Building Better Teachers in Latin America and the Caribbean: New

Building Better Teachers in Latin America and the Caribbean:
New Evidence on Strategies for Teacher Quality and Student Learning
World Bank regional study 2013
Presentation by Barbara Bruns, World Bank
MIDE- UC. Santiago, Chile
April 16, 2013
Overview
1.
2.
3.
Context
Diagnosis – key issues
Recommendations
3a.
3b.
3c.
3d.
3e.
4.
Recruiting better teachers
Grooming teachers better
Motivating teachers to perform
Managing the politics of teacher reforms
Exploiting a “reform window” – 2014-2025
Conclusions
1. Context
1.
2.
3.
4.
LAC shows low learning outcomes to GDP and
spending…
… But some countries show impressive
progress.
Global research indicates that teacher quality
matters: teacher effectiveness varies widely,
and has a statistically and educationally
significant impact on student learning.
LAC’s current demographic transition opens
up opportunities in most countries for
improving the quality of teachers.
2. Diagnosis
1.
The teaching profession in LAC is mired in a
“low-level equilibrium”:
– Low standards for entry into teacher education and teaching
positions
– Low quality teacher education
– Relatively low pay (adj. for hours, education)
– Flat lifetime pay-scales
– Pay-scales de-linked from skills and performance
2.
3.
Teachers have weak content mastery
Teachers have weak teaching and classroom
management skills:
-
Classroom management and teaching skills vary widely.
They affect student learning and levels of engagement.
3. Recommendations
Major policy reforms to
 Recruit
 Groom
 Motivate
teachers differently.
3a. How to improve
the recruitment of teachers
1.
Raise selectivity of entry into teacher
education.
- Admission systems [constraint: institutional autonomy]
- Incentives to attract strong candidates, e.g. Chile’s BVP.
2.
Raise quality of teacher education
- Short-term strategies: close down very low-quality institutions, establish
national teacher university.
- Long-term strategies: quality standards, accreditation systems, competitive
funds.
- Teaching practice is particularly important.
3.
4.
Raise selectivity at exit of teacher education.
- Standardized exams at exit.
- National teacher standards.
Allow alternative certification.
3b. How to improve
the grooming of teachers
1.
Introduce regular, comprehensive teacher
evaluations.
- Tests of teacher content mastery; expert observations of classroom
practice; student, parent, and peer feedback.
2.
Improve quality of in-service training.
- Use results of teacher evaluation to target training and maximize
impact.
- Seek direct control of design and delivery of in-service training.
3.
Build culture of shared practice.
- Peer observation; whole school development; teacher collaboration.
4.
Higher standards and accountability for principals.
- Rigorous selection, fixed terms, high quality training and mentoring.
- De-selection of consistent poor performers.
- Accountability for teacher quality and school performance.
3c. How to improve
the motivation of teachers
1.
Increase professional rewards
- Teacher professionalism is the core driver: autonomy, time for preparation, sharing of
practice, promotion stream for master teachers
2.
Increase accountability pressure
- Strengthen managerial oversight.
- Link job tenure to performance: teacher de-selection.
3.
Increase financial rewards
- Replace the single salary scale and seniority-based promotion with differentiated
financial rewards linked to skills and performance. 3 major approaches:
- Career path reforms (competency-based promotion and pay):
» Decompression of the overall salary scale
» Promotions based on competence rather than seniority
- “Hybrid” reforms:
» Fixed term bonuses for teachers who perform well on tests of skills
» Permanent promotions still based on traditional criteria (seniority, formal
credentials)
- Bonus pay reforms (rewards for prior period results):
» School based bonuses
» Individual teacher bonuses
3d. How to manage
the politics of teachers policy reform
1.
Political dynamics of education reform, shaped by:
- How the reform affects key stakeholders’ interests
- The relative power of key stakeholders
- The effectiveness of stakeholders’ political strategies
2.
Stakeholder power of teachers unions in LAC stems
from multiple sources.
- Union density, union fragmentation, relations with political parties, history /
capacity for disruptive behavior, and capture of education ministry: comparison.
3.
4.
Two core strategies: negotiation, confrontation.
