the impact of these instances was limited to promote the
activities of CSOs and to encourage citizen participation in general, despite finding
that the contributions of non-governmental actors are significant.
First, we asked about the main input for the discussion: the delivery of information.
In this topic, 64.6% said they had provided relevant information in advance of the
topics, and only 6.3% said they never had that information.
Delivery of information to members of councils
Table 5. The counselors are provided with relevant information on advance topics
for the sessions.
Never
Almost ever
Sometimes
Always
No.
5
5
18
51
%
6.33
6.33
22.78
64.56
9
%ac.
6.33
12.66
35.44
100.00
However, only 18% claimed to have received regular training to carry out its
functions, and 38% said they had not been trained.
In regard to the manner of operation, the interviewed said they create workgroups
or commissions.
Table 6. Creation of working groups
No.
Never
7
Almost ever 8
Sometimes 25
Always
39
%
8.86
10.13
31.65
49.37
%ac.
8.86
18.99
50.63
100.00
Most of councils also create monitoring tools to their agreements. In fact, 90% say
that these mechanisms do exist, being mainly the development and approval of
agreements at the next meeting. And in this context, 95% of counselors say that
agreements are prepared in all meetings of the instances. However, only 43% say
that these are made public.
Another important item to measure the impact of the instances is related to the
perception of transparency and accountability. In this regard, in general half of the
documents are made public, however this information cannot be corroborated
when searching for this information on their websites.
Table 7. Public information IPD according to participants
NO
SI
Regulations
29.1%
69.6%
Resumes
60.8%
39.2%
Doccuments
53.2%
46.8%
Actions
43.8%
456.3%
Results
42.5%
57.5%
When we directly asked about the perceived impact of these instances, the results
were negative in general. Only 15% of respondents considered that the instance in
which it participated effectively fulfill the functions, 35% felt that in a few areas and
9% in none.
10
Figure 3. Effectiveness of Consultative Councils.
El consejo cumple efectivamente sus funciones
15%
En ninguno de los
aspectos
9%
En pocos aspectos
En la mayoría de los
aspectos
35%
41%
En todos los aspectos
In terms of impact on sectorial policy, there were opposing views. On the one
hand, a group claimed that these bodies impact "nothing" or "low" in sectorial
policy (totaling 47%) and on the other hand, another group claimed that these
bodies have a "more or less" or "high" impact in policies.
Figure 4. Impact of sectorial policy.
Impacto de la instancia sobre la política sectorial de la que
forma parte
35.00%
32.50%
31.30%
30.00%
25.00%
20.00%
20.00%
16.30%
15.00%
10.00%
5.00%
0.00%
Nada
Poco
Más o menos
Mucho
These results are revealing because they involve a high institutionalization or
majority government presence does not necessarily mean that these entities have
a "high" impact according to its members. As discussed in the conclusions,
11
problems of power’s balance and low politicization seem to be more important in
explaining the perception that low levels of institutionalization or the presence of an
internal regulation in these instances.
Conclusions
The general conclusion can be summarized in one sentence: The advisory
councils with non-governmental actors at federal government in Mexico work more
or less, but do little. Indeed, 23.25% of these councils are not implemented,
although there is in laws or rules of operation. And the councils on that work, the
perception of half of the councilors is that they have little impact and/or do not
generate the expected consequences, in short, do little.
To explain this perception, it is necessary to identify structural and agency
problems. Within the first, we identified three: “de-politicization” of councils, opacity
and territorial disarticulation. Within seconds it notices the lack of training of
participants, and problems of representation.
The main structural problem of the IPD has to do with the balance of power and
low degree of politicization. Instances of participation for work, they must create a
balance or equilibrium between its two main functions: effectiveness and legitimacy
(Hevia 2006; Hevia y Vergara-Lope 2011). The mechanisms of participation
without established functions are usually decorative instances, which only serve to
legitimize decisions made in other areas and by other actors. If, however, have
functions, powers and capabilities, but do not enjoy the public recognition by the
community about its legitimacy, its actions do not achieve sustainability over time
and commitment of the actors. They are technocratic instances, which excludes or
replaces the diversity in the representation of interests.
In the Mexican case, there are many "decorative instances", contributing to one of
the most recurrent simulation mechanisms by Mexican public power: the creation
of laws and bureaucracies assuming that its invocation solves the problems for
which they were created (Sefchovich 2008).
12
These processes contribute to erode citizen participation they do not present
results, because it helps the idea that participation cannot be a useful plots to
improve the lives of citizens (Font 2001) and it deepens the problems of
representation. Indeed, in the "decorative participation" many voices and interest
groups (semi-public and private) do not participate or want to participate in these
instances to not inadvertently collaborate with the legitimacy of decisions made in
the federal government, shaken by a significant citizenship after the 2006 election
process.
The second structural problem has to do with the opacity of these mechanisms.
Despite advances in transparency and access to public government information in
this decade, the opacity of these bodies is evident. That only 37% report their
functions, 14% report the name and position of the participants of the council,
21.6% a telephone or email contact and 22.8% post some kind of result on the
Internet is a clear indicator the difficulty of these instances are true deliberative
public bodies(Hevia, Vergara-Lope, y Ávila 2011). As we shall see in the dimension
of representation, not only opacity comes from the federal public service, but also
non-governmental actors and CSOs that most of the time do not include in their
websites or the result of actions those instances(García et al. 2010).