Key lessons for politicians and policy makers
- Reform momentum is greatest at the start of an administration.
- Hard data on education system results is a critical policy tool.
- Confrontation strategies can succeed legislatively, but create issues for
implementation.
- Sequencing reforms can ease adoption and implementation. Classic sequence = 1)
student testing; 2) school-based bonus pay; 3) voluntary teacher evaluation; 4)
mandatory teacher evaluation.
3e. How to take advantage of
the demographic transition
1.
Even under ambitious assumptions of schooling
expansion, the need for teachers in LAC will decrease over
the next 15 years because of the declining size of the
school-aged population.
- Total stock of teachers will shrink from 7.35 to 6.6 million (constant pupil-toteacher ratio, PTR).
- With adjusted PTR it would fall to 5.8 million.
2.
This is a common trend in most LAC countries:
- Large declines in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Cuba.
- Smaller declines in Mexico, Costa Rica.
- Colombia, Paraguay, and Central America will need more teachers.
3.
This opens up a window of opportunity for improving
teacher quality by, inter alia, paying higher salaries to a
smaller stock of teachers, de-selecting bad performers,
and opening fiscal space to invest in training and
evaluation.
4. Conclusions
1.
Teacher quality is the binding constraint on LAC
education performance today
guide
- Countries realize this, and region is full of policy experimentation
and reforms
- Very few reforms are rigorously evaluated, so the evidence to
design is weak
2.
“Biggest of the big” challenges are:
- Improving quality/relevance of pre-service education
- Evaluating teacher performance and de-selecting poor performers
- Reforming the career path to base promotions and pay on skills
and raising pay incentives
- Stimulating true professional collaboration among teachers at the
school level
- Creating a cadre of skilled school managers accountable for
grooming teachers and raising school results
- Managing the pupil-teacher ratio efficiently to reallocate resources
from teacher quantity to teacher and school quality
ANNEX
1. Context
Context (2): But…impressive progress
in some LAC countries
Figure 8: Comparative PISA math improvement, 2000-2009
Potential
lessons
from
within the
region:
Chile, Brazil and
Peru among
PISA’s “most
improved”
countries
Source: OECD PISA Secretariat, 2010
Context (3): Global research on
importance of teachers
• Evidence base unequivocal that:
– Teacher effectiveness most important in-school
determinant of student learning progress
– Teacher effectiveness varies widely, even within same
grade and school (from 0.5 – 1.5 years of curriculum
content over single academic year)
– Teacher effectiveness (measured by student learning
gains) not predicted by teachers’ formal qualifications,
age, or experience
– Raising student learning performance depends on school
systems’ ability to find and develop more effective
teachers
Context (4): Demographic transition
2010-2025
Figure 1: Change in the Stock of Teachers Needed with Constant Pupil-to-Teacher Ratios,
2010-2025
Even under ambitious
assumptions of schooling
expansion
• total stock of teachers will
shrink from 7.35 to 6.6
million (with constant PTR)
• with adjusted PTR would
fall to 5.8 million
• Large declines in Brazil,
Argentina, Uruguay, Chile,
Ecuador, Peru and Cuba
and smaller declines in
Mexico and CR
• Colombia and Central
Amer. will need more
teachers
Source: Authors’ elaboration with data from (UNESCO, 2011) and (UNESCO, 2009)
2. Diagnosis
Diagnosis (1): Teaching profession in LAC
mired in “low-level equilibrium”
• Low prestige, resulting from:
– Low standards for entry into teacher education
and teaching positions
– Low quality teacher education
– Relatively low pay (adj. for hours, education)
– Flat lifetime pay-scales
– Pay-scales de-linked from skills and performance
Teacher pay: Long-term decline in
relative salaries
Figure 6: Evolution of teacher salaries in Peru 1960-2010 (constant 1999 soles)
Figure 20: Long-term decline in returns to university level teacher education in Sweden, 1968-2003
3000
Soles(1999)
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
0
Notes: In periods of high inflation, the data are sensitive to the end month (1987-1990). The data are also sensitive to the deflators used (IPG of
GRADE or IPC INEI)
Source: Fredriksson and Ockert 2007.
Teacher pay: flat salary trajectory
Career average salaries for teachers and
alternative professions, 10 LAC countries 2010
Career average salaries for teachers and
alternative professions, Sweden 2004
Figure 22: Career salary trajectories for teaching and alternative professions, 2004
Source: ibid.
Teacher pay: undifferentiated by skills
or performance
Wage distribution for teachers
and non-teachers, Sweden, 2004
Wage distribution for teachers and other
occupations, Chile, 2000 and 2010
Diagnosis (2): Teachers have weak
content mastery
PISA math scores for prospective teachers and engineers, 2006
Teachers have weak content mastery
Performance of 6th grade teachers on 6th grade math and reading test, Peru 2006
Below level 2: cannot make basic inferences from a text or apply routine
math procedures and strategies.
Teachers have weak content mastery
Comparative math knowledge of primary and secondary school teachers,
TEDS-M study 2008
Primary school teachers
623
586
548
536
518
512
509
501
481
456
441
440
413
345
Singapore
Russian…
Switzerland
Germany
Poland
Philippines
Georgia
0
Source: TEDS-M, 2008.
Secondary school teachers
200
400
600
800
Singapore
544
Switzerland
531
Poland
529
Germany
483
United States
468
Norway
461
Philippines
442
Botswana
436
354
Chile
0
200
400
600
Diagnosis (3): Teachers have weak teaching
and classroom management skills
Average use of instructional time, 2010-2012
Weak classroom management skills
affect student learning
Colombia 5th grade Math
Honduras 3rd grade Language
Weak classroom management skills affect
student learning
Share of class time teacher is “off task”
and student learning, Mexico DF 2011
Share of class time teacher is “off task” and
student learning, Rio municipality 2011
Teachers’ weak skills leave students
unengaged
Share of class time students
visibly not engaged
Share of time teacher keeps
entire class engaged
Average classroom management is weak,
but tremendous variation across schools
And within schools….
Variance in instructional time within schools,
Colombia 2011
Variance in instructional time within
schools, Honduras 2011
High variance within schools and high share of time
teachers are off-task and out of the classroom
suggests weak accountability for performance
3a. Recommendations:
Recruiting better teachers
1. Recruiting better teachers
• Raise selectivity of entry to teacher training
(difficult in LAC, given heterogeneity of providers
and institutional autonomy)
– Short term actions:
• Close low-quality schools under Ministries’ control (Peru,
Ecuador)
• Establish National Teacher University (Ecuador UNAE)
• Incentives for top students (Chile BVP)
– Longer-term strategies:
• Raise accreditation standards for tertiary institutions, forcing
closure or adaptation (Chile 2013)
Need to manage transitional issue: inadequate supply of qualified
candidates
Raising quality through accreditation
Figure 17: Chile - Enrollments in teacher education programs by accreditation status,
2007-2010
(number of full-time students enrolled)
90000
80000
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
2007
2008
Accredited programs
2009
Non-accredited programs
Source: Authors’ construction using Ministry of Education enrolment data
2010
Recruiting better teachers
• Raise quality of teacher education – esp. increase
emphasis on teaching practice
– Competitive funding for reform of university teacher
education programs (Chile MECESUP, Peru FEC)
Compulsory Pre-service teaching practice (# of weeks) in selected LAC countries
Compulsory Pre-service teaching practice (# of weeks) in
selected LAC countries
Recruiting better teachers
• Raise selectivity at exit
from teacher education
– Exit exams – signal relative
institutional quality and
graduate quality:
• Voluntary teacher exit
exam (Inicia, Exame
Nacional Brasil)
• Mandatory teacher exit
exam (El Salvador ECAP,
Colombia Saber Pro)
Need research on how well
exams predict teacher
effectiveness
El Salvador ECAP – Pass rate 2001-2012
Recruiting better teachers
• Raise hiring standards for teachers
– National teacher standards (Chile MBE)
– Hiring tests (Chile Examen Inicial, Brazilian concursos,
Peru CPM)
• Chile will be first case of mandatory national standard for
teachers (?)