The third structural problem has to do with the lack of coordination between these
bodies and territories where public policies are executed or decide to consult them.
Although not analyzed in one dimension profanity in this research, it is clear that
IPD cannot escape the federal centralism. A significant percentage of the actors
involved in these instances live or have to come to Mexico City. The disconnect
between the federation and its programs and activities on the one hand, and the
territories where they carry out these actions, on the other, let out a huge range of
functions, voices, interests and responsibilities that could bring these federal
agencies, which non-national, deliberation
Within the agency problems of the actors contributes to the perception of little use
of the Councils is noted, first, a lack of knowledge concerning the participants on
the functions and operations of their own bodies. This is directly related to the lack
13
of specific training, with few exceptions, is made to the directors to perform their
tasks. As the literature and interviewees point out, the potential of these bodies as
“schools of citizenship”, and personal benefits that mitigate in part the costs of
participation are elements that reinforce the need to establish regular training in the
field-specific policy (Vitale, Albuquerque, y Oliveira 2004).
The second problem that explains the perception of the usefulness of these
instances has to do with the second analytical dimension of this research: low
levels of representation that limit the number of voices "represented". This,
together with the “balance of power” problems already discussed, makes an
important part CSOs decide no participate in government agencies because these
are instances of legitimation and this creates a vicious circle difficult to break: do
not participate because it does not work and do not work because they not
participate.
Finally, the data presented here support the conclusion that the Councils have
limited autonomy, which is expressed in the limited ability of these instances-and
non-governmental advisors to call meetings, the lack of voting, the limited
capability to appoint its chairman and the lack of financial resources. This, coupled
with the lack of training of directors is in whole, in instances with limited autonomy.
While this is further reflected in their performance in their design, it is clear how
unimportant these instances seem to have in all government policies, wasting its
potential to strengthen democracy.
In this respect, enhance the legitimacy, but above all the effectiveness of advisory
councils are a research agenda and a political action to bring more voices to
participate in decision making in the federal government in Mexico.
14
Appendix 1.
Councils of sample
Gov
Consultative Council (in Spanish)
21
22
37
34
38
Asamblea Consultiva del CONAPRED
non
gov
2
Non
especif.
TOTAL
2
2
2
CENAPRED
Comisión Estatal del Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Nayarit,
1
Río Santiago
1
Comisión Nacional de Inversiones Extranjeras
Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro, Comité
1
Consultivo y de Vigilancia
1
1
1
Comité Nacional de Productividad e Innovación Tecnológica
Comité Nacional para el Desarrollo Sustentable de la Caña de
1
Azúcar
1
Conampros
1
2
24
CONEVAL
Consejero Nacional
(Accesibilidad)
2
2
2
41
Consejo Ciudadano Consultivo SNDIF
1
1
16
Consejo Consultivo Ciudadano para la Política de Población
4
4
28
Consejo Consultivo de Desarrollo Social
2
2
42
Consejo Consultivo de la LFFAROSC
1
1
18
Consejo Consultivo del Consumo (PROFECO)
3
3
33
Consejo Consultivo del Instituto Nacional de Migración
1
1
17
Consejo Consultivo INMUJERES
3
3
25
Consejo Consultivo Mixto (CIBIOGEM)
2
2
26
Consejo Consultivo Mixto de Bioseguridad
2
2
19
Consejo Consultivo para el Fomento de las Energías Renovables 2
1
3
2
1
2
8
Consejo Consultivo para la Gestión Pública
Consejo Consultivo Permanente de Prevención de Desastres y
1
Protección Civil
Consejo de Cuenca de la Costa de Chiapas, CONAGUA
1
Consejo de Cuenca de los Ríos Grijalva y Usumacinta,
CONAGUA
2
9
Consejo de Cuenca Mocorito al Quelite, CONAGUA
1
1
3
31
Consejo de Cuenca Río Santiago, CONAGUA
Consejo de Seguimiento a Proyectos y Programas del Instituto
1
Mexicano de la Juventud
2
1
2
43
Consejo Mexicano para el Desarrollo Rural Sustentable
1
1
20
Consejo Nacional Forestal
3
3
30
Consejo Social INMUJERES
2
2
36
CONSEPP
1
1
4
2
Consejo de Cuenca Río Sabinal, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, CONAGUA
Coordinación Nacional para Atender, Prevenir y Erradicar la
Explotación Sexual C
1
Cuenca de la costa de Chiapas, CONAGUA
2
11
Cuenca del Altiplano, CONAGUA
1
1
Cuenca del Alto Noroeste, CONAGUA
3
39
35
40
23
29
27
7
3
32
10
para las Personas con Discapacidad
1
15
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
4
12
Cuenca del Río Concepción, CONAGUA
5
Cuenca Lerma Chapala, CONAGUA
14
Cuenca Nazas Aguanaval, CONAGUA
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
4
2
Cuenca Península de Yucatán, CONAGUA
15
Cuenca Río Matape, CONAGUA
1
1
13
Cuenca Río Mayo, CONAGUA
1
1
6
Cuenca Yaqui-Matape, CONAGUA
1
47
Fondo de Inversión y Estímulos al Cine (FIDECINE)
44
Órgano de dictaminación. Programa Coinversión social
45
Promotoria de Desarrollo Forestal Teziutlán de la CONAFOR
46
Subcomisión de derechos económicos
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
21
TOTAL
1
57
1
3
81
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