• Rio municipality’s 2013 concurso: first stage selection based
on content mastery, then candidates take a short course in
classroom management and candidates’ classroom practice
is assessed – first such case in Brazil
Recruiting better teachers
• Allow alternative certification
– Teach For All (Ensena Chile, Peru, Ensina!)
– Can staff hard-to-fill positions
– Can introduce innovation (training program very
different from traditional teacher training, emphasis on
mentoring also unique)
– Can create stream of future education managers (US
experience)
– Some LAC evidence of TFAll positive impacts on student
learning, self-esteem and aspirations; US evidence -with a broader array of programs -- also positive
– RCT of Ensena Chile launched for 2013-2017
3b. Recommendations:
Grooming teachers better
2. Grooming teachers better
• Introduce regular, comprehensive teacher evaluation
– Tests of teacher content mastery
– Expert observation of classroom practice (video or
live?) using validated instruments
– Student, parent and peer feedback
– Not recommended to include student test results in
LAC teacher evaluations (VA scores not widely
available, risk of perverse incentives)
– Only Chile has system in place; Peru is developing,
Mexico reforming
Kane (US) MET study – evidence that content mastery, observed classroom practice
and student/parent feedback are correlated with student learning results
Grooming teachers better
• Improve quality of in-service training
– Use teacher evaluation results to target training
programs to identified issues (Pernambuco, MG, Rio
state)
– Direct control of design and delivery of in-service
training
• UNAE Ecuador, Minas Gerais Magistra, Rio Casa do
Educador
High priority to build evidence on effectiveness of new
training models – RCTs planned in Brazil (PE and RJ)
Grooming teachers better
• Build culture of shared practice
– Peer observation (Japanese lesson study)
– Whole school development planning (Ontario)
– Teacher collaboration – explicit time in school week
(Finland, Rio’s ginasio carioca experimental)
– Most common LAC model (pedagogical coordinators
stationed in school or at district office) doesn’t seem
to work – lack true expertise and don’t engage
enough in classroom observation
Grooming teachers better
• Higher standards and accountability for school principals
– Rigorous selection (Singapore; Minas Gerais, Rio state
Brazil)
– Fixed terms (Ecuador, Brazil reforms in last few years)
– Accountability for teacher quality and school
performance (annual performance assessments)
– High quality training/mentoring support
– De-selection of consistent poor performers
3c. Recommendations:
Motivating teachers to perform
3. Motivating teachers
Three key sources of motivation:
– Professional rewards (mastery and professional
growth, recognition, prestige, working conditions)
– Accountability pressure (client feedback, managerial
oversight, job stability)
– Financial rewards (salary differentials, bonus pay,
pensions/benefits)
All three are under-developed in LAC compared to East
Asia and Europe (professional, financial); US/UK
(accountability – except for Chile)
Motivating teachers:
Increase professional rewards
•
Cross-country research on high-performing education systems
(Finland, Singapore, Shanghai, Japan, Cuba, Ontario) points to
teacher professionalism as core driver
–
•
Teacher autonomy, time for preparation, sharing of practice, promotion
stream for master teachers
But no hard impact evidence on reforms/programs to build this
culture in systems with low professionalism
–
–
Rio municipality – ginasio carioca experimental (team teaching and
substantial time for collective work within and across disciplines and
grades)
Chile microcentros?
Motivating teachers:
Increase accountability pressure
•
Strengthen managerial oversight:
–
–
•
School directors accountable for results and trained to observe teachers
Comprehensive external assessments of teacher performance
Link job tenure to performance (“teacher de-selection”)
–
–
Teachers with poor performance evaluations get remedial support
Successive poor evaluations leads to separation from service (Chile, Peru,
Ecuador, Colombia – legislation exists but limited implementation)
– 2011 Chilean law delegates broader dismissal powers to municipal
directors (need research on impact!)
US research (Hanushek) estimates large impacts from teacher de-selection, but
empirical evidence almost non-existent
•
Increase client feedback/accountability pressure
–
–
Open schooling market to choice (Chile, Bogota PACES) and alt. cert
Build parent/student feedback into teacher performance evaluations and
(in Chile) school performance evaluations (SNED)
Motivating teachers: Increase financial rewards
Reforms to replace the single salary scale and seniority-based promotion with
differentiated financial rewards linked to skills and performance. Three major approaches:
• Rewards for skills:
– Career path reforms (competency-based promotion and pay)
• Decompression of the overall salary scale
• Promotions based on competence rather than seniority
– “Hybrid” reforms
• Fixed term bonuses for teachers who perform well on tests of skills
• Permanent promotions still based on traditional criteria (seniority, formal
credentials)
• Rewards for results
– Bonus pay (rewards for prior period results)
• School based bonuses
• Individual teacher bonuses
Almost no global research evidence on career path reforms or hybrid reforms; substantial
research evidence on bonus pay
Motivating teachers/financial rewards:
Career path reforms
•
Career path reforms (promotion based on tests of knowledge/skills)
–
–
–
–
Colombia 2002 Estatuto de Profesionalizacion Docente (EPD) – mandatory,
impact limited by weak implementation
Peru 2008 Carrera Publica Magisterial (voluntary) – no eval.
Sao Paulo 2009 Prova de Promocao (voluntary) – no eval.
Chile 2013 Sistema de Promocion y Desarollo Profesional Docente Municipal
•
•
•
Career path reforms (promotion based on comprehensive metrics)
–
–
•
Promotions managed nationally based on tests of content mastery and teaching skills
Bonus pay managed locally based on comprehensive measures incl. classroom practice
Ecuador 2008 Ley de Carrera Docente y Escalofon del Magisterio –
mandatory, includes peer, parent and student feedback – no eval.
Peru 2012 Ley de Reforma Magisterial - mandatory, includes classroom
observation and parent/student feedback – no eval.
Career path reforms (promotion based on comprehensive metrics
including student test scores)
–
Mexico 1992 CM – inconsistent implementation, limited impact
Table 5.1 Career Path Reforms in Latin America
RESULTS
TOTAL COST
COUNTRY (EVAL. DATE)
A.
TYPE
DESIGN AND
COVERAGE
PERFORMANCE
MEASURE
AWARD PROCESS
PREDICTABILITY
MONITORING
SALARY SCALE AND
TYPE OF
AND SUPPORT
DISTRIBUTION
INCREASE
Tests
developed and
administered
by ICFES,
graded by
National
University.
Branch 1 (secondary school
degree) Levels A-D: 127204% of base (1A) salary
Branch 2 (bachelor’s
degree, no specialization)
Levels A-D: 126-230% of
base salary
Branch 2 (bachelor’s degree
with specialization)
137%,-256% of base salary
Branch 3 (masters’ degree)
Levels A-D: 211-357% of
base salary
Branch 3 (doctorate) Levels
A-D: 279%-475% of base
salary
Level 1: 50% increase over
base salary
Until 115%
2011,base
flat increase
Level:
of $1250
forbase
10 years.
Level
3=130%
Level
From4=150%
2012, base
larger
Level
5=200%
base
rewards,
proportional
EVAL.
METHOD AND
PERIOD
Promotion based on teacher content mastery
Colombia – Estatuto
de
Profesionalizacion
Docente (2002)
Ome (2012)
Peru – Carrera
Indiv
Indiv
National.
Voluntary
for teachers
in service;
mandatory
for new
entrants
National,
D.Public
“Hybrid”
career incentives voluntary for
Magisterial
Chile
– AEP
Indiv National
(2008,
revised in
teachers in
Asignacion
de
(all
2012)
service;
mandatory
Excelencia
schools)
for new
Pedagogica (2002)
Voluntary
entrants
Eisenberg, (2008)
Manzi et al,
(2008)
Chile-AVDI
Asignacion
Variable por
Desempeno
Individual (2004)
Eisenberg, (2008)
Manzi et al,
(2008)
Indiv
National
(municipal
schools
only)
Voluntary
Tests of content
mastery,
pedagogy and
behavioral
competencies.
Tests of content
mastery and
Tests
of
pedagogy
content
mastery, a
videotaped
class and
portfolio of
work
Tests of
content
mastery and
pedagogy (for
teachers rated
outstanding or
competent on
comprehensive
national
teacher
evalation
system)
Threshold score
of 80% required
for promotion,
but promotions
contingent on
budget available
(those with
highest scores
given priority.)
Test implemented
yearly since 2010.
Teachers
achieving
Teachers
threshold score
scoring
above
passed to
second
stage evaluation
threshold
on
by local
comprehensive
committees (for
performance
specific schoolmeasure
level CPM
receive
award
positions)
68,000 applicants
from 2009-2011,
Only
20%24,966
of
of which
applicants
were incorprated
into system
achieve
award
Teachers
scoring in top 3
categories
(outstanding,
competent or
sufficient)
15% of teachers
( 85% of
teachers who
take the test
earn some
bonus, but
these
represented
only 25% of all
municipal
teachers in
2011)
45,773 teachers
took test in 2011;
19% achieved
threshold score
for promotion.
Unsuccessful
candidates may
retake test
following year.
annually; as of
2012, only 4% of
all teachers had
ever achieved
award
Unsuccessful
candidates may
retake test
following year
to salary
Avg reward xx of annual
salary
Maximum award 25% of
annual salary; avg. 711% of annual salary
Base pay
increase
Panel
regression
analysis
(2004-2011)
Must stay 3
years in grade
Base pay
increase
Base pay
increase
Must
stay 3for
years
Level 1;
10 years.
5From
years L2012,
2;
6 years L 3;
pay
6 years L 4
US$xx million
Soles 38.7
million (from
2009-2011)
NA
RDD.
increase for
4 years
Base pay
increase for
four years
Positive
effects on
5th and 9th
grade math
and 9th
grade
Spanish, but
no effects
observed at
11th grade
RDD
Higher
test
scores
for
student
s
exposed
to larger
number
of AEP
teachers
Higher test
scores for
students
exposed
to larger
number of
AVDI
teachers
•
Motivating teachers/financial rewards:
“Hybrid reforms”
Reward for skills overlaid on traditional promotion system
– Chile 2002 AEP
• voluntary, rewards content knowledge and classroom practice, 10 year
bonus, all public and subsidized schools, limited take-up
• From 2012, 4 year bonus, larger size
– Chile 2004 AVDI
• Voluntary, rewards content knowledge and classroom practice, 4 year
bonus, only municipal teachers, limited take-up
Research (Eisenberg, Manzi, Bravo et al.) confirms positive correlation between teacher
certification and student results, but low uptake has limited system-wide impact
– Rio state 2013 Teacher certification program
• Voluntary, rewards content knowledge and (at top level) also classroom
practice, 5 year bonus, large salary increments (Level 3 doubles annual
salary); must advance, re-accredit or drop down w/in 5 years
No research evidence to guide design choices and no evidence of overall impact on
incentives to enter (or remain in) teaching
Motivating teachers/financial rewards: Bonus pay
• Bonus based on student learning results only
– Andhra Pradesh, India (group and individual) – 5 yr program
• Individual bonus much larger impact
– Mexico (ALI) – (group, incl. students; individual; students) 3 yr
• Individual bonus no impact; student bonus strong impact; group bonus
huge impact and cheating
– Chicago Heights, Ill. – “loss aversion” (group and individual) – 1 yr
• Individual and group bonuses at end of year no impact; bonuses granted at
beginning of year, large impact
• Bonus based on student learning and pass rates
– Pernambuco, Brazil – (group bonus) – ongoing since 2008
• Significant increase in pass rates, some increase in learning; no evidence of
cheating; smaller schools improved most; disadvantaged students
improved most
Motivating teachers/fin. rewards: Bonus pay, ctd
• Bonus based on student learning results and other (nonstudent) performance measures
– Chile SNED – tournament
• Overall positive impacts on student learning (Contreas and Rau, 2012)
• Heterogeneous impacts across schools (bonus exerts strongest effects on
schools with 65% chance of winning, and limited incentive effects on
schools that consistently win and never win)
• No evidence that SNED “signal” affects schools’ subsequent enrollments,
tuition and student SES (Mizala and Urquiola, 2007)
Conclusions:
– Global evidence that bonus pay can improve student learning results, esp. in
developing country contexts
– Impacts highly sensitive to incentive design (group/indiv; bonus size,
ambitiousness of targets)
– Heterogeneous impacts on different types of schools
3d. Recommendations:
Managing the politics
of teachers policy reform
4. Managing the Politics of Teacher Reforms
Political dynamics of education reform shaped by:
– How the reform affects key stakeholders’ interests
– The relative power of key stakeholders
– The effectiveness of stakeholders’ political strategies
Managing the Politics:
Education policies through the lens of teachers’ interests
• Reforms perceived as threats to teachers’ benefits:
– Loss of job tenure
– Reduction/loss of other benefits (pensions, higher retirement age)
•
Reforms perceived as threats to teachers’ working conditions:
– Curriculum reform
– Student testing
– Teacher evaluation systems
• Reforms perceived as threats to union structure and power
–
–
–
–
–
Decentralization
School choice
Higher standards at entry
Alternative certification
Individual pay based on skills or performance
• Reforms aligned with unions’ interests
– Higher spending
– Bonus pay for school results
– Lower pupil-teacher ratio
Managing the Politics:
Stakeholder power of teachers’ unions in LAC
•
•
•
•
•
Union density
Union fragmentation
Relations with political parties
History/capacity for disruptive behavior
Capture of education ministry
Country
Teacher’s Union(s)
Union Density
Fragmentation
Relation with Political Parties
Disruptive Behavior
Capture of Education Ministry
Argentina
Confederación de Trabajadores de la Educación
de la República Argentina (CTERA) is the most
important, but there are several other state
organizations which do not belong to CTERA
50.8% (234,000)
High fragmentation (effective
coordination through CTERA)
Diverse strategies and alliances (EJEMPLOS
CONCRETOS)
High (varies by province)
No at the national level, but some state
unions have participated in the Disciplinary
Boards and in the School councils
Brazil
Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores em
Educação (CNTE) is the most important, but
there are several other municipal and state
organizations which do not belong to CNTE
44.2% (925,229)
High fragmentation (partial
coordination through CNTE)
Closer to the Workers Party (PT)
Intermediate (varies by municipality
and by state)
Intermediate (some positions by former
leaders of the CNTE)
Chile
Colegio de Profesores
53.3% (71,982)
Monopoly of representation
Not formally but supported the presidential candidates
of the left coalition, Concertación de Partidos por la
Democracia
Low levels of disruptive behavior
No
Colombia
Federación Colombiana de Educadores (FECODE)
81.6% (Pulido 2007)
Monopoly of representation
Although not formally linked to any of the major
political parties, FECODE has recently allied with Polo
Democrático
Intermediate (disruptive behavior has
weakened during the last years)
No
Costa Rica
Asociación Nacional de Educadores (ANDE),
Asociación de Profesores de Segunda Enseñanza
(APSE), Colegio de Licenciados y Profesores en
Letras, Ciencias y Artes (COLYPRO), Sindicato de
Trabajadores de la Educación Costarricense
(SEC). ANDE and APSE are the main unions, for
primary and secondary education, respectively.
100% (membership est.
140,000-200,000)
Calcular union density
(porcentaje)
Fragmentation by education
level
Relationship with political parties reflects short-term
common issues, and there is no formal systematic
alliance across issues or time with any political party
Low levels (approximately 47 protests
during 1998-2007. Violent episodes in
1995 against changes in teachers’
pensions, and 2003-2004 for demand
of higher wages)
Some high-ranking union and association
members are recruited by the national
legislative and executive branches to
perform legislative or bureaucratic
activities (EJEMPLOS CONCRETOS)
Ecuador
Unión Nacional de Educadores (UNE). Minor
competition from Frente Unionista de los
Trabajadores de Educación del Ecuador (FUTE).
Regional organizations orbita round UNE
Monopoly of representation
Union leadership is not organically part of the
government, but identifies publicly with the left-wing
Movimiento Popular Democrático (MPD)
Intermediate-High. Protests, strikes; 62
during 1998-2007. Protests occur at
least once a year according to some
observers (SOURCE?)
Union’s influence over the teachers’
careers. Tense relationship with President
Correa because of policies to curb UNE’s
influence on education system (Education
minister highly criticized by UNE)
Sources:
79% - 90% for UNE during
1990s, 79% this decade
Managing the politics: 4 recent cases of two core
strategies
• Negotiation
– Negotiated reform with sequencing: Chile (19902013)
– Negotiated reform in a context of institutional
capture: Mexico (1992-2012)
….. Giving way to confrontation (2012 - )
• Confrontation
– Teacher reform in the face of union oppostition:
Peru (2007-2012) – Garcia and Humala govts
– Teacher reform in the face of union opposition:
Ecuador (2007-2013) – Correa
Managing the politics of teacher policy reforms
Conclusions:
• Political leaders can build effective pro-reform alliances of business leaders
and civil society through communications campaigns
• Reform momentum is greatest at the start of an administration
• Hard data on education system results is a crucial political tool (particularly
internationally benchmarked such as PISA)
• Confrontation strategies can succeed legislatively, but create issues for
implementation
• Sequencing reforms can ease adoption and improve implementation: classic
sequence is 1) student testing to create a platform for performance-based
reforms; 2) school-based bonus pay (more palatable to unions than individual
pay differentiation), 3) voluntary program of teacher evaluation with
individual bonuses, 4) teacher evaluation made mandatory, after union
members perceive benefits and valuable implementation experience is
gained.
• Incorporating parent and student feedback into teacher and school director
performance evaluations increases the robustness of the assessment, but
poses political challenges, given asymmetric power at local level, particularly
in rural and disadvantaged communities.
3e. Recommendations:
Exploiting a “reform window”,
2010 - 2025
5. Exploiting a reform window – 2014-2025
Constant pupil-teacher ratios
Country
Adjusted pupil-to-teacher ratios
Teachers needed in
2025 with respect
to circa 2010
PTR circa
2010, preschool
education
PTR circa 2010,
primary
education
PTR circa 2010,
secondary
education
Teachers needed in 2025 with respect to
circa 2010, with adjusted PTR
(20:1 in pre-school and secondary;
25:1 in primary)
Argentina
-1%
19
16
12
-34%
Brazil
-24%
18
21
15
-37%
Chile
-8%
12
24
23
-19%
Colombia
2%
27
28
26
27%
Costa Rica
-8%
14
18
15
-33%
Cuba
-26%
14
9
9
-67%
Dominican Republic
25%
24
25
28
43%
Ecuador
-13%
12
18
11
-47%
El Salvador
-5%
23
30
24
14%
Guatemala
57%
23
28
15
48%
Honduras
34%
28
32
11
19%
Mexico
-8%
25
28
18
-5%
Nicaragua
8%
21
30
31
36%
Panama
19%
18
23
15
0%
Paraguay
44%
26
28
12
21%
Peru
-4%
19
20
18
-18%
Uruguay
-23%
25
14
13
-45%
Source: Authors’ projections with data from UNESCO 2011 and UNESCO 2009. Assumes 100% NER in primary
education and 90% GER in secondary and pre-school (ages 4-6) for all countries.
5. Exploiting a reform window – 2014-2025
Table 6: Adjustments in teacher salaries 2010 – 2025 made possible by demographics, assuming
constant spending on teacher salaries as share of GDP, with constant and adjusted PTRs
Average salaries circa 2010
Average teacher salaries in 2025,
with constant PTR
Average teacher salaries in 2025,
with adjusted PTR
Country
Teachers
Professionals
Percentage change
Teachers
Percentage change
Teachers
Brazil
76
90
24%
82
37%
85
Chile
78
90
8%
79
19%
82
Costa Rica
83
87
8%
83
33%
89
Honduras
88
88
-34%
78
-19%
82
Mexico
85
88
8%
88
5%
85
Nicaragua
71
91
-8%
68
-36%
60
Panama
81
90
-19%
70
0%
81
Peru
70
90
4%
72
18%
75
El Salvador
86
90
5%
89
-14%
84
Uruguay
69
92
23%
76
45%
81
Source: Authors’ calculations. Salaries are expressed as the percentile in the income distribution of the mean salary in the country in 2010.
Figure 1: Change in the Stock of Teachers Needed with Constant Pupil-to-Teacher Ratios,
2010-2025
Source: Authors’ elaboration with data from (UNESCO, 2011) and (UNESCO, 2009